Indian NCA formalized

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Sep 2003 00:00

Link: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030902/asp/nation/story_2324035.asp

Text:
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Meet to consolidate nuke deterrence
New Delhi, Sept. 1 (PTI): The Nuclear Command Authority today reviewed the arrangements for the strategic forces programme.

The authority’s political council, on the recommendations of the body’s executive council, took decisions on development and management of the programme that “will consolidate India’s nuclear deterrence”, said a statement issued after a two-hour meet chaired by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

The meeting is also believed to have reviewed how the army, the air force and the navy were coordinating with the Strategic Forces Comand.

Those attending the meeting included deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, finance minister Jaswant Singh, defence minister George Fernandes, national security adviser Brajesh Mishra, cabinet secretary Kamal Pande, defence secretary Ajay Prasad, air force chief S. Krishnaswamy and Strategic Forces Command commander-in-chief Air Marshal Teja Mohan Asthana.

The political council was set up on January 4 to lay out political principles and administrative arrangements to manage the country’s nuclear arsenal.

This was the first meeting of the council and came in the wake of the recent announcement in Parliament by Fernandes that the 700-km range Agni I and the 2000-km range Agni II ballistic missiles were ready for induction.

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ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Sep 2003 00:02

Vick
Member
Member # 1539

posted 02 September 2003 01:12 PM
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Defense News

Sept 02, 2003

India Activates Nuclear Command Structure

By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI, NEW DELHI

India’s nuclear command structure, a concept first outlined in January, was put into effect after a meeting Sept. 1 by the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority, which is chaired by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.

An official of the Indian Ministry of Defence told DefenseNews.com on Sept. 1 that the decision was made following intelligence reports that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is being re-deployed. The official refused to give details on whether India also is re-deploying its nuclear arsenal, but said, “India’s Nuclear Command Structure is activated.”

The Nuclear Command Authority that formed Jan. 4 is responsible for the deployment, control and safety of nuclear weapons. But control for launching a nuclear strike is held by the Political Council, which is advised by the Executive Council. That council is led by a National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra.

The Political Council meeting included the Lal Kishen Advani, deputy prime minister; George Fernandes, defense minister; Yashwant Sinha, external affairs minister; Jaswsant Singh, finance minister; and Mishra.

Currently India’s nuclear assets include nuclear war-heads, which are estimated to total 80; the Prithvi short-range missiles; and the medium-range missiles Agni-II and Agni-I.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Sep 2003 00:06

http://www.thestatesman.net/page.news.php?clid=2&theme=&usrsess=1&id=22005

PM in nuke readiness huddle

Statesman News Service
NEW DELHI, Sept. 1. — Prime Minister Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee today presided over a meeting of the Nuclear Command Authority, the politico-military apparatus that controls the country’s nuclear arsenal.
Officials today said the “preparedness” of the nuclear arsenal was being looked at.
India currently has two ways of striking with nuclear weapons at the enemy, through Air Force planes and through the Agni intermediate-range ballistic missiles which are with the Army. There are reports that the third leg of the triad — the submarine-launched ballistic missile — is being developed.
A government spokesman said that on the “basis of recommendations made by the executive council, the political council also took a number of decisions on further development and management of the programme”. Certain issues need to be sorted out. Firstly, the base of the NCA, currently in the capital, is likely to be shifted. A central Indian city is being considered and the possibility of having it in the Andamans or in Thiruvananthapuram is remote.
The defence minister, Mr George Fernandes, is part of the higher body, the political council, but the nuclear weapons command is currently being looked after by Air Marshal TM Asthana.
How many nuclear weapons India has is a secret, but according to some Western estimates, the number is between 40 and 60. The spokesman said the decisions would “consolidate India’s nuclear deterrence”.
China and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons and during Operation Parakram, when India had launched troops along the Indo-Pak border, there were reports that Pakistan had threatened to use nuclear weapons.

AkshayM · Post by **AkshayM** » 03 Sep 2003 00:11

Chankians released this news on a Tue, now Shrilleen has to wait one full week to :whine: about India's hegemonistic designs...

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Sep 2003 00:14

http://www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.php?newsId=en37399&F_catID=&f_type=source

Headline: Indian body examines intelligence on Pak military -- Detail Story

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on Monday chaired a meeting of the high-powered political committee of nuclear command and control authority and reviewed the military preparedness and deliberated at length on many other matters including the sensitive intelligence about the recent conference of Pakistani corps commanders, reports BBC.
Besides Premier Vajpayee, it was also attended by Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani, Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Finance Minister Jaswant Singh and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra. It was the first-ever meeting of the political committee since its formation on January 4. The meeting lasted for about two hours.
A brief statement, issued after the meeting of the committee, said that it reviewed the practical preparedness and position of the armed forces and took some important decisions aimed at further strengthening of the country’s nuclear deterrence.
Besides military preparedness, the committee also reviewed the level of cooperation and communication among the army, navy and air force under the command and control authority and ascertained the level of coordination and organisation in their working in certain circumstances.
According to the Indian defence analysts, the Indian intelligence service has provided intelligence about the Pakistani corps commanders’ meeting which was held about two weeks ago under the chairmanship of President General Pervez Musharraf. In this conference, the high-ranking Pakistani army officials considered the various aspects of installation of nuclear weapons as well as their safety and deployment of long-range missiles capable of striking targets in India, the report of the Indian intelligence service added.
The BBC in its report said it is believed that an in-depth discussion was held on the intelligence about the Pakistani corps commanders conference in the meeting of the political committee of command and control authority of India. The Indian nuclear command and control is in the hands of the political leadership.
Only the Indian political leadership can take a decision about the use of nuclear weapons, but the executive council, which is headed by the National Security Advisor, provides basic information for this purpose.
The Nation tried to contact Director-General ISPR who was not available whereas lower-ranked officials were not ready to comment on it.
Nuclear Command Authority MEETING: Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on Monday presided over the first meeting of the Nuclear Command Authority, which took decisions to ‘consolidate India’s nuclear deterrence’, a government statement said.
The two-hour meeting ‘took a number of decisions on the further development and management of the programme’, based on recommendations by a council headed by India’s National Security Advisor,’ the statement said.
‘These decisions will consolidate India’s nuclear deterrence,’ it added, without elaborating.
The meeting of the Nuclear Command Authority was meant to take stock of Indian forces’ readiness and procedures for command and control.
Besides Vajpayee, the meeting was attended by Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, Finance Minister Jaswant Singh and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra.
The Nuclear Command Authority was created January 4 to coordinate the administrative work under Mishra and the political council under Vajpayee.
The Hindustan Times reported that Monday’s deliberations were also to focus on ‘sensitive’ intelligence information about a recent meeting of Pakistan’s corps commanders presided over by President Pervez Musharraf.

JCage · Post by **JCage** » 03 Sep 2003 00:23

No one from the Army or Navy mentioned,thats odd?
Does ACM K's presence signify that the AF with its a/c is the prime mover for now?
Tie this in with the news of 126 Mirages for SAC etc.Mentioning or speculating on the city would be a crime.Hope DDM doesnt step that far.

Vick · Post by **Vick** » 03 Sep 2003 00:28

There are two councils:
The Political Council (PC) and the Executive Council (EC).

The members of the PC are:
Lal Kishen Advani, Deputy Prime Minister
George Fernandes, Defense Minister
Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister
Jaswsant Singh, Finance Minister
Brajesh Mishra, National Security Advisor
Atal Vajpayee, Prime Minister (this I am assuming)

Who are the memebers of the EC?

Vick · Post by **Vick** » 03 Sep 2003 00:33

Originally posted by nitin:
No one from the Army or Navy mentioned,thats odd?
Does ACM K's presence signify that the AF with its a/c is the prime mover for now?
Tie this in with the news of 126 Mirages for SAC etc.Mentioning or speculating on the city would be a crime.Hope DDM doesnt step that far.

The military brass probably makes up the EC that advises the PC. The conclusion I am drawing is that the ACM is the head of the EC and that the headship is rotational among the branches.

Also, why would giving the name of the city of the NCA be bad? Everyone knows what Cheyenne Mountain is, everyone knows Camp David, etc. I doubt that the physical presence of the NCA in any city can be hidden for long, if at all.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 03 Sep 2003 00:36

Cross posted from Launcher thread on Military Forum

Gerard
Member
Member # 1686

posted 01 September 2003 03:29 PM
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Posted in full since TOI no longer archives articles.

India National Command Authority reviews state of nuclear arsenal

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RAJAT PANDIT

TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 01, 2003 10:17:53 PM ]

NEW DELHI: With the nuke command post being established in concrete underground bunkers at ''a secure location'', the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) took several decisions on Monday to ''consolidate nuclear deterrence'' — a euphemism for the country's weapons arsenal and doctrine governing its use.

The first-ever formal meeting of the NCA, chaired by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, reviewed the ''arrangements'' in place for ''the strategic forces programme''. The progress achieved by the tri-Service Strategic Forces Command (SFC), established in January to manage the country's nuclear arsenal, was part of this.

The alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes, the transfer of nuclear delivery systems to the SFC and the need for an operational nuclear weapon triad — in the form of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based platforms — were also discussed, said sources.

The armed forces, at present, only have the 2,000-km-plus Agni-II ballistic missile and the 150-250 km range Prithvi tactical missile in their armoury. The Pakistan-specific 700 to 800-km range Agni-I missile is only now being readied for induction. Frontline IAF fighters like Mirage-2000s and Sukhoi-30MKIs, of course, can also be configured to deliver nuclear weapons.
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IP: Logged

Gerard
Member
Member # 1686

posted 01 September 2003 03:35 PM
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More info from Rediff...

Nuclear Command Authority meets
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IP: Logged

Gerard
Member
Member # 1686

posted 01 September 2003 03:45 PM
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More on this from the Daily Pioneer. Posted in full since there is no archiving.

N-deterrence reviewed

quote:
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N-deterrence reviewed

Pioneer News Service/ New Delhi

The first meeting of the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) here on Monday reviewed the country's Defence preparedness and took a series of decisions aimed at consolidating India's nuclear deterrence.

The two-hour-long meeting chaired by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee reviewed the arrangements in place for the Strategic Forces programme including the Chain of Command and transfer of nuclear assets to it. "On the basis of the recommendations made by the Executive Council, the Political Council also took a number of decisions on further development and management of the programme," an official statement issued after the meeting said.

It added: "These decisions will consolidate India's nuclear deterrence."

The high-powered meeting was attended among others by Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani, Union Defence Minister George Fernandes, Union Finance Minister Jaswant Singh and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, besides some top Government and defence officials.

It was learnt that the Council, which met for the first time after the Nuclear Command Authority was set up on January 4 this year, examined all the aspects of the nuclear programme of the country.

Special stress was laid on the Chain of Command, transfer of nuclear assets and the relationship between the three Services, the institution of Chief of Integrated Defence Staff(CIDS) and the Strategic Forces Command.

The transfer of assets including ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons from the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the scientific establishment, to the Strategic Forces Command, and the drill to be followed, came under scrutiny of the Political Council, it was learnt. The Council also reviewed the preparedness of the Strategic Command vis-a-vis the platforms to carry the weapons including air, land and under-sea, and the doctrines adhered to by the Strategic Forces Command.

The security scenario in the Indian sub-continent with regards to the nuclear threat, the nuclear capabilities of the neighbouring countries and the developments in some parts of the world in this sphere were also discussed.

The Political Council was formed to lay down the political principles and administrative arrangements to manage the country's nuclear arsenal, which is under civilian control with the final authority resting with the Prime Minister. This council comprises members of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and the National Security Advisor.

The Executive Council includes the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee of the three Services, the three Service chiefs, heads of intelligence agencies, the scientific establishment engaged in the nuclear programme and the National Security Advisor. While the Political Council and the NCA is headed by the Prime Minister, the Executive Council is headed by the National Security Advisor.

Meanwhile, the Cabinet Committee on Security will meet here on Wednesday to take stock of the situation in the country in the wake of the two encounters in Srinagar, the twin Mumbai blasts and the gunning down of the JeM terrorists in Delhi. The CCS was also likely to take up the case of the proposed acquisition of Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT).

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Mudy · Post by **Mudy** » 03 Sep 2003 00:52

Why this meeting was called? It is not clear.
a) 700 Km Agni is ready for induction ?
b) During Paki C C meeting - Are they planning something like operation Topaz or 1965 type of misadventure or want to re try Kargil ?
c) Prize jewels between 4-7 were removed from arrested Paki Army officers hands and now in new location with new gate keepers?
d) Paki internal problem is in dire strait, it is better to divert attention, hitting India giving Gujarat as a cause?
e) Imminent coup in Pakistan?

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 03 Sep 2003 01:34

> Why now..

Don't know (reaching for glass of nimbu pani)..

JCage · Post by **JCage** » 03 Sep 2003 02:54

Vick,
Thanks.Makes ample sense!
Re: city.
They release the name of the city...its dead.No1 on hit list.
Second,we cant replicate the US yet .They had serious survivability built into their C&C.We are just starting off.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 03 Sep 2003 06:28

To answer the question of who comprises the Executive Council, from Gerard's link to the Pioneer report in the Space and Missiles folder in the Mil Forum:

The Executive Council includes the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee of the three Services, the three Service chiefs, heads of intelligence agencies, the scientific establishment engaged in the nuclear programme and the National Security Advisor. While the Political Council and the NCA is headed by the Prime Minister, the Executive Council is headed by the National Security Advisor.

merlin · Post by **merlin** » 03 Sep 2003 11:41

>>They release the name of the city

You mean if they don't release the name, no one will ever find out about it?

kgoan · Post by **kgoan** » 03 Sep 2003 12:01

>> Executive Council

We'll never know. Nor will anyone else.

Formal declaratory aspects are political tools. Actual operational aspects are the bits that give the political tools their meaning and the nation it's deterrence.

It'll be lotsa fun to speculate**, but if we (or anyone else!) actually did find out details about the actual operational (as opposed to declaratory) executive aspects of our deterrence, then the force would be hopelessly compromised to the extent that the very concept of having a deterrence could probably be called into question.

**I mean besides the obvious stuff like the army chief being in the loop, or the head of "Strategic Command" etc.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 03 Sep 2003 13:35

Indian NCA along with India's Nuclear Doctrine were formalized (declared in public) on 4th Jan 2003. There was a good article in Hindu on this.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/01/05/stories/2003010504810100.htm

Some Key points mentioned in the article:

A two-layered structure, called the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) responsible for the management of its weapons. </li>
The Political Council chaired by the Prime Minister "is the sole body which can authorise the use of nuclear weapons".
</li>
The Executive Council, chaired by the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister, "provides inputs for decision making by the NCA and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council".
</li>
"Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command", would be responsible for the administration of the nuclear forces.
</li>
Actual composition of the NCA at its Political and Executive levels not disclosed.
</li>
India's Nuclear doctrine -Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent
</li>
A posture of "no-first use"
</li>
Retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the NCA
</li>
Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states
</li>
In the event of a major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons
</li>
A continuance of controls on export of nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, and observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests. </li>

JCage · Post by **JCage** » 03 Sep 2003 15:00

Originally posted by merlin:
>>They release the name of the city

You mean if they don't release the name, no one will ever find out about it?

Ambiguity in this regard is good,imho.
Anyway, back to the thread I go.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 03 Sep 2003 15:09

Originally posted by kgoan:
[Q]>> Executive Council

We'll never know. Nor will anyone else.

Formal declaratory aspects are political tools. Actual operational aspects are the bits that give the political tools their meaning and the nation it's deterrence.

It'll be lotsa fun to speculate**, but if we (or anyone else!) actually did find out details about the actual operational (as opposed to declaratory) executive aspects of our deterrence, then the force would be hopelessly compromised to the extent that the very concept of having a deterrence could probably be called into question.

**I mean besides the obvious stuff like the army chief being in the loop, or the head of "Strategic Command" etc.[/Q]

Very True Sir!
In fact, as per the officials at the time of Formal declaration of our nuclear doctrine, there is also a ANCA (Alternate Nuclear Command Authority). This had appeared at that time in a few publications (I am giving the links below). But justifiably, there is nothing more to that. So All of us can have fun speculating on its composition.
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2002/stories/20030131007103200.htm

However, the government has not been very forthcoming about the composition of the Political and Executive Councils that constitute the NCA. But the CCS statement stressed that the government had "reviewed and approved the arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities". According to Indian officials, if there is an attack targeting the nation's leadership "the alternative nuclear command authority will be in a position to take charge" and ensure maximum retaliation. They insist that there are foolproof mechanisms in place to prevent any accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.

India has alternative N-command authority

New Delhi, January 7
India has an Alternative Nuclear Command Authority (ANCA) in “more than one place” besides the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) announced on Saturday for the management of its weapons.

The ANCA is intended to take control in case of an exigency whereby the NCA becomes a victim of the enemy’s first strike, highly authoritative sources said here today. They refused to elaborate or pinpoint where these ANCAs are located.

Drawing pointed attention to the civilian control of the NCA or the ANCA, the sources refused to discuss either on the succession issue if the apex authority or authorities are to be disabled. They insisted that all these “alternatives have been clearly chalked out and there are no ambiguities.”

Simultaneously, they said the safety and security of the nuclear weapons were such that they were much safer than those of the many nuclear weapons states.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 03 Sep 2003 15:27

Kgoan, Look! who is so distressed at the lack of transparency in Indian Nuclear Doctrine?.

(Disclaimer:The whole aricle is a crap load of bad english and marred by incoherence. I had read it long ago when it appeared, and remembered it only because of its rambling nature. I had been shocked at that time on reading such a pedestrian and poorly researched piece from some one who had been a senior officer in TSPA and heads the Institute of Regional studies.)

But reading it now in the light of your comments made it somewhat more palatable.

India's Nuclear Doctrine
By Jamshed Ayaz Khan, Maj. Gen. (Retd.)

India's Nuclear Doctrine does not tell all. Missing is the actual composition of the NCA, at its political and executive levels. The alternate "chain of command" that India talks about, has also not been cleared.

That means 'No First Use' is really out, India has now made it more ambiguous. Whenever they decide to use Nuclear Weapons against a State, they could just say that State X was planning to launch a major biological or chemical attack on India — the theory of unilateral pre-emptive strike formula could also be commissioned. United States — the only Super Power, has retained a similar option to prevent nations with chemical and biological weapons from assuming that the use of these weapons of mass destruction will not invite a nuclear response. India has taken out this part from USA's doctrine.

Moreover when India talks about 'Building and Maintaining a credible minimum deterrent', it does not mention that the Minimum Deterrence will be against Pakistan or China — obviously it will have to be different if it is against China rather than Pakistan, India thus remains beautifully vague and to the West India will say "Deterrence has to be vague" and the West will leave it that that.

Vick · Post by **Vick** » 03 Sep 2003 17:14

Purefool doing what he does best: showing the world how petty and partisan he is and in the process hurting Indian interests. Oh well, morons will be morons...

Notice his choice of words.

India toys with its nuclear button

NEW DELHI - Five years after it conducted a series of nuclear blasts, the Indian government has taken one more step toward the actual induction and deployment of nuclear weapons into the country's arsenal, potentially enhancing the nuclear danger in the troubled South Asian region.

According to Purefool, India taking steps to increasing its security is a threat to the South Asia. He's the kind of guy who's a$$ is begging to have a foot inserted.

Editor · Post by **Editor** » 03 Sep 2003 17:39

Dinesh Mannan,

Would you like to try summarizing this thread into a BRM referenced article?

S Bajwa · Post by **S Bajwa** » 03 Sep 2003 18:26

City one or more could be anyone.. pick from following..

chandigarh,shimla,ghaziabad, agra, jhansi, bhopal, hyderabad, indore, pune, lucknow, jaipur, faridabad, sonepat, jalandhar, bhatinda, ambala, nagpur, banglore, cochin, trivandrum, nasik, guwhati, shillong, dispur, calcutta, allahabad, vishakapatnam, patna, warangal, and hundreds more...

Rahul Mehta · Post by **Rahul Mehta** » 03 Sep 2003 18:44

some truely good news after a long time ...

I hope that Indian Nbs will harvest lakhs of nukes and lakhs of missiles to carry them to any city the WORLD, so that we can live in peace.

NCA is perhaps the FIRST step, and hoepfully Nbs will take more steps.

I wish Ahmedabad becomes city central for NCA. NCA city may become a prime target, but thats a risk I will be gladly happy to take. But given that Abad is NOT in center of India, I dont that happening.

Long live nuclear India ...

-Rahul Mehta

Amarko · Post by **Amarko** » 03 Sep 2003 21:24

Good step ahead. Good to know that the command and control structure is falling into place and necessary steps are being taked with the utmost seriousness at the highest levels.

I love the govt. learning to become ambiguous and not telling all to the world. They're reading BRF?

Lets speculate to our hearts content where the command center(s) will be located. I hope GOI does it in a manner that can decieve curious eyes within and without !

Amarko.

JCage · Post by **JCage** » 04 Sep 2003 01:12

Originally posted by sbajwa:
City one or more could be anyone.. pick from following..

chandigarh,shimla,ghaziabad, agra, jhansi, bhopal, hyderabad, indore, pune, lucknow, jaipur, faridabad, sonepat, jalandhar, bhatinda, ambala, nagpur, banglore, cochin, trivandrum, nasik, guwhati, shillong, dispur, calcutta, allahabad, vishakapatnam, patna, warangal, and hundreds more...

Aahaaa!Bajwa sirjee this kind of confusion for the pakis and their chinese masters is what I hope for.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 04 Sep 2003 10:56

Originally posted by Editor:
Dinesh Mannan,

Would you like to try summarizing this thread into a BRM referenced article?

I would love to! But IMHO not much has been discussed as yet. Are there any approaching deadlines? Otherwise we can have the thread on for another few days, and maybe lot of other interesting views can emerge. Then we can have a summary. I volunteer for this. Please let me know (dmannan@indiatimes.com)

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 04 Sep 2003 11:58

In an article on Indian NCA, some of the apprehensions of Pakistann come to fore. http://www.defencejournal.com/2003/apr/ind-nuclear.htm

The United States has also retained a nuclear retaliatory option to prevent nations with chemical and biological weapons from assuming that the use of these weapons of mass destruction will not invite a nuclear response. Significantly, President Bush’s new security doctrine suggests that the United States will henceforth attack adversaries to prevent them not only from using but also from acquiring the technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction. While following the Americans’ experience, India may adopt this strategy in the near future.

IMHO the NSAB recommended the use of nuclear response even on the use of Chem/Bio weapons on India / Indian forces(any where) to preclude the possibility of such an act being carried out a-la Kargil. So it lessens a few arrows in TSP's quiver.

The Government also mentions that it has “reviewed and approved the arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities”. This is a reference to a situation in which the Prime Minister may be incapacitated during a crisis. But the CCS did not reveal how the power to press the nuclear button would move down to the political chain in the event of such a contingency.

Strange! This coming from a TSP journal. The issue of alternate command or lack thereof is more of concern in Pakistan's case.

Among its other recommendations, the National Security Advisory Board had asked the government to review its no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy in light of the history of the last four years in its National Security Review, submitted to National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra on December 2002. The CCS didn’t accept this recommendation. It makes sense that a country with large conventional resources will not renounce the option of No First using nuclear weapons. But the recent developments indicate that India is hurtling towards inducting nuclear weapons into her armed forces. In the near future, India may give up her present force-in-being nuclear posture and assemble and operationalize her nuclear weapons.

IIRC the issue of India's force-in-being nuclear posture had been discussed quite extensively in one of the BR threads and many shared the same view that this posture may be transitory in nature.

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 04 Sep 2003 17:04

dont forget my wolfbunker in bhutan, where india
already hides tons of banned chem weapons.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 05 Sep 2003 03:51

Managing the nuclear deterrent

Jasjit Singh

The announcement about the very first meeting of the National Command Authority more than five years after the country declared itself a nuclear weapons state would naturally raise more questions than it answers. The most crucial element of nuclear strategy is the issue of its credibility.

Transparency is a necessary element in influencing credibility. And announcements like these must be judged in that context. The timing of the present meeting, where little of actual relevance, leave alone substance, was announced, is likely to give rise to some perceptions that this was done in response to the Congress charges of the Government ignoring national security. This may carry conviction with many since the pattern of NSC meetings (that have met only twice since 1998, while the CCS takes all decisions) also give us no clue of the effectiveness of our key national security management institutions.

It appears that we are yet to deploy an operationally reliable mobile ballistic missile for nuclear delivery, and, of course, the submarine-based nuclear deterrent is many years away. Talking about the short range Prithvi missiles in this context is highly misleading. This leaves only aircraft delivery system, and we have a number of credible effective options in the shape of Su-30, Mirage-2000 and Jaguar aircraft available in service. This has been the core of our nuclear deterrent for the past five years since we announced nuclearisation.

These aircraft may not have the ranges finally required. But they would remain the core of our arsenal even after we have the full-range of ballistic missiles on land and at sea. The crux, however, is the mobile survivable ballistic missile. The deployment of an operationally reliable system in adequate numbers is yet to be announced. Such a deployment would automatically convey the signal within the country and outside that we have a credible deterrent beyond the aircraft-delivered arsenal.

But we don’t need to rush into building a large missile force, though we need to keep testing them. In fact it is time we started to pay attention to space capabilities for defence since they would have a major impact on the way we can manage not only conventional military capabilities, especially air power, but also on our nuclear deterrent.

The other issue is that of command and control. The alternate chain of command is critical to the success of any nuclear strategy. This would be the simplest and least complicated in case of a strategy of no-first-use, and by implication extremely complex and costly (and susceptible to error and risks of accidents) in case of a first-use strategy. But what we need to remember is that the chain of command would be the priority target that the adversary would seek to destroy with a nuclear strike in an effort to decapitate the arsenal, and crucial for the success of our own strategy. This must, therefore, remain the most tightly guarded secret at all times.

Secondly, in a parliamentary democracy like ours, the Prime Minister holds the authority for nuclear strike. He would designate the alternate chain in case he is incapacitated for any reason. That chain need not follow a protocol-based system.

Incidentally, it is obvious that top political and military leadership must travel in aircraft that have secure communications, command and control infrastructure and reliable fast jets to ensure that they can discharge the functions of nuclear command responsibilities properly. It is surprising, therefore, that we have not yet upgraded our transport aircraft fleet in the Air HQ Communication Squadron which continues to fly the slow obsolescent Avro of the 1960s vintage knowing that there is qualitative change in the nature of transportation and communication needs after a country goes nuclear.

link:http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story ... t_id=30782

George J · Post by **George J** » 05 Sep 2003 05:20

I've been pondering over this issue for a while...

What is the relavence of a recallable and interceptable delivery platform like an IAF aircraft when we have a clear NFU policy? Will not a fire and forget and arguably non-interceptable Agni-I/II fit more clearly in this paradigme. The concept of 'second strike' is that once authorized (which has its own chia-biscoot algorithm) there should be no deviance from the decision to inflict 'disproportionate' level of damage with minimal effort.

Are the P-5 more reliant on their missiles over their aircrafts for doing the deed? Why are we regressing to aircrafts. Not really a can-o-worms question, but been wondering for a while.

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 05 Sep 2003 05:49

our missile force is quite small at the moment. building the numbers and logistics will take 15-20 years to deter a full PRC strike. in the interim, having a second line of defence is useful.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 05 Sep 2003 10:41

GeorgeJ, Rudra
Hi!

For a nation-state believing in NFU and thus second strike capability, the preference order (starting from less preferable to the most preferable) for nuclear weapons delivery is as follows:
1) Aircrafts / bombers
2) Land Based Missile System in Hardened Silos
3) Mobile Land based Missile system (Rail/Road)
4) Sea-Surface based Missile System
5) Submarine based (SLBMs / SLCMs)

This preference order is based on the probability of survival of these assets in the First strike by the enemy nation.

In case of India, as per all the open source info available, India's deterrence is based on 1 & 3, while there have been various reports of our working towards 4 & 5. I have not come across any reports mentioning our use of option 2. Even if we have exercised the option 2, we may not get to see any reports on that, and justifiably so. Nuclear game is all about deterrence and a little ambiguity always helps.

Now coming to your question George Ji - Though we have better options (2?,3)they are at inadequate levels now, as started by Rudra.We are working on even better options (4 & 5) but these are still on the designing stages.

Also, considering the vastness of our nation and considering the arsenal and delivery mechanism of our potential adversaries (China / Pak), there exists a very high probability / (near certainity) of much of our aircraft based assets surviving, and thus be in a position to launch a credible second strike of massive proportions.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 05 Sep 2003 11:26

Ramana, Hi!
In the Jasjit Singh article, he has raised this issue

Secondly, in a parliamentary democracy like ours, the Prime Minister holds the authority for nuclear strike. He would designate the alternate chain in case he is incapacitated for any reason. That chain need not follow a protocol-based system.

Incidentally, it is obvious that top political and military leadership must travel in aircraft that have secure communications, command and control infrastructure and reliable fast jets to ensure that they can discharge the functions of nuclear command responsibilities properly. It is surprising, therefore, that we have not yet upgraded our transport aircraft fleet in the Air HQ Communication Squadron which continues to fly the slow obsolescent Avro of the 1960s vintage knowing that there is qualitative change in the nature of transportation and communication needs after a country goes nuclear.

I think, this issue could have been discussed in the NCA itself. I say this, because just after 2 days of the NCA meet, the Government through CCS, cleared the purchase of 5 executive jets from Brazil for the VVIP / Communications squadron of IAF and also Home Ministry. http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=24375

On the decision to procure five executive jet from Brazilian firm Embraer at a cost of Rs 727 crore, Prasad said that four of these 14-seater jets would replace the aging British-made Avros in the VVIP communication squadron of the Air Force while one would be used by the Border Security Force. In a normal configuration, the jets have a capacity of 19 seats.

These jets would be fitted with 'self-protection suit' to deceive incoming missiles on the lines of the safety equipment in Air Force-One used by the US President, the Defence Secretary said, adding that the safety equipment was already available with the IAF and would be fitted by the Brazilian firm in the jets.

Also, it is just my opinion that GOI does not need to declare any decision on nuclear strategy / policy, solely from the platform of NCA when other platforms such as CCS do exist.

George J · Post by **George J** » 05 Sep 2003 20:56

GD and Dinesh:
Errr how many vehicles do you need for 'disproportionate' levels of damage if you have POK-I validated design and a new 250 kg TN design? 4-5 on political and economic centers would be MAD enough.

IIRC most of the P-5 are moving to road mobile and sub lauched assets. There are still hardened silos which are merely remanents of cold war but majority of the assets are on board subs and on TELs god knows where.

I was under the impression that in this day and age even tepo-ding-dong barers realize that missile platform is far more survivable than an a/c. They can fly faster and longer with little chance of interceptions.

There is a far better probability of our road/rail mobile assets surviving when compared to a/c in clearly known bases. Further there probability of interception and hence size of the package is much bigger for the AF a/c.

Then comes point of a/c being 'recallable'. You can only safely recall if the a/c is in your airspace, or can return unmolested from enemy airspace, which is quite iffy. Most importantly and this is a policy issue, why recall? Doesnt that violate the tenets of the NFU-Credible Second Strike doctorine? You will only proceed with a second strike and once a first strike has been ascertained and validate and you 'decide' to on a second strike there is no reason to recall.

Finally if SBM's anecdote of one agni and a couple of prithvis being readied in 99 is indicative of shape of things to come then from 99 onwards some semblence of a second strike was in place and in circa 03 we have come a long way and near deployment of a road/rail mobile all solid Agni-I.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 05 Sep 2003 22:20

Hi,

I think there is a important difference here.

In a crisis everything goes! operationally reliable or otherwise, whatever offers crisis stablity must be attempted. To this end even if a platform is not 100% operationally reliable we can still have it be used to push out a credible deterrence (although such a deterrence may even be short lived).

However in times of relative stability, where one is looking to damp down escalatory tendencies, we have to be more discerning. This automatically raises the standards for `operational reliability'.

To give an example, the Atlas ICBM system was fielded in a remarkably short time after its first developmental launch. From the very outset, the military was fully involved and as soon as a launch could be attempted with a fully military crew, the missile was declared operational. The USG went to the world announcing that the Atlas ICBM was now an integral part of its arsenal.

However at that time the USG had at its disposal a grand total of ONE atlas ICBM which was operational. This was clearly not an `operationally reliable' affair. Similar stories also exist about the SLBM deterrent in the USN and RN context. The specifics of these are not important but I feel it is important to remember that `operational reliability' is a somewhat more abstract criteria than `operational readiness'.

Crudely speaking I would say that `operational readiness' is the ability to credibly demonstrate the will to stare down a nuclear armed adversary seized by an enthusiasm for escalation.

`Operational reliability' is the ability to close all arguments _ever_ on the credibility of the will to stare down a nuclear armed adversary possessed by the desire to escalate.

I have pretty much made up these definitions sitting on the you-know-what today morning, so I would appreciate a debate on this, perhaps I am wrong about this altogether.

Now there is also a bit of a paradox here, technically speaking a `high operational reliability' deterrence scheme should in theory provide additional stability during crises, so one should generally welcome such a development. However it is fair to note that the presence of this `operational reliability' on the Pakistani side (given their propensity for tactical brillance) could offer an equal incentive to aggression. This brings us back to the main paradox of deterrence, i.e. the stability created by it is a global stability - not a minutely local one.

I sense there is now increasing pressure on the Pakistani establishment. For one, there is pressure to develop an Alternative National Command Authority, to match the Indians. So far the Pakistanis have got away with gassing off about the survivability of their deterrent. They have also been able to pfaff about things like non-proliferation and anti-escalation safeguards. Everything has been pretty much tailored to Musharraf's personal preferences. This will have to change.

I agree that forcing change is not without risks in Pakistan. I strongly feel that without a formal representation of the survivability of the Indian national command and control structure, we had left a door open to a monster. The Pakistanis for their part had long harped on the possibility of sudden escalation through some illunderstood command and control failure mode on their part. They were desperately looking to see some confidence building measures to ensure that such an `unfortunate event' would not bring forth an unacceptable outcome on them.
Now atleast whoever takes over Pakistan, whether in a sherwani or a saville row suit, will have to accept the notion that we are more than ready for eventualities.

So in contrast to what Praful Bidwai is saying, I feel that this is a massively stabilizing development.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Sep 2003 22:00

Is there a Chinese angle?

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 09 Sep 2003 22:59

Y I Patel · Post by **Y I Patel** » 11 Sep 2003 05:56

The recent news about raising of Garuda (IAF's elite ground security force) may be at least partially about security of nukes.

I am not discounting the official reason that has been put out - that this is a counterterrorist measure aimed at improving protection of air bases. But if you think about it, if there are going to be nukes within air force installations or units at times of heightened tensions, then the air force would be very remiss in not providing the best possible security for the strategic assets in its possession.

The Sovs, for example, had elite units that trained exclusively for protecting their strategic assets. In the Indian context, such thinking would undoubtedly be reinforced by the ineffectual Paki commando raids on air bases in 65, by the successful Tamil Tiger raid on a Sri Lankan air base, and by the terrorist raid on Srinagar airport a couple of years ago.

There are implications of such a force protecting nukes in air force installations: one assumes that if nukes are going to be under civilian control until they are released for use, then they will be in a civilian controlled and non-military protected installation. We now have an alternative possibility of the nukes being in civilian hands but in a military protected and administered installation. We then have the following ramifications: the time between readying nukes under civilian control and handing them over to the military would be shorter (much shorter) than assumed; and the dividing line between effectively military control and civilian control would be thin (atleast in times of escalated tension).

So this development of raising Garuda may have some interesting implications on India's nuclear posture that need to be examined in greater detail. I feel fairly comfortable in raising this issue publicly, because I view it as a stabilizing development. If nukes are well protected, and if there is a secure and well oiled hand over mechanism between the civilians and the mily types, then that will surely contribute to India's confidence in the security of its nukes and to the effectiveness of its NFU doctrine.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 12 Sep 2003 10:34

Hi!

Paging anyone with Access to the book "Weapons of Peace" by Raj Chengappa

Can anyone please post exact exercpt of the Mirage 2000 nuke trials at the Mahajan ranges with Rajiv Gandhi watching, or any other excerpt which mentions about PAL or any other control mechanism on Indian nukes.

Please do so quoting the Page number also.

You can also mail me at dmannan@indiatimes.com

Thanks!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 12 Sep 2003 20:08

Dinesh There was a Manoj Joshi article in India Today dealing with these issues. Dont know how to search IT archives.