India-US Nuclear Deal continued

Gerard
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Postby Gerard » 26 Dec 2006 04:37

India will NOT have credible deterence vis-a-vis China unless India posseses Megaton nukes


Because China does? The Chinese need for megaton nukes just shows the poor accuracy of their missiles. The UK uses a 100 kT (variant of the W76) warhead and their arsenal is very credible.

The radius of blast damage varies with the cube root of the warhead yield.

A 1MT weapon gives a 70% increase in blast and fire effects over a 200 kT weapon even though it is 500% larger in yield. You get a blast radius increase from 4.3 miles to 7.3 miles and you have to deliver the much larger and heavier 1 MT device.

While a 1 MT bomb would destroy buildings 5-7 miles away, a 27 MT bomb would destroy buildings 15-21 miles away. 27 times the yield to get 3 times the blast radius.

Compare 27 MT to 200kT.

135 times the yield but only 5-6 times the blast radius. And you need a monster ICBM to deliver that weapon. Largest weapon that SU fielded was 20MT for the SS-18 mod 1. This was designed to hit hardened command bunkers but its poor accuracy demanded a huge warhead. The Russian Topol-M uses a single 550 kT warhead for the same purpose.

A number of smaller bombs are far more efficient at causing destruction (yield to throw-weight) than a single large weapon.

That is why the US, Russia, UK etc all use kiloton yield warheads. The US W87 (used on MX and Minuteman 3 missiles) has a 300 kT yield.

Now, this only works if you have accurate missiles.. if your CEP is crap, then you cannot deliver the warheads in a dispersal pattern to ensure destruction. That is why the megaton weapons were used in the past. They paid the price in delivery of a large, heavy weapon in order to ensure they could destroy the target.

Making small weapons is much harder.. the Chinese had to steal the W88 warhead (300-475kT used on the Trident missile) design from the US. This uses a non-spherical (oblate) primary and a spherical secondary in a peanut shaped hohlraum.

French President Mitterand said that France did not have the capability to make small bombs like the US. Only after CTBT did they get design data.
We know from the traitor Vanunu's photos that the Israeli thermonuke is not a staged weapon like the Indian Shakti-1 design. It appears to be a much simpler sloika. You only get 50-60kT but that is enough to deter the arabs.

So 6 300kT warheads dropping on Chongqing or Shanghai will deter the lizard. If they have an ABM with 50% kill rate, then add three more -- 9 warheads to level the place.
Put those 9 warheads together with a decoy and chaff dispenser on a single heavy ICBM, or have three warheads each on three SLBMs dedicated for a Chinese city and they will think twice about territorial aggression.

We know from WOP book that Indian primaries in 1998 were spherical... so work needs to be done if MIRV capability is to be achieved.

Regarding the number of warheads that are enough to count us in the club, the genie is out of the bottle and the situation even 10-20 years from now is a total unknown.


If the security situation 10-20 years down the road demands that India must have 5000 bombs then India will build 5000 bombs. No treaty or US law will prevent this.
Look at Japan.. under PM Abe they are doing studies on cost and time frame for prototype nuke development. When they need to, they will say to hell with NPT and withdraw.

And you need superpower sized economy and military-industrial complex to have an arsenal of thousands of weapons and their delivery systems. One cannot eat grass and get this. China could not afford a large arsenal. They (and the French or the British) never sought to match the superpower arsenals.

And when you have such economy and MI complex, no treaty or domestic law of other states will stop you. A superpower has such freedom of action. Think about the world reaction if Abe announces a Japanese nuke tomorrow morning. Think there will be sanctions on Japan? Japan can withdraw from the CTBT and the NPT and the world has no choice but to accommodate them.
Last edited by Gerard on 26 Dec 2006 07:00, edited 3 times in total.

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Postby Arun_S » 26 Dec 2006 06:48

India Research Foundation will soon put this on their website:
http://www.indiaresearch.org/


Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program:
Will it make available more indigenous Uranium reserve for Indian Weapons Program?


Introduction
On July-18,2005 President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in a major breakthrough announced an agreement on ‘Global Strategic Partnership’ involving many sub-agreements, including civil nuclear energy cooperation, whose details were further agreed on March 2, 2006. The civil nuclear power cooperation envisages United States to remove sanctions legislated by US Congress in 1978 on nuclear fuel and power-plant technology, and work with US lead NSG to accommodate nuclear fuel supply for Indian civilian nuclear plants. India in turn will separate its strategic facilities from civilian facilities and put all current & future civilian nuclear power plants and facilities under site specific IAEA safeguards.
Some opponents of this agreement have argued that India has small Uranium reserve thus letting India purchase nuclear fuel supply for civilian power plants from NSG will somehow help Indian nuclear weapons program by making available greater fraction of indigenous Uranium reserve for military nuclear weapons program.

Assessment
Let us look at facts to understand merit of this argument.
1. Indian strategic nuclear weapons use approximately 3 Kg Plutonium.
2. India has large un-safeguarded Plutonium stockpile (conservatively estimated to between 3,000 Kg and 6,000Kg), a fraction of that will suffice to make hundreds of nuclear weapons if India choose to exercise the option.
3. Indian PHWR reactors that are outside IAEA safeguard when operated for efficient power generation would have cumulatively required just 5,842 tonnes. India is estimated to have mined about 9,200 tonnes of natural-uranium, indicating that about 55% of the fuel and 8% of its reactor capacity was used in low fuel burn mode, generally associated with operating the reactors in mode optimized to generate weapon grade Plutonium. This corresponds to about 2,400Kg weapon grade Plutonium enough for 800 strategic nuclear weapon.
4. Current Indian reserves of uranium estimated between 77,500 – 94,000 metric tonnes, enough to support 12,000 MWe power generation for 50 years .
5. Current Indian PHWR reactors that are outside IAEA safeguard annually require 116 tonnes of natural-uranium when operated in a mode optimized for power generation. When operated in a mode optimized to generate weapon-grade Plutonium they require just 747 tonnes of natural-uranium annually, in the process they generate 745 Kg weapon grade Plutonium, which is enough for 248 nuclear weapons per year.
From above one can clearly see that there is no merit in the argument that US-India civilian nuclear agreement will be of any consequence to Indian nuclear weapons programs.

Conclusion
In conclusion the Indo-US agreement on civil nuclear reactors does not help Indian military program:
1. India already has fissile material enough to make more than 800 warheads.
2. Its Fast Breeder Reactors can generate limitless fissile material for weapons or civilian applications.

Date: 02-May-2006 Author: Arun S


The table and references can only be seen in he word/PDF document. I will reference it later.

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Postby Vivek_A » 26 Dec 2006 07:04

asprinzl wrote:India will NOT have credible deterence vis-a-vis China unless India posseses Megaton nukes.


Sorry to flog a dead horse but there will never be real deterrence as long as India has a NFU policy.

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Postby Gerard » 26 Dec 2006 07:20

Why does China have a NFU ?

Because it made their rather small arsenal seem less threatening to the US and SU, either of whom had the ability to take out the entire Chinese arsenal using multiple ICBMs targeted on each Chinese missile silo.

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Postby Gerard » 26 Dec 2006 07:24

about 55% of the fuel and 8% of its reactor capacity was used in low fuel burn mode, generally associated with operating the reactors in mode optimized to generate weapon grade Plutonium. This corresponds to about 2,400Kg weapon grade Plutonium enough for 800 strategic nuclear weapon.


:eek:

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Postby rocky » 26 Dec 2006 07:56

Arun_S wrote:2. Its Fast Breeder Reactors can generate limitless fissile material for weapons or civilian applications.
That line will affect your credibility. To generate fissile material in an FBR, you are going to also consume lots of fissile material.

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Postby Gerard » 26 Dec 2006 08:14

Lots of reactor grade fissile material... and you can extract weapons grade stuff...

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Postby Alok_N » 26 Dec 2006 08:33

rocky wrote:
Arun_S wrote:2. Its Fast Breeder Reactors can generate limitless fissile material for weapons or civilian applications.
That line will affect your credibility. To generate fissile material in an FBR, you are going to also consume lots of fissile material.


take note of the large stockpile ready to be converted into MOX ... Arun_S is a careful researcher ...

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Postby NRao » 26 Dec 2006 08:34

Gerard wrote:Why does China have a NFU ?

Because it made their rather small arsenal seem less threatening to the US and SU, either of whom had the ability to take out the entire Chinese arsenal using multiple ICBMs targeted on each Chinese missile silo.


Chicom's NFU does not extend to India. Right? (that was my understanding.)

Soem claim that India's Agni program is because of that.

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 26 Dec 2006 09:29

Do not disagree, but assuming a successful Chinese BMD in place in the future, the numbers change again? Right?


Ah! Hate to bring reality into a fine discussion such as this, but some ppl may benefit from browsing this link and seeing where it is published, and what it's intent is.

Input Estimation Algorithms for Reentry Vehicle
Trajectory Estimation
Cheng-Yu Liu, Huai-Min Wang and Pan-Chio Tuan


Cheers!!!!! 8) 8) 8) :eek: :eek:

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Postby Alok_N » 26 Dec 2006 10:02

enqyoob wrote:browsing this link and seeing where it is published, and what it's intent is.


Vijay J, you will enjoy this ...

Fast and accurate estimation of trajectory is important in tracking and intercepting reentry vehicles. Validating model is a real challenge associated with the overall trajectory estimation problem. Input estimation technique provides a solution to this challenge. Two input estimation algorithms were introduced based on different assumptions about the input applied to the model. This investigation presents approaches consisting of an extended Kalman filter and two input estimation algorithms to identify the reentry vehicle trajectory in its terminal phase using data from a single radar source. Numerical simulations with data generated from two models demonstrate superior capabilities as measured by accuracy compared to the extended Kalman filter. Evaluation using real flight data provides the consistent results. The comparison between two input estimation algorithms is also presented. The trajectory estimation approaches based on two algorithms are effective in solving the reentry vehicle tracking problem.


it is so much HEP onlee ... except that the problem is over-constrained and numerical models are more predictive than statistical ones ...

Ghauri ding-dong is toast :)

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Postby Alok_N » 26 Dec 2006 10:05

that is a nice site to browse ... but what's this?

Finite Element Simulation of Sheet Metal Forming Processes

Mohd Ahmed and G.S. Sekhon
Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi–110 016
and
Devender Singh
All India Radio, Prasar Bharati, Mumbai

ABSTRACT

In the present study, the survey of research work on finite element analysis of metal forming processes has been carried out. A classification of formulations dealing with geometry and material nonlinearity in the context of finite element simulation of forming operations has been recapitulated. The procedures based upon shell and continuum approaches and methods of dealing with frictional contact, are described. Topics of current interest on finite element analysis such as error estimation, projection of error, and adaptive mesh refinement have been reviewed.


a dude from All India Radio is involved ... :)

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 26 Dec 2006 10:38

a dude from All India Radio is involved


The awaaz from the sheet metal forming process is probably being considered as background music. Would be an improvement on what used to force me out of bed at 6AM.

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Postby Gerard » 26 Dec 2006 18:17

Chicom's NFU does not extend to India. Right? (that was my understanding.)


Chinese NFU applies to what it considers 'legal' nuclear powers - the NWS under the NPT. India is not a NWS.
It also does not apply on Chinese soil and China claims parts of India as its own territory. So an attack on an Indian airbase or armored formation in certain 'disputed' areas would not violate the NFU.

Sections of the PLA openly question the NFU and whether it would be honored in a crisis. The PLA second artillery does train however to absorb a first strike and then retaliate a few days later. As Chinese ability to field a survivable, numerically larger and more capable nuclear force evolves, the NFU will probably be discarded.

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Postby Gerard » 26 Dec 2006 18:21

enqyoob wrote:Ah! Hate to bring reality into a fine discussion such as this, but some ppl may benefit from browsing this link and seeing where it is published, and what it's intent is.


:eek:

If they can make this collaboration public, imagine what is still under wraps...

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Atoms for War...?

Postby Manav » 26 Dec 2006 18:43

I guess you folks are familiar with Ashley Tellis' "Atoms for War: US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal" (2006). He makes a similar point, though from a different angle.

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Postby ShauryaT » 26 Dec 2006 20:10

about 55% of the fuel and 8% of its reactor capacity was used in low fuel burn mode, generally associated with operating the reactors in mode optimized to generate weapon grade Plutonium. This corresponds to about 2,400Kg weapon grade Plutonium enough for 800 strategic nuclear weapon.


Arun_S is being quite conservative. Most others have this reactor grade plutonium at much higher numbers. There will be an additional 4200 KG of such reactor grade unsafeguarded plutonium expected to be produced between now and 2014. Further adding to the stockpile.

Two questions.

1. What is the impact of FMCT on this conversion process from reactor grade to weapons grade?

2. Is not some of this reactor grade plutonium reserved for the TFBR?

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Postby Gerard » 26 Dec 2006 20:22

Arun_S is writing about weapons grade Pu, not reactor grade Pu.
Previous estimates have been much lower (enough for 100 bombs, not 800).

The only way to 'convert' reactor grade material to weapons grade is to use it in a breeder reactor. Neutrons from the Plutonium will convert the Thorium and Uranium in the breeder blankets to the desired stuff - weapons grade Pu and U233.

Laser enrichment (Plutonium AVLIS or MLIS) holds the prospect of direct production of weapons grade material from a stockpile of reactor grade Pu.

FMCT would ban production of additional weapons grade material. This includes breeding such using a stockpile of lower grade material.

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Postby Nagarajans » 26 Dec 2006 20:25

Gerard wrote:
enqyoob wrote:Ah! Hate to bring reality into a fine discussion such as this, but some ppl may benefit from browsing this link and seeing where it is published, and what it's intent is.


:eek:

If they can make this collaboration public, imagine what is still under wraps...


Begging your collective mercies:My valiant attempt at emulating a post that is even remotely technical.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalman_filter
From what I can glean from this article - the drdo site abstract seems like another case of pilfering.

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Postby ShauryaT » 26 Dec 2006 20:27

Gerard wrote:Arun_S is writing about weapons grade Pu, not reactor grade Pu.
Previous estimates have been much lower (enough for 100 bombs, not 800).

The only way to 'convert' reactor grade material to weapons grade is to use it in a breeder reactor. Neutrons from the Plutonium will convert the Thorium and Uranium in the breeder blankets to the desired stuff - weapons grade Pu and U233.

Laser enrichment (Plutonium AVLIS or MLIS) holds the prospect of direct production of weapons grade material from a stockpile of reactor grade Pu.

FMCT would ban production of additional weapons grade material. This includes breeding such using a stockpile of lower grade material.


The Arun_S is the only person I know of who has these estimates of 2400 Kg of weapons grade Pu. I hope he is right.

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Postby Alok_N » 26 Dec 2006 20:31

ShauryaT wrote:Two questions.

1. What is the impact of FMCT on this conversion process from reactor grade to weapons grade?

2. Is not some of this reactor grade plutonium reserved for the TFBR?


Boss, I have on equestion onlee ... why not spend the time to read Arun_S report and try to understand the issues? ... Shiv has started another thread to help with the process ...

btw, even "reactor grade" Pu is fissile ... as long as the Pu-240 fraction is below a certain threshold, above which it becomes a fizzle material ...

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Postby ShauryaT » 26 Dec 2006 20:32

Gerard wrote:The only way to 'convert' reactor grade material to weapons grade is to use it in a breeder reactor. Neutrons from the Plutonium will convert the Thorium and Uranium in the breeder blankets to the desired stuff - weapons grade Pu and U233.


I found this in the Ashley Tellis report.

[quote]One ‘modern design’ feature that allows reactor grade plutonium to be used for weapons is
‘boosting’, in which a gas mixture of deuterium and tritium is introduced into the hollow core of
an implosion weapon as it begins to detonate.94 The fusion reaction that is triggered releases a
large quantity of neutrons, which are able in turn to initiate fission more quickly in a larger mass
of the fissile material than the normal chain reaction. This serves to reduce both the mass of
fissile material required for the weapon and greatly increase a fizzle yield. Indian weapon
designers claim to have tested a thermonuclear weapon with a boosted fission primary in 1998.95
One history of India’s nuclear weapons program notes explicitly the use of boosting in a reactor
grade plutonium device test in 1998 and observes that “if validated it would increase India’s
stock of fissile material dramatically.â€

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Postby ShauryaT » 26 Dec 2006 20:36

Alok_N wrote:Boss, I have on equestion onlee ... why not spend the time to read Arun_S report and try to understand the issues? ... Shiv has started another thread to help with the process ...


Did not find it last night, have found it now. Will go through it. Thanks for your kind advice.
btw, even "reactor grade" Pu is fissile ... as long as the Pu-240 fraction is below a certain threshold, above which it becomes a fizzle material ...


Thanks.

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Postby Alok_N » 26 Dec 2006 20:38

Nagarajans wrote:Begging your collective mercies:My valiant attempt at emulating a post that is even remotely technical.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalman_filter
From what I can glean from this article - the drdo site abstract seems like another case of pilfering.


good thing you sought mercy at the outset ... :) ... that abstract is using the extended kalman filter as a benchmark and showing that numerical predictors provide superior results ...

if I claim I have a Bhoot power module that is better than Jinn power, I am not pilfering from Jinn R&D ...

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Postby Gerard » 26 Dec 2006 20:57

I found this in the Ashley Tellis report.


While the NWS have experimented with reactor grade material, either in composite pits or using the plain stuff, they don't use it directly, except in downblending where they take 'super-grade' Pu and combine it with high level reactor grade Pu to make normal weapons grade Pu.

A lot of the research in laser enrichment was actually in the hope of using the technique to enrich Pu to weapons grade.

There is a report from the US DOE where they state that reactor grade Pu can be used to make reliable warheads of predictable yield if one's design is good enough. But the NWS have enough of the real thing not to bother with designing weapons that use reactor grade stuff.

BARC's stockpile of reactor grade Pu is probably earmarked as fuel for the breeder reactors, not for bomb making.
And they won't use any weapons grade material as fuel - it is far too valuable for strategic purposes.

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Postby Alok_N » 26 Dec 2006 21:01

Gerard wrote:BARC's stockpile of reactor grade Pu is probably earmarked as fuel for the breeder reactors, not for bomb making.


Gerard, I am not agreeing with the Tellis scenario, but there are the niggling questions about the design of the chotawallahs tested in 1998 ...

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Postby S.Valkan » 26 Dec 2006 21:08

ShauryaT wrote:Your first post says IAEA agreement guidelines are negotiable – when the Hyde act already demands non-NWS type of guidelines and when this is pointed out, you hide behind the word that these are only guidelines. The Hyde bill has additional safeguards in addition to the IAEA’s and ofcourse you conveniently do not respond to that because you cannot.


Let me try to rephrase the arguments for your benefit.

1) Hyde Act's "demand" is merely an advisory ("guideline" ) for the US Govt., and it is not binding on India.

2) IAEA is not the US. It is a multilateral organization, where the safeguards agreement will be negotiated and approved by the Board of Governors by an act of simple majority.

3) India has full freedom to negotiate the IAEA agreement as it deems fit. The US Executive and the US Congress will have to figure out how to reconcile the India-IAEA agreement with the Hyde Act. Not India's headache.

4) The "additional" inspection mechanisms "demanded" by the Hyde Act only applies to material or components supplied by the US.

If you don't like it, don't buy from the US. Period.

There are other vendors,- France, Russia. Negotiate something less intrusive with them.

Your definition of de-facto status is wrong. It could have been de-facto if it was just J18 as it allowed both sides to interpret things differently but M2 and now the Hyde act blow the hole. Anyone claiming de-facto NWS status with the Hyde act in place should get his head checked.


Just for your benefit:

1) India keeps its nuclear weapons.

2) Indian "military" plants will not be subject to any safeguards.

2) There is no limit to what fissile material India can produce from its "military" plants.

If that is not de facto NWS, you must have an utter confusion about what "de facto" means.


You are wrong again. All future FBR would be civilian, no choice in the matter.


I would love to see this on paper, sir.

To the best of my knowledge - and I suspect of everyone else but you - India has been given full choice to designate any future reactor as civilian or military.

Please do not pass off premonitions and irrational fears as incontrovertible facts.

[quote]Who is hung up on H&D? The “backgrounderâ€

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Postby Alok_N » 26 Dec 2006 21:37

this probably belongs in the ABM technology thread but I can't find it ... just to elaborate ...

Alok_N wrote:that abstract is using the extended kalman filter as a benchmark and showing that numerical predictors provide superior results ...


this is speculation, so please take it fwiw ...

my conjecture in that other thread was that since the dynamics of various ding-dongs have been observed and simulated by non-ding-dong countries, the problem of ding-dong-tracking is over-constrained ...

things like kalman filter are good for predicting dynamics using noise-corrupted data ... secondly, a ding-dong trajectory is not markovian (i.e., there is no history and state n+1 depends on state n onlee) ...

however, if you know the properties of a ding-dong, you can pre-calculate the space of all possible ding-dong trajectories ... once a launch is detected, the problem reduces to narrowing down the space of possible trajectories based on intital observations, i.e., rejecting trajectories that are incompatible with data ...

IMO, this is what that abstract is claiming (I haven't read the paper yet) ... a numerical model based error analysis will not only be superior but faster than a recursive filter like EKF ...

my Q is this: will the packees continue to boastfully notify India of missile tests now that they know that India is very glad for the opportunity onlee ... more "tests", more ding-dong-data ... :lol:

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Postby Alok_N » 26 Dec 2006 23:15

cross-posting from power thread ...

Two more NPCIL reactors at Kudankulam.

The Rs 13,000 crore project is a 50 per cent joint venture with Russia’s Atomstroyexport Russian Representation. Atomstroy has supplied the design and equipment for the project. It will also supply the enriched uranium fuel for the plant.


with 50% stake, they will want to ensure continued fuel supply ... :)

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Postby svinayak » 27 Dec 2006 02:03

"Nuclear deal is a break with past"
http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/27/stories ... 601200.htm

Diplomatic Correspondent

Agreement unlocks larger global cooperation otherwise denied to India, says official

# Accord shows ability to revisit fundamentals
# In the larger global setting, U.S. seeks to reach out to India

Advertisement
NEW DELHI : A senior External Affairs Ministry official, who was a key player in negotiating the July 18, 2005 civilian nuclear understanding with the United States, says the accord "broke decisively with the past," showed the ability of both countries to "revisit fundamentals," and discarded orthodoxies that prevented their coming to terms with "reality."

Writing in Indian Foreign Policy, a collection of articles brought out by the Academic Foundation and the Foreign Service Institute, S. Jaishankar, Joint Secretary (Americas), argued that an Indian elite, little used to dealing constructively with the U.S., found it difficult to "comprehend an iconoclastic [Bush] administration bent on reshaping the world."

The deal unlocked larger global cooperation that was otherwise denied to India. "In that sense, the U.S. is negotiating not just on its own behalf but for the entire international community. To then evaluate this understanding purely in Indo-U.S. terms would be an injustice."

Cost-irrelevant exercise

Dr. Jaishankar said: "The costs of separation of civilian and military facilities have also been raised in the course of the debate [on the nuclear deal]. To a considerable degree, the separation should be regarded as a cost-irrelevant exercise."

The deal was based on the "assumption" that the future of Indo-U.S. ties was not a simple extrapolation of the past. "India and the U.S. arrived at an agreement after a difficult and painstaking process in which both sides expended considerable political capital." Neither party had an incentive to depart from a cooperative relationship, which was established with great effort. "Indeed, the larger the scope and extent of our cooperation, the more powerful will be the case against it."

Hinting at implications for India in case it goes in for another nuclear test, Dr. Jaishankar said: "While no relationship can be completely free of risk, a judgment could be made that a future U.S. administration will take into account the totality of our strategic partnership when making a decision that has consequences for a sensitive facet of our ties."

Referring to the new framework of the defence relationship agreed upon in June 2005, he said this was subject to scrutiny and was not without controversy on the Indian side.

"Many of the judgments passed reflected the assumptions of a past era and did not take into account the changing nature of contemporary threats... the new directions in defence ties can be judged to be promising but sensitive, in the last analysis, to the overall climate of relations."

Unable to keep pace

Dr. Jaishankar said many observers found themselves "unable to keep pace" with the developments in Indo-U.S. relations because they posited this equation in a static global situation. It was necessary to appreciate the "full consequences" of the end of the Cold War."For the United States, Europe is increasingly a competitor as well as model for alternate lifestyles and values. China's growing influence is a complicated and dynamic element in the calculus, made more uncertain by its unique political ethos. It is a society, in [U.S.] Secretary [of State Condoleezza] Rice's words, that needs to be helped to make the right choices.

"The structural limitations of the U.S.-Russia relationship are also quite evident by now... Japan remains inhibited about global responsibilities. ASEAN too is largely preoccupied with its internal dynamics. The U.S. relationship with the nations of West Asia is likely to be difficult in the foreseeable future. It is in this larger global setting that the United States has sought to reach out to India."

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Postby S.Valkan » 27 Dec 2006 02:25

Alok_N wrote:with 50% stake, they will want to ensure continued fuel supply ... :)


No doubt.

Were it GE with such stakes, by now the Ed Markey and Barbara Boxer camps would be singing hashanas about India's legitimate security needs rather than pushing their electorate to bear the tax burden of subsidizing GE's lost revenue in the aftermath of an enhanced radiation weapon test at Pokharan. :lol:

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Postby Arun_S » 27 Dec 2006 03:06

ShauryaT wrote:
about 55% of the fuel and 8% of its reactor capacity was used in low fuel burn mode, generally associated with operating the reactors in mode optimized to generate weapon grade Plutonium. This corresponds to about 2,400Kg weapon grade Plutonium enough for 800 strategic nuclear weapon.


Arun_S is being quite conservative. Most others have this reactor grade plutonium at much higher numbers. There will be an additional 4200 KG of such reactor grade unsafeguarded plutonium expected to be produced between now and 2014. Further adding to the stockpile.

Two questions.

1. What is the impact of FMCT on this conversion process from reactor grade to weapons grade?

2. Is not some of this reactor grade plutonium reserved for the TFBR?


These were extra conservative estimates that assumed single pass fuel use; i.e. the fuel rod is only 15% irradiated to make Wpn Grade Pu and after reprocessing the uranium is not re-used in the reactor to consume the rest of the 85% fissile U235 still present in the Uranium (the fuel is still free of actinides and easy to handle for fuel rod fabrication). If one considers BARC using the fuel in this way then many times more weapon grade Pu stockpile is possible limited only by capacity utilization of reactor's fuel loader/unloader.

But the bottom line is India has access to much more fissile material then it wants to weaponize now. Consummating the WpnGrade Pu to make nuke weapons has financial and other cost, thus India will make only those that it needs apart from short term stockpile to keep the powder dry. All the crap that NPA told the US Congress about foreign uranium fueling Indian weapon stockpile was really hog waste.

OTOH Wpn Grade stockpile of 800 nuke does square with the likely qty that India needs in current security perspective. However if it security perspective changes the requirements may increase. Thus there is no possibility to FMTC till global nuclear disarmament is complete. In reality that means never. India will not waste precious money to build a ridiculously huge inventory that has become a mill-stone in the neck for the P5. Of course with their ball* are crushing under weight of unwanted (& high risk) fissile stockpile, noble intentions like "voluntary monitorium on further weapon grade fissile material production" is so very desirable. For India to not make that big a mountain of stockpile is "Good Problem" to have. Just say "No to Drugs" the first and last time and you will never have withdrawal symptoms. You know what I mean? ;)


Manav wrote:I guess you folks are familiar with Ashley Tellis' "Atoms for War: US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal" (2006). He makes a similar point, though from a different angle.
Yes, but because the information contained in my article was so enlighteningly clear, yet NPA could have twisted it again to sell more snake oil, that its publication was voluntarily withheld. When Ashly Tellis came with his own analysis using similar equations and assumptions but based on reactor life cycle rather than yearly baseline, the conclusion was the same. And now that the morphed deal is through Kangress I decided to make public my analysis and report. The report will be on IRF website in a day or so.

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Postby rocky » 27 Dec 2006 03:14

Arun_S wrote:The report will be on IRF website in a day or so.
I think it's already there: http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf

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Postby Arun_S » 27 Dec 2006 03:14

Alok_N wrote:this probably belongs in the ABM technology thread but I can't find it ... just to elaborate ...

Alok_N wrote:that abstract is using the extended kalman filter as a benchmark and showing that numerical predictors provide superior results ...


this is speculation, so please take it fwiw ...

my conjecture in that other thread was that since the dynamics of various ding-dongs have been observed and simulated by non-ding-dong countries, the problem of ding-dong-tracking is over-constrained ...

things like kalman filter are good for predicting dynamics using noise-corrupted data ... secondly, a ding-dong trajectory is not markovian (i.e., there is no history and state n+1 depends on state n onlee) ...

however, if you know the properties of a ding-dong, you can pre-calculate the space of all possible ding-dong trajectories ... once a launch is detected, the problem reduces to narrowing down the space of possible trajectories based on intital observations, i.e., rejecting trajectories that are incompatible with data ...

IMO, this is what that abstract is claiming (I haven't read the paper yet) ... a numerical model based error analysis will not only be superior but faster than a recursive filter like EKF ...

my Q is this: will the packees continue to boastfully notify India of missile tests now that they know that India is very glad for the opportunity onlee ... more "tests", more ding-dong-data ... :lol:

Holy Halaku! India can also start to test its "Kali" Mantar Jadoo Kalandar on free Ding Dong test flights. Building on top of "Kalman".
Last edited by Arun_S on 27 Dec 2006 03:45, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Arun_S » 27 Dec 2006 03:21

rocky wrote:
Arun_S wrote:The report will be on IRF website in a day or so.
I think it's already there: http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf


Wow that was fast. Yes this is the report. Pls look at the Appendix- spreadsheet data, there are some more gems there for the discerning eyes.
[url=http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf]India Research Foundation
Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program:
Will it make available more indigenous Uranium reserve for Indian Weapons Program?
[/url]

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Postby milindc » 27 Dec 2006 03:32

ShauryaT wrote:
Gerard wrote:Arun_S is writing about weapons grade Pu, not reactor grade Pu.
Previous estimates have been much lower (enough for 100 bombs, not 800).

The only way to 'convert' reactor grade material to weapons grade is to use it in a breeder reactor. Neutrons from the Plutonium will convert the Thorium and Uranium in the breeder blankets to the desired stuff - weapons grade Pu and U233.

Laser enrichment (Plutonium AVLIS or MLIS) holds the prospect of direct production of weapons grade material from a stockpile of reactor grade Pu.

FMCT would ban production of additional weapons grade material. This includes breeding such using a stockpile of lower grade material.


The Arun_S is the only person I know of who has these estimates of 2400 Kg of weapons grade Pu. I hope he is right.


Couple of days back, Alok_N nudged me to review earlier discussions. Please go through the archives. I think you will understand and also that Arun_S is conservative.

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Postby milindc » 27 Dec 2006 03:47

Arun_S wrote:
Wow that was fast. Yes this is the report. Pls look at the Appendix- spreadsheet data, there are some more gems there for the discerning eyes.
[url=http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf]India Research Foundation
Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program:
Will it make available more indigenous Uranium reserve for Indian Weapons Program?
[/url]


Arun_S, From the chart date, I assume you had the chart ready on 3/30/2006 :)

Any input on the nuclear deal's impact on existing spent fuel stocks. Do they come under purview of IAEA.. I wasn't able to figure that out from the Hyde act. Thanks

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Postby Arun_S » 27 Dec 2006 04:16

milindc wrote:Arun_S, From the chart date, I assume you had the chart ready on 3/30/2006 :)
Yes the analysis and report was ready in March-April time frame. It was hard to hold back the urge to make it public and share the good news. But got to do what is right .. .. .

Any input on the nuclear deals impact on existing spent fuel stocks. Do they come under purview of IAEA.. I wasn't able to figure that out from the Hyde act. Thanks
Nuclear deal is about future fuel import. There arise no question of negotiating anything that is not in dispute. Indian mined fuel and spent fuel arising from it is & was always sovereign Indian ownership and prerogative. No more self-goals.

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Postby Arun_S » 27 Dec 2006 04:43

Oh BTW its been 9 months since 3/30/06 (the baseline for the spread sheet), and if the bhatti is burning full throttle for Super High Grade Pu add 75% of maximum annual production rate of 745Kg/Yr; I.e. 558 Kg Shuddha Desi Ghee worth 186 Siva-Kashi bam bam Bholay ;)

Current score card: 2,959 Kg Wpn Grd Pu with potency of 986 Cypress seeds. & for initial seed stock for FBR+AHWR & trickle-feed of AHWR the spent fuel non-IAEA inventory has at least 12,500Kg reactor grade Pu.

Om Shanti Shantihe.

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Postby ShauryaT » 27 Dec 2006 05:46

Arun: It seems you are taking the differential in mined vs used fuel for power consumtion and distributing the same across all operational non safeguarded HWR/PHWR and the TFBR.

While others presume that weapons grade Pu is from from Cirus and Dhruva only.

If this is correct, any further references and/or assumptions to your study. TIA.
Last edited by ShauryaT on 27 Dec 2006 06:01, edited 1 time in total.


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