India Nuclear News and Discussion - June 9th

John Snow
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Postby John Snow » 12 Jun 2007 08:28

Calvin wrote:The inimitable Cho once said that he opposed V R Krishna Iyer, not because he was left thinking, but because thinking had left him.


This one of the first ChiefJustices to sart a dissertaion along with judgement as why he had to decide one way or the other.

He was alos one of the very selected Justices of IG

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Postby NRao » 12 Jun 2007 17:44

One of the concerns the US has, which she is trying to pawn it of on to India (Pranabda's complain)?

Siffy :: June 12, 2007 :: Threat of nuke terror all too real: US

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Postby ramana » 12 Jun 2007 19:33

Then go after AQK. Why tighten controls (lock barns) of other countries after the Paki horse escaped? it should be the paki barn that should be closed down.

Seems to be e geo-political ploy.

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Postby Rye » 12 Jun 2007 20:03

They are trying to see if their super-covert Xerox Khan nuclear sting operation which was exposed by the pakis can be milked some more --- other countries should see through the US's BS, until the US and other P-5 start to implement the disarmament clauses in the NPT...until that time, there is no reason for India to assist in tightening controls for their benefit.

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Postby S.Valkan » 12 Jun 2007 22:10

ramana wrote:Seems to be e geo-political ploy.


Actually, this is an attempt to get FMCT pushed through the back door, by using a smokescreen of "terrorists may lay their hands on fissile material", and thereby prevent the fuel-cycle independence of anyone outside the GNEP supplier group.

The gullible would be fed the carefully crafted theory that terrorists would never be able to corrupt the honest morally upright folks in charge of fissile material in US, UK, France, Israel or the other G-8 /GNEP supplier states.

It is only the barbarians that need to be bridled.

The NP Ayatollahs must be really getting desperate.

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Postby SaiK » 13 Jun 2007 03:01

menon wrote:Is he not the one who as Law minister of Kerala made all his properties into trust properties and THEN brought in Kerala Land Reforms Act (which excempted trust properties)? A Great Commie indeed.
If I remember right it was his action that led to emergency also.


err... it was dictator EMS, the greatest commie ever. other wise I would be enjoying 144 (at least part of it) acres of my grandpa's western ghat kingdom now left with zero or minus.

and cho!~ man that guy is well fit only for movies.

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Postby ramana » 13 Jun 2007 03:47


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Postby Satya_anveshi » 13 Jun 2007 08:11

From the link ramana posted:

That signal will only come if and when Washington gets back to New Delhi and calls for another round of talks. The assessment here is that if Bush is keen, Washington will invite Foreign Secretary Shankar Menon within a fortnight at the latest to resume the dialogue.


But the 123 draft agreement prepared by Washington was more or less on the same lines as the Hyde Act. ``The Indian Prime Minister cannot sell this here, not after the red lines he drew in his two statements to Parliament,'' said an official. ``We pointed this out again and again to the Americans but they didn't seem to want to listen.''


Which ever way one looks at it, MMS must step down for being incapable of assuming PMship of India. Him being taken for a ride is not an excuse nor is distinguishable from wilfully colluding with Americans in taking everyone for a ride along with him. With little to no mandate, zero accountaility, he became PM and tried to do something no other PM ever embarked to do.
It is also normal that after so much capital(political or otherwise) is invested, if things don't work, some people will pay the price. Not sure who and how.

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Postby Calvin » 13 Jun 2007 10:44

Folks: Have any of you negotiated *any* kind of agreement that needs to built up from ground zero - without a template to work off of? If you have, you will know that this kind of negotiation is very, very common. The two key parties will meet and decide they want to do the deal, then they will leave it to the grunts to make the terms stick. Generally, the grunts negotiate in a very narrow space - in many cases, operating from their experience base, and without a complete appreciation of the strategic drivers for the agreement to create an agreement.

So, from time to time, the grunts will call in the parties to the agreement to hammer out a particularly contentious issue - and so on.

This long-drawn out process is a good one, and if it had been quick, one would have had to wonder which of the two parties was being bent over a barrel.

The fact it has taken this long implies that no one has blinked yet on a critical issue.

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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 13:06

Central Chronical :: June 13, 2007 :: N-deal: Are differences narrowing?

As of today, the negotiations have revealed that disagreement existed on five major issues: (a) Testing; (b) Right of return; (c) Safeguards; (d) Fuel assurances; and (e) Right to reprocess spent fuel.
The latest round of three-day Indo-US nuclear deal talks between Indian and American officials ended in New Delhi on June 3 without resolving certain specific aspects relating to Indo-US "full civilian cooperation".

It may be recalled that on July 18, 2005, US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed in Washington a landmark agreement on civil military cooperation that, if implemented as intended, would mark the end of what Jaswant Singh, the former Foreign Affairs Minister, once famously called "nuclear apartheid" against India. This agreement had spelled out the term "full civilian cooperation" provided India voluntarily provide separation plan and bring its civilian nuclear facilities under the international safeguard regime.

On March 2, 2006 when President Bush visited New Delhi, India provided such a separation plan among other things to attain "full nuclear cooperation" with the US, including an assurance of uninterrupted fuel supply to all the civilian nuclear facilities in India. However, all these assurances suffered a setback when the US Congress passed the Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 in December.

The Hyde Act did redefine the nature of the "full civilian cooperation." thereby giving the impression to India that the US was shifting the goal post of July Joint Agreement. However, the Bush Administration officials like Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns asked India "not to rock the boat" and that the provision of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which forms part of the Hyde Act (Section 103) would be as 123 Agreement or bilateral agreement between the US and India that need to be worked out would be the operative part of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation. After signing the Hyde Act, President George Bush in reference to controversial Section 103, had said "The executive branch shall construe such policy statement as advisory."

India is hoping that it could resolve some of the concerns of the Hyde Act. While negotiating the text of the 123 agreements the negotiation with American officials have been held at Washington, New Delhi, London, Cape Town since January to the current round of talks ending on June 3. As of today, the negotiations have revealed that disagreement existed on five major issues: (a) Testing; (b) Right of return; (c) Safeguards; (d) Fuel assurances; and (e) Right to: reprocessing spent fuel, reprocessing technology and heavy water technology.

Assurance of permanent fuel supplies has been a major concern. The Department of Atomic Energy officials had been noticing from the beginning that placing of all the civilian reactors under permanent safeguards was on the assurance of permanent fuel supply. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar points out that there was another 123 agreement which India signed with the US relating to Tarapur reactor in 1963. It had contained very specific provisions for reliable supplies to Tarapur, but nothing prevented the Americans from reneging on that 123 agreement. Therefore, the Indian technical team wants to put down clearly the American assurance on fuel supply in the 123 Agreement, including that of developing a "reserve of nuclear fuel", to ensure uninterrupted supply over a lifetime of India's reactors.

Such an assurance is not forthcoming from the American side led by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who had been referring to the Hyde Act Section 103(b) (10) which is structured to limit nuclear power reactor fuel reserves to amount commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements. Furthermore, according to the Congressional Report, the US officials have testified to Congress that America does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed in response to Indian action such as conducting another nuclear test.

On conducting a nuclear test, the Indian officials seem to have indicated that there was no way India could commit itself not to test. Yet there is some indication that on this issue a compromise formula is being attempted. Nevertheless this issue involves the sovereignty and security of the country. Indeed American officials have repeatedly indicated that current strategic partnership with India has been to make India power.

Our neighbourhood is surrounded by untrustworthy nations. The relation of China with Pakistan, supply of magnetic rings to Pakistan, transfer of Korean missile technology to Pakistan and the unresolved Sino-Indian border dispute are the threats to Indian security. For the US the threat is only from the terrorists but for India it is from the terrorists and the countries funding and abetting them directly or indirectly plus nuclear blackmail from China and Pakistan combined.

Compromising on this issue is akin to compromising with the security of nation in the long term.

Section 123(a)(4) of the US Atomic Energy Act gives the US government the right to require the return of any nuclear material and equipment transferred under this deal and any special materials produced through the use thereof, if India conducts nuclear test or terminated or abrogates the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. Presently, the Hyde Act does not exempt India from this clause. However, there are suggestions of setting up a consultative mechanism that gets into action in case of nuclear devise thereby to reduce complete breaking down of the right to return clause.

On the other key issue of reprocessing of spent fuel right, the American officials have conceded that neither the Hyde Act nor any other law prevents US from giving consent on reprocessing to India. All that the US Atomic Energy Act and Hyde Act seek that India would have to get the consent of US for reprocessing. Therefore, all that Indian officials are legitimately seeking for "permanent consent for reprocessing written in the 123 agreement. Reports indicate that while the American officials would concede on this count but would not immediately accept on the contentious issue of denial of technology transfer for uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing and heavy water production. In fact these technologies are specifically under section 103(a)5 and 104(d)(4) of the Hyde Act.

It is noteworthy that July 2005 Joint statement, in effect, accepts India as a de facto nuclear weapon power. The US atomic Energy Act nor Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not deny the right for these technologies even to non-nuclear weapon states Yet the Hyde Act denies these technologies to India. Moreover, Under Secretary of State Burns during the Senatorial hearing of the Hyde Act affirmed: "we do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to any State. Therefore, full civil nuclear cooperation with India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology."

Secretary of State Rice also informed the Senators that "the US does not foresee transferring heavy water production equipment or technology to India." Still the Indian side is seeking these technologies for India by pointing out already Euroatom and Japan has received these technologies.

The American officials reportedly have pointed out that these technologies were not immediately provided to Japan and Euroatom. Possibly this could be way out in resolving this issue of technology transfer by committing the US to transfer of these technologies on the specific time-frame.

For India an ideal nuclear deal written into 123 agreement could be right to testing, the right to reprocessing; unrestricted uranium supplies; full civil nuclear cooperation without exceptions of certain parts of the fuel cycle; lifting embargoes on civil nuclear activity; and safeguards in perpetuity to be made contingent on continuing bilateral cooperation so as to avoid any Tarapur-like situation. Viewed in terms of sovereign rights, of entitlements without anybody limiting, especially relating to nuclear deal would depend on our capability to exercise that right. We are thankful to our scientists that having exercised the right have successfully provided us nuclear installation of dignity of almost 24 reactors. Yet we need adequate fuel supply of uranium for these reactors and further growth which we lack. The US deal does not give us all we ought to get.

Meanwhile, there are bizarre championship of opponents to the deal in domestic environment of India and the US and also in countries like Pakistan and China. Any compromise which indicates a compromise of sovereignty of India would threaten the life of the UPA government in New Delhi. For President Bush the problem is less as his administration would end only constitutionally in December 2008 only. Yet India cannot let go the historic opportunity of ending "nuclear apartheid."

Prof Christopher S Raj, INFA

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Postby Shankar » 13 Jun 2007 13:20

As of today, the negotiations have revealed that disagreement existed on five major issues: (a) Testing; (b) Right of return; (c) Safeguards; (d) Fuel assurances; and (e) Right to reprocess spent fuel.
The latest round of three-day Indo-US nuclear deal talks between Indian and American officials ended in New Delhi on June 3 without resolving certain specific aspects relating to Indo-US "full civilian cooperation".


what else is left -looks like the deal has managed to find road block in all areas simply put

-us does not want india to carry out any more test if it does fuel supply stops
- us wants to reserve the right to return any critical item,spares,fuel if we test
-US does not want to give any ironclad guarantee about fuel if we test
-US does not want us to have the right to reprocess the spent fuels even for civilian purpose

So what exactly we are getting out of this damned deal????

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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 18:08

Organiser :: June 17, 2007 :: N-deal stuck on US obstinacy

[quote]
By M.D. Nalapat

Although India has six times more thorium reserves than uranium deposits, a succession of pusillanimous governments in New Delhi has prevented the needed exploitation of either resource.

Were the Government of India serious about meeting India’s energy needs, it would speed up the thorium-based programme and utilise more effectively the country’s stock of uranium as well as fuel feedstock, so as to enhance the country’s base inventory of plutonium.

The reality is that, given political will, India has all the elements in place to fast-track the indigenous thorium programme. Such a move would ensure that for generations to come the country does not fall prey to externally orchestrated sanctions.

With the price of uranium having gone up by about 300 per cent over the last three years, it makes no sense for India to give up a much more economically viable and proliferation-resistant technology that uses thorium, in favour of imported uranium.

After having promised India an equitable deal, the country is being pressured to settle for a killer agreement. With the Bush administration moving away from its initial position on the core issue of fuel supply and re-processing even before the 1-2-3 agreement is inked, clearly hoping for a dilution of the several killer conditions set by the Hyde Act would be foolish.

Among such conditions is the inspections regime mandated under the legislation. These would comprise of multiple agencies, the effect of which would be to uncover every key technology that has been indigenously developed. Thanks to the proposed nuclear deal, India may find its technology taken away by the US and sold back to it! With India taking the lead on global thorium technology, the inspections prescribed by the Hyde legislation and later by the IAEA would ensure that the country’s intellectual property would be taken away and even patented in other countries. This would happen as a result of the many “safeguardsâ€

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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 18:50

Since G-8, AK and PKI have talked and now this article. Each progressively more potent than the previous one. Then Pranbda speaks up.

saboteur of India’s nuclear and missile programme


Wonder which is a better word, that or sellout.

A great indicator of where MMS is heading and that the deal does not conform to J18 or is, really , no where close to it.

WRT Aug/Spet, Pranbda is not being proposed for the Presidency (I was informed).

Somethings up and MMS is not open enough.

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Postby abhischekcc » 13 Jun 2007 19:05

What I have been wondering is this - now that the US claws are finally out in the open, and the Indian team is unwilling to relent, what next?

What if the talks really do collapse? What will US do thereafter to try to strangulate the Indian FBR program? And what will be India's options? Do we tell the US to f*ck itself, and start proliferating like crazy to countries the US does not like?

Or will there be another war in the subcontinent - like the Clinton sponsored Kargil War?

These are interesting times.

Raju

Postby Raju » 13 Jun 2007 19:14

Surprisingly after the newclear deal's chances of being stillborn getting higher, UPA under able leadership of Shri Manmohan Singhji has come up with another plan. That of FDI in Indian PSU which incidentaly will also entitle corporations like Lockheed Martin etc from getting controlling stake in Indian Defence PSU. This is especially after a lot of new technology with multiple uses has fallen into our hands lately.

The controlling stake of Foreign corporations in Indian PSU's was discussed at length on some debates with eminent strategy experts, so ofcourse that is in the realm of possibility as well and not just any vague apprehension. What is this tearing hurry to sell off something or the other and what does this man really want ? I really want to believe that this dispensation has the best interests of India at heart, but something somewhere begins to stink even before one can begin to repose trust in them.

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Postby Rye » 13 Jun 2007 19:21

Raju, what PSUs specifically are you talking about? I sure would be glad to see some of these blood-sucking dinosaurs being sold to private investors --- disinvestment has come to a grounding halt under MMS for these reasons, and has not moved forward since Mr Arun Shourie was taken out and his post eliminated.

Now, if this same administration starts to want to sell of PSUs associated with specific programs, then there may be some credibility to such accusations.

Raju

Postby Raju » 13 Jun 2007 19:25

BEL, BEML, Bharat Dynamics and some more.

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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 19:27

I used to wonder how much Tellis "knows". Given that he was the right hand man of Amby Blackwill, specifically recruited to deal with Indian nuclear issues AND that he was given unprecedented access to the Indian nuclear establishment, he must know a ton more than anyone on this side of the pond - which is natural, nothing sinister in all this.

The Nalapat article adds two things: Tellis, and what he may know and the FBR is not totally a "civilian" gizmo. Both have a huge impact on what has gone into the formulation of the deal and the stout defence from Indian Scicom.

Raju

Postby Raju » 13 Jun 2007 19:40

At the max Tellis will know enough to make some guesstimates. Even your seniormost babu will not have the best idea. All of them plainly believe whatever is fed to them by the scientists. This is how it works here.

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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 19:44

This is how it works here


Ah. I see.

Is that common knowldge?

IF true, then no matter which GoI, they are in no position to conduct any meaningful negotiations (without DAE directing them).

Also, IF so, then why would MMS bargain for this deal knowing this?

Just curious.

Raju

Postby Raju » 13 Jun 2007 19:51

>>no matter which GoI, they are in no position to conduct any meaningful negotiations (without DAE directing them).

This is absolutely correct. Babu doesn't even have the option of cross-checking to verify facts if all the scientists parrot the same line. In this respect I have always maintained that for MMS & Co, this deal was for the purpose of gaining strategic ground. That is how they sold it to bureaucracy. Electricity and stuff was for public consumption.

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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 19:52

Raju,

WRT PSUs, etc:

The Hindu :: May 23, 2007 :: Changes in Atomic Energy Act soon, says Kakodkar

Kolkata : The Atomic Energy Act will be amended "as soon as possible" to enable private sector participation in the civilian nuclear programme, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar said here on Tuesday.

"Certainly more players can come into nuclear energy that has so much potential but it has to be synchronised with the amended Act," he said.


AK has an option for that too. However, what he implies, is that, everything will be under DAE - LM, Westinghouse, ABC, XYZ,.....

His philosophy has always been - 'India/Indians control nuclear field in India'.

So, as long as the US is willing to play within those rule/S, he is just fine. BTW, it includes the IAEA too.

Raju

Postby Raju » 13 Jun 2007 19:54

Yesterday I heard something on media on govt delicensing/opening up mining of Ileminite.

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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 19:55

In this respect I have always maintained that for MMS & Co, this deal was for the purpose of gaining strategic ground.


Very interesting.

How so? Perhaps I missed your posts?

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Postby ramana » 13 Jun 2007 19:56

NRao, wrt to Nalpat article:

Maverick says

FBR_NPA stratergy

MDN is falling for the bogey.

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Postby ShauryaT » 13 Jun 2007 19:58

NRao wrote:Also, IF so, then why would MMS bargain for this deal knowing this?

Just curious.
It is the color of the lens. Nothing less, Nothing more. The general world views form a basis to pursue certain paths. MMS believes in the following:

1. Expansion of the sources of energy is vital to India's future growth
2. Nuclear energy is a desirable form of energy and India should look to end the nuclear and dual use technology apertheid
3. India has no desire to be a hard power and should continue to focus on building its economy
4. No roll back to the strategic program

The above world view is simply not balanced by hard power realities, security perspectives and regional realities.

Raju

Postby Raju » 13 Jun 2007 20:03

>>How so?

We are intent on playing in the big league with the big boys. The reasons for this confidence could be technological, while the Americans want to delay acknowledging this for as long as they can afford. Thus they are coming up with legions of excuses.

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Postby John Snow » 13 Jun 2007 20:06

This is the time I wish Sunil S , ALok N, kgoan and N cube come out for batting on this thread.

Folks come leave your differences apart , rip this tamasha wide open from all perspectives. Forget the Bradmins bad umpiring, padd up and bat please for the sake of BR.

Thanks in advance...
Last edited by John Snow on 13 Jun 2007 20:57, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby SaiK » 13 Jun 2007 20:13

imho, this is the one reason that we have to ensure we have strong economy going.. self reliant, and least dependent on external sources. unfortunately we are already dependent on the middle east for oil.. in addition, after this nuclear deal, we have to add one more dependent : NSG especially when governed by the sole super power and its haegemonic designs.

the most america can do is not what India has not already tasted. sanctions, denying dual use techs, banning Indians participation in CERN, and other international peaceful nuclear use, etc. furthermore, ankill can instigate more pakis to do terrorism operations in India, by just by giving more psychological and political support as they are doing now (but slightly lowered their ant after 911). they would increase free defence aid to pakistan, etc..

nothing americans can do that we can't handle or we don't know. fearing their ops is the worst disease to have at this stage of our maturity knowing american politics.

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Postby SaiK » 13 Jun 2007 20:13

del

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Postby Satya_anveshi » 13 Jun 2007 20:19

Actually, at this point, any intellectual mumbo-jumo will once again muddy the waters when things are crystal clear on the intent, method, and the madness.

Just do what M.D. Nalapat is doing and hope for many more to do the same (against few more with focus being on MMS).

That alone may keep this mafia from venturing into these kind of sellout deals.
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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 20:27

ramana,

Too shallow on first pass. Will re-read it. Pls check email.

ShauryaT,

Is that a London School of Econ motto by any chance? I have been told that but have never been able to nail MMS via goggle.

Raju,

Well. Then MMS is not in sync for sure. IF he intends playing in the BLs, then he needs danda too. That could explain his weakness to 'give away'.

John,

Sigh................ London has an underground. However, re-read the Nalapat article. Just that geekheads are more in tune than most of us. You just need to find the right socket to plug in. :)

_______________________________________________________

I feel that the Nalapat article is rather advanced and open as it can get at this point in time.

However, here is another observation of mine, just like I felt KS and Burns were in tune, it looks like MMS and Bush (or was it Condi) are in tune.

Bottom line: whatever anyone does, let the DAE drive till 2050. That means the US, NSG and the IAEA have to follow the diktat of the DAE till 2050 without any objections - even economical.

Raju

Postby Raju » 13 Jun 2007 20:56

>>Well. Then MMS is not in sync for sure. IF he intends playing in the BLs, then he needs danda too. That could explain his weakness to 'give away'.

He has to go by what he is advised. Then he has to formulate an opinion. At this moment we do not know where the disconnect is. Vested interests might be feeding dubious advice which might only reach his notice after public outcry. But in this country he can't really get away with a bad decision on long-term strategy, there are too many hurdles in the path. Thus no reason to press panic-button at any point, but never cease vigilance.

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Postby Anabhaya » 13 Jun 2007 21:31

the most america can do is


Stop Israeli weapon supplies. Phalcon and Green Pine ? GE Engine supplies for Tejas

We've been there, done that.

But considering we've come so far another decade of 'external assistance' will allow us to reach points of no return where no amount of sanctions can disrupt our most important programs.

This is the most appropriate stage for Uncle to squeeze things and for us to play safe.

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Postby NRao » 13 Jun 2007 23:13

Rajuji,

Thanks.

But in this country he can't really get away with a bad decision on long-term strategy, there are too many hurdles in the path.


Well, understand that, but at times even giving in into a "short" term strategic event can hurt the longer term one. Right?

Also, when one reads the Hyde Act, one has to wonder what did the US give up at all. (SV stated that the US has to start at the HA here on out - I do not understand that, but will give him the benefit of that doubt.) Thus the risk, IMHO, is rather unmanageable - which is what I feel we are witnessing.


Sometimes when we think things are going one way they go another and it is too late by the time they can be changed. It is not just the US that is after whatever they are after - Japan, EU and the rest are after that too. IF we go on 'getting into the main stream' theme, we have to be aware that it has a force of its own - which can drag ...................

Thus no reason to press panic-button at any point, but never cease vigilance


At times vigilance can be misinterpreted as a panic attack.

And, at times one deliberately 'panics' - to lay a 'mine' - or at times called red-line. Taken seriously they can stop progress in its track. And, of course, then there is the real panic attack.

'vigilance': how do we know what to be vigile against? IF DAE is conducting side shows?

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Postby SaiK » 13 Jun 2007 23:26

Unlike the Cold War period, concepts of 'deterrence' and 'denial' are no longer mutually exclusive. They are in a state of co-habitation today. Unlike the US, India believes in the continuance of deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial is not feasible for India and has only a limited value. Further, there are limitations on India acquiring BMD capabilities as it involves huge expenditures. In the case of the US, the emphasis is on asymmetric threats, which is not the case with India. However, China is going in for missile defence and hence there has to be simultaneous research and development of offensive and defensive weapons by India.

The US is looking at leaner but meaner nuclear forces, alongside modernization of warheads and delivery systems. It is also looking for a responsive weapons infrastructure. India has smaller nuclear weapons compared to the West and if the taboo on nuclear use is broken, it will create new problems for Indian security. India must accord serious thought to its nuclear weapons infrastructure, especially because of its commitment to separating its military and civilian nuclear facilities in terms of the Indo-US nuclear deal. There must be clear emphasis on improvement in yield to weight ratio.

......... While this has no major implications for India, if it is a case of multilateral arms control, China will come into the picture, and India's calculation of its own deterrent size and composition will be influenced.

Nuclear weapons are here to stay. India must take cognizance of this reality and ensure adequate measures for security. Substantial measures must be taken for conventional modernization to shore up the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Above all, India must persevere in striving for a nuclear weapons free world.

If this is the state of affairs on nuclear weapons thinking and strategies, is it feasible for India to abandon or neglect its nuclear deterrent? The underlying rationale for nuclear deterrence remains the same. India cannot afford complacency in building its nuclear deterrent capabilities. China's current estimation and future projections have to be taken into account while planning for India's nuclear deterrent. India's nuclear strategy for combating terrorism differs from the global strategy in dealing with this problem through improved intelligence, export controls and more vigilance. Dr Sethi's paper addresses the fact that India must pay attention to upgrading and modernizing its nuclear arsenal to address the uncertainties of the future while, at the same time, emphasizing that India adheres by a restrained nuclear policy. If, according to Dr Sethi, India's nuclear threshold is raised to thwart any adventure by Pakistan, this will open a Pandora's box of proliferation concerns. While a verifiable FMCT, UNSCR 1540, and no first use (NFU), seem to be favoured in India, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) remains a matter of concern as it sidesteps international law, lacks UN backing and militates against the Convention on the Law of the Seas.

http://ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?ac ... icle&mod=b



http://ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle11.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2257&status=article&mod=b Nuclear Tests: India Cannot Foreclose the Option

The deal is important for India, but its fate is now contingent on India's stance on future nuclear tests.

Future nuclear tests are crucial for ensuring the safety and reliability of existing nuclear arsenals and making design improvements for higher yield and reducing the yield-weight ratio of nuclear warheads in the future.

The credibility of this posture derives from India effectively communicating its resolve to its adversary, viz. that any nuclear attack will be reciprocated with a symmetrical response. To achieve this objective, India requires modern state-of-the-art weapons, tried and tested, which could deter any belligerent adversary from contemplating an attack on India.

After the May 1998 tests, India was under stringent sanctions under the existing US laws. If India is to conduct any nuclear tests in future, India would again be subject to sanctions by the US. The legal situation is thus clear. After the May 1998 tests, India had announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to reassure the global community, as also to the ideal of global nuclear disarmament. This is a voluntary stand, which was reiterated in the July 2005 agreement. However, India's voluntary moratorium cannot foreclose the option for a future government to test if national interests so demand. India cannot convert its unilateral voluntary moratorium into a bilateral legality.

ramana
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Postby ramana » 14 Jun 2007 00:14

X-posted from the China thread

Narmad posted

India, like any choice, comes with a price
Choices usually involve a price, but people persist in believing that they can avoid paying it. That's what the Indian government thought when it joined the American alliance system in Asia in 2005, but now the price is clear: China is claiming the whole Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, some 83,000 sq. km. (32,000 sq. mi.) of mountainous territory in the eastern Himalayas containing over a million people. China has claimed Arunachal Pradesh for a century: during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 Chinese troops briefly occupied most of the state before withdrawing and inviting India to resume negotiations. However, most Indians thought the dispute had been more or less ended during Chinese premier Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi in April 2005, when the two sides agreed on "political parameters" for settling both the Arunachal Pradesh border dispute and another in the western Himalayas.

Indians assumed that the new "political parameters" meant that China would eventually recognize India's control of Arunachal Pradesh. In return, India would accept China's control of the Aksai Chin, a high-altitude desert of some 38,000 sq. km. (14,000 sq. mi.) next to Kashmir. And that might actually have happened, in the end if India had not signed what amounts to a military alliance with the United States

A year ago, Indian foreign policy specialists were confident that they could handle China's reaction to their American deal. In fact, many of them seemed to believe that they had taken the Americans to the cleaners: that India would reap all the technology and trade benefits of the U.S. deal without paying any price in terms of its relationship with its giant neighbour to the north.

But there was confidence in Washington, too: a quiet confidence that once India signed the 10-year military cooperation deal with Washington, its relations with China would automatically deteriorate and it would slide willy-nilly into a full military alliance with the United States. Who has taken whom to the cleaners remains to be seen.


SaiK
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Postby SaiK » 14 Jun 2007 00:55

imho, that is a psy op.. should we fear chinese more than americans? etc. and we need to fear our own sectarians first before speak about J&K and NE borders., that we have given way too autonomous functioning.

btw, it could be all american psy op that wants us to think hard on the nuclear deal now and don't fall back since anyway chinese are going to be chinese afterall.

when it comes to the goodies, we point china, and their nuclear club acceptance that has no relationship with economy or politics. but when it comes to our own benefits, we are divided.. and favour local neighbors and their designs than 10k miles away.

we have to look at the deal, what satisfy our best interests viz civilian needs. this border issue is non sequitur to the nuclear deal is my understanding.

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Postby Sadler » 14 Jun 2007 02:36

Are there any good articles that articulate India's position on its civilian as well as military nuclear program? What are its objectives, goals, plans etc?

svinayak
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Postby svinayak » 14 Jun 2007 04:28

http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/11/stories ... 341100.htm

THE HINDU, JUNE 11, 2007
U.S. presidential campaign and India

Derek Chollet

The strong U.S.-India relationship has deep support from both Republicans and Democrats.

WITH THE U.S. 2008 presidential campaign in full swing, nearly 20 Republican and Democratic contenders (and possibly more to join soon) are already crisscrossing the country and outlining their policy positions and platforms. This frenzy of campaigning even seems early for most Americans, but for those abroad — in India and elsewhere — it is worth asking: how does this matter to us?

All American presidential elections are consequential, but the next one seems more so. For the first time in over 50 years, no incumbent President or Vice President is in the race, making this a truly open contest to be the first post-Bush, post-9/11 President. The next President — whether Republican or Democrat — will have an opportunity to assess the successes and failures of the Bush years, and then change course accordingly.

It is fair to expect that after 2009, the world will witness a major readjustment of American foreign policy across many issues.

Every new administration spends its first few years dealing with the difficult inheritance of its predecessor, and Mr. Bush’s successor will have his or her hands full — from winding down the disastrous Iraq war to reversing the animosity toward the U.S. around the world. Most analysts concede that when it comes to America’s place in the world, Mr. Bush’s successor will face the most difficult circumstances in U.S. history. That’s why it’s so significant that one of the good news stories a new U.S. administration will inherit is a relationship with India that is stronger than ever before.

For this reason, the U.S.’ relationship with India will not be a major issue in the 2008 campaign. So far, the subject has hardly been mentioned at all. But it’s fair to ask: what would a change in administration, especially to a Democratic one, mean for India? There are some who believe that because of Democratic concerns about nuclear proliferation (the former U.S. Ambassador, Robert Blackwill, derides them as nonproliferation "ayatollahs") and trade issues, a Democratic victory in November 2008 would somehow be bad for India or set our relationship back.

There is always a temptation for a new President to make his mark by doing the opposite of his predecessor. George W. Bush did this with his "ABC" — anything but Clinton — attitude after he took office, and the next Democrat in the White House will have plenty of incentive to return the favour. But importantly, the U.S. relationship with India was an exception to this in 2001, and there are powerful reasons to expect the same in 2009.

Importantly, the strong U.S.-India relationship has deep support from both Republicans and Democrats. While many Bush officials like to herald their work as opening a new era in U.S.-India relations, most Democrats see the past seven years as a continuation of the course set by President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s. To be sure, steps such as the nuclear deal are historic breakthroughs, and these have strong support from most Democrats — especially the dominant presidential contenders. The fact is that the strong U.S.-India relationship is one of the great bipartisan achievements since the end of the Cold War. At a moment where American politics is so soured by partisanship, that’s no small feat.

Trade issues

While trade issues remain a point of anxiety for many Democratic constituents and politicians — and the campaign might produce some heated rhetoric — there is broad recognition of how important the economic relationship with India is. The Democratic presidential contenders recognise that outsourcing is a fact of the global economy, and instead of talking about ending trade or building economic walls with India, they talk about ensuring that the government does more to help those who suffer most. In fact, one could argue that because of their credibility with labour unions and working Americans, Democrats are better positioned to put U.S,-India trade relations on a solid footing.

Democrats have also raised concerns about the deep problems of India’s neighbour, Pakistan. The Bush administration has pursued unprecedented cooperation with Islamabad — showering Musharraf with $10 billion in aid since 2002 — in exchange for cooperation in fighting terrorism. Yet most Democrats believe such cooperation has been too episodic, and that the peace deals Islamabad recently signed with pro-Taliban elders in western Pakistan have amounted to a failed policy and a Musharraf retreat. Democrats are concerned over negative trend lines in Pakistan — the lack of democracy, rising anti-Americanism, and deep social tensions. And they are alarmed that the vast majority of U.S. assistance money to Pakistan’s military is going to weapons that are more appropriate for confrontation with India than rooting out Al-Qaeda. A new administration would reassess this policy and look for ways to fix it.

But most important, Democratic presidential contenders (and those who would staff their administrations) realise that in a world where the U.S. has far fewer friends and seems more isolated than ever before, the U.S.-Indian partnership can be a foundation for greater American engagement in Asia and beyond.

They believe in working to give India the place of leadership it deserves as the world’s largest democracy — whether by including it on the U.N. Security Council, or as a founding member of a new "Alliance of Democracies."

In short, no serious Democrat is talking about undoing the great work the past two Presidents have done to strengthen U.S.-Indian relations. If anything, they are planning for a more ambitious agenda. So as one of the most interesting American presidential elections unfolds, America’s friends in India should watch with close interest — and with the confidence in our strong partnership.

(Derek Chollet is a senior fellow at The Center for a New American Security and served in the State Department during the Clinton Administration.)


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