Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

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Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 05 Feb 2004 01:51


Let's continue the news and views on TSP's Nuclear proliferation and its coverup/aftermath in the world.


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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Sunil » 05 Feb 2004 01:57


Oh My God!

I never realised BCCI was such a giant operation. No really...

I did not know that BCCI was not only used by the D I Kaskar organization to launder drug money but also used by a number of western intelligence agencies for maintaining slush funds for secret operations.

I did not even know that BCCI was also used by Abdul Qadeer Khan to make purchases and sales on a nuclear black market or that elements of the D I Kaskar organization were used to smuggle nuclear components.

and I really did not know that BCCI had so many benefactors in the US or that several major political leaders were connected to BCCI in such ways or that several major persons in US policy circles shared the same bank as A Q Khan.

Oh my God! I have learnt so much from reading this thread.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby ramana » 05 Feb 2004 02:00

Sunil, THe BCCI branch manager in Atlanta an Italian guy got a heavy sentence in the early 90's. Also it figured in the Iran COntra hearings. So deep connections are there. As the saying goes live and learn.
In fairness BCCI also gave GOI some advance money to purchase the Mirages!

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 02:01

Sorry to say sunil you were dozing at the wheel.

One of the reason BCCI collapse was such hush hush operation with nobody in Washinton or London raising an eyebrow was that all the agencies were using it as a conduit. If you look very carefully you will see Manuel Noreiga( Not Jack Noreiga of WI cricket team) of Panama (and darling of unkil till he was sent packing) also used BCCI.
Read on

BCCI wants to nail 'negligent' Bank of England for $1.3bn
January 13, 2004

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The meltdown of Bank of Credit & Commerce International in 1991 could be about to make history again.

More than a decade after the collapse of BCCI, its liquidator, the Deloitte & Touche LLP unit of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, is suing the Bank of England for £550 million ($1.3 billion) plus interest, saying Britain's central bank was worse than negligent in its oversight of BCCI.

While the Bank of England, like bank regulators in most countries, cannot be sued for negligence, the plaintiffs are basing their case on a centuries-old offence developed to deal with corruption among election officials, "misfeasance in public office", amounts to being deliberately or recklessly negligent.

Legal experts say such a case is unlikely to happen in the US. "You could never get a federal regulator on a charge like this. Quite frankly, it's nutty," said Barry McNeil, a trial lawyer in Dallas. But in 2001, Britain's highest court ruled that there were enough grounds for the case to go to trial.

Now, the trial set to start Tuesday in a London courtroom could set a precedent.



BCCI collapsed in 1991, leaving losses originally estimated at $US10 billion ($12.85 billion) and triggering an inquiry into one of the most infamous bank frauds in recent times. The bank was founded in Abu Dhabi in the early 1970s and expanded to 130 countries.

Since its collapse, liquidators have recovered roughly $US7.8 billion. If they were to win this case and the full amount they seek - which, including interest, could reach $US850 million - it would boost the amount recovered by an additional 25 per cent, according to Lovells, the London law firm acting for the liquidators.

The Bank of England isn't commenting on the trial, which is expected to last more than a year and is likely to make public thousands of internal Bank of England memos. Three former central-bank governors - Eddie George, Robin Leigh-Pemberton and Gordon Richardson - may be called, and scores of reports from British and US intelligence services will be brought to light.

The case being put forward by the plaintiffs focuses on two areas. First, they will ask why the Bank of England granted BCCI a licence to take deposits in 1980 when they say officials repeatedly had raised questions about the bank's dealings.

They will point to memos such as one in which Bank of England officials refer to BCCI founder Agha Hassan Abedi as being a "slippery customer". Yet another memo said: "We are all perturbed at the spread of BCCI within the UK."

Secondly, the claimants will ask why bank officials disregarded warnings about the way the bank was run and why they let it go on operating until its collapse in 1991.

Brian Gent, who was deputy head of banking supervision at the central bank just before BCCI collapsed, repeatedly wrote memos to his bosses raising doubts about BCCI.

In one instance, when Member of Parliament Julian Amery was offered a seat on the board of BCCI, he was "sheered off" from taking it on the advice of Mr Richardson, the Bank's governor at the time.

"I gave him a frank account of our reasons for taking a distinctly cautious view of BCCI," a Bank memo said. This, complainants say, illustrates what those in charge really thought of BCCI.

BCCI has also been connected with money laundering for then-Panama dictator Manuel Noriega in one of BCCI's offices in the US, the Medellin drug cartel and Abu Nidal's terror group, and with arms shipments to Iran and Iraq.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby kgoan » 05 Feb 2004 02:02


BCCI is stuff we need to *very* carefull about. Seriously.

I think the links go quite deep. At a guess, I'm willing to bet that BCCI came into prominence when the Nugan Hand Bank (look that up and who it's directors were, you'll see what I mean), went belly-up and when the action moved from S E Asia/S Africa to the wonderland of the jihad in Zia's time.

Nugan Hand is not, I think, relevant - except for the pattern of behaviour.

Dunno what BCCI will give, lets see. But there's another *far* more interesting question - which is *not* academic: If BCCI took the place of Nugan-Hand, what took the place, or *will* take the place of BCCI now?

BTW, will let you know where I am on that other little job by the end of the week.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 02:07

and more
Notice the Senators investigating.
Notice the Kissinger Associates.


Notice the actors line up All Oscar winning including from Crouching Dragon leaping Tiger countries. :D



Matters For Further Investigation

There have been a number of matters which the Subcommittee has received some information on, but has not been able to investigate adequately, due such factors as lack of resources, lack of time, documents being withheld by foreign governments, and limited evidentiary sources or witnesses. Some of the main areas which deserve further investigation include:

1. The extent of BCCI's involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program. As set forth in the chapter on BCCI in foreign countries, there is good reason to conclude that BCCI did finance Pakistan's nuclear program through the BCCI Foundation in Pakistan, as well as through BCCI-Canada in the Parvez case. However, details on BCCI's involvement remain unavailable. Further investigation is needed to understand the extent to which BCCI and Pakistan were able to evade U.S. and international nuclear non-proliferation regimes to acquire nuclear technologies.

2. BCCI's manipulation of commodities and securities markets in Europe and Canada. The Subcommittee has received information that remains not fully substantiated that BCCI defrauded investors, as well as some major U.S. and European financial firms, through manipulating commodities and securities markets, especially in Canada, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. This alleged fraud requires further investigation in those countries.

3. BCCI's activities in India, including its relationship with the business empire of the Hinduja family. The Subcommittee has not had access to BCCI records regarding India. The substantial lending by BCCI to the Indian industrialist family, the Hindujas, reported in press accounts, deserves further scrutiny, as do the press reports concerning alleged kick-backs and bribes to Indian officials.

4. BCCI's relationships with convicted Iraqi arms dealer Sarkis Soghanalian, Syrian drug trafficker, terrorist, and arms trafficker Monzer Al-Kassar, and other major arms dealers. Sarkenalian was a principal seller of arms to Iraq. Monzer Al-Kassar has been implicated in terrorist bombings in connection with terrorist organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Other arms dealers, including some who provided machine guns and trained Medellin cartel death squads, also used BCCI. Tracing their assets through the bank would likely lead to important information concerning international terrorist and arms trafficker networks.

5. The use of BCCI by central figures in arms sales to Iran during the 1980's. The late Cyrus Hashemi, a key figure in allegations concerning an alleged deal involving the return of U.S. hostages from Iran in 1980, banked at BCCI London. His records have been withheld from disclosure to the Subcommittee by a British judge. Their release might aid in reaching judgments concerning Hashemi's activities in 1980, with the CIA under President Carter and allegedly with William Casey.

6. BCCI's activities with the Central Bank of Syria and with the Foreign Trade Mission of the Soviet Union in London. BCCI was used by both the Syrian and Soviet governments in the period in which each was involved in supporting activities hostile to the United States. Obtaining the records of those financial transactions would be critical to understanding what the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Andropov was doing in the West; and might document the nature and extent of Syria's support for international terrorism.

7. BCCI's involvement with foreign intelligence agencies. A British source has told the Bank of England and British investigators that BCCI was used by numerous foreign intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom. The British intelligence service, the MI-5, has sealed documents from BCCI's records in the UK which could shed light on this allegation.

8. The financial dealings of BCCI directors with Charles Keating and several Keating affiliates and front-companies, including the possibility that BCCI related entities may have laundered funds for Keating to move them outside the United States. The Subcommittee found numerous connections among Keating and BCCI-related persons and entities, such as BCCI director Alfred Hartman; CenTrust chief David Paul and CenTrust itself; Capcom front-man Lawrence Romrell; BCCI shipping affiliate, the Gokal group and the Gokal family; and possibly Ghaith Pharaon. The ties between BCCI and Keating's financial empire require further investigation.

9. BCCI's financing of commodities and other business dealings of international criminal financier Marc Rich. Marc Rich remains the most important figure in the international commodities markets, and remains a fugitive from the United States following his indictment on securities fraud. BCCI lending to Rich in the 1980's amounted to tens of millions of dollars. Moreover, Rich's commodities firms were used by BCCI in connection with BCCI's involving in U.S. guarantee programs through the Department of Agriculture. The nature and extent of Rich's relationship with BCCI requires further investigation.

10. The nature, extent and meaning of the ownership of shares of other U.S. financial institutions by Middle Eastern political figures. Political figures and members of the ruling family of various Middle Eastern countries have very substantial investments in the United States, in some cases, owning substantial shares of major U.S. banks. Given BCCI's routine use of nominees from the Middle East, and the pervasive practice of using nominees within the Middle East, further investigation may be warranted of Middle Eastern ownership of domestic U.S. financial institutions.

11. The nature, extent, and meaning of real estate and financial investments in the United States by major shareholders of BCCI. BCCI's shareholders and front-men have made substantial investments in real estate throughout the United States, owning major office buildings in such key cities as New York and Washington, D.C. Given BCCI's pervasiveness criminality, and the role of these shareholders and front-men in the BCCI affair, a complete review of their holdings in the United States is warranted.

12. BCCI's collusion in Savings & Loan fraud in the U.S. The Subcommittee found ties between BCCI and two failed Savings and Loan institutions, CenTrust, which BCCI came to have a controlling interest in, and <u>Caprock Savings and Loan in Texas,</u> and as noted above, the involvement of BCCI figures with Charles Keating and his business empire. In each case, BCCI's involvement cost the U. S. taxpayers money. A comprehensive review of BCCI's account holders in the U.S. and globally might well reveal additional such cases. In addition, the issue of whether David Paul and CenTrust's political relationships were used by Paul on behalf of BCCI merits further investigation.

13. The sale of BCCI affiliate Banque de Commerce et de Placements (BCP) in Geneva, to the Cukorova Group of Turkey, which owned an entity involved in the BNL Iraqi arms sales, among others. Given BNL's links to BCCI, and Cukorova Groups' involvement through its subsidiary, Entrade, with BNL in the sales to Iraq, the swift sale of BCP to Cukorova just weeks after BCCI's closure -- prior to due diligence being conducted -- raises questions as to whether a prior relationship existed between BCCI and Cukorova, and Cukorova's intentions in making the purchase. Within the past year, Cukorova also applied to purchase a New York bank. Cukorova's actions pertaining to BCP require further investigation in Switzerland by Swiss authorities, and by the Federal Reserve New York.

14. BCCI's role in China. As noted in the chapter on BCCI's activities in foreign countries, BCCI had extensive activity in China, and the Chinese government allegedly lost $500 million when BCCI closed, mostly from government accounts. While there have been allegations that bribes and pay-offs were involved, these allegations require further investigation and detail to determine what actually happened, and who was involved.

15. The relationship between Capcom and BCCI, between Capcom and the intelligence community, and between Capcom's shareholders and U.S. telecommunications industry figures. The Subcommittee was able to interview people and review documents concerning Capcom that no other investigators had to date interviewed or reviewed. Much more needs to be done to understand what Capcom was doing in the United States, the United Kingdom, Egypt, Oman, and the Middle East, including whether the firm was, as has been alleged but not proven, used by the intelligence community to move funds for intelligence operations; and whether any person involved with Capcom was seeking secretly to acquire interests in the U.S. telecommunications industry.

16. The relationship of important BCCI figures and important intelligence figures to the collapse of the Hong Kong Deposit and Guaranty Bank and Tetra Finance (HK) in 1983. The circumstances surrounding the collpase of these two Hong Kong banks; the Hong Kong banks' practices of using nominees, front-companies, and back-to-back financial transactions; the Hong Banks' directors having included several important BCCI figures, including Ghanim Al Mazrui, and a close associate of then CIA director William Casey; all raise the question of whether there was a relationship between these two institutions and BCCI-Hong Kong, and whether the two Hong Kong institutions were used for domestic or foreign intelligence operations.

17. BCCI's activities in Atlanta and its acquisition of the National Bank of Georgia through First American. Although the Justice Department indictments of Clark Clifford and Robert Altman cover portions of how BCCI acquired National Bank of Georgia, other important allegations regarding the possible involvement of political figures in Georgia in BCCI's activities there remain outside the indictment. These allegations, as well as the underlying facts regarding BCCI's activities in Georgia, require further investigation.

18. The relationship between BCCI and the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. BCCI and the Atlanta Branch of BNL had an extensive relationship in the United States, with the Atlanta Branch of BNL having a substantial number of accounts in BCCI's Miami offices. BNL was, according to federal indictments, a significant financial conduit for weapons to Iraq. BCCI also made loans to Iraq, although of a substantially smaller nature. Given the criminality of both institutions, and their interlocking activities, further investigation of the relationship could produce further understanding of Saddam Hussein's international network for acquiring weapons, and how Iraq evaded governmental restrictions on such weapons acquisitions.

19. The alleged relationship between the late CIA director William Casey and BCCI. As set forth in the chapter on intelligence, numerous trails lead from BCCI to Casey, and from Casey to BCCI, and the investigation has been unable to follow any of them to the end to determine whether there was indeed a relationship, and if there was, its nature and extent. If any such relationship existed, it could have a significant impact on the findings and conclusions concerning the CIA and BCCI's role in U.S. foreign policy and intelligence operations during the Casey era. The investigation's work detailing the ties of BCCI to the intelligence community generally also remains far from complete, and much about these ties remains obscure and in need of further investigation.

20. Money laundering by other major international banks. Numerous BCCI officials told the Subcommittee that BCCI's money laundering was no different from activities they observed at other international banks, and provided the names of a number of prominent U.S. and European banks which they alleged engaged in money laundering. There is no question that BCCI's laundering of drug money, while pervading the institution, constituted a small component of the total money laundering taking place in international banking. Further investigation to determine which international banks are soliciting and handling drug money should be undertaken.


(All witnesses testified in public session or in published depositions printed by the Subcommittee, except witnesses with *, who testified at hearing conducted within Subcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in coordination with this investigation, May 23, 1991.)

Robert A. Altman, former president, First American Bankshares and attorney for BCCI.

Fausto Alvarado, Member, Peruvian House of Deputies.

Fernando Ramon Marin Amaya. Investigator retained by Attorney General of Guatemala to investigate BCCI's activities in Guatemala.

Amjad Awan, federal prisoner, former BCCI official who handled accounts of Panamanian General Manuel Noriega.

Sidney Bailey, Virginia Commissioner of Financial Institutions, Richmond, Virginia.*

Robert R. Bench, Partner, Price Waterhouse, Former Deputy Comptroller for International Relations and Financial Evaluation.

Gerald Beyer, Executive Vice President, Chicago Merchantile Exchange.

Akbar Bilgrami, federal prisoner, former head of Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office, BCCI, Miami.

Jack Blum. A private attorney at the firm of Novins, Lamont & Flug. Formerly special counsel to the Foreign Relations Committee for the investigation of the Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Operations into Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy, 1987-1988.

Parker W. Borg. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters at the Department of State.

James Bruton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Tax Divisin, Department of Justice.

A. Peter Burleigh, Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism at the Department of State.

Jorge Del Castillo, Member, Peruvian House of Delegates.

Pedro Cateriano, Member, Peruvian House of Deputies.

Nazir Chinoy, federal prisoner, former General Manager, BCCI Paris.

Clark M. Clifford, formerly, chairman of First American Bankshares and attorney for BCCI.

Andrea Cocoran, Director of Planning and Compliance, Commodities Futures Trading Commission.

Michael Crystal, Queen's Counsel, representing English court-appointed liquidators of BCCI.

George Davis, President and CEO, First American Bankshares, Washington, D.C.

James F. Dougherty, Attorney, Miami Florida. Representing Lloyds of London in litigation concerning alleged fraud involving BCCI.

Scott M. Early, General Counsel, Chicago Board of Trade.

Lourdes Flores, Member, Peruvian House of Deputies.

Robert Genzman, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida.

Wendy Gramm, Commissioner, Commodities Futures Trading Commission.

John Heimann, former New York State Bank Supervisor and Comptroller of the Currency.*

Mark Jackowski, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida.

Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Chairman, First American Bankshares, Washington, D.C.

Gregory Kehoe, First Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division, for the Middle District of Florida.

Richard Kerr, Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

Alan J. Kreczko. Deputy Legal Advisor at the U.S. Department of State.

T. Bertram Lance, Former Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Dexter Lehtinen, Former U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Miami, Florida.

Richard A. Lehrman, Esq., attorney, Miami, Florida. Represented Lloyds of London in case involving BCCI commmodities fraud.

Ricardo Llaque, Deputy Director of Exchange Operations, Federal Reserve Bank of Peru.

Paul Maloney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.*

Virgil Mattingly, General Counsel, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.

Robert Mazur, Undercover Agent for Operation C-Chase, Drug Enforcement Administration.

Douglas P. Mulholland, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Robert Morgenthau, District Attorney, County of New York, New York.*

Robert S. Mueller, III, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Fernando Olivera, Member, Peruvian House of Deputies.

Laurence Pope, Associate Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Department of State.

William Von Raab. An attorney at the firm of William H. Bode Associates. Formerly Commissioner of the United States Customs Service, 1985-1989, oversaw Customs' handling of the sting operation that targeted BCCI, Operation C-Chase.

Masihur Rahman, Former Chief Financial Officer, BCCI London.

Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

Edward M. Rogers, Jr., former White House aide.

Jesus Rodriguez, Member, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina.

Abdur Sakhia, former head, BCCI Miami.

Ahmed Al Sayegh, Director, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.

Raul Alconada Sempe, former Secretary of Defense and former Secretary for Special Projects, Foreign Ministry, Argentina.

Grant Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics Matters, Department of State.

Brian Smouha, Court Appointed Fiduciary for BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) SA and Bank of Credit and Commerce International, S.A., London, England.

John W. Stone, Chief of Enforcement, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

William Taylor, Staff Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve, Washington, D.C.



Amjad Awan

Akbar Bilgrami

Nazir Chinoy

Ian Howard


Sani Ahmed


Roy Carlson

Kerry Fox

Grand Hotel, Washington DC

Abol Helmy

Kissinger Associates

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Price Waterhouse (US)

Price Waterhouse (UK)

First American

First American Georgia

Robert Magness

David Paul

Robert Powell

Ed Rogers

Larry Romrell

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby kgoan » 05 Feb 2004 02:10

Also, the question is whether we can link Beg or Lt Gen Durrani (the Saudi ambassador one) to BCCI - especially Beg. The Pak trucking mafia *must* somehow be linked to it - they were after all the primary beneficiaries of the Taliban.

BTW, do look up Nugan-Hand, it's worth the trouble. The following link will give people a basic introduction, (click on the last link of that page as well). You won't need more than that to get an overview, at least I don't think so.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 02:11

All the Mallus, Konkans Andhras working in Gulf during the boom years had accounts in BCCI, poor folks all of them lost shirts.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 02:12

Dubai businessman gave cheques to Malik
Ashok Tuteja
16 May, 2000
Dubai: A Dubai-based businessman has confirmed that he had issued cheques to Salim Malik in 1994 but vehemently denied Rashid Latif's charge that the cheques were payments made by alleged bookies for match-fixing to the Pakistani cricketer.

"It is wrong on Rashid Latif's part to use the cheques issued by me to Salim Malik in 1994 as match-fixing evidence," Mr Khalid Qazi told 'Gulf News'.

His statement was in response to the fact that Latif had submitted the cheques to the one-man Justice Malik Qayyam inquiry commission to bolster his claim that top Pakistani cricketers, including Salim Malik, were involved in match-fixing.

Mr Khalid said he had issued the cheques to Malik as a guarantee. "Malik had asked me to provide the guarantee in a business deal he was getting into. The cheques were not meant to be deposited in his account."

"How can a cheque with both cash and account payee written on it be a valid document," he asked and pointed out that the two cheques given to Malik had cash as well as Malik's name written on them.

"I have lived in Dubai for 20 years and I have no connection with betting or match-fixing," Mr Qazi said.

The daily said that in fact Mr Qazi was operating Malik's account with the now defunct Bank of Commerce and Credit International before it went bust in 1991.

"Malik had given me a power of attorney to operate his account with BCCI in 1990," he explained.

Incidentally, Malik was given $ 35,000 in April 1990 by the Cricketers' Benefit Fund Series for being one of the six beneficiaries during the Sharjah Cup, the newspaper recalled and quoted a BCCI employee as saying that the Pakistani cricketer had opened the bank account only after receiving the benefit purse.

The daily said the cheques issued by Mr Qazi to Malik in 1994 had the address of Mr Talaat Butt, a local cricketer and a banker with the Bank of Sharjah.

According to Mr Butt, "Malik came to me with the cheques (issued by Mr Qazi) and I helped him open a zero balance non-resident account. When the National Bank of Dubai returned the cheques, we closed Malik's account."

The newspaper said that under the laws of the Central Bank of UAE, a person residing outside the UAE can open an account with banks here without a cheque book facility. And under this law, the Bank of Sharjah opened Malik's account so that he could deposit the cheques issued by Mr Qazi.

The 'Gulf News' said it tried to reach Rashid Latif for his comment, but he was not available.

Meanwhile, another report in the daily said frantic efforts were on to prevent a life ban on top Pakistani cricketers, named in the Justice Malik Qayyam report.

It quoted a source close to the Pakistan Cricket Board as saying that the players, who have given evidence on match-fixing, were being pressurised by the authorities not to stand by the findings of the one-man commission.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 02:19
Preamble says this.

BCCI's criminality included fraud by BCCI and BCCI customers involving billions of dollars; money laundering in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas; BCCI's bribery of officials in most of those locations; support of terrorism, arms trafficking, and the sale of nuclear technologies; management of prostitution; the commission and facilitation of income tax evasion, smuggling, and illegal immigration; illicit purchases of banks and real estate; and a panoply of financial crimes limited only by the imagination of its officers and customers.

Among BCCI's principal mechanisms for committing crimes were its use of shell corporations and bank confidentiality and secrecy havens; layering of its corporate structure; its use of front-men and nominees, guarantees and buy-back arrangements; back-to-back financial documentation among BCCI controlled entities, kick-backs and bribes, the intimidation of witnesses, and the retention of well-placed insiders to discourage governmental action.


Notice the bold stuff, you get the picture that
Enron executives just Plagiarized the trade mark methods of BCCI.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Rye » 05 Feb 2004 02:22

various other BCCI links I found on the web.
Some of them sound very leftwing-ish (hack canada, for eg.), so not sure how credible they are. But these links seemed to have other references I have not gone through. Heck, all of these references are left-wingish so, caveat emptor.

Though it was fundamentally a financial fraud, BCCI itself was not a bank in any conventional sense. Or, more precisely, banking was only a part of the global organism, the ingeniously constructed platform from which its other lines of business were launched....

This "bank" possessed its very own diplomatic corps, intelligence network, and private army, its own shipping and commodities trading companies. And BCCI itself was so thoroughly enmeshed in the official affairs of Pakistan that it was often impossible to separate the two.
(edited some links that I found bogus on further reading)

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Rak » 05 Feb 2004 02:23

Saddam has no weapons of mass destruction. But he has been captured and humiliated.

Pakistan has and has been sharing weapons of mass destruction with 'Axis of Evil', but its just kiss and make up, with an apology.

What the heck has the world become ? Will the great US of Asses let Osama bin Laden go if he issues a public apology ?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby svinayak » 05 Feb 2004 02:31

Can anybody ge the PA structure from 1991 to 1996

The Army Chiefs were

Mirza Aslam Beg (1988-91)
Asif Nawaz Janjua (1991-93)
Abdul Waheed Kaker (1993-96)
Jehangir Karamat (1996-1998)
Pervez Musharraf ( 1998 - )

ISI DG Hamid Gul

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Benazir Bhutto
PM Nawaz
DG,ISI, Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir

General Asif Nawaz Janjua replaces Mirza Aslam Beg as Chief of Army Staff
PM Nawaz

COAS COAS General Asif Nawaz
PM Nawaz
ISI head, Gen. Assad Durrani

PM Nawaz
COAS General Asif Nawaz Janjua dies suddenly.

General Abdul Waheed Kakar appointed COAS by President, reportedly against the wishes of the Prime Minister

COAS Kakar intervenes, forcing both PM and President to resign; fresh elections to be held
BB takes over as PM

1994 -
COAS Kakar

COAS Kakar


COAS General Abdul Waheed Kakar retires; replaced by General Jehangir Karamat

President Farooq Leghari, who then told the nation that he had dismissed the Bhutto government

PM Nawaz Sharif elected

PS ---

Since 1947 Pakistan had 13 Commanders-in-Chief/Chiefs of Army Staff.

1. Gen. Sir Frank Messervy (1947-1948) - A British
2. Gen. Sir Douglas David Gracey (1948-1951) ? A British
3. Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan (1965 War Field Marshal) ? A Pathan
4. Gen. Muhammad Musa (1958-1966) ? A Baluch
5. Gen. Muhammad Yahya Khan (1966-1971) ? A Pathan
6. Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan (1971-1972) ? A Punjabi
7. Gen. Tikka Khan (1972-1976) ? A Punjabi
8. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq (1976-1988) ? A Muhajir (Julundar)/Pathan (by domicile)
9. Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg (1988-1991) ? A Muhajir
10. Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua (1991-1993) ? A Punjabi
11. Gen. Abdul Waheed Kakar (1993-1996) ? A Baluch
12. Gen. Jehangir Karamat (1996-1998) ? A Punjabi
13. Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf (1998-Present) ? A Muhajir

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby SaiK » 05 Feb 2004 02:53

Going for Saddam was entirely different ball game. There was not even a single proof he or iraq was involved in 911.

Its all imperialistic actions and for oil purposes. Afghansitan too is for oil pipeline that was being held up by talibans.

Its American interests... thats all it matters. When has america done something outside its interests.

Perhaps, its true that americans never got their interests killed by these actions. Perhaps, the xerox khan's duds were no brainer for the americans.

The result: Pakis only exploded a chinese weapon right after the pokhran-2. And, gave the khans nothing but some figs and digs.

If one dirty bomb lands in USA with xerox khan's fingerprints, maybe would be the turning point.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 02:53

Adams, James Ring and Frantz, Douglas. A Full Service Bank: How BCCI Stole Billions Around the World. New York: Pocket Books, 1992. 381 pages.
Manhattan district attorney Robert Morgenthau called it "the largest bank scandal in world financial history." The Bank of Credit and Commerce International was present almost everywhere around the globe, but was regulated nowhere. By taking advantage of a system of shell corporations and off-shore branches, BCCI built a huge Ponzi scheme with money from depositors, many from Third World countries. They also laundered money for drug cartels and arms merchants, and performed banking services for other undesirables, including the CIA and terrorist Abu Nidal. In the U.S. they were able to operate through First American Bankshares after paying fat "bonuses" to Clark Clifford and Robert Altman. Jimmy Carter and Bert Lance were also involved with BCCI.
The authors get bogged down with too much detail and too many descriptions of minor characters, particularly when describing the U.S. Customs Service undercover operation that resulted in the first indictments against BCCI in 1988. But on the whole this book is an excellent overview of BCCI, and is more readable than similar books on banking fraud, a topic which can quickly become rather technical. James Ring Adams is a journalist who specializes in banking, and Douglas Frantz reports for the Los Angeles Times from its Washington bureau.
ISBN 0-671-72911-X

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 02:57

Levins, Hoag. Arab Reach: The Secret War Against Israel. Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1983. 324 pages.
Even after twenty additional years of Arab-Israeli conflict, this book by Philadelphia reporter Hoag Levins has much to offer. His point of departure is America's dependency on oil; the growing Arab wealth and influence in the U.S. due to the ability of Arab nations to control oil supplies; and finally, Israel's nuclear monopoly in the Middle East and the likelihood that she will use these weapons in the next major war. The chapters on outrageous Arab spending around the world are particularly fascinating, as well as perversely entertaining.
A few things have changed. Arab spending and investment was sharply curtailed when oil prices dropped after this book was published, and OPEC lost power. (However, prices could go up again, as alternative energy and conservation efforts were abandoned as well.)<h3> Secondly, this book describes how Arab leaders were concentrating on nuclear weapons development in Pakistan and other countries; now Pakistan has the bomb.</h3> But the big change is that the Cold War is over, and today organized terrorism has largely replaced warfare between nations. Globalization and U.S. unilateralism is finally making America a prime target. Along with this there is a new awareness that chemical and biological weapons can be devastating, which means that nuclear weapons are no longer the only option.
ISBN 0-385-18057-8

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Kanu » 05 Feb 2004 03:00

Seriously the US has no bloody clear objective with regard to Pakistan. They are just going on like a blind man. This whole Iraq mess is taking up time and resources, they know where the real problem is but since itll require a real war to settle the issue they are too afraid.

Bush family links with the Saudi royals dont help either.

The long term quagmire is in Pakistan, not Iraq or Afghanistan.

So what is exactly the position of the smaller Gulf states and Oman vis-a-vis Indo-Pak and Saudi/Pak-India probs.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby svinayak » 05 Feb 2004 03:11

Originally posted by Kanu:
Seriously the US has no bloody clear objective with regard to Pakistan. They are just going on like a blind man. This whole Iraq mess is taking up time and resources, they know where the real problem is but since itll require a real war to settle the issue they are too afraid.

Bush family links with the Saudi royals dont help either.

The long term quagmire is in Pakistan, not Iraq or Afghanistan.

So what is exactly the position of the smaller Gulf states and Oman vis-a-vis Indo-Pak and Saudi/Pak-India probs.
There is a clear objective. Its survival.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Kanu » 05 Feb 2004 03:15

Well that really doesnt seem like the case to me. Eventually something will bite them in the ass like 9/11. How long will they ignore it.

Come on Mushy, just keep on doing what you are, eventually your time too will come.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Manu » 05 Feb 2004 03:27

Bali ka Bakra:

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - The founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program claimed responsibility Wednesday for leaks of nuclear secrets he said were made behind the government's back, begging forgiveness in an extraordinary televised address to the nation.

In Washington, White House spokesman Scott McClellan offered no opinion when asked if the Bush administration approved of Pakistan's apparent decision not to prosecute Khan.

"We appreciate their efforts to address what is a serious concern, which is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the government of Pakistan is continuing to look into issues of proliferation," McClellan said.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Prof Raghu » 05 Feb 2004 03:45


Did you read all of my posts on the prior thread?
I saluted you for your very prescient commentary on the use of media by GOTUS.

Anyway, how come you did not highlight this?
a. The two gents in the Miami office -- the Miami posting's significance should be obvious.

b.I seem to recall a few other Chinoys - who have been a pain in the ass for India; perhaps related?

Originally posted by John Umrao:

Akbar Bilgrami, federal prisoner, former head of Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office, BCCI, Miami.

[b]Nazir Chinoy, federal prisoner, former General Manager, BCCI Paris.

Abdur Sakhia, former head, BCCI Miami.


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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 05 Feb 2004 03:52

Below is the report published today by David Albright's Institute For Science and International Security. It reveals for the first time, details of AXK's contact with Iraq and also talks of Syria among other countries. It also has a copy of the Iraqi memo unearthed by the UN which implicated AXK.

Iraq-AXK memo

Link to ISIS report on AXK

Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries?

By David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
February 4, 2004

The following discusses a set of documents obtained by United Nations (UN) inspectors in Iraq in 1995 that may indicate an effort by Abdul Qadeer Khan shortly before the start of the 1991 Persian Gulf War to sell Iraq nuclear weapon design drawings and gas centrifuge design information, facilitate the procurement of the equipment required to build these items, and provide on-going technological assistance. Combined with recent information about Khan and his associates' assistance to gas centrifuge programs in Iran, Libya, and North Korea, these documents raise the highly disturbing possibility that Khan may have also sold these and perhaps other countries nuclear weapon designs. Inevitably, these concerns also raise questions about whether Pakistani scientists transferred nuclear weapon designs to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.

Pakistani government investigations are reported to have obtained a statement from Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's gas centrifuge program who was recently removed from his post as advisor to Pakistan's Prime Minister, acknowledging that he provided nuclear technology, components, and equipment to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. So far, the revelations about Khan's activities have focused on the transfer of gas centrifuge designs and components and the wherewithal to make centrifuges. However, a troubling development is the likelihood that Khan and his associates have also transferred nuclear weapon designs to these countries. Libya is reported to have told investigators from the US government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it had acquired nuclear weapon design information. The source was probably Pakistanis, according to a person close to the Libyan investigation.

The Washington Post reported on January 27, 2004 that Khan's middlemen allegedly also offered the Pakistani scientists' services to Syria and Iraq. However, these offers were not accepted, the Post added.

This revelation about Iraq, if true, could shed light on unresolved questions about the authenticity of a set of documents found at the farm of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, after his 1995 defection. One of the documents, a one-page memo from the Iraqi intelligence service (Mukhabarat), dated October 6, 1990 and addressed to a contact person in Iraq's main nuclear weapons program (codenamed PC-3), summarizes a meeting between members of the Mukhabarat and an intermediary, believed to have used the name "Malik," who said he represented A.Q. Khan. The meeting took place in the offices of the Technical Consultation Corporation (TCC) - a procurement organization of the Mukhabarat. A translation of this original memo can be found here (will open in new window in .pdf format).

This memo states that the intermediary approached the Mukhabarat with the following offer: Khan was prepared to give Iraq project designs for a nuclear weapon and to provide assistance in enriching uranium and manufacturing a nuclear weapon. He would also ensure any requirements or materials from Western European countries through a company Khan owned in Dubai. He requested a preliminary technical meeting to discuss the documents that he was willing to sell. However, the memo notes that a meeting with Khan directly was not possible at that time, given the tense international atmosphere resulting from Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait and the impending attack by Coalition forces. An alternative of setting up a meeting in Greece with an intermediary, who had good relations with the Iraqi intelligence agents, was mentioned as a possibility. Iraqi intelligence officials said in the memo that they believed the motive was money.

Other Documents
A related document, which appears to be a list of items discussed at the meeting, indicates that the "up-front" cost of this assistance would be $5 million. In addition, a ten percent commission would be payable on all material procured through the offer.

Another document, PC-3's response to the Mukhabarat office, shows PC-3 to be dubious about the offer and concerned that it could be a sting operation. Nonetheless PC-3 advised the Mukhabarat to try to obtain a sample of what was being offered. However, in post-1995 discussions, former leaders of the PC-3 program repeatedly told inspectors that no such samples were ever received. Given that the offer occurred just three months before the start of the Persian Gulf War, this might have resulted from lack of time rather than lack of mutual intent.

IAEA Reporting
In its reporting to the Security Council in the late 1990s, the IAEA recorded its concern about this matter, not only with respect to its potential direct effect on Iraq's endeavors to acquire nuclear weapons but also in the global arena of nuclear weapons proliferation. The IAEA invested significant effort in attempting to resolve this matter both in its interactions with Iraq and with Pakistani officials. When approached about this matter by the media in the late 1990s, the Pakistani government and Khan vehemently denied making any such offer. When in December 1998 the IAEA inspectors departed from Iraq, the matter remained one of a small number of outstanding questions and concerns. It has not yet been resolved.

Although the IAEA investigation in the 1990s was inconclusive in its effort to confirm the authenticity of this offer, these documents provide additional indicators that Pakistani scientists may have offered assistance to a number of countries not only in uranium enrichment but also in nuclear weapon design and fabrication. The possibility that Pakistanis offered assistance in designing and building nuclear weapons to many countries, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria, is an extremely disturbing new development. This possibility must be investigated thoroughly.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby John_Doe » 05 Feb 2004 03:58

Originally posted by Sai Krshna:
If one dirty bomb lands in USA with xerox khan's fingerprints, maybe would be the turning point.
TSP had its fingerprints all over 9/11. Yet D.C. went after Afghanistan and Iraq.

If a dirty bomb goes off in the USA, I think D.C. will manufacture evidence to show it was Iran or North Korea, anyone but Pakistan, and absolve TSP again.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Dipanker » 05 Feb 2004 03:58

Originally posted by Manu:
Bali ka Bakra:

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - The founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program claimed responsibility Wednesday for leaks of nuclear secrets he said were made behind the government's back, begging forgiveness in an extraordinary televised address to the nation.

In Washington, White House spokesman Scott McClellan offered no opinion when asked if the Bush administration approved of Pakistan's apparent decision not to prosecute Khan.

[b]"We appreciate their efforts
to address what is a serious concern, which is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the government of Pakistan is continuing to look into issues of proliferation," McClellan said.[/b]
They will appriciate even more when Musharraf delivers Osama!
AQK can't be delivered so Osama will be delivered!

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Suraj » 05 Feb 2004 04:04

I fear an effort to tie any attempt by Iraq to get nuke tech with Paki proliferation will not help. You could have a picture of AXK/Mush and Saddam kissing each other in front of a nuke at one of Saddam's palaces and the SD will still tap dance around that. At worst, they'll blame Saddam and provide some form of plausible deniability to the Pakis.

Kgoan's thrust about seeing where the BCCI gravy train leads up the Paki and US establishment might provide far more insights. It may not 'get us anywhere', but it will help us better understand the kind of bafflingly ridiculous ties between the Paki establishment and the SD/Pentagon etc. The BCCI trail will help us figure out more into *why* the US and the Pakis are so keen on whitewashing the obvious Paki involvement in the whole business.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 05:19

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Sunil » 05 Feb 2004 05:37

Kgoan and Ramana,

Someone on the earlier thread had pointed out that the intelligence services had failed to detect nuclear proliferation related transactions. Now if the bulk of these were at BCCI itself, then that would offer some explanation as to why they were never detected?

If this is true then the ramifications of this are truly stunning. I am shocked and speechless. I have been a fool all these years to look at the Dawood Ibrahim gang as a mere transborder crime group, these latest links change everything, I thought about the gang.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Sunil » 05 Feb 2004 05:56


> Links between Beg, Durrani and BCCI.

"Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to the attention of my colleagues a report that appeared in the Washington Post of September 12, 1994, which describes a disturbing link between narcotics and terrorism. The report from Karachi, Pakistan, headlined `Heroin Plan by Top Pakistanis Alleged' quotes Pakistan's former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif saying that `drug deals were to pay for covert operations' brings to mind other reports not so long ago of Pakistani involvement in using the Bank of Credit and Commerce International [BCCI] to launder drug money that was eventually believed to have been used in financing terrorist groups involved in the New York World Trade Center bombing.

The report cites Pakistan's army chief and head of intelligence agency proposing to then-Prime Minister Sharif `a detailed blueprint for selling heroin to pay for the country's covert military operations in early 1991.' The role played by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency in exporting terror to Kashmir and Punjab in neighboring India was sufficiently well-documented for the previous administration to place the country on the watch list of states sponsoring terrorism. Its removal from that list is justified neither by its past track record nor by its present performance. The State Department's most recent report on global patterns of terrorism talks of `credible reports in 1993 of official Pakistani support to Kashmiri militants who undertook attacks of terrorism in Indian-controlled Kashmir"

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby kgoan » 05 Feb 2004 06:34


Palones referring to Cowasjee's article in 1994 in which he details the Beg-Durrani offer to Nawaz on the drug deals.

Cowasjees sort of reprised his 1994 article here:

Note the really interesting thing: The protagonist even then, was the very versatile Kamran Khan. One could conclude that KK is definetely the hatchet man for a US-clique of generals inside the PA - which raises some questions about his role in the daniel Pearl affair.

Note too, how easily things can spin out of control getting into all sorts of areas we may not want to, if we're not *really* careful.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby svinayak » 05 Feb 2004 06:42


- Pakistan’s record of proliferation may be turned to its advantage
Diplomacy / K.P. Nayar
Those in New Delhi who are gloating over the “nemesis” of Abdul Qadeer Khan may find that their joy over the dark clouds surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear programme may be premature. General Pervez Musharraf, who has lived dangerously ever since he became Pakistan’s army chief in late 1998, has the cunning, the daring and the bargaining chips to turn the ongoing crisis over his country’s proliferation record into yet another opportunity to increase his relevance to the West and enhance Washington’s stakes in his political longevity.

Indeed, Musharraf has taken the biggest risk of his politico-military career by putting Khan’s back to the wall: for close to three decades, Khan has been a holy cow for Pakistanis, be it politicians, the army or the public. To suggest that Musharraf will not succeed in protecting Pakistan’s nuclear assets by sacrificing the “father” of that country’s nuclear programme is to underestimate the wily general.

Speeches are beginning to be made in New Delhi and articles are beginning to be written by pundits in the Indian media comparing India’s squeaky-clean record in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to that of China and Pakistan, which can only be described as murky at best, dangerously irresponsible at worst. There are no doubts about India’s record. But those who praise that record as an end in itself may find that Musharraf may well have the last laugh.

A quarter century ago, General Zia-ul-Haq walked away from Washington’s inducements and blandishments to become a frontline state against Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, dismissing the offer of then president, Jimmy Carter, of $ 400 million in assistance as mere “peanuts”. Zia then blackmailed Ronald Reagan into converting the Georgian peanut-farmer-turned-president’s offer of “peanuts” into a tidy aid package of $ 3.2 billion.

Learning from that lesson of history, Musharraf may end up turning Pakistan’s sleazy record of proliferation to his advantage, securing for himself and his regime much more than anything India’s strategic pundits ever bargained for. Musharraf’s non-proliferation problems with the United States of America and the rest of the world began at a time when Pakistan’s relations with Western countries was at its nadir. In most Western capitals, it was no longer possible for Pakistani diplomats to sustain Islamabad’s duplicitous policy of hunting down Islamic terrorists and supporting them at the same time.

For the first time since the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, Pakistan faced a real threat of losing its influence and leverage within that neighbouring country which has been historically viewed by civilian and military regimes in Islamabad as crucial for its strategic depth in south and central Asia. Ironically, such a dead end for Pakistani policy in Afghanistan has coincided with an understated crisis for the Western presence in Afghanistan. Because the world’s attention is focused on Iraq, the spectacular Anglo-American intelligence failures there and the consequent political problems in London and Washington, Afghanistan’s slow slide into conflict has gone largely unnoticed.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, once a protégé of Islamabad and a recently designated terrorist in Washington, is now running the primary resistance operation against Western presence in Afghanistan, independent of any support from Pakistan. He has been joined by splinter groups, many of which once looked across the border and to the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency for money, training and arms to continue their operations.

Such a development, by itself, is not something that would make anyone lose any sleep in Washington. Not so, though, when it translates into the prospect of increased attacks against Western forces in Afghanistan or rising casualty figures among US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization personnel in the months prior to an American presidential election.

More than at any time since the taliban was thrown out of power by the Americans with help from Musharraf, Washington now needs the support of Islamabad to pursue its objectives in Afghanistan. With new equations in the tribal melting pot that Afghanistan has been for centuries, there is a frightening prospect that given the rising level of violence there, a return to full-scale war cannot be avoided once the winter months are over.

Contrary to expectations in some quarters in New Delhi that the US no longer needs Pakistan, Washington may actually appeal to Musharraf, instead, for greater support in ending the taliban menace in Afghanistan. Even if the hypothetical, albeit real, possibility that the capture or death of Osama bin Laden is crucial to ensuring another term for George W. Bush in the White House is dismissed, the Americans still need Pakistan’s support to ensure that Afghanistan does not once again become a staging ground for terrorist operations worldwide.

This is a scenario that is tailor-made for Musharraf, just as it may have appeared to many people in New Delhi that the wily General has run out of options. It is certain that Musharraf will not be found wanting in pledging his support to the US administration on this score. But his support will come with a price tag — just as Zia’s support to Reagan in the fight against the Soviets in Kabul came with a high price tag — the price of which is actually being paid by virtually the whole world today in terms of Isla- mic extremism and religion-based terrorism.

This is where Khan’s fate really comes in. Musharraf, it is more or less certain, will offer Khan and other Pakistani nuclear scientists, hitherto lionized as national heroes, as sacrificial lambs so that Islamabad can continue to hold on to its nuclear assets. If the post-September-11 experiences are any guide, Musharraf will not to have much difficulty in convincing Washington that successive Pakistani rulers from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif have been playing with fire in the management of their country’s nuclear programme.

He will argue, however, that with him in charge, the world need not have any more worries about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Even if many people in Washington may not take Musharraf at his word, there will be enough support at the Pentagon and the state department for the General’s line because it is expedient for them to do so. In any case, do they have much of a choice?

If this happens, Musharraf would have prevented Pakistan’s nuclear programme from going the same way as similar programmes in South Africa, Brazil, Iran and Libya. Washington will yet again look the other way as Pakistan reconstitutes its weapons programme, post-Khan, exactly the same way the Americans did in the Eighties, as the price for Zia’s support in fighting the Soviets in Kabul.

Already, there are stories circulating within Washington’s diplomatic community that Pakistan will insist on a future role for the rump elements of the taliban in Afghanistan’s post-election government on the twin grounds that such forgiveness for Mullah Omar’s men is good for national reconciliation, and that these elements who are joining the mainstream are capable of being reformed. Any such move will amount to a continued role for Islamabad in Afghan affairs at a time when it appeared that Pakistani influence in Kabul had touched its nadir since the heady days when the ISI was calling the shots under taliban rule. This will ensure that India’s efforts to cosy up to any permanent, post-taliban set-up for governing Afghan- istan will have built-in checks, which will also take care of Islamabad’s interests in Kabul.

There is a worrying perception in many influential quarters in India that Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s embrace of Zafarullah Khan Jamali, his counterpart on the other side of the border, has opened a new chapter in relations between the two neighbours. Musharraf’s scheme to undo Khan for what is obviously a much bigger prize ought to make Indians realize that their stakes in Pakistan are no different now merely because Vajpayee and Musharraf are talking again.



A friend who specializes on Pakistan affairs says that Musharraf has several cards up his sleeves:


1. Reducing Taliban led attacks in Afghanistan - which his ISI is supporting
2. Arrest of Mullah Omar
3. Arrest of Osama

It's not known how many of these cards he really holds - it's not even clear that the Mullah Omar and Osama cards are not perishable - that is they could escape to some other part of the world. But, one suspects that he holds at least two of them - strangely, he'll find it more difficult to give up Mullah Omar than Osama, because of the support that Omar enjoys in his army and also in NWFP

So, the question is, what is Musharraf going to try and get for them?

Musharraf wants a few things in return:

1. Some guarantee of permanent power or his ability to hold on to it at least for the next 5-10 years (By the way, there was a report last week that the American military is now providing Musharraf direct protection).

2. Increased conventional weapons support for his army.

3. Compromise from India on Kashmir

The other thing that he does is that he uses his articulate nature to present himself as the sole saviour of the Muslim world, as he did at Davos... those are his weapons.

What are the things US feels Musharraf can deliver to America?

Basically, the US feels that the following can be delivered -

(1) some cap on nuclear weapons and at least on nuclear weapons proliferation - remember, Pakistan is not self sufficient in missle technology - it has to sell something to get it.

(2) maintaining some control or at least reducing Islamism in the army.

(3) reducing or backtracking the rise of Islamism in Pakistan.

(4) keep China out of Pakistan in terms of access to large ports for the Chinese army etc.

(5) some kind of a face saver exit from Afghanistan - that is permanent.

(6) significant inroads into Pakistan's government and decision making by US officials etc. - the penetration of the FBI and CIA into Pakistan over the last few years has increased tremendously

(7) Use Pakistan and countries like Indonesia to reduce or control the power of the Arab nations in the Muslim world

(8) If necessary, provide a base for and do the dirty work of de-stabilizing Iran

Except the last and perhaps the last but one, the others seem okay for India - but the question is at what cost?

The thing that the US establishment misses in this analysis is the following fact...

Under Musharraf Pakistan is becoming less of a stable and viable country - for one very simple reason. Pakistani institutions are being undermined one by one. Within the first few days of taking over, Musharraf quickly forced some of the seniormost judges to resign - thus, cleaning out and destroying an independent judiciary.

After that most civilian institutions - far more than before have been taken over by the army

Journalists have been driven out of the country with their families under dire threats; the political system has been stripped of moderates and non-radical Islamists slowly.

The scientific community also has been affected by the latest brouhaha - you cannot make public carricature of some of your top scientists and expect that this will not affect the country's institutions. This list goes on and on - every institution in Pakistan is being slowly destroyed by Musharraf and inadvertently with the help of the US-State Department.

What will America offer Pakistan in return for the 8 favors mentioned above?

Money, conventional weapons, Indian compromise on Kashmir, some cover for illegal activities when they become publicly visible - such as is being done now by the State Department, wink and a nod at terrorist activities (though America would like to see the end such activities); significant role in Afghan politics; and most importantly a perennial "honour and dignity" component of a hyphenated relationship with India.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby shynee » 05 Feb 2004 07:36

Close the nuke file immediately

Daily Whines

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 08:31

In 1983 a Dutch court convicted Dr. Abdul Qader Khan, head of Pakistan's nuclear program, on charges of stealing the blueprints for a uranium enrichment factory. . . . Kahn's lawyer was paid by BCCI.

"In 1984, three Pakistani nationals were indicted in Houston for attempting to buy and ship to Pakistan, high-speed switches designed to trigger nuclear weapons. The trio offered to pay in gold supplied by BCCI.

"In 1987 two Americans, Rita and Arnold Mandel, together with Hong Kong businessman Leung Yu Hung, were indicted by the U.S. Attorney in Sacramento, California, on charges of illegal importations of $1 billion worth of oscilloscopes and computer equipment for Pakistan's nuclear program. . . . BCCI facilitated [some of the shipments]"

"In 1987 in Philadelphia, Ashad Pervez, a Pakistani-born Canadian, was indicted for conspiring to export restricted specialty steel and metal used to enhance nuclear explosions. ... He . . . paid high prices with money delivered to the Toronto BCCI branch from BCCI London"

(Rachel Ehrenfeld, Evil Money, HarperCollins, 1992).

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 05 Feb 2004 08:39

Now that the scapegoat has been found, the CIA is jumping in to claim credit. Apparently CIA chief Tenet is going to testify to Congress tomorrow that the CIA knew about AXK's dealings all along.


CIA Director George J. Tenet plans today to deliver a spirited and highly unusual public defense of his agency's prewar conclusions that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and to disclose previously secret success the CIA had in uncovering weapons programs in Libya and Pakistan, senior intelligence officials said yesterday.

In response, officials said, Tenet will say for the first time in public today that the intelligence community had long-standing knowledge of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's weapons-program dealings with North Korea, and that it had prior knowledge of Libya's nuclear program.

Although the material on Khan was highly classified, a discreet public reference was included in the unclassified 2002 worldwide threat assessment. A more detailed version was given to policymakers and members of the intelligence committees.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 08:52

A trip down the past into future.
1979 -- The United States cut off aid to Pakistan under section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 FAA) after it was learned that Pakistan had secretly begun construction of a uranium enrichment facility.

Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-grade enriched uranium from China. 1980--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Re-export via Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge enrichment activities).

1981--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: New York, zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material). 1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State Department cable stating `We have strong reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives capability * * * Pakistan is conducting a program for the design and development of a triggering package for nuclear explosive devices.' 1981--Publication of book, Islamic Bomb, citing recent Pakistani efforts to construct a nuclear test site.

1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire bomb parts (13-inch `steel spheres' and `steel petal shapes').

1983--Declassified US government assessment concludes that `There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program * * * We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafe guarded, is clearly nuclear weapons.

'1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a `very modest' uranium enrichment capability for `nothing but peaceful purposes.'

1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of `grave consequences' if it enriches uranium above 5%.

1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has `successfully tested' a `firing mechanism' of an atomic bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US krytrons `have been acquired' by Pakistan.

1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Texas, krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).

1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: US cancelled license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.

1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US. 1985 -- Pressler Amendment [section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act] requires a total cut-off of U.S. aid to Islamabad unless the president can certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon, and that continued US aid will significantly decrease the probability of its developing one in the future.

1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged DIA report saying Pakistan `detonated a high explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5% level.

1986--Press reports cite U.S. `Special National Intelligence Estimate' concluding that Pakistan had produced weapons-grade material.

1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General Zia tells interviewer, `It is our right to obtain the technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us.'

1986--Declassified memo to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states, `Despite strong U.S. concern, Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability * * * If operated at its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material to build several nuclear devices per year.'

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture and bomb components).

1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant in Pakistan.

1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan states in published interview that `what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct.'

1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for `at least 93% enrichment' of uranium; blueprints of uranium enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: California, oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon R&D).

1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK government official tells German counterpart on European nonproliferation working group that he was `convinced that Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.'

1987 -- China concluded a deal with Pakistan to sell M-11 missiles and launchers.

1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan due to an export control violation; in his formal certification, he confirmed that `material, equipment, or technology covered by that provision was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.'

1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.

1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability `that is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.'

1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence service.

1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meets `nuclear-capable' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.

1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that `Clearly Pakistan is engaged in developing a nuclear capability.'

1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and tritium facility from West Germany in mid-1980's.

1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to missile program in Pakistan.

1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iraq.

1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States has issued `about 100 specific communiqués to the West German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations;' exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery facility.

1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states `sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.'

1989--Reporting on a recent customs
investigation, West German magazine Stern reports, `since the beginning of the eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons program.'

1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms control authority, claims US has turned a `blind eye' to proliferation developments Pakistan in and Israel.

1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's democratically elected government after a year in office; Glenn concluded, `There simply must be a cost to non-compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.'

1989-1990--reports of secret construction of unsafe guard nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.

Spring 1990 -- Pakistan reportedly reacted to Indian Army war game maneuvers near its border by preparing to drop one of seven weapons from a specially configured C-130 cargo plane. [02 December 1992 NBC News report]

1990--US News cites `western intelligence sources' claiming Pakistan recently `cold-tested' a nuclear device and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.

1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German government document citing claim by UK official that British government believes Pakistan already possesses `a few small' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.

1990--London Sunday Times cites growing U.S. and Soviet concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16 aircraft are being modified for nuclear delivery purposes; claims US spy satellites have observed `heavily armed convoys' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at Kahuta and heading for military airfields.

1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed `model' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.

1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports `US officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear weapons technology.'

1990--Dr. A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives `Man of the Nation Award.'

1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear and missile applications.

October 1990 -- President Bush announced that he could no longer provide Congress with Pressler Amendment certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. Economic and military aid was duly terminated, though the Bush administration continued to permit a limited number of commercial military sales to Pakistan. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United States.

1991 -- Pakistan proposed to India commencement of a multilateral conference on the nuclear proliferation in south Asia 1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-capable M-11 missile from China.

1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, `Last July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear Pakistan warheads. And they've still got them.'

1991--Time quotes businessman, `BCCI is functioning as the owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.'

1991--India and Pakistan enter agreement prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations.

July 1991 - Reliable reports from Islamabad confirm that Pakistan had frozen production of HEU and halted the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components.

1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses Pakistan's possession of `cores' of nuclear devices.

Late 1992 -- The US Government determines that China had transferred items controlled under the international Missile Technology Control Regime to Pakistan.

December 1992 -- The US Government asked Pakistan to return eight US Navy frigates and a supply ship that had been leased to the Pakistan Navy, which accounted for more than half of Pakistan's major surface combatants.

01 December 1992 -- Senator Larry Pressler reportedly stated in a press interview that he had been told by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Pakistan had assembled seven weapons and could air drop one in a matter of hours [Dec. 1, 1992 NBC News broadcast].

1993 -- Pakistan proposed to India creation of a missile-free zone in south Asia

25 August 1993 -- The United States imposed "Category Two" sanctions against certain Chinese and Pakistani entities that were involved in an M-11 missile-related transfer, which is prohibited under US law.

Late 1993 -- The Clinton Administration, citing what it considered to be asymmetrical treatment accorded to Pakistan and India over their respective nuclear programs, proposed revising the Pressler Amendment and certain "country-specific" sections of the Foreign Assistance Act. The administration argued that by the time nuclear nonproliferation provisions had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act, India had already acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons and thus Pakistan had borne the brunt of most United States sanctions.

Early 1994 -- The Clinton Administration withdrew its proposal to revise the amendment because of strong criticism from a number of influential members of Congress, including Senator Pressler himself.

April 1994 - Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visits Islamabad to propose a one-time sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Delivery of the planes would be contingent on specific commitments from Pakistan regarding its nuclear program, including a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials. Talbott states that there is "broad agreement" between the United States and Pakistan on the goal of "first capping, then reducing, and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia."

April 1995 -- Prime Minister Bhutto visits Washington.

September 1995 -- The Clinton Administration proposes revisions to the Pressler Amendment, citing the Amendment's roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's Government in areas such as combating terrorism and furthering US commercial interests in Pakistan. Under the Brown Amendment, the US would not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan, but the President decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan. 01 January 1996 -- India and Pakistan exchange lists of atomic installations which each side has pledged not to attack under an over seven-year-old confidence-building agreement.

January 1996 -- The Brown amendment was signed into law to relieve some of the pressures created by the Pressler sanctions, which had crippled parts of the Pakistani military, particularly the Air Force. The Brown amendment allowed nearly $370 million of previously embargoed arms and spare parts to be delivered to Pakistan. It also permitted limited military assistance for the purposes of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics efforts, and some military training.

March 1996 -- Pakistan commissioned an unsafe guarded nuclear reactor, expected to become fully operational in the late 1990s, that will provide it with a capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Late 1996 -- Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, the A.Q. Khan Laboratory in Kahuta, purchased 5,000 ring magnets from China. The ring magnets would allow Pakistan to effectively double its capacity to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons production.

03 October 1996 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto called for the convening of a South Asia security conference that would deal with, among other things, Kashmir and the nuclear arms issue.

04 July 1997 -- Pakistan confirms test-firing of new indigenous Hatf missile.

06 September 1997 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claims Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, saying that: "Pakistan's nuclear capability is now an established fact. Whatever we have, we have a right to keep it...."

28 May 1998: Pakistan detonates five nuclear devices. Pakistan claimed that the five nuclear tests measured up to 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a reported yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). 30 May 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warheads, with a yield of 12 kilotons, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Sunil » 05 Feb 2004 09:00



Posts: 547
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 09:00

some more BCCI
The Pretence is Over | Pak Link with Nuclear Black Market

[ SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 01, 2004 08:54:58 PM ]

It was August 1985. I was attending an international conference on nuclear proliferation organised by Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan as a prelude to the third NPT review conference. After a reception at Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan’s chateau outside Geneva , I found myself along with Professor Abdus Salam, the Nobel laureate Pakistani physicist and Altaf Gauhar, Pakistani media luminary in the same limousine taking us back to our hotel.

Professor Salam told me that I was exaggerating the possibility of Pakistan making a nuclear weapon. I was taken aback when he asked me whether a metallurgist who stole documents in Holland would be able to make the bomb. The reference was obviously to A Q Khan. I replied that I was aware of the rivalry between physicists and engineers involved in the bomb project, not peculiar to Pakistan , but my assessment was that the success of the project would not be dependent on the talents of any one person but of the team as a whole.

It reminded me of the scepticism of our own scientists in those days about Pakistan ’s capability to produce nuclear weapons. Their scepticism was based on their judgment that Pakistan did not have the critical mass of scientific and engineering talent necessary for the project.

Now there are a lot of revelations about A Q Khan’s direct ties with international black market dealers in the Pakistani media. A semi- official version of the Pakistani nuclear effort is given in Shahidur Rahman’s ‘Long Road to Chagai’. He describes how the Pakistanis were able to pay hard cash upfront and buy anything they wanted in nuclear weapon techno- logy, equipment, materials and engineering services in western countries.

It is not possible to assess the scientific genius of A Q Khan. But where Professor Abdus Salam and the Indian scientists went woefully wrong was to underestimate his organisational genius. When he left Holland in 1976, he had all the drawings for a uranium enriching centrifuge cascade and a complete list of contractors, supplying equipment, materials and services to the Almelo plant. He was able to establish contacts with most of them and additional West European firms in the business and buy all the equipment, materials and services by paying them exorbitantly.

Some Pakistani estimates put the country’s expenditure on its nuclear programme at $10 billion. Money was no consideration since it did not come from Pakistani sources but from Libya , Saudi Arabia , Iraq (initially), UAE and from the depositors of BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International), the bank which failed in 1992. The bank founded by Pakistani Agha Hasan Abedi dealt with money laundering, the drug trade, clandestine arms deals etc. It was funded at the start by the royal family of Dubai . The current Pakistani disclosures reveal that the network for the international black market on nuclear technology operated from Dubai .
<small> Sunil Dawood bahi ka haath ki safai hai sub kutch</small>

A Q Khan should have had the US Manhattan project as his model. The Americans tapped European brains for the development of the bomb. Various sub- systems could be subcontracted to companies in the US . Khan used the European brains and subcontracted out extensively to European industries willing to execute various components of the nuclear complex at fabulous profits.

General Musharraf has admitted that during the clandestine phase of the bomb project, scientists had enormous amounts to spend and there was very little accountbility. But the overt and covert phase of the Pak bomb project does not make any difference to Pakistan ’s need to obtain its requirements from the European nuclear black market by paying exorbitant sums in contravention of the laws of the country of origin.

In the light of Pakistan ’s state of industrial development, Islamabad will continue to need foreign black market imports for a long time to come to sustain its nuclear arsenal. There were recent reports of 800 spark gaps needed for nuclear triggers being bought in the US by a South African Jew, shipped to Dubai and then on to Pakistan.

It is logical for A Q Khan to have exploited fully the European nuclear black market network to build a nuclear arsenal. He got the design of the bomb from China and also the initial stock of enriched uranium and tritium for the trigger. The Chinese probably benefited from the European nuclear black market of which A Q Khan was the chief patron.

A Q Khan has now become the nemesis of western hypocrisy on non-proliferation and of the Pakistani military establishment. It is not easy for General Musharraf to maintain that the Pak military and the ISI had no clue of Khan’s vast operations. They do know that without the European nuclear black market network, the Pakistani nuclear arsenal cannot be sustained indefinitely. Obviously, such an enormous operation could not have been missed out by the CIA, MI-6 and secret services of all major western countries. The commitment of the West to non-proliferation was never genuine. Whatever his other merits, or demerits, the world owes a debt of gratitude to Khan for exposing what a sham the non-proliferation treaty was.

On the day of the Indian nuclear tests, Henry Kissinger, on his own accord, went to the CNN studios and justified the Indian tests on the ground that India was living in a tough neighbourhood. He obviously knew what he was talking about.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby Umrao » 05 Feb 2004 09:04

Scandals: Not Just a Bank

You can get anything you want through B.C.C.I. -- guns, planes, even nuclear-weapons technology

"We were representing a joint venture and chasing a sale of military equipment to the Belgian government. We had gone pretty far down the line when suddenly B.C.C.I. showed up, representing the Italians. I was staying at the Hilton in Brussels, and I got a phone call from a B.C.C.I. guy asking me to come down to the lobby. When I go down, there's a B.C.C.I. guy, Pakistani, and next to him is this 220-lb. French guy named Andre -- the kind of guy who stuffs people in car trunks. They have business cards with a B.C.C.I. logo. So Andre says, 'You're getting out of this thing. This is our deal.' Then the other B.C.C.I. guy says, 'You're out, and go and tell your client you're out.' They scared the hell out of me. B.C.C.I. had two functions, as bagmen and as thugs. They pushed the competition out."

Bagmen, thugs, arms deals and B.C.C.I. Common ingredients, it turns out, in the murky world of international arms sales, where experiences like that of the American dealer quoted above are common fare. While prosecutors and auditors from governments and regulatory bodies continue their scramble to unravel the role of the Bank of Credit & Commerce International in the world's first truly global financial scandal, TIME has learned that what looked like a bank was in fact a multipurpose, multinational enterprise. In the past two decades, the organization created by Pakistani financier Agha Hasan Abedi has become, among other things, a powerful player in the netherworld of international arms. Using the clandestine routes and alliances originally created for money laundering, B.C.C.I. has brokered, financed and, in some instances, initiated transactions that have often upset the uneasy technomilitary balance sought by the U.S. and other major powers engaging in government-to-government sales.

Many of the B.C.C.I.-brokered arms deals are perfectly legal, involving shipments of conventional weapons -- rocket launchers, tanks and even sophisticated jet fighters such as the Mirage 2000. But many more are not. Moreover, government sources, former B.C.C.I. bankers, and arms merchants doing business through B.C.C.I. have described the bank's more sinister role in providing nuclear-weapons technology for Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Libya -- nations widely believed to be pursuing development of the so-called Islamic bomb to counter the nuclear force they assume Israel possesses. According to these sources, B.C.C.I. has also been busy providing Pakistan and other customers throughout the Middle East with the capacity to deliver such weapons.

Though the discovery of irregularities led to the shutdown of B.C.C.I.'s banking operations last July, Abedi's $20 billion "bank" is in fact far more complex. It is a vast, stateless, multinational corporation that deploys its own intelligence agency, complete with a paramilitary wing and enforcement units, known collectively as the "black network." It maintains its own diplomatic relations with foreign countries through bank "protocol officers" who use seemingly limitless amounts of cash to pursue Abedi's goals. B.C.C.I. trades massively and for its own account in commodities ranging from grain, rice, cement and coffee to timber, carpets and anchovies. It is a force to be reckoned with in international oil markets and, through its intertwined relationship with the Gokal brothers' shipping interests, is a shipping conglomerate as well. Taken altogether, B.C.C.I. commands virtual self- sufficiency as a purveyor of goods around the world.

Through its practiced use of false documentation, the deployment of billions of dollars in unbooked letters of credit, and clandestine arrangements with compliant government officials in numerous countries, B.C.C.I. was ideally positioned for its role as arms marketeer to the world, particularly the Middle East. Though its tracks are often difficult to detect, TIME has discovered B.C.C.I.'s fingerprints on a startling array of transactions. Among them:

-- The victorious allied march into Kuwait City in the wake of Desert Storm was spearheaded by a contingent of returning Kuwaitis. Few if any noticed, however, that the Kuwaitis were riding atop Yugoslavian M-84 battle tanks -- upgraded versions of the Soviets' workhorse T-72 -- complete with East European backup personnel. Sixty-four such tanks and crews had been purchased, financed and supplied to the Desert Storm coalition forces by B.C.C.I.

-- An ongoing project in Abu Dhabi to develop a standoff land-attack missile system for the emirate's fleet of Mirage 2000s is being financed by B.C.C.I.

-- Recently B.C.C.I. brokered the sale of OF-40 Mark 2 main battle tanks -- also to Abu Dhabi -- from Italian arms manufacturer Oto Melara. B.C.C.I. later obtained and financed a dozen S-23 180-mm artillery guns from North Korea for Dubai.

-- In the past three years B.C.C.I. has brokered and financed the sale of Astros II battlefield multiple-rocket launchers from Brazil to both Iran and Iraq. The enterprise has also sold Chinese Silkworm missiles to both countries. A spokesman for Avibras Industria, maker of the Astros rocket system, concedes sales to Iraq but denies any sales to Iran or any deals involving B.C.C.I. A spokesman also allows that the company received "insignificant" financing from the Brazilian B.C.C.I. bank that was used for "domestic purposes."

-- B.C.C.I. arranged for the sale of Argentine TAM battle tanks to Iran in 1989, arms sources report. Argentina's Defense Ministry denies that any tanks were ever sold to Iran.

-- B.C.C.I. supplied Iraq with French-made Roland antiaircraft missile systems and with G-6 mobile artillery units from South Africa.

B.C.C.I. did more than finance or broker arms deals between nations that couldn't risk exposure of politically embarrassing relationships. Arms dealers from Europe and the Middle East, as well as a high-level operative from B.C.C.I.'s Karachi-based black network, have separately provided TIME with nearly identical descriptions of some of B.C.C.I.'s elaborate services for the sale of conventional weapons. "They could handle everything," says one of those sources. "Brokering, financing, letters of credit, false end-user certificates, shopping, spare parts, training and even personnel. You could order a bomb, a plane to deliver it and somebody to drop it."

With that kind of muscle, B.C.C.I. was able to secure substantial business from one of the world's pre-eminent makers of military aircraft, Dassault Aviation, the French company that produces the Mirage jet fighter. According to Arif Durrani, a B.C.C.I.-financed Pakistani arms dealer now doing time in a U.S. federal prison for illegally providing Hawk antiaircraft missile parts to Iran during the Iran-contra era, one of the biggest Mirage dealers in the world is a Pakistani multimillionaire named Asaf Ali. "Just as Ghaith Pharaon fronts for B.C.C.I. to purchase banks and businesses, Asaf is B.C.C.I.'s man in the weapons business," says Durrani, who financed many of his weapons deals through B.C.C.I. offices in London and New York City. While Durrani has made a number of other claims that have been contested by the Justice Department, another well-placed source confirms that Asaf Ali is backed financially by B.C.C.I. in his worldwide deals and that he brokers Mirages, including some top-of-the-line Mirage 2000s that were sold to Iraq, Libya and Abu Dhabi, among other countries.

In a recent deal, Asaf, displaying the political dexterity of a superpower, brokered the sale of 49 Mirage 2000s to India and then, to maintain parity, provided Pakistan with a similar number of new and used Mirages. To fill the Pakistani order, investigators looking at the deal say, he rerouted nearly two dozen Mirages, yet to be paid for, originally brokered through B.C.C.I. to Peru. A political scandal enveloping B.C.C.I. in Peru focuses in part on the financial transactions in the on-again-off-again Mirage deal. But last week a Dassault spokesman, Francois Prigent, briskly dismissed any responsibility. "The shipment to Peru is the business of Peru; what happens to planes after we make a delivery is up to them." The firm also denied connections to B.C.C.I. ("Banks are chosen by clients, not by us") and to Asaf Ali ("We don't know that man").

But arms merchants interviewed in several countries say otherwise. "Asaf Ali has been an important Dassault agent for years, and everyone knows that," says a French businessman who has worked on arms deals in Pakistan.

The arrest last month of a retired Pakistani general brought into sharp focus B.C.C.I.'s role in selling nuclear secrets. General Inam ul-Haq, who was arrested in Germany, has been sought since 1987 by U.S. authorities in connection with the purchase of nuclear weapons-grade steel for Pakistan's bomb-development program. The Justice Department says that B.C.C.I. was Inam's financier, and the U.S. is seeking his extradition. The alarm has spread to other branches of the U.S. government. In a recent letter to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee chairman John Glenn, a Democrat from Ohio, expressed concern that "B.C.C.I. has been providing financial services to agents of the Pakistani government for the illicit purchase of nuclear weapon-related commodities in the United States and in other nations." Glenn urged Thornburgh to pursue "a full examination of such activities."

"B.C.C.I. is functioning as the owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project," says an international businessman who has worked through the bank to supply Pakistan's nuclear-weapons and missile industry. "In the West, Abedi presented one face, but in the Muslim world, he and his bankers have always promoted themselves as a Third World, Muslim bank that would eventually dominate global finances by using oil dollars and Abedi's network of influence. And he whispered in the ears of the sheiks and the generals that he would bring them the Muslim bomb."

While munitions-control experts in the U.S. have evidence that B.C.C.I. played a role in the delivery of munitions-grade nuclear hardware and technology to Iraq and Iran, it is the Pakistanis who are the chief beneficiaries of Abedi's multifarious services. "You can't draw a line separating the bank's black operatives and Pakistan's intelligence services," says an international arms broker, who provided details of recent B.C.C.I.-generated orders for nuclear-bomb supplies for Pakistan. "And in Karachi his bankers are surprisingly patriotic."

Sources also point to China as a supplier of nuclear hardware for Pakistan, as well as missile-delivery systems for Pakistan, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, including a B.C.C.I.-brokered sale of midrange ballistic missiles to ( the Saudis in 1988. By way of explanation, they cite B.C.C.I.'s close banking relations with China, where $400 million in assets were frozen after the bank's offices were shut down in July. Abedi's bank had been the first Western-style bank allowed to operate on the communist mainland, in part because of Abedi's early support of CITIC, the Chinese investment company that is the doorway to China's military-industrial complex. China, starved for hard currency, has thus far not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or missile-technology-limitation agreements.

Arms dealers are not the only ones to describe a pact between Abedi's bank and China's weapons industry: according to State Department sources, China has also used B.C.C.I. as a middleman in Silkworm missile sales to Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Silkworm missiles sold to Iraq and Saudi Arabia were equipped with sophisticated Israeli-manufactured guidance systems, the government sources say. Arms dealers who have done business with B.C.C.I. say its officers attracted illegal deals because the bank provided documentation and letters of credit for arms being shipped, for example, as agricultural machinery, and that it routinely handled arms moving out of Eastern Europe and masked technology transfers from the West into Soviet bloc countries. The East bloc trade was so lucrative that Abedi traveled to Moscow in 1985 to promote more weapons deals and to lobby for permission to open B.C.C.I. branch offices in the Soviet Union. Former employees have told TIME that B.C.C.I. associates found it easy to bribe arms-factory managers and officials within the Soviet Union because of low pay, but that perestroika had cut into B.C.C.I. profits there. Reason: some government officials who favored the bank because of payoffs had been removed from their positions.

The very act of operating simultaneously as a bank and as a broker gives B.C.C.I. an enormous advantage: it is instantly able to fund virtually any deal it wants and empower any middleman it chooses to pull such a deal off. The B.C.C.I.-brokered sale of F-4 Phantom jet parts to Iran from the U.S. offers a good illustration of the process. The deal starts when B.C.C.I. learns from its sources in Iran that it wants to buy spare parts. B.C.C.I. and its agents then research the supplier market to obtain the price of the materiel. Because U.S. restrictions on the sale of such equipment to Iran make this particular deal illegal, B.C.C.I. next provides a falsified end-user ; certificate saying the jet parts will be sold to Israel. The bank then opens a letter of credit -- a form of financing only a bank can do -- in favor of the seller or the seller's agent and arranges to ship the parts. Because B.C.C.I. is a large bank, it can afford to pay off the seller immediately, then turn and collect a vastly larger sum from Iran.

In spite of the virtual global shutdown of B.C.C.I., the bank remains intact in its traditional haven, Pakistan. Though other press reports maintain that Abedi is physically frail and often incoherent, TIME has interviewed several business associates who say he remains a major figure in the international weapons trade. He has held a press conference within the past month, and is in the process of licensing a new bank in Pakistan, called the Progressive Bank.

In the meantime, B.C.C.I. is even now brokering an arms deal to Abu Dhabi, involving the sale of 45 South African G-6 mobile artillery pieces. If B.C.C.I. can hold it together, sources say, Abu Dhabi may buy as many as 55 more of the same pieces.

The Price Waterhouse audit that led to B.C.C.I.'s seizure last July covered only its banking activities. It said nothing about immensely profitable deals in other businesses, notably weaponry. Nor could it account for profits it could not see. And while the enterprise's known banking services are shut down around the world, virtually the full cadre of B.C.C.I.'s black network, arms traders and global operatives remain unindicted, unaccused and at large. The best guess of many of the sources TIME interviewed is that they will simply move on, perhaps under the umbrella of Pakistan's newest bank

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby SSridhar » 05 Feb 2004 10:19

Moving from crisis to nuclear safety by Krepon.
Tries to bring in the equal-equal between TSP and India.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 04 Feb 2004

Postby JE Menon » 05 Feb 2004 11:40

>>The Pak trucking mafia *must* somehow be linked to it - they were after all the primary beneficiaries of the Taliban.

Maybe this will help. One of the key trucking operations into Afghanistan that era was run by the daughter (yes, daughter) of a former ISI Director General. Guess who? Hamid Gul. :D

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