Indian Nuclear News & Discussion - 28 Jul 2007

Rangudu
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Indian Nuclear News & Discussion - 28 Jul 2007

Postby Rangudu » 29 Jul 2007 01:28

This thread filled up in 3 days.
I have split it peeling with it the last ~30 posts for continuity.
Link to previous Thread:
Jai Hind-Arun_S {Admin hat on}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

JC,

The economic leverage works both ways. The difference between India and China is that our leaders automatically assume that all leverage rests with the other side while the Chinese believe they can use some of the leverage to their advantage.

If testing is a strategic imperative, then tens of billions of dollars is the least of our worries. In other words, if we are a nation that is so worried about a small fraction of our GDP that may be at risk, then we don't deserve nukes. Thankfully, India is not that nation. We faced an order of magnitude higher economic risk in 1998, but we tested anyway. I'm sure we will do the same should we be in a similar situation down the line.

My bet is that in that theoretical situation, the pressure from GE, Westinghouse, Boeing etc. would be strong enough to ensure that NPAs fury is not more than a pinprick.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jul 2007 01:47

Manav wrote:I asked about AK and the soundbytes that came from him in the wake of the agreement. He smiled and referred me to the internal political condition that the current govt. needs to address/ is addressing. AK, according to this guy, has also been 'frozen' in that he has been made complicit in the govt's decisions despite his disagreement - somewhat like being co-opted.


AK himself confirms the above, with the careful choice of his words. He says, he is satisfied from what J18/M2, seek to achieve. No one questioned him, if he agreed with, what J18/M2 seek to achieve?

There is good reason, why AK cannot object beyond a point. The idea of India accepting safeguards more as an NNWS or an NWS or the question of how nuclear wars are to be fought and what the policies shall be for our postures on MNCD, NFU, Moratorium, etc are largely political decisions and hence, he has important but limited input into this process.

What AK needed to do is namely protect the 3 stage and protect the strategic deterrent, along with DAE independence. His weight towards deciding how much is enough WgPu for India is limited by the policy assumptions put in front of him. AK's ideas of a new lighter weight MIRV TN war heads and their reliability measures would be different from, say the army chief's.

So, with all due respect to AK, He is but one and not the most important individual in the realm of nuclear policy, which is largely political.
[/quote]

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Postby SaiK » 29 Jul 2007 01:52

counter to counter move strategies must be documented in the 123.. i.e, if we test, and they stop and ask us to surrender fuel and technology, then we would allow only reduced (say 4 or 5) number of reactors into civilian zone and slowly move into IAEA zone as we deem fit document right away. at such a stance, we can't afford to keep 70% of reactors under IAEA and further getting castrated for strategic decisions we might make at a later stage.

otoh.. if the deal says, only USA will stop and ask us to surrender fuel and will not force others (but australia et al chelas will just follow US decisions, immaterial of it directs or not)... then we have to ensure, such that other NSG suppliers deal with a perenial supply that is not directed by USA, and other indo-us bilateral agreements.

That way, we can be clear... and though we could agree for such a deal, for a later sanction, that we could decide not to use Made in USA tags in the nuclear field at all.. just use this deal to get other deals .. but clearly and cleverly documented.

natural uranium suppliers needs to be taken into confidence regarding such a deal.

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Postby NRao » 29 Jul 2007 02:05

The consequences of India's n-test is always going to be more affected by India's political relationship with the US and other powers thant it is by "rules."


Very true.

What +ves does the future hold? I am assuming that it will be a partnership and not a one sided, NPA driven, hogwash.

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Postby JCage » 29 Jul 2007 02:10

Rangudu wrote:JC,

The economic leverage works both ways. The difference between India and China is that our leaders automatically assume that all leverage rests with the other side while the Chinese believe they can use some of the leverage to their advantage.

If testing is a strategic imperative, then tens of billions of dollars is the least of our worries. In other words, if we are a nation that is so worried about a small fraction of our GDP that may be at risk, then we don't deserve nukes. Thankfully, India is not that nation. We faced an order of magnitude higher economic risk in 1998, but we tested anyway. I'm sure we will do the same should we be in a similar situation down the line.

My bet is that in that theoretical situation, the pressure from GE, Westinghouse, Boeing etc. would be strong enough to ensure that NPAs fury is not more than a pinprick.


Good post R - will think over it !

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Postby SaiK » 29 Jul 2007 02:26

Well there is also a valid theory that says its 'cause of the MNCs in Bangalore that put pressure not to cross LoC during Kargil war. If that is true, or partially true, then there is a bigger problem with our chieftons who decide things... now after signing this deal, they would more threshold factors to overcome. fuel supplies, and surrender, plus the after effects going to be disaster in the sense having to take back power from civilian grid with no backup plans as such, and whole 9 yards of chain reactions.

Its a very well known fact that we will test only if China or Pakistan test. btw, did we test after NoKo did? wasn't NK in our zone of interests, who are direct enemies supporting and selling missiles and systems to pakistan? where was chief strategists brain then? why did we not test then?

IMHO, we would only test if Pakistan tests or China (after nuke deal) does. Rest, we will not, not by indo-us nuclear deal, but by the way our decision makers think (fish-bone here).

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Postby bala » 29 Jul 2007 02:57

Currently, for India, due to its voluntary moratorium on test, there is no need for test. However there is a need to test once the following conditions happen: a) the US tests b) China tests c) any other P5 member tests. If the Pukes or any other wannabe nations like Iran ever test they will be history. Considering the fact that, say, the US tests or China or any P5 member then the world would be willing to countenance a test by India. If the US or China tests then India following suit immediately would have the world focus on the former and not on India. In these cases the US president would have to think twice before invoking any sanctions or withdrawal. By treaty they cannot cut of uranium fuel supplies to civilian reactors. If the US had tested then they have no moral leg to stand on for lecturing/countenance of India.

As long as India does not resort to nuclear weapons testing unilaterally then we are dealing with hypotheticals.

Once the FBRs are mastered and produce adequate energy then India can write new treaty/rules for FBR technology and thorium fuel waste reprocessing.

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Postby Neshant » 29 Jul 2007 03:09

> there is no need for test

how do u know there is no need for test.

that one h-bomb which india claims to have tested by some accounts failed. even if it did succeed partially, the question is can a nuclear deterrent be based on one suspect test.

they should test everything BEFORE signing onto anything. do as the chinese did, they ignored all agreements between the US and USSR regarding atmospheric tests..etc until they were ready.

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Postby milindc » 29 Jul 2007 03:19

Neshant wrote:> there is no need for test

how do u know there is no need for test.

that one h-bomb which india claims to have tested by some accounts failed. even if it did succeed partially, the question is can a nuclear deterrent be based on one suspect test.

they should test everything BEFORE signing onto anything. do as the chinese did, they ignored all agreements between the US and USSR regarding atmospheric tests..etc until they were ready.


Boss, this has been discussed for umpteenth time...
Pls don't re-hash the same old arguments. If you have any other material other than old NPA VDM articles, then pls post them.
Just don't make any blanket statements like test wasn't successful, or partially successful, or suspect test.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jul 2007 03:25

I want to temporarily interrupt to ask something -- back in 1974 when we tested and the Buddha Smiled, did we ever first consider that US would cut off the Uranium supply and cut off N-assistance? Did we ever consider that NSG would be formed?

Or did we merely realize and react after the fact?

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Postby milindc » 29 Jul 2007 03:28

Rangudu wrote:If testing is a strategic imperative, then tens of billions of dollars is the least of our worries. In other words, if we are a nation that is so worried about a small fraction of our GDP that may be at risk, then we don't deserve nukes. Thankfully, India is not that nation.


Very succinct and articulate quote. This should and hopefully will be our guidance on testing. Thanks.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jul 2007 03:49

Rangudu wrote:If testing is a strategic imperative, then tens of billions of dollars is the least of our worries. In other words, if we are a nation that is so worried about a small fraction of our GDP that may be at risk, then we don't deserve nukes. Thankfully, India is not that nation.


But is it better for us to invest the tens of billions upfront to gradually develop, or is it better to bypass that now with 123 and later pay those tens of billions afterwards when we test? You could argue that we can financially better afford things later on, but on the other hand there will be more disruption.

I'd imagine though that US power will decline over the coming decades, which will make the pain of any such disruption much more mutual.
Furthermore, I don't mind a reduction in autonomy on our foreign policy that specifically muzzles Indian commies. They will effectively be checkmated, and perhaps even coalition govts with them will become impossible if they prove too troublesome towards the new agenda. That could also limit Congress Party's power.

But I'm also thinking that China at least, if not Pak as well, will try to take advantage of the weakness in the 123 deal (the N-test clause), in order to force our hand on N-testing.

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Postby bala » 29 Jul 2007 03:51

The above mentioned replies are very good and you need to study them some more. For good or bad moratorium on nuclear test has been declared (after consideration by Indian leaders) and we have only ourselves to blame/congratulate for such a declaration.

they should test everything BEFORE signing onto anything. do as the chinese did, they ignored all agreements between the US and USSR regarding atmospheric tests..etc until they were ready.


The problem with the above quote is that we are operating in different era. china got away in a different era, the 60s. Testing in the 90s by the French, Chinese, Indians and pukes is perhaps the last. There is a new sentiment in the world that any nuclear testing is abhorrent to human kind existence and opposition to any test is very high. There is a new era in which the politics of not testing is the mantra. When we operate under such conditions keeping the focus away from India on such unsavory deeds is the prudent thing to do, no point in becoming the hated guy in the world.

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Postby svinayak » 29 Jul 2007 03:51

Sanjay M wrote:I want to temporarily interrupt to ask something -- back in 1974 when we tested and the Buddha Smiled, did we ever first consider that US would cut off the Uranium supply and cut off N-assistance? Did we ever consider that NSG would be formed?

Or did we merely realize and react after the fact?


1974 was based on geo-political situation after 1971.
With USS Enterprise in 1971 there was more pressure to get a nuclear option for India.
NSG was created in 1979

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jul 2007 03:57

Acharya wrote:1974 was based on geo-political situation after 1971.
With USS Enterprise in 1971 there was more pressure to get a nuclear option for India.
NSG was created in 1979


So in other words, we didn't think ahead.

I'm thinking that we should have planned a little farther ahead before getting the Buddha to Smile so briefly.

Geo-political situation is less relevant than immediate border situation, when you're not even a Great Power. I don't necessarily see that China was posing an immediate dire threat to our border years after 1971, so I'm thinking that if we'd waited awhile before testing, or at least planned ahead, we could have at least built up a strategic fuel reserve.

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Postby Gerard » 29 Jul 2007 04:17

Arun_S wrote:Wake up gents. What wodoo science says that PHWR are incapable of geenrating Weapon Grade Pu? Must be a new psudo science taught at Montray NPA Academy.


All the Ayatollah estimates conveniently ignore the PHWRs.
Interesting that the Indian Fast Breeder (150 kg) is compared with a single Paki reactor (40 kg) yet each Indian PHWR can produce more Pu than that.

The Tellis paper has some interesting tables on this,

Easily 70-80 weapons per year (including output from the breeder) after 2010 and that on top of existing weapons stocks ... it has been 9 years since the Shakti tests and the expansion of weapon production....

Never mind... the Ayatollahs say India has fewer weapons than even TSP...

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Postby nkumar » 29 Jul 2007 04:25

Sanjay M wrote:

But I'm also thinking that China at least, if not Pak as well, will try to take advantage of the weakness in the 123 deal (the N-test clause), in order to force our hand on N-testing.


If you want to say that PRC will test and we have to test consequently, IMO that is the best scenario we can hope for. Already US is wary of China's growing power and a test from China will further antagonize Unkil. We should test as many designs as we should using a test by China as excuse. I don't think Unkil will ask to return the material and fuel in that case. OTOH, a unilateral test by India could create a problem.

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jul 2007 04:57

From what I see, China has done all the testing it needs to. I don't know what technical info they would gain from more testing, except perhaps hydronuclear testing to further miniaturize warheads -- and that's undetectable anyway.

Perhaps China could give Pak more N-tech and more missiles, to further undermine our current strategic position, or else venture its N-subs closer and closer to the Indian coastline.

But either way, I can't see the Chinese standing still. They'll come up with a significant reaction, and it won't be some purely concialitory concessionary one.

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Postby ldev » 29 Jul 2007 05:15

Arun_S wrote: However when operated fully for low burn to generate Weapon Grade Pu it can generate 2,500Kg/year. Now if we wish we can use for another 5 years the other 4 operational rectors of Rawatbhata and Kaiga that wil eventually be seperated and assigned to civilian pool under safeguard.


Arun_S,

In the event that India wants to to keep a contingency open to provide driver fuel (Th-Pu oxides) for its AHWRs (in the event of an interruption of overseas supply due to various possibilities) how many 300MW reactors will a reactor blend of this be able to fuel i.e what is the driver fuel requirement on initial loading for one 300MW AHWR? The U-233 requirements will ofcourse become neutral (1.0) after about 8 years.

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Postby Calvin » 29 Jul 2007 05:25

They'll come up with a significant reaction, and it won't be some purely concialitory concessionary one


Nukes for Bangladesh and Burma

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Postby Arun_S » 29 Jul 2007 05:36

Gerard wrote:The Tellis paper

Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ ... final4.pdf
gives good background on PHWR refuelling etc.


Low burn refueling puts 5.5 times additional frequent fuel loading.
I am very sure the 540MWe TAPPS-3 & 4 is designed for that capacity these two themselves could produce ~796Kg/Year.

Commercial CANDU PHWR reactors are typically designed with loader overcapacity of 150%, the Indian CANDU's very likely have higher overcapacity (~300%) because of the pressure of strategic requirements. Assuming on an average 220MWe reactors effectively deliver 100% loader overcapacity (conservatively), the nonsafeguarded 220MWe PHWR can generate 430Kg/yr WgPu.

Thus 540MWe TAAPS and 220MWe will together likely produce 1,230Kg/Yr. Much of it will go to kick start FBR and AHWR.

The Shakti-1 based TN requires ~2 Kg WgPu for Primary and some ~2Kg for tertiary stages.

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Postby Arun_S » 29 Jul 2007 05:56

ldev wrote:
Arun_S wrote: However when operated fully for low burn to generate Weapon Grade Pu it can generate 2,500Kg/year. Now if we wish we can use for another 5 years the other 4 operational rectors of Rawatbhata and Kaiga that wil eventually be seperated and assigned to civilian pool under safeguard.


Arun_S,

In the event that India wants to to keep a contingency open to provide driver fuel (Th-Pu oxides) for its AHWRs (in the event of an interruption of overseas supply due to various possibilities) how many 300MW reactors will a reactor blend of this be able to fuel i.e what is the driver fuel requirement on initial loading for one 300MW AHWR? The U-233 requirements will ofcourse become neutral (1.0) after about 8 years.


From An overview of Fuel Cycles for the AHWR the 300MWe AHWR will use 230Kg/yr fresh Pu driver.

220MWe PHWR used in Pu breeding mode & 85% power generation capacity and adequate fuel loader capacity will generate 181Kg/Yr WgPu, however if there is not enough fuel loader capacity and if it is operated in conventional high burn mode the spent fuel will have only 98 Kg RgPu (Reactor grade Pu).

Corresponding figured for 540MWe PHWR are 447Kg WgPu/yr and 227Kg RgPu/yr.

Of course we do not know FBR output rate. They are conservatively starting with charactering with Mox fuel, followed by Carbide fuel and eventually metallic fuel.
Last edited by Arun_S on 29 Jul 2007 06:28, edited 3 times in total.

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Postby ldev » 29 Jul 2007 06:06

Arun_S wrote:220MWe PHWR used in Pu breeding mode & 85% power generation capacity and adequate fuel loader capacity will generate 181Kg/Yr WgPu, however if there is not enough fuel loader capacity and if it is operated in conventional high burn mode the spent fuel will have only 98 Kg RgPu (Reactor grade Pu).

Corresponding figured for 540MWe PHWR are 447Kg WgPu/yr and 227Kg RgPu/yr.

Of course we do not know FBR output rate. They are conservatively starting with charactering with Mox fuel, followed by Carbide fuel and eventually metallic fuel.


Thanks Arun_S. Your figures seem to indicate that effectively it means that if nothing catastrophic happens globally in the next 5-8 years, the rate of availability of driver fuel domestically will be adequate to support a normal commissioning program of AHWRs. Ofcourse it will not be adequate to add 100,000MW of generating capacity per year, but it will supplement quite nicely the coal/thermal capacities being added on.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jul 2007 06:07

The following is an excerpt from an old IDSA report dated 2000 time frame. It was posted earlier in one of the nuclear related threads.


India's Nuclear Force Structure
By Gurmeet Kanwal



Americans managed to convince themselves that thousands of strategic warheads and multiple means of delivering them were needed in order to deter the Soviet Union. If, however, one thinks politically instead of militarily, it becomes apparent that not much is needed to deter. What political leader would run the risk of losing even a city or two—and also his position of power—in military pursuit of problematic gains?

— Kenneth Waltz 1



Is Minimum Deterrence a Numbers Game?

Writing in the early-1980s, Bhabani Sen Gupta had said that the entire basis for nuclear weapons is deterrence: 2 "The entire purpose is to deter the enemy, not to fight him... the very existence (of nuclear weapons) is justified on a theoretical base that is gravely limited at best, and outright wrong at worst... it would be better for India to settle the doctrinal issues before going nuclear, instead of first going nuclear and then looking for doctrinal justification." However, India's nuclear policy evolved without major debate on the doctrinal issues and the nuclear weapons research and development programme was shrouded in secrecy. It is only after the Pokhran-II nuclear tests that Indian analysts have begun to wrestle with the complexities of nuclear theology and most of the home truths have had to be re-learnt. It is a universally accepted truism that deterrence is ultimately a mind game. It needs to be achieved during peace to ensure against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by one's adversaries and for the purposes of coercive diplomacy. The concept of nuclear deterrence first evolved in a US Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum where it was stated that the "threat of the use of atomic bomb would be a great deterrent to any aggressors, which might be considering embarking on atomic war."



"Minimum deterrence is not a numerical definition but a strategic approach. If a country is in a position to have a survivable arsenal, which is capable of exacting an unacceptable penalty in retaliation, it has minimum deterrence as opposed to an open-ended one aimed at matching the adversary's arsenal in numerical terms. Those arsenals in thousands were produced in an era when the strategic establishments believed in nuclear war fighting and did not understand its ecological consequences. Today, sections of the US strategic community argue that the US can discharge its global responsibilities with an arsenal of 200 warheads."



A report by W. P. S. Sidhu in the Jane's Intelligence Review soon after the May 1998 nuclear tests estimated that India's nuclear stockpile contained between 20 to 60 warheads assembled from the weapons-grade plutonium re-processed from the fuel taken from the research reactors located at Trombay. 16 However, according to Sidhu, if the plutonium produced in India's commercial reactors is also taken into account, India would possess adequate fissile material to produce "at least 390 nuclear weapons and as many as 470 weapons." 17 R. Ramachandran writes that it does not make sense to use reactor-grade plutonium "which has a high content of spontaneously fissionable Pu-240 and makes only 'dirty' bombs as against weapons-grade Pu-239 from research reactors." 18 He has calculated that India is likely to have adequate stocks of plutonium for about 30 bombs and that "A good upper band would... be 35." 19 It also needs to be noted that India's fast breeder programme requires reactor-grade plutonium and if it were to be used for making nuclear warheads, it would not be available for the purpose for which it is actually intended. 20 Estimates of the nuclear stockpile in the Indian media have ranged from 25-65 21 warheads to 50-64 22 warheads.



K. Subrahmanyam has written that "... if a country can project an image of having around 500 nuclear warheads, which India can build in twelve to fifteen years time if it were to set out on the programme and disperse them on its vast area, the country will have a credible deterrent." 62 Even after the Pokhran-II tests, while explaining that minimum deterrence is not a numbers game, he wrote: "Whether it is 150, 250 or 300, the Indian deterrent will still be a minimum one compared to others except Pakistan." 63 However, he is known to believe that "... a force of around 60 deliverable warheads could meet adequately India's need for a minimum deterrent."


Jasjit Singh also advocates a minimalist approach and a time period of 15 to 20 years for the Indian arsenal to stabilise. He writes. 67 "The exact size of the arsenal needed at the end-point will need to be worked out by defence planners based on a series of factors. But at this point it is difficult to visualise an arsenal with anything more than a double-digit quantum of warheads. It may be prudent to even plan on the basis of a lower end figure of say 2-3 dozen (survivable) nuclear warheads by the end of 10-15 years.



General K. Sundarji, a former Indian Chief of the Army Staff and a perceptive military thinker, was perhaps the first analyst in India to write about the military aspects of India's nuclear deterrence. He advocated a nuclear force structure of approximately 150 warheads mounted almost entirely on a Prithvi-Agni missile force.



Brigadier Vijay K. Nair has suggested a force level of 132 nuclear warheads of different types, including weapons in the megaton range. 70 For delivery, besides bomber/fighter-bomber aircraft, he recommends five SSBNs (each with 16 SLBMs) and 48 ballistic missiles (12 SRBMs and 36 MRBMs). He writes: "India must ensure adequate reserves to provide fail safe assurance of her strategy and yet maintain an adequate force structure after hostilities cease. An additional reserve of two weapon systems is required for each planed autonomous strike and a minimum of 20 percent of the entire force structure should be available for post-strike security imperatives."



Rear Admiral Raja Menon (Retd.) recommends that India's nuclear arsenal should be based primarily on SSBNs from about 2020 onwards. 71 Till then, he feels that India's nuclear deterrent should be based only on ballistic missiles.



Admiral Menon has estimated that the modernised Chinese arsenal would comprise 596 warheads after 2010. Up to 2030, he suggests that an all-missile, land-based force should comprise five regiments of 12 missiles each (with survivability being ensured by concealment and rail-garrison mobility) and fifty percent of them should have up to four independently targetable warheads each. He feels that these would suffice to withstand a first strike by China with the maximum number of warheads that China may decide to launch and yet have enough missiles remaining to inflict unacceptable damage. He feels that some hardened silos may need to be provided "if the rate of degradation of the rail garrison missile force is judged to be too rapid." Against Pakistan, he proposes a force of 200 cruise missiles, 36 of them nuclear tipped, as cruise missiles are the least provocative. He visualises the "handing over of Indian deterrence from the land-based force to the sea-based force... over a ten year period... (to be) completed by 2030" and suggests a nuclear force of six SSBNs, each armed with 12 SLBMs. Each SSBN will carry at least 12 missiles and, in his view, as India has MIRV (multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) ambitions, each missile could carry up to ten 250 to 400 Kt nuclear warheads. "Such a force would give India a warhead strength of 216 (6 x MIRV) in a pre-launch scenario and probably 380 warheads in a scenario with adequate strategic warning and with five boats deployed. This could be the entire Indian deterrence till the middle of the 21st century."



Bharat Karnad follows what has been dubbed a 'maximalist' approach to nuclear deterrence and strongly advocates the need for megaton-class thermonuclear weapons in the Indian arsenal. He assumes that the primary and secondary target lists could contain about 60 locations that need to be hit. In order to ensure that each of these targets can be destroyed with an acceptable assurance level so that deterrence is credible, he recommends the targeting of each with four nuclear weapons, each of which has a two mile (approximately three km) CEP (circular error probable—a measure of the accuracy of delivery; it denotes the distance from the point of impact to the centre of the target as the radius of the circle within which, on average, 50 percent of the missiles aimed at the target will fall). Bharat Karnad suggests that India's nuclear arsenal be gradually built up over a period of three decades to a total of 328 nuclear warheads, as given in Table 3: 74



Table 3. Requirement of Nuclear Warheads

Timeframe Maximally Strategic* (Warheads) Minimally Tactical** (Warheads) Total
2000-2010 57 30 87
2010-2020 131 40 171
2020-2030 268 60 328




R.R. Subramanian, a senior analyst at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, and a physicist by training, is of the opinion that India needs at least 425 warheads if the combined efficiency (accuracy, reliability, in-flight interception) of the delivery systems is taken to be 0.3.



Lieutenant General Pran Pahwa (Retd.) recommends that India's deterrence be based on 182 warheads. 78 He bases his calculations on the assumption that China is likely to employ two warheads each to destroy every Indian warhead and that 20 percent Indian warheads would survive a Chinese first strike which would be essentially a counter force one. He feels that if India had 182 warheads, China would need to fire 364 warheads and, given a Chinese arsenal of 400 warheads, it would be left with 36 to India's surviving 36 warheads. Since the numbers remaining would be matched, China would be deterred from launching a first strike.



It emerges that Indian analysts have widely varying views on the number of nuclear warheads that India needs for its minimum deterrent. The figures vary from the low double digits ("two to three dozen") at the lower end to just over 400 at the upper end.



Despite Mao's assertion that "300 million Chinese would survive" nuclear war, it could be argued that the fear of losing some of its modern showpieces on the eastern coast, combined with the certainty of horrendous civilian casualties due to extremely high population densities, would be adequate to deter China from being the first to begin nuclear exchanges that are bound to escalate to city-busting strikes. The China scholars at IDSA hold sharply divergent views on the number of Chinese cities that need to be targeted to ensure deterrence. Sujit Dutta is of the opinion that China would be deterred if its leadership were convinced that its adversary could destroy even three major cities. 82 M.V. Rappai concurs with this view and argues that the Chinese are taking their economic development very seriously and would not do anything to jeopardise the future of their thriving population and industrial centres. 83 Swaran Singh advocates the targeting of five cities for effective deterrence but feels that rather than the ability to target a number of cities, India's overall nuclear capability should be built up for effective deterrence. 84 However, Srikanth Kondapalli holds the view that perhaps even the credible targeting of 15 to 20 Chinese cities may not be adequate for deterrence as the Chinese would not hesitate to take whatever military action they might consider necessary if, in their view, their national security interests were to be seriously threatened. 85



Recommended Nuclear Force Structure

It is now acknowledged in almost all quarters that successful deterrence does not demand qualitative or quantitative parity in force structures—the ability to inflict unacceptable damage is adequate. However, an adversary confronted with having to worry only about a retaliatory strike, would be deterred only if he was convinced that the nuclear warheads aimed at his cities, military and industrial complexes would, firstly, survive his own first strike in adequate numbers; secondly, they are powerful enough to destroy vital targets and, thirdly, they can be delivered with the required accuracies. The problem of survival can be overcome by building in sufficient redundancies into the force structure, besides dispersion, hardening and concealment. The remaining two, accuracy of delivery and the warhead yield, are directly dependent on each other — greater the CEP of a missile, larger the warhead yield required to cause the same damage for a given assurance level. G. Balachandran's calculations for an assurance level of 90 percent are given at Table 4: 90


aking into account the requirement and the likely availability of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, it would be advisable that India's nuclear force be raised in a phased manner over a period of three decades. Mid-course corrections can be applied based on the availability of new technologies and developments in the diplomatic field. For example, depending on the pace of development in China and whether that country graduates to a democratic form of government, the need to plan to target ten cities and industrial complexes for a counter value strategy, could be reviewed around 2010. In the nuclear era, strategy has never been the sole determinant of force architecture. This, according to Rajesh Rajagopalan is exemplified by the US decision to opt for the MIRV programme as the technology for it was available and it would help them to circumvent nuclear arms reduction negotiations. The technology trajectory will continue to drive nuclear force structures that should therefore be flexible and adaptable.

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Postby Arun_S » 29 Jul 2007 06:21

ldev wrote:
Arun_S wrote:220MWe PHWR used in Pu breeding mode & 85% power generation capacity and adequate fuel loader capacity will generate 181Kg/Yr WgPu, however if there is not enough fuel loader capacity and if it is operated in conventional high burn mode the spent fuel will have only 98 Kg RgPu (Reactor grade Pu).

Corresponding figured for 540MWe PHWR are 447Kg WgPu/yr and 227Kg RgPu/yr.

Of course we do not know FBR output rate. They are conservatively starting with charactering with Mox fuel, followed by Carbide fuel and eventually metallic fuel.


Thanks Arun_S. Your figures seem to indicate that effectively it means that if nothing catastrophic happens globally in the next 5-8 years, the rate of availability of driver fuel domestically will be adequate to support a normal commissioning program of AHWRs. Ofcourse it will not be adequate to add 100,000MW of generating capacity per year, but it will supplement quite nicely the coal/thermal capacities being added on.


Pls note that I have corrected the Pu consumption rate for 300MWe AHWR in my post.

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Postby vsudhir » 29 Jul 2007 06:21

N-deal to trigger sweeping enrichment of the campus (IE)

[quote]Big-bang news in six months on education in nuclear engineering, says Bikash Sinha, director, Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics

New Delhi, July 28:This is one fallout of the Indo-US nuclear deal that has not hit the headlines so far. Foreseeing a spurt in demand for nuclear scientists in India, the government is working on a wide-ranging policy to introduce nuclear sciences courses in universities.

As of now, only IIT-Kanpur has a programme in Nuclear Engineering and Technology which, on an average, awards barely 10 M.Tech degrees and just one PhD each year. But those working in the area of nuclear sciences in various organizations of the Department of Atomic Energy are mostly science and engineering graduates who have been trained for specific jobs.

While such an arrangement has worked with reasonable satisfaction till now, top experts in the field say there is a need being felt at the highest levels that the country needs better qualified nuclear scientists.

“I can tell you that probably in the next six months there is going to be a fairly important policy announcement in this regard,â€

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 29 Jul 2007 06:51

[quote]
“We can produce quality nuclear scientists not just for our own country but for the rest of the world too. For that our output has to increase,â€

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Postby ldev » 29 Jul 2007 09:31

Arun_S wrote:Pls note that I have corrected the Pu consumption rate for 300MWe AHWR in my post............the 300MWe AHWR will use 230Kg/yr fresh Pu driver.


Uh-huh. That is more like it. That is why India wanted this deal. Thanks.

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Postby Mohan Raju » 29 Jul 2007 09:36

Responding to a post from the previous thread:

Moreover, that "stupidity" is actually codified in the Indian constitution as article 51, which states that India shall adhere to all its international treaties and agreements. The only country in the world with such a clause -- Thank our constitution forefathers for that.


Wrong. India is not the only country in the world with such a clause in its constitution. The US constitution has a similar clause.

Article VI : "...and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."

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Postby Sanjay M » 29 Jul 2007 09:40

[quote="enqyoob"][quote]
“We can produce quality nuclear scientists not just for our own country but for the rest of the world too. For that our output has to increase,â€

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Postby Anand K » 29 Jul 2007 09:47

Quote Mohan Raju
Wrong. India is not the only country in the world with such a clause in its constitution. The US constitution has a similar clause.

Article VI : "...and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."


And Article 51 is only a Directive Principle of State Policy..... same status as Article 44 which advocates that the UCC would be a jolly thing. So there Yankees..... you got only a "non-justiciable right" in the bargain. Evil Chankian yindoos rule! :P

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Postby NRao » 29 Jul 2007 10:05

My bet is that in that theoretical situation, the pressure from GE, Westinghouse, Boeing etc. would be strong enough to ensure that NPAs fury is not more than a pinprick.


That is lot of weight to place on these companies.

They, I bet, will take the $$ for building the reactors, then bail out when it comes time for India to return them.

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Postby Ananth » 29 Jul 2007 10:49

Regarding the testing issue, IIRC Hyde even prevents sub-critical tests or limits the tests to yeilds < 1kT. So please factor that too in your calculations about the cost this deal imposes on regular validation of nuke weapons.

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Postby NRao » 29 Jul 2007 16:33

Bet on India

Sunday, July 29, 2007; Page B06

IN LARGE PART, modern U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy began with India. India received U.S. aid under the "Atoms for Peace" program of the early Cold War era -- only to lose its U.S. fuel supply because India, which had refused to sign the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), exploded a nuclear "device" in 1974. Decades of U.S. noncooperation with India's civilian atomic energy program were intended to teach India, and the world, a lesson: You will not prosper if you go nuclear outside the system of international safeguards.

Friday marked another step toward the end of that policy -- also with India. The Bush administration and New Delhi announced the principles by which the United States will resume sales of civilian nuclear fuel and technology to India, as promised by President Bush in July 2005. The fine print of the agreement, which must still be approved by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group and by Congress, has not yet been released. But the big picture is clear: The administration is betting that the benefits to the United States and the world of a "strategic partnership" with India outweigh the risks of a giant exception to the old rules of the nonproliferation game.

There are good reasons to make the bet. India is a booming democracy of more than 1 billion people, clearly destined to play a growing role on the world stage. It can help the United States as a trading partner and as a strategic counterweight to China and Islamic extremists. If India uses more nuclear energy, it will emit less greenhouse gas. Perhaps most important, India has developed its own nuclear arsenal without selling materials or know-how to other potentially dangerous states. This is more than can be said for Pakistan, home of the notorious A.Q. Khan nuclear network.

You can call this a double standard, as some of the agreement's critics do: one set of rules for countries we like, another for those we don't. Or you can call it realism: The agreement provides for more international supervision of India's nuclear fuel cycle than there would be without it. For example, it allows India to reprocess atomic fuel but at a new facility under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision, to protect against its diversion into weapons. The case for admitting India to the nuclear club is based on the plausible notion that the political character of a nuclear-armed state can be as important, or more important, than its signature on the NPT. North Korea, a Stalinist dictatorship, went nuclear while a member of the NPT; the Islamic Republic of Iran appears headed down the same road. Yet India's democratic system and its manifest interest in joining the global free-market economy suggest that it will behave responsibly.

Or so it must be hoped. The few details of the agreement released Friday suggest that it is very favorable to India indeed, while skating close to the edge of U.S. law. For example, the United States committed to helping India accumulate a nuclear fuel stockpile, thus insulating New Delhi against the threat, provided for by U.S. law, of a supply cutoff in the unlikely event that India resumes weapons testing. Congress is also asking appropriate questions about India's military-to-military contacts with Iran and about New Delhi's stubborn habit of attending meetings of "non-aligned" countries at which Cuba, Venezuela and others bash the United States. As Congress considers this deal, India might well focus on what it can do to show that it, too, thinks of the new strategic partnership with Washington as a two-way street.

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Postby Gerard » 29 Jul 2007 16:33

Given that Shakti 4+5 were not detected, subcritical or even low yield (sub-kiloton) tests (with decoupling) should be no problem...

The US asserts that its subcritical tests are not a violation of the CTBT or the test moratorium, that they are not really nuclear tests. Can they attempt to penalize India while doing the same?
Last edited by Gerard on 29 Jul 2007 16:56, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby NRao » 29 Jul 2007 16:40

IF it is written into their "Law" they can, they certainly can try.

The point being that this is not a equal partnership even in the civilian arena. And, given that DAE had all along stated that they can go it alone (I do not know how), what is the risk India carries if this is defeated?

From a US PoV, the thinking is beyond just this deal (above post of mine). IF this is true, then they should abandon even the Hyde Act, leave alone NPAs. They have to amend their Laws to accommodate new realities (kick-the-can is one way they would claim).

Which begs the question is India mature enough to play this game? And, at what point in time will the Americans be willing to let go of the chains - in this bigger game or are they planning on driving all the time?

On the flip side, IF India is interested in forcing the issue, then she has to gain a good foothold and quickly. The lethargic attitude works against India most of the time.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Jul 2007 16:45

Mohan Raju wrote:Responding to a post from the previous thread:

Moreover, that "stupidity" is actually codified in the Indian constitution as article 51, which states that India shall adhere to all its international treaties and agreements. The only country in the world with such a clause -- Thank our constitution forefathers for that.


Wrong. India is not the only country in the world with such a clause in its constitution. The US constitution has a similar clause.

Article VI : "...and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."


My comment on the "only" part was derived from a speech by Ram Jethmalani, a recognized Indian constitutional expert, it is possible, He is wrong or his comment was in jest or he indeed has a certain view, which i do not know of.

However, for completeness here is article 51 of the Indian constitution:

Article 51: Promotion of international peace and security
The State shall endeavour to -
(a) promote international peace and security;
(b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations;
(c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people with one another; and
(d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.

As you will notice, there is a marked difference in the words used and moreover the attitudes and practices prevalent in India, India has a far more serious interpretation of International laws and treaties than the US genereally does.

e.g: on 51(c): I do not know the last time, we were taught to ridicule the UN in India. The skirting of Geneva on Guntanamo prisoners, also comes to mind.

AnandK is right, it is in the non enforceable parts of the constituion, however and hence the respect to it is entirely discretionary.

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Postby Gerard » 29 Jul 2007 17:08


Gerard
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Postby Gerard » 29 Jul 2007 17:11

Babu Burns has been worn out by Indian babus...

No nuclear deal with other countries: U.S.[quote]“This is complicated enough, I can assure you, that the United States is not going to suggest a similar deal with any other country in the world. We’ve always felt of India as an exception,â€

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Postby NRao » 29 Jul 2007 17:36

Gerard wrote:xpost
Snubs to subcontinent


The Aussies are coming, the Aussies are coming.

Perhaps nothing the Bush administration has done in Asia is more important than the US-India nuclear deal.

Under this deal, India will split its nuclear program in two: one for its nuclear weapons and one for the peaceful generation of electricity. This peaceful program will come under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. There will be a special provision to allow India to receive nuclear material and technology from other nations even though India is not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Under this deal, the US will supply nuclear technology to India. France and Russia are also looking longingly at the potential Indian nuclear market.

The Australian revealed this week that federal cabinet's national security committee will soon consider a submission from Foreign Minister Downer to sell uranium to India.

India cannot join the NPT because under it only the five declared nuclear weapons states - the US, Britain, France, Russia and China - are allowed to possess nuclear weapons. India will certainly never give up its nuclear weapons, and it is absurd for Australia to export uranium to China, which has in the past proliferated nuclear technology to rogue nations but not to India, which has never proliferated nuclear technology to anybody.

Naturally, for Australia to export uranium to India it will need to negotiate a nuclear safeguard agreement to govern the uses to which Australian uranium can be put.

If the Howard Government proceeds along these lines before the election it sets a fantastic trap for Kevin Rudd and the Labor Party. If Rudd sticks to his opposition to uranium sales to India he will face political trouble from pro-Indian Australians and from the mining industry. But imagine if Rudd is elected with the anti-uranium policy intact. If he pursues the policy in government, he will have to repudiate an agreement, at least in principle, to supply India with uranium.

Uranium is the one thing India really wants from Australia, the one way Australia can become strategically important to India.

Thus almost the first act of a Rudd government in office would be to have the most awful fight with a giant Asian democracy. It would likely be a bitter, rancorous and wounding fight from which India-Australia relations could take many a long year to recover.

Moreover, if the US-India nuclear deal is ratified by both nations' parliaments, it will inevitably win broad international acceptance. A Rudd Labor government would thus be left in the ludicrous position of defending ground that everyone else has long since abandoned.


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