Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby shiv » 15 Feb 2004 19:09

Originally posted by A.Ananth:
[
What does this mean? A Pak bomb was OK for US because it would be used agaist (only) India?
Ananth - the more I look at the world - specifically India US issues - the more I come out feeling like mutual awareness of the US and India has been like that of a tree (the US) and a dog (India). The dog shows acute awareness of the tree and intimate knowledge of little areas that it can sniff and pee on on but the tree shows no awareness of the dog.

Even that great, much quoted "magnum opus"of a book Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" shows that that author has a huge hole in his knowledge where he should have had knowledge of the Indian civilization. He admits this but is unaware of what he has missed. Again - the more I read of that book - the more irritating it is because it is moderately pathetic and yet quoted all over.

The US has had only limited awareness of India. It has been a "dark area" and China has received a lot of attention. So "bums" in Islumagood were no problem because of the "anti-commie all-lie - the Islamic nation that can never be commie. India was a little blip on the US's radar - a little morsel to be fed to ally Pakistan. And even Pakistan was attribited more power than it has - because the US diplomaic/intel community swallowed RAPE martial-islamic lies wholesale.

I am saying that the US has miscalculated big-time. They will learn. Gradually.

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16814
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby NRao » 15 Feb 2004 19:15

A surgeon's touch. :rotfl:

Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Gerard » 15 Feb 2004 19:17

Originally posted by A.Ananth:
Pak nukes have Chinese prints

In fact, long before Americans discovered that much of their manufactured goods are 'Made in China', the Pakistanis took Chinese help, expertise, and design, in making their 'bum'.
:eek:

'bum' !!! BR speak now spreads to the TOI !!

rgosain
BRFite
Posts: 441
Joined: 10 Jan 2003 12:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby rgosain » 15 Feb 2004 19:19

Do you chaps remember all those times Bill Clinton used to bang on about how the PRC was a responsible and constructive nuclear power. For once he was speaking the truth - the PRC was and is responsible for constructing the programs of the DPRK, Pakistan etc.

The point, however remains that the PSI or whatever it is likely to be called, has all the characteristics of baiting India into compliance with the non-proliferating agenda of the established powers, much like to CTBT in the nineties evolved into an anti-India measure. Perhaps this requires a folder of its own to flesh out the details.

arun
BRF Oldie
Posts: 10248
Joined: 28 Nov 2002 12:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby arun » 15 Feb 2004 19:36


pran
BRFite
Posts: 110
Joined: 09 Oct 2001 11:31
Location: internet

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby pran » 15 Feb 2004 20:10

Even without that, I believe the ToysRUs mgmt would have decided that it was not in their interest to have PRC-origin isotopes floating in the mushroom clouds over Dilli and Mumbai. Bad for business.
....
The reveleation sequence was aimed as retaliation for the NoKo humiliation. Look how it came out. The Americans KNEW quite well, when they first got Gaddafi to GUBO, that the Libyan stuff came from China. So how did this come out sooooo sloooow - lee?
Why does Toy'sR Us mgmt feel they have achieved critical mass to undertake the toy proliferation chain reaction which ultimately is testing the strategic power equations at a minimal cost to itself.It seems toys'rus mgmt have proliferated enough toys to attain that mass.It makes some sense that Toy's R Us Inc. is making US spend so much against something that costs so little.
Going by NoKo,Libyan example PRC finds itself humiliated and constrained by many US proxies.Taiwan is just one of them but not the main one.
I suspect that the payback is coming via WHO with a slew of bio scares doing rounds in SE Asia suddenly while the civet cats and chickens had been there in the local menu for a long time.

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby shiv » 15 Feb 2004 20:24

Originally posted by rgos:

The point, however remains that the PSI or whatever it is likely to be called, has all the characteristics of baiting India into compliance with the non-proliferating agenda of the established powers, much like to CTBT in the nineties evolved into an anti-India measure. Perhaps this requires a folder of its own to flesh out the details.
Even before the details are "fleshed out" I cannot see how you can be confident that this "has all the characteristics of baiting India into compliance with the non-proliferating agenda of the established powers"

Non proliferation is such a joke - it should not be mentioned in ths folder - nor the needless worries that the new regime will somehow trap India.

Just look at what happened with the old one. India was the ONLY friggin nation in the entire world that followed the NPT to the letter. The non-prol mullahs could not control piddly Libya and NkKo from getteing the tech - leave alone Pak land. So why do I see so much virtual handwringing and worries that India will be baited. India will merely bite the balls off any potential baiter. Let them get the NoKos and Myanmars first.

I think some of us put too much faith in the abilities of some nations because they are traditionally described as "established" powers. Even Pakistan has cocked a snook at them - so why this constant and continuous worry about India getting somehow trapped.

India won't get trapped. Just drop the subject in this folder. start a new one -and call it "India sure to be trapped and beaten into submisson" where the arguments can be "fleshed out" by the nail biters.

What are they going to do? Stop Uranium supplies? India will just have to offer or threaten to Tritium to Gabon, Myanmar and iran and we will get all the friggin things we need. What kind of cock-eyed worry is this that I am seeing - everyone getting his knickers in a twist that teacher USA will cane the bottom of good boy India and make him suffer?

daulat
BRFite
Posts: 338
Joined: 09 Oct 2002 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby daulat » 15 Feb 2004 20:37

now you don't suppose that toys-r-us may have preciptiated the current crisis in order to keep unkil very very distracted with middle east for the forseeable future? might give them a free hand via no-ko to start putting the thumbscrews on japan and the benchpress on taiwan?

either way, nuke nude if if isn't already true, will very shortly be so. i think that parakram was going to go ahead because this had been divined by the fish driven higher bania intellect, but then unkil threatened us with dhoti removal if we didn't let mushy keep his H&D... so we had to back off

after all, unkil is maibaap, and we are only humble peasant supplicants

rgosain
BRFite
Posts: 441
Joined: 10 Jan 2003 12:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby rgosain » 15 Feb 2004 20:49

Shiv, I do share your assesment, however the non-prolif mullahs in DC still believe that they can conflate India with pakistan and North Korea and since they have are associated with the Pakistan lobby, and have the ear of the White House the future regarding Trinity et al is still uncertain.

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 15 Feb 2004 21:28

Amir Mir says what we have all been waiting to hear. The other shoe drops.

Link

Fission Smokescreen

The US searchlight flits from Khan to PAEC-NDC, Pak's 'real nuclear hubs' Updates

AMIR MIR

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s proliferation headache shows all signs of becoming even more severe. Sources say the Bush administration has now asked the Pakistan government to debrief scientists at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the National Defence Complex (NDC), fearing Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan just might have been used as a decoy to divert the international community’s attention from these two bodies where substantial work on the country’s nuclear programme was undertaken. (This follows a US rebuttal of Musharraf’s contention that American intelligence inputs on Pakistan’s nuke leaks came his regime’s way only last October, and Israel and Russia expressing serious concern, quite vocally, over the concealed pan-Islamist dimension of the Pak nuclear weapons programme.)

Diplomatic sources in Islamabad say the US demand is based on intelligence showing that most aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear programme—mining and processing of uranium, and designing and manufacturing—were assigned to the PAEC which, till April 6, 2001, was headed by Dr Ashfaq Ahmed. The enrichment of fissile materials to weapons-grade level was the responsibility of the Khan’s Kahuta Research Laboratories. Since Pakistan’s nuclear programme was covert, Khan was encouraged to pose as the ‘father of the bomb’, even though he was responsible for just one of the 24 steps required for producing nuclear weapons. Those entrusted with the other 23 steps worked under Dr Samar Mubarikmand, member (technical) of the PAEC, who reported to chairman Ahmed. Khan’s status was equal to the PAEC chairman’s and he reported to the president directly.

There has been intense competition between KRL and the PAEC to claim credit for Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Ever since his return to Pakistan in 1976, Khan had grabbed headlines; his shadowy sketches began to appear in national and international magazines. Subsequently, he began to openly speak to the press, arrogating to himself the credit for Pakistan’s nuclearisation. But this was challenged in the summer of 1998, after the successful Chagai nuclear explosions. Mubarikmand was quoted saying it was wrong to solely credit the KRL, considering it was responsible for just one of the 24 vital steps in the nuclear programme.

As Khan and Mubarikmand jostled for fame, the US was fast becoming suspicious of Pakistan’s nuke programme. It was under intense pressure from Washington that Musharraf effected, on April 6, 2001, large-scale changes in the country’s nuclear establishment. Khan was retired as KRL chairman and made advisor to the chief executive; Ahmed was packed off from the helm of PAEC; so was Mubarikmand as member (technical).

But there was one vital difference. Mubarikmand, on the same day, was anointed NDC head. This was in effect a promotion: earlier in the year the weapons programme had been transferred to the NDC, as the establishment feared the gathering proliferation storm—and fearing sanctions against organisations known for their roles in the nuclear programme. Diplomatic sources say the US wants Pakistan to debrief Mubarikmand on the basis of intelligence information that he too had been involved in uranium enrichment. Mubarikmand in his younger days had undertaken an experiment involving centrifuges in the ’70s. Though he denied it had any application in uranium enrichment, his supervisor had thought otherwise. It was around this time that Khan produced uranium enrichment blueprints. He demanded a separate organisation and a team of PAEC scientists from then PM, Z.A. Bhutto. Thus the KRL’s birth.

The US intelligence apparently believes all this drama could have been enacted to use Khan as a decoy and divert attention from the PAEC, where the real nuclear programme was carried out. Diplomatic sources say the Americans are aware that the KRL’s scientists constitute only a fifth of the PAEC’s and that it was grossly overmanned considering its workload. This was done to mislead those who would want to train the searchlight on Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In fact, the information acquired by the US suggests the PAEC’s top brass, including Mubarikmand, knew of Khan’s proliferation activities and his clandestine attempts at procurement for the programme. It’s felt that this is reason enough to debrief Mubarikmand.

The Pakistan government’s response to the US demand for the debriefing of PAEC and NDC scientists has been positive. The government has, however, communicated the implausibility of PAEC and the NDC scientists being involved in proliferation, largely because of the stringent security restrictions under which they work. As the PAEC never enjoyed sweeping autonomy, the government circles maintain, the only proliferation charge levelled against Pakistan by the International Atomic Energy Agency pertained to the one preliminary step Khan was responsible for. "Had proliferation been a state policy, the other 23 groups involved in the bomb-making process should have also been leaking out nuclear secrets," insist government officials. They say the blueprints Khan supplied to Libya could well turn out to be the rival KRL design that wasn’t adopted.

Yet, diplomatic sources say, the welter of information the US possesses shows that Pakistanis were assisting North Korea and Iran in accordance with officially vetted agreements for clandestine training of nuclear scientists and mutual exchange of the nuclear know-how. They say no such agreement could have been possible without the military leadership’s approval. These sources say the information was provided to Musharraf on October 6, 2003, at the time deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, assistant secretary of state Christina Rocca and US central command chief John Abizaid descended on Islamabad.

Sources say US intelligence sleuths stationed in Pakistan began to suspect North Korean involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme after Kim Sin-ae, wife of Kang Thae-yun, North Korean economic counsellor in Islamabad, was found murdered. It was Kang Thae who had brokered a deal with an unidentified Russian company to bring to Pakistan Maraging Steel, a key component of missile bodies and nosecones. He and his wife, Kim, were close to Khan. The US agents believe Kim was probably killed by her own government after she approached a British agent, wishing to defect in exchange for Pak and North Korean nuclear secrets. US sleuths were also told a prototype centrifuge was smuggled with her coffin on a special flight from Islamabad.

Diplomatic sources cite US intelligence to claim that since January 2000, after Musharraf came to power, Pakistani nuclear scientists had been working in North Korea and the latter’s missile experts in Pakistan. It was part of the now infamous nuke-for-missile deal. With the US, the EU and Japan providing Pakistan increased economic assistance post 9/11, Islamabad began to pay cash for North Korean missiles. In 2003, large-scale movement of goods under military escort to Pakistan from China via the Karakoram Highway was recorded. While most of the containers ferried spare parts for Chinese arms and ammunition in Pakistan’s arsenal, it is possible, diplomatic sources say, that missile-related goods were sent by North Korea into China and then transported along the Karakoram Highway.

Diplomatic sources here say few believe the military establishment wasn’t aware of the role Khan and his colleagues played in proliferation. But they are willing to not name Musharraf or past governments as long as the US is provided detailed information on the nuclear blackmarket and assured that Islamabad will indeed cap the proliferation for all times to come.

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 15 Feb 2004 21:45

From the latest Newsweek Mag

Pakistan, not Iraq, is probably the world's most dangerous breeding ground for both WMD and terror. But Pakistan is also a key U.S. ally. U.S. officials had to swallow hard while President Pervez Musharraf only mildly disciplined Khan, a national hero, dismissing him from his ceremonial role as adviser. NEWSWEEK has learned that it was the IAEA, rather than the Bush administration, that first put pressure on Pakistan to force Khan to publicly reveal his central role in the network. :eek: :eek:

Rye
BRFite
Posts: 1183
Joined: 05 Aug 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Rye » 15 Feb 2004 21:48

Originally posted by Niranjan Rao:
Someone needs to also tell him that India has exploded a nuke and is a declared nuclear state - thus it cannot sign under the non-nuclear category. (The logic follows that if they expect India to roll back, then so can the rest of the declared states. And, that actually is THE ONLY solution.)
Given that a foundation stone for US foreign policy is to work on possessing the most power weapons possible at any given time, the above is a non solution. The US and the nuclear five are not going to roll back, not now, not ever. The ONLY solution is to trash the NPT and use that for blowing our collective noses.

Vivek_A
BRFite
Posts: 593
Joined: 17 Nov 2003 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Vivek_A » 15 Feb 2004 21:50

Is this for real? Pakistani supplied North Korean and Iranian nukes are pointed at US soldiers in South Korea, Japan and Iraq and the IAEA did more than the Bush administration? This seems kind of odd, especially with the news about the CIA bein all over the proliferation bazaar.

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 15 Feb 2004 21:52

V,

Had Iran not gone to the IAEA, the US and UK would have swept AXK and his scandal under the rug.

jrjrao
BRFite
Posts: 869
Joined: 01 Jul 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby jrjrao » 16 Feb 2004 00:38

KS in TOI:

Pak Proliferation | Why Uncle Sam Wore Blinkers

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/497814.cms

JE Menon
Forum Moderator
Posts: 7043
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby JE Menon » 16 Feb 2004 02:36

The acknowledged disclosures so far have only to do with KRL and NK, Libya, Iran.

The real issue is PAEC leak to Al Qaida. This will be less easy to flesh out, but certainly the stuff is there, they know it. It is only a matter of timing I think, and the roll-out may already have begun.

This might be part of the choreography of pressure designed to get OBL on a platter, to begin with. In any case, Pakistan is in for a few hot months. Summer will be sizzling.

I am increasingly inclined to believe that an N,B, and/or C terror strike is in the offing. Things are getting dicier by the day.

Kuttan
BRFite
Posts: 439
Joined: 12 Jul 1999 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Kuttan » 16 Feb 2004 03:13

Er, JEM, the list has expanded. :D
Tubelights are coming on REEEEAAAAALLLL SLOOOOWWLEEE..

www.reuters.com
China Links with Saudi, Pakistan a U.S. Concern ( :rotfl: )
Updated 4:45 PM ET February 15, 2004

By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States believes China is still cooperating with Saudi Arabia on missiles and with Pakistan on nuclear technology and missiles, despite Beijing's promises to control arms proliferation, U.S. officials said.

These are among the subjects expected to be discussed when senior U.S. and Chinese officials meet this week in Beijing, the U.S. officials told Reuters.

Undersecretary of State John Bolton, the top U.S. non-proliferation official, plans to encourage Chinese participation ... but Beijing's own activities will also be a focus, ..

.....

But it (GOTUS) is also "concerned about what the Saudis are getting from the Chinese in terms of missiles," a U.S. official said. "They want to continue a relationship with the Saudis."

.....

NUCLEAR SAUDI?

For some time, experts have speculated that Saudi Arabia helped bankroll the Pakistani nuclear program with the expectation that at some point it would gain access to a nuclear weapon.

In recent interviews, several senior U.S. officials were cagey about a possible Saudi nuclear program.

One said: "There is no evidence that Pakistan has helped Saudi Arabia with a nuclear program."

But another official said: "There is always concern even if the information is flimsy."

..(blah blah F_A_R_T/Al_Lie blah blah)...

According to Richard Russell of Georgetown University, the Saudis "already have in place a foundation for building a nuclear weapons deterrent."

In the mid-1980s, Riyadh secretly negotiated the $3 billion purchase of 50 to 60 Chinese CSS-2 missiles, with a range of 2,500 miles, U.S. officials have said.

Riyadh and Beijing said the missiles delivered to Saudi Arabia had conventional warheads and rebuffed U.S. requests to inspect them, Russell said.

"It is well past time for Washington to renew calls for independent inspection of the Saudi missiles to ensure that they are armed as the Chinese and Saudis claim, and that ballistic missile modernization efforts are not underway," he said.

In November 2000, China vowed it would not help any country develop ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons.

In August 2002, Beijing published a comprehensive missile export control system but a 2003 CIA report said China continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile projects.

The unclassified version of the CIA report did not mention Saudi Arabia but two U.S. officials told Reuters the kingdom's dealings with China are an issue.

"We have unanswered questions. There is some cooperation we have seen" between China and the Saudis, one official said.

U.S. officials also said China was continuing a nuclear relationship with Pakistan. "The suspicion is that they have not ceased it and that's obviously a problem as well," one official said.

"And not just nuclear, but cooperation with Pakistan in the missile area as well," he added.


China so far has resisted joining the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative under which countries pledge to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction. (Reporting by Carol Giacomo, editing by Anton Ferreira; Reuters messaging: carol.giacomo.reuters.com@reuters.net)

jrjrao
BRFite
Posts: 869
Joined: 01 Jul 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby jrjrao » 16 Feb 2004 03:21

Edit in the Wash. Times.

A bombshell for Musharraf

http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20040214-112841-1578r.htm

Calvin
BRFite
Posts: 623
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Calvin » 16 Feb 2004 04:23

Folks:

KS' article is a keeper. There are a number of questions that derive:

1. He is very careful in not calling Pakistan a proliferator but toes the line that Khan was the proliferator. Is this the GOI/GOTUS line that KS is toeing?

2. He points at China, understandably

3. He also takes Musharraf's cue and focuses attention on European proliferators. I'm not sure what they are angling for here. I've been inclined to think of Euro proliferation as for-profit since state-entities are not involved. Are we trying to flush the Germans and Italians out of the closet?

4. Interesting comments on Bush's plan:

his exhortation to nuclear suppliers group (NSG) to refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment to any state that does not already possess full-scale functioning and reprocessing plants is intriguing. The only instance of this type is China establishing a plutonium reactor and providing assistance for a reprocessing plant in Pakistan . Mr Bush is silent on China , which is not a member of the NSG.
This is probably a disguised pointer at China to come clean on NK and Pakistan. He then goes on to note a possible carrot for India.

It is not clear whether the exhortation to the NSG not to supply to states without a full fuel cycle facility enrichment and reprocessing technology would mean that it could, in future, lift its embargoes on dealing with India since India has full fuel cycle capability.
Finally, the Additional Protocol has an interesting loophole:

He requires that only countries which sign additional protocol permitting IAEA full inspection rights should be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programme. India can sign the additional protocol on the same conditions as the five nuclear weapon powers. Will that be acceptable to the nuclear five?

Prateek
BRFite
Posts: 310
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Prateek » 16 Feb 2004 04:37

It seems that the days of reckoning the evil Pentagon (China, KSA, Pakistan, Iran and NKorea) are not far off ...

Prateek
BRFite
Posts: 310
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Prateek » 16 Feb 2004 04:46

Op-ed: Nuclear issue and domestic politics —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-2-2004_pg3_2

The prime minister should have summoned a meeting of the heads of the political parties represented in the Parliament, consulting them on the issue before the scientists were publicly accused of illicit nuclear transactions.

The on-going debate in Pakistan on the nuclear scientists issue is highly polemical and contentious, reflecting the non-accommodative and non-consensual nature of Pakistani politics. Despite the sensitivity of the issue, the government and the opposition are locked in their highly partisan positions, not making any effort to bridge the gap between their perspectives in order to evolve a shared approach.

The government is pursuing the nuclear issue secretively, sharing as little information as possible with the opposition and the ordinary people. This has made the government vulnerable to the charge that it has given in too much to international pressure. The opposition’s disposition lacks the appreciation of the dynamics of the current international context of a highly skewed power structure and the deep concern of the international community about weapons of mass destruction. They have attempted to avail of the issue to pressurise the Musharraf-Jamali government for pulling it down.

The polemical exchanges between the government and the opposition gave rise to conspiracy theories and shocked and confused the information-starved ordinary people. To the good luck of the government, the opposition parties have not been able to overcome their mutual differences while addressing the nuclear scientist issue, which has partly compromised their ability to pressure the government.

The management of the nuclear scientists issue shows that policy making and management continues to be dominated by a centralised, narrow-based and military-intelligence dominated establishment. They are self-assured of their ability to best understand the national interest and protect it adequately. It is not therefore surprising that the prime minister and his cabinet had little to do with the management of the present crisis. The key policy managers expect the political-civilian elements and the leaders of public opinion not to raise controversies because it diverts their attention from dealing with the security and diplomatic fall out of the nuclear issue.

Pakistan’s official circles released very little information on their own; the top army official of the Strategic Plans Division gave briefings to a small number of selected press people to avoid difficult questions. The president’s meeting with the press came very late. The Pakistani version of the nuclear controversy came out mainly in response to news reporting and comments by the western press and statements of the official spokespersons of US Department of State or the White House or the International Atomic Energy Agency. This gave rise to speculations in Pakistan, enabling the opposition to resort to emotional appeals for rousing the people against the government.

The opposition leaders are accusing the government, especially General Pervez Musharraf, of a ‘sell out’ under US pressure; some leaders with conservative Islamic orientations have gone to the extent of suggesting that Pakistan should have refused to undertake investigations and that there is nothing wrong in providing nuclear technology to Islamic countries. The western countries are involved in nuclear proliferation but Pakistan is being targeted because it is the only Islamic country possessing nuclear weapons, it is argued.

Other opposition comments emphasise that the present investigation is the beginning of the end of Pakistan’s nuclear programme; first Pakistan would be asked to allow inspections of its nuclear programme and then it would be forced to give up nuclear weapons. The most repeated charge is that a national hero has been disgraced to save the army and intelligence personnel who could be involved in the illicit nuclear transactions.

However, the opposition parties have not been able to present a unified stand against the government. The Jamaat-e-Islami-led one-day strike on February 6 in the name of the MMA produced a lukewarm response in the country. Other MMA parties, including the MMA government in NWFP, did not take part in the strike. The ARD parties stayed away, although they bitterly criticised President Musharraf on the handling of the nuclear issue. The ARD has started a week-long anti-Musharraf protest on February 13 but it is expected to be a limited and sporadic affair; the MMA has not joined the strike.

One inescapable conclusion is that there is a lack of consensus not only between the government and the opposition but also within the opposition ranks. The divided and fragmented nature of the opposition has been highlighted during these days. The opposition parties need to give more attention to serious and in-depth study of the issues they wish to highlight. The statement of their leaders and their party position must be backed up with hard and credible data. There is hardly any statement of the opposition leaders that reflected any understanding of the sensitivity of the present crisis and an understanding of international dynamics. None of the statements provided alternative policy options, although criticism of the government’s handling of the nuclear issues was quite sharp. It would be a service to the country if the opposition parties were to establish research infrastructures for producing studies on national and international issues that met academic standards. This would help make the statements and the positions of the opposition leaders credible.

The government should also take steps to encourage informed debate on national issues. Hence it should increase civilian-political input to the military-intelligence dominated decision making on key policy issues. Some internal and external difficulties currently being faced by Pakistan can be traced back to narrow military-dominated perspectives that shaped Pakistan’s security related choices in the 1980s and the 1990s.

In the case of the present nuclear crisis, the prime minister should have summoned a meeting of the heads of the political parties represented in the Parliament, consulting them on the issue before the scientists were publicly accused of illicit nuclear transactions. The prime minister could have asked the opposition leaders for their cooperation on such a sensitive issue.

The government should disseminate information about the institutional arrangements for the management of Pakistan’s nuclear assets and policies. Some information on the National Command Authority (NCA) was released when it was set up in February 2000 and some data on it is available on the Internet.

Recently, a brigadier from the Strategic Plans Division made an informed presentation on the NCA in a seminar organised by the Pakistan National Forum in Lahore. Perhaps this was the first public presentation of the institutional arrangement for the nuclear programme by an official which was appreciated by the participants of the seminar.

The Ministry of Defence and especially the NCA should make more efforts to inform the people about the nuclear policy and its management in order to encourage an informed dialogue. This will also contribute to building trust between the policy managers and the people.

The government needs to consider the above suggestions because the nuclear controversy will not end soon. The IAEA and the major global actors, especially the US, would pressurise Pakistan to secure information gathered from the scientists and others. They would also demand iron-clad guarantees for ensuring that such incidents did not happen again. These pressures would be coupled with the doubts of west-based nuclear watch groups about Pakistan’s official story on nuclear proliferation.

Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

Prateek
BRFite
Posts: 310
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Prateek » 16 Feb 2004 04:58

Pull the pin on this rogue's gallery of bomb-makers
By Hamish McDonald
February 16, 2004

[color=red size=+2.0]Nuclear treachery from Pakistan and North Korea must be halted.</font>

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/15/1076779833366.html

Two months ago, North Korea invited an American non-government delegation into its secret nuclear facility at Yongbyon and showed off some bomb-grade plutonium metal. It even allowed a metallurgist who once directed the key US weapons facility at Los Alamos to handle the stuff to assess its weight.

The contrast with other nations - Saddam Hussein's Iraq or ayatollah-run Iran, for example - on the US list of secret nuclear weapons developers could not have been more stark.

Prospects of reconvening six-nation talks on a voluntary disarmament (involving North Korea with the US, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia) were still hazy. North Korea's stance could be read as straight hardball atmospherics, upping the ante for firm US security guarantees and billions of dollars of aid before it moved to scrap its bombs. But the ground for the new North Korea talks has shifted drastically since a commencement date, February 25, was finally set a couple of weeks ago.

The recent bombshell revelations in Pakistan have put a completely different slant on the North Korean gambit of displaying its plutonium. Many closely involved diplomats think Kim Jong-il's regime was drawing a large and radioactive red herring across the noses of the world's nuclear proliferation sniffer-dogs.

In Pakistan, the scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, whose technology thefts from Europe allowed Islamabad to construct a nuclear bomb, confessed to providing North Korea, among other "rogue" nations, with nuclear weapons technology. In particular, Khan provided plans and components for enrichment centrifuges to make bomb-grade uranium.

Enough has emerged to establish that Khan made several trips to North Korea since the mid-1990s. The technology transferred might have included not only blueprints but a working example of a centrifuge. His claim that this was a personal enterprise for private reward has to be taken with a large dose of salt. It was clearly linked to North Korea's provision of ballistic missile know-how - Pakistan's Ghauri missiles are a knock-off of North Korea's Nodong rockets - and Pakistan's Air Force shuttled the centrifuge and missile parts across Chinese airspace.

The crisis, it will be remembered, started in October 2002 when the US assistant secretary of state for East Asia, James Kelly, went to Pyongyang and told the North Koreans that the US had documentary evidence of the uranium enrichment program, which breached a 1994 agreement. According to Kelly, the North Koreans admitted and defended the effort (though they now vehemently deny this).

Within three months, North Korea declared the 1994 deal dead, withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and reactivated the Yongbyon plant, which included a large storage pond of spent nuclear fuel rods and a nearby reprocessing plant.

In the year since, the world has been fixated by the Yongbyon plutonium activity. Until recently Washington was not showing much to substantiate the uranium enrichment charge, and its dismal intelligence record on Iraq has not helped. China, the host of the inconclusive first round of six-nation talks here in August, was openly dismissing it as unsubstantiated. Like a fearful South Korea, it was pressuring the US to get back to the negotiating table with some tangible inducements to get Yongbyon under control and its plutonium accounted for.

To the chagrin of the Bush Administration's neo-conservatives, the diplomatic process was heading back to a rerun of the 1994 freeze-for-aid deal signed by the Clinton administration. The risk of a new Korean war was simply too big for a more forceful approach.

Now such a deal would be suspect, unless it included the uranium centrifuges. Kim Jong-il would be ostentatiously giving up his plutonium industry and any weapons based on it, while holding up his sleeve the uranium enrichment program, which is more easily hidden and draws on North Korea's ample reserves of natural uranium ore.

It is unclear if Pyongyang actually has centrifuges in production let alone made any bombs yet from enrichment uranium, but the prospect would be there. Khan's confessions have made it much harder for any of the Beijing participants to ignore it. China's embarrassment is deepening as it emerges that Khan was also "sharing" the atomic-bomb design that China gave Pakistan in the early 1980s to help it catch up with India.

The Beijing talks are suddenly looking even tougher. The new allegations that Kim Jong-il's regime is testing chemical and biological weapons on political prisoners adds a sinister new edge. But to resolve all doubts about North Korea's nuclear intentions, said one diplomat closely following the talks, "You are looking at a complete settlement of all the leftover Cold War issues in North-East Asia."

Yet to make unsatisfactory deals in the expectation Kim Jong-il's regime will soon collapse - as Bill Clinton did in 1994 - could again be badly mistaken.

jrjrao
BRFite
Posts: 869
Joined: 01 Jul 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby jrjrao » 16 Feb 2004 05:01

Radioactive nation
J.N. Dixit
The first Pakistani nuclear device was tested at China’s testing site at Lopnor in Sinkiang in 1987.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_573675,00120001.htm

Prateek
BRFite
Posts: 310
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Prateek » 16 Feb 2004 05:03

A tale of nuclear proliferation: How a Pakistani built his network

By W. BROAD, D. SANGER and RAYMOND BONNERNew York Times News Service

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/NewsStory.aspx?section=Focus&oid=44854

The break for US intelligence operatives tracking Abdul Qadeer Khan’s nuclear network came in the wet August heat in Malaysia, as five giant cargo containers full of specialized centrifuge parts were loaded into one of the nondescript vessels that ply the Strait of Malacca.

The CIA had penetrated the factory of Scomi Precision Engineering, where one of the nuclear network’s operatives -- known to the workers only as Tinner -- watched over the production of the delicate machinery needed to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. Spy satellites tracked the shipment as it wended its way to Dubai, where it was relabeled “used machinery” and transferred to a German-owned ship, the BBC China. When it headed through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, the order went out from Washington to have it seized.

That seizure led to the unraveling of a trading network that sent bomb-making designs and equipment to at least three countries -- Iran, North Korea and Libya -- and has laid bare the limits of international controls on nuclear proliferation. On Wednesday, President Bush proposed to enhance that system by restricting the production of nuclear fuel to a few nations.

The scope and audacity of the illicit network are still not fully known. Nor is whether the Pakistani military or government, which had supported Khan’s research, was complicit in his activities.

But what has become clear in recent days is that Khan, a Pakistani national hero who began his rise 30 years ago by importing nuclear equipment to secretly build his country’s atom bomb, gradually transformed himself into the largest and most sophisticated exporter in the nuclear black market.

“It was an astounding transformation when you think about it, something we’ve never seen before,” said a senior US official who has reviewed the intelligence. “First, he exploits a fragmented market and develops a quite advanced nuclear arsenal. Then he throws the switch, reverses the flow and figures out how to sell the whole kit, right down to the bomb designs, to some of the world’s worst governments.”

The story of that transformation emerges from recent interviews on three continents -- from Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; from the back streets of Dubai, where many of the deals were cut, to Washington and Vienna, where intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency struggled to understand and defuse the threat.

Taken together, they show how Khan assembled a far-reaching organization of scientists, engineers and businessmen who operated on murky boundaries between the legal and the illegal, sometimes underground but often in plain view, unencumbered by international agreements that prohibit trafficking in nuclear technology.

Khan started in the mid-1980s, according to intelligence officials, by ordering twice the number of parts the Pakistani nuclear program needed, and then selling the excess to other countries, notably Iran.

Later, his network acquired another customer: North Korea, which was desperate for a more surreptitious way to build nuclear weapons after the United States had frozen the North’s huge plutonium-production facilities in Yongbyon.

And in the end, he moved on to Libya, his ultimate undoing, sellingen tire kits, from centrifuges to enrich uranium, to crude weapon designs. Investigators found the weapons blue prints wrapped in bags from an Islamabad dry cleaner.

In his speech on Wednesday, Bush said the network even sold raw uranium to be processed into bomb fuel. He also identified Khan’s deputy -- “the network’s chief financial officer and money-launderer,” he called him -- as Bukhari Sayed Abu Tahir, owner of a computer company in Dubai, who, investigators say, placed the order for the Libyan equipment.

One long-time associate of Khan’s was Peter Griffin, a British engineer who said in an interview that he had been a supplier to Pakistan for two decades while Khan was building nuclear weapons.” Anything that could be sent to Pakistan, I sent to Pakistan,” he said. But he said that all his sales had been approved by British trade authorities.

Griffin is also the partner in a Dubai company that investigators said placed the order for materials that wound up on the ship headed for Libya, although he denies knowing anything about that shipment.

Hints of Khan’s operation were an open secret for years among intelligence officers and officials in Pakistan, the United States and elsewhere. But Pakistan’s President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, confronted Khan only after the BBC China was seized on its way to Libya and evidence of the network tumbled out. Last week, Khan issued a public confession and then was pardoned by Musharraf.

The deference shown Khan at the end began decades before, when he was working secretly and successfully to make his country a nuclear power.

“Khan had a complete blank check,” said one aide close to Musharraf. “He could do anything. He could go anywhere. He could buy anything at any price.”

Khan’s start came with India’s first atomic test in 1974, an event that so traumatized Pakistan that developing its own weapon became the country’s most pressing goal. “We will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own,” said Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then the prime minister.

Khan, a bright young Pakistani metallurgist working in the Netherlands, lent his aid. From his perch at Urenco, a European consortium, he possessed blueprints of the world’s best centrifuges -- the hollow metal tubes that spin very fast to enrich natural uranium into bomb fuel. A set of thousands of centrifuges, called a cascade, concentrates the rare U-235 isotope to make a potent fuel.

“I saw top-secret technical drawings in his house,” recalled Frits Veerman, a Dutch colleague who shared an office with Khan.

Khan stole the designs, Dutch prosecutors charged, and he fled back to Pakistan in 1976. He used the blueprints and his knowledge to setup an enrichment project in Kahuta, near Islamabad, that reported directly to the prime minister. He drew heavily on Dutch lists of nearly 100 companies that supplied centrifuge parts and materials.

“They literally begged us to buy their equipment,” Khan boasted in 2001 in a publication celebrating the 25th anniversary of his Pakistani laboratory. “My long stay in Europe and intimate knowledge of various countries and their manufacturing firms was an asset.”

Businessmen and merchants, including German, Dutch and French middlemen, flocked to Pakistan to offer price lists for high-technology goods and learn what Pakistan needed. The multilingual Khan led the acquisition effort. His shopping spree spanned the world.

“Africa was important because of the materials needed,” said a senior Pakistani official involved in the investigation of Khan.” Europe was crucial for bringing in high-tech machines and components. Dubai was the place for shipments and for payments.

“We were not the first beneficiaries of this network. But the intensity of Pakistan’s nuclear acquisition effort did enlarge the market. Everybody knew that there is a buyer out there, loaded with money and hell bent on getting this ultimate weapon.”

Even in the early days, the trade was no secret. Washington sent Germany dozens of complaints about their leaky export-control system that let “dual use” technology leave even though some was clearly intended for Pakistan’s nuclear program, said Mark Hibbs, a Germany-based editor of a technical journal, Nucleonics Week. But many of those warnings were ignored, he said.

Veerman said that Dutch companies continued to work with Khan after it was clear that he was developing centrifuges for a weapon. Khan even sent scientists to the Netherlands in the late 1970s for centrifuge-related training.

Eventually, the flow of technology reversed, two senior Pakistani military officials involved in the probe of Khan said. “These contacts and channels were later used for sending technology out of Pakistan by certain individuals,” a military official said,” including Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan.”

Khan had three motives, investigators say. He was eager to defy the West and pierce “clouds of the so-called secrecy,” as he once put it. He was equally eager to transfer technology to other Muslim nations, according to a senior Pakistani politician. “He also said that giving technology to a Muslim country was not a crime,” the politician said.

But another motive appears to have been money. As Khan’s nuclear successes grew, so did his wealth. He acquired homes and properties, including a tourist hotel in Africa.

A family friend said that Khan spoke of the centrifuge designs he perfected as if the technology belonged to him personally, not to Pakistan. A senior politician said that in meetings with Chaudry Shujat Hussain, leader of a Pakistani political party, Khan never spoke of selling the technology, only of “sharing” it.

He started slowly. He simply ordered more parts in the black market than he needed for Pakistan.

At first, Western intelligence agencies tracking Khan were perplexed.

“In the 1980s, I remember being told by officials that Khan was over-ordering centrifuge parts and they couldn’t understand why,” recalled Simon Henderson, a London-based author who has written extensively about Khan. It eventually became clear that the extras went to clients outside Pakistan.

Around 1987, Khan struck a deal with Iran, which wanted to build 50,000 centrifuges of a type known as P-1, for Pakistan-1, an entry-level model, Western investigators found. If it had been completed, a plant that size would let Tehran make fuel for about 30 atom bombs each year.

As Pakistan’s own technology became more sophisticated, Khan sold old Pakistani centrifuges and parts, Western investigators found, some contaminated with highly enriched uranium.

Iran appears to have acquired such second-hand gear. “They were not happy to discover they over paid for old wares,” said one US intelligence official. But for Iran, it was a start.

A Pakistani military official involved in the investigation of Dr. Khan said foreign requests for technology “came on paper, in person, through third parties, in meetings with Khan himself.”

The scientist then used the vast logistic system available to him, which included government cargo planes, to ship the components to middlemen, who cloaked the source.

“The same network, the same routes, the same people who brought the technology in were also sending it out,” said the military official.

In the final stages of his export career, Khan simply used his middlemen to order large shipments of parts for foreigners, even if Pakistan had no apparent role in the transaction and appeared to receive no direct benefits, US investigators said.

When Libya embarked on its two-step effort to become a nuclear weapons state, Khan’s network was presented with an opportunity to sell a particularly sophisticated system. The network was moving to anew level of ambition.

Libya’s initial focus was the aging Pak-1 design, US and European investigators said. But eventually the Libyans sought a more efficient technology, the Pak-2, made of maraging steel, a superhard alloy. That design has steel rotors that could spin nearly twice as fast as earlier aluminum ones, doubling the rate of enrichment.

The central figure in the Libyan Pak-2 effort, US officials said, was Tahir, a Sri Lankan native who had moved to Dubai as a child. Khan had attended Tahir’s wedding in 1998, Malaysian officials said.

In his speech on Wednesday, Bush said that Tahir used a company he owned in Dubai, SMB Computers, “as a front for the proliferation activities of the A.Q. Khan network.”

Another associate whose name surfaced in the Libyan deal was Griffin, the British engineer who long procured gear for Khan, according to investigators in several countries, corporate records and company officials.

Interviewed by telephone from France, Griffin, 68, declined to discuss details of his early relationship with Khan but said he had known him for decades. “We met ages ago,” he said.

Griffin said that all the exports he sent to Pakistan were approved by the British Department of Trade and Industry and that he had done nothing illegal. Griffin said that British authorities had seized his computer in June from his home in France. That had given rise to false suspicions that Gulf Technical Industries and myself were doing things for Libya, Griffin said. “There’s no such truth in it,” he added.

In June 2000, according to investigators and public records, Griffin set up a trading company in Dubai, Gulf Technical Industries, that contracted with a Malaysian company to make sophisticated parts.

The company, Scomi Group Berhard, said it signed a contract with Gulf Technical in December 2001 to supply the components. Griffin and Tahir met with company officials in February 2001 to discuss the deal, a Scomi official said. After the contract was signed, Scomi set up Scomi Precision Engineering, hired some 40 workers, bought costly machine tools and began work, the Scomi official said.

Khan provided the blueprints for the machines and parts, said a close aide to Musharraf who is familiar with the Pakistani investigation. “He had given them most of the designs,” the aide said. At one point, Khan suggested that two of his senior aides go join the Malaysian enterprise, he said.

Scomi Precision made its first shipment to Gulf Technical in December 2002, and the last in August 2003. Investigators said the shipments were largely Pak-2 centrifuge parts.

Throughout the work at Scomi Precision, the man known as `Tinner,”an engineer sent from Dubai by Tahir, was on site over seeing the work, a Scomi official said.

In a news release, Scomi said the shipments had consisted only of “14 semi-finished components.” Company officials said they neverknew of the intended use of the parts.

A senior Bush administration official disputed the company’s account, saying it would be highly unlikely that someone there did not know what they were producing. US and European weapons experts also said that Scomi had actually shipped thousands of centrifuge parts. “Their goal was far-reaching,” a top European nuclear expert said of the Libyans. “They had ordered this very large amount.”

Griffin acknowledged that he had been to Malaysia and that he and Tahir had met with Scomi officials. But he said the discussion had to do with exports of tanker trucks, a deal he said never materialized. Griffin said that if Tahir had continued to meet with Scomi officials, or struck any deals, he did not authorize it.

But a Scomi official said the meeting was to discuss Scomi’s contract for finely-tooled parts.

Malaysian officials said that Tahir is under investigation in Malaysia, but is not under arrest. His younger brother, Seyed Ibrahim Bukhary, denied in a telephone interview this week that Tahir held any important ownership position in SMB Computers, the company in Dubai.

Bush said that Malaysian authorities have assured Washington that the Scomi factory is no longer producing centrifuge parts.

A US expert said that the Libyans planned on making at least 10,000 of the machines. Such a complex would make enough highly enriched uranium each year for about ten nuclear weapons.

But the advanced centrifuges never reached Libya. They were seized on the BBC China. When investigators went to Libya, they found that Khan’s network had also provided blueprints for a nuclear weapon. For investigators it was a startling revelation of how audacious and dangerous the black market had become. And it made them recognize that they did not know who else out there was buying and selling.

Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said: “We haven’t really seen the full picture.”

Rye
BRFite
Posts: 1183
Joined: 05 Aug 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Rye » 16 Feb 2004 05:07

Oooh, china has decided to proliferate nukes via NK rather than pakisan. How interesting!

Rye
BRFite
Posts: 1183
Joined: 05 Aug 2001 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Rye » 16 Feb 2004 05:10

Originally posted by Calvin:
This is probably a disguised pointer at China to come clean on NK and Pakistan. He then goes on to note a possible carrot for India.
Firstly, there is no carrot on this planet that will make China come clean on its proliferation activities, which is part of a carfully planned strategy to ensure that every mortal enemy of the US is armed with a nuke, and the pakis were in charge of that plan, till they ficked up big time.

As they say, "if you want it done right, you gotta do it yourself"

Div
BRFite
Posts: 327
Joined: 16 Aug 1999 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Div » 16 Feb 2004 05:36

I think I mentioned this a couple of months ago, but let me say this again, the Aussies sure seem to have their undies in a knot. I wonder why...could it could have been the NK nukes or the planned LeT attacks?

Guest

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Guest » 16 Feb 2004 06:08

Pakistan has grown into a malignant cancer in every respect - this is just a symptom.

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby shiv » 16 Feb 2004 06:24

The MSNBC article above and the KSub articles make good reading.

The points they make are:

1)Proliferation has been in high gear because all the high tech machines needed for proliferation have been merrily manufactured and exported from a whole lot of advanced Western nations to rogue states. This list includes Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, UK, France, Italy and the US - also Malaysia.

2)In many cases the manufacturers of these components either really did not know what they were for, or they will pretend that they did not know. Inevitably a caste system will develop here. Those companies that have financial and political clout will be declared "innocent" of wrongdoing, and those that do not, wil be guilty.

3)Whatever the reason for proliferation, the horse has now bolted. I love warm cuddly Uranium 235. It has a half life of 700 million years. And a whole lot of nations have now got together and collected a whole lot of Uranium 235. Great stuff.

Actually the nations who are getting their testimonials squeezed maximally in this game are not the low tech proliferators nor the high tech suppliers of machines.

It is the "sincere and truthful about non-proliferation" nations - possibly New Zealand, Japan, and a whole lot of Africal and South American states. The reason I am not putting India on this list is because although India has been sincere abouit non-prol, it falls in a different category.

India falls in the category of nations who have been at risk of nuclear attack since the 1960s - so this wild proliferation hardly makes a differnece to us. But it makes a big difference to nations who never ever wanted to risk nuke war.

shyam
BRFite
Posts: 1453
Joined: 29 Jul 2003 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby shyam » 16 Feb 2004 06:27

Looks like they are getting noose around China too...
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3491329.stm

pran
BRFite
Posts: 110
Joined: 09 Oct 2001 11:31
Location: internet

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby pran » 16 Feb 2004 06:44

In the mid-1980s, Riyadh secretly negotiated the $3 billion purchase of 50 to 60 Chinese CSS-2 missiles, with a range of 2,500 miles, U.S. officials have said.
Why 2500 miles and not something around 1000 miles targetting their arch enemy Israel.It is my hypothesis that these are targetted towards the channel,which have been the origin of most of the geo political conflicts and the people behind them.

Div
BRFite
Posts: 327
Joined: 16 Aug 1999 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Div » 16 Feb 2004 06:52

Crossposting;

THE DOUBLE STANDARD IN WHO GETS NUKES
Richard Reeves

Kumar
BRFite
Posts: 259
Joined: 13 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Kumar » 16 Feb 2004 07:38

If Iran and Libya had the centriguge technology and the weapon designs, then I can bet that Saudi Arabia has the bomb . They have always had money and ambition to buy themselves a "grand vision".

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16814
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby NRao » 16 Feb 2004 07:43

Pakistan in nuclear 'cover-up' row

Relatives of six scientists who worked with A.Q. Khan, the disgraced "father of the Islamic bomb", have accused Islamabad of indulging in a cover-up to protect the Pakistani military from being tainted by the nuclear proliferation scandal.


The Pakistani government alleges that the scientists "passed on" nuclear materials, designs and machinery to "foreign countries", thought to be Libya, Iran and North Korea.

General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, pardoned A.Q. Khan last week after he had confessed to having been the kingpin of the nuclear proliferation racket. In a speech last Wednesday, George W. Bush, US president, upheld Gen Musharraf's view that A.Q. Khan and his colleagues had acted alone and for financial motives.

But relatives of the six scientists, who are being held at undisclosed locations and have not been permitted access to lawyers, say that on Monday they intend to present evidence showing that the scientists could not have transferred the materials from Khan Research Laboratories without being detected.

They say that the site was closely guarded by Pakistani troops and agents working for Inter-Services Intelligence, the Pakistani equivalent of the US's Central Intelligence Agency.

The relatives will argue that it would have been impossible to smuggle centrifuge components out of the KRL site. They plan to present organisational details of the KRL site showing the degree to which the intelligence services were integrated with the rest of the operations.

Pakistani officials say the intense security was to protect against external threats.

"You cannot get radioactive bits of machinery past such tight security without being discovered," Shafiq Sajawal - whose father, Sajawal Khan, 66, was head of maintenance and construction at the KLR - told the Financial Times.

"They [the scientists] are being scapegoated by the Pakistan government."

The Pakistani government said in a submission to the Rawalpindi bench of the Lahore high court this week that it was detaining the scientists for another three months under a law that would classify the six as a security threat.

Pakistani officials say the men were part of a cabal of "rogue scientists", led by A.Q. Khan, who operated without the knowledge or blessing of any higher authority. But relatives say they have been declared guilty without trial.

Sheikh Rashid, Pakistan's minister for information, would not comment on the relatives' specific allegations but said they should await the outcome of the government investigation.

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby shiv » 16 Feb 2004 08:14

Eureka!!

You can rest easy folks. I have figured out the solution to this problemof proliferation. In fact all is going on well - because the problem that started in Pakistan has thankfully ended in Pakistan.

It's like this.

Can you really blame the President of France, the PotUS. the British PM or the Sultan of Switzerland for the proliferation role of companies in their territory?

Of course not, you silly twit.

And by the same token, can you blame Musharraf for the proliferation by Qopier Khan? Of course not.

And Khan has apologised. I am sure the companies involved will apologise too.

And that is it, Proliferation has ended. Close this thread and talk about more pressing issues.

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 16 Feb 2004 08:17

Okay. It's official now. Uneven Cohen is on Pakistan Army payroll.

Here's uneven's OpEd in tomorrow's NY Times.

Out of the Nuclear Loop

By STEPHEN P. COHEN

ASHINGTON — The news coming out of Pakistan seems more like the stuff of bad fiction: a rogue scientist selling secrets to other countries; an emotional staged confession; a president who claims to be in the dark about it all. The reality, of course, is that the scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, did sell nuclear technology. And Washington has accepted the explanation of Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, that Dr. Khan was acting on his own when he did so.

Dr. Khan's confession suits both Pakistan and America, since rounding up Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders (many may be hiding in Pakistan) trumps other concerns. But it is widely believed in Pakistan and elsewhere that the government knew of Dr. Khan's activities. This would make President Musharraf, as well as army and intelligence services, complicit in the nuclear crime of the century.

As improbable as it may seem, though, President Musharraf may, for once, be telling the truth. But the fact that this rogue operation could have been mostly unknown to the Islamabad government and its army should trouble the world even more — and propel Washington into rethinking its policies toward Pakistan.

[color=dark green]Strategically, it is unlikely that the Pakistani Army — let alone intelligence officials — would have directed Dr. Khan to sell nuclear secrets to North Korea, Libya and Iraq. Why? It is more important for Pakistan to keep good relations with China than with North Korea, and selling to North Korea certainly angered the Chinese. As for Libya and Iraq, Pakistani strategists knew that helping a Middle Eastern state acquire nuclear weapons would bring the wrath of the Israelis.</font>
[color=blue size=0.5]I'd normally :o The only Pakistan officials who know nuclear strategy and have a grasp of diplomacy are in the army. The bomb is no doubt safer in their hands than in those of another feeble civilian government. So far, we've been asking the wrong question. It's not whether President Musharraf and his army knew of Dr. Khan's activities — but why they didn't.
Can you say chutzpah?

arun
BRF Oldie
Posts: 10248
Joined: 28 Nov 2002 12:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby arun » 16 Feb 2004 09:06

AQ Khan suffers heart attack, condition critical: Report

The interesting bit is that this PTI story quotes Dawn, but I could not find the story on Dawn.

Presumably the heavy hand of Pakistani censorship has descended on Dawn.

Vriksh
BRFite
Posts: 406
Joined: 27 Apr 2003 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Vriksh » 16 Feb 2004 09:11

here is the dawn link dawn link for AQK heart-attack

Rak
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 54
Joined: 21 Jun 2000 11:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby Rak » 16 Feb 2004 09:14

Interesting plan. I thought the ISI would use a plane crash or something like that to get rid of Khan.

arun
BRF Oldie
Posts: 10248
Joined: 28 Nov 2002 12:31

Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

Postby arun » 16 Feb 2004 09:14

Originally posted by cshankar:
here is the dawn link dawn link for AQK heart-attack
Thanks. I stand corrected.


Return to “Nuclear Issues Archive”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest