Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Tim
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Tim » 29 Feb 2004 19:46

The Russia-Iran connection has been in the news, at least partially, for years. The Russian help with the Bushehr reactor has been a focus of US and international concern for at least a decade. Russian missile designs, particularly the SS-4 and SS-5 MRBM/IRBM (liquid-fueled), were reportedly transferred to Iran in the mid-1990s, and form part of the Shahab-4 MRBM project (which may, in turn, be transferred to North Korea and/or Pakistan, if the proliferation trail holds).

HEU is a new claim, but it's clear that people have been tracking proliferation leaks (of various sources) from Russia for a while.

A more interesting question might be whether Russian technology has been getting to Pakistan through Iranian sources.

Narayanan,

I'd be glad to take a stab at answering (or at least responding to) some of the questions you refer to, but I'm not sure what those questions are. What are you referring to? Your statements? Or something else somewhere in this or another thread? I wasn't clear (not an unusual condition, sadly :) ).

Tim

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Kuttan » 29 Feb 2004 19:48

Well.. "high security alerts" are declared at US airports these days about once a month, whenever the airports actually stay open between snowstorms and thunderstorms.

Can't say that this is a big deal, any more than REDIFF recently posting a headline saying: "Airplane Forcelands Near Mumbai". It turned out that a Cessna 152 trainer (single propeller engine, 2-seater) had made an emergency landing in a field and the occupants had to walked away to get help, and were trying to get the plane transported back to the flying club.

Dork media.

If the airports were SHUT DOWN, as they were in TSP on 9/12/2001, one would have to ask what was going on.

I wasn't clear (not an unusual condition, sadly ).
Tim, I'm trying to learn the lingo of the Stategic Community, where clarity is "simply not done" since it destroys deniability. :)

A lot of the discussion on this thread was beginning to remind me of the Economic Forecasts published in the Atlanta Journal & Constitution by Donald Ratacjak, which sounded real good, but were basically making a whole lot of jargon statements in shotgun mode. Six months later, the writer could claim "Expert" omniscience by saying: "As I wrote six months ago", safe in the knowledge that no one could deny what he wrote, since no one could figure out what it was anyway.

Hence my list of 13 "True/False" questions above, to see what people are trying to say here. Sadly, I see that they are gone, :( so please, do return to the intellectual discussion in progress .. I'll go away and bother someone else.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Kuttan » 29 Feb 2004 20:06

Well.. sorry... I'm back.

Let me try those questions again - I suspect that someone did not like those questions being here, because they tended to call the relevance of the intellectual discussion into some question. That's not my intention here.

I'm trying to get some coherence to the discussion here, so that it doesn't stay stuck in the mode of people tossing out buzz-words to show their deep ability to quote definitions from undergraduate textbooks, and some answers can really be sought. Will people please declare, based on their OPINIONS (as best they are altered/unaffected by evidence) the answers to the following in True/False mode:

1. Pakistan had developed an indigenous nuclear weapon capability by 1980.

2. Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons in 1980.

3. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon (probably as part of a Chinese export deal) in 1987 (Lop Nor.. wherever that is)

4. Kahuta (Xerox Khan) Labs never managed to develop a production-grade process to make weapons-grade enriched uranium.

5. The PAEA managed to get a nuclear power plant operating.

6. PAEA produced plutonium in its reactors.

7. Pakistan, by 2002, had generated enough weapons-grade fissile material to produce 50 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size.

8. North Korea, as of 1994, had an operating nuclear power plant.

9. North Korea was producing plutonium from its reactors.

10. North Korea needed centrifuges to enrich uranium.

11. Kahuta Labs' centrifuges were strictly for export only.

12. The US knew as of 1980 that Pakistan was developing or otherwise acquiring / had acquired nuclear weapons.

13. The whole Kahuta Lab was a scam to scare the Americans, Indians and Israelis - and was hence marketed to other countries which wanted to pull similar scams.

That seems an adequate reconstruction, and since no one had tried answering the questions, no damage is done to the statistical quality of the response analysis. :)

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Sunil » 29 Feb 2004 20:21

Hi,

Here is a stab.

CASE GREEN (optimistic)
CASE WHITE (pragmatic)
CASE RED (pessimistic)

Case Green.

True/False mode:

1. Pakistan had developed an indigenous nuclear weapon capability by 1980. (F)
2. Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons in 1980. (T)
3. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon (probably as part of a Chinese export deal) in 1987 (Lop Nor.. wherever that is) (T)
4. Kahuta (Xerox Khan) Labs never managed to develop a production-grade process to make weapons-grade enriched uranium. (T)
5. The PAEA managed to get a nuclear power plant operating. (F)
6. PAEA produced plutonium in its reactors. (F)
7. Pakistan, by 2002, had generated enough weapons-grade fissile material to produce 50 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size. (F)
8. North Korea, as of 1994, had an operating nuclear power plant. (T)
9. North Korea was producing plutonium from its reactors. (F)
10. North Korea needed centrifuges to enrich uranium. (T)
11. Kahuta Labs' centrifuges were strictly for export only. (T)
12. The US knew as of 1980 that Pakistan was developing or otherwise acquiring / had acquired nuclear weapons.(T)
13. The whole Kahuta Lab was a scam to scare the Americans, Indians and Israelis - and was hence marketed to other countries which wanted to pull similar scams. (T)

Case White

1. Pakistan had developed an indigenous nuclear weapon capability by 1980. (F)
2. Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons in 1980. (T)
3. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon (probably as part of a Chinese export deal) in 1987 (Lop Nor.. wherever that is) (T)
4. Kahuta (Xerox Khan) Labs never managed to develop a production-grade process to make weapons-grade enriched uranium. (F)
5. The PAEA managed to get a nuclear power plant operating. (T)
6. PAEA produced plutonium in its reactors. (F)
7. Pakistan, by 2002, had generated enough weapons-grade fissile material to produce 50 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size. (T)
8. North Korea, as of 1994, had an operating nuclear power plant. (T)
9. North Korea was producing plutonium from its reactors. (F)
10. North Korea needed centrifuges to enrich uranium. (T)
11. Kahuta Labs' centrifuges were strictly for export only. (T)
12. The US knew as of 1980 that Pakistan was developing or otherwise acquiring / had acquired nuclear weapons.(T)
13. The whole Kahuta Lab was a scam to scare the Americans, Indians and Israelis - and was hence marketed to other countries which wanted to pull similar scams. (F)

Case Red

1. Pakistan had developed an indigenous nuclear weapon capability by 1980. (T)
2. Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons in 1980. (T)
3. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon (probably as part of a Chinese export deal) in 1987 (Lop Nor.. wherever that is) (T)
4. Kahuta (Xerox Khan) Labs never managed to develop a production-grade process to make weapons-grade enriched uranium. (F)
5. The PAEA managed to get a nuclear power plant operating. (T)
6. PAEA produced plutonium in its reactors. (T)
7. Pakistan, by 2002, had generated enough weapons-grade fissile material to produce 50 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size. (T)
8. North Korea, as of 1994, had an operating nuclear power plant. (T)
9. North Korea was producing plutonium from its reactors. (T)
10. North Korea needed centrifuges to enrich uranium. (T)
11. Kahuta Labs' centrifuges were strictly for export only. (F)
12. The US knew as of 1980 that Pakistan was developing or otherwise acquiring / had acquired nuclear weapons.(T)
13. The whole Kahuta Lab was a scam to scare the Americans, Indians and Israelis - and was hence marketed to other countries which wanted to pull similar scams. (F)

Tim
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Tim » 29 Feb 2004 20:28

Heck, I'll give that a shot. I can't promise that my assumptions are correct, but I'm more than willing to give you an opinion :)

Tim
That seems an adequate reconstruction, and since no one had tried answering the questions, no damage is done to the statistical quality of the response analysis.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Roop » 29 Feb 2004 23:13

N^3:

Here are my answers:

1. Pakistan had developed an indigenous nuclear weapon capability by 1980. False. Pakistan did not have, and still does not have, any <u>indigenous</u> nukes. They are all Chinese.
2. Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons in 1980. True. They were Chinese nukes.
3. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon (probably as part of a Chinese export deal) in 1987 (Lop Nor.. wherever that is) True.
4. Kahuta (Xerox Khan) Labs never managed to develop a production-grade process to make weapons-grade enriched uranium. True.
5. The PAEA managed to get a nuclear power plant operating. False.
6. PAEA produced plutonium in its reactors. False.
7. Pakistan, by 2002, had generated enough weapons-grade fissile material to produce 50 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size. False. In fact, bullsh!t!!!
8. North Korea, as of 1994, had an operating nuclear power plant. True, I think.
9. North Korea was producing plutonium from its reactors. False.
10. North Korea needed centrifuges to enrich uranium. True.
11. Kahuta Labs' centrifuges were strictly for export only. True. They didn’t work worth a damn, but they were for bamboozling export customers.
12. The US knew as of 1980 that Pakistan was developing or otherwise acquiring / had acquired nuclear weapons. True. Definitely true.
13. The whole Kahuta Lab was a scam to scare the Americans, Indians and Israelis - and was hence marketed to other countries which wanted to pull similar scams. True.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Calvin » 29 Feb 2004 23:29

The technology involved in high speed centrifuges is not that technology intensive to believe that the Pakistani machines did not work "worth a damn"

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Kuttan » 29 Feb 2004 23:42

Thanks. I take sunil's "white" case as his probable opinion.

Secondary questions (to refine the survey):

1. My understanding was that you had to have a reactor going to generate Pu (that Pu was a fission by-product or processed by-product?) - but that may be wrong, based on what I see everyone saying??

2. The number of centrifuges needed to generate the kinds of mass for an arsenal, was described at around 10,000 somewhere. Do you guys really believe that TSP managed to build that many with precise fabrication and exotic metals and bearings? In a nation that can't make aircraft engines? Remember - weapons-grade is a lot richer/purer than reactor-grade, right? Hence much more centrifuging?

3. Why did TSP suddenly have zillions of "used" centrifuges to sell in 2001-2003? Evidently they were just "pre-owned" centrifuges, not "used" as in "junk" or Gaddafi would not have paid $$ for them?

Point of #2 being that it's logically improbable that the "bums" at Chagai were TSP-bums, but probably PRC-bums. I would believe THAT evidence a lot better than reported isotope samples etc. The law of conservation of mass is tougher to cheat than a report on an isotope structure.

Calvin, just noticed your post. Thanks. But the centrifuges needed sophisticated bearings etc. to take the very high speeds. It may be possible to import a few, but enough for 10,000? That's where my problem (or proof, as the case may be) arises.

Also, refining to 98% or 99% as needed for a weapon, I presume, takes a LOT more spinning than refining to 95% as for reactor fuel. Its like GRE scores, 95th percentile vs. 99th percentile, hey?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Amber G. » 29 Feb 2004 23:56

OK, I will bite. Of course, unlike Tim, I would only give facts (and not opinions) :) based upon solid evidence. Since, unlike N^3 some of the evidence may not be as reliable as being told by an alien, :) I would present the evidence, and the rational for reaching the conclusion I am reaching. So you can make up your own mind. Also keep in mind, that some of the information here is still classified, so please do not discuss it outside of BRF. :D

>>> 1. Pakistan had developed an indigenous nuclear weapon capability by 1980.

NO , In Dec 1982 when I was returning from a visiting professorship from Islamabad, I stopped in Saclay (in Gif-Sur_Yvette in France) and ran into French Nuclear Scientist Michael Gaudin (who was assistant to the renowned Prof. Claude Bloch). Michael has just returned from Princeton, and narrated an incident about Professor Freeman Dyson who (FD) was commenting on his undergraduate student’s paper about how to construct a fission bomb. It was clear from the comments of F. Dyson, Michael told me, that Pakistani embassy was unable to buy that undergraduate paper for the details. (And FD, told them (Paki diplomats who drove in droves to New Jersey) to take a hike)

It is true that they (Pakistanis) were able to obtained a copy of the ‘Text Book of Nuclear physics” (By Roy and Nigam - NY Academy Press) by stealing it from an Indian graduate student from the Roth Quad of the NY State University at Stony Brook, and were able to ‘indigenously’ discover the scattering cross section area of U235 (Equal to 24.1 barns) but by that time Abdus Salaam was mad of being declared a non-Muslim and would not tell them how much was a ‘barn’ . (This also explains why, when I was in Pakistan, every government scientist I met kept quizzing me ‘how much is a barn’ - .. Any way it was only in 1982 that they learned that a barn = 10^(-24) sq cm. .. so in some way I may be more responsible for Pak nuclear bums than people realize).

2. Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons in 1980.

>>> No. They had tried to buy Uranium from French Congo but they did not know the specific gravity of U (let alone what is a ‘barn’) so the middle-man Michael (Why All Frenchmen I know are named Michael?) made quite some money selling them pure sand instead of U235-U238 Mix. ..

>>>3. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon (probably as part of a Chinese export deal) in 1987 (Lop Nor.. wherever that is)

No, Mausbour-Zeeman radio-active interferometer conclusively proved that.

>>>4. Kahuta (Xerox Khan) Labs never managed to develop a production-grade process to make weapons-grade enriched uranium.

NO. (Strictly speaking yes, because some U235 was produced when Cosmic rays hit Kahuta, but it had nothing to do with centrifuges .. and the amount was in femto-grams)

5. The PAEA managed to get a nuclear power plant operating.
>>> True. (Critical point is when?)

>>>6. PAEA produced plutonium in its reactors.
Producing Pu is not a big deal – separating it is. So yes Pu was produced but could not be used unless the fuel is sent to some reprocessing plant.

7. Pakistan, by 2002, had generated enough weapons-grade fissile material to produce 50 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size.

>>> Depends on what you mean by size, .. Sure if you consider the volume of the outer shell. .. Not , even by a long shot.. if you consider destructive power …. Gun type of detonators (designs) can be less than 1% efficient (compared to implosion devices) and even 15 kg of HEU is no guarantee that it will not fizzle out.

8. North Korea, as of 1994, had an operating nuclear power plant.
>>> never been to NK.

>>> 9. North Korea was producing plutonium from its reactors.
Yes – again separator is critical.

>>>10. North Korea needed centrifuges to enrich uranium.
Any country would need centrifuge (or similar technology) to enrich uranium.

>>>11. Kahuta Labs' centrifuges were strictly for export only.
No, only when they did not work.. they try to cut the losses.

.>12. The US knew as of 1980 that Pakistan was developing or otherwise acquiring / had acquired nuclear weapons.
Yes they were developing it, US certainly knew it. I know all my letters were intercepted and if I knew, they certainly did.

Ok guys .. if you are still with me.. you deserve all this.

Regards,

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Calvin » 01 Mar 2004 00:09

NK: You're familiar with the high speeds and that they mean that the centrifuge is magnetically coupled through the "magnetic suspension bearings" - (cf "ring magnets"?), with speeds of 50,000 - 70,000 rpm or greater.

What I believe is that once you can make one (or have the design for one), with modern CNCs available at $30K from parts of East Asia, its not unreasonable that these can be made by the tens of thousands.

http://www.exportcontrols.org/centrifuges.html
http://www.npp.hu/uran/3cent-e.htm
http://www.ornl.gov/info/reporter/no48/may03.pdf
http://www.stoples.org/centrifuge.htm

Picture of centrifuge bank.
<img src="http://www.npp.hu/uran/kepek/centri.jpg" alt="" />

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Amber G. » 01 Mar 2004 00:18

My understanding was that you had to have a reactor going to generate Pu (that Pu was a fission by-product or processed by-product?) - but that may be wrong, based on what I see everyone saying??
No plutonium expert, (just basic knowledge of Nuclear Physics).. but don't see how one can get Pu (in quantities > femto-grams) without a nuclear reactor.

One can 'buy' it from black-market or steal it .. but you have to have a reactor as a source.
2. The number of centrifuges needed to generate the kinds of mass for an arsenal, was described at around 10,000 somewhere. Do you guys really believe that TSP managed to build that many with precise fabrication and exotic metals and bearings? In a nation that can't make aircraft engines? Remember - weapons-grade is a lot richer/purer than reactor-grade, right? Hence much more centrifuging?
Again there is quite a range (again from theoretical point of view) for the purity and the amount of fission material required depending on the design of the bomb. The guess for the 'required number of cetrifuges' can easily be off by a maginetude or two unless one knows more details about the design. ..

In The Hiroshima device, IIRC, about 1% of the fissionable material was really “fissioned “ (Mainly due to Gun type of device) …

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby JE Menon » 01 Mar 2004 01:13

Thanx Amber. Input much appreciated.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Raj Singh » 01 Mar 2004 01:14

Perhaps, on the condition of Dr Qadeer Khan/or his inner thoughts on the present situation... :)

Quote ............

HUM Jee ke kya Karenge
Jab BUM hi loot gaya
Jab BUM hi loot gaya

Hum Ji Ke Kya Karenge
Jab BUM hi loot gaya

Bum ka tareeqa humne
Holland se CHOORAYA tha
BB ke Baapne Humen
Sar par bithaya tha

Sala Parvez "moot" gaya!
Mere BUM Pe "moot" gaya! Hum Ji Ke..

Kahuta ke andhero me
Is BUM ko banaya tha
Korea ki missile par
Is BUM ko (also, BBne) Sajaya tha

Qaddafi "moot" gaya!
Mere BUM Pe "moot" gaya! Hum Ji Ke.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Amber G. » 01 Mar 2004 01:30

JEM - Too bad there was no google in 1982.. I just did a google on 'barn' and found this web page among many;.. (Honestly I did not know the origin of the word 'barn'

During wartime research on the atomic bomb, American physicists who were bouncing neutrons off uranium nuclei described the uranium nucleus as "big as a barn." Physicists working on the project adopted the name barn for a unit equal to 10-24 square centimeters, about the size of a uranium nucleus. Initially they hoped the American slang name would obscure any reference to the study of nuclear structure; eventually, the word became a standard unit in particle physics.

BTW: The exact value of this cross-section, for U235 etc, which can be found in any standard nuclear physics hand-book is still classified by US... (Or at least was classified in 1980's...)

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Rudra » 01 Mar 2004 01:31

> ‘Text Book of Nuclear physics” (By Ray and Nigam - NY Academy Press)

was this book a secret...if a indian grad student
could have it , couldnt they just buy it ?

I am assuming you posted it seriously :confused:

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Amber G. » 01 Mar 2004 01:42

assuming you posted it seriously
GD: What do you think? :D
Seriously ( :D ), ask any Pak expert here, Just because a book is available in Barns and Noble .. do you really think that a pak govt scientis would know that? Fat chance.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Tim » 01 Mar 2004 01:57

On the centrifuge, I believe recent press reports have made the following data public:

P-1 design: 50,000 centrifuges can produce enough HEU for 30 bombs/year.

P-2 design: 10,000 centrifuges can produce enough HEU for 10 bombs/year.

Now, I've gotten a bunch of data in the past from other sources that suggest a 1000 centrifuge cascade (in the case of Iraq, pre-1991) could provide 1-1.5 bombs worth of material (American source) or 3-5 bombs worth of material (German source) annually. I've tended to use 1 bomb/year/thousand centrifuges as a conservative estimate.

Iraq was gearing up for production or at lesat 2000 centrifuges a year by 1993 at one complex - possibly as many as 5000 a year if multiple complexes are kept in mind. Iraq put roughly as much money into its nuclear program (in a shorter time) as Pakistan has, according to recent press estimates.

Iran produced hundreds of centrifuges covertly that have been discovered at secret sites this year alone.

Iraq and Iran don't have incredibly sophisticated military industries. They are probably roughly comparable to Pakistan.

That's a lot of data points, I know. It leads me to believe, given the priority Pakistan clearly gave this project in the 1970s and 1980s, that it's possible they could get a serious centrifuge program running.

The cargo of the Libyan ship, BTW, included brand-new centrifuge components manufactured in Malaysia, in addition to some used items.

Again, all according to recent press reports and ancient research (book will be out this year!). I don't have access to all of Amber G's classified resources :)

Tim

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Prateek » 01 Mar 2004 02:02

Nuclear Insecurities

[ FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 12:00:45 AM ]

Muthiah Alagappa , director of East-West Center, Washington DC, is a leading security expert on Asia who has been tracking the fallout of the recent disclosures about Pakis- tani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s role in masterminding a network of nuclear proliferation. On a recent visit to Delhi , he spoke to Ranjan Roy about the safety and control of Islamabad ’s nuclear arsenal:


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/522085.cms


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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby JE Menon » 01 Mar 2004 02:18

>>Iraq and Iran don't have incredibly sophisticated military industries. They are probably roughly comparable to Pakistan.

I'm assuming this is a gut-feel comparison, Tim. Is it? Or have you seen analysis suggesting this to be the case?

My own gut feeling is that Iran is probably better than Pak.

GD - It's Nuclear Physics: Theory & Experiment by Roy & Nigam that Amber is talking about I think. Shoulda been available in libraries.

But Pak scientist was prolly being testicularly brilliant and following in footsteps of AXK, just to show that he, too, could steal. :D

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 01 Mar 2004 03:29

X-posted.
BR sees way ahead of others.

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=4462614

Report: Deal for U.S. to Hunt Bin Laden in Pakistan

Sun Feb 29, 2004 01:09 PM ET

NEW YORK (Reuters) - The United States has struck a deal with Pakistan to allow U.S. troops to hunt for al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden this spring in an area of Pakistan where he is believed to be operating, the New Yorker magazine reported on Sunday.

Thousands of U.S. troops will be deployed in a tribal area of northwest Pakistan in return for Washington's support of President Pervez Musharraf's pardon of the Pakistani scientist who this month admitted leaking nuclear arms secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh wrote in the issue that goes on sale on Monday.

Full disclosure of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's activities would have exposed him as "the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the world," an intelligence official is quoted as saying.

"It's a quid pro quo," according to a former senior intelligence official. "We're going to get our troops inside Pakistan in return for not forcing Musharraf to deal with Khan."

Musharraf has also offered other help in the hunt for bin Laden, accused of masterminding the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, according to the article.

"Musharraf told us, 'We've got guys inside. The people who provide fresh fruits and vegetables and herd the <u>goats</u> :D :roll: :lol: for bin Laden and his al Qaeda followers," the intelligence official added.

The spring offensive could slow the tempo of U.S. operations in Iraq, the magazine said.

"It's going to be a full-court press," one Pentagon planner was quoted as saying. The article added that some of the most highly skilled U.S. Special Forces units would be shifted from Iraq to Pakistan.

Special Forces personnel have been briefed on their new assignments and in some cases have been given "warning orders" -- the stage before being sent into combat, according to a military adviser.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Kuttan » 01 Mar 2004 05:55

So lets see now:

Latest explanation on
"Why did we reveal what we've known for the past 24 years, NOW?"
Top 10 Reasons Why the GOTUS Revealed the Pakistani Nuclear Bazaar:

10. It came on CNN.
9. The Washington Post needed a headline
8. We were asking for a raise to the South Asia budget of the CIA.
7. The BBC made us do it.
6. It was accidentally Declassified after 17 years - a bit late.
5. The US and UK Agents heroically worked to bring out the key document which we were able to present to Musharraf and convince him to start an investigation.
4. The Libyans complained to the Better Business Bureau about low-quality centrifuges.
3. We were trying to placate Ariel Sharon
2. We wanted & NEEDED General GUBO Musharraf's permission to go hunt Osama in Waziristan. :roll:

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Alok Niranjan » 01 Mar 2004 06:39

Originally posted by Amber G.:
In Dec 1982 when I was returning from a visiting professorship from Islamabad, I stopped in Saclay
just curious ... from one physicist to another ... why waste a hard-earned sabbatical on Pakiland? I know of some Bangladeshis who consider it a privilege, but why you?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Alok Niranjan » 01 Mar 2004 07:22

Originally posted by narayanan:
Also, refining to 98% or 99% as needed for a weapon, I presume, takes a LOT more spinning than refining to 95% as for reactor fuel. Its like GRE scores, 95th percentile vs. 99th percentile, hey?
you presume "erroneously". In reality, anything above 90% is adequate and typical for weapon grade ... for reactor grade, even 5% is workable. GRE or no GRE (suspiciously similar to an undergraduate definition, I presume :) )

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Sridhar » 01 Mar 2004 07:45

It seems Amber succeeded in fooling more than one person. Also, it seems as if people don't read posts till the end.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Vivek_A » 01 Mar 2004 08:12

Originally posted by Rangudu:
herd the <u>goats</u>
So that's their big plan....monitoring the sex life of Al Qaeda's members.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Kuttan » 01 Mar 2004 08:22

Vivek:

Proper Translation:

"So Laden and entire harem are in TSP,a nd Mush has his agents ogling the harem"

laxmibai
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby laxmibai » 01 Mar 2004 08:43

It was never Pakistan's fault you see:

In 1990, the United States was compelled to stop the sale of F-16 planes to Pakistan because of its nuclear activities. Washington waged a campaign to get other nations not to sell anything that could deliver weapons, especially nuclear bombs.

But according to Mr. Oakley, that step only prompted Pakistan to look elsewhere — and find North Korea. In return for missiles, Pakistan secretly transferred nuclear weapons technology, which the United States discovered only in 2002.
And Musharraf was cho-chweet, you see:

State Department officials said that the moment evidence of that activity came in, Mr. Powell had another talk with Mr. Musharraf.

"Anything about North Korea is just devastating," Mr. Powell told the Pakistani leader, adding "You can't do it," those officials recalled.

The officials said Mr. Musharraf denied any knowledge of the North Korean connection but promised it would stop if true.

The official said Mr. Powell said he had not seen signs of such activity since.
and the rest was India's fault :


Another case of unintended consequences with Pakistan occurred when the Bush administration installed an anti-Taliban government in Kabul in early 2002. The Persian-speaking Tajiks who were given most of the power were friendly to India, Pakistan's enemy.

That led Pakistani security people who had long been close to the Pashtun-speaking Taliban to welcome their presence in border areas, where, in the eyes of Islamabad, they could form a friendly buffer zone. Now that Mr. Karzai has brought more Pushtun representatives into the government, Pakistan's concerns about the Kabul government have been allayed to some extent.

Salvaging Powell's H&D

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 01 Mar 2004 08:59

Being in the US State Department is the cushiest job in the world. You can be like the dufus Oakley and be proven wrong time after time and yet be considered an "expert". Talk about job security...

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby RanjanRoy » 01 Mar 2004 09:14

SPACEWAR: Pakistan proliferation unpunished so US troops could hunt bin Laden: report
WASHINGTON (AFP) Feb 29, 2004
The United States withheld criticism of Pakistan despite leaks of nuclear secrets to Libya and other countries, so long as US troops could launch a search for Osama bin Laden in the Islamic state, said a report released Sunday.
"It's a quid pro quo," a former senior intelligence official told New Yorker reporter Seymour Hersh.

"We're going to get our troops inside Pakistan in return for not forcing (Pakistani leader Pervez) Musharraf to deal with (Pakistan's nuclear research director Abdul Qadeer) Khan," who admitted sharing nuclear secrets with US foes Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Musharraf pardoned Khan, who admitted "full responsibility" for the leaks and denied military involvement in his proliferation.

"One thing we know is that this was not a rogue operation," a Bush administration official told The New Yorker.

"Suppose (atom bomb inventor) Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology and equipment around the world. Do you really think he could do that without the government knowing? How do you get missiles from North Korea to Pakistan? Do you think (Khan) shipped all the centrifuges by Federal Express?"

Hersh's article appeared in the issue of the New York weekly hitting newsstands Monday.

Washington said it had not pressured Islamabad for fear of politically weakening Musharraf, a much-needed ally in President George W. Bush's war on terror.

However, the amount of nuclear know-how Khan made available to hostile nations put the United States in jeopardy, experts told The New Yorker.

"We haven't been this vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814," former UN weapons inspector Robert Gallucci told The New Yorker.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby kgoan » 01 Mar 2004 09:43

Farruh Saleem: Paks Terror economy

What I found most interesting-and the most painful-was Pakistan's calculation regarding our Gross Terror-economy Product (GTP). Pakistan has been at war on many fronts, as a consequence "Pakistan's conflict with India, Iran and the Shia community within the country, and most significantly its involvement in Afghanistan, has created a Conflict Economy. The Conflict Economy has two components: formal, expressed in military expenditure and informal, expressed in its Gross Terror-economy Product." Pakistan's Visible Gross Terror-economy Product stands at Rs164 billion while Ur Invisible Gross Terror-economy Product has been estimated at Rs100 billion. That's a total of Rs264 billion plus Military Expenditures of Rs160 billion and Pakistan's Conflict Economy, at Rs424 billion, stands at 10.6% of our GDP.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby shiv » 01 Mar 2004 10:11

Originally posted by Tim:
On the centrifuge, I believe recent press reports have made the following data public:

P-1 design: 50,000 centrifuges can produce enough HEU for 30 bombs/year.

P-2 design: 10,000 centrifuges can produce enough HEU for 10 bombs/year.
What is NOT clear from these quotes is the info about centrifuges in the "West" that has been published in the past. I will ferret out some refs if I can but the problem with centrifuges is that they have to spin at speeds that are close to the physical limits of the materials used.

That means that getting all 50,000 centrifuges to work without breaking down and failing 24x7x365 is something that even URENCO could probably not manage leave alone KRL/PAEC

Ultimately it is a question of efficiency. On the face of it the figures you quote mean that 50,000 centrifuges working 24x7x365 is the same as ONE centrifuge working for 3 billion hours- i.e. 3 billlion centrifuge-hours. Does your figure take into account breakdowns?

One would require extremely fine engineering and materials science experts to get 50000 centrifuges working like that, even if the designs were printed on the palms of every employees hands. Has the US done it? Has anyone in Europe done it?

Apart from teh centrifuges themselves it the business of balancing, bearings, power supply etc that nobody has any clear knowledge of with reference to conditions within Paki labs.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby jarugn » 01 Mar 2004 10:50

http://newyorker.com/fact/content/

THE DEAL
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan’s nuclear black marketers?
Issue of 2004-03-08
Posted 2004-03-01

On February 4th, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is revered in Pakistan as the father of the country’s nuclear bomb, appeared on a state-run television network in Islamabad and confessed that he had been solely responsible for operating an international black market in nuclear-weapons materials. His confession was accepted by a stony-faced Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s President, who is a former Army general, and who dressed for the occasion in commando fatigues. The next day, on television again, Musharraf, who claimed to be shocked by Khan’s misdeeds, nonetheless pardoned him, citing his service to Pakistan (he called Khan “my hero”). Musharraf told the Times that he had received a specific accounting of Khan’s activities in Iran, North Korea, and Malaysia from the United States only last October. “If they knew earlier, they should have told us,” he said. “Maybe a lot of things would not have happened.”

It was a make-believe performance in a make-believe capital. In interviews last month in Islamabad, a planned city built four decades ago, politicians, diplomats, and nuclear experts dismissed the Khan confession and the Musharraf pardon with expressions of scorn and disbelief. For two decades, journalists and American and European intelligence agencies have linked Khan and the Pakistani intelligence service, the I.S.I. (Inter-Service Intelligence), to nuclear-technology transfers, and it was hard to credit the idea that the government Khan served had been oblivious. “It is state propaganda,” Samina Ahmed, the director of the Islamabad office of the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization that studies conflict resolution, told me. “The deal is that Khan doesn’t tell what he knows. Everybody is lying. The tragedy of this whole affair is that it doesn’t serve anybody’s needs.” Mushahid Hussain Sayed, who is a member of the Pakistani senate, said with a laugh, “America needed an offering to the gods—blood on the floor. Musharraf told A.Q., ‘Bend over for a spanking.’”

A Bush Administration intelligence officer with years of experience in nonproliferation issues told me last month, “One thing we do know is that this was not a rogue operation. Suppose Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology and equipment around the world. Do you really think he could do that without the government knowing? How do you get missiles from North Korea to Pakistan? Do you think A.Q. shipped all the centrifuges by Federal Express? The military has to be involved, at high levels.” The intelligence officer went on, “We had every opportunity to put a stop to the A. Q. Khan network fifteen years ago. Some of those involved today in the smuggling are the children of those we knew about in the eighties. It’s the second generation now.”

In public, the Bush Administration accepted the pardon at face value. Within hours of Musharraf’s television appearance, Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, praised him as “the right man at the right time.” Armitage added that Pakistan had been “very forthright in the last several years with us about proliferation.” A White House spokesman said that the Administration valued Musharraf’s assurances that “Pakistan was not involved in any of the proliferation activity.” A State Department spokesman said that how to deal with Khan was “a matter for Pakistan to decide.”

Musharraf, who seized power in a coup d’état in 1999, has been a major ally of the Bush Administration in the war on terrorism. According to past and present military and intelligence officials, however, Washington’s support for the pardon of Khan was predicated on what Musharraf has agreed to do next: look the other way as the U.S. hunts for Osama bin Laden in a tribal area of northwest Pakistan dominated by the forbidding Hindu Kush mountain range, where he is believed to be operating. American commanders have been eager for permission to conduct major sweeps in the Hindu Kush for some time, and Musharraf has repeatedly refused them. Now, with Musharraf’s agreement, the Administration has authorized a major spring offensive that will involve the movement of thousands of American troops.

Musharraf has proffered other help as well. A former senior intelligence official said to me, “Musharraf told us, ‘We’ve got guys inside. The people who provide fresh fruits and vegetables and herd the goats’” for bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers. “It’s a quid pro quo: we’re going to get our troops inside Pakistan in return for not forcing Musharraf to deal with Khan.”

The spring offensive could diminish the tempo of American operations in Iraq. “It’s going to be a full-court press,” one Pentagon planner said. Some of the most highly skilled Special Forces units, such as Task Force 121, will be shifted from Iraq to Pakistan. Special Forces personnel around the world have been briefed on their new assignments, one military adviser told me, and in some cases have been given “warning orders”—the stage before being sent into combat.

A large-scale American military presence in Pakistan could also create an uproar in the country and weaken Musharraf’s already tenuous hold on power. The operation represents a tremendous gamble for him personally (he narrowly survived two assassination attempts in December) and, by extension, for the Bush Administration—if he fell, his successor might be far less friendly to the United States. One of Musharraf’s most vocal critics inside Pakistan is retired Army Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, a fundamentalist Muslim who directed the I.S.I. from 1987 to 1989, at the height of the Afghan war with the Soviets. If American troops start operating from Pakistan, there will be “a rupture in the relationship,” Gul told me. “Americans think others are slaves to them.” Referring to the furor over A. Q. Khan, he added, “We may be in a jam, but we are a very honorable nation. We will not allow the American troops to come here. This will be the breaking point.” If Musharraf has made an agreement about letting American troops operate in Pakistan, Gul said, “he’s lying to you.”

The greatest risk may be not to Musharraf, or to the stability of South Asia, but to the ability of the international nuclear monitoring institutions to do their work. Many experts fear that, with Khan’s help, the world has moved closer to a nuclear tipping point. Husain Haqqani, who was a special assistant to three prime ministers before Musharraf came to power and is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted, with some pride, that his nation had managed to make the bomb despite American sanctions. But now, he told me, Khan and his colleagues have gone wholesale: “Once they had the bomb, they had a shopping list of what to buy and where. A. Q. Khan can bring a plain piece of paper and show me how to get it done—the countries, people, and telephone numbers. ‘This is the guy in Russia who can get you small quantities of enriched uranium. You in Malaysia will manufacture the stuff. Here’s who will miniaturize the warhead. And then go to North Korea and get the damn missile.’” He added, “This is not a few scientists pocketing money and getting rich. It’s a state policy.”

Haqqani depicted Musharraf as truly “on the American side,” in terms of resisting Islamic extremism, but, he said, “he doesn’t know how to be on the American side. The same guys in the I.S.I. who have done this in the last twenty years he expects to be his partners. These are people who’ve done nothing but covert operations: One, screw India. Two, deceive America. Three, expand Pakistan’s influence in the Islamic community. And, four, continue to spread nuclear technology.” He paused. “Musharraf is trying to put out the fire with the help of the people who started the fire,” he said.

“Much of this has been known for decades to the American intelligence community,” Haqqani added. “Sometimes you know things and don’t want to do anything about it. Americans need to know that your government is not only downplaying this but covering it up. You go to bed with our I.S.I. They know how to suck up to you. You let us get away with everything. Why can’t you be more honest? There’s no harm in telling us the truth—‘Look, you’re an ally but a very disturbing ally.’ You have to nip some of these things in the bud.”

The former senior American intelligence official was equally blunt. He told me, “Khan was willing to sell blueprints, centrifuges, and the latest in weaponry. He was the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the world and he’s pardoned—with not a squeak from the White House.”

The most recent revelations about the nuclear black market were triggered by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a now defunct opposition group that has served as the political wing of the People’s Mujahideen Khalq, a group that has been on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations since 1997. The National Council lobbied in Washington for decades, and offered information—not always accurate—about Iran. There had been suspicions about Iran’s nuclear intentions since the eighties, but the country’s religious rulers claimed that its nuclear facilities were intended for peaceful purposes only. In August of 2002, the National Council came up with something new: it announced at a news conference in Washington that it had evidence showing that Iran had secretly constructed two extensive nuclear-weapons facilities in the desert south of Tehran. The two plants were described with impressive specificity. One, near Natanz, had been depicted by Iranian officials as part of a desert-eradication program. The site, surrounded by barbed wire, was said to include two work areas buried twenty-five feet underground and ringed by concrete walls more than eight feet thick. The second plant, which was said to be producing heavy water for use in making weapons-grade plutonium, was situated in Arak and ostensibly operated as an energy company.

Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the organization that monitors nuclear proliferation, eventually followed up on the National Council’s information. And it checked out.

A building that I.A.E.A. inspectors were not able to gain full access to on a visit in March, 2003, was found on a subsequent trip to contain a centrifuge facility behind a wall made of boxes. Inspectors later determined that some of the centrifuges had been supplied by Pakistan. They also found traces of highly enriched uranium on centrifuge components manufactured in Iran and Pakistan. The I.A.E.A. has yet to determine whether the uranium originated in Pakistan: the enriched materials could have come from the black market, or from a nuclear proliferator yet to be discovered, or from the Iranians’ own production facilities.

Last October, the Iranian government, after nine months of denials and obfuscation—and increasingly productive inspections—formally acknowledged to the I.A.E.A. that it had secretly been producing small quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium, and had been operating a pilot heavy-water reactor program, all potentially in violation of its obligations under the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Some of the secret programs, Iran admitted, dated back eighteen years. At first, the country’s religious leadership claimed that its scientists had worked on their own, and not with the help of outside suppliers. The ayatollahs later admitted that this was not the case, but refused to say where the help had come from.

Iran’s leaders continued to insist that their goal was to produce nuclear energy, not nuclear weapons, and, in a public report last November, the I.A.E.A. stopped short of accusing them of building a bomb. Cautiously, it stated, “It is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations . . . with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use. . . . To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.”

Privately, however, senior proliferation experts were far less reserved. “I know what they did,” one official in Vienna told me, speaking of the Iranians. “They’ve been lying all the time and they’ve been cheating all the time.” Asked if he thought that Iran now has the bomb, the official said no. Asked if he thought that Iran had enough enriched uranium to make a bomb, he said, “I’m not sure.”

Musharraf has insisted that any dealings between A. Q. Khan and Iran were independent of, and unknown to, the Pakistani government. But there is evidence to contradict him. On a trip to the Middle East last month, I was told that a number of years ago the Israeli signals-intelligence agency, known as Unit 8200, broke a sophisticated Iranian code and began monitoring communications that included talk between Iran and Pakistan about Iran’s burgeoning nuclear-weapons program. The Israeli intelligence community has many covert contacts inside Iran, stemming from the strong ties it had there before the overthrow of the Shah, in 1979; some of these ties still exist. Israeli intelligence also maintained close contact with many Iranian opposition groups, such as the National Council. A connection was made—directly or indirectly—and the Israeli intelligence about Iran’s nuclear program reached the National Council. A senior I.A.E.A. official subsequently told me that he knew that the Council’s information had originated with Israeli intelligence, but he refused to say where he had learned that fact. (An Israeli diplomat in Washington, asked to comment, said, “Why would we work with a Mickey Mouse outlet like the Council?”)

The Israeli intercepts have been shared, in some form, with the United States intelligence community, according to the former senior intelligence official, and they show that high-level officials in Islamabad and Tehran had frequent conversations about the I.A.E.A. investigation and its implications. “The interpretation is the issue here,” the former official said. “If you set the buzzwords aside, the substance is that the Iranians were saying, ‘We’ve got to play with the I.A.E.A. We don’t want to blow our cover, but we have to show some movement. There’s no way we’re going against world public opinion—no way. We’ve got to show that we’re coöperating and get the Europeans on our side.’” (At the time, Iran was engaged in negotiations with the European Union on trade and other issues.) It’s clear from the intercepts, however, the former intelligence official said, that Iran did not want to give up its nuclear potential. The Pakistani response, he added, was “Don’t give away the whole ballgame and we’ll look out for you.” There was a further message from Pakistan, the former official said: “Look out for your own interests.”

In the official’s opinion, Pakistan and Iran have survived the crisis: “They both did what they said they’d do, and neither one has been hurt. No one has been damaged. The public story is still that Iran never really got there—which is bullshit.” And analysts throughout the American intelligence community, he said, are asking, “How could it be that Pakistan’s done all these things—developed a second generation of miniaturized and boosted weapons—and yet the investigation has been shorted to ground?”

A high-level intelligence officer who has access to the secret Iran-Pakistan exchanges told me that he understood that “the Pakistanis were very worried that the Iranians would give their name to the I.A.E.A.” The officer, interviewed in Tel Aviv, told me that Israel remains convinced that “the Iranians do not intend to give up the bomb. What Iran did was report to the I.A.E.A. the information that was already out in the open and which they cannot protect. There is much that is not exposed.” Israeli intelligence, he added, continues to see digging and other nuclear-related underground activity in Iran. A nonproliferation official based in Vienna later explained that Iran has bored two holes near a uranium-mining operation that are “deep enough to do a test”—as deep as two hundred metres. The design of the bomb that could be tested, he added, if Iran chose to do so, came from Libya, via Pakistan and A. Q. Khan.

Last December, President Bush and Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, jointly announced that Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, had decided to give up his nuclear-weapons program and would permit I.A.E.A. inspectors to enter his country. The surprise announcement, the culmination of nine months of secret talks, was followed immediately by a six-day inspection by the I.A.E.A., the first of many inspections, and the public unveiling, early this year, of the role of yet another country, Malaysia, in the nuclear black market. Libya had been able to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of nuclear parts, including advanced centrifuges designed in Pakistan, from a firm in Malaysia, with a free-trade zone in Dubai serving as the main shipping point. It was a new development in an old arms race: Malaysia, a high-tech nation with no indigenous nuclear ambitions, was retailing sophisticated nuclear gear, based on designs made available by Khan.

The centrifuge materials that the inspectors found in Libya had not been assembled—in most cases, in fact, the goods were still in their shipping cases. “I am not impressed by what I’ve seen,” a senior nonproliferation official told me. “It was not a well-developed program—not a serious research-and-development approach to make use of what they bought. It was useless. But I was absolutely struck by what the Libyans were able to buy. What’s on the market is absolutely horrendous. It’s a Mafia-type business, with corruption and secrecy.”

I.A.E.A. inspectors, to their dismay, even found in Libya precise blueprints for the design and construction of a half-ton nuclear weapon. “It’s a sweet little bomb, put together by engineers who know how to assemble a weapon,” an official in Vienna told me. “No question it’ll work. Just dig a hole and test it. It’s too big and too heavy for a Scud, but it’ll go into a family car. It’s a terrorist’s dream.”

In a speech on February 5th at Georgetown University, George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, hailed the developments in Libya as an American intelligence coup. Tenet said, “We learned of all this through the powerful combination of technical intelligence, careful and painstaking analytic work, operational daring, and, yes, the classic kind of human intelligence that people have led you to believe we no longer have.” The C.I.A. unquestionably has many highly motivated and highly skilled agents. But interviews with former C.I.A. officials and with two men who worked closely with Libyan intelligence present a different story.

Qaddafi had been seeking a reconciliation with the West for years, with limited success. Then, a former C.I.A. operations officer told me, Musa Kusa, the longtime head of Libyan intelligence, urged Qaddafi to meet with Western intelligence agencies and open up his weapons arsenal to international inspection. The C.I.A. man quoted Kusa as explaining that, as the war with Iraq drew near, he had warned Qaddafi, “You are nuts if you think you can defeat the United States. Get out of it now. Surrender now and hope they accept your surrender.”

One Arab intelligence operative told me that Libyan intelligence, with Qaddafi’s approval, then quickly offered to give American and British intelligence details about a centrifuge deal that was already under way. The parts were due to be shipped aboard a German freighter, the B.B.C. China. In October, the freighter was seized, and the incident was proclaimed a major intelligence success. But, the operative said, it was “the Libyans who blew up the Pakistanis,” and who made the role of Khan’s black market known. The Americans, he said, asked “questions about those orders and Libya said it had them.” It was, in essence, a sting, and was perceived that way by Musharraf. He was enraged by what he called, in a nationally televised speech last month—delivered in Urdu, and not officially translated by the Pakistani government—the betrayal of Pakistan by his “Muslim brothers” in both Libya and Iran. There was little loyalty between seller and buyer. “The Pakistanis took a lot of Libya’s money and gave second-grade plans,” the Arab intelligence operative said. “It was halfhearted.”

The intelligence operative went on, “Qaddafi is very pragmatic and studied the timing. It was the right time. The United States wanted to have a success story, and he banked on that.”

Because of the ongoing investigation into Khan and his nuclear-proliferation activities, the I.A.E.A.’s visibility and credibility have grown.The key issue, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the I.A.E.A., told me, in an interview at the organization’s headquarters in Vienna, is non-state actors. “I have a nightmare that the spread of enriched uranium and nuclear material could result in the operation of a small enrichment facility in a place like northern Afghanistan,” he said. “Who knows? It’s not hard for a non-state to hide, especially if there is a state in collusion with it. Some of these non-state groups are very sophisticated.”

Many diplomats in Vienna expressed frustration at the I.A.E.A.’s inability, thanks to Musharraf’s pardon, to gain access to Khan. “It’s not going to happen,” one diplomat said. “We are getting some coöperation from Pakistan, but it’s the names we need to know. ‘Who got the stuff?’ We’re interested to know whether other nations that we’re supposed to supervise have the stuff.” The diplomat told me he believed that the United States was unwilling to publicly state the obvious: that there was no way the Pakistani government didn’t know about the transfers. He said, “Of course it looks awful, but Musharraf will be indebted to you.”

The I.A.E.A.’s authority to conduct inspections is limited. The nations that have signed the nonproliferation treaty are required to permit systematic I.A.E.A. inspections of their declared nuclear facilities for research and energy production. But there is no mechanism for the inspection of suspected nuclear-weapons sites, and many at the I.A.E.A. believe that the treaty must be modified. “There is a nuclear network of black-market centrifuges and weapons design that the world has yet to discover,” a diplomat in Vienna told me. In the past, he said, the I.A.E.A. had worked under the assumption that nations would cheat on the nonproliferation treaty “to produce and sell their own nuclear material.” He said, “What we have instead is a black-market network capable of producing usable nuclear materials and nuclear devices that is not limited to any one nation. We have nuclear dealers operating outside our front door, and we have no control over them—no matter how good we are in terms of verification.” There would be no need, in other words, for A. Q. Khan or anyone else in Pakistan to have a direct role in supplying nuclear technology. The most sensitive nuclear equipment would be available to any country—or any person or group, presumably—that had enough cash.

“This is a question of survival,” the diplomat said, with a caustic smile. He added, “Iraq is laughable in comparison with this issue. The Bush Administration was hunting the shadows instead of the prey.”

Another nonproliferation official depicted the challenge facing the I.A.E.A. inspection regime as “a seismic shift—the globalization of the nuclear world.” The official said, “We have to move from inspecting declared sites to ‘Where does this **** come from?’ If we stay focussed on the declared, we miss the nuclear supply matrix.” At this point, the international official asked me, in all seriousness, “Why hasn’t A. Q. Khan been taken out by Israel or the United States?”

After Pakistan’s role in providing nuclear aid to Iran and Libya was revealed, Musharraf insisted once again, this time at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland, in January, that he would not permit American troops to search for Al Qaeda members inside Pakistan. “That is not a possibility at all,” he said. “It is a very sensitive issue. There is no room for any foreign elements coming and assisting us. We don’t need any assistance.”

Nonetheless, a senior Pentagon adviser told me in mid-February, the spring offensive is on. “We’re entering a huge period of transition in Iraq,” the adviser said, referring to the coming changeover of forces, with many of the experienced regular Army combat units being replaced by National Guard and Army Reserve units. “We will not be conducting a lot of ops, and so you redirect and exploit somewhere else.”

The operation, American officials said, is scheduled to involve the redeployment to South Asia of thousands of American soldiers, including members of Task Force 121. The logistical buildup began in mid-February, as more than a dozen American C-17 cargo planes began daily flights, hauling helicopters, vehicles, and other equipment to military bases in Pakistan. Small teams of American Special Forces units have been stationed at the Shahbaz airbase, in northwestern Pakistan, since the beginning of the Afghanistan war, in the fall of 2001.

The senior Pentagon adviser, like other military and intelligence officials I talked to, was cautious about the chances of getting what the White House wants—Osama bin Laden. “It’s anybody’s guess,” he said, adding that Ops Sec—operational security—for the planned offensive was poor. The former senior intelligence official similarly noted that there was concern inside the Joint Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, over the reliability of intercepted Al Qaeda telephone calls. “What about deception?” he said. “These guys are not dumb, and once the logistical aircraft begin to appear”—the American C-17s landing every night at an airbase in Pakistan—“you know something is going on.”

“We’ve got to get Osama bin Laden, and we know where he is,” the former senior intelligence official said. Osama bin Laden is “communicating through sigint”—talking on satellite telephones and the like—“and his wings have been clipped. He’s in his own Alamo in northern Pakistan. It’s a natural progress—whittling down alternative locations and then targeting him. This is not, in theory, a ‘Let’s go and hope’ kind of thing. They’ve seen what they think is him.” But the former official added that there were reasons to be cautious about such reports, especially given that bin Laden hasn’t been seen for so long. Bin Laden would stand out because of his height; he is six feet five. But the target area is adjacent to Swat Valley, which is populated by a tribe of exceptionally tall people.

Two former C.I.A. operatives with firsthand knowledge of the PakistanAfghanistan border areas said that the American assault, if it did take place, would confront enormous logistical problems. “It’s impenetrable,” said Robert Baer, who visited the Hindu Kush area in the early nineties, before he was assigned to lead the C.I.A.’s anti-Saddam operations in northern Iraq. “There are no roads, and you can’t get armor up there. This is where Alexander the Great lost an entire division. The Russians didn’t even bother to go up there. Everybody’s got a gun. That area is worse than Iraq.” Milton Bearden, who ran the C.I.A.’s operations in Afghanistan during the war with the Soviet Union, recounted, “I’ve been all through there. The Pashtun population in that belt has lived there longer than almost any other ethnic group has lived anywhere on earth.” He said, “Our intelligence has got to be better than it’s been. Anytime we go into something driven entirely by electoral politics, it doesn’t work out.”

One American intelligence consultant noted that American forces in Afghanistan have crossed into Pakistan in “hot pursuit” of Al Qaeda suspects in previous operations, with no complaints from the Pakistani leadership. If the American forces strike quickly and decisively against bin Laden from within Pakistan, he added, “Musharraf could say he gave no advance authorization. We can move in with so much force and firepower—with so much shock and awe—that we will be too fast for him.” The consultant said, “The question is, how deep into Pakistan can we pursue him?” He added, “Musharraf is in a very tough position.”

At home, Musharraf is in more danger than ever over his handling of the nuclear affair. “He’s opened up Pandora’s box, and he will never be able to manage it,” Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, a former government minister who now heads an opposition party, said. “Pakistani public opinion feels that A.Q. has been made a scapegoat, and international opinion thinks he’s a threat. This is a no-win situation for Musharraf. The average man feels that there will be a nuclear rollback, and Pakistan’s immediate deterrent will be taken away. It comes down to an absolute disaster for Musharraf.”

Robert Gallucci, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is now dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, calls A. Q. Khan “the Johnny Appleseed” of the nuclear-arms race. Gallucci, who is a consultant to the C.I.A. on proliferation issues, told me, “Bad as it is with Iran, North Korea, and Libya having nuclear-weapons material, the worst part is that they could transfer it to a non-state group. That’s the biggest concern, and the scariest thing about all this—that Pakistan could work with the worst terrorist groups on earth to build nuclear weapons. There’s nothing more important than stopping terrorist groups from getting nuclear weapons. The most dangerous country for the United States now is Pakistan, and second is Iran.” Gallucci went on, “We haven’t been this vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814.”

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Prateek » 01 Mar 2004 10:53

[url=http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/03/01/d40301020328.htm]Perspectives
The fate of Pakistan's bomb!
M Abdul Hafiz[/url]

Pakistanis are still trying to catch up with the realities surrounding the country's recent infamy -- peddling of the nuclear secrets indiscriminately without being caught by its ubiquitous intelligence services. They are equally nonplussed at the multi-dimension personality of Dr A Q Khan, Pakistan's architect of bomb, a national hero and the country one of the best known celebrities who can at the same time cause ignominy to his country without compunction and accept full responsibility for it. An immaculately arranged confession statement and what followed, however fail to set things at rest. Even as Dr Khan's statement is replayed thousand times over the TV channels the whole world continues to appear askance if he could proliferated without official support and connivance. Even if the confession story is indeed bought questions are bound to be asked whether the country incapable of guarding its own nuclear secrets can be trusted with nuclear arsenal.

Dr Khan's bizarre admission on national TV that he headed a massive international smuggling operation supplying Libya, Iran and North Korea with assorted nuclear technology was not just an unprecedented political and public relation disaster for Pakistan. It also handed Washington a cudgel with which to thrash Pakistan over nuclear issue. Washington's long standing notion that Muslim countries are too irresponsible, corrupt and unstable to be allowed nuclear weapons has now been vindicated by Kahuta disaster. It may now be a matter of time that the US would demand at least joint control over Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless it was an embarrassment both at home and abroad. President Musharraf busy in placating both domestic anxiety and external scrutiny did a deft balancing while repeating his resolves to preserve the sanctity and security of Pakistan's nuclear assets. His voice was visibly defensive. But the Western media with its strident views remained blatantly hostile -- dressing Pakistan down and even suggesting de-nuking of the country. In the meantime the canards of all sorts spread like wild fire. Officially however the United States seems circumspect although she never liked Pakistan's nuke capability.

However, a different picture is likely to emerge once Pakistan's military and strategic usefulness in Afghanistan is over and normalcy is restored on anti-terror war front. That will be a crucial juncture when UN Security Council may, at the behest of the United States, icily ask Pakistan to open up its uranium enrichment laboratory for inspection. Pakistan will have nothing to protest because the charge of the proliferation against the country stands proven with the confession and pardon drama staged earlier. Obviously the trauma befalling the nation persists.

Even if the timing of the AQ Khan episode is an incredible coincidence, many believe that is a part of brilliantly orchestrated campaign to eliminate Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Even earlier Pakistan's nuclear programme never enjoyed the sort of immunity from criticism that was afforded, for example, to Israel and to an extent which subsequently became recognised nuclear power with the west's subtle patronisation. Nor was there any hullabaloo about South Africa's nuclear capabilities which was revealed and then hastily dismantled as a matter of principles when the nation moved out of apartheid although the dismantling was sold to the world as an anti-proliferation measure. On the contrary the application of Pressler Amendment, occasional threats of sanction and frequent scrutiny of the US dogged the progress of Pakistan's nuclear programme.

Although Dr AQ Khan and some other scientists of KRL have been fully implicated in the transfer of nuclear expertise to North Korea, Libya and Iran as a result of debriefing conducted by Pakistan military such sleazes are inherent in the international nuclear regime. Like important part of Delhi's nuclear arms development was based on US technology stolen by Israel and then sold to India, Pakistan also extensively shopped for nuclear materials through shady middlemen and secretive dealers. The dubious deal involving third world countries could have been struck along the way. Pakistan's path to success has been long, arduous and painful. The same way each nuclear-capable nation has its own history of reaching the capability, each part of which might not have been savoury.

There are sources to supply nuclear material to Iran, for example, from many western countries including the US which ridiculously raise their eyebrows at the scale of proliferation by Pakistan. In spite of an attempt to cloak the proliferation issue with a measure of legality it was always political consideration and a matter of expediency that guided western policy whether or not to help an aspirant in obtaining nuclear technology. Researchers opine that allegation against Pakistan for supplying URENCO centrifuge design information to Iran pales into insignificance when compared with the official documents detailing the supply of nuclear technology to oil rich ally Iran by the US, Germany, France and other European countries -- of course before the Islamic revolution of 1979. It was a matter of political imperative and was not certainly done as charity for Iran. What is happening now with regard to centrifuge scandal is viewed by the analysts as a ploy by Washington to presserise General Musharraf to shut down perhaps half of his nuclear weapon project.

The reluctance of the West to complete the negotiated Bushehr nuclear plant in a changed politico-strategic milieu, it may be mentioned, forced Iran to look towards Russia to complete its first nuclear power plant. On July 28, 1998 President Clinton announced that the US had imposed economic sanction against seven firms under investigation by the Russian government for proliferating WMD to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Such information abounds about proliferation even today.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Prateek » 01 Mar 2004 10:56


Johann
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Johann » 01 Mar 2004 11:52

1. Pakistan had developed an indigenous nuclear weapon capability by 1980.
- False

2. Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons in 1980.
- False

3. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon (probably as part of a Chinese export deal) in 1987
- False [Pakistani requests to test at Lop Nor were reported to have been turned down in 1989 and 1994]

4. Kahuta (Xerox Khan) Labs never managed to develop a production-grade process to make weapons-grade enriched uranium.
- False [However KRL's efficiency is probably greatly overestimated, since analyses for this kind of thing are more often than not based on the median from a range of worst-case scenarios]

5. The PAEA managed to get a nuclear power plant operating.
- True [Kanupp has an extremely poor safety and efficiency record. But there's no doubt that they fabricated the fuel for it after the Canadians cut them off in 1977. I dont think its a coincidence that they got it restarted after they smuggled in a uranium hexaflouride plant from Germany between 1977 and 1980. ]

6. PAEA produced plutonium in its reactors.
- True [but not in time to supply the Chagai tests]

7. Pakistan, by 2002, had generated enough weapons-grade fissile material to produce 50 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size.
- False [There is not enough evidence that Pakistan had access to the amount of feedstock needed for that number. Of course proliferation of hexaflouride feestock from China is not something that can be ruled out. Barring that I would at least halve your hypothetical estimate.]

8. North Korea, as of 1994, had an operating nuclear power plant.
- True

9. North Korea was producing plutonium from its reactors.
- True

10. North Korea needed centrifuges to enrich uranium.
- True

11. Kahuta Labs' centrifuges were strictly for export only.
- False

12. The US knew as of 1980 that Pakistan was developing or otherwise acquiring / had acquired nuclear weapons.
- True [This is a silly question; the Carter administration suspended all aid to Pakistan in April 1979 largely because of the Pakistani pursuit of uranium enrichment. A better question might focus on Carter and Reagan administration estimates of Pakistani progress, rather than Pakistani intentions.]

13. The whole Kahuta Lab was a scam to scare the Americans, Indians and Israelis - and was hence marketed to other countries which wanted to pull similar scams.
- False

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Johann » 01 Mar 2004 12:28

Originally posted by JE Menon:
My own gut feeling is that Iran is probably better than Pak.

JEM, I think there is evidence from the modifications they made to reverse engineered weapons systems that the Iranians today are much more capable at the higher ends than the Pakistanis, and Iraq after 1991 but they've also been technically overambitious, at least since the pressures of war ended in 1988.

The Pakistanis bought the No-Dong without major design modification, but the Iranians tinkered with their No-Dongs and so they've taken much longer to field a missile that doesnt explode in flight or fails to reach its target area.

Similarly reports suggest that the Iranians originally bought centrifuge design information from KRL but attempted to fabricate key parts on their own right from the start, rather than acquiring them abroad, causing significant delays.

Over the long run that kind of ambition will drive growth in Iranian capabilities, but it makes a difference in the race to build a deterrent as well, especially given the ten year head-start the Pakistanis had over the Iranian nuclear weapon programme.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby daulat » 01 Mar 2004 13:15

i would imagine that iran is much more technologically capable than pakistan, their aircraft programme alone has produced several viable fighter and trainers in the last decade. I do not know their numbers or status, but a number of prototypes were flown (from various aerospace journals from about 2 years ago). this suggests sufficient engineering depth to produce many more sophisticated items.

it strikes me that pakistan's proliferation to the 'axis of evil' makes pakistan a declared adversary of the US... and yet the whitehouse says nothing...

there is some black in the lentils!

again, possibly for another thread, but given the new Indo-Iranian strategic relationship... what does it mean w.r.t. former pakistani deals?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Calvin » 01 Mar 2004 17:10

Folks:

I'm not sure I understand why people keep bringing up Pakistan's tecnical ability to "prove" that it could not have run 50,000 centrifuges.

Machined fabrication IS NOT high tech. Any Joe Blow can machine a part to +/- 0.001 inch tolerance, on a *CHEAP* commercially available lathe. Once you have a drawing with tolerances, isn't it merely a bank of lathes making parts to tolerance?

And then you have assembly. Frankly, none of the machine shops, including the 5-axis machine shops employ any engineers anymore (okay, maybe one). The rest of these fellows dont even have a highschool degree, and yet they can turn out parts with better than 0.001 in tolerance.

Anyone out there with a machining background to comment?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Postby Rangudu » 01 Mar 2004 17:37

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-murder1mar01,1,5476674.story?coll=la-headlines-world

Death of N. Korean Woman Offers Clues to Pakistani Nuclear Deals

Sources say Kim Sa Nae watched Islamabad's first bomb tests days before she was killed in 1998, and that secrets left on plane with her body.

By Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi
Special To The Times

March 1, 2004

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Ten days after Pakistan tested its first atomic bomb in 1998, the wife of a major North Korean arms dealer was shot to death near the heavily guarded home here of the nuclear program's leader, Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Authorities hushed up the mysterious shooting of Kim Sa Nae, and it was more than a year before news broke that she was probably killed by North Koreans. After Khan's confession in early February that he secretly sold nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya, Kim's death is taking on a new meaning as fresh details emerge.

Pakistan's government and military say that Khan and at least seven associates were motivated by greed and acted without official knowledge or approval. But details of Kim's death on June 7, 1998, and the way Pakistani authorities handled it, may hold clues to what officials actually knew about Khan's activities.

Khan has admitted shipping nuclear secrets from at least 1989 to 2002 on what sources said were Pakistani air force cargo planes. U.S. officials and many nuclear weapons experts suspect that Pakistan aided Pyongyang's nuclear program in exchange for help with Islamabad's missile program.

But Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf insists his country bought missiles separately from North Korea, and that it did not barter nuclear secrets and technology for them. Musharraf condemned Khan on Feb. 5 as a black market profiteer. He also praised him as a hero for developing Pakistan's nuclear program and pardoned him.

Khan is now under house arrest in Rawalpindi, a high-security garrison town on the edge of Islamabad, which is home to many senior military and government officials. Kim was shot at point-blank range, a few yards from Khan's house in the neighborhood known as E-7, a senior police officer said in an interview.

Kim previously has been described as the wife of a mid-ranking North Korean diplomat. But present and former staff members at Khan Research Laboratories, or KRL, the Pakistani scientist's weapons development facility about 20 miles southeast of Islamabad, say that was a cover story.

The officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said Kim was part of a 20-member delegation of North Korean engineers and scientists whom Khan had invited to witness Pakistan's first underground nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, and to learn how to enrich uranium for a North Korean bomb, the Pakistani officials said.

There has long been speculation that Kim was killed by her own government because she was suspected of spying for the United States or another Western power. Officials in both Pakistan and rival India, whose intelligence services closely monitor Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, backed that version of events.

A Pakistani official said his country's intelligence agents suspected that the United States was using Kim as a mole inside the North Korean delegation, but that her actions were uncovered by Pakistani and North Korean agents.

An Indian official who is familiar with his government's assessment of the killing said bluntly: "She was in fact killed by the North Koreans on the grounds that she was in touch with certain Western diplomats." A Pakistani intelligence source said Kim and the rest of the North Korean delegation was staying in a guest house in the compound of Khan's home when Kim was killed. Even after reports the next year revealed she was probably killed on purpose, few Pakistani officials would talk about it. They said a neighbor's cook accidentally killed the North Korean woman when he fired a shotgun borrowed from a guard. Another account at the time claimed that one of Khan's neighbors accidentally killed Kim when his gun fired as he was cleaning it in the garage.

A coroner was not allowed to carry out an autopsy on Kim's body, and authorities told local police not to open a file on her death.

Khan told The Times in a 1999 interview that Pakistani intelligence services told him that Kim's death was an accident. "You Americans always try to put the blame on us," he said.

Three days after she was shot, Kim's body was spirited out of Pakistan on a chartered Pakistani cargo plane, a source said. The plane, a U.S.-built C-130 military transport, was the same one that Khan recently told investigators he had used to ship plans and equipment for making a nuclear bomb, according to the official, who is familiar with Khan's signed 12-page confession.

The plane carried Kim's body back to North Korea along with P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade material, according to the source.

The cargo also included drawings, sketches, technical data and depleted uranium hexafluoride gas, which is converted into weapons-grade material in centrifuges, the source said.

The Pakistani source said the aircraft was under the control of his country's air force. The Indian official said the charter flight was operated by Shaheen Air International, one of several large corporations run by Pakistan's military. The company began operating in 1993, and its current chairman is the air force chief of staff, Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat. Six of its seven directors are retired air force officers.

Pakistan's foreign office spokesman, Masood Khan, declined to comment on Kim's death, or whether the current investigation into Khan and his associates had uncovered any new evidence.

Officially, Kim was married to Kang Thae Yun, who had the title of economic counselor at North Korea's embassy in Islamabad.

But the U.S. State Department has identified Kang as one of North Korea's chief arms dealers in the 1990s.

Kang worked for North Korea's state-run Changgwang Sinyong Corp., which the State Department accused of missile proliferation and imposed sanctions under U.S. law several times from 1996 to last year.

Kang was suspected of providing Pakistan with advanced missile technology in exchange for plans and equipment to build a nuclear bomb.

"Changgwang Sinyong Corp. is a North Korean missile marketing entity and has been sanctioned repeatedly in the past for its missile-related exporting behavior," State Department spokesman Philip Reeker said in April 2003.

It "transferred missile-related technology to [Khan's] KRL," Reeker added. "The United States made a determination to impose penalties on both Changgwang Sinyong Corp. and KRL as a result of this specific missile-related transfer."

Kang left Pakistan a month after Kim's death.

Musharraf became Pakistan's military chief of staff in 1998, four months after Kim was killed, and he seized power in a bloodless coup in December 1999.


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