Oh.. my god! Is he our SOS or Mush chamcha?Mr Powell said Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was "as determined as we are" to put an end to nuclear proliferation.
Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
> is he an SOS or Mush ka Chamcha.
Nah.. its just foreplay. Pretty soon he will hand Musharraf a tube of KY Jelly.
Nah.. its just foreplay. Pretty soon he will hand Musharraf a tube of KY Jelly.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
To roll back or forward?
Iqbal Mustafa
The writer is a former member of the Central Board,
State Bank of Pakistan and CEO of SMEDA
Mustafa@hujra.com
Quo Vadis, whither are you going?
The progressively dissolving foreign policy of Pakistan had three legs: Support for Taliban, militant stand on Kashmir and development of nuclear deterrent. The first two have undergone fundamental revision and the mechanics of new directions are in play. The third leg has been splintered with exposure of proliferation evidence, followed by confessions of guarded nature. This issue remains to be revised at a major policy level, in spite of the valiant claims to proceed undeterred as before. Behind this boyish bravado, questions lurk in every sensible person’s mind that believes a serious concern. The three questions are: One how did the mess-up happen? Two, did the government manage the damage control effectively? And three, what are the options open in the future.
The mess-up began the day Mr Bhutto decided to sponsor a covert nuclear development plan in 1974, and the whole nation stood behind the initiative with a militant zeal. Unlike cold mathematical rules where multiplication of negative numbers can have a positive resultant, in moral terms, a negative always negates anything that it relates to. Independent sovereign states are based on assumptions of irreconcilable adherence to rule of law; at least on face value and in technicalities. That is why governments find it hard to deal with outlaws who are not obliged to follow morals and rules. And whenever an authority cuts corners in dispensation of justice, there is an outcry from world opinion. The fundamental rights of worst criminals are supposed to be protected; only then can an authority assume rights to prosecute. The fate of al-Qaeda prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is a case in point where the world opinion is castigating the US.
The furtive nuclear development program compromised Pakistan’s moral chastity. The whole initiative slipped into the murky shadows of international criminal underworld, out of the realm of sovereign rights. It is always a slippery downward path to step across the line of legitimacy whether it is a matter of conjugal fidelity or violation of official rules. Entering the darkness of lies and deception has no return; to hide one lie many other have to be spoken and the one sinks deeper into the quicksand. In case of an authority, there is another caveat. When the officials at the top compromise legitimacy, the subordinates are relieved of such obligations; even towards the authority. Moral discipline becomes impossible to maintain. For that reason, criminal and terrorist organisations rely on violent force to keep members in line. A legitimate authority cannot resort to such methods.
This is exactly what happened in Pakistan. Abdicating official control of the uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta to Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1975 and giving him a carte-blanche authority to smuggle components for nuclear technology through underworld connections set the rot in from day one. After that, it is pointless raising questions as to why his high profile arrogance and sinfully lavish life style were not questioned. It was exactly as if the lady of the house were to connive with the cook to abet her clandestine activities. She compromises both, her reputation and control over the cook.
Now to say that there was no other way is very questionable. In trying to match India’s nuclear capability we threw moral cautions to the wind. India’s nuclear program had totally different genesis. India had set up infrastructure early in the fifties for producing nuclear energy, which could lead to development of weapons. In 1954, India defied International Atomic Energy Agency by rejecting oversight safeguards. In 1964, it had set-up the first plutonium reprocessing plant at Tromboy. In 1966 after the withdrawal of US military aid, India announced that it could produce nuclear weapons in 18 months. In 1968 India refused to sign the NPT. In 1974 India tests a nuclear device as a peaceful nuclear explosion. Finally, in 1998 India exploded the bomb. In the beginning, India’s nuclear program was assisted by the US and Canada, a support that was withdrawn subsequently but all along there was more of an element of defiance than clandestine shadows to the Indian program.
In contrast, Pakistan’s programme was spooky from the start; we denied its very existence for many decades, although default postal address for Kahuta plant came to be ‘atom bomb factory’. It was the worst kept secret in the world. The world suspected but could not confront for one reason or another. In 1976, Canada stopped providing fuel for Karachi plant. In 1978, France concealed the deal to supply plutonium-reprocessing plant at Chashma. In 1979 US imposed economic sanctions after Pakistan is caught importing parts for Kahuta plant. There is a long story of cat and mouse games that Pakistan played through 80s and 90s before going open in 1998, in response to India’s nuclear tests. The point is that both countries had arrived at the same point through different routes. The route Pakistan had taken was full of pitfalls that were exposed in 2003 by western intelligence agencies. In the mess that followed, it became impossible to sift through the culpability of individuals and that of the State.
Next, did Pakistan Government handle the crisis adequately? Polish thinker, Ryszard Kapuscinski said that, "When is a crisis reached? When questions arise that can’t be answered." This crisis had been reached in case of Pakistan. Balancing between appeasing the international pressures and placating domestic outrage was not an easy task. In my opinion, largely, General Pervez Musharraf did the best that was possible under the circumstances. His candid confession of ground realities to international press and clemency for Dr Khan was the best possible solution. Of course, there are opinions that he could have involved the politicians, special committees of the legislature to fudge up procedures, rather than face the world alone but that would have complicated issues further, and Pakistan’s credibility could have suffered more with such feet dragging.
The most consequential questions are about the future options for Pakistan now. There is no point in hiding from the fact that Pakistan’s credibility for securing its nuclear assets has been damaged badly. Few in the world believe that Dr Khan is alone responsible for such a scale of proliferation. And the matter has not been closed forever, as we would like to believe. There will be many interests and concerns that will keep trying to reopen the issue, especially as International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei told reporters, "Dr (Abdul Qadeer) Khan was not working alone," saying he had help from people in many different countries. "Dr Khan is the tip of an iceberg for us."
Pakistan will have to do far more than a confession and promises of future vigil. Let us not forget that the US and its allies did not find any WMDs in Iraq and Syria. They have turned their concerns to nuclear weapons now. Libya and Iran have been coerced into compliance. In his speech on Policy for non-proliferation, George Bush did not implicate Pakistan government but he spent a good fifteen minutes playing prosecutor general to A Q Khan. The implications are quite clear. In the proposed scheme of things countries suspect of proliferation will not get any assistance for nuclear technology, even for peaceful purposes, neither will they deserve a seat in International Atomic Energy Agency. The noose is tightening around Pakistan.
In these circumstances, Pakistan can take two initiatives to placate international suspicions. We can sign a bilateral treaty with India against use of nuclear weapons and some form of limitation on weapons, like SALT treaties between previous USSR and US. Following that Pakistan can sign the NPT, since having achieved a nuclear state status, and the proclaimed nuclear deterrent; Pakistan can afford to invest in International confidence building measures. This line of action would harmonize with the revision of the other legs of the foreign policy mentioned earlier.
We are fortunate, until now, to have the opportunity of living down past sins and taking a new path to global integration with respect. Obstinacy at this stage would have very unforgiving consequences. The greatest boxer of all time, Mohammad Ali once said, "He who hits and runs away lives to fight another day." This way we can roll forward and not call it a roll back.
To roll back or forward?
Iqbal Mustafa
The writer is a former member of the Central Board,
State Bank of Pakistan and CEO of SMEDA
Mustafa@hujra.com
Quo Vadis, whither are you going?
The progressively dissolving foreign policy of Pakistan had three legs: Support for Taliban, militant stand on Kashmir and development of nuclear deterrent. The first two have undergone fundamental revision and the mechanics of new directions are in play. The third leg has been splintered with exposure of proliferation evidence, followed by confessions of guarded nature. This issue remains to be revised at a major policy level, in spite of the valiant claims to proceed undeterred as before. Behind this boyish bravado, questions lurk in every sensible person’s mind that believes a serious concern. The three questions are: One how did the mess-up happen? Two, did the government manage the damage control effectively? And three, what are the options open in the future.
The mess-up began the day Mr Bhutto decided to sponsor a covert nuclear development plan in 1974, and the whole nation stood behind the initiative with a militant zeal. Unlike cold mathematical rules where multiplication of negative numbers can have a positive resultant, in moral terms, a negative always negates anything that it relates to. Independent sovereign states are based on assumptions of irreconcilable adherence to rule of law; at least on face value and in technicalities. That is why governments find it hard to deal with outlaws who are not obliged to follow morals and rules. And whenever an authority cuts corners in dispensation of justice, there is an outcry from world opinion. The fundamental rights of worst criminals are supposed to be protected; only then can an authority assume rights to prosecute. The fate of al-Qaeda prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is a case in point where the world opinion is castigating the US.
The furtive nuclear development program compromised Pakistan’s moral chastity. The whole initiative slipped into the murky shadows of international criminal underworld, out of the realm of sovereign rights. It is always a slippery downward path to step across the line of legitimacy whether it is a matter of conjugal fidelity or violation of official rules. Entering the darkness of lies and deception has no return; to hide one lie many other have to be spoken and the one sinks deeper into the quicksand. In case of an authority, there is another caveat. When the officials at the top compromise legitimacy, the subordinates are relieved of such obligations; even towards the authority. Moral discipline becomes impossible to maintain. For that reason, criminal and terrorist organisations rely on violent force to keep members in line. A legitimate authority cannot resort to such methods.
This is exactly what happened in Pakistan. Abdicating official control of the uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta to Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1975 and giving him a carte-blanche authority to smuggle components for nuclear technology through underworld connections set the rot in from day one. After that, it is pointless raising questions as to why his high profile arrogance and sinfully lavish life style were not questioned. It was exactly as if the lady of the house were to connive with the cook to abet her clandestine activities. She compromises both, her reputation and control over the cook.
Now to say that there was no other way is very questionable. In trying to match India’s nuclear capability we threw moral cautions to the wind. India’s nuclear program had totally different genesis. India had set up infrastructure early in the fifties for producing nuclear energy, which could lead to development of weapons. In 1954, India defied International Atomic Energy Agency by rejecting oversight safeguards. In 1964, it had set-up the first plutonium reprocessing plant at Tromboy. In 1966 after the withdrawal of US military aid, India announced that it could produce nuclear weapons in 18 months. In 1968 India refused to sign the NPT. In 1974 India tests a nuclear device as a peaceful nuclear explosion. Finally, in 1998 India exploded the bomb. In the beginning, India’s nuclear program was assisted by the US and Canada, a support that was withdrawn subsequently but all along there was more of an element of defiance than clandestine shadows to the Indian program.
In contrast, Pakistan’s programme was spooky from the start; we denied its very existence for many decades, although default postal address for Kahuta plant came to be ‘atom bomb factory’. It was the worst kept secret in the world. The world suspected but could not confront for one reason or another. In 1976, Canada stopped providing fuel for Karachi plant. In 1978, France concealed the deal to supply plutonium-reprocessing plant at Chashma. In 1979 US imposed economic sanctions after Pakistan is caught importing parts for Kahuta plant. There is a long story of cat and mouse games that Pakistan played through 80s and 90s before going open in 1998, in response to India’s nuclear tests. The point is that both countries had arrived at the same point through different routes. The route Pakistan had taken was full of pitfalls that were exposed in 2003 by western intelligence agencies. In the mess that followed, it became impossible to sift through the culpability of individuals and that of the State.
Next, did Pakistan Government handle the crisis adequately? Polish thinker, Ryszard Kapuscinski said that, "When is a crisis reached? When questions arise that can’t be answered." This crisis had been reached in case of Pakistan. Balancing between appeasing the international pressures and placating domestic outrage was not an easy task. In my opinion, largely, General Pervez Musharraf did the best that was possible under the circumstances. His candid confession of ground realities to international press and clemency for Dr Khan was the best possible solution. Of course, there are opinions that he could have involved the politicians, special committees of the legislature to fudge up procedures, rather than face the world alone but that would have complicated issues further, and Pakistan’s credibility could have suffered more with such feet dragging.
The most consequential questions are about the future options for Pakistan now. There is no point in hiding from the fact that Pakistan’s credibility for securing its nuclear assets has been damaged badly. Few in the world believe that Dr Khan is alone responsible for such a scale of proliferation. And the matter has not been closed forever, as we would like to believe. There will be many interests and concerns that will keep trying to reopen the issue, especially as International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei told reporters, "Dr (Abdul Qadeer) Khan was not working alone," saying he had help from people in many different countries. "Dr Khan is the tip of an iceberg for us."
Pakistan will have to do far more than a confession and promises of future vigil. Let us not forget that the US and its allies did not find any WMDs in Iraq and Syria. They have turned their concerns to nuclear weapons now. Libya and Iran have been coerced into compliance. In his speech on Policy for non-proliferation, George Bush did not implicate Pakistan government but he spent a good fifteen minutes playing prosecutor general to A Q Khan. The implications are quite clear. In the proposed scheme of things countries suspect of proliferation will not get any assistance for nuclear technology, even for peaceful purposes, neither will they deserve a seat in International Atomic Energy Agency. The noose is tightening around Pakistan.
In these circumstances, Pakistan can take two initiatives to placate international suspicions. We can sign a bilateral treaty with India against use of nuclear weapons and some form of limitation on weapons, like SALT treaties between previous USSR and US. Following that Pakistan can sign the NPT, since having achieved a nuclear state status, and the proclaimed nuclear deterrent; Pakistan can afford to invest in International confidence building measures. This line of action would harmonize with the revision of the other legs of the foreign policy mentioned earlier.
We are fortunate, until now, to have the opportunity of living down past sins and taking a new path to global integration with respect. Obstinacy at this stage would have very unforgiving consequences. The greatest boxer of all time, Mohammad Ali once said, "He who hits and runs away lives to fight another day." This way we can roll forward and not call it a roll back.
To roll back or forward?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
May be you are right ...is he an SOS or Mush ka Chamcha.
Nah.. its just ..
And
this from khilafah.com
The only reason why these meetings take place is so that the Western powers can order and instruct their subcontractors (the rulers of the Muslims) in order to further their plans to subdue and humiliate the Muslim Ummah, to prevent her return to political Islam and her return to the world stage as an ideological superpower.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Nooooo, no no no no no no no. What CP means to say is that Mushy is as determined to put an end to nuclear proliferation by Pakis as foggies are which is to say that Mushy is not at all determined to put an end to nuc prol by Pakis.Originally posted by Amber G.:
Oh.. my god! Is he our SOS or Mush chamcha?Mr Powell said Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was "as determined as we are" to put an end to nuclear proliferation.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Cross-posted ..
Weak on Terror
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: March 16, 2004
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com
y most immediate priority," Spain's new leader, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, declared yesterday, "will be to fight terrorism." But he and the voters who gave his party a stunning upset victory last Sunday don't believe the war in Iraq is part of that fight. And the Spanish public was also outraged by what it perceived as the Aznar government's attempt to spin last week's terrorist attack for political purposes.
The Bush administration, which baffled the world when it used an attack by Islamic fundamentalists to justify the overthrow of a brutal but secular regime, and which has been utterly ruthless in its political exploitation of 9/11, must be very, very afraid.
Polls suggest that a reputation for being tough on terror is just about the only remaining political strength George Bush has. Yet this reputation is based on image, not reality. The truth is that Mr. Bush, while eager to invoke 9/11 on behalf of an unrelated war, has shown consistent reluctance to focus on the terrorists who actually attacked America, or their backers in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
This reluctance dates back to Mr. Bush's first months in office. Why, after all, has his inner circle tried so hard to prevent a serious investigation of what happened on 9/11? There has been much speculation about whether officials ignored specific intelligence warnings, but what we know for sure is that the administration disregarded urgent pleas by departing Clinton officials to focus on the threat from Al Qaeda.
After 9/11, terrorism could no longer be ignored, and the military conducted a successful campaign against Al Qaeda's Taliban hosts. But the failure to commit sufficient U.S. forces allowed Osama bin Laden to escape. After that, the administration appeared to lose interest in Al Qaeda; by the summer of 2002, bin Laden's name had disappeared from Mr. Bush's speeches. It was all Saddam, all the time.
This wasn't just a rhetorical switch; crucial resources were pulled off the hunt for Al Qaeda, which had attacked America, to prepare for the overthrow of Saddam, who hadn't. If you want confirmation that this seriously impeded the fight against terror, just look at reports about the all-out effort to capture Osama that started, finally, just a few days ago. Why didn't this happen last year, or the year before? According to The New York Times, last year many of the needed forces were tied up in Iraq.
It's now clear that by shifting his focus to Iraq, Mr. Bush did Al Qaeda a huge favor. The terrorists and their Taliban allies were given time to regroup; the resurgent Taliban once again control almost a third of Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda has regained the ability to carry out large-scale atrocities.
But Mr. Bush's lapses in the struggle against terrorism extend beyond his decision to give Al Qaeda a breather. His administration has also run interference for Saudi Arabia — the home of most of the 9/11 hijackers, and the main financier of Islamic extremism — and Pakistan, which created the Taliban and has actively engaged in nuclear proliferation.
Some of the administration's actions have been so strange that those who reported them were initially accused of being nutty conspiracy theorists. For example, what are we to make of the post-9/11 Saudi airlift? Just days after the attack, at a time when private air travel was banned, the administration gave special clearance to flights that gathered up Saudi nationals, including a number of members of the bin Laden family, who were in the U.S. at the time. These Saudis were then allowed to leave the country, after at best cursory interviews with the F.B.I.
And the administration is still covering up for Pakistan, whose government recently made the absurd claim that large-scale shipments of nuclear technology and material to rogue states — including North Korea, according to a new C.I.A. report — were the work of one man, who was promptly pardoned by President Pervez Musharraf. Mr. Bush has allowed this farce to go unquestioned.
So when the Bush campaign boasts of the president's record in fighting terrorism and accuses John Kerry of being weak on the issue, when Republican congressmen suggest that a vote for Mr. Kerry is a vote for Osama, remember this: the administration's actual record is one of indulgence toward regimes that are strongly implicated in terrorism, and of focusing on actual terrorist threats only when forced to by events.
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/opinion/16KRUG.html
Finally Some-One's Asking the Right Questions
Slow-burning Fuse has finally lit
Weak on Terror
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: March 16, 2004
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com
y most immediate priority," Spain's new leader, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, declared yesterday, "will be to fight terrorism." But he and the voters who gave his party a stunning upset victory last Sunday don't believe the war in Iraq is part of that fight. And the Spanish public was also outraged by what it perceived as the Aznar government's attempt to spin last week's terrorist attack for political purposes.
The Bush administration, which baffled the world when it used an attack by Islamic fundamentalists to justify the overthrow of a brutal but secular regime, and which has been utterly ruthless in its political exploitation of 9/11, must be very, very afraid.
Polls suggest that a reputation for being tough on terror is just about the only remaining political strength George Bush has. Yet this reputation is based on image, not reality. The truth is that Mr. Bush, while eager to invoke 9/11 on behalf of an unrelated war, has shown consistent reluctance to focus on the terrorists who actually attacked America, or their backers in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
This reluctance dates back to Mr. Bush's first months in office. Why, after all, has his inner circle tried so hard to prevent a serious investigation of what happened on 9/11? There has been much speculation about whether officials ignored specific intelligence warnings, but what we know for sure is that the administration disregarded urgent pleas by departing Clinton officials to focus on the threat from Al Qaeda.
After 9/11, terrorism could no longer be ignored, and the military conducted a successful campaign against Al Qaeda's Taliban hosts. But the failure to commit sufficient U.S. forces allowed Osama bin Laden to escape. After that, the administration appeared to lose interest in Al Qaeda; by the summer of 2002, bin Laden's name had disappeared from Mr. Bush's speeches. It was all Saddam, all the time.
This wasn't just a rhetorical switch; crucial resources were pulled off the hunt for Al Qaeda, which had attacked America, to prepare for the overthrow of Saddam, who hadn't. If you want confirmation that this seriously impeded the fight against terror, just look at reports about the all-out effort to capture Osama that started, finally, just a few days ago. Why didn't this happen last year, or the year before? According to The New York Times, last year many of the needed forces were tied up in Iraq.
It's now clear that by shifting his focus to Iraq, Mr. Bush did Al Qaeda a huge favor. The terrorists and their Taliban allies were given time to regroup; the resurgent Taliban once again control almost a third of Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda has regained the ability to carry out large-scale atrocities.
But Mr. Bush's lapses in the struggle against terrorism extend beyond his decision to give Al Qaeda a breather. His administration has also run interference for Saudi Arabia — the home of most of the 9/11 hijackers, and the main financier of Islamic extremism — and Pakistan, which created the Taliban and has actively engaged in nuclear proliferation.
Some of the administration's actions have been so strange that those who reported them were initially accused of being nutty conspiracy theorists. For example, what are we to make of the post-9/11 Saudi airlift? Just days after the attack, at a time when private air travel was banned, the administration gave special clearance to flights that gathered up Saudi nationals, including a number of members of the bin Laden family, who were in the U.S. at the time. These Saudis were then allowed to leave the country, after at best cursory interviews with the F.B.I.
And the administration is still covering up for Pakistan, whose government recently made the absurd claim that large-scale shipments of nuclear technology and material to rogue states — including North Korea, according to a new C.I.A. report — were the work of one man, who was promptly pardoned by President Pervez Musharraf. Mr. Bush has allowed this farce to go unquestioned.
So when the Bush campaign boasts of the president's record in fighting terrorism and accuses John Kerry of being weak on the issue, when Republican congressmen suggest that a vote for Mr. Kerry is a vote for Osama, remember this: the administration's actual record is one of indulgence toward regimes that are strongly implicated in terrorism, and of focusing on actual terrorist threats only when forced to by events.
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/opinion/16KRUG.html
Finally Some-One's Asking the Right Questions
Slow-burning Fuse has finally lit
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Musharraf Has No Clue Where the Country is Headed
By Wajid Shamsul Hasan
PRESIDENT General Pervez Musharraf has put the country in an abysmal mess. As a result of his policies that lack foresight, his decisions that are devoid of any wisdom and his inconceivable blunders have pushed Pakistan in a hornet's nest.
Neither the commando has an exit route out of the dilemma nor has he the courage and intelligence to take wise counsel from others who could save Pakistan from becoming a failed state and ending up like Yugoslavia.
Unfortunately in a situation when Pakistan is jostling for survival between the devil and the deep blue sea, Musharraf is surrounded by cronies and there is hardly a sane voice that could tell him that enough is enough. Time has come when he needs to be told and that he should make room for others who could bring about a national reconciliation and mobilize the people to defend vital national strategic interests.
No doubt his best asset today are a group of his master's voices that keep harping all is well in the state of Denmark and that he is the best ruler that Pakistan so far has had. His media managers also want the nation to believe that AQ Khan crisis is over and it is gradually dying down in the domestic and western media.
What is reassuring for him are the various news stories in the American press that he has managed to defuse Washington's anger by allowing US troops - thousands in number - total freedom to operate as a sovereign force into Pakistani territory to flush out Al-Qaeda, arrest hiding Osama Bin Laden and his associates before the Presidential elections so that George W. Bush has a safe romp home.
This view, however, is not shared by hawkish US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who has openly charged Pakistan of "failing to cooperate with the United States in its battle to crush Taliban despite Washington's restrain over Islamabad's nuclear proliferation scandal".
Such an outburst by the man who is a key figure in Bush Administration amounts to a tight slap on the face of President Musharraf who has not only unzipped himself but the country as well, to be fouled by the Americans in the name of what they call their war on terrorism. Islamabad, however, denies this and its ministers keep on orchestrating that no foreign troops will be permitted to operate in Pakistan since it would violate its independence and sovereignty.
These Falstaffian ministerial pronouncements have no relevance to facts. Musharraf government cannot deny that Pakistan's airports and other exit points are manned by FBI agents, that the country has been heavily infested by CIA operatives and that American agencies helped by their marines have been conducting raids to arrest those wanted by them.
"Now all is well and settled" on Dr AQ Khan front is for public consumption. In their hearts Musharraf and his colleagues know it well that nothing has ended, there is something more in offing and the lull in the wind from Washington is a precursor to the whirlwind. They have genuine apprehensions that the persistent blowing of hot and cold by different functionaries and the media pressure have a method behind it all.
Though US Secretary of State Colin Powell has expressed his satisfaction over Musharraf's conduct of AQ Khan affair and also on his pardon to him, what has made their nights sleepless is the recent scathing attack by both Bush's National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Defence Secretary Wolfowitz.
Rice has dubbed as "criminal enterprise" the Musharraf nuclear proliferation network. The lady, who is also a hawk like Wolfowitz and is reputed to be closer to Bush than Powell, made it clear-in keeping with some of the previous assertions of the US State Department-- that it would go to the bottom of it -- that those who indulge in trafficking of deadly weapons "will be brought to justice".
In this context-- while Musharraf and his military establishment think that by making AQ Khan a scapegoat they have washed their hands of the responsibility of the transfer of nuclear technology, this is not the perception in Washington. The relevant people in the United States continue to hold the view that Musharraf and other generals have had their fingers much too deep in Pakistan's "dirty" nuclear pie and that if not conducive now, they will have to share the burden of guilt with AQ Khan at some later stage. "They will not be allowed to have the cake and eat it too."
According to Rice the entire export of nuclear technology was a "criminal enterprise" motivated by "greed or fanaticism or perhaps both." (Speech at Ronald Reagan presidential library and museum in Sun Valley, California). "We must strengthen the world's ability to keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes," she emphasized.
Although Musharraf has pardoned Dr Khan, Rice insisted that those who traffic in deadly weapons will be brought to justice "working with intelligence officials from the United Kingdom and other nations," she said, adding: "We unraveled the Khan network and we are putting an end to its criminal enterprise. Its key leaders - including Dr Khan - are no longer in business, and we are working to dismantle the entire network".
Despite having put Dr Khan out of their way, Musharraf and his colleagues are not sure of the ground they are treading upon. Besides internal threats of elimination for betraying Pakistan's nuclear program, they fear that once the current operations are over in South Waziristan and Osama is found, Washington would no more need them. Like the end of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan made General Zia and his colleagues redundant and they had to be put to rest en bloc, Musharraf and his team mates would also be discarded to the dustbin of history soon after.
General Musharraf thinks he is shrewd enough to know that notwithstanding Washington's goody-goody behavior,
<u>
the undercurrents there are loaded with evidence that it was Pakistan's military establishment led by General Aslam Beg, Lt General Hameed Gul and Lt General Asad Durrani who had laid down the policy of 'proliferation for cash' to overcome paucity of funds due to stoppage of American money after the Afghan war.
To continue meddling in Afghanistan, to ensure what the Generals call Pakistan's strategic depth to protect and sustain other interests, they required a lot of money. So did he need unaccounted funds to carry on what General Musharraf has now acknowledged as cross-border terrorism-harming the indigenous Kashmiri intifada.
His Kargil fiasco - while sending 3,000 Pakistani brave military jawans into their graves unsung - cost the country around $500 million. Sustaining of our troops pointing their guns at their counterparts from below the Siachin Glacier required between $500m to $600m annually since 1984 when General Zia let India occupy it without firing a shot. For all these operations - Afghanistan, Kashmir etc - money to the tune of $1000 million per annum was needed. Obviously this kind of cash was not growing on trees and Musharraf had yet to declare that he could perform miracles. Pakistan's dwindling foreign exchange reserves only shot up after 9-11 for reasons other than patriotism.
</u>
Having survived two serious assassination attempts- though some people take them to be stage-managed - Musharraf believes he would be nine times lucky while those after him want their luck to favor them once. With both internal and external odds against him, he is trying his best to avert an international and domestic backlash.
Forewarned of the Ides of March - Musharraf desperately wants to erase the impression that he and other generals were involved in nuclear proliferation (although there is enough circumstantial evidence to prove their culpability) and that AQ Khan was a genuine villain and not a scapegoat as believed by the masses.
His agencies are reported to have whipped into action their wired columnists - some of them being retired army officers who escaped court martial for deserting from duty in former East Pakistan. This dubious characters are posing as born-again patriots and have the audacity to describe the legendary Dr Khan as "an albatross round Pakistan's neck that has brought us to ground zero of world public opinion". They forget that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto opened floodgates of nuclear power for Pakistan while Dr AQ Khan - along with other capable nuclear scientists raised by Bhutto - had developed the "atomic pill" to provide the much needed **** to the Pakistani Generals.
These defence analysts - a constant fixture in the government owned TV and private channels - have not only been assigned to join the orchestra to further blacken Dr Khan, but their new task is to defend Musharraf by matching his lies with Benazir Bhutto's recently revealed truths regarding the generals involvement in the nuclear trade. They want Bhutto to show more propriety in her charge sheet against Musharraf and they desperately plead that it should be ensured that "more skeletons do not appear on an already hot tin roof".
Probably provided a pack of lies to counter Benazir Bhutto they want to drag Benazir in the game of nuclear proliferation to lessen the international heat on Musharraf. It has been claimed that Sri Lankan Abu Tahir's involvement with AQ Khan started in 1994-95 when Bhutto was prime minister. They, however, forget that General Musharraf came on record in February last to declare that only Presidents and Army chiefs had their say in nuclear affairs. Obviously this meant that all civilian prime ministers since Zia's fatal fall had nothing to do with the control of the nuclear program. And to put the record straight, Abu Tahir had purchased special steel from Britain for AQ Khan and the case was investigated in London during 2001.
Now read this howler from one of the anti-BB propagandists: "Libya contacted AQ Khan in 1997 (again during the Benazir regime), to obtain help and expertise in the field of uranium-enrichment centrifuge as well as supply centrifuge units for Libya's nuclear program." This writer went overboard and forgot that Benazir Bhutto was not in power in 1997. President Farooq Leghari had dismissed her in November 1996.
Despite Musharraf's categorical denial pen pushers hired by his media managers are trying to divert attention and in a new propaganda drive have started accusing that it were the post-Zia civilian governments that failed to exercise stricter security controls. It was then, it is alleged, "when AQ Khan first started to run amok." It has, however, been grudgingly acknowledged that ZA Bhutto had introduced strict official controls that were even followed by Gen Zia ul Haq.
There is also criticism of Bhutto now talking about the Benazir Nuclear Doctrine, that banned exports of nuclear know-how and material from Pakistan. The necessity for such a doctrine was based on a briefing by her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his death-cell. Besides warning her of external threats to Pakistani nuclear scientists, ZAB had told her to ensure that there was no transfer of technology to any Muslim country or any one else-- either for money or friendship.
ZAB had believed that while those who opposed our nuclear program might swallow the fact of Pakistan making and possessing a bomb, once it had become a fait accompli, they would never tolerate it to be a source of an Islamic bomb and transfer of nuclear technology to the Muslim countries for that purpose. Such intricate things are much too difficult to be understood by thickheaded self-styled defence analysts.
It seems that Bhutto touched somebody's raw nerve when she alleged in recent TV and newspaper interviews that "Gen Pervez Musharraf is responsible for the nuclear exports to Libya". Instead of proving her wrong crocodile tears are being shed.
"With the President already treading a fail-safe line for Pakistan, it was extremely disappointing to see our former PM pursuing crass political objectives well knowing she was causing immense damage to the country. As an admirer of Ms Benazir's political talents and charisma" as he claims, he "expected her to uphold the national interest "even to the peril of her life".
Like most Pakistanis, Bhutto believes that by being a party to the transfer of nuclear technology Musharraf has not only betrayed a vital national trust but also committed an act of high treason. Indeed, when a general could send ZAB to the gallows for seeking the nuclear glow for the country on ground of conspiring to kill a pygmy political opponent who is still walking alive, why can't the nation try a general for high treason for giving a fatal blow to Pakistan's nuclear program and hold him accountable for this national crime.
It is, indeed, a tragedy that our Praetorian class considers itself to be more important than Pakistan itself, bigger than the state. It needs to be reminded what the Quaid had said: "Who lives if Pakistan dies". Surely, if there is no Pakistan where would our generals go, nay, where we all would go.
One agrees with the countrywide view that Pakistan's nuclear tragedy is likely to lead to much more dire consequences than that of fall of Dhaka. And it has happened because there was no accountability of those who had laid down their arms in an abject surrender to the Indian general in 1971. It is an irony that it took 27 years for a general to recognize ZA Bhutto as the father of Pakistan's nuclear program. I hope Benazir Bhutto will not have to wait that long to be recognized as the Prime Minister who got Pakistan the capability to carry its nuclear warheads to their targets in Pakistan's self-defence.
The writer is a former Pakistan High Commissioner to UK and a close aide of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
http://www.satribune.com/archives/mar14_20_04/P1_wajid.htm
By Wajid Shamsul Hasan
PRESIDENT General Pervez Musharraf has put the country in an abysmal mess. As a result of his policies that lack foresight, his decisions that are devoid of any wisdom and his inconceivable blunders have pushed Pakistan in a hornet's nest.
Neither the commando has an exit route out of the dilemma nor has he the courage and intelligence to take wise counsel from others who could save Pakistan from becoming a failed state and ending up like Yugoslavia.
Unfortunately in a situation when Pakistan is jostling for survival between the devil and the deep blue sea, Musharraf is surrounded by cronies and there is hardly a sane voice that could tell him that enough is enough. Time has come when he needs to be told and that he should make room for others who could bring about a national reconciliation and mobilize the people to defend vital national strategic interests.
No doubt his best asset today are a group of his master's voices that keep harping all is well in the state of Denmark and that he is the best ruler that Pakistan so far has had. His media managers also want the nation to believe that AQ Khan crisis is over and it is gradually dying down in the domestic and western media.
What is reassuring for him are the various news stories in the American press that he has managed to defuse Washington's anger by allowing US troops - thousands in number - total freedom to operate as a sovereign force into Pakistani territory to flush out Al-Qaeda, arrest hiding Osama Bin Laden and his associates before the Presidential elections so that George W. Bush has a safe romp home.
This view, however, is not shared by hawkish US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who has openly charged Pakistan of "failing to cooperate with the United States in its battle to crush Taliban despite Washington's restrain over Islamabad's nuclear proliferation scandal".
Such an outburst by the man who is a key figure in Bush Administration amounts to a tight slap on the face of President Musharraf who has not only unzipped himself but the country as well, to be fouled by the Americans in the name of what they call their war on terrorism. Islamabad, however, denies this and its ministers keep on orchestrating that no foreign troops will be permitted to operate in Pakistan since it would violate its independence and sovereignty.
These Falstaffian ministerial pronouncements have no relevance to facts. Musharraf government cannot deny that Pakistan's airports and other exit points are manned by FBI agents, that the country has been heavily infested by CIA operatives and that American agencies helped by their marines have been conducting raids to arrest those wanted by them.
"Now all is well and settled" on Dr AQ Khan front is for public consumption. In their hearts Musharraf and his colleagues know it well that nothing has ended, there is something more in offing and the lull in the wind from Washington is a precursor to the whirlwind. They have genuine apprehensions that the persistent blowing of hot and cold by different functionaries and the media pressure have a method behind it all.
Though US Secretary of State Colin Powell has expressed his satisfaction over Musharraf's conduct of AQ Khan affair and also on his pardon to him, what has made their nights sleepless is the recent scathing attack by both Bush's National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Defence Secretary Wolfowitz.
Rice has dubbed as "criminal enterprise" the Musharraf nuclear proliferation network. The lady, who is also a hawk like Wolfowitz and is reputed to be closer to Bush than Powell, made it clear-in keeping with some of the previous assertions of the US State Department-- that it would go to the bottom of it -- that those who indulge in trafficking of deadly weapons "will be brought to justice".
In this context-- while Musharraf and his military establishment think that by making AQ Khan a scapegoat they have washed their hands of the responsibility of the transfer of nuclear technology, this is not the perception in Washington. The relevant people in the United States continue to hold the view that Musharraf and other generals have had their fingers much too deep in Pakistan's "dirty" nuclear pie and that if not conducive now, they will have to share the burden of guilt with AQ Khan at some later stage. "They will not be allowed to have the cake and eat it too."
According to Rice the entire export of nuclear technology was a "criminal enterprise" motivated by "greed or fanaticism or perhaps both." (Speech at Ronald Reagan presidential library and museum in Sun Valley, California). "We must strengthen the world's ability to keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes," she emphasized.
Although Musharraf has pardoned Dr Khan, Rice insisted that those who traffic in deadly weapons will be brought to justice "working with intelligence officials from the United Kingdom and other nations," she said, adding: "We unraveled the Khan network and we are putting an end to its criminal enterprise. Its key leaders - including Dr Khan - are no longer in business, and we are working to dismantle the entire network".
Despite having put Dr Khan out of their way, Musharraf and his colleagues are not sure of the ground they are treading upon. Besides internal threats of elimination for betraying Pakistan's nuclear program, they fear that once the current operations are over in South Waziristan and Osama is found, Washington would no more need them. Like the end of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan made General Zia and his colleagues redundant and they had to be put to rest en bloc, Musharraf and his team mates would also be discarded to the dustbin of history soon after.
General Musharraf thinks he is shrewd enough to know that notwithstanding Washington's goody-goody behavior,
<u>
the undercurrents there are loaded with evidence that it was Pakistan's military establishment led by General Aslam Beg, Lt General Hameed Gul and Lt General Asad Durrani who had laid down the policy of 'proliferation for cash' to overcome paucity of funds due to stoppage of American money after the Afghan war.
To continue meddling in Afghanistan, to ensure what the Generals call Pakistan's strategic depth to protect and sustain other interests, they required a lot of money. So did he need unaccounted funds to carry on what General Musharraf has now acknowledged as cross-border terrorism-harming the indigenous Kashmiri intifada.
His Kargil fiasco - while sending 3,000 Pakistani brave military jawans into their graves unsung - cost the country around $500 million. Sustaining of our troops pointing their guns at their counterparts from below the Siachin Glacier required between $500m to $600m annually since 1984 when General Zia let India occupy it without firing a shot. For all these operations - Afghanistan, Kashmir etc - money to the tune of $1000 million per annum was needed. Obviously this kind of cash was not growing on trees and Musharraf had yet to declare that he could perform miracles. Pakistan's dwindling foreign exchange reserves only shot up after 9-11 for reasons other than patriotism.
</u>
Having survived two serious assassination attempts- though some people take them to be stage-managed - Musharraf believes he would be nine times lucky while those after him want their luck to favor them once. With both internal and external odds against him, he is trying his best to avert an international and domestic backlash.
Forewarned of the Ides of March - Musharraf desperately wants to erase the impression that he and other generals were involved in nuclear proliferation (although there is enough circumstantial evidence to prove their culpability) and that AQ Khan was a genuine villain and not a scapegoat as believed by the masses.
His agencies are reported to have whipped into action their wired columnists - some of them being retired army officers who escaped court martial for deserting from duty in former East Pakistan. This dubious characters are posing as born-again patriots and have the audacity to describe the legendary Dr Khan as "an albatross round Pakistan's neck that has brought us to ground zero of world public opinion". They forget that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto opened floodgates of nuclear power for Pakistan while Dr AQ Khan - along with other capable nuclear scientists raised by Bhutto - had developed the "atomic pill" to provide the much needed **** to the Pakistani Generals.
These defence analysts - a constant fixture in the government owned TV and private channels - have not only been assigned to join the orchestra to further blacken Dr Khan, but their new task is to defend Musharraf by matching his lies with Benazir Bhutto's recently revealed truths regarding the generals involvement in the nuclear trade. They want Bhutto to show more propriety in her charge sheet against Musharraf and they desperately plead that it should be ensured that "more skeletons do not appear on an already hot tin roof".
Probably provided a pack of lies to counter Benazir Bhutto they want to drag Benazir in the game of nuclear proliferation to lessen the international heat on Musharraf. It has been claimed that Sri Lankan Abu Tahir's involvement with AQ Khan started in 1994-95 when Bhutto was prime minister. They, however, forget that General Musharraf came on record in February last to declare that only Presidents and Army chiefs had their say in nuclear affairs. Obviously this meant that all civilian prime ministers since Zia's fatal fall had nothing to do with the control of the nuclear program. And to put the record straight, Abu Tahir had purchased special steel from Britain for AQ Khan and the case was investigated in London during 2001.
Now read this howler from one of the anti-BB propagandists: "Libya contacted AQ Khan in 1997 (again during the Benazir regime), to obtain help and expertise in the field of uranium-enrichment centrifuge as well as supply centrifuge units for Libya's nuclear program." This writer went overboard and forgot that Benazir Bhutto was not in power in 1997. President Farooq Leghari had dismissed her in November 1996.
Despite Musharraf's categorical denial pen pushers hired by his media managers are trying to divert attention and in a new propaganda drive have started accusing that it were the post-Zia civilian governments that failed to exercise stricter security controls. It was then, it is alleged, "when AQ Khan first started to run amok." It has, however, been grudgingly acknowledged that ZA Bhutto had introduced strict official controls that were even followed by Gen Zia ul Haq.
There is also criticism of Bhutto now talking about the Benazir Nuclear Doctrine, that banned exports of nuclear know-how and material from Pakistan. The necessity for such a doctrine was based on a briefing by her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his death-cell. Besides warning her of external threats to Pakistani nuclear scientists, ZAB had told her to ensure that there was no transfer of technology to any Muslim country or any one else-- either for money or friendship.
ZAB had believed that while those who opposed our nuclear program might swallow the fact of Pakistan making and possessing a bomb, once it had become a fait accompli, they would never tolerate it to be a source of an Islamic bomb and transfer of nuclear technology to the Muslim countries for that purpose. Such intricate things are much too difficult to be understood by thickheaded self-styled defence analysts.
It seems that Bhutto touched somebody's raw nerve when she alleged in recent TV and newspaper interviews that "Gen Pervez Musharraf is responsible for the nuclear exports to Libya". Instead of proving her wrong crocodile tears are being shed.
"With the President already treading a fail-safe line for Pakistan, it was extremely disappointing to see our former PM pursuing crass political objectives well knowing she was causing immense damage to the country. As an admirer of Ms Benazir's political talents and charisma" as he claims, he "expected her to uphold the national interest "even to the peril of her life".
Like most Pakistanis, Bhutto believes that by being a party to the transfer of nuclear technology Musharraf has not only betrayed a vital national trust but also committed an act of high treason. Indeed, when a general could send ZAB to the gallows for seeking the nuclear glow for the country on ground of conspiring to kill a pygmy political opponent who is still walking alive, why can't the nation try a general for high treason for giving a fatal blow to Pakistan's nuclear program and hold him accountable for this national crime.
It is, indeed, a tragedy that our Praetorian class considers itself to be more important than Pakistan itself, bigger than the state. It needs to be reminded what the Quaid had said: "Who lives if Pakistan dies". Surely, if there is no Pakistan where would our generals go, nay, where we all would go.
One agrees with the countrywide view that Pakistan's nuclear tragedy is likely to lead to much more dire consequences than that of fall of Dhaka. And it has happened because there was no accountability of those who had laid down their arms in an abject surrender to the Indian general in 1971. It is an irony that it took 27 years for a general to recognize ZA Bhutto as the father of Pakistan's nuclear program. I hope Benazir Bhutto will not have to wait that long to be recognized as the Prime Minister who got Pakistan the capability to carry its nuclear warheads to their targets in Pakistan's self-defence.
The writer is a former Pakistan High Commissioner to UK and a close aide of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
http://www.satribune.com/archives/mar14_20_04/P1_wajid.htm