India-US Nuclear Deal continued

fanne
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Postby fanne » 27 Dec 2006 05:51

Arun S sir,
Well your analysis does one good thing, hopefully I won't die of ulcer. But taking your own analysis, what is the worst we could do/happen!!
When you do the worst case analysis, please assume (even though you might not agree), that Sonia and her side Kick would try to do maximum harm. (A usual question we were asked when we were kids was have u sean a begger who is a Sardar, followed by the second question, do you know a Sardar who is a traitor, well I still do not know answer to the first question, all Sardars are harworking people, but I can claim I know answer to the second question!!)

rgds,
fanne

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Postby Alok_N » 27 Dec 2006 07:42

Arun_S wrote:
milindc wrote:Arun_S, From the chart date, I assume you had the chart ready on 3/30/2006 :)
Yes the analysis and report was ready in March-April time frame. It was hard to hold back the urge to make it public and share the good news. But got to do what is right .. .. .


hehehe ... congratulations, boss ... as for me, the bruises are there to see ... I had to keep my lips sealed for almost one year even during serious rocket attacks ...

make sure you mail a copy to Halfbright ... :)

btw, there was this poster JaiKissan who had dropped some hints and then disappeared ... I lost my old yahoo account where his emails were stored ...
Last edited by Alok_N on 27 Dec 2006 07:48, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby NRao » 27 Dec 2006 07:43

FYI Only.

I hope Henry Hyde, NPAs, etc are watching History Channel.

# 3 on "Last Days of the Earth" is nukes!!!!! Guess what, we have enough nukes to kill 8 Billion people and teh earth holds 6 right now. And, wat may start a nuke war? # 1 reason: accident. :rotfl:

I am telling you. The problem is Pakistan. Get out of A'stan and Iraq and young man go to Pakistan - the Land of the Pure (do not know of what).

The accident will start there.

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Postby Alok_N » 27 Dec 2006 07:56

ShauryaT wrote:While others presume that weapons grade Pu is from from Cirus and Dhruva only.


snake oil comes in different bottles ... while it is good to critically examine the one being pushed by the salesman, it pays to examine the back shelves as well ...

perhaps, it makes some sense that Indian nuke scientists repackaged the snake oil and sold it as so much Gulab Jal to DDM who lapped it up ...

its all drama folks ...

btw, I don't think Gerard had seen it earlier ... it will be useful to have his critique ...

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Postby Arun_S » 27 Dec 2006 08:01

ShauryaT wrote:Arun: It seems you are taking the differential in mined vs used fuel for power consumption and distributing the same across all operational non safeguarded HWR/PHWR and the TFBR.

While others presume that weapons grade Pu is from from Cirus and Dhruva and conveniently forgot the 12 other non-IAEA Heavy Water R reactors.

If this is correct, any further references and/or assumptions to your study. TIA.

No one said "Emperor is Naked" when Half-bright et-al calculated Indian weapon grade fissile material production using only Dhruv and Cirus convinently ignoring 12 other non-IAEA Heavy Water Power Reactors.

Beg to ask if U238 and Pu239 pair in heavy water moderated Cirus or Dhruv is somehow KOSHER, while the U238 and Pu239 pair in heavy water moderated 220MWe nuclear power plant is NOT. If indeed Dhruv and CIRUS are kosher and power plants are not, then the U238 are indeed discriminative of CAST to behave differently if the reactor is under P5 control versus if they are operated by children of lesser God; then WTF are P5 and NPA losing their sleep over Full Scope Safeguard, NPT, FMTC and other 4 letter mofo mumbo-jumbo.

So How? Half-Bright and Perko-Witch !:twisted:

The fact of the matter is that in the domain of neucleonics, heavy water moderated natural Uranium fueled rectors behave identically as far as generation of Pu is concerned or its purity. Unfortunately U238 and Pu239 are very democratic and absolutely fair (totally blind to P5 or colonial CAST system)

So if a 220MWe (660MW-thermal) heavy water moderated reactor has say 500 fuel rods, if 10% of those rods positions are always populated by fuel rods made from fresh Uranium and removed from the reactor after spending only 15% time of normal fuel rods (thus seeing <15% of total irradience), for recovery of weapon grade Pu. Such reactor is functionally equivalent to a 66MW-thermal research reactor as against 100MW-thermal Dhruv. Yet at the same time it behaves like a normal 660MW thermal power plant.

{Added Later: "This scenario of operating conditions for PHWRs is purely hypothetical and concoted by the author. However, raw uranium data is strongly supportive of such a scenario."}

And this does not even involve any additional shuffling of fuel rods, for this removal can be timed to coincide with the normal shuffling of fuel rods as their nuclear reactivity changes progressively, to maintain the reactor in desired regime of neutron flux and power uniformity.

Add to that additional use of fuel loader to turn (i.e. exchange) 10% of the special rods more frequently (i.e. lower irradience) allows super-weapon grade Pu (Super grade can make KOSHER Reactor Grade Pu to wpn grade).

The neutron flux or neutron energy in a heavy water moderated reactor is totally insensitive to its ability to convert U238 to Pu239 in terms of quantity or purity.

Scums like Half-bright et-al get past their cooked scholarly spin reports/papers because ordinary high school graduates or for that sake engineers from India feel unsure and incapable of challenging mighty white-dumbo from a US psy-op think tank.

Or the readers of such scholarly report think that Indian nuclear scientists are very stupid rocket scientists that they can't figure out a way to operate the reactor in a mode that a small fraction of the reactor operate with fuel rods that are persistently partially irradiated at <15% of normal full irradiance; when all that involves is remove some fuel rods prematurely from the reactor.

We all forget that it only took a child (and not a abstract philosopher) to say that the "Emperor is Naked". Truth on your side is so much more powerful than Emperors, Kingdoms & Fiefdoms.
Satyam-Eva-Jayate
Last edited by Arun_S on 27 Dec 2006 08:58, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby Alok_N » 27 Dec 2006 08:13

Arun_S wrote:So if a 220MWe (660MW-thermal) heavy water moderated reactor has say 500 fuel rods, if 10% of those rods positions are always populated by fuel rods made from fresh Uranium and removed from the reactor after spending only 15% time of normal fuel rods (thus seeing <15% of total irradience), for recovery of weapon grade Pu. Such reactor is functionally equivalent to a 66MW-thermal research reactor as against 100MW-thermal Dhruv. Yet at the same time it behaves like a normal 660MW thermal power plant.


Arun,

Please stick to the disclaimer as follows:

"This scenario of operating conditions for PHWRs is purely hypothetical and concoted by the author. However, raw uranium data is supportive of such a scenario"

reverse psy-ops ... let the NPA sweat it out ... :)

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Postby Arun_S » 27 Dec 2006 08:25

Alok_N wrote:
Arun_S wrote:
milindc wrote:Arun_S, From the chart date, I assume you had the chart ready on 3/30/2006 :)
Yes the analysis and report was ready in March-April time frame. It was hard to hold back the urge to make it public and share the good news. But got to do what is right .. .. .


hehehe ... congratulations, boss ... as for me, the bruises are there to see ... I had to keep my lips sealed for almost one year even during serious rocket attacks ......


Alok you were my project partner and yes I know you took lot of flake and bruises last 9 months, while we were together constrained to not reveal what we knew was truth and could defend technical introspection in honest adjudication setting. Some battle are better fought in hiding behind Hindu-Kush mountain range; that IMHO was right decision.

make sure you mail a copy to Halfbright ... :)

I would rather let him sulk and die in ignominy. Next time around though I will not hesitate to cross sword with the moron in open. NPA tribe lost the game and their balls.

btw, there was this poster JaiKissan who had dropped some hints and then disappeared ... I lost my old yahoo account where his emails were stored
Dropped hint of ... ?
Last edited by Arun_S on 27 Dec 2006 08:33, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Alok_N » 27 Dec 2006 08:32

Arun_S wrote:Alok you were my project partner ...


please ... I was just someone you could throw ideas off of ... ramana and others were there in a similar role ... the credit is yours, please don't dilute it ...

Alok_N wrote:btw, there was this poster JaiKissan who had dropped some hints and then disappeared ... I lost my old yahoo account where his emails were stored
Dropped hint of ... ?


something to the effect, "look more closely at the discharged fuel of PHWRs" ... at that time I thought he was talking about design of tactical weapons using reactor grade Pu ... it wasn't until your analysis that I realized that he may have been talking about the same thing ... by then he was gone ...

I recall discussing with ramana what he thought about the chotawallahs ... those questions are still there, but it could all have been a distraction ...

I have too many questions ... :(

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 27 Dec 2006 13:48

Begging your collective mercies:My valiant attempt at emulating a post that is even remotely technical.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalman_filter
From what I can glean from this article - the drdo site abstract seems like another case of pilfering.


There is Karman, there is Kallman, and there is Von Kalman, and there is Kalman Ghia. Arr diffelent.

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Postby Philip » 27 Dec 2006 18:56

MRS is on the ball yt again!
http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/27/stories ... 441000.htm

Remember lessons from Tarapur

M.R. Srinivasan

Indian negotiators must insist that the 123 agreement recognise India's sovereign right to reprocess nuclear fuel imported from any country and to use it in safeguarded facilities. Otherwise, the country's civil nuclear energy programme will be tied solely to imported uranium.

AFTER PRESIDENT George W. Bush signed the United States-India nuclear cooperation bill, he called up Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to tell him how pleased he was at this development. While welcoming this event, the Prime Minister took the opportunity to tell the President that there remained areas of concern that needed to be addressed during the negotiation of the bilateral agreement (called the 123 agreement, after the relevant clause number in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, 1954). The U.S. has entered into some twenty-five 123 agreements with various countries, including the one concerning Tarapur. The Tarapur agreement concluded in 1963 was unique in that it guaranteed supplies of enriched uranium fuel from the U.S. for running the Tarapur reactors for their entire life. However, after 1978 the U.S. did not supply fuel saying its domestic legislation (under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act) prevented it from doing so. India argued that Tarapur was an inter-governmental agreement and hence it had to be honoured by the U.S. But to no avail. However, later, the U.S. allowed France to supply fuel to India. Subsequently, the USSR (now Russia) and even China supplied fuel for Tarapur.

The lesson from the Tarapur episode is that the U.S. breached with impunity even a cast-iron guarantee it had furnished. Considerable bitterness grew between the U.S. and India and extended to many other areas beyond the nuclear one. When India agreed, reluctantly, in March 2006 to put imported reactors under "safeguards in perpetuity," the U.S. consented to the Indian insistence on assurances of fuel supply. This meant India could build up a stockpile of fuel to tide over disruption in supply and the U.S. would agree to work with other countries namely Russia, France, and Britain to arrange alternate supplies. The U.S. legislation, based on the Hyde Bill, forbids India building up a stockpile of nuclear fuel. It also obligates the U.S. administration to work with other Nuclear Supplier Group countries to get them to suspend supplies to India, if the U.S. has done so under some provision of the Hyde Bill. It is not evident how the U.S. can address the legitimate concerns of India on continued fuel supply, given the boundaries set by the Hyde Bill.

With regard to future nuclear tests, the Prime Minister has said India is only committed to a voluntary moratorium. A moratorium is only a temporary holding off of an activity, conditioned by specific circumstances that obtained at the time when such a declaration was made. It cannot be construed as a permanent ban. The Hyde Bill has sought to make the moratorium into a permanent ban. However, there is no such restraint imposed on the U.S., China, Pakistan or any other country. In bringing up this issue, I do not wish to suggest that I favour a resumption of tests by India. But India cannot prevent other countries from carrying out tests. It is, therefore, unacceptable that India forfeits its right to test for all time to come under the agreement with the U.S. Even if the 123 agreement is silent on the issue, Indian negotiators must put this issue on the table. The Hyde Bill calls for suspension of all cooperation and fuel supplies and even calls for return of all equipment and materials supplied earlier in the event of a test. It baffles one how India can return reactor installations that might have been operated a few years were such a contingency to arise in future.

The differences over the definition of "full civilian nuclear cooperation" have been discussed in the media. The Indian understanding was that reprocessing of spent fuel, enrichment of uranium, and production of heavy water also formed part of the term "full civilian nuclear cooperation." In the congressional debate, it has been noted that these were construed by the U.S. to be in the nature of military activities and not civilian. India's future plans for thorium utilisation for civil nuclear power depend crucially on reprocessing.

Similarly, civil nuclear power units using natural uranium require heavy water as reactor coolant and moderator.

Equally if India were to embark on a sizeable light water reactor programme, it may like to have control on supply of enriched uranium for economic and supply security reasons. India has technologies of its own in these areas and will develop them further in the years ahead. If the Indo-U.S. agreement moves ahead in the manner its sponsors have speculated, in a few decades from now some 90 per cent of the nuclear installations in India would be open to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. In that scenario, how can India reconcile to the embargo from nuclear advanced countries on the export of enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technologies? Even if the issue were to be papered over now, it will then look from India's point of view to have been a very bad bargain.

There is the important question of India's right to reprocess imported nuclear fuel, enriched uranium or natural uranium, for use in future reactors. The Tarapur experience is relevant to recall. The 123 agreement recognised India's right to reprocess the spent fuel; the residual uranium and plutonium could then be used as fuel at Tarapur or elsewhere in safeguarded reactors. But is reality, the U.S. never issued its consent on reprocessing. The agreement had stated that the consent "shall not be withheld unreasonably." Indeed the U.S. did withhold its consent "unreasonably."

Indian negotiators must insist that the 123 agreement recognise India's sovereign right to reprocess nuclear fuel, whether enriched or natural uranium, imported from any country and to use such fuel in safeguarded facilities. Unless India has access to using such separated plutonium in civilian fast breeder and thorium burning systems, the civil nuclear energy programme will be tied solely to imported uranium. Global uranium prices are already rising, in sympathy with hydrocarbons, and this could adversely affect the economics of nuclear power generation in India.

The Hyde Bill refers to "congruence" in certain aspects of foreign policy between the U.S. and India, and Iran's nuclear ambitions have been specifically mentioned. While the Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that India does not wish to see another nuclear weapon power in the region, India cannot give a carte blanche to the U.S. that it will associate itself with unspecified future actions Washington may take vis-à-vis Iran. Mr. Bush, when signing the Bill, has taken exception to certain provisions of the Hyde Bill and asserted the powers of the President to pursue the foreign policies of the U.S. Some U.S. Congressmen have criticised the President's assertions.

India should be prepared to deal with various expectations of the U.S. in future and learn to stand up for its own interests, even recognising the inherent asymmetry of the Indo-U.S. agreement. Contrary to the hopes of many who believe that Indo-U.S. relations will grow in all directions in an unimpeded manner, the reality may be one of working out mutual compromises in a patient and mature manner simply because the perceptions of the U.S. and India differ, given the geopolitical and historical contexts of the two countries.

Task for negotiators


To sum up then, the Indian negotiators of the 123 agreement must be instructed to raise all the issues that the Prime Minister referred to in the August 2006 intervention in the Rajya Sabha and other areas of concern in the Hyde Bill and obtain clear responses from the U.S. There should be no attempt to paper over differences or to accept suggestions that these could be addressed in due course of time. Once India accepts the agreement, it will find its freedom of action severely restricted and may well have to accommodate decisions not in its best interest. The negotiators must appreciate that the provisions of the agreement are of a long-term nature and indeed some clauses run "in perpetuity."

Finally, we must realise that an agreement that is in keeping with India's minimum expectations may not be reached. What are the consequences? India must pursue its national nuclear energy programme based on pressurised heavy water reactors, fast breeder reactors, and thorium utilisation with intensified vigour. All activities relating to locating new reserves of uranium, their mining and processing must be given the highest priority, and innovative solutions must be found to tackle local and environmental concerns. The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, the 700 MWe Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors, and the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (using thorium) must be built and put into operation at the earliest. These actions and the general growth of the Indian economy will make the U.S. rethink the terms of the agreement and a revised one will no doubt emerge in due course of time. A delayed agreement is certainly better than a bad agreement, settled in haste.

(The writer is a member of the Atomic Energy Commission.)

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Postby S.Valkan » 27 Dec 2006 21:57

Philip wrote:Indian negotiators must insist that the 123 agreement recognise India's sovereign right to reprocess nuclear fuel, whether enriched or natural uranium, imported from any country and to use such fuel in safeguarded facilities.

There should be no attempt to paper over differences or to accept suggestions that these could be addressed in due course of time.


Excellent points by M.R.


These actions and the general growth of the Indian economy will make the U.S. rethink the terms of the agreement and a revised one will no doubt emerge in due course of time.


This is where the train of logic got derailed.

The Hyde Act is already in place.

If the terms of the upcoming 123 agreement can be revised to India's satisfaction LATER, it can just as well be revised to India's satisfaction NOW by careful negotiations.

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Postby svinayak » 27 Dec 2006 22:17

[quote]


The crippling nuke deal
EXPOSING THE LEFT DECEIT
By M.D. Nalapat

In Manmohan Singh’s view as expressed during the meeting, even the 1974 Pokhran-I explosion had been a mistake, a comment that shocked Rao. Fortunately, (then Defence Minister) Sharad Pawar agreed with the scientists’ view, and as a result, the effort at getting India to bind itself to the FMCT was abandoned for the time being. Looked at in the light of their 1992 stance—as well as the stand taken by Manmohan Singh in 1995 when the proposal to test a nuclear device was debated—their defence of the Henry J. Hyde Bill as expressed on December 18 and 19 comes as no surprise.

Under the Maino parivar, India is swiftly going the way of Iraq in 1991, and that too without a shot being fired. What an asset the UPA’s ruling parivar is to those to whom its allegiance is pledged!

Within years after the Manmohan Singh-George W. Bush pact takes effect, all of India’s independent R&D in cutting-edge technologies such as composites and nanotechnology will shrivel, because of the impact of the intrusive and obstructive nature of the sanctions that Manmohan Singh will sign on to.

Both Manmohan Singh and Pranab Mukherjee can justifiably claim to being the Bush babies of the Union Cabinet. Surprisingly, the Bush babies are being kept in office by none other than the CPI and the CPM, which have evidently decided to follow a policy of verbally opposing the US policy while at the same time keeping in power those committed to Washington. The debate on the nuclear deal that took place on December 18 and 19 was rendered a non-event because of its admission under a rule that excluded a vote. It would have been best for each Member of Parliament to have made his stand clear through voting, on a fast-progressing deal that will spell the death-knell of modern Indian R&D once implemented.

For within years after the Manmohan Singh - George W. Bush pact takes effect, all of India’s independent R&D in cutting-edge technologies such as composites and nanotechnology will shrivel, because of the impact of the intrusive and obstructive nature of the sanctions that Manmohan Singh will sign on to. Although, at present only a dozen (very key) facilities have been formally offered up for slaughter through Inspections, the numerous pursuit clauses that will be present both explicitly and implied in the numerous restrictive covenants that the Bush Babies will get India to sign will make possible the entry of “international inspectorsâ€

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Postby ShauryaT » 27 Dec 2006 23:41

Arun_S:

Some further thoughts to your report.

1. Would it be possible to add the min and max WG Pu in your summary. May be there should be multiple min/max based on a single or multiple pass.

2. Is it possible to corroborate the theory with one or two references at the individual plant level, in the sense of total used by this plant in year X or total used at the plant as per xxx was x and the plant capacity utilisation is x and the electricity output is x and therefore WG Pu output is x. Such a reference will make the theory more credible and may be found. JMT.

3. Kalpakkam I and II have been operational since 83/85 respectively. Do you think the production of WG Pu started before RG's nod given, I believe some time in 87/88. Any reason you can think of that some plants that have been included should not be.

Apologies if my lack of technical knowledge, makes these questions/thoughts moot. TIA.

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Postby Alok_N » 27 Dec 2006 23:49

ShauryaT wrote:2. Is it possible to corroborate the theory with one or two references at the individual plant level, in the sense of total used by this plant in year X or total used at the plant as per xxx was x and the plant capacity utilisation is x and the electricity output is x and therefore WG Pu output is x. Such a reference will make the theory more credible and may be found. JMT.


Why not just tabulate the entire inventory and send an advance copy to uncle?

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Postby Rye » 28 Dec 2006 00:01

ShauryaT ,

These answers to your questions must never be in the public domain...that is for the GoI and the Indian nuke establishment to know, and for the rest of the world to keep guessing.

One must think carefully about the strategic value of such bits of information to India's adversaries before requesting for such info. in public or providing such information in public.

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Postby Alok_N » 28 Dec 2006 00:07

once again:

"This scenario of operating conditions for PHWRs is purely hypothetical and concocted by the author, Arun_S. While raw uranium data are consistent with such a scenario, there is no evidence that it has actually occurred."

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Postby S.Valkan » 28 Dec 2006 00:35

Alok_N wrote:This scenario of operating conditions for PHWRs is purely hypothetical and concocted by the author, Arun_S. While raw uranium data are consistent with such a scenario, there is no evidence that it has actually occurred.


Good one. :lol:

Although Arun_S has done a marvellous job, the NP Ayatollahs and the snoops from Paki-Chinese establishments must be kept guessing.

BTW, even the Japanese are trying to keep NoKo-Chinese establishments guessing :

Japan needs 3 to 5 years to produce nuclear warheads

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Postby Arun_S » 28 Dec 2006 03:47

Let me put the link to my article


Here is the report. Pls look at the Appendix- spreadsheet data, there are some more gems there for the discerning eyes.

http://www.indiaresearch.org

[url=http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf]India Research Foundation
Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program:
Will it make available more indigenous Uranium reserve for Indian Weapons Program?
[/url]

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Postby Gerard » 28 Dec 2006 06:35

xpost

The nonproliferation ayatollah blog has a translation of the Sankei Shimbun article on the Japanese Gov't internal study of nuclear weapon production...

it would take 3-5 years to build a prototype of a miniaturized nuclear warhead.
[quote]However, using their light water reactors will not yield weapons-grade plutonium. Enrichment facilities only manufacture LEU enriched to 3% and frequently experience mechanical problems, so expanding enrichment would be difficult.
Japan would have to construct a graphite-moderated breeder reactor and expand its reprocessing facilities to produce enough Pu 239 needed for a nuclear arsenal. It would also be difficult for Japan to miniaturize nuclear warheads because there are many gaps in the technical knowledge required for development.â€

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Postby ldev » 28 Dec 2006 10:08

Arun_S wrote:Let me put the link to my article


Here is the report. Pls look at the Appendix- spreadsheet data, there are some more gems there for the discerning eyes.

http://www.indiaresearch.org

[url=http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf]India Research Foundation
Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program:
Will it make available more indigenous Uranium reserve for Indian Weapons Program?
[/url]


Thanks a lot Arun S to you and to your collaboration partner, Alok N, for spelling it all out. From what I can see right now, India's constraint on the strategic side is not lack of material but delivery systems development which has to to play catch up to do justice to the material already available. Material production even without factoring in the FBRs is also very generous even after the proposed civilian/military divide takes place as per the terms of the agreement with the US. The FMCT is a non issue factoring in global politics right now. If FMCT becomes an issue 5/10 years from now, there is enough spare capacity including the FBR coming on line to catapult production to extremely high levels although given current capacity I dont think the FBRs will ever be needed for strategic requirements.

So what's the beef with all the critics? Sour grapes? If all that they are left with to carp about is lack of transfer of technology for reprocessing on the civilian side, frankly why should India care? Just make sure that there is enough financial stake in every plant from overseas investors that they will be hurt in the event they decide to commit harakiri by stopping *civilian fuel supplies*. I mean, why would overseas financial stakeholders do something like that - commit harakiri?

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Postby SaiK » 28 Dec 2006 12:54

why would overseas financial stakeholders do something like that - commit harakiri?


what is a draconianism? [american constitution and its laws on such matters]

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Postby sivab » 28 Dec 2006 20:37

And this does not even involve any additional shuffling of fuel rods, for this removal can be timed to coincide with the normal shuffling of fuel rods as their nuclear reactivity changes progressively, to maintain the reactor in desired regime of neutron flux and power uniformity.

Add to that additional use of fuel loader to turn (i.e. exchange) 10% of the special rods more frequently (i.e. lower irradience) allows super-weapon grade Pu (Super grade can make KOSHER Reactor Grade Pu to wpn grade).


Arun_S:
Fuel handling systems seem to be one of the complex aspects of INDU. They seem to be designed for average fuel bundle replacement capacity requirements per day, as opposed to shuffling fuel bundles around. In fact nothing in enclosed links indicate they do any kind of shuffling at all.
http://www.npcil.nic.in/nupower_vol19_1-4/articles/Article19-Commissioning_of_Fuel.pdf
http://www.npcil.nic.in/nupower_vol19_1-4/articles/Article18-The_Challenge_of_Completing.pdf

For TAPP 3&4 average fuel replacement requirement is 15 bundles a day and the both fuel handling systems together can replace 8 bundles in one cycle comprising thousands of discrete steps in an extremely slow manner. Fuel trays and shuttle bays are designed to handled 16 bundles. Also note comments about problems with fuel handling in 220MWe units, lack of manufacturing capability in India for ball screw mechanism for 540MWe units (which led to change in design) and machining accuracy requirements for 11m bridge components with distortion less than 1mm under extreme temp & pressure.

If 10% of fuel rods stay only for 15% of normal burn time, that means 1.57 times of original fuel bundle handling requirement needs to be handled per day i.e. ~24 bundles per day. One cannot overwork these machines since they will fail and the reactor will have to be shut down if that happens.

The unknown is if NPCIL has additional fuel handling systems (say 4 instead of 2) in every reactor that is not disclosed to public. But if this case is true, a lot of low level people in NPCIL will know about it and should be easy for media/uncle/tsp/chicom to find out. It is lot easier to contain information leaking from BARC than it is from NPCIL.

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Postby Alok_N » 28 Dec 2006 22:55

sivab wrote:For TAPP 3&4 average fuel replacement requirement is 15 bundles a day and the both fuel handling systems together can replace 8 bundles in one cycle

...

If 10% of fuel rods stay only for 15% of normal burn time, that means 1.57 times of original fuel bundle handling requirement needs to be handled per day i.e. ~24 bundles per day.


how confident are you about the requirement of 15 bundles/day? ... afaik, these figures are highly dependent on the geometry of the core, details of the cladding etc ... also, rods located at different radii need replacing at different time intervals ... that number could just be psy-ops ...

if the number is 10/day instead of 15/day in power mode, then it will be 15.7/day for maal mode ...

what about the design rating of 540 MWe? ... how confident are we that it is the correct number? ... how much error is there?

of course, the 8/day capacity per machine could easily be understated as well ... but, you are saying that uncle would have found out that 12/day were being exchanged per machine ... so what? ... how do you know that uncle doesn't know? ...

this stuff is layer upon layer of intrigue ... the only data handle that Arun has used is raw uranium ... that could be fake as well ...

in the final analysis, it is best to float technical analyses and keep everyone guessing ...
Last edited by Alok_N on 28 Dec 2006 23:34, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby Bade » 28 Dec 2006 23:25

From the link posted by Arun_S,
India plans to generate 20,000 MW electricity from Nuclear
sources by 2020– with or without the deal.
With the deal, n-sector is also open to US/foreign investment of about $35b.

The latest issue of Science mag Vol 314 Dec 22, 2006 has figures of 50,000MW in 25 years or by 2030 at a cost of $75 billion. So the article might need an upward revision.

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Postby Alok_N » 28 Dec 2006 23:42

following up on the post by sivab ...

why is it that otherwise secretive organizations are perfectly willing to put up websites containing technical information?

IMO, it is done in order to sneak in calculated amounts of disinformation in reports that otherwise appear to be highly credible ...

this is done at high level so even the lower level employees of the org are not in a position to question it ...

for eaxmple

the fuel-rod-loading-dude will say, "sure enough, we load 15 rods per day" ...

the bijli-meter-dude will say, "yup, we put out XXX amount of power" ...

both numbers will check out with the article on the web ... the disinformation content will be in the assumptions relating the two numbers, i.e., design parameters which will be known only to the top brass ...

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Postby sivab » 29 Dec 2006 00:01

Alok_N:

I wish you are right ...

You seem to have lot more confidence in Indian technocrats/babus than me.

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Postby Alok_N » 29 Dec 2006 00:28

sivab wrote:You seem to have lot more confidence in Indian technocrats/babus than me.


why is it that when ex-technocrats whine in the media, their words are posted in BOLD fonts? ...

I don't have "lot more confidence" in them ... all I claim is that a group of people who could put together a program from scratch are perfectly capable of inserting a bit of intrigue into that program ... intrigue of the kind that even you and I can think of ...

as for confidence, you read a pdf file on the web and bought it hook, line and sinker ... why?

secondly, confidence is the only way to operate ... one can not get very far without confidence ... it quickly reduces to whining ... my approach is to give them benefit of doubt unless they demonstrate incompetence ...

off topic, but here is an anecdote about an american technocrat ... bob wilson was testifying before congress about a proposed acclerator ...

Senator: Dr. Wilson, what are the defence implications of your accelerator?

Wilson: Sir, it provides one good reason why this country is worth defending.

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Postby Arun_S » 29 Dec 2006 07:10

Let me just submit that I did the homework deligently and have dealt with long stroke precision robotics well enough to deal with this subject.

For those who care and are technically savvy here are some interesting pointers:

http://www.unene.ca/un802-2005/ben/basi ... tation.pdf

http://www.nuceng.ca/ep4d3/guests/fueld ... en2004.pdf
In perticular Page 32 & 33

And pls see Session-17 of

http://www.unene.ca/un802-2004/index.htm

http://www.unene.ca/un802-2005/ben/reac ... is_fun.pdf

And a treasure trove at: http://www.nuceng.ca/ep4d3/ep4d3home.htm

CANDU stuff at : http://www.unene.ca/un802-2005/index.htm

------------------
Bottom line is that one can operate the CANDU in a mode in which decent percentage of the fuel rods are removed after 15% of normal irradience and replaced with new fuel rod, WITHOUT significantly altering the work-load of fuel loaders.
Last edited by Arun_S on 30 Dec 2006 10:49, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Raju » 29 Dec 2006 10:52

'Sarabhai wanted not one, but a series of N-tests'
Srinivas Laxman
[ 28 Dec, 2006 2345hrs ISTTIMES NEWS NETWORK ]

MUMBAI: A hitherto unknown aspect of India's nuclear weapons programme was that Vikram Sarabhai, who headed the country's atomic establishment between 1966 and 1971, after the death of Homi Bhabha, was in favour of a series of nuclear tests and not just a single one.

This was revealed to TOI on Monday by nuclear analyst O P Sabherwal, who had access to a confidential briefing given by Sarabhai in May 1970, in New Delhi, to a select group of people.

This disclosure assumes significance in the context of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh making it clear to the US last week that if the situation demands, India will carry out nuclear tests despite the moratorium.

According to Sabherwal, who has authored India's Tryst With The Atom, Sarabhai in his secret briefing had made some points:

There is a line of thinking in the country that some sort of nuclear explosion is called for. It will boost the country's morale as also the prestige abroad.

If one looks at past experiences abroad, it is clear that just an explosion without requisite follow-up growth will gradually lead to a decline in national prestige and a slide down in national morale.

"Thus in Britain the failure to sustain a massive nuclear programme after the explosions did not help Britain, but created varied problems."

With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, Sarabhai pointed out that there were three lines of thinking: building tactical weapons which can be used in conjunction with ground forces.

Second, having strategic weapons because only tactical weapons will land the country in mortal danger, and third, India should eschew nuclear weapons and actively participate in the worldwide efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament.

Sarabhai had said, after studying the choices, that the second option seemed the most ideal one. This project, however, has not been fully implemented.

Finally, Sarabhai said if one considers the problem of a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, it is possible to note its usefulness. An atomic explosion might be of immense help in the discovery of mineral oils and petroleum crude.

At the same time, he acknowledged that using nuclear blasts for a peaceful role could cause contamination. For example, a sub-soil explosion could contaminate the undersurface waters and be a serious threat to human life.

"These and other problems are being studied and ways considered to avoid risks," the former nuclear chief had stated in his confidential briefing.

Sabherwal recalled that preparations for the first nuclear test, which was dubbed as a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), at Pokhran, were initiated in 1970. The test was carried out four years later on May 18, 1974.

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Postby sivab » 29 Dec 2006 12:53

Arun_S:
Thanks for those excellent references. Page 17 of this link resolved my doubts.
http://www.unene.ca/un802-2005/ben/reactor_physics_is_fun.pdf

In the worst case of a fuel handling system failure, there is about a weeks time at full power and several more weeks time at reduced power. I am sure INDU also has similar capability, if not same as CANDU 6. This feature can be used during normal operation when fuel handling system is required/scheduled for more than full capacity on certain days. I happily agree 100% with your bottomline comment. :D

Alok_N:
No need for psy-ops ...

You misunderstood. I never said I don't have confidence, only that you seem to have more. More specifically, I have confidence in their technical excellence, but doubt that they are as machiavellian as you portrayed them to be. NPCIL is not a very secretive organization like BARC. Anyone can visit NPCIL facilities, if they know right people to ask. Lets leave it at that.

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Postby Gerard » 29 Dec 2006 22:08

Raju wrote: MUMBAI: A hitherto unknown aspect of India's nuclear weapons programme was that Vikram Sarabhai, who headed the country's atomic establishment between 1966 and 1971, after the death of Homi Bhabha, was in favour of a series of nuclear tests and not just a single one.


http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/I ... tBomb.html
On 5 April 1965 bBhabha initiated the effort by setting up the nuclear esplosive design group Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP). Bhabha selected Raja Ramanna - Director of Physics at AEET - to lead the effort.
Sarabhai was a follower of Mohandas Gandhi and a pacifist who opposed nuclear arms. His selection was probably politically motivated as Sarabhai hailed from a rich and politically powerful family.

At the beginning of June 1966 Sarabhai ordered a halt to SNEPP, and the confiscation of the papers that had been generated on the project. It appears that this was Sarabhai's personal decision, rather than a reflection of PM Gandhi's policies at this time, and he may not have even consulted with her on it. That this was possible illustrates the vulnerability of a program not based on a broad consensus among key decision makers. It did not altogether mean the end of Indian progress toward acquiring nuclear weapons however. The development of the necessary infrastructure proceeded apace, and the cadre of scientists that Bhabha personally recruited did not forget their objective (as they would demonstrate less than 18 months later). And the logic of India's strategic situation continued to push India toward exercising this option.
Chengappa however states that Gandhi directly approved the new effort at the urging of her new secretary Parmeshwar Narain Haksar [Chengappa 2000, pg. 112], and that she specifically told Vikram Sarabhai, chairman of the IAEC, not to interfere. In any case Sarabhai did not try to stop this work when he became aware of it and appears by the spring of 1969 to have become at least a moderate supporter of the program.

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Postby ramana » 29 Dec 2006 23:15

A definite image of Sarabhai as a peacenik was created and nurtured. The news by Sabherwal makes one wonder at Sarabhai's sudden death due to cardiac arrest in 31 Dec 1971 in Trivandarum. May he rest in peace! He has been vindicated atleast now.

BTW, read again his assessment of UK and its tests. Uncle had to step in and keep the UK's H&D. And India knew by 1970 if not before.

India is blessed with scientists who are statesmen.

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Postby Bade » 30 Dec 2006 00:09

Another tangential piece of information I recollect being told was that Mrinalini Sarabhai's sister was in the INA. This may not necessarily vindicate Vikram Sarabhai being painted as a peacenik, but it would have been highly unlikely that he would have close associations with a Malayali family with such credentials if he were a true peacenik.

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Postby Roop » 30 Dec 2006 03:26

ramana wrote:India is blessed with scientists who are statesmen.


Amen!! And one of the things that most infuriated me about this whole J18/M03/HydeAct debate was the way these scientists were insulted/trashed by MMS and his UPA stooges, publicly and shamelessly.

BTW, read again his assessment of UK and its tests.


Where can one do this? Is it in one of the links provided on this thread?

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Postby svinayak » 30 Dec 2006 03:41

ramana wrote:A definite image of Sarabhai as a peacenik was created and nurtured. The news by Sabherwal makes one wonder at Sarabhai's sudden death due to cardiac arrest in 31 Dec 1971 in Trivandarum. May he rest in peace! He has been vindicated atleast now.

BTW, read again his assessment of UK and its tests. Uncle had to step in and keep the UK's H&D. And India knew by 1970 if not before.

India is blessed with scientists who are statesmen.


We have the information that explains lot of things between 1966 to 1971.
They may have found out that he has initiated the explosion and that could explain his death.

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Postby ramana » 30 Dec 2006 03:58

MR from Raju's post above
If one looks at past experiences abroad, it is clear that just an explosion without requisite follow-up growth will gradually lead to a decline in national prestige and a slide down in national morale.

"Thus in Britain the failure to sustain a massive nuclear programme after the explosions did not help Britain, but created varied problems."


Wonder if BRF members would like to comment on this?


Acharya, if the shaft was started in 1970 then he was part of the decision loop. And that is contrary to all that is perceived about him.

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Postby Gerard » 30 Dec 2006 06:53

The British got what they wanted out of their bomb tests - transfer of US weapon designs, components and missiles, independent development of which would have been an enormous strain on UK resources. They built the bomb to maintain their great power status. They had to prove they could develop the bomb independently.

The 1946 McMahon act stopped all US nuke cooperation. It was only after the British hydrogen bomb tests in 1958 did the US agree to the US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement, after which all UK weapons were based on US designs.

http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php? ... 1moore_050

In 1957 and 1958, Britain's last two series of atmospheric nuclear tests took place over Malden and Christmas Islands in the Pacific. The British government called these bombs "megaton" weapons, a term that appears to have been chosen deliberately to obscure their nature. Historians still do not know whether British scientists discovered independently how to create a two-stage hydrogen bomb, although it is now clear that the 1957 tests included at least one failed attempt at a thermonuclear design. "We haven't quite got it right," said Bill Cook, the deputy head of Britain's nuclear weapons program, after the 1957 failure. [4]


Some people even claim the UK never successfully tested an H bomb
http://www.williambowles.info/guests/uk_wmd.html

Interesting history of the British hydrogen bomb programme:

http://www.atomicforum.org/uk/grapple.html
http://www.atomicforum.org/uk/grapplex.html
http://www.atomicforum.org/uk/grappley.html

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Postby shiv » 30 Dec 2006 07:23

About Atomic bomb tests - things may have changed after Sarabhai's time

http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper451.html
Computer Simulation Capability
In the early days of nuclear weapon design, the physics knowledge - both in terms of experimental data and in terms of theoretical techniques - in areas like nuclear cross-sections, equation of state, radiation hydrodynamics, etc. was weak. There would be considerable discrepancy between the predicted yield of a test and the yield actually achieved and one or more parameters in the computer calculation package would be adjusted to achieve a match. But by 1998, when we refined our computer calculations for the designs we tested, physics knowledge had advanced tremendously in every field, whether it was the use of density functional methods for calculating the total energy of a material at any given pressure and temperature or the nuclear cross-sections for any isotope, with the result that such "fudging" was not necessary. If you get all your physics right, there is no basic difference between computer design calculations for a nuclear weapon and computer simulation calculations; after all, the same physics has to go into both. The computer design program developed by us was validated in parts through our own laboratory hydrodynamic experiments as well as by a few international benchmark data sets -- on marginal supercriticality experiments like GODIVA-II24, inertial confinement fusion-related experiments on radiation driven shock waves at various radiation temperatures25, etc. -- which are available in the literature. That is why there was such a good match between design and achieved yields in all our tests, including that of the thermonuclear device. In a large complex system like a nuclear weapon, the performance of an integrated test nowadays is the culmination of a large number of precise laboratory tests of subsystems and validation of individual parts of the computer simulation package through benchmark experimental data.


Image

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Postby Gerard » 30 Dec 2006 07:32

http://www.atomicforum.org/uk/grapplex.html

While preparation of the test site was underway, development of the test devices proceeded. The new IBM 704 computer, delivered to Aldermaston in the summer of 1957, was used extensively for calculations by the design team


http://www.atomicforum.org/uk/grapple.html
The tests were hailed by the British government as proof that Britain had indeed mastered the hydrogen bomb. This was inaccurate and the government prevented the publishing of the true nature of the tests by press. While not megaton range weapons, Short Granite and Purple Granite were technically hydrogen bombs since fusion reactions contributed to a substantial amount of their respective yields.
Last edited by Gerard on 30 Dec 2006 16:49, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Arun_S » 30 Dec 2006 10:32

Cross posting from the other nukleer thread.
g.sarkar wrote:There is just one thing that bothers me, the low number of tests. If the news is correct, Indian scientists cancelled one or more test, saying that they were no longer needed. Why so few tests, while everyone of the Nukleer powers tested many many more. I remember even some Russian scientists saying that India will need more test to prove the boosted device. Could someone comment on this?

Please read more before asking this kind of uninformed questions, but this question seems to be ritual that repeats every 10 months or so. So let me do the honors for the 'Nth' time:
1. Pls do a litte more study or Googling.

To start with pls see Dr Chidambram's presentation:
THE MAY 1998 POKHRAN TESTS: Scientific Aspects, by R. Chidambaram. http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper451.html

See the graph showing the co-relation between increasing in computing power and the numbers of nuclear tests.

2. Nuke testing was the only option available when the physics and computing was unable to converge in terms of understanding all mechanics that go into fission, boosting and radiation driven fusion implosion. Hence more prevalent when its recipe was black-art.

As can be see in the Venn-diagram of Dr Chidambram (above article) that only USA and Indian nuclear weapon program is totally independent, not predicated on nuclear proliferation (from a prior Nuclear state) that is the base and hall mark of all other nuclear states (viz. Russia, UK, French, Israel, China, Pakistan & North Korea). And the Indian design is of 1995 circa, built at a time when fundamental science had matured by many order compared to 1860, 1970, or 80 or even 1990. Not to mention explosive growth in
1. Computer MEGAFLOP and precision (floating single and double) {the Cry-MP/XMP Carter embargoed against India is less powerful than my home PC 5 years ago. Hope one can see how barrier to know how has been lowered, to ordinary mullah’s, terrorists and Non-democratic rough nations}
2. Finite element modeling tools and optimization software
3. High energy experimental physics data in open
4. Accurate & well controlled High energy experimental lab setup to acquire and validate physical parameter/constants.

Thus Indian TN weapons were designed from first principle and thoroughly grounded in experimentally validated physical parameters.

The Pokhran-II tests were so close to predicted performance that even with preliminary sensor data from close in sensors the scientists decided not to explode the 6th Low Yield experimental device on the second round.

3. Fission physics and Fission weapon is so well known that it is no more an area of fundamental investigation/validation by P5 and of late all P5 tests were not focused on fission stage, all of them have focused on refining their low yield Fusion secondary that has been most changing to model in software in the 80’s and early 90’s phase of nuke development & testing. (tertiary validation/testing has been rarely done).

4. Fission optimization, testing and verification is now done using passive U238 core, using modern electronic instrumentation to validate the software code. This is where military engineers need to inspect (as observers) to gain confidence on experimental and theoretical validation of mil weapon.

5. The French will arm their Sub launched M51 ICBM with a new Thermo-nuke TNO, and this TNO will for the time be put to service without a full scale testing. One may ask why?and why will be the French military agree to such untested deterrent weapon, or why will French enemies will be deterred by an untested TNO?

Aviation Week & Space Technology
M51 Gives France More Flexible Deterrent To Meet Changing Threats
By Michael A. Taverna
10/22/2006 10:48:45 PM
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/c ... 2306p1.xml
The M51 also reflects France's decision to rely henceforth on simulation, rather than atmospheric testing, to verify the reliability and safety of the country's nuclear arms. The missile will be fitted initially with miniaturized TN75 warheads that equip the M45--and benefit from the last round of atmospheric tests of that warhead in 1995. But it will eventually carry an all-new warhead, dubbed TNO, that will be developed using a giant simulator facility, the Megajoule Laser, which is under construction near Bordeaux in the heart of the country's nuclear complex (AW&ST July 17, p. 122).


Rumor has it that 3 years ago GOI was going to do another round this time full yield nuke test to cut short the western teasing /psy-op of “Oh Indian weapons tested didn’t work and questioning the yield/efficacy of Shakti-1 ThermoNuke weaponâ€


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