India-US Nuclear Deal continued
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No. The NWS will not budge a dime. i.e: They will not offer to move their military reactors to in scope, even on a voluntary basis. India would do so because it has agree to. Let me explain.Alok_N wrote:let's be realistic ... how the heck can anyone enforce an FMCT if the military reactors stay out of the inspections regime? ... if you are going to persist with this bogey, at least give it some teeth ... so, you envision that one day uncle and bear and panda will suddenly open all reactors for inspection? ... if not, then why would India do so?ShauryaT wrote:Once FMCT is in place - the question of a non civilian reactor does not arise.
Uncle and Bear have enough material with them to blow earth about 50 times over, so they do not need more material. Panda is not in the same league but has enough - as far as the treaty does not prohibit the production of additional weapons from existing stock pile, Panda will go along. There are many ways to get Panda to sign on the dotted line, carrots and if it is non-verification based, Panda may go for it.
All the treaty requires is the cessation of production of fissile material for weapons use.
The treaty does not even need India to come into force. The plan is to shove it down India's throat.The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as the "Parties"), have agreed as follows: Article I No Party shall, after the entry into force of the Treaty for that Party, produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or use any fissile material produced thereafter in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Will a non inspections based treaty work with the NWS? I am inclined to say yes. But It will certainly work on India.1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which an instrument of ratification has been deposited by all of the following States: the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
Here is how it works. Focus on the word "Civilian" in the nuclear agreement. All future civilian reactors of India will automatically be in perpetual safeguards. Once, FMCT is in place, All future reactors automatically become civilian - hence under perpetual safeguards (of the non-NWS type for India).
The US is not proposing an FMCT out of some desire to do good. It is just another instrument proposed by them so that they can limit others. It is another instrument to further their non-proliferation goals. Russia does not need more, China has enough, who else remains? India.
The nuclear agreement along with FMCT would serve to CAP India's qualitative and quantitative arsenal. I do not know, if India has enough for 200 or 2000 but every foreign source report I have seen, says it is more close to the lower number. If true, and if China's number is closer to 2000 then a case has just been made for China to be interested in such a treaty.
I read the rest of your post and failed to see the "explanation" ... all you have is a declaration that "India has agreed to FMCT" ... what is the basis of that assertion?ShauryaT wrote:They will not offer to move their military reactors to in scope, even on a voluntary basis. India would do so because it has agree to. Let me explain.
SharyaT wrote:
If the Indian govt. accepts this throat shoving and meekly accepts itself as a signatory without a verifiable means (via inspection of their facitlities) of proving that the P-5 have completely ceased production of FM, then I think your contention that there can be no future military reactors may end up being true.
This FMCT coming into force without our signature is just ridiculous --- I cannot see how the GoI will find this acceptable?
ShauryaT,The treaty does not even need India to come into force. The plan is to shove it down India's throat.
If the Indian govt. accepts this throat shoving and meekly accepts itself as a signatory without a verifiable means (via inspection of their facitlities) of proving that the P-5 have completely ceased production of FM, then I think your contention that there can be no future military reactors may end up being true.
This FMCT coming into force without our signature is just ridiculous --- I cannot see how the GoI will find this acceptable?
I did not say India has agreed to FMCT. It has agreed to make all future civilian reactors to be in perpetual scope. Apologies, if there is a confusion.Alok_N wrote:I read the rest of your post and failed to see the "explanation" ... all you have is a declaration that "India has agreed to FMCT" ... what is the basis of that assertion?ShauryaT wrote:They will not offer to move their military reactors to in scope, even on a voluntary basis. India would do so because it has agree to. Let me explain.
I think Rye understood the post. Also, Rye, to be clear. India would have to sign the FMCT to apply to India. But, India's signature would not be required for FMCT to come into force. With the declatation by India to work with the US on FMCT, it is only a matter of time. How much time is a very key question.
try this for confusion ... I have agreed that all my future ******** daughters will be whores ...ShauryaT wrote:I did not say India has agreed to FMCT. It has agreed to make all future civilian reactors to be in perpetual scope. Apologies, if there is a confusion.
what conclusion do you draw about my future daughters?
What crap are you talking about? Be specific and direct.Alok_N wrote:boss, as long as you continue to peddle that crap out of your musharraf, there is no room for PG13 here ... this is the nth time I am asking you for substantiating that claim ...ShauryaT wrote:... if production of future non-******** daughters has been disabled.
Added: On second thoughts, I will catch some sleep and you can re-read the posts, maybe you will find some more hams, eggs and finally figure out that the cheese has moved
For the (n+1)th time ... you claim that India signing on to FMCT is all but obvious ... why?ShauryaT wrote:What crap are you talking about? Be specific and direct.
any more direct than that and I would be accused of being an Airbus 380 ...
to recap your memory, you wrote:
to which I replied that it is up to India to designate future reactors as civilian or military ... are you disputing this point? ... if not, then why is your musharraf acting up? ... if yes, then please state your claim more clearly ...I did not say India has agreed to FMCT. It has agreed to make all future civilian reactors to be in perpetual scope. Apologies, if there is a confusion.
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FYI – Extracts from a Q&A at a Press Briefing by Stephen G. Rademaker, US Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation, on May 18, 2006 at the Palais de Nations in Geneva -
http://www.usmission.ch/Press2006/0518R ... Press.html
QUESTION: I’d like to go back to this issue of verification. It has been a mantra forever, of trust but verify. How can you go away from this now? And so if you trust countries to stop production, how can you really trust it without verifying this? Do you have any support from other countries on this and is it really more difficult to create a verification regime for this particular treaty than for others? You mentioned the Chemical Weapons Treaty for one.
RADEMAKER: Yes, we do have support from a number of other delegations for our position on this. The quote about trust but verify came from a very important source, former President Reagan. He made that comment in the context of bilateral US-Soviet arms control where verification was a critical component of the willingness of the United States to commit to reductions in strategic nuclear forces.
There was a very elaborate verification regime ultimately negotiated there which our experts judged gave them satisfactory insight into Soviet compliance with the arms control obligations. The difference here is that this is not a bilateral negotiation; it is a multilateral negotiation. Sixty-five countries are going to have to agree by consensus on any verification mechanism that is structured here. We have taken into account what positions those 65 countries are likely to take, what types of measures those governments will likely be prepared to agree to, and reviewed what we think will be the result. We also asked ourselves the question of whether that resulting verification regime could give us a reasonable level of assurance that cheating can be detected by that mechanism. Our answer to that has been no.
This does not mean, and I’ve referred to this in my statement, that the FMCT would be unverified. It would be the responsibility of all of the parties to use the means and methods at their disposal to reach judgments about whether other parties to the treaty were complying with the treaty. Should concerns emerge, our text does include a mechanism for asking the Security Council to consider whether there has been compliance or non-compliance with the treaty. We think that as a practical matter that national means and methods will work more effectively than spending many years here. We should not kid ourselves -- it would take man years to negotiate something similar to the verification regime established under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We think that resulting regime would not give us any better assurance that cheating will be detected than relying on the ability of the individual states parties to use information at their disposal to make the same judgments.
Now when you consider that the US Senate rejected even the CTBT, I'm not sure what the fuss is about...
On the other hand, if it is taken for granted that the plan is to shove FMCT down our throat and our plan is to open our mouths for the same, as no doubt we have done time and time again with the NPT, CTBT, etc... then I submit that we are up the creek with the only paddle lodged firmly in our rears...
http://www.usmission.ch/Press2006/0518R ... Press.html
QUESTION: I’d like to go back to this issue of verification. It has been a mantra forever, of trust but verify. How can you go away from this now? And so if you trust countries to stop production, how can you really trust it without verifying this? Do you have any support from other countries on this and is it really more difficult to create a verification regime for this particular treaty than for others? You mentioned the Chemical Weapons Treaty for one.
RADEMAKER: Yes, we do have support from a number of other delegations for our position on this. The quote about trust but verify came from a very important source, former President Reagan. He made that comment in the context of bilateral US-Soviet arms control where verification was a critical component of the willingness of the United States to commit to reductions in strategic nuclear forces.
There was a very elaborate verification regime ultimately negotiated there which our experts judged gave them satisfactory insight into Soviet compliance with the arms control obligations. The difference here is that this is not a bilateral negotiation; it is a multilateral negotiation. Sixty-five countries are going to have to agree by consensus on any verification mechanism that is structured here. We have taken into account what positions those 65 countries are likely to take, what types of measures those governments will likely be prepared to agree to, and reviewed what we think will be the result. We also asked ourselves the question of whether that resulting verification regime could give us a reasonable level of assurance that cheating can be detected by that mechanism. Our answer to that has been no.
This does not mean, and I’ve referred to this in my statement, that the FMCT would be unverified. It would be the responsibility of all of the parties to use the means and methods at their disposal to reach judgments about whether other parties to the treaty were complying with the treaty. Should concerns emerge, our text does include a mechanism for asking the Security Council to consider whether there has been compliance or non-compliance with the treaty. We think that as a practical matter that national means and methods will work more effectively than spending many years here. We should not kid ourselves -- it would take man years to negotiate something similar to the verification regime established under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We think that resulting regime would not give us any better assurance that cheating will be detected than relying on the ability of the individual states parties to use information at their disposal to make the same judgments.
Now when you consider that the US Senate rejected even the CTBT, I'm not sure what the fuss is about...
On the other hand, if it is taken for granted that the plan is to shove FMCT down our throat and our plan is to open our mouths for the same, as no doubt we have done time and time again with the NPT, CTBT, etc... then I submit that we are up the creek with the only paddle lodged firmly in our rears...
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JEM:
Have u been to India recently?
Have u been to India recently?
Last edited by enqyoobOLD on 26 Dec 2006 09:24, edited 1 time in total.
No. I am not disputing that point. That decision is certainly sovereign. But before thumping our chests, let us look at the word "Civilian"? How is it defined? We do not have 123, so we do not know. Read that word in light of J18, US goals, Hyde and proposed FMCT. My submission is the definition of Civilian is likely to be clear and unambiguous.Alok_N wrote: it is up to India to designate future reactors as civilian or military ... are you disputing this point? ... if not, then why is your musharraf acting up? ... if yes, then please state your claim more clearly ...
Here is a sample definition.
In plain words, India has made a commitment to sign FMCT, when we do not know. The US position is, it has to be soon.Civilian means any reactor and/or site not used to produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Why FMCT is likely to be in place? Except for China, there is a unilateral cessation of fissile materials production by the other NWS, so they will be making a dejure commitment to defacto.
How will India handle this, is upto anyone's guess. Till the other day, we were not part of any of these regimes NPT, CTBT, FMCT. The US goals have never changed. What has changed is that now the US has engaged with India in a process, that to me seems committed to achieving US goals to the maximum extent possible. We are now in a NPT+ category but applied non-NWS provisions, where possible, with a bi-lateral CTBT (if Hyde does not change - regardless of the protestations of volunatary moratarium) and a commitment to work on FMCT with J18.
India can stall but not hide. The trajectory is clear. Unlike before, the US will have more leverage to push for their goals, which would be an earlier cessation than later.
How do US officials say that upto 90% of the Indian program will be under safeguards. It makes sense only in light of FMCT and most reactors in the future being in the automatic "civilian" designation.
How much time do we have is anyone's guess. Will we able to match China's reserves, is an open question.
Gerard: Why is 400-500 enough for great power? The US and Russia have dozens of tons of material - to qualify as a great power in the nuclear realm. Also, apart from quantitative there is a qualitative issue in India's weapons.
Last edited by ShauryaT on 25 Dec 2006 19:56, edited 1 time in total.
The US and SU were not great powers.. they were superpowers. They moved beyond countervalue targeting (cities) and had an arsenal (25 000+ each) designed for counterforce (silos, bases, TEL garages etc) attacks. These weapons were meant for nuclear war fighting.Gerard: Why is 400-500 enough for great power? The US and Russia have dozens of tons of material - to qualify as a great power in the nuclear realm. Also, apart from quantitative there is a qualitative issue in India's weapons.
Even today, they have 6000+ warheads apiece...
Both the US and Russia are keeping a huge number of pits in reserve, enough for several thousand weapons.
The great powers - France, the UK had arsenals of less than 500 each.
Their weapons were for deterrence only, strictly countervalue.
In the present situation, both the US and Russia seek arsenals of ~1000 - 1500. The UK will have <200. France will have perhaps 100 more than the UK.
China is another story. While they were satisfied to have about 20 weapons capable of striking the US, and another 400 or so available for shorter range strikes, BMD may force them to increase their arsenal to levels closer to the future Russian and US arsenals - 1000+ perhaps.
What does India need for French style deterrence and independent action?
What would deter the big lizard? Destruction of the 20 largest Chinese cities? How many 200kT weapons would be needed for each? Six ?
Therefore would not an arsenal a bit larger then France's be enough?
A future security environment that requires India to build 2000+ warheads is one where the NPT no longer exists and there are perhaps twenty nuclear powers..
By qualitative I assume you mean miniaturized 200 - 300 kT weapons.. each warhead weighing 200 kg or so (RV+warhead = 300 kg).. small enough for 3 to fit on an Agni MIRV bus.
ShauryaT wrote:
As long as India sticks to its stance that any FMCT must be legally binding on all parties and must be verifiable and multilateral before it will adhere by it, what is the problem?
The sequence is this:
1) India signs up for a verifiable and multilateral FMCT
2) India then places all plants after that as civilian
Why are we worried about step 2 first instead of step 1....isn't that putting the cart before the horse?
The optimal time for signing the FMCT would be a week after the P-5 comes to a consensus on supporting the issue of a verifiable and multilateral FMCT.
I am sure the P-5 would *love* to get a non-verifiable treaty into force, so that only the non P-5 states would have to subject themselves to verification....it would be the GoI's fault if it lets such an abomination see the light of day.
I think you should recalculate the odds --- all the material required for doing that is right here on this thread. You really think the P-5, especially China, is going to sign up? I would wager not. As JEM points out, the NPT and the CTBT have not been shoved up our throat and there was far more consensus on those treaties than there is on the FMCT in its present form.Why FMCT is likely to be in place? Except for China, there is a unilateral cessation of fissile materials production by the other NWS, so they will be making a dejure commitment to defacto.
As long as India sticks to its stance that any FMCT must be legally binding on all parties and must be verifiable and multilateral before it will adhere by it, what is the problem?
The sequence is this:
1) India signs up for a verifiable and multilateral FMCT
2) India then places all plants after that as civilian
Why are we worried about step 2 first instead of step 1....isn't that putting the cart before the horse?
But India is a responsible country that is neither stalling nor hiding from a treaty like the FMCT that is necessary for our children and our children's children and therefore would like a multilateral, verifiable FMCT to come into force as soon as possible, and India will work with the P-5 to bring about such an agreement to a successful conclusion. That should be our story and we should stick to it.India can stall but not hide. The trajectory is clear. Unlike before, the US will have more leverage to push for their goals, which would be an earlier cessation than later.
The optimal time for signing the FMCT would be a week after the P-5 comes to a consensus on supporting the issue of a verifiable and multilateral FMCT.
I am sure the P-5 would *love* to get a non-verifiable treaty into force, so that only the non P-5 states would have to subject themselves to verification....it would be the GoI's fault if it lets such an abomination see the light of day.
Last edited by Rye on 25 Dec 2006 21:20, edited 5 times in total.
that is a definition prejudiced by your claim ... and it is not simple ... here is a simpler definition:ShauryaT wrote:
No. I am not disputing that point. That decision is certainly sovereign. But before thumping our chests, let us look at the word "Civilian"? How is it defined? We do not have 123, so we do not know. Read that word in light of J18, US goals, Hyde and proposed FMCT. My submission is the definition of Civilian is likely to be clear and unambiguous.
Here is a sample definition.
Civilian means any reactor and/or site not used to produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
civilian = non-military
The treaty must address the stockpiles held by the P5.any FMCT must be legally binding on all parties
It must also have tough verification provisions.
Haggling over the amount of Pu to be transferred to civil power and the details of verification should take 5-10 years... enough time for Indian stockpile to grow.
Have you actually read that law document?ShauryaT wrote: Here is how it works. Focus on the word "Civilian" in the nuclear agreement. All future civilian reactors of India will automatically be in perpetual safeguards. Once, FMCT is in place, All future reactors automatically become civilian - hence under perpetual safeguards (of the non-NWS type for India).
The word "civilian" reactor does not occur among the definitions - and in fact nowhere in the document. There is a clear statement that it is impossible to disinguish between fissile material for "civilian" use and diversion towards military use. Hence the term "safeguards" tends to get used.
There is a very specific set of definitions and words around which that law is built.
IIRC nowhere does it say that India is to sign the FMCT. I am giving myself another 2-3 days to finish reading that document and some related material and I might well start a new thread if I can gel some of the info.
It is possible that a lot of the stuff that is being discussed in this thread could be hot air generated by a lack of knowledge of the specifics of the law and Indian nuclear programs. But I may be mistaken.
From the Hyde act: Page 4.
Nothing more than what is written can be inferred.The prohibition concerning a recipient country not engaging in activities
involving source or special nuclear material under Section 129 are permanently waived for India, as India will undoubtedly continue to produce fissile material, until such time after it is able to fulfill its commitment in the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement to work with the United States toward conclusion of a future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
Indeed. There is also a "subsection b" that says that India and the US should work towards cut off of fissile material for weapons that BOTH countries will be parties to.Rye wrote:From the Hyde act: Page 4.
Nothing more than what is written can be inferred.The prohibition concerning a recipient country not engaging in activities
involving source or special nuclear material under Section 129 are permanently waived for India, as India will undoubtedly continue to produce fissile material, until such time after it is able to fulfill its commitment in the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement to work with the United States toward conclusion of a future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
Yes. I have read and know that the word "Civilian" is not defined in the Hyde law and neither clearly defined in the separation plan of M2. I have contemplated a possible definition of "civilian" in 123, in light of the events so far and the understanding of US goals, in the posts above. How far India will allow them to succeed is anyone's guess.shiv wrote:
Have you actually read that law document?
The word "civilian" reactor does not occur among the definitions - and in fact nowhere in the document.
From draft FMCT: For the purposes of this Treaty: 1. "Fissile material" meanshere is a clear statement that it is impossible to disinguish between fissile material for "civilian" use and diversion towards military use. Hence the term "safeguards" tends to get used.
(a) Plutonium except plutonium whose isotopic composition includes 80 percent or greater plutonium-238. (b) Uranium containing a 20 percent or greater enrichment in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235, separately or in combination; or ( c) Any material that contains the material defined in (a) or (b) above.
No it does not, not in those words. It says India will work with the US to get an FMCT in place - BTW: It also does not say that the FMCT envisaged needs to be verifilable. The current draft treaty circulated by the US does not envision a verification regime. If accepted, what are the chances that India can unilaterally change FMCT to a verification based one? None.IIRC nowhere does it say that India is to sign the FMCT.
No. It is possible that I am mistaken. However, I remain skeptical of current Indian governements ability to protect our interests in light of the process started by J18 and the slippery slope, since then. The Hyde act is nothing but a slap on the face of MMS' Aug 17 statement to Parliament. How they get reconciled is something, I have not yet heard on this thread.It is possible that a lot of the stuff that is being discussed in this thread could be hot air generated by a lack of knowledge of the specifics of the law and Indian nuclear programs. But I may be mistaken.
The issue is not that that GoI does not understand the issues but there could be very different interpretation to what our nuclear interests actually are and hence different perceptions on what and how much we need and hence different solution templates.
Last edited by ShauryaT on 25 Dec 2006 22:58, edited 2 times in total.
ShauryaT wrote:
Let's leave the H&D stuff to the direct descendants of the Arab civilization to the west of India. I think we just have to live with a "slap in the face" as we weep uncontrollably due to this H&D loss...all the way to the bank.
Specifically, Shiv has pointed out the part of the Hyde act that precludes what you say from happening....I get the feeling that your objections are gratuitous when you ignore the responses and repeat yourself.
The Hyde act is nothing but a slap on the face of MMS' Aug 17 statement to Parliament. How they get reconciled is something, I have not yet heard on this thread.
Let's leave the H&D stuff to the direct descendants of the Arab civilization to the west of India. I think we just have to live with a "slap in the face" as we weep uncontrollably due to this H&D loss...all the way to the bank.
Please read the responses to your concerns before repeating them.No it does not, not in those words. It says India will work with the US to get an FMCT in place - BTW: It also does not say that the FMCT envisaged needs to be verifilable. The current draft treaty circulated by the US does not envision a verification regime. If accepted, what are the chances that India can unilaterally change FMCT to a verification based one?
Specifically, Shiv has pointed out the part of the Hyde act that precludes what you say from happening....I get the feeling that your objections are gratuitous when you ignore the responses and repeat yourself.
The difference is UK/France are backed up by NATO and hence US aresenals too. Also, UK/France are not in the same league as India in terms of geographic size, population, threat perceptions and very soon economic sizes too.Gerard wrote:What does India need for French style deterrence and independent action?
Do not disagree, but assuming a successful Chinese BMD in place in the future, the numbers change again? Right?What would deter the big lizard? Destruction of the 20 largest Chinese cities? How many 200kT weapons would be needed for each? Six ?
Therefore would not an arsenal a bit larger then France's be enough?
Primarily, Yes.By qualitative I assume you mean miniaturized 200 - 300 kT weapons.. each warhead weighing 200 kg or so (RV+warhead = 300 kg).. small enough for 3 to fit on an Agni MIRV bus.
Last edited by ShauryaT on 25 Dec 2006 22:47, edited 1 time in total.
An NFU will invite an extremely large and catastrophic first strike.ShauryaT wrote:Do not disagree, but assuming a successful Chinese BMD in place in the future, the numbers change again? Right?What would deter the big lizard? Destruction of the 20 largest Chinese cities? How many 200kT weapons would be needed for each? Six ?
Therefore would not an arsenal a bit larger then France's be enough?
An NFU will also invite equally large second strikes, and these second strikes may come from states that didn't carry out the first strike. Think about it in terms of India.
The Indian inventory needs to not only be significantly large, but also geographically disperesed, and deliverable from anywhere, to cause any real deterrence.
Please read that as an analogy. In FP diametrically opposite positions to our PM by the other side (A greater power) is tantamount to a slap. It is not an H&D issue. The issues are real and been raised by the Indian opposition.Rye wrote:ShauryaT wrote:
Let's leave the H&D stuff to the direct descendants of the Arab civilization to the west of India. I think we just have to live with a "slap in the face" as we weep uncontrollably due to this H&D loss...all the way to the bank.
No it does not, not in those words. It says India will work with the US to get an FMCT in place - BTW: It also does not say that the FMCT envisaged needs to be verifilable. The current draft treaty circulated by the US does not envision a verification regime. If accepted, what are the chances that India can unilaterally change FMCT to a verification based one?
My concern is a proposed theory of how the US is thinking and the likelihood that it will succeed. I think, I have wriiten enough on the issue and anything more, would be simply repeating myself. So, I will take your advice and shut up now.Please read the responses to your concerns before repeating them.
India will NOT have credible deterence vis-a-vis China unless India posseses Megaton nukes. Kiloton nukes are for little boys like Noko, Satanistan and Iran. Until India builds the Megaton warhead, India will only be in the little boy club and feel inferior to China. That is why capping the nuke test after 1974 was extremely moronic and delusional. 24 years were wasted instead of perfecting and developing better warheads. The trintium charged test in 1998 can be said as partial success and though it was a high yield test but it was still not a megaton explosion.rocky wrote:An NFU will invite an extremely large and catastrophic first strike.ShauryaT wrote: Do not disagree, but assuming a successful Chinese BMD in place in the future, the numbers change again? Right?
An NFU will also invite equally large second strikes, and these second strikes may come from states that didn't carry out the first strike. Think about it in terms of India.
The Indian inventory needs to not only be significantly large, but also geographically disperesed, and deliverable from anywhere, to cause any real deterrence.
At present American NP Ayathollahs are not so much worried about India increasing her number of warheads or amt of fissile materials but the worry that with enough advances in research India would be able to acquire a megaton capability. That is why the FBR worries them. That is why they want to reduce as much as possible the numbers of military reactors.
Too bad. India could have achieved this in the 70s, 80s and 90s. I believe if instead of moronic selfrighteous stupidity, India had conducted more tests right after 1974, after initial misgivings and animosity, the powers that be probably would have come to accept Indian nukes much earlier and perhaps would have accomodated India in their high council too. And Indian nuke warheads would by now be a lot more advanced and of higher yielding type than the present reality.
I think Indians should institute something like a Siberian deathcamp high up in the cold Himalays for anymore bumbling fools who would want to curb Indian strategic advances.
Avram Sprinzl
ShauryaT wrote:
ShauryaT: The Hyde act requires both US and India to agree to the FMCT....and India would obviously require the verifiability clause in there to find it acceptable.
I think it may be unreasonable to expect the US senate/congress to pass a bill that is exactly to the liking of the GoI, since their nuclear concerns are very different from ours, and their laws will reflect their concerns, but will not be binding on us, except via other instruments that we may end up signing in due course. The US govt. will be unable to enforce the clauses it has passed in the Hyde amendment without other instruments coming into force, no?Please read that as an analogy. In FP diametrically opposite positions to our PM by the other side (A greater power) is tantamount to a slap. It is not an H&D issue. The issues are real and been raised by the Indian opposition.
Their likelyhood of success may be directly proportional to the likelyhood of failure of the GoI to maintain its bottomline. Don't see why the GoI should stop doing that now -- I think our institutions are robust enough to not be compromised by one or two individuals, if such people exist.My concern is a proposed theory of how the US is thinking and the likelihood that it will succeed.
ShauryaT: The Hyde act requires both US and India to agree to the FMCT....and India would obviously require the verifiability clause in there to find it acceptable.
Regarding the number of warheads that are enough to count us in the club, the genie is out of the bottle and the situation even 10-20 years from now is a total unknown. There is no way of knowing what is enough for tomorrow and our options must be left open at all costs. Let's not tie the hands of future Indians just because today's leaders are doling out free electricity in exchange for votes and are unable to mine the uranium we need because they are scared of NGOs.
avram,
the megaton issue has been discussed many times before ... as accuracy of delivery improves, the required tonnage drops ... why bother with megaton shotguns when you have laser guided rifles?
secondly, what do FBR's have to do with megatonnage? ...
in fact, can anyone point to a strategic advantage that FBR's provide? ... the economic arguments have all been discussed ... what am I missing on the strategic front?
[except for research in futuristic weapons like isomer based bums as suggested by kgoan]
the megaton issue has been discussed many times before ... as accuracy of delivery improves, the required tonnage drops ... why bother with megaton shotguns when you have laser guided rifles?
secondly, what do FBR's have to do with megatonnage? ...
in fact, can anyone point to a strategic advantage that FBR's provide? ... the economic arguments have all been discussed ... what am I missing on the strategic front?
[except for research in futuristic weapons like isomer based bums as suggested by kgoan]
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- BRFite
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For MAD (mutually asussured destruction) to work, megaton bombs are a requirement. In the nuclear senario, accuracy is not the main issue, rather it is the level of destruction.the megaton issue has been discussed many times before ... as accuracy of delivery improves, the required tonnage drops ... why bother with megaton shotguns when you have laser guided rifles?
One can however debate the validity of the MAD doctrine. The question is if China or any other nation could accept the damage of 40 25KT bombs. In most cases it would be unacceptable damage. Hence the nuclear equilibriam can be maintained even with small nukes that India has. But a megaton bomb would be desirable.
which causes more strategic destruction, a 15 kT bomb hitting downtown Beijing or a 1 MT bomb falling 10 km away? ... answer: about the same ...Rishirishi wrote:In the nuclear senario, accuracy is not the main issue, rather it is the level of destruction.
IMO, India needs bigger and better rockets, not bigger and better bombs ...
Right said Fred.Alok_N wrote:which causes more strategic destruction, a 15 kT bomb hitting downtown Beijing or a 1 MT bomb falling 10 km away? ... answer: about the same ...Rishirishi wrote:In the nuclear senario, accuracy is not the main issue, rather it is the level of destruction.
IMO, India needs bigger and better rockets, not bigger and better bombs ...
The chinis and porkis are threatening us with JDAMs besides, something we got no real defense against. Unless there's a doctrinal change that says that if and when we're threatened with nukes, all restraining clauses and agreements (FMCT, nuke fuel end-use restraints etc) become null and void, or at least optional.