India-US Nuclear Deal continued

Alok_N
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India-US Nuclear Deal continued

Postby Alok_N » 21 Dec 2006 21:36

SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.


that used to be US law ... that will remain US law ... regardless of whether India signs a 123 agreement or not ... so, what's your point?

isn't it the biggest exercise in futility to fret over an action that has no consequences on the object that is causing your grief?


I would truly appreciate if someone can answer my query above in one coherent post minus "sell out" etc throw in ... I have no problems if the answer is purely political ...

Shiv, Gerard, enqyoob et al have made similar points ... in more creative ways involving famous breasts to boot ...

someone can equally well claim that if the action is inconsequential, why do it? ... I believe the answer was in ramana's story about JP Morgan ...
Last edited by Alok_N on 21 Dec 2006 22:26, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Alok_N » 21 Dec 2006 21:39

NRao wrote:In that case, I must have missed ramana's post.

:(


Nrao, Here it is:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... ht=#295378
Last edited by Alok_N on 21 Dec 2006 22:29, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby S.Valkan » 21 Dec 2006 21:41

Rye wrote:Seems like the US is going to have plenty of oppurtunities to write IAEA and NSG rules, such that invocation of the Hyde law at a future point in time can set of a domino of rules/regulations that will ensure non-cooperation from ALL US allies in the NSG....which would leave India dependent on...China and Russia?


The IAEA "rules" would be negotiated between the IAEA and India.

Sure, the US would have its input in the process, but India is not bound by them, only by what it accepts and signs.

The NSG "rules" , on the other hand, are guidelines, not law.

In any event, the fundamental stumbling block at NSG always was "full scope safeguards".

Since that is being removed, the rest of the guidelines are negotiable, commensurate with India's power and influence at the time.

If that is the case, what do you think will happen if in the short term US insists on attacking Iran, and that is not the best course of action from an Indian POV.


Just as a reminder, Indian troops aren't there in the killing fields of Iraq, myriads of backchannel pressures notwithstanding.

What makes you think different about India's policy on Iran ?

Err..isn't that pretty bad all around?


It depends on the nature of constitutional division of powers.

The question of ratification is primarily of peoples' mandate.

Since the Indian executive branch is comprised of elected members of the legislature, peoples' mandate is already assumed to be there.


Why all this coyness and bad faith being exhibited from the US? I mean, if there is really no harm in telling which parts of the US govt.'s rules are binding and which ones are not, why not answer Mr. Shourie's query?


What is missing from this analysis is an understanding of how things operate in the real world.

As much as the US may want this budding relations to consolidate, it must keep a finger in the pie in case the relations turn in a direction not entirely favourable to the US.

That lever is the "extraneous" provisions of the Hyde Act.

Some village idiots talk of "trust" as the guiding principle behind international relations, but the real guiding principle is realpolitik.

The intent of the US at THIS time is to provide India with the necessary leeway on nuclear strategic issues, without giving up all means to pull the reins back, when the need arises.

If the Indo-US relations are firm and smooth, not even the strictest clause of the Hyde Act will ever be invoked.

Au contraire, it is entirely possible that the US would in fact subvert "international norms" to get India through rough waters.

But, just on that 0.00005% outside possibility that India drifts towards a "subvert-Pax-Americana" scenario, the Hyde Act has those onerous provisions, to be invoked if necessary.

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Postby Alok_N » 21 Dec 2006 21:43

del
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Postby Neupane » 21 Dec 2006 22:02

According to Economist, Pakistan and China is in the governing Board of IAEA-


India's nuclear plans

The home front
Dec 13th 2006 | DELHI
From The Economist print edition

[quote]Looking a gift horse in the mouth?


INDIA'S civil nuclear deal with America is about rather more than the proportion of electricity that might be generated by atom-splitting in 15 years' time (a meagre 4%). For those in Delhi and in Washington, DC, looking to bury what Jaswant Singh, a former foreign minister, once described as “50 wasted yearsâ€

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Postby NRao » 21 Dec 2006 22:09



Ah. Thanks.

However, here is the version I heard:

An entrepreneur came to JP and asked him to invest in his venture. JP took him for a walk on Wall Street and they discussed the weather and the kids etc but not money. When they came back to the office, the entrepreneur asked JP what about the investment in his firm? JP said 'Now that the street has seen you in my company you will not face any problems in raising the money.’

Well, this entrepreneur, as advised, approached other investors, who gave him not funds but insisted that they place their people to help him run the show. The entrepreneur went to become a very successful businessman.

However, when the time came to repay the investors, the investors insisted that they get paid not just in terms of monies, but also IP.

The entrepreneur, over time, lost his company to the investors.

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Postby Rye » 21 Dec 2006 22:25

Valkan S. wrote:
Just as a reminder, Indian troops aren't there in the killing fields of Iraq, myriads of backchannel pressures notwithstanding.

What makes you think different about India's policy on Iran ?


It is not about the GoI's Iran policy, which is stable and well-defined, but the lack of choices, and the complete break from past Iran policy (which is fine and acceptable *if* breaking from the past is not going to cost India in terms of the energy deficit) that would have to happen before the "deal" starts breathing. If things go south during IAEA negotiations and India finds the going unacceptable, then India would have lost its Iran energy option AND the US energy option, forcing India to continue with negotiations even though we are on a losing wicket. Net result: US 1 India 0, and India will be back to the pre-J18 days --- that seems very very bad from the POV of India's choices moving forward.


Of course, it is a different matter that India would have to be really stupid to actually back Iran in its current belligerent warmongering, and there is no chance of India supporting Iran on that, but if India overtly supports hostility on Iran, India will lose Iranian support at the grassroots level and that seems to be a terrible thing for all concerned.

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Postby NRao » 21 Dec 2006 22:34

Just as a reminder, Indian troops aren't there in the killing fields of Iraq, myriads of backchannel pressures notwithstanding.


Only because the BJP hid behind the commies.

What makes you think different about India's policy on Iran ?


Then why have Iran mentioned in ANY Act?

On the flip side we already see side effects of this Act: Sen Hawkins effect: even when the Act make not mention of the possibility of india helping Iran with their nuclear program, we have a Yahoo sen who claims they may do it.

Point being - even as our discussions here on BR show - we ALL are distracted. This is about Indian Civilian nuclear effort in the near future. Simple. It is NOT about Iran, not about that Indian nuclear scientists have contributed only 3% towards the current electricity production in India, or that FBR is experimental and has not proved anything so far, etc, etc, etc.

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Postby TSJones » 21 Dec 2006 22:47


Only because the BJP hid behind the commies.


I don't understand this. I thought that Vajpayee(sp?) made himself very clear: He could not send troops when most of his country was against it. Because after all India was a democracy.

Those may not have been his exact words but as close as I could remember it as reported in the news. This is a principled stand and while one may disagree with it, one can't fault it for being up front and succinct.

It is the US administration who was not listening. Or even bother reading the Indian newspapers for that matter. In diplomacy don't ask for something you can't get *unless* there is something else you, really, really, want.

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Postby S.Valkan » 21 Dec 2006 22:52

Rye wrote:If things go south during IAEA negotiations and India finds the going unacceptable, then India would have lost its Iran energy option AND the US energy option, forcing India to continue with negotiations even though we are on a losing wicket.


No country surrenders its policy options based on whimsical fancies.

Neither would India.

The aim of India at this juncture is to find the optimum balance,- how to maintain the necessary tactical links with Iran, while at the same time developing the strategic partnership with the US.

All indicators are that India is doing just fine.

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Postby NRao » 21 Dec 2006 22:54

India has principles, US has arm-twists.

"Principles" won - then.

But then, it is possible, I got the wrong story too.

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Postby NRao » 21 Dec 2006 22:59

No country surrenders its policy options based on whimsical fancies


Very true. And, no one is argueing against that.

However, when the "policy" does not believe in - say - nuclear options, then giving up nuclear options is not part of the "policy options".

IIRC M Desai shut down _ to some extent(?) - Indian nuke efforts. So, to him the policy was to have no nukes. So, giving up the nuclear option was meant nothing to him - from his PoV he is giving up nothing. he agreed with those that said India should cap/give up nukes.

It woudl be diff if ALL in India had the same policy (on nukes say).

My concern is that MMS falls in the MDesai bucket.

Am I wrong?

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Postby ShauryaT » 21 Dec 2006 23:12

S.Valkan wrote:Since that is being removed, the rest of the guidelines are negotiable, commensurate with India's power and influence at the time.


Incorrect.

The Hyde act specifically in Section 110 (1) says that the Additional Protocol by the IAEA can be only under the Information Circular 540, which is applicable to Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

Section 104 B (5) (a) (iii) says, :In the event, the IAEA is unable to implement the safeguards,...It says that 'the assurances that there will be fall back safeguards, if needed, are an important feature for nuclear cooperation."

So not only India will be subject to intense verification similar to non-NWS states but in addition will have fall back safeguards, in perpetuity regardless of what happens with the IAEA.

The question of ratification is primarily of peoples' mandate.
Since the Indian executive branch is comprised of elected members of the legislature, peoples' mandate is already assumed to be there.


Not really. I doubt if any constitutional expert will call the UoM headed by the PM as the body with the peoples' mandate. It is the legislature and only the legislature with such a manadate. The problem is the party whips have made the legislature more or less defunct. So, in effect the leader(s) of the ruling party can shepherd and the sheep simply follow.

But, just on that 0.00005% outside possibility that India drifts towards a "subvert-Pax-Americana" scenario, the Hyde Act has those onerous provisions, to be invoked if necessary.


And for this it is necessary that the strategic reduction of India is to be codified, right? If all that was needed were the whims and fancies of the US president then that could have been done with an annual presidential waiver. The whole idea was to enact a law to avoid such Presidential waivers. What has happenned here is J18 has been interpreted by the US body to reflect their primary non-proliferation goals and the desire to not let any more nuclear powers and if that is not possible then to seek a strategy to cap for now and then find further opportunities to roll back the nuclear weapons of these powers. From a US perspective that makes sense.

The frustration has been either MMS and team have not seen through it or the more dangerous interpretation they are quite OK with this strategic reduction.

If as some say on this board that all we need is a a temporary window until the 3 stage fuel cycle is complete and then we can demand changes are, IMO missing the point. Once, you sign on the dotted line, it will take more than the wish of a PM to change things.

The bigger question is Why are we so desperate? Are the strategic costs of this bill really worth it? Are there really no other solutions, such as Hydro power from NE and maybe more local Uranium?
Last edited by ShauryaT on 22 Dec 2006 00:11, edited 3 times in total.

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Postby NRao » 21 Dec 2006 23:13

after the decade, India can take the ek do teen and make it char sau bees ... keep the CNCs, fire up some thorium, smoke a fat cigar, and declare with Ajeet flair: "nothing personal, it was bijness onlee" ...


Two problems with this.

Why 420? FBR is declared, we are not hiding anything, are we? This deal is meant to jump start our FBR program ASAP. We have alternatives that will take more time. (That is my understanding.)

Second, why saddle future Indian gens with 420 activities? But 420 has to be removed from both sides of the equation - Hyde Act too has to vanish. Hawkins should be far more worried about drugs (which is what he has in common with pakistan) in Iowa than India helping Iran in nuke filed.

To alieviate fears of a nuke arms race(!!!) India has NFU and Minimum Credible Deterence (MCD). What is it that Hyde, Hawkins or Wisconsin project cannot understand? And, why is India feeding into this self created frenzy?

BTW, this 420 move ASSUMES that Hyde will accept, via 123, reprocessing - is it not? Without reprocessing NO FBR? Correct?

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Postby ramana » 21 Dec 2006 23:30

NRao wrote:
No country surrenders its policy options based on whimsical fancies


Very true. And, no one is argueing against that.

However, when the "policy" does not believe in - say - nuclear options, then giving up nuclear options is not part of the "policy options".

IIRC M Desai shut down _ to some extent(?) - Indian nuke efforts. So, to him the policy was to have no nukes. So, giving up the nuclear option was meant nothing to him - from his PoV he is giving up nothing. he agreed with those that said India should cap/give up nukes.

It woudl be diff if ALL in India had the same policy (on nukes say).

My concern is that MMS falls in the MDesai bucket.

Am I wrong?


This is the biggest psy-ops. It was under his regime that the POKI was converted to a working weapon as was attested by GP's book and other statements which were posted in earlier versions of this thread. I recall posting that he was misjudged.

MMS is different bucket. His own type.

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Postby NRao » 21 Dec 2006 23:31

In fact, I would like to make the argument that the US is in a very bad situation.

The US cannot afford to let India slide economically. Just cannot - impossible.

I had made this argument 2-3 years ago - the US needs India far more than India needs the US.

IF India is willing to humbly stick to her guns, I for one would not be surprised if the US donates 10 reactors with fuel and reprocessing rights.

If one thinks about the geo-political situation now thru' 15 years from now, what options does the US have?

Just as a powerful India is bad for China, a weak India is bad for the US (and a few others). (A weak India will easily slide in the orbit of China.)

JMTs. Sorry to distract from the discussion.

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Postby NRao » 21 Dec 2006 23:34

This is the biggest psy-ops. It was under his regime that the POKI was converted to a working weapon as was attested by GP's book and other statements which were posted in earlier versions of this thread. I recall posting that he was misjudged.

MMS is different bucket. His own type


OK, then I stand corrected WRT M Desai. Thx.

However, the reasoning abt "policy" still stands? (That example was bad, granted.)

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Postby Vijay J » 22 Dec 2006 00:02

Alok,

This is what I mean by fake calculation.

If you want to do that kind of a calculation, why not plot the energy supplied as a function of the price of Uranium?

In MV Ramana pseudocalculation, the price of Uranium is assumed to be constant which is absurd.

There is no allowance for the fact that the price of Uranium will rise as the resource becomes more scarce.

The very logic of the FBR is that natural uranium resources are scarce and so energy has to be extracted in a more efficient and renewable ways.

In this way a sleight of the hand is used to hide the most basic point of the FBR's utility while making assertions about the viability of a uranium only once-through cycle that are quite simply bald faced lies.

Today thanks to the Non-Proliferation community's efforts people in the US congress who know absolutely nothing about nuclear power have been influenced to ask India to surrender its reprocessing rights as payment for imported Uranium.

This is the real price of Uranium which the Non-Proliferation community is imposing on us.

See this argument is a segue to a wider one, today M V Ramana is saying that Uranium fueled PHWRs will "generate more electricity" than FBRs. Tomorrow he will insist that per pound of fuel, a LWR/PWR will generate more power than the PHWR.

All this argumentative style is meant to do is seduce people to accept the idea that LEU fired imports from the US are the way that India should take.
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Postby SaiK » 22 Dec 2006 00:06

okay alok_n, whats your take? r u saying no moolahs transacted in this deal at all? r u saying there is zilch given for congressional members or senators (of course i am talking legal donations here)..

in india, its not legalized.. hence, things have to be done under the table. besides, i am not able to say or i think you can challenge that we have such pure babooze and they can never be imbibed into silencing on this deal.

its know fact, that non-greasy-non-oily (friendly) external affair chiefs have been externalized and terminated from the posts, and that does not come with out any magic wand.

imho, it was my imho. regarding the sound you are generating that this deal can't be walked away, at least the way i understand is that we have much more to lose or a caveat like posture from your posts. now, care if you could explain why would such a situation arise or why do you think we can't walk away.. or what is that in this deal (other than the civilian N fuel part), you see has benefits from strategic and defence angle.

do we need those spent fuels, and is must for our ADS, then by not walking away, how can we protest against :-
1. can't reprocess without IAEA [forget defence issues).
2. can't reprocess with IAEA [we have a problem? secrets revealed?]
3. we haven't developed sophisticated mechanism to work with IAEA.. we can reprocess fuel, under the safeguards, but still safe from strategic (civilian nuke energy) angle.

where do one see going with deal, we can do what we want to do?

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Postby ramana » 22 Dec 2006 00:16

From news insight

Link: http://www.newsinsight.net/archivedebat ... recno=1548

New prenup
President Bush's clarifications on the nuke deal don't satisfy.


21 December 2006: While president Bush's clarifications on the Henry Hyde Act are welcome, they don't go far enough. The US president has several constructions on the law passed by Congress to enable civilian nuclear cooperation with India.

Bush says he is not bound by the policy statements of the law even though he signed it Monday. He says he would construe them as "advisory". The policy statements relate to export restrictions on enriching and reprocessing equipment and technologies. Another section of the Hyde Act he objects to is aligning exports to India with those of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, and any changes the NSG makes would automatically apply to American exports. The president calls it "unconstitutional" delegation of legislative powers to an international body.

All very interesting and illuminating to a student of international law. In arrogating powers to himself, the US president takes sanctuary in the American Constitution. The Constitution, he says, vests authority in him to conduct foreign relations. He would give "the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require", but this would be "to the extent consistent with US foreign policy".

Why aren't we satisfied, while government cheerleaders are spinning it as a big victory? Because it isn't.

What we are witnessing here is a constitutional struggle or wrangle between the US president and a bipartisan Congress that wants to control/ limit his foreign policy- and decision-making powers. It is a consequence of the Iraq disaster. Nine-eleven benumbed Congress into not preventing Bush from assuming some imperial powers, which included the warrantless wiretapping of Americans in America by the NSA. It was the neo-Conservative will and design to make him an imperial president and forever bury the ghosts of Watergate. Iraq spoilt the party.

Iraq and the Indo-US nuclear deal is not one and the same thing. Nor is it a congressional no-no like the Dubai ports deal or the Vietnam trade pact, both of which Bush lost. But when the Congress is shown up as negligent, derelict in controlling presidential policy which has given America its biggest politico-military defeat since Vietnam, there is a certain amount of over-reaction. By his statement, the president has also shown anger, hoping the Congress will back down. This is not a signal of victory for us. We are amidst a constitutional face-off in America. And while we appreciate Bush's stand, it makes it all the clearer how legislatively impossible it is to reconcile the Hyde Act with the assurances given to India which Manmohan Singh repeated in Parliament. In this whole thing, Manmohan Singh comes out a complete disaster. He is unable to understand the legislative complexities of law-making and international treaties.

It is simply not good enough that Bush goes out on a limb to save the nuke deal. Let's be cynical about this. He will. This is his only foreign policy achievement in six years of a two-term presidency. The rest of his term will see his history rating plunge as America perforce withdraws from Iraq. We are going with a losing American president. No harm. The nuke deal has bipartisan support. But let us not become insensible and throw out the lifejackets snuggling up with Bush. Great nations don't commit such grave blunders.

Didn't Congress – and it was a Republican-controlled Congress – know the centrality of the nuke deal to US strategic policy in Asia and to its pressing concerns about proliferation? A Republican Congress should have been happy to make a present of a good deal to the president, but it gave him one to be unhappy about, because India is now unhappy. Left to the Manmohan Singh government, it would have accepted anything. Thank God for the opposition from nuclear scientists and the BJP/ Left.

And in making his unhappiness left, Bush has not touched upon the no-test clause in the Henry Hyde Act. It is binding. It is true we are committed to a unilateral moratorium on testing. It was the most foolish NDA decision after it bravely conducted the Pokharan II tests. But even so, the moratorium is voluntary. The Henry Hyde Act commits it to law. That is the opposite of the PM's assurances to Parliament.

{Kgoan hats off for reading the elite}

Yesterday, seeing the hostile mood of Parliament, the foreign minister, Pranab Mukherjee, let slip that the 123 bilateral agreement between Manmohan Singh and Bush would contain nothing on testing. Is this reconcilable with US law? Pranab Mukherjee says this. But not Bush. You may argue he needn't spell everything. True, but he's spelt – or tried to spell out – most things, but nothing about the no-test condition. Why not? Isn't there already a gap between what Pranab says and Bush does not?

Interestingly, where is Manmohan Singh in all this?

Where has he disappeared?

To any half decent lawyer, it should be clear we are coming up against a legislative wall on the nuke deal. The 123 agreement simply cannot contain anything not contained or ignore what is binding in the Hyde Act. The 123 agreement has to conform to the Hyde Act or one of them has to be retailored. If India sticks to its guns, it would force the US president to return to the Congress for amendments, and as many amendments until it satisfies us. Not possible? Think again. So far India goes, we have entered the era of the impossible. Who would have thought ten years ago that we would get away honourably defying the NPT?

Nothing less than India specific amendments to the Hyde Act should satisfy us. We cannot rest with commitments made by the US president. They are in the nature of subjective commitments. Another US president may feel differently, despite the weight of the precedent. Americans are contractual. It is a thriving contractual culture. Prenuptials couldn't have been anything but an American invention. We ought to draw up the tightest, all-weather nuke contract with the US, which is regime and president/ PM neutral. Yes, on this side and that.

When we seek a tight, climate resistant contract, we are not thinking of contestations. Ultimately, all international treaties sustain on good will, give and take, trust, and evidentiary friendships. It is the way of the world to cover all sides. To minimize risks. Let us get worldly.


That word trust again VijayJ!

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Postby svinayak » 22 Dec 2006 00:37

We ought to draw up the tightest, all-weather nuke contract with the US, which is regime and president/ PM neutral. Yes, on this side and that.


This should have been the starting point before negotiation.
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Postby ramana » 22 Dec 2006 01:03

Indians always mirror themselves in their interlocutors.

Just because one is not paranoid doesnot mean there is nobody out there to get you.

Again the dialog and the twists and turns this simple deal(J18?M04) took shows that atleast in the US Congress thare are people out to get India. If the US Admin wants a deal they have to assure India that there is no one in its area of influence out to get India.

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Postby S.Valkan » 22 Dec 2006 01:10

ShauryaT wrote:So not only India will be subject to intense verification similar to non-NWS states but in addition will have fall back safeguards, in perpetuity regardless of what happens with the IAEA.


Incorrect.

Hyde Act simply lays down that INFCIRC540 must be the guiding model on which the Additional Protocol should be negotiated.

India is free to negotiate its own.

It is for the US Executive and US Legislature to determine how to reconcile that among themselves.


I doubt if any constitutional expert will call the UoM headed by the PM as the body with the peoples' mandate. It is the legislature and only the legislature with such a manadate.


Since the Executive branch is part and parcel of the elected Legislature, and there is no successful no-confidence motion against it, the complaint is not valid.

And for this it is necessary that the strategic reduction of India is to be codified, right?


That's an internal matter of the US Govt. as to how it spells out its pipedreams, and how it keeps options open to wiggle out.

Instead of complaining about that, India should codify its own set of laws which allows it wiggle room, and exit-on-demand option.

What has happenned here is J18 has been interpreted by the US body to reflect their primary non-proliferation goals and the desire to not let any more nuclear powers and if that is not possible then to seek a strategy to cap for now and then find further opportunities to roll back the nuclear weapons of these powers.


The evidence flies on the face of this charge.

The US has accepted India as a de-facto nuclear weapon state, all the protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is unable to formally define India as a NWS because it is impossible to change NPT by consensus at this juncture, without inordinate delays, and endless blocking-by-proxy attempts by you-know-who.

As for strategic cap, the evidence once again is against it. By allowing India full freedom to do what it pleases with its own Uranium ore, and "military" plants, India is in effect given free reign to increase its arsenal to match China and its Paki-NoKo proxies.

Now, were India to change tack, and somehow work towards the detriment of US interests and against the Pax Americana at a later date, what leverage would the US have left if the barn door was open all the way ?

Read the Hyde Act in that light. Nothing more.

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Postby Rye » 22 Dec 2006 01:17

Valkan S. wrote:
Instead of complaining about that, India should codify its own set of laws which allows it wiggle room, and exit-on-demand option.


If that is done in the open and the political opposition in India is part of
this process, then it would be easier to bring more supporters for the deal from the Indian side, no?.....but there is a lack of movement in this direction in India (and the reasons for this was based on how the Indian constitution works, according to BRF), and without this step being taken by consensus among the Indian political parties, how can anyone on the Indian side not be concerned that those in Charge of India have not implicitly agreed to various disagreeable conditions?

(BTW, I am in agreement with what you say in general but I am just playing devil's advocate to see if I can learn anything new. Thank you for your responses.)
Last edited by Rye on 22 Dec 2006 01:23, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby S.Valkan » 22 Dec 2006 01:22

ramana wrote:Ultimately, all international treaties sustain on good will, give and take, trust, and evidentiary friendships. It is the way of the world to cover all sides. To minimize risks. Let us get worldly.


The relevant words that needed to be highlighted are the above.

Those whining about the Hyde Act don't seem to understand the mechanics behind that codified escape clause.

India isn't going to feed the underground smugglers, and it would be extremely difficult to find fault with India's civil-military separation plan.

Where does the US find that exit clause to use when things go out of control in the love-fest ?

It has to cover all sides.

Let the whining ones get a little worldly.

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Postby Rye » 22 Dec 2006 01:27

I think there can be no disagreement on the point that the GOTUS has basically passed the Hyde act to cover its butt in case India-US relations are not so peachy in the future.

The sticking point seems to be that the PM and DM and others in the GoI are not offering concrete items that provide the direction on the Indian side if Indo-US relations go south in the future.....where is India's butt-covering-clauses, and why isn't anyone in the GoI coming up with such stuff, and instead sending out the media dogs to bark at the local opposition and scientists?

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Postby S.Valkan » 22 Dec 2006 01:29

Rye wrote:If that is done in the open and the political opposition in India is part of this process, then it would be easier to bring more supporters for the deal from the Indian side, no?.....but there is a lack of movement in this direction in India


First of all, the GoI needs the opposition to be vocally critical of the entire deal until the process is complete, and to India's satisfaction.

That's the GoI's leverage to wiggle out of the process, if it isn't going where India wants it to go.

Secondly, you don't play all your cards at once.

Let the IAEA negotiations complete, and India get a provision in the safeguards agreement that perpetuity of all safeguards are contingent upon fuel supply continuity.

Any break leads to an automatic termination. Step 1.

If the US Congress takes up this issue, and the Ed Markeys try their antiques to push back this arrangement, only THEN should the GoI ask the Opposition to vociferously demand that GoI make it a domestic law.

Then, the game is fair and square.

If the US calls in Hyde Act to wiggle out, India can use its own domestic law to wiggle out as well.

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Postby Rye » 22 Dec 2006 01:36

Valkan, Understood. Sounds like a plan. :)

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Postby ramana » 22 Dec 2006 01:49

As far as I know the US is in the governing board of the IAEA and might have objections to such a clause. In other words the US is suggesting the IAEA as the body to negotiate the safeguards knowing it can veto the agreement if it doesnt fit in with its Hyde Act.

So what is the plan if the IAEA doesnt get India that fuel supply continengcy clause? I guess no harm as the US will be shown for not putting its mouth where it matters.

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Postby ShyamSP » 22 Dec 2006 02:06

Touches on that Indian political parties are divided on this issue.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/indexn12.as ... nter_img=1
Ballistic for votes

Kalyani Shankar

Political parties in the country are divided on the proposed India-US civil nuclear deal because anti-Americanism is still a potential vote-getter

Who could think 30 years ago that the US would one day offer a civil nuclear cooperation deal to India ending its long nuclear apartheid? Even after the 1998 Pokhran blasts, then US President Bill Clinton was furious that India went for nuclear test, provoking Pakistan to do the same. However, within a few years, the relationship between the two countries improved, resulting in the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement.

President George Bush has already signed this week what is called the Henry J Hyde United States Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, 2006 (PAEC). Now the US will prepare the 123 agreement, to be signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The debate in India is whether the sting in the Act will be taken out in the 123 agreement. Although President Bush has addressed some of the major concerns after signing the Bill, there are apprehensions in New Delhi about the shifting of goal posts from the July 18 agreement between Mr Singh and Mr Bush.

The three major concerns are fuel supply, fuel processing and nuclear testing option. The critics fear that the ultimate aim of the US is to cap and freeze India's nuclear programme. As expected, the UPA Government has put up a brave face and hopes that the final agreement would have no objectionable language. The Prime Minister has assured Parliament that he will not sign any deal compromising India's national interests.

What is the Indo-US nuclear deal; and, why is it provoking such sharp reactions? The Bill, which President Bush signed on December 17, was the culmination of the 18-month-old process to get the US Congress nod to provide civil nuclear cooperation to India, ending its nuclear apartheid of more than three decades.

The nuclear deal has come into being after a lot of pressure from the Bush Administration as well as influential NRI community on the US Congress. The Act, in its present form, has created some serious concerns not only to the Opposition in India but also the Union Government, which had been conveyed to the Bush Administration. Mr Bush, too, has shown accommodation and sent proper signals to allay our apprehensions.

However, the debate in Parliament has exposed the sharp polarisation in the political and scientific community. Many senior scientists have expressed concern about the PAEC Act. Why is there so much opposition to the Bill? There could be three broad reasons. While the Left parties are opposing it as a foreign policy issue and have always held an anti-US line, the scientific community is opposing it from an indigenous research angle. The BJP is opposing it on technical grounds as it wants to play an effective Opposition.

Why are the political parties divided? Is the Uttar Pradesh election in March one of the reasons? During the NDA regime, the BJP was wooing the US and as Prime Minister said in Parliament, then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh was even negotiating with the Clinton Administration on CTBT.

The BJP knows that as a talking point for the common man, surrendering the country's sovereignty to the US would jell better than any other issue. The BJP has high stakes in the Assembly polls. Even though the Congress is irrelevant in UP, the BJP wants to make it an issue.

The JD(U), which is part of the NDA, is also quite vocal in its opposition to the nuclear deal. Mr Digvijay Singh is leading the attack for his party both within Parliament as well as outside. The party is also eying the UP elections, although, it does not have much stake.

Then, take the case of the Samajwadi Party, which is supporting the UPA from outside. It is opposing the deal for different reasons. The SP has high stakes in the Assembly polls and Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav wants to retain his Muslim vote base. Anti-US stand will probably help him.

Opposing the Congress as well as the US will be a good strategy for the SP. Moreover, Mr Yadav has good relations with the Left; he depends on the CPI(M) support to prevent imposition of President's rule in UP, which the Congress, the BJP and the BSP have been demanding.

Most political parties, except the ADMK and TDP, from the south are quiet on this issue. Ms J Jayalalithaa wants to send a signal to her constituency that the DMK, a partner in the UPA, is not doing the right thing. Second, she is cozying up to Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav and other parties, which may form a Third front in future.

Ms Jayalalithaa has been quite active even after her defeat and has expressed her opinion on every issue. Nuclear deal is another issue to beat the DMK in the State and the Congress at the Centre. The TDP has left the NDA and is trying to get into the Third Front whenever it is formed. Also, at the State level, it will be a stick to beat the Congress with and also mobilise support of Muslims in TDP's favour.

It is difficult to predict how many people understand what a nuclear reactor, spent fuel and such other words connected with the nuclear programme mean. It is not clear how many political parties have studied the PAEC Act or its clauses in detail.

For the common man, these mean nothing; they have other more pressing issues. There is need to educate the public about the nuclear deal.
Last edited by ShyamSP on 22 Dec 2006 02:22, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby shyamd » 22 Dec 2006 02:10

India still has issues, Bush told
[quote]When US President George W Bush telephoned on Thursday, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told him India still had concerns over the recently enacted US legislation on the India-US civil nuclear deal. This despite many problem areas having been addressed by Bush in a statement clarifying that several aspects of the legislation were “advisoryâ€

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Postby ramana » 22 Dec 2006 02:22

The Pioneer article is very superficial as it looks at the political opposition stance hru the prism of anti-US stance. The pols might understand the onerous clauses appears to escape the writer. The article is also elitist as it says the common man does not care for the nuances.

The fuel supply, fuel processing and the testing are departures from the J18 and are bread and butter issues for th deal. The first two are related to the viability of the investments in the power reactor field. The last one is a sovereign right same as any P-5 that acceded to the CTBT. They all have the supreme interest clause.
Last edited by ramana on 22 Dec 2006 03:32, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Gerard » 22 Dec 2006 03:28

IAEA approval would not be a problem.... Lizard and Bakri have no veto... and India is also a member of the 35 governors board....

http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/Board/

It also approves safeguards agreements


Member States represented on the IAEA Board for 2006-2007 are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.


Rule 35. Voting Rights
Each Governor shall have one vote.
Rule 37. Simple Majority
Other decisions of the Board, including the determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be taken by a majority of the Governors present and voting.
Last edited by Gerard on 22 Dec 2006 03:39, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Alok_N » 22 Dec 2006 03:35

SaiK wrote:okay alok_n, whats your take? r u saying no moolahs transacted in this deal at all?


boss, I was commenting on the fact that the Lefties are being accused of taking money from both pandapoker and uncle to do opposite things ...

I am just wondering how to become a Leftie and get a piece of this action ...

it should be trivial to make like a ProFool and write crap ... :lol:

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Postby NRao » 22 Dec 2006 04:04

I am just wondering how to become a Leftie


One of two options: bat from the other side or hold the racket in your left hand. :)

Valkan,

Good points. Thx.

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Postby Sanjay M » 22 Dec 2006 04:40

The US DemocRATS are still trying to harp on India being a proliferator to Iran:

http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/dec/21nd ... &file=.htm

That's just as preposterous as the DemocRAT claim of being "liberal"
We all know the US Democratic Party is the leading Atlanticist party -- a party of ColdWar hawks that make the Republicans look tame by comparison.

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Postby Rye » 22 Dec 2006 05:00

Another lifafa worm called CP Bhambri writes about the "Indian elite" wanting weapons and nukes. Obviously, this internet wielding warrior is one of the downtrodden masses.

http://www.indianexpress.com/story/19135.html

The fellow does nothing to further the debate but would just like to generally rubbish all the debate as "elite power play" since Bhambri dislikes weapons and likes buttered naan for the masses.

and then he yanks this out of his rectum:

It deserves to be clearly stated that the nuclearisation of the Indian war machine does not enjoy a popular mandate. When Indira Gandhi exploded a nuclear device in 1974, she was politically isolated from the mainstream. The BJP, in 1998, exploded the bomb on the basis of only 20 per cent of the national voters behind it. The Indian war machine has been ‘nuclearised’ without a democratic mandate because political leaders of 1974 or 1998 or 2004 did not enjoy public confidence, if we are to go by the percentage of votes they had polled.


20% of voters behind POKII is just a pack of lies.

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Postby prahaar » 22 Dec 2006 05:11

CP Bhambri is quoting numbers that are completely out of context. He quotes the BJP national vote percentage - and by not clarifying.. what the 20% stands for, is trying to shadily pass off that as the percentage of support for POKII :evil: .

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Postby Neupane » 22 Dec 2006 05:39

COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS:

The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
Author: Esther Pan

Updated: February 24, 2006
Introduction
What are the terms of the deal?
What kind of technology would India receive in return?
What do proponents say about the deal?
What are the objections to the agreement?
Who needs to approve the agreement?
What effect will the U.S.-India deal have on the NPT?
What role does China play in the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal?
What effect will the deal have on U.S. and Indian relations with Pakistan?
What’s the history of India’s nuclear program?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction

On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached a landmark agreement on civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The deal, which marks a notable warming of U.S.-India relations, would lift the U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India, provide U.S. assistance to India's civilian nuclear energy program, and expand U.S.-Indian cooperation in energy and satellite technology. The two sides aim to formalize the deal during a planned visit by Bush to India next week. But critics in the United States say the agreement would fundamentally reverse half a century of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, undermine attempts to prevent states like Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, and potentially contribute to a nuclear arms race in Asia. "It's an unprecedented deal for India," says Charles D. Ferguson, science and technology fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "If you look at the three countries outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—Israel, India, and Pakistan—this stands to be a unique deal."

What are the terms of the deal?

The details of the agreement are still being negotiated, but experts say some clear points are emerging. They include the following:
India agrees to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear watchdog group, access to its civilian nuclear program. But India would decide which of its many nuclear facilities to classify as civilian. Teresita Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says these will now include domestically built plants, which India has not been willing to safeguard before now. Military facilities—and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced up to now—will be exempt from inspections or safeguards.
India commits to signing an Additional Protocol (PDF)—which allows more intrusive IAEA inspections—or its civilian facilities.
India agrees to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
India commits to strengthening the security of its nuclear arsenals.
India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) with the United States banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.India agrees to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don't possess them and to support international nonproliferation efforts.
U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program.What kind of

technology would India receive in return?
India would be eligible to buy U.S. dual-use nuclear technology, including materials and equipment that could be used to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, potentially creating the material for nuclear bombs. It would also receive imported fuel for its nuclear reactors.
What do proponents say about the deal?[/b

]Proponents of the agreement argue it will bring India closer to the United States at a time when the two countries are forging a strategic relationship to pursue their common interests in fighting terrorism, spreading democracy, and preventing the domination of Asia by any single power. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—currently serving as an adviser to the State Department on Indian affairs—says in congressional testimony that the deal recognizes this growing relationship by engaging India, which has proven it is not a nuclear proliferation risk. Other experts say the deal lays out the requirements for India to be recognized as a responsible steward of nuclear power. "This is part of a process of making India a more durable and reliable nuclear partner," Schaffer says.

[b]Other experts say the deal:


Would encourage India to accept international safeguards on facilities it has not allowed to be inspected before. This is a major step, experts say, because the existing nonproliferation regime has failed either to force India to give up its nuclear weapons or make it accept international inspections and restrictions on its nuclear facilities. "President Bush's bilateral deal correctly recognizes that it is far better for the nonproliferation community if India works with it rather than against it," writes Seema Gahlaut of the University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security in a CSIS policy brief. IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei has strongly endorsed the deal, calling it a pragmatic way to bring India into the nonproliferation community.
Recognizes India's history of imposing voluntary safeguards on its nuclear program. Proponents of the deal say India has an excellent record of setting credible safeguards on its nuclear program for the last thirty years. After the safeguards on the U.S.-supplied Tarapur nuclear facility expired in 1993, for example, India voluntarily established a new agreement with the IAEA to continue the restrictions.
Recognizes that India has a good record on proliferation. Although it is not a signatory to the NPT, India has maintained strict controls on its nuclear technology and has not shared it with any other country. Proponents of the deal say this restraint shows that India, unlike its nuclear neighbor Pakistan, is committed to responsible nuclear stewardship and fighting proliferation. In May 2005 India passed a law, the WMD Act, which criminalizes the trade and brokering of sensitive technology.
Rewards India's decision to adopt similar nuclear export standards as those imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India has thus far chosen to abide by the strict export controls on nuclear technology set by the NSG, a group of forty-five nuclear-supplier states that voluntarily coordinates controls of nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. Experts say if India chose to lift these voluntary restrictions, it could easily sell its technology to far less trustworthy countries around the world. The U.S. deal would reward the Indian government for its voluntary controls and give New Delhi incentive to continue them, against the demands of Indian hardliners who question what India gets out of placing such limits on itself.

What are the objections to the agreement?

Critics call the terms of the agreement overly beneficial for India and lacking sufficient safeguards to prevent New Delhi from continuing to produce nuclear weapons. "We are going to be sending, or allowing others to send, fresh fuel to India—including yellowcake and lightly enriched uraniumt—that will free up Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to making many more bombs than they would otherwise have been able to make," says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving awareness of proliferation issues. While India has pledged that any U.S. assistance to its civilian nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear weapons program, experts say India could use the imported nuclear fuel to feed its civilian energy program while diverting its own nuclear fuel to weapons production. New Delhi has done similar things in the past; India claimed it was using nuclear technology for civilian purposes right up until its first nuclear weapons test in 1974. A Congressional Research Service report (PDF) on the agreement states, "There are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India's nuclear weapons program."

Other objections raised by experts include:

The safeguards apply only to facilities and material manufactured by India beginning when the agreement was reached. It doesn't cover the fissile material produced by India over the last several decades of nuclear activity. The CRS report says, "A significant question is how India, in the absence of full-scope safeguards, can provide adequate confidence that U.S. peaceful nuclear technology will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes."
The deal does not require India to cap or limit its fissile material production. This comes at a time when nearly all the major nuclear powers—including the United States, France, Britain, and Russia—are moving to limit their production. It does not require India to restrict the number of nuclear weapons it plans to produce.
There are far more cost-efficient ways to improve India's energy and technology sectors. These could include making India's existing electricity grid more efficient, restructuring the country's coal industry, and expanding the use of renewable energy sources, Sokolski said in congressional testimony. All these steps would involve much less dangerous transfers of technology that would not be dual-use, and therefore not convertible to nuclear weapons production.
The agreement was rushed and takes unnecessary risks without adequate preparation or expert review. The agreement "appears to have been formulated without a comprehensive high-level review of its potential impact on nonproliferation, the significant engagement of many of the government's most senior nonproliferation experts, or a clear plan for achieving its implementation," writes William C. Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, in Nonproliferation Review. "Indeed, it bears all the signs of a top-down administrative directive specifically designed to circumvent the interagency review process and to minimize input from any remnants of the traditional 'nonproliferation lobby.'"
Who needs to approve the agreement?
The final terms of the nuclear deal need approval from several sources before they can be implemented. The bodies required to approve the deal include:
Congress.

Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which regulates the trade of nuclear material, congressional approval is needed to pass the exemptions to U.S. laws required for the nuclear deal to be implemented. Members of Congress are showing resistance, with some calling for India to commit to strict limits on its nuclear weapons program before the deal goes through. "Congress needs to address the many troubling questions raised by this deal before it considers changing longstanding nonproliferation laws," David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said in congressional testimony (PDF) in October 2005.
India's Parliament.

The deal is controversial in India, with many parliamentarians arguing it will limit India's sovereignty and hurt its security. Some Indian nuclear experts are protesting what they see as excessive U.S. participation in deciding which of India's nuclear facilities to define as civilian, and open to international inspections under the plan.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group. The NSG tries to restrict the spread of nuclear technology that could be used in weapons programs through export controls. The United States will try to convince the group to make an exception for India, which may be a difficult case to make when the United States is simultaneously trying to prevent Iran and North Korea from gaining similar access to nuclear fuel and technology.
What effect will the U.S.-India deal have on the NPT?
It could gut the agreement, experts say. Article 1 of the treaty says nations that possess nuclear weapons agree not to help states that do not possess weapons to acquire them. Albright says that without additional measures to ensure a real barrier exists between India's military and civilian nuclear programs, the agreement "could pose serious risks to the security of the United States" by potentially allowing Indian companies to proliferate banned nuclear technology around the world. In addition, it could lead other suppliers—including Russia and China—to bend the international rules so they can sell their own nuclear technology to other countries, some of them hostile to the United States. On the other hand, experts like Gahlaut argue the NPT was already failing in its mission to prevent proliferation. She says many countries—including North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq—have cheated while being signatories of the NPT.
What role does China play in the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal?
It is a motivating factor in the deal, some experts say. China's rise in the region is prompting the United States to seek a strategic relationship with India. "The United States is trying to cement its relationship with the world's largest democracy in order to counterbalance China," Ferguson says. The Bush administration is "hoping that latching onto India as the rising star of Asia could help them handle China," Sokolski says.
But other experts say the growing economic relationship between China and India is so critical to New Delhi that its interests in China cannot be threatened or replaced by any agreement with the United States. Indians "have no interest whatsoever in trying to contain China because they believe this could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, and their whole policy is to seek the best possible relationship with China," Robert Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said at a Council meeting February 23. Other experts worry U.S. nuclear aid to India could foster a dangerous nuclear rivalry between India and China. Though India has a strong interest in building economic relations with China, New Delhi is still wary of China's military rise in the region.

What effect will the deal have on U.S. and Indian relations with Pakistan?
Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, who has suffered fierce criticism at home—and survived two assassination attempts—or his strong alliance with the United States since 9/11, has not received a similar deal on nuclear energy from Washington. Some experts say this apparent U.S. favoritism toward India could increase the nuclear rivalry between the intensely competitive nations, and potentially raise tensions in the already dangerous region. "My impression is that [the Pakistanis] are worried this will feed the Indian nuclear weapons program and therefore weaken deterrence," Blackwill said. Other experts say the two countries, both admittedly now nuclear, could be forced to deal more cautiously with each other. Pakistan is already a proliferation risk: Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's illicit nuclear network, revealed in 2004, shocked the world with its brazen trade of nuclear technology. Some experts worry the U.S.-India deal could prompt Pakistan to go elsewhere for similar terms.
What’s the history of India’s nuclear program?

In the 1950s, the United States helped India develop nuclear energy under the Atoms for Peace program. The United States built a nuclear reactor for India, provided nuclear fuel for a time, and allowed Indian scientists study at U.S. nuclear laboratories. In 1968, India refused to sign the NPT, claiming it was biased. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb, showing it could develop nuclear weapons with technology transferred for peaceful purposes. As a result, the United States isolated India for twenty-five years, refusing nuclear cooperation and trying to convince other countries to do the same. But since 2000, the United States has moved to build a "strategic partnership" with India, increasing cooperation in fields including spaceflight, satellite technology, and missile defense.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/

__________________________________________________

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Postby ShauryaT » 22 Dec 2006 06:50

S.Valkan wrote:Hyde Act simply lays down that INFCIRC540 must be the guiding model on which the Additional Protocol should be negotiated.

India is free to negotiate its own.

It is for the US Executive and US Legislature to determine how to reconcile that among themselves.
India is certainly not free when guidelines are suggested. Also, the use of the word guidelines need to be understood. Non-NWS safeguards are generally full scope. Since full scope will not be applied to India the next best option of a non NWS based type of agreement is envisaged. India is being specifically excluded from the loose and flexible guidelines reserved for NWS.

Since the Executive branch is part and parcel of the elected Legislature, and there is no successful no-confidence motion against it, the complaint is not valid.
Who in the world is complaining, stop patronizing yourself. You are simply incorrect to state that the UoM has the peoples manadate. Reality is party whips make it impossible to test the peoples mandate.

That's an internal matter of the US Govt. as to how it spells out its pipedreams, and how it keeps options open to wiggle out.


The only problem is 123 would be under the auspicies of the hyde act. No need for the repeat of all the provisions of the hyde act into 123, a simple reference to 123 being under US laws will do. I will bet my ass that will be the case and each and every one of the provisions of the Hyde act will apply to 123, ofcourse invoked at the discretion of the haired individual sitting in the white house.

Instead of complaining about that, India should codify its own set of laws which allows it wiggle room, and exit-on-demand option.
First, all the opposition can do is complain as party whips will not allow a free vote. The only way to do this deal would be for India to pass its own laws to clearly articulate its goals, anything less than that would be a criminal act to bind India's future.

The US has accepted India as a de-facto nuclear weapon state, all the protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.


That would have been the case if J18 would have been copied into the Hyde act, nothing less and nothing more. The way the act is written now, accepts India as a state with nuclear weapons but does not provide India any PARITY of an NWS. It specifically states that it does not accept India as an NWS. Not being able to do something about a reality and accepting a reality are two very differrent things. Your claim of a de-facto NWS flies against all the deliberations, testimonies and the written word of the Hyde act.

It is unable to formally define India as a NWS because it is impossible to change NPT by consensus at this juncture, without inordinate delays, and endless blocking-by-proxy attempts by you-know-who.
I will not comment as it is conjecture. India has never tried for such a status. India's position until POK II has been complete nuclear disarmament, which has failed spectacularly. The current imbroglio is a result of that failed policy.

As for strategic cap, the evidence once again is against it. By allowing India full freedom to do what it pleases with its own Uranium ore, and "military" plants, India is in effect given free reign to increase its arsenal to match China and its Paki-NoKo proxies.


The concept of free reign does not go well with qualifications. Go read the act and search for words like full freedom, you will not find them. Search for the words "not significantly increase" and you shall see what it says. Even if India is expected to increase her arsenal, the qualitative development of this arsenal has been blocked, with the no test clause.

Now, were India to change tack, and somehow work towards the detriment of US interests and against the Pax Americana at a later date, what leverage would the US have left if the barn door was open all the way ?

Read the Hyde Act in that light. Nothing more.


Read the hyde act for exactly what it says. Nothing less, Nothing more. The winking and 420 business can be left to the snake oil salesmen and out of agreements between sovereign nations.

What the opposition in India is asking for is the right to make sovereign decisions and not get locked into words like the FP should be congruent to that of the US. The US President has enough powers to act in its interests and needs no such act to build leverage.

No point in going on and on, I do not think we will agree. The larger question will need to be answered.

Is this deal worth it?


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