N-Doctrine: Discussions Only. Please no news posts

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Postby Arun_S » 18 Aug 1999 00:40

<B>Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Discussions Only.</B><P><I>Please do not post any news items on this thread</I><BR> <BR>I had been awaiting Ramana to start the new thread. But I could'nt wait to raise few questions on the new Nuclear Doctrine.<P>So let me start with the previous post from Ramana. <P>------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR><B>ramana</B> Member posted 17-08-1999 13:14 <BR>The url is found at the MEA site: <A HREF="http://www.meadev.gov.in/govt/indnucld.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.meadev.gov.in/govt/indnucld.htm</A> <BR>Let us now start a new thread to discuss it and leave this for news reports etc.<BR>------------------------------------------------------------------------<P>I am piqued by the following part of the policy draft:<P><I>7.2. While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, <B>it will not accept any restraints</B> on building its R&D capability.</I><P>It should instead say: <P>7.2. While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, <B>it will continue to build its R&D capability within its sovereignly determined limits. </B><P><BR>Can some one help me understand the implication of the following: ?<P><I>5.3. For effective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces including dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.</I><P>Cheers -Arun <BR><p>[This message has been edited by Arun_S (edited 17-08-1999).]

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Postby Vikram Rathore » 18 Aug 1999 00:49

Arun,<P>My take on the `dual capable systems' is that there's going to be a unified command and control system (with probably the PM's `hand on the button') for not just dedicated nuke delivery systems (like the Agni) but also conventional systems which can be used to deliver nukes (Prithvi, aircraft which can be used to deliver nukes).<P>My guess is we'll evolve a force comprising missiles, some nuke-capable aircraft (defy Mirage 2000, Su-30) which will form part of a unified chain of command. Perhaps for the aircraft bit, we may well evolve some variant of the US SAC...have a standing force which in addition to conventional duties trains and is prepared for nuclear duties, with at least a couple of planes on constant alert to respond to a pre-emptive strike

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Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 18 Aug 1999 01:20

Dual capability I assume would mean that the delivery system, in this case the missile system, and not the ac platform, could carry both conventional and nuclear payloads. The Prithvi and Agni already have this capability apparently. An extension of dual capability could also mean the use of the same platform and the same warhead to deliver different yields. For example your SSM could simply employ a pure fission element, without the boosted fission or secondary core fusion stage. Or one could opt for the full package, depending on the orders, thus giving large flexibility in that a single platform could be used to deliver a 10-15kt device, or a MT+ device, or a 10-15kt device or the same boosted to 15kt+. This enhances the potency of a nuclear deterrent because regardless of the attrition due to a first strike, one is assured of a desired response, given the numbers of surviving weapons. Ie, your foe can not wipe out all your city busters and here you are stuck lobbing tactical nukes at him.<P>A question: Is it possible to engineer a multi-purpose device? Ie, a fission core and boosted fission _and_ second core fusion? Or does is one limited to fission->boost and fission->fusion and not fission->boost OR fission->fusion?<P>Another: It appears to be possible to skip the fission stage completely or use a very small fission reaction and go straight to fusion by using focused implosive devices to create suitable conditions for fusion. Has this been done? And wouldnt this potentially give essentially unlimited size to the nuclear deterrent(well limited by need and capability)?<P>

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Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 18 Aug 1999 02:13

Brajesh Mishra specifically stated that it was a draft. I believe it is implied, but will probably clarified when a final statement is on the table, after the elections. I would assume that only the broad salients would be made available to the public but the fact is that foreign governments often have no more information about our policies than what is in the public domain, either through 'communication' difficulties or simply incompetency in their intelligence gathering. The WMD addition that LNS mentions should be part of a final draft, although it is implied since India does not have any other WMD's other than the nuclear kind, and that response to WMD attack will be with A WMD of which again India only has one kind.

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Postby Sam » 18 Aug 1999 02:19

OTOH the critter will crawl out under the rocks in the TSP and come up with a copy cat "New Clear Doctor In" of their own. At least this will tell India who in TSP presses the buttons. Right now it is a triangular contest between NS/ISI/Army, so TSP should also be encouraged to stay abreast with India. Lets see if they can be suckered in this time around!

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Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 18 Aug 1999 02:39

Regardless of the size of one's nuclear arsenal it is the numbers that survive after a first strike and a guaranteed second strike that inflicts unacceptable losses that matters. So when Indian officials mention a minimum credible deterrent they refer to a guaranteed second strike capability. This can be achieved in a number of ways. One can have enough nuclear weapons that any first strike no matter how large, can not eliminate a response. Or one can do the smart thing and ensure that one's arsenal or as large a part as possible, is out reach of an opponent guaranteeing a second strike that inflicts unacceptable loss. <P>This seems to be India's aim, and basing our deterrent on a road/rail mobile Agni and Prithci is one of the things GOI is doing in this regard. Development of the ATV is also another step in this direction since even if the land based arsenal and C&C is wiped, and a majority of one's boomers, it would be impossible to wipe out one's deterrent completely. India would still be able to inflict unacceptable loss this way. Essentially, this is a war that will never be fought. Having effective MAD ensures that the threshold for nuclear conflagration is increased since neither side will want to risk it and will concentrate on economic competion, war by proxy etc. Inflicting unacceptable loss is possible at a 'minimum' level, since there is a fine line between MAD and 10-15 city busters lobbed your way, both cause irrepairable damage. A minimum credible deterrence would not mean the destruction of life as we know it for both adversaries, instead such great loss to the recipient of 'minimum deterrent' that any potential gains through the elimination of your adversary is nullified by unacceptable loss to your self. <P>Most countries including the P5 seem to be moving in this direction gradually. However, India still needed the deterrent since having the ability to tear the arm off the enemy, is better than not having the ability at all. And having WMD's does give India some political legroom, consumate with our size...<P>Why be a Japan, better to be an America, with the economic, and the military clout to go along with it.<p>[This message has been edited by Prasenjit Medhi (edited 18-08-1999).]

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Postby Arun_S » 18 Aug 1999 03:15

>><I>A question: Is it possible to engineer a multi-purpose device? Ie, a fission core and boosted fission _and_ second core fusion? Or does is one limited to fission->boost and fission->fusion and not fission->boost OR fission->fusion? </I><P>IMHO, given high cost of Fissile Material and India's relatively low inventory of fissile material, all practical nuclear weapons would use boosting. <P>Note that even <B>Shakti-I (2 stage Thermonuclear) bomb used a boosted primary</B>. India appears to have mastered boosting way before POK-II. Per my understanding, apart from Shakti-I, all other POK-II explosions were pure Fission. The small ~ 1 KT shots were mainly used to characterize & calibrate the threshold for determine most cost effective Boosted-Fission bomb configuration.<P>With these ground realities, its is safe to say that Indian Nuclear Weapons would use boosting for single-stage as well as multi-stage nuclear explosion. Though theoretically it would be possible to engineer a multi-purpose a Boosted Fission weapon which can be configured for pure fission by removing the Fusion-Fuel pallet from the core. <P>I am sure there are more capable person on this forum to critique me if there are any inaccuracies.<P><BR>>><I>Another: It appears to be possible to skip the fission stage completely or use a very small fission reaction and go straight to fusion by using focused implosive devices to create suitable conditions for fusion. Has this been done? And wouldnt this potentially give essentially unlimited size to the nuclear deterrent(well limited by need and capability)?</I><P>Per my knowledge US has been working on it for some time, but it has not yet been accomplished. <B>Once they do then of course they would ask the rest of the world to dismantle all enriched fissile material stockpile and the means of producing it.</B>. Of course there is no prize to figure out what is in US self-interests ……!<P>Cheers -Arun Sharma

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Postby Arun_S » 18 Aug 1999 03:22

For effective Second Strike capability, I do hope that India has a secret DRDO factory to churn out hundreds of Agni & Prithvi decoys/dummies to move around the country just like the real ones. Given the poor record of secret keeping, these decoys must look and feel like the real ones to oridinary civilians & soldiers. Its Very Important.<P>Did they learn some of the trickes of the trade from Iraq or Yugoslavia ??<P>Cheers -Arun

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Postby Manas » 18 Aug 1999 05:25

===================<BR>Arun Sharma wrote:<BR>With these ground realities, its is safe to say that Indian Nuclear Weapons would use boosting for single-stage as well as multi-stage nuclear explosion. Though theoretically it would be possible to engineer a multi-purpose a Boosted Fission weapon which can be configured for pure fission by removing the Fusion-Fuel pallet from the core. <P>I am sure there are more capable person on this forum to critique me if there are any inaccuracies.<BR>================<BR>I am not an expert, my knowledge is derived mainly by scanning various books etc. Boosting is achieved primarily by making the reaction more efficient by means of reflectors/small amounts of fusion fuel. What you have suggested probably can be achieved theoretically. However the weapon configuration to switch boosting on and off needs to happen before mating with the delivery vehicle. I have been particularly interested in learning more about the news reports that I read a few months after Pok-2 that India had achieved a breakthrough in dynamically varying the yields. Let's assume that we assemble a device that can yield a max of 5 megatons. This report seemed to suggest that we could vary the yield in some range starting with less than 5 megatons upto to max of 5 megatons. This seems impossible unless it is "software configurable". <P>========<BR>Prasenjit Wrote:<BR>Another: It appears to be possible to skip the fission stage completely or use a very small fission reaction and go straight to fusion by using focused implosive devices to create suitable conditions for fusion. Has this been done? And wouldnt this potentially give essentially unlimited size to the nuclear deterrent(well limited by need and capability)?<BR>=============<BR>As per last published reports work was on in full swing at NIF in Livermore. I don't know if they have miniaturised the lasers small enough to be put even in World War II size devices that can generate temperatures high enough to ignite a fusion reaction. Lab conditions probably yes in U.S., does the U.S. have deployable devices of this kind..probably not. However it should be a matter of time.

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Postby Badar » 18 Aug 1999 07:12

Hi,<P>Nothing much that is really new or surprising in the NSA report.<P>I found only two points of interest - 2.5 and 2.7, the only ones that make a real policy statement. Rest is the usual "obviously" true jingle that you and I could have wrote down. The stuff I am interested in is what exactly is the NSAB suggesting we impliment/do to ensure all the points listed out are complied with. On this there is silence.<P>The only point this document really makes is that the NSA is alive and kicking (or atleast pretending to). <BR>

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Postby Guest » 18 Aug 1999 08:38

two things i felt - <BR> a) the timing of this so called independent bodies report release has something to do with the BJP election ploy. Good it will help BJP win more votes.<BR> b) The US reaction was pretty positive. It has scaled down from it's stance of asking India to eliminate nuclear capability to asking India to restrain building more. This is surely consistent with what Jaswant Singh has maintained that the US has started understanding the security concerns of India.

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Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 18 Aug 1999 18:05

Same thing Dinesha. Unacceptable damage means the loss of your major cities, and about the same impact as MAD, all things considered. Oh, minimum unacceptable damage might leave more people alive to envy the dead ..

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Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 18 Aug 1999 18:16

Mukhi,<BR> Thats a good question. Given that India's nuclear arsenal is going to be quite small, an effective first strike might deny us a second strike, so until we have boomers and enough land/rail mobile nukes, launch on warning is the only viable way of ensuring deterrence it would seem. Even if we had enough boomers and mobile nukes I dont see how say intelligence reports about dozens of Chinese silos being cranked up and then subsequent launch during a period of Sino-Indian military confrontation can be interpreted as not being a first strike ..<P>Given such a situation where a first strike might wipe out our ability to respond, a launch on impact policy might not be the best way of assuring deterrence. Bear in mind that these weapons will never be used, what effective deterrence implies is the closing of all options to the foe, and an absolute cap on the level of confrontation. Until you can assure your foe of his destruction, you risk the possibility that he may think he can escape such an eventuality! This is extremely dangerous. A balance of destructive potential is necessary. Not a nice way to live, but that is how the world works.<P>So, in any case, I would advocate launch on (verifable and redundantly safeguarded) warning until such time as India has a guaranteed minimum deterrent through boomer based and land/rail based nukes. And maybe even after .. Is there any possible way of discerning whether a missile is carrying a nuclear or conventional payload accurately while its in flight(would be essentially the same as launch on impact)? <p>[This message has been edited by Prasenjit Medhi (edited 18-08-1999).]

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Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 18 Aug 1999 19:00

That would seem to be the case unless we can determine on launch what the warhead types are. I was under the impression that the US/USSR were under the launch on warning system. Ramen informed me differently. He says they had launch on impact, which makes sense really considering they used hardened silos and large numbers of boomers and had assured second strike ability. <P>How about launch on detection of launch and confirmation of payloads? Would essentially be the same thing but the question is would it really be necessary as long as guaranteed deterrence is assured, since that presumably is our goal, ie to assure the opponent of unacceptable response.<P>I am not so sure about the USSR though, I believe they used a so-called deadheand system under which a response would be forthcoming even without authorization from C&C. Still they did assure deterrence this way.<p>[This message has been edited by Prasenjit Medhi (edited 18-08-1999).]

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Postby Sukumar » 18 Aug 1999 19:08

The publication of the draft nuclear doctrine is a very welcome first step. However the document needs a lot more beef.<P>What would add value is some hypothetical scenarios, so that there is no ambiguity. These could always be published as an independent book by some "retired" general.<P>It was my impression that during the cold war, the US would launch on detecting (by multiple sources) trajectories of incoming Soviet missiles, not after impact.<P>However, in the movie Wargames, part of which was filmed in NORAD HQ in Cheyenne Mountain, shows the general in charge waiting for impact of one of the first warheads at an air base in Alaska. He then calls the air base and speaks to an airman and discovers that it is a simulation by the computer.<P>In an Indo-Pak scenario, since reaction times are so short, retaliation would be better after absorbing a first strike. Since most of the Indian nuke deterrent would be mobile (and not silo based) the chances of the arsenal surviving are high. Now to ensure that a command and control capability survives such an onslaught.<P>Against China, long range cruise missiles, Agni II/III IRBMs and a future SLBM force would make a good deterrent. This same force could deter hostile acts by middle-east, central Asian or European countries also. After that a dozen or so ICBMs would close the deterrence.<P>The investment in early warning systems, intelligence and command and control is going to be as costly as the delivery systems themselves. A clear guide "book" on roles, responsibilities and missions accompanied by extensive training is going to be important.<P>A unified strategic command to task an IAF Strike command (strike aircraft, SRBM/IRBM/ICBM force), Army strike forces (tactical nukes and Prithvi Is), and a naval strike command (ship/sub borne nuke weapons) is going to be crucial.<p>[This message has been edited by R Sukumar (edited 18-08-1999).]

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Postby Jodhka » 18 Aug 1999 19:18

Hello,<BR>I have a proposal for what I have chosen to christen Improvisable Nuclear Doctrine or IND.<P>The salient feature of IND will be its flexibility. IND will have programmed into it the age-old law of human behaviour - do unto others as they do unto you. Thus an adversary with NFU policy will be reciprocated similarly. However, one with definite first use (DFU)policy can be certain of our first use of WMD when situation so warrants.<P>The plus point of IND is that it combines the best of both doctrines. It allows us to maintain a deterrent as well as an offensive weapon.<P>The negative point is that in an all out war, the adversary, upon widespread destruction, may not follow its own NFU policy. In this case, IND reduces to the same principles as made public now in GOI's draft.<P>Any comments?<P>J<BR>

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Postby Prasenjit Medhi » 18 Aug 1999 19:23

> Besides why<BR> would anyone lob a multi million dollar missile to blow up a few kgs of TNT?<<P>There lies the quandary. The above might be the best argument for launch on warning. However, what if it is conventional or a false launch, as you earlier pointed out. Still, guaranteed deterrence might rid us of the dangers that launch on warning potentially causes.

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Postby Jodhka » 18 Aug 1999 19:45

Openly, we will say no first use, but in<BR>reality, it will be launch on signal. This gives us excuse to use our missiles, at any given time, in confrontation with anybody.<P>Agree with that.<BR>However, there mustn't be anything open or secretive about it. The NFU policy may be slightly redefined (or put a spin upon, if you will) to mean that the clear intent of first-strike may be deemed equivalent to first-strike and therefore, initiate a response.<BR>

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Postby Calvin » 18 Aug 1999 19:59

If we go to the CASI discussions of 1993, at the following web-site, you will see Sundarji's comments on "response time"<BR> <A HREF="http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/nonproliferation/discuss1.pdf" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/nonproliferation/discuss1.pdf</A> <P>Page: 28/32<P>Sundarji says about the various stages of alerts: All this presupposes that you have just 10 mins to go: first strike, or second strike, within seconds after the launch... And I would suggest that this is the very anthesis of the doctrine I've spelt out. There is NO tactical response required. The delay could be measured in days, if not certainly in hours, and that there could be NO CONFUSION that you're misreading the thing after you've been hit!...As I said, AFTER I've been hit, after I've taken a FIRST STRIKE in 3 cities, I don't think there will be any misreading of the situation...<P>This is what they mean by ASSURED retaliation. It is not going to be "hair trigger". I think early warning is essential for civilian reasons.<P>This may also indicate a move towards developing shelters.<P>

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Postby ramana » 18 Aug 1999 21:32

Sorry for being a bit late but I wanted to think it over.<BR>-------------<BR>Some comments on the draft doctrine as found at the MEA site:<BR>Preamble section.<BR>This section is six paragraphs long and sets out the rationale, the why and wherefore for the doctrine. The operative paragraphs are 1.2 and 1.3. In essence it is to ensure 'autonomy of decision making in developmental process and strategic matters'. It is here that the inalienable right part is asserted. <BR>Par 1.6 sets out how the operating parts flows from this and that it is a dynamic process and subject to change. This is correct and shows it is not cast in concrete and is subject to evolution. It also documents the torturous path along which India traveled in order to clear the ambiguity.<BR>Objectives section<BR>Par 2.2 sets out the contours of the deterrent posture- credibility, survivability, effectiveness, safety and security. Par 2.3 spells out the credible minimum deterrence (CMD) posture that will be such as to ensure credibility of assured retaliation.<BR>Par 2.4 sets up the core deterrence as the main role for India's nuclear posture and enunciates the NFU pledge. The NSAB was not fooled into embracing expanded deterrence- countering B&C weapons. There would have been two problems with this - one, the negative security guarantees to non-weapon states and the fact that both the principal challengers of India are signatories of CWC as non- weapon states. There is need for a BWC on the lines of the CWC but that is another tale.<BR>Par 2.5 gives the negative security assurances to the non-nuclear states. The clause about allies of NWS is a copy from US book. It forestalls coalition type of forces being ranged against India.<BR>Par 2.6 gives the six elements of a deterrent posture for India and is intuitively obvious. <BR>Par 2.7 sets out the requirement for effective conventional capabilities in order to raise the threshold. This is important for if conventional capabilities are lowered than, the propensity to use nukes is increased. In other words India sees a need for conventional weapons to deter/fight other wars.<BR>Part 3 sets out the descriptors of the nuclear forces, which would be required to support the doctrine. The emphasis is on survivable assets, which can inflict unacceptable damage to aggressors. The shift from peacetime deployment to full employable forces in "shortest time" is stated here.<BR>Part 4 is about credibility, effectiveness and survivability. In keeping with the emphasis on "minimum" it seeks a synergy of various assets to achieve effective retaliation.<BR>Part 5 is about command and control. The final authority rests with the Prime Minister or his designated successor(s). There is a need to clarify this by an act of Parliament. The civil protocol list is a hangover from colonial times and is more suited to ceremonial situations.<BR>Par 5.2 requires the creation of an integrated operational plan(s) and an effective and survivable C&C system.<BR>Par 5.3 requires the creation of a unified command of the nuclear forces including the dual capable systems. This is essential in order to lend credibility to the deterrent posture. What they are saying here is dual capable systems will be under conventional command but will come under the unified command under special circumstances. This raises the cost of first strike for an aggressor.<BR>Par 5.4 sets out what constitutes an effective C4I2 system by requiring all these assets to be survivable.<BR>Par 5.5 requires that all Indian forces will be able to operate in an NBC environment with minimal degradation. It means NBC gear for all the forces in order to operate after a first strike by the aggressor. This will be the most costly aspect of the doctrine. <BR>Par 5.6 requires space based and other assets to provide early warning, communications, damage/ detonation assessment. This is crucial and provides the backbone of the C4I2 system. I guess it means more satellites and fiber-optic links. It also includes the strike authentication component. It is necessary to verify a strike has occurred and from where. For e.g. a FAE hidden in a tanker truck is smuggled into Chandni Chowk area and set off. Due to media chatterati, rumors fly fast about a nuke strike. It is essential to identify source and nature of such activities before flying of the handle. <BR>Part 6 is about security and safety of forces and is very clear.<BR>Part 7 is about the need to continue R&D. Herein are the seeds of an Indian stockpile stewardship program. I guess RC's remarks about BARC capabilities are directed to enhance this feature of the doctrine.<BR>Part 8 identifies that, selective arms control can add to the national security and spells out where India is willing to participate. Till now it was an ad-hoc procedure moving in fits and starts. US should be happy about this aspect.<BR>------------------------ <BR>In early nineties, Gen. Sunderji had asked in a landmark article in Hindu a series of questions:<BR>1) Can a non nuclear power deter a nuclear power with out nukes?<BR>2) If the answer is no to above, do the deterrent components have to be tested? Or can they be based on previous PNE and success of civilian launch vehicle technology?<BR>3) Does the nation have to adopt an overt war-fighting posture or rely on ambiguity to convey its determination?<BR>I think the doctrine answers all these questions and I salute the real father of the Indian nuclear thinkers.<BR>My only beef is it should have addressed non-state actors and proxies. But realistically speaking we are talking of only the TSP and India can handle them as long as we have an elected government that keeps in mind India's national interests. I think we have winner here. Don't know what State Dept. is bitching about, but this is more than they could have expected out of GOI. <BR>What I would like to see next:<BR>1) An act in Lok Sabha, spelling out the succession for the C&C system.<BR>2) Creation of unified strategic command for the forces.<BR>3) Creation of a SS program at BARC.<BR>4) Reorganizing the MoD with a CoDS.<BR>5) Etc.<BR>NOTE: Can some one do a comparison to my What next? And see how far I was?<P>

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Postby Calvin » 19 Aug 1999 01:04

To further add to Ramana's post:<P>1.5 is a direct reference to the US. Including this indicates that we take the American threat seriously, and that the Indian deterrent is not only meant for Pakistan and China.<P>2.3. & 2.4 when read together indicate that we will not respond with a nuclear attack to the mere threat of a nuclear attack. Our nuclear forces are purely for retaliatory purposes. This does not discuss the operation of NFU in the event of national survival itself.<P>Part 4. The discussion of "timeliness" is interesting. I've raised the issue of time as being critical, despite the "assured retaliation" notion, from a military morale standpoint. Are there other implications for "timeliness"? What will constitute "timeliness"?<P>4.3 -- Why does this talk of ".. A punishing strike". Are they envisioning a single retaliatory strike as part of the "minimum" deterrence equation?<P>5.6 -- What are the "other assets"? Espionage?<P>Part 7: I read Part 7 as repudiation of CTBT as well.<P>There is a question in my mind regarding the necessity of publicly available document regarding "continuity of control." As long as this document is sanctioned by a the Defence committee, should it be public knowledge?<P>Does this imply we can look forward to a NORAD type Nuclear HQ? <P><BR>

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Postby Calvin » 19 Aug 1999 03:24

2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of "retaliation only", the survivability of our arsenal is critical. <P>This is putting NFU is very, very clear language. However, the question of "retaliation to what scenario" is still somewhat open, given Sundarji's earlier definition of NFU in the face of national survival.<P><BR>3.1 [...]These forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in keeping with the objectives outlined above. <P>This is very carefully chosen language. I think this indicates that we have Ship-Launched Prithvi's or Dhanush's operational. <P>

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Re: N-Doctrine: Discussions Only. Please no news posts

Postby Bharat » 19 Aug 1999 11:26

<P><B>Indian Minimum Nuclear Detterent[/b]<BR>.I have not read the enitre document but from what I gather thee essence is that a N-strike would invite an all out attack by India.This could mean that after a first strike India would pull out all stops on nukes.This must be conveyed to Pakistan and they must understand that India would not cross the threshhold but if the line is crossed then our response would not be in proportion to their strike but would be that of an assured destruction .<BR><U><B>How do we retaliate</u>[/b]<BR>A Order of nuclear attack {ORNAT}<BR>must be developed.This must be divided into 2 parts.One for PRC and an another for Pakistan.In the next 25 yrs a nuclear war with Paks seems too be the only possibility.Paks must be told that we have kept a threshhold and if that is surpassed then we would remove all stops on our nukes and strikes would be carried out as per ground requirements.ORNAT must include all targets of strategic and tactical importance and the sort of weaponry reqd.Once ORNAT is finished and all studies including N-strikes at nuclear installations then we must shape our N-forces to the requirement.We must till 2005 maintain a robust Prithvi,Agni and A/C capability.After 2005 we must use the SSBN, SLCM and Agni, Prithvi and A/c capability.I would say that our N-forces must have 400-450 bombs.Also secure SATs must be in place for comm.ISRO must also develop Imaging and video capable sats.<BR>Our N-forces must be divided into 3 commands.A SAC sort of command that controls all nukes that are on Indian soil.A naval command for SLBM and SLCM.An early warning command that controls all Indian military sats. <BR>My main worry in the NSAB report is that it is hell bent on no first use.<BR>A scenario<BR><B>Gen. Singh (GoC-in-C of early warning command at command centre),PM and top cabinet advisors with chiefs of all forces incuding N-forces are assembledd in the Nuclear bunker near Delhi after RAW gives GoI a nuclear warning<BR>.<BR>Gen Singh:-Sir, I can confirm that Pak N-forces incuding Ghauris are in Launch mode and Pak F-16 are on runways ready to takeoff.<BR>COAS:- Sir, we must pre-empt a N-strike by our's<BR>FM:- but that would mean violating our NFU pact<BR>Home Minister:-How about Calling Pak PM and warning him.<BR>COAir Staff:-Sir,then they could move their nukes andd targetting them by pre-emptive strike would be near impossible.<BR>PM:- If they strike we will strike back.<BR><BR>(USA President is on phone to Pak to defuse the crisis and has told GOI to give diplomacy a chance and not violate it's NFU pledge)<BR>[/b]A tense cabinet waits for a the US President to come back on line and tell them that the situation is defused <B><B><B>OR[/b]</B>[/b] Gen Singh to give an attack in progress warning.<BR><P>.</p><BR>The above scenario is more possible with Pm's like Gujral who are mainly reactionaries and do not have the guts or will to start an attack.<BR><BR><BR>Also NSAB has not thought of a scenario of a terrorist nuke attack.ALso what in case of a Chemical or Biological attack.<P>------------------<BR>bharat<p><br>


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