Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 11 Feb 2004

[AJay]

Originally posted by Mohan Raju:
These Packees are ridiculous! Robert Oppenheimer had nothing to do with the Soviets getting the atom bomb.

Mohan Raju

You are quite right. He was a victim of the McCarthian purge. There were several other geniuses who were persecuted during that time including Paul Erdos.

[svinayak]

Originally posted by shiv:

For China, that has "full cycle" capability, and which actually has access to stolen miniature warhead designs from the US - URENCO-Khan designs must have been nothing more than a curiosity. Why would China need U235 enrichment via the relatively ineffficient centrifuge route when they have everything. It is dufficult to swallow that story.

Shiv, You have raised very important quesiton where things dont add up. The reason for China spin is to show that it is a mutual beneficial relationship and it was not a ulterior one way tranfer to arm a rogue country. The way china is behaving it looks like it was a puppet in the entire croocked scheme.

Originally posted by shiv:

As for DPRK and established Pu bomb designs - why on earth would DPRK want Paki centrifuges or Paki HEU if they had Pu designs. Why would they give missiles and Pu designs to Pakistan and risk the attention of the great Satan unless their so called Pu design was useless or non existent.

This one is little complex. This looks more like a forced purchase to give a perception that it was transfer benefiting both parties. DPRK did not need anything but the agreement in 1994 was a sham to work on a covert PU program. DPRK was allowed to sell its missile to TSP as a favor by some powerful power brokers.

Think of everybody in this thing; deliberately to hoodwink the entire world before NPT was signed.

[Calvin]

OK folks, this thread is moving rapidly, but I'd like to draw your attention to a news article that Musharraf air-dashed to Karachi after the visit of the CIA team (led by Tenet, possibly including Rocca). Musharraf's visit to Karachi was not a scheduled visit.

Does anyone know why he would want to meet with the Karachi Corps Commander, Lt-Gen. Ahsen Saleem Hayat and discuss matters relating to "operational preparedness, administration and welfare of the troops."

KARACHI, Feb 14: President Gen Pervez Musharraf has said that a vibrant economy and strong defence are key elements to security, peace and development of any country and by the grace of Allah almighty Pakistan , which already has an impregnable defence, has also taken strides in stabilising its economy.

He made these observations while speaking to officers of the Karachi Garrison here on Saturday.

The President said that unswerving faith in Allah Almighty, high standards of professionalism and discipline and devotion to duty complemented with adequate weaponry and equipment were hallmarks of the Pakistan armed forces.

He dwelt at length on the prevailing international and regional security situation and other matters of professional interest.

The President also spoke of the measures that have been taken during the last four years for the national economy, poverty alleviation and reforms in the public sector.

Later, the President, accompanied by the Corps Commander, reached the Corps Headquarters. They remained together for some time.

The Corps Commander, Lt-Gen. Ahsen Saleem Hayat, apprised the President about matters relating to operational preparedness, administration and welfare of the troops.-APP

http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/15/top4.htm

From Kamran Khan (ex-MI) we know that by October 7th of next year, Hayat will be one of two of the senior most Lt. Gens in the army along with Lt. Gen Ghazi.

By giving an opportunity to lieutenants general Ahsan Salim Hayat and Javed Hassan to command corps, President Pervez Musharraf was basically ensuring that two of the senior-most lieutenants general of Pakistan Army are also considered when he selects the new Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) next year

http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-daily/21-12-2003/main/main2.htm

KARACHI : Pakistan may have a new Chief of Army Staff by October 2004, though no public pledge has been made by the country's President Pervez Musharraf on this account so far. If sources close to Musharraf are to be believed, the President will only appoint that military commander to this prestigious post who commands his loyalty ... According to The News, Musharraf would also like to maintain his command and control over key national security institutions unless his latest peace offensive with India is decided one way or the other before the Indian elections to be held in or before October next year. Officials in the know have predicted that in the unlikely event of his decision to continue as COAS after October next year, he would most certainly appoint a new vice chief and of course a new chairman joint chief of staff.

While selecting his successor, he could also have the option of just elevating the present Vice Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Yusuf, with whom he has "developed the smoothest of relationships." Though not a very old friend of the president's, General Yusuf caught Musharraf's personal attention and admiration through his hard work as the military secretary at the MS Branch of the GHQ during the early weeks of the military government. Subsequently he became Gen Musharraf's first choice for the posting as chief of general staff (CGS) and finally as the VCOAS.

For the post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCOS) to be vacated in October by General Aziz Khan, informed officials said that Musharraf can ask the present naval chief, Shahid Karimullah, who will be the senior most four-star general to take over as the new CJCOS, after the retirement of General Yusuf and General Aziz. In that event a new naval chief will be appointed.

In all likelihood, Musharraf would announce the changes in the Pakistan Army some time before October next year. This could mean that Lt.General Hamid Javed, the president's chief of staff, though not in the run because of his extension in service, would still be the senior-most Lt. General of the Pakistan Army next year. Presently, the two most senior Lt.Generals, Imtiaz Shaheen (commander logistics) and Ali Jan Orakzai (Corp Commander Peshawar) will be retiring from the Army in the next two months ruling them out of race.

After Orakzai and Shaheen's retirement, the present commander of the National Defence College , Lt. General Javed Hassan, the general who led the ground operation at Kargil, and Lt.General Munir Hafiz would be the senior most generals. However, both of them are due for retirement in August next year.

If Musharraf makes his decision in the first week of October or in late September, the present corps commander of Sindh Lt. General Tariq Waseem Ghazi would be among the contenders -because of his seniority and professional reputation - for the top slot.

By October next year, Lt. Generals Ghazi and Ahsan Salim Hayat would be the senior most Lt. Generals of the Pakistan Army. Ghazi, a winner of the Sword of Honour at Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), and a second-generation army officer, is widely regarded as one of the finest general officers of the Pakistan Army and once considered one of Musharraf's favourite generals. The other contenders are Lt. General Ghulam Mustafa Khan, Lt. General Muhammad Akram, Lt.General Ehsanul Haq and Lt. General Syed Pervaiz Shahid.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-372015,curpg-1.cms

[Prateek]

Disarming of Israel termed US responsibility
http://www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.php?newsId=en54267&F_catID=&f_type=source

WASHINGTON: The United States has taken a view of 'exceptionalism' that Israel cannot be treated by the norms on nuclear proliferation , so the best approach is not to talk about it at all, an Israeli academic said at a weekend seminar here.

Avnar Cohen, former co-director of the Project on Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East, said the US had a responsibility to disarm Israel. "Unfortunately, this administrator does not recognise the responsibility."

The discussion at Washington's Nuclear Research Institute focused on the refusal of India, Israel and Pakistan to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Besides Mr Cohen, Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy of Pakistan and Gautam Adhikari of India spoke about their countries' nuclear capabilities.

Mr Cohen said Israelis viewed the subject of nuclear weapons in Israel as one not to be discussed. The author of "Israel's Last Taboo" said Israel's official position of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons was ingrained in the national culture. "The issue cannot be discussed" in Israel, he said.

Israel is the sixth nuclear nation in the world, Mr Cohen said, more in the league of France and Britain than India and Pakistan. Mr Cohen admitted that it made some sense in the mid-1950s when Israel was in its infancy for the nation to tell others in the Middle East about its nuclear strategy and to obtain a nuclear bomb. Now, however, it makes little sense to still possess nuclear weapons.

Dr Hoodbhoy, who teaches physics at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, told the seminar that most Pakistanis felt the government was not telling them the entire story.

"There is a serious credibility gap at the moment," he said. Dr Hoodbhoy explained that there was a general feeling of anger, grief and betrayal in Pakistan directed towards the government for allegedly buckling under US pressure to persecute Dr Khan.

If President Gen Pervez Musharraf had kept silent, Pakistan would have been sanctioned, leading the economy in a downward spiral. Gautam Adhikari, the former executive editor of the Times of India, said that there was mounting alarm over the direction in which Pakistan was heading.

[Prateek]

Nuclear half-proliferation
http://www.iht.com/articles/129805.html

NYT NYT Tuesday, February 17, 2004
President George W. Bush has rightly called attention to one of the world's most alarming problems, the quickening spread of nuclear weapons technology, but proposes a disappointingly limited series of responses. The initiatives he set forth last week were all timely and useful and deserve international support. But they do not go far enough.
.
Bush called for tighter export controls by the leading nuclear supplier nations, strengthened intelligence and law enforcement against rogue proliferators, and expanded efforts to eliminate or secure nuclear bomb fuel left over from abandoned weapons programs. What he failed to do was put America's weight behind a sustained effort to revise and strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and persuade the handful of countries outside the treaty to join. Also disappointing was his failure to propose increased American financing for the expanded bomb fuel elimination program. In addition, Bush refuses to recognize that established nuclear powers like the United States undermine antiproliferation efforts when they talk about developing new nuclear weapons for possible use against non-nuclear states.
.
The president is right to call on the major nuclear supplier states to ban exports of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing equipment to countries that do not now have fully developed nuclear fuel programs. These are the two main technologies for producing bomb fuel. As the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty now stands, signatories are free to dabble in such proliferation-prone technologies as long as they allow regularly scheduled inspections. Several countries, including Iraq and Iran, have exploited this loophole in the past to acquire the means to develop nuclear weapons.
.
Banning the export of fuel processing technology and equipment is not enough, however. As continuing disclosures about Pakistan make plain, these items can easily be acquired from rogue sources outside the official suppliers group. It would be more effective if supplier states also refused to sell reactors, which they alone can provide, to countries that insist on the right to develop new programs for producing enriched uranium and plutonium fuels. Such a wider ban might not be popular with the nuclear power industry, but it would be a much stronger tool against weapons proliferation.
.
Over the longer term, the nonproliferation treaty needs to be amended. It should ban nuclear fuel processing while guaranteeing supplies of reactor fuel to countries that accept this ban and subscribe to the treaty's tough new inspections arrangements. Only about 40 countries have so far accepted these arrangements. Bush rightly proposes banning nuclear equipment exports to countries that have not signed up for strengthened inspections.
.
Bush's support for the nonproliferation treaty's tough new inspection rules is welcome. But in other areas, his embrace of the treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency that monitors it, seemed lukewarm. Amending the treaty will take lengthy negotiations and time, while export controls could, if the supplier countries agreed, be applied right away. But law enforcement and intelligence agencies will have an easier time detecting and shutting down new programs for making nuclear bomb fuel if they are outlawed under the treaty. The treaty is now accepted by all but four countries. Controlling nuclear proliferation will be easier when India, Pakistan and Israel sign and ratify the treaty and North Korea, which pulled out last year, returns.
.
Those countries will not sign on without a U.S.-led diplomatic effort that it is hard to imagine this administration leading. Bush has gone part of the way toward accepting that only concerted international action can counter the growing threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The remaining steps cannot be delayed much longer.

[Prateek]

EDITORIAL: Nuclear nonproliferation

http://www.asahi.com/english/opinion/TKY200402170119.html

Profound discussions are needed to make world safer.

North Korea, Iraq and Libya. These countries embarked on nuclear weapons development programs under the cover of peaceful uses of atomic energy by evading inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In trying to deal with this setback to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, U.S. President George W. Bush has proposed plugging loopholes that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear arms. This would be done by placing strict regulations on facilities capable of enriching uranium and extracting plutonium that can be used for nuclear weapons. There would be tighter rules on the transfer of such technology and increased inspections by the IAEA.

The president also proposed tightening controls over nuclear-related exports and passing stiffer laws around the world to crack down on smuggling. His suggestion stems from a sense of crisis over the fact that nuclear-related technology and materials were handed to Iran and Libya from Pakistan through the black market.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, is the basis for preventing disorderly proliferation of nuclear weapons. But that didn't stop India and Pakistan, neither of which are parties to the nonproliferation accord, from conducting nuclear tests. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons is also an ``open secret.'' On top of that, there are loopholes in the treaty.

The international community urgently needs to put the nonproliferation regime on the right track. Bush's proposal is meaningful in calling attention to the present situation, but it is fraught with difficulties and problems.

Under his plan, nuclear fuels could continue to be exported to advanced countries that already have facilities for enriching uranium and extracting plutonium, but denied to those that hope to build such facilities in the future. These countries would be obliged to abandon these projects and rely on advanced countries to supply nuclear fuel.

This means that, apart from the five original nuclear powers, no country will be allowed to have uranium and plutonium facilities except for those that are hardly likely to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, such as Japan and Germany.

This represents a major turnaround in the traditional principle that every country belonging to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and willing to allow IAEA inspections can proceed with its nuclear development.

The NPT was riddled with inequality from the outset: The five declared nuclear powers have been allowed to possess nuclear arsenals but other countries had to refrain from possessing nuclear weapons. Critics feared this inequality would induce countries to look for loopholes. The Bush administration wants to prevent possible rogue states from getting their hands on nuclear weapons.

The United States does not have much persuasive power, however, when it presents a new proposal on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, given its policy of pre-emptive nuclear strikes and its refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Some countries may resent the Bush proposal as the ``new dual standard.''

Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the IAEA, has come with his own proposal to correct the wrongs in the nonproliferation regime. He wants to put facilities capable of enriching uranium and extracting plutonium under international control. But some countries that are advanced in nuclear development and trying to press ahead with nuclear-fuel recycling projects of their own-and Japan in particular-are vehemently opposed to his plan.

Where should we seek to find consensus in these matters in the international community? While harmonizing those plans is no easy task, it is hoped that profound discussion will be made at the United Nations and at meetings of the leaders of the eight industrialized powers.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 16(IHT/Asahi: February 17,2004) (02/17)

[Prateek]

Looks like some Pakis are seeing the light atlast.. This guy here sees Pakistan more safer with out the BUM ...

Drop the bomb! - By I Hassan

http://www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.php?newsId=en54232&F_catID=&f_type=source

It is extraordinary how propaganda can make black, white or evil, good. The way the eulogising of the nuclear bomb in this country has made the most evil thing into a lifesaver is really worth going into deeper. In the process the perpetrator, Dr Qadeer Khan has been turned into a worshipful saint. A major part of the latter process has been done by the doctor himself spending 50 million rupees of our money (he had the key to Pakistanis treasury for 30 years) in praise of himself. With this, money he is said to have bought editors, publications and even a whole edition of a book written by a foreigner and published overseas in which the writer had written a whole chapter on the great doctor, exposing him. The doctor bought up the whole edition of the book (every single copy, whenever it was to be found) removed physically the section pertaining to him and having his own version of himself printed, inserted that into each copy of the book, rebound it, making it appear as the original and distributed the book. This operation was out of the 50 million rupees expended for self-praise. One must be moved at the audacity of it but one must note the efficiency of it, for he is a hero!

What is heroic about building the weapon of mass destruction? Those who did so, 60 years ago, are as evil as he and those who used it then on a defenceless people, Japan, were the biggest criminals in the world, and this particularly when the Japanese were already parleying for surrender and peace.

A notion has been spread that a nuclear bomb is a shield for us, and makes us invulnerable. Nothing could be further from the truth. A nuclear bomb is so horrendous that every nation would devise means for ensuring that they are not at the receiving end. The best method of achieving that is to neutralise the one who is likely to throw bombs at one.

In the case of India and Pakistan, admittedly India had the bomb first. As long as Pakistan did not have one, Pakistan was safe for India could not fear and did not fear that Pakistan would drop one on India. The destructive power of the bomb is such that, whoever drops it first, is the winner. In order to escape the fate of being the first recipient, it is evident that the moment there is a threat from an adversary, to pre-empt that threat, the threatened party is obliged to adopt this course.

In Pakistan, the bomb is made out to be a deterrent. This is a fools’ paradise. First of all, it needs to be said that despite the fact that India has not once attacked Pakistan, and the latter has started each of the three wars with India. The fact that India had a nuclear bomb did not deter Pakistan from attacking India, and particularly at the time of Kargil, India could have retaliated with a bomb. That would have put paid to Pakistan. That India did not do that goes to the credit of India.

If India remained ‘deterred’ despite provocation on three times, then the only bomb we have to fear is our own which attracts retaliation and retribution.

Pakistan being as small (compared to India) as it is can be obliterated. India cannot, for if Pakistan is able to drop a bomb or two, there is enough room in the peninsular India which cannot be reached by Pakistan, so that means that whilst Pakistan can be totally annihilated and wiped off the map, India (of sorts) can continue to function.

The only deterrence is not to have the bomb. This has already been proved. Each time Pakistan has fought India, the latter has not used the bomb. As said earlier, each time Pakistan was not deterred by India’s bomb. If Pakistan continues to pat its bomb, in the end, India might be persuaded to use it and terminate the whole thing.

Since it has been proved that the best deterrence is not to have the bomb, it is better to get rid of it sooner, than later. The billions of dollar that have been wasted in lining the pockets of the good doctor Qadeer, could have been used for building Pakistan in education, health care and general welfare of the people.

What is the point of this rivalry with India? We are a small nation vis-‡-vis India, the same as Nepal. We should settle down without tilting at the windmills. We should live in peace with India as good neighbours. The approach now adopted by both the countries is right. We should
stop bomb toting. We would have nothing to fear.

[daulat]

[quote]Originally posted by muddur:
Looks like some Pakis are seeing the light atlast.. This guy here sees Pakistan more safer with out the BUM ...

let it not be said that TSJ does not care for India!

[jrjrao]

<img src="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ubb/icons/icon14.gif" alt="" /> <img src="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ubb/icons/icon14.gif" alt="" />

In the WSJ today.
<hr>
February 17, 2004
COMMENTARY

Abdul Qadeer Khan

By BERNARD HENRI LEVY

PARIS -- We observed the Abdul Qadeer Khan affair, the incredible story of this Pakistani nuclear scientist who delivered over 15 years -- freely and with impunity -- his most sensitive secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Then we learned that President Musharraf in person, after an interview from which little or nothing has been divulged, ended up granting Khan his "pardon." Case closed? End of story? That's what the American administration, falling oddly in step with the official Pakistani doctrine, would have us believe. But knowing something of the case -- and being the first French observer, to my knowledge, to have tried to alert public opinion to the extreme gravity of the situation -- I believe that we are only at the very beginning this story.

* * *
Far from ending on Sept. 11, 2001 -- the day, we are told, on which "the world changed" -- this terrifying nuclear traffic continued until well after: A last trip to Pyongyang, his thirteenth, was made in June 2002 by the good doctor Khan; not to mention the ship inspected last August in the Mediterranean, transporting elements of a future nuclear plant to Libya. The eyes of the world, emulating the eyes of America, were fixed on Baghdad, while the tentacles of nuclear proliferation were being extended from Karachi.

We will soon learn that far from being the overexcited, but in the end isolated, "Dr. Strangelove" that most of the press has described, Khan was at the center of an immense network, an incredibly dense web. There were Dubai front companies, meetings in Casablanca and Istanbul with Iranian colleagues, complicities in Germany and Holland, Malaysian and Philippine agents, and detours through Sri Lanka, with Chinese and London connections -- a world of crime and dirty war that the West, mired in a big game that is beginning to get ahead of it, has so blithely allowed to develop.

We will find that, since Pakistan is steered by the iron hand of its secret service and its army, it is inconceivable that Khan operated alone without orders or cover. We will understand more precisely that we cannot repeat without contradiction that, on the one hand, the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is under control, and that not a warhead can budge without the authorities' knowledge, and, on the other, that Khan was acting alone, working on his own account, with no official connivance. To put it simply and disconcertingly: Pakistan's nuclear weapons need to be secured. They cannot -- will not -- be secured by Pakistan alone.

We will come back to Gen. Musharraf -- and Pakistan being what it is, we will come back also to other generals and ex-generals, such as Mirza Aslam Beg and Jehangir Karamat, both former army chiefs of staff. But we must not shift our gaze from the president himself, whose knowledge of Khan's dark machinations no one in Islamabad doubts, and who, at the very moment of his confounding, celebrated Khan once more as a "hero." What does Khan know of what Gen. Musharraf knows? And what does Khan's daughter, Dina, who announced in London that she has suitcases of compromising files, know?

And at last, sooner or later, we will come to the real secret: that of al Qaeda; and of Khan's links to Lashkar-e-Toiba, the fundamentalist terrorist group at the heart of al Qaeda; and the fact that this "mad scientist" is first of all mad about God, a fanatical Islamist who in his heart and soul believes that the bomb of which he is the father should belong, if not to the Umma itself, at least to its avant-garde, as incarnated by al Qaeda. So let us not shrink from measuring the probability of a nightmare scenario: to wit, a Pakistani state which -- in the shelter of its alliance with an America that is decidedly not counting inconsistencies -- could furnish al Qaeda with the means to take the ultimate step of its jihad.

How much time will it take for all this to be said? How much longer will Islamabad's masquerade endure? <u>Next month the American Congress will vote on the question of three billion dollars in aid to Pakistan: Will this aspect of things be taken into account?</u> Will demands be made, at last, in exchange for this aid, for inspections of Pakistani sites, as well as the installation of a double-key system -- a system that some of us here in Europe have been calling for?

These are just a few elements I offer -- as part of a debate that has scarcely begun.

Mr. Levy is the author, most recently, of "Who Killed Daniel Pearl?" (Melville House, 2003).
<hr>
URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107697702868230947,00.html

[jrjrao]

Financial Times (London, England)
February 17, 2004 Tuesday
London Edition 1
HEADLINE: ‘Being a nuclear state is a dynamic process’: why doubts persist over Pakistan’s pledge to curb proliferation The US is standing by General Pervez Musharraf. But Islamabad's arms programme depends on imports, while the continuing influence of the country's military may be an obstacle to change, write Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari

BYLINE: By FARHAN BOKHARI and EDWARD LUCE

It was a development no one in Pakistan would have thought possible. Ten days ago A.Q. Khan, the "father of the Islamic bomb" and a towering figure to millions, confessed to exchanging nuclear secrets with other countries - later named as Libya, North Korea and Iran.

For General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, to whom Mr Khan was a "personal hero", it was a particularly unwelcome moment. But with much the same speed that Pakistan's leader showed in responding to previous emergencies - notably Washington's demand that Pakistan turn against its Taliban protege in Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11 2001 - Gen Musharraf arguably defused the immediate crisis.

Gen Musharraf persuaded Mr Khan to broadcast an apology to Pakistanis - although tellingly it was delivered in English - and then pardoned the disgraced scientist on the grounds that he was a national hero. Ignoring suspicions about whether the real motive of the pardon was to avoid an awkward trial that might have cast the net of responsibility much wider, George W. Bush, the US president, last week backed Gen Musharraf by upholding Islamabad's view that Mr Khan had acted without authorisation and out of personal greed.

The US had its own reasons for accepting Gen Musharraf's version of events. Washington wants Islamabad's continued co-operation in the war on al-Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban in Pakistan's border areas with Afghanistan. The US also wants to ensure that Pakistan never again becomes a centre for nuclear proliferation. On both counts Washington accepts Gen Musharraf's actions in good faith.

Yet the decisiveness with which Gen Musharraf acted also meant that the world paid less attention to other signals the president sent out - signals that raise questions as to whether Pakistan has turned over a new leaf in curbing the threat of proliferation.

One of these was a stark warning that Gen Musharraf gave to Pakistani newspaper editors: "You should play a more responsible role in this matter - and even if for the sake of argument it is accepted that the government and the army were involved in the (proliferation) affair, do you think it would serve our national interest to shout about it? . . . Stop writing this!"

The Pakistani army's right to determine what is in the national interest seems unlikely to diminish, even after Gen Musharraf removes his uniform at the end of this year and becomes a civilian president. But many believe that the problems involving Mr Khan emerged precisely because the Pakistani military sees itself as the arbiter of the national interest.

"Most Pakistanis don't really care if A.Q. Khan siphoned off money for his own personal use - they see so much corruption anyway," says Talat Masoud, a retired general who was in charge of Pakistan's defence procurement. "Their main gripe is that the military is trying to cover up its responsibility for the scandal by pardoning A.Q. Khan (and so avoiding a public trial). I am sorry to say they are to a large extent right."

So should the world now accept that Pakistan has become a responsible and co-operative nuclear power? In their defence, senior Pakistani figures concede that they were remiss in failing to detect Mr Khan's nuclear salesmanship over an estimated 15-year period starting in the late 1980s. But they point out that since 1998, when Pakistan followed India in holding tests and declaring itself a nuclear power, the logic of the country's nuclear strategy has been reversed.

"Pakistan has gone from being a covert nuclear state to an overt nuclear state and that changes everything," says Farooq Leghari, who was president of Pakistan in the mid-1990s. "Dr Khan needed to operate with great secrecy and autonomy to accomplish what he did. But now that Pakistan is a declared weapons state there is no need for this."

Furthermore, Pakistan's chain of command was overhauled and centralised in 2000, when Gen Musharraf established the Nuclear Command Authority to oversee development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Both the Khan Research Laboratories, which purloined the technology to enrich uranium, and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Authority, which oversaw most of the remaining 26 steps to create a nuclear weapon, are now answerable to the same clear line of authority.

This is important because the two bodies have a history of rivalry and antagonism that many believe helped foster the climate of subterfuge and permissiveness in which Dr Khan so dangerously manoeuvred.

"It would simply be impossible for a Dr Khan to emerge from the structure we now have in place," says Faisal Saleh Hayat, Pakistan's interior minister.

Against this, however, there are a number of nagging doubts over whether Pakistan can be depended upon to end proliferation.

The most important is that Pakistan will almost certainly have to continue importing technology, material and components if it wants to maintain and develop its existing nuclear arsenal, estimated at 45 to 50 warheads.

<u>"Most Pakistanis and foreigners believe that Pakistan's nuclear deterrent is now wholly indigenous," says Shahid-ur-Rehman, author of a book on Pakistan's nuclear programme and a close acquaintance of Dr Khan. "They are completely mistaken."</u></font>

This might not matter if - as Islamabad maintains - Pakistan already had a credible nuclear arsenal in place to serve as a "minimum deterrent" to neighbouring India, at whom the programme is directed. But there are serious doubts whether Pakistan's military-dominated Nuclear Command Authority would sit idly by while India continued to upgrade its nuclear arsenal - estimated at 50 to 100 warheads.

"Being a nuclear weapons state is a dynamic process," says Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani defence analyst. "You don't just say: 'Now I have nuclear weapons and I have no intention of upgrading them.'"

India's civilian-dominated nuclear system, which maintains an opaque division of responsibilities, makes no secret of its intention continually to modernise its nuclear arsenal. India aims to develop a "triad" capability in which it can launch nuclear missiles from land, air and sea. Since New Delhi's nuclear programme is as much directed at China as at Pakistan, India is also constantly striving to extend the range of its ballistic missiles so that it can reach China's east coast.

On the face of it India's modernisation plans should not affect the calculations of the strategic planners in Islamabad, since Pakistan has no need to match China. But the depth of rivalry between India and Pakistan would make such assumptions precarious. "You can never assume Pakistan will behave wholly rationally vis-a`-vis India, <u>or vice versa,"</u> says an UTTERLY IDIOT western ambassador in Islamabad.

Pakistan would be unable to replicate even its existing technology if various imported components were to fail. Crudely speaking, experts estimate that Pakistan's uranium-enrichment programme - which has supplied the weapons-grade material for most of its warheads - is less than 50 per cent indigenous.

The country is more self-sufficient in plutonium, which is created by reprocessing spent fuel rods from nuclear reactors. The Pakistani army operates a 40-megawatt nuclear reactor near the city of Jhelum, which, unlike the country's two civilian nuclear power plants, is not subject to external safeguards.

Just five of Pakistan's 50 or so nuclear warheads are plutonium-based. "Although it is a more expensive process than enriching uranium, it is a fair bet that Pakistan will place more emphasis on the plutonium option over the coming years," says Mr Rehman. But even then Pakistan would run into difficulties, since it would need to import roughly a fifth of the components required to expand its plutonium capacity.

Conversely India - which like Pakistan refuses to sign the international nuclear non-proliferation treaty - is now thought to have an almost wholly indigenous nuclear weapons manufacturing capability.</font>

International observers are thus deeply sceptical of Gen Musharraf's assurances that Pakistan will completely shut down its proliferation activities, because such a move would hamstring Pakistan's own programme. "When Gen Musharraf pledges to end proliferation he almost certainly means to other countries excluding Pakistan," says Michael Krepon, head of the Washington-based Henry L. Stimson Institute, which focuses on weapons of mass destruction. "It is hard to believe this will not store up more problems for the future." he other primary cause for concern is the likelihood that Pakistan's army will continue to interfere in the country's politics. Under a deal that Gen Musharraf struck with the six-strong group of Islamist parties in December, the president will shed his uniform in December and serve the remaining three years of his term as a civilian. In exchange, however, the opposition Islamist parties in effect agreed to waive their veto over establishing a National Security Council by conceding that the law would require only a simple majority in the national assembly.

This means the pro-Musharraf parties, which are in a majority, will comfortably push through a law later this year to establish an NSC on which the army will be generously represented. The new body is likely to take precedence over democratic governments on undefined questions of "national interest" - presumably including Pakistan's nuclear programme.

At the very least, such a move would create doubts about Gen Musharraf's professed aim of restoring genuine democracy to Pakistan. But it could also sow the seeds for further scandals of the variety cooked up by Dr Khan. "It would be nice to say that the Pakistani army has learned its lessons from the A.Q. Khan debacle," says a western diplomat. "But it appears to be drawing precisely the wrong conclusions - that more secrecy, rather than more transparency, is the answer."

Evidence of this abounds. Islamabad's investigations into the "rogue scientists" allegedly behind the proliferation ring have short-circuited normal legal procedures. Relatives of the six detained scientists say they are being held at secret locations without access to lawyers. Government officials including Gen Musharraf have publicly declared them guilty; few believe there will be a trial.

Pakistani officials point out that other countries including the US and Britain have laws permitting incarceration for long periods on grounds of national security. "The west has no right to get on its high horse," says one official.

But even on broader issues Pakistan's army shows no signs of making itself accountable to elected politicians. The country's defence budget - which officially amounts to almost 4 per cent of gross domestic product - <u>is traditionally just one sentence long, providing no breakdown.</u> "Off-budget" military spending is rampant and the army's involvement in Pakistan's mainstream economy remains as extensive as ever.

Retired or serving military officers hold influential positions at many of the country's largest state corporations. The army runs corporate subsidiaries and investment funds that own large chunks of the private sector, including much of urban Pakistan's prime residential land.

Many concede that Gen Musharraf, who remains a target of Islamist terrorist groups that in December twice came close to assassinating him, is a moderate and progressive figure. Like his admirers in Washington and elsewhere, they support Gen Musharraf's plans to reform Pakistan's backward education system and rein in the country's array of Islamist militant groups.

But they are frustrated by the slow pace of change and conclude that the role of the army is the real obstacle - in the nuclear programme as in much else.

"There are a lot of people who feel let down by Gen Musharraf," says Ms Siddiqa. "He has made all the right noises about women's rights and curbing the Islamist militants. But while the army remains unaccountable the whole system will remain unaccountable. It is hard to fix all our other ailments while this remains the case."

It is not often that Pakistan can turn to neighbouring India for comfort. But this week's peace talks between the two countries - the first in almost three years - which start in earnest today, mark an unusual diversion from Islamabad's woes over nuclear proliferation.

Senior Indian figures have avoided exploiting Pakistan's embarrassment over its alleged central role in the international "nuclear black market". Last week Yashwant Sinha, India's foreign minister, said Pakistan was unlikely to have been alone in exchanging nuclear secrets over the past 15 years.

The two countries share great disdain for multilateral nuclear treaties. Both refuse to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as long as the five permanent members of the United Nations Security council decline to acknowledge newcomers to the club. And both have also shunned the comprehensive test ban treaty.

"Nuclear diplomacy is one of those few areas where India and Pakistan are of one mind," says an official in Islamabad.

Yet such affinity is dangerously absent when it comes to nuclear stances towards each other. Unlike the Soviet Union and the US during the cold war, India and Pakistan have not exchanged information about their respective nuclear facilities.

Military analysts say this raises the possibility of a nuclear conflict between the two countries.

But this week's talks provide an opportunity to establish a safer environment by agreeing to discuss nuclear risk-reduction measures, say diplomats. "This is the perfect opportunity for Pakistan to demonstrate it is a responsible nuclear power," says a western ambassador in Islamabad. "It would also be a very good way of drawing a line under the A.Q. Khan scandal."

Pakistan's formal position is to avoid discussing the nuclear question until there is progress in talks over the disputed state of Kashmir, which Islamabad sees as the core problem. India has typically been willing to discuss anything but Kashmir, its only Muslim-majority state.

Islamabad is thought to be under intense pressure from the US to separate progress on nuclear risk-reduction from the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, especially following the recent proliferation crisis. "It is becoming increasingly difficult for Pakistan to hold nuclear safety hostage to other issues," says Pervez Hoodbhoy, a professor at Islamabad's Quaid-e-Azam' university.

Many believe, however, that it would be hard for the two nations to take serious steps - exchanging details about the positioning of their respective nuclear arsenals, for example - since this would require a degree of trust between New Delhi and Islamabad that is lacking.

There are certain measures, such as more frequent use of the nuclear "hotline" - a dedicated phone line between the leaders of the two countries - that would reassure the international community, say analysts. Substantive steps, such as agreeing to cap the production of fissile material, or forgoing development of anti-ballistic missiles, are considered unrealistic.

Moreover, India's hopes of purchasing the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system from the US would almost certainly accelerate the arms race between the two, says Mr Hoodbhoy.

"This would be a deeply irresponsible act," he says. :whine: "It would push Pakistan to develop new types of delivery system, such as the cruise missile. If that was approved, risk-reduction measures would become futile."

[Vriksh]

Sify Report on TSPA nook-noodity

[jrjrao]

Heh heh. When it comes to China, the DC nonprof Ayatollahs suddenly forget their entire Jumma sermon...

U.S.: China Is Ally Against Proliferation --
Diplomat's Assertions Follow Reports on Ties to Pakistan

The upbeat assessment from John R. Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, seemed designed to take the edge off reports from Washington this weekend quoting U.S. officials saying China has been -- and may still be -- cooperating with Pakistan on nuclear technology and missile development.

[Raj Malhotra]

It has been pointed out before but I would like to repeat it again. None of the nations that got the centrifuge tech from Pakistan was able to get bomb grade enriched uranium from it. Look at Iran; it has more money and better tech base even then it failed. The list of nations that failed is Iran, Libya, Nkorea etc.

(In fact I think India has also dappled with indigenous centrifuge tech but has not got any enriched uranium in real quantities.)??

So what gives?? Note :- US is bending over backwards to pardon Pakistan. Note also US obsession about a “dirty” bomb. Probably LEU wrapped with explosives.

In fact this gives me the chance to repeat my pet theory which is that Pakistan has never been able to get bomb grade enriched uranium from centrifuge tech. US and Europe actually encouraged Pakistan and all & sundry to follow this dead end (for bomb grade material) tech.

So my one para thesis concludes, All paki nukes are Chinese. Which China took back. And our Paddy has rightly called Pakistan nude.

Pakis are getting this exposure and ass kicking for forcing them to hand over Osama but I think Osama also has some nice tapes like Khan and Dawood. Otherwise this was the time for mushy to hand him over.

[Sunil]

Hi,

some thoughts.

If PRC's centrifuge tech. was poor, and stealing it from european countries was difficult/costly for the PRC; would they let Khan do the dirty work?

If the DPRK did not have adequate Pu stocks to project a credible deterrent, did they went in for a `stop gap' measure an HEU device?

Isn't it cute the way in which that DPRK, Pakistan and China seem to tag team each other on proliferation issues?

China gives first, then it `stops' under pressure from the US, but continues to give to Pakistan or DPRK, and then DPRK or Pakistan give to whoever China was giving to before it got hit by US sanctions.

The NPT is dead - and so is the WoT.

[daulat]

photochor's early centrifuges may have been inefficient, but i am willing to accept that over 20 years they got them to work. why? if we accept that they have 50 nukes, and about 5 are Pu based (as per thread sources above), even 10, then that leaves 40 to be supplied by china. which sounds like a very large number... i can see how china would have supplied 10... maybe 15; perhaps the old ones they no longer needed as their warheads grew more sophisticated? After all, china would be worried enough about Pakistan (with an eye on the Uighurs) to not give them too many nasty toys?

it is just possible that photochor and his masters played a double bluff on the umma-bro's, i.e. give them tech that looks credible, but actually doesn't get to 98.8% or whatever purity you need for weapons grade, so that they get cash, credibility, and ummah-kudos and hope not to get caught out. it would be interesting to note if khan ever offered completed warheads or enriched uranium? surely that would be a simpler purchase than the components needed to build more components that would eventually build the bomb? maybe this is why unkil was happy to turn a blind eye to proliferation all this time - in the safe knowledge that nothing would ever come to it, and TSP would have an additional source of funding than just heroin?

its just possible that photochor overstepped the mark and started selling warhead designs, which with the acquisition of FSU HEU on the black market suddenly led to the weaponisation time scale being accelerated?

also - there has been much talk lately of pakistani nukes being dismantled in the natural state - like India's. I do not recall this assertion from Tellis et al., can someone confirm this? I thought that their posture was to maintain weapons ready to go, and close to missiles (assuming they work) or close to Sargodha to air drop them on demand?

we haven't explored the role of PAF in all this mess much, focusing exclusively on the army -on the assumption that the nodongs have been mated to the #4 Chini maal. what connection if any is there to senior PAF figures and any Fokker 27 accidents (realms of conspiracy theory land) but worth examing never the less...

[Tim]

Daulat,

Your argument might be circular - I bet the estimates of 40-50 nukes are based on open source estimates of potential HEU production from Kahuta
. So if the HEU line didn't work, the production estimates are wrong.

But I haven't seen much to suggest that the HEU line didn't work.

Shiv,

I'm just looking at western press reports, not real data . Those were just a couple of things I noticed.

Seriously, though, there are a couple of articles that suggest that Pakistan's European centrifuge technology was more effective than China's, at least in the mid-80s. I don't know what China's fissile production facilities used, so it might be plausible.

The North Korea issue is slightly different. Yongbyon became a problem in the late 1980s, or early 90s at the latest. It was closed - having produced a lot of spent fuel - by the Agreed Framework in 1993-94. At that time (and ever since), open sources have been talking about the DPRK having enough extracted Pu for 1-2 bombs (apparently initial estimates were higher), and since the Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002 those estimates are going up, since the spent fuel is no longer in storage (and if I'm massacring the technology-speak, I apologize ).

Regardless, North Korea's FIRST nuclear line is Pu based. That creates at least some possibility that they had Pu weapons designs before Pakistan, since their capability had been evolving for thirty years based on Pu. The source may well have been China, but I simply don't know.

The North Korean HEU line (here I'm responding a bit more to Sunil) opened AFTER the Agreed Framework, which covered only existing facilities. So I think it was hedging - but of a slightly different kind. I don't know what DPRK thinks it needs for deterrence, but the Yongbyon line was geared to produce a lot of weapons every year. This was just a "legal" (under their interpretation of the Agreed Framework) way to continue their efforts without international monitoring. It may or may not have reflected concerns about their deterrent, but it certainly reflected an interest in getting more.

It may have been a straight nukes for missiles deal (that's what the press is implying), but there's enough overlap in this DPRK-Iran-Pakistan production link that I'm willing to keep looking at other possibilities. And a Pu connection seems as plausible as missiles.

Raj,

The Iranian program was working. IAEA has evidence that Iran enriched uranium in its centrifuges. The US believes that, if allowed to proceed uninterrupted, DPRK HEU production will begin in 2005 - at least according to some press reports.

I'm not quite sure what to think about that.

Libya stopped its program in the 90s, and recently restarted. It hadn't acquired enough centrifuges to really make a difference yet. The figure I've seen for P-1 (I think) is that with sufficient uranium, 50,000 centrifuges can create enough HEU for 30 weapons annually. I'm pretty sure that was in the NY Times, but I'd have to go back and check the cite. Libya wasn't close to that. Iran was getting there - it appears Iran was actually producing centrifuges, and also had gotten the P-2 design (twice as efficient).

[Sunil]

Tim,

Is there an open source analysis of early Chinese centrifuge tech? and of speculations of Pakistani contributions to it? I recall reading some comments about possible Pakistani contributions to the PRC's nuclear efforts but that was in the context of Pu production. Some Pakistani oped writer was advertizing it as a sign that Pakistanis were capable of more than simple photocopiers. Also strangely enough, PRC-Pakistani nuclear cooperation took off in the late seventies and the Pakistanis `paid' for this in some sense with huge conventional arms contracts to Norinco. In all the Norinco deals, the Pakistanis kept bringing up the point that they were not merely factory workers but `co-developers'. I think Ayesha Siddiqi Agha has some pieces about this. This leads me to wonder if there is some truth to this.

I am of the opinion that the PRC was `in' on Pakistan's nuclear initiatives from the very beginning. My guess is that the PRC was testing working devices but fissile material was in short supply, so they must have been interested in better technology to improve Uranium enrichment production.

I remain of the opinion that if China was interested in `acquiring' the necessary technology, it is possible that it turned to Pakistan to be its proxy in these matters as the dividends would have been enormous.

[daulat]

Tim

no doubt the estimates are from Kahuta production, I think Tellis quotes sources to this effect in his estimates (from memory). However, that does not neccesarily mean that the centrifuges were getting to the required purity. Assuming that the kahuta production estimate was ok, and that the centrifuges worked then 40-50 is the figure (i imagine this is the logic used)

however, if the centrifuges did not get quite there - again this would be due to quality of manufacture or mettalurgical problems, then at best they have a dirty bomb. I would err on the side of caution and accept that the centrifuges did work, because the other option is that China supplied 30+ warheads, which I think is implausible

I am postulating that khan sold substandard centrifuge tech to libya and iran to keep them sweet in exchange for cash, and possibly gave the real mccoy to north korea in exchange for nodongs with a helping hand from china. i am sure that one does not overfly chinese airspace in a military transport without the authorities taking an interest in your cargo/schedule!

given the assumed north korean inexperience with warheads, it then makes sense if the warhead was of chinese design and/or manufacture

i few months ago, i suggested that we should do an analysis of the mechanical engineering industrial base in pakistan in order to reach some judgement on their in-house capability to get to the desired levels of sophistication required for weaponisation - i accept that there are flaws in this hypothesis, but its an intriguing question never the less!

khan's rise to fame may sincerely have to do with success in getting usable HEU, but the remaining 26 steps or so seem to require more analysis. i stick to my hypothesis that although pakistan has sufficient intellectual capability, it lacks the industrial depth and breadth required for a truly indigenous capacity for producing successful missile portable warheads using U and Pu within a short timescale starting from a poor technological base AND mating them to intermediate range missiles

[Vivek_A]

(TS)Pakistan demands nuclear papers

By Massoud Ansari
LONDON SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

KARACHI, Pakistan — The scientist behind a worldwide black market in nuclear technology is involved in high-stakes brinksmanship over his future, refusing to hand over reportedly incriminating documents demanded by Pakistani authorities.
The documents and a tape-recorded statement, which are said to demonstrate that senior Pakistani army officials — including President Pervez Musharraf — were aware of Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear proliferation activities, are believed to have been smuggled out of the country for safekeeping by the scientist's daughter Dina.
Pakistani intelligence officials said Mr. Khan first agreed to surrender the documents in return for a blanket pardon but has failed to do so. They believe his daughter is prepared to disclose their contents if legal action is brought against him by the country's military government.
Mr. Khan, 68, a national hero in Pakistan, remained under house arrest in Islamabad over the weekend, and restrictions on his movement were being tightened.
More than a week after Gen. Musharraf granted the scientist clemency after he confessed to selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea, he is still in legal limbo. Pakistani officials say he faces 24-hour surveillance for the rest of his life.
The country's foreign office confirmed that the pardon granted to Mr. Khan was conditional. "It is not a blanket pardon. It relates only to his television confession," said Massoud Khan, a spokesman.
The pardon was granted on the grounds that Mr. Khan "had cooperated with the investigation begun by the Pakistani government in November last year, and that he will continue to cooperate."
It would not extend to any activities that may yet be revealed as the investigation into Mr. Khan's actions continues. The spokesman said that the scientist should accept that the security restrictions would continue "indefinitely."
He added: "What we have ensured is that he and his network of associates would never again be able to operate. They have effectively been demobilized."
Intelligence officers, however, said that the scientist remained resistant. "The government has been trying to retrieve the documents since Mr. Khan was offered a presidential pardon last week, but they are yet to receive them, even though he promised," one official said.
The official said the government had originally decided to negotiate a deal with Mr. Khan only after it discovered that his daughter had left Pakistan with the potentially incriminating material.
The scientist is said to claim that all the chiefs of army staff since 1977, including Gen. Musharraf, knew what he was doing and were aware of his actions.
The discovery derailed plans to put the scientist and a number of his associates on trial over their role.
Last month, three senior government officials, including the head of the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency, held long meetings with Mr. Khan in which they persuaded him to apologize unconditionally and surrender all the documents in return for a pardon.
"The government's concern was genuine," said one intelligence official. "First, because they were unaware of the exact nature and details of these documents, and second, because of Dr. Khan's knowledge of all the secret nuclear dealings.
"If his daughter reveals this secret information in retaliation, it could create manifold problems both for the country and its nuclear program," he said.

[Div]

Originally posted by shankar:
Sify Report on TSPA nook-noodity

Has this person posted on BR in the past?

[Adi]

There seems to be a member with a similar name and location.

[ramana]

The early Chinese program was based on gas diffusion process similar to Project Manhattan. Then they also developed from Russian sources the Pu reactor technology. They had a two track approach. Same as Manhattan Project.
The URENCO/Pak-I centrifuge is an Aluminum sub critical speed rotor- it whirls at speeds lower than the critical speed of the rotor and is thus not so efficient. This is good enough for reactor fuel purposes.

The URENCO/Pak-II based on maraging steel is a super critcal speed rotor- it whirls at speeds higher than the critical speed of the rotor. This is important fact o understand. The rotor deforms/ bends as it goes past the critical sped and hence advanced/conformal bearings to allow this to happen. This is where the ring magnets come into play. So the Chinese transfer of ring magnets in 1995 shows that they were aware of the Pak-II technology.
In all probability the Chinese were using the centrifuge technology to produce enriched uranium as feed for their Pu reactor or to mix with the already available Pu to increase the yield of their thermonukes.

The FT report is hogwash. There are no fifty or any number of locally made TSP weapons. They all are Chinese made. So the HEU fuel cycle is a cover for the prolfieration by China. The agency at heart of this is the PAEC under Dr. Mubarik Mand. That why he is still in the NDC.
There is another model based on graphite epoxy for the rotor which is more efficent. These were ound in Iraq during Gulf War I. But not many were produced.
---------------------
Also one nagging question if TSP provided the centrifuge technology and hardware who provided the Uranium hexaflouride gas plants?- for the centrifuges are useless unless the hexaflouride plant exists. It a tandem process.

[Rangudu]

CFR (Council on Foreign Policy) has a new Q&A on TSP's nuke network.

http://www.cfr.org/background/nonpro.php

What got me ****ed was a reference at the end:

Experts say the current IAEA safeguards against nuclear proliferation need to be strengthened, and the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bans the sale or transfer of prohibited items, extended even to countries that have not signed—including India and Pakistan. Some experts say the threat of the nuclear black market highlights the need to disarm countries like Pakistan of nuclear weapons entirely. “There has to be some hard thinking about how long [Pakistan’s nuclear] program can be tolerated,” Leventhal says.

See, this page wasn't always this way. The original page, can be seen here through Google's cache.

It says:

Experts say the current IAEA safeguards against nuclear proliferation need to be strengthened, and the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bans the sale or transfer of prohibited items, extended even to countries that have not signed—including India and Pakistan. Some experts say the threat of the nuclear black market highlights the need to disarm countries like India </font>and Pakistan of nuclear weapons entirely. “There has to be some hard thinking about how long [Pakistan’s nuclear] program can be tolerated,” Leventhal says.

How did the reference to India get removed? Well, yours truly emailed CFR and asked them why they included India here and with what proof? And if all nations outside of NPT are to be included, I asked them as to why they left out Israel.

Here's the response I got to my missive:

Thank you very much for your letter and your close attention to the nuclear proliferation piece. The story does mention that India has a much better record than Pakistan on proliferation issues, but the references to India and Pakistan being disarmed at the end resulted from experts' worries; in response to your inquiry, we're taking out the reference to India. We don't talk about Israel in the proliferation section because the story is about proliferation and the trading of nuclear secrets, and the experts we've spoken with are not speaking about Israel as a current proliferation risk.

Thank you again for your comments.</font>

Chalk one up for BR activism!

[svinayak]

Good Catch R, The std policy of most of think tanks when they pulish is to clean the material for political correctness according to the govt policy. But internally most of the document will contain references to India just as Pakistan.

This is a normal practice from other govt institutions also and the docs are screened for any faus pax before it is relased for the public. Do not take word for word when they refer only to TSP since internally they would be saying something else.

[RobinM]

Great job R.

[Prateek]

It appears that some one high up in the GOI needs to send a strong message to other nations or the so caled nuclear Brahmins that India is in no way responsible for the Paki nuke proliferation. Pakistan is a rogue state and it must be treated independently with out references to India.

More over do these 'experts' really know their geography well ? If so do they know that India and Pakistan are 2 independent nations ? Some one up in the GFOI should take up the issue, seriously. Some can justify it as a way to save Paki H&D, but it should not be tolerated for long, since it can be a double edged sword in the long term.

[VikramS]

Originally posted by Aditya_C:
There seems to be a member with a similar name and location.

HariCa I think..

[Calvin]

Tim: It is interesting that you say that you haven't seen much to suggest that the HEU line DID NOT work. What have you seen to suggest that it DID work?

Or, is there an academic preference that leads one to accept one of two equally plausible hypotheses?

[Tim]

Calvin,

It may be the latter - or at least, I may have a bias.

But...

Ring magnets, as ramana has pointed out, are part of the HEU process. And, clearly, they were transferred in the mid-1990s.

The Dutch put Khan on trial for espionage. It may have been some sort of counter-espionage mission, but it seems pretty clear - given recent admissions by the Dutch government - that at least the Dutch feel that the technology Khan stole was functional, and would do what the Pakistanis wanted it to do, which was to enrich uranium.

I suppose the US government could also have been complicit in helping the Pakistanis to hide the fact that their nuclear technology didn't work. It may be that the various revelations in the 1980s, and the Pressler amendment, and the gradual revelations that Pakistan was claiming - admittedly, not PROVING - a capability to first enrich uranium to 10%, and then later 90%, wer all part of a deception scheme.

But you've already got three major states involved in covering up a possibly non-functional Pakistani capability. That's getting a bit thin, in my opinion.

Furthermore, you have Indian intelligence estimates (declassified for the Kargil Review Committee Report, among others) regarding Pakistan's emerging capabilities. You also have India's actions, which do not suggest (in my interpretation) either blithe disregard of Pakistan's capabilities or secure knowledge that they are inoperable.

Iran's centrifuges, according to at least one IAEA report, have traces of HEU that is linked with Pakistan's reactors.

The DPRK, which had functioning nuclear capabilities, sought Pakistan's HEU line.

Iran, which clearly sought HEU capabilities, obtained Pakistan's HEU line, and apparently successfully enriched uranium with it.

Those are some of many data points. They suggest to me, at least, that Pakistan's HEU production is credible - maybe not astonishingly efficient, maybe based on significant amounts of imported technology and materials, but still credible.

On the other side, I see very little evidence to suggest that the HEU facilities DON'T work. It's harder to prove a negative, admittedly. Still, the argument (as far as I can tell, and I'm open to new information) rests on assumptions about a failed test in the May 15-18 1998 period, about which there are substantial doubts that Johann summed up earlier, some trips to China by Pakistani nuclear officials later that month, and a set of assumptions about Pakistani scientific capabilities.

I don't find the latter argument very convincing. If North Korea, which has very limited contact with modern science, can somehow build a nuclear program, I'm not sure why Pakistan can't. We know for a fact that other states, with imported technology, have created missile and nuclear capabilities - Iraq, Iran, Norh Korea, South Korea, South Africa, even Israel. Estimates of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear program in public sources currently run in the $5 billion - $10 billion range, so even resources (over a thirty year period) do not suggest a meaningful constraint (Iraq spent that much in less than a decade in the 1980s).

In short, my interpretation of the data is that it seems to support the idea that Pakistan spent a lot of money on a program, and got something significant for it.

It may indicate hidden (or not so hidden) bias. But I find the "nuke nude" hypothesis more compelling and probable than the "Pakistan bought a dud" hypothesis.

Again, if there are more significant explanations for the "Pakistan bought a dud" hypothesis, I'll be glad to look them over. I've been known to change my mind on occasion

Tim

[Tim]

P.S. - in case it wasn't clear. I don't find the "nuke nude" hypothesis compelling at all. At a minimum, it's a bad idea to base policy on assumptions that some other power has solved all your problems for you. It's easy to get burned that way. Sorry if there was any confusion.

Tim

[NRao]

Great job R.

Thank you very much for your letter and your close attention to the nuclear proliferation piece. The story does mention that India has a much better record than Pakistan on proliferation issues, but the references to India and Pakistan being disarmed at the end resulted from experts' worries; in response to your inquiry, we're taking out the reference to India. We don't talk about Israel in the proliferation section because the story is about proliferation and the trading of nuclear secrets, and the experts we've spoken with are not speaking about Israel as a current proliferation risk.

Thank you again for your comments.

R,

Any chance of contesting the highlighted portion? With no record of proliferation on what grounds can they even talk of India AT ALL on this topic?

R,

Where did you send your e-mail?

TIA.

[Rangudu]

Niranjan,

I've got my foot in the door for the future. Therefore I decided not to push it - for now.

[Calvin]

Tim: If ring-magnets were necessary for weapons grade HEU, and these were not available until the mid 1990s, what does that tell us about the 1987 test, and Khan's boast to Nayar, and the putative weaponized F-16s on the runways at Chaklala in 1990?

[shiv]

Originally posted by Tim:
P.S. - in case it wasn't clear. I don't find the "nuke nude" hypothesis compelling at all. At a minimum, it's a bad idea to base policy on assumptions that some other power has solved all your problems for you. It's easy to get burned that way.

Policy is one thing. Public posture is another.

The dipping of H&D in pig droppings requires 400% reaffirmation of our unshakeable faith in the wholly factual account that the great Pakistani nuclear deterrent has been given away to Unkil by TFTA Pakis after some threats were issued. India is a weak state at this point and must be attacked now because the entire 1 billion population of India are rolling on the floor and lauging uncontrollably at Pakistan's meek giving away of its alleged nuclear arsenal, built up by eating grass.

Added later - acually the nook nood status and continued Indian vigilance are not incompatible - because only an extremely foolish and naive Indian security apparatus can assume that all nuclear preparations vis a vis Pakistn can be dropped, for many reasons:

1) The nook nood status may not include all warheads.
2)It probably does not include all the HeU
3)The US may be unable, or unwilling at some future date to disallow use against targets in India - for whatever reason.
4)Given the civilizational threat posed by Pakistan, it is essential to make Pakistani leaders face the crude threat of actual physical elimination by vaporization. Pragmatism and morality necessarily occupy different pages of the book of life.

Also - I think that if the US were able to give India an unequivocal and credible warranty that Pakistani nukes CANNOT be used against India, the latter could ease up a little. Either the US cannot do that, or will not do that - so I doubt if India can ease up for any reason other than stupidity.

[Rak]

Salesman on Nuclear Circuit Casts Blurry Corporate Shadow

[jarugn]

Pakistan not in a nuke-race with India but will test fire Shaheen II - Musharaff

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/17/nuclear.pakistan.reut/index.html

LONDON, England (Reuters) -- Pakistan has no interest in matching India's nuclear weapons development and does not need outside help to maintain or advance its programme, President Pervez Musharraf told the Financial Times newspaper.

He rejected any move to bring in foreign inspectors to monitor Pakistan's nuclear weapons or civil nuclear facilities after the father of the country's atomic bomb confessed this month to selling nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

"We are not interested in competing with India," Musharraf said in an interview in Wednesday's newspaper.

But he said that in the next few weeks Pakistan would test-fire its Saheen II missile, which has a range of 2,000 km (1,200 miles), making it capable of striking just about anywhere in India.

"If they want to reach 5,000 km, or have intercontinental ballistic missiles, we are not interested in those. We are only interested in our own defence," he said of India.

In a wide-ranging interview, Musharraf also said Pakistan would not freeze its nuclear weapons programme.

"We will never stop our nuclear and missile programme," he said. "That is our vital national interest. It is totally indigenous now. Whatever had to be imported and procured has been obtained."

That included buying conventional surface-to-air missiles from North Korea in 2002 when Pakistan and India went to the brink of their fourth war after militants from disputed Kashmir attacked the parliament building in the heart of Delhi.

'Not responsible'
Musharraf said top nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan had acted alone in selling atomic secrets to other countries.

But many in Pakistan and outside have doubted this, saying Khan could not have carried out the transfer of nuclear technology, including the use of transport aircraft to fly equipment to buyers, without the knowledge, and possible assistance, of senior military officials.

"No sir. It (Pakistan's nuclear programme) is not under the aegis of the military. It never was and it is not now," Musharraf told the Financial Times.

He reiterated he had heard nothing of Khan's nuclear smuggling since he became Pakistan's military chief in 1998 and the country's leader in a bloodless coup the following year.

"I believe in the army dictum that a commander is responsible for all that happens or does not happen in his command -- and to that extent any president is responsible for what happens in his country.

"But otherwise, if you are hinting at my direct responsibility, no not at all," he told the newspaper.

News of Khan's nuclear smuggling confession sparked alarm in the United States that atomic arms could fall into the hands of Washington's enemies.

Asked if foreign inspectors should be allowed to examine the country's nuclear programme, he said:

"This is a very sensitive issue," he said. "Would any other nuclear power allow its sensitive installations to be inspected? Why should Pakistan be expected to allow anybody to inspect?"

"We are not hiding anything... what is the need for any inspection?" the president said.

[Prateek]

Musharraf rejects nuclear inspections
http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=13391692

Hong Kong: Pakistan would never allow foreign inspectors to monitor its nuclear facilities and has no intention of freezing its nuclear or missile programmes, President Pervez Musharraf said.
Musharraf said Pakistan's investigation of the smuggling ring centred around scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan so far indicated that only designs for centrifuges to enrich uranium to weapons-grade material had been leaked to Iran.

And he emphatically denied reports Pakistan had traded nuclear technology for North Korean ballistic missile technology, saying Pakistan paid cash for North Korean surface-to-surface missiles in 2002.

"Why should Pakistan be expected to allow anybody to inspect?" Musharraf told the London-based Financial Times in an interview published Wednesday.

"We are not hiding anything ... what is the need of any inspection," said Musharraf, who was head of the armed forces before seizing power in a bloodless coup in 1999.

Musharraf on February 4 pardoned Khan, considered a national hero in Pakistan for guiding the programme which built the country's nuclear bomb, after the scientist confessed to selling nuclear secrets.

The scandal has raised doubts about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and has led to allegations that the Pakistani military was directly involved in proliferation.

But the Pakistani leader again insisted that Khan, together with six other scientists and officials currently in custody, acted alone in selling nuclear technology without the government's or the military's knowledge.

"I believe in the army dictum that a commander is responsible for all that happens or does not happen in his command -- and to that extent any president is responsible for what happens in the country," he said.

"But otherwise, if you are hinting at my direct responsibility, no not at all," he said.



Musharraf said Iran was the only country which had received nuclear secrets from Khan, despite reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western governments that Libya and North Korea were also beneficiaries.

He also said Pakistan's ongoing investigation had found that Khan only sold designs for centrifuges rather designs for nuclear weapons.

Musharraf said Pakistan would continue to develop its nuclear and missile programmes to create a deterrent, and would test a Shaheen II missile with a range of 2,000 kilometres in the next few weeks.

"We will never stop our nuclear and missile programmes," he said. "That is our vital national interest. It is totally indigenous now."

"We are not interested in competing with India. If they want to reach 5,000 kilometres or have intercontinental ballistic missiles, we are not interested in those. We are only interested in our own defence."

Pakistan launched an investigation of its nuclear scientists in November after it received a letter from the IAEA.

In an 11-page report detailing the leaks which took place between 1986 and 1993, Khan said he was involved in giving nuclear information for groups working for Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Musharraf said Khan had given a written undertaking not to resume contacts with the "nuclear underworld" and that if this promise was breached his pardon would be rescinded.

He also said Khan would be allowed to keep his extensive financial assets.

"Yes, he has property and he has been buying and spending left right and centre. But we have not taken them (his assets) over. We are not planning to."

[SaiK]

In his own words, mush confirms:

after begging/copying/stealing/ whatever pakis want, now they have made something indiginous. Its only a question of replication.

sheesh! what efforts they have made. They would have toiled to put together the copies to work with a massively graphical language instructions.

anyways, they can't copy a 5k wallah. Not any more, with uncles condomn-land, already under high radiation effects.

After India's agni-III test, he would again go: We have clearly told we are not interested in doing 5k. Who would sell the pakis a 5k version now? Chinese would not because, their butts would be uncovered too.

[Raj Malhotra]

Re Ramana

Interesting info and analysis. Even if Pak got some bombgrade HEU then it would be very minimal, nowhere near 40 bombs beig talked about. It is very possible that the last chotu bomb exploded by Pak (disdained by GF) may be indigenous, less than ideal weight, poor design and inadequate degree of enrichment of uranium.

Re tim

We are talking of "bombgrade" enrichment not enrichment per se.

And till recently there was no admission/proof of Pak nuke proliferation either. and still with so much proof the cover up is going on.

[shiv]

Some relevant links:

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakArsenal.html
Last changed 6 August 2001
Weapons Stockpile
The uranium enrichment facility that produces most of Pakistan's weapons material )(highly enriched uranium or HEU) is the gas centrifuge plant at KRL (A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories) at Kahuta, 50 km Islamabad. This facility, which employs 7,000 people including 2,000 scientists and researchers, began operating in the early 1980s, but suffered serious start up problems. A.Q. Khan announced that Kahuta was producing low enriched uranium in 1984. US intelligence believes that uranium enrichment exceeded 5% in 1985, and that production of highly enriched uranium was achieved in 1986. Kahuta has run essentially non-stop at enriching uranium since that time (though with varying numbers of gas centrifuges). At start-up Pakistan had reportedly manufactured 14000 centrifuges, but had only 1000 operating. By 1991 about 3000 machines were operating according to US intelligence. This implies a production capacity of 45-100 kg U-235/year depending on the tails concentration and production efficiency, enough for 3-7 implosion weapons. Shahryar Khan has said that the cost of Kahuta was relatively modest, less than $150 million[Albright and Hibbs 1992].

http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/ta-pak060198.html

If Pakistan resumed WGU production in January 1998 using LEU as feed, it could have more than doubled its WGU stock within the last five months to a central estimate of roughly 490 kg. If Pakistan resumed production in March, after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a plurality in India's most recent national election, Pakistan could have a stock of 425 kg of WGU.

Using natural uranium as feed, the Kahuta plant is estimated to be able to produce about 80 kg to 140 kg of WGU annually, with a central estimate of 110 kg. Based on this central estimate, if Pakistan resumed WGU production in January 1998 using natural uranium as feed, it could have increased its stock to 260 kg through May 1998.

If Pakistan produced WGU after 1991, contrary to Pakistani government statements, ISIS estimates that Kahuta could have produced a total of 680 kg of WGU from the mid-1980s through May 1998. This estimate assumes that WGU production did not occur for 1 to 2 years during the period of mid-1991 through May 1998.

http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/stocks1099.html

<img src="http://www.isis-online.org/publications ... ockst1.JPG" alt="" />

http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/abbk2.html
Israel, India and Pakistan continue to hold out against international controls: The authors' central estimates are that at the end of 1995 Israel possessed 460 kg of plutonium, India 330 kg of plutonium and Pakistan 210 kg of HEU. These stocks are outside international controls and are believed to be part of their nuclear weapon programmes. India's and Israel's stocks are projected to grow. Although Pakistan is believed to have 'frozen' the production of HEU there are indications that it may start to produce unsafeguarded plutonium. Secrecy surrounding the Khushab reactor currently under construction suggests Pakistan may have plans to separate plutonium there.

http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper195.htm
In his latest paper, Prof. Albright using a statistical approach has placed the stock pile of weapon grade Uranium for Pakistan from 585 to 800 kilogram on a percentile basis. The weapon equivalent for the stockpile would therefore be between 45- 95 bombs. Since the percentile is from 5 to 95, the figures could be in between, according to his estimates.

http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/05/980513-isis1.htm

Since 1991, Pakistan is believed to have produced low enriched
uranium (LEU) there. If Pakistan decides to resume its production of WGU,
it would likely use its stock of LEU to produce WGU more quickly. If the
enrichment output of the Kahuta plant remains fixed, Pakistan could produce
about 300 kg of weapon-grade uranium during the first year by utilizing its
LEU as "feed" for Kahuta. In subsequent years, Pakistan is estimated to be
able to produce about 110 kg/yr of weapon-grade uranium, using natural
uranium feed. In 2005, Pakistan is estimated to have enough weapon-grade
uranium for over 60 nuclear weapons.

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=36865