Indian Nuclear News & Discussion - 01 Aug 2007

Gerard
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Postby Gerard » 03 Aug 2007 15:36


enqyoobOLD
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Postby enqyoobOLD » 03 Aug 2007 16:13

V need a new thread on BRF Called

Nuke Chicken Littles Pls Click Here to Place Ur Crow Order


Let's c now:

Ms. Ghose by her own admission is relying on the word of MMS and his minions. BC in contrast has offered his informed opinions. Lets wait for his customary doosras and googlies after he gets hold of the 123. I am sure it will be explosive.


Er.. I guess it did not occur to the postor that Ms. Ghose probably had full access to the 123 text before, during and at the end of the negotiation, unlike "BC" and "DNM" and all the other CLs.

Let me make a guess: BC and DNM will, of course, offer "explosive" doosras, googlies etc which will be hard to spot, but they will also give tough stares which will be VERY scary. It comes from the severe bellyaching.

Of course the safe thing to do now is to "reveal" the "Hidden Agreement Behind the 123". Here is a sneak preview

456 Agreement Between US and India

The USA, hereinafter referred to as Party of the First Part, also known as "Master" has concluded this Agreement with the Yindoos, hereinafter referred to as Party of the Second Part, also known as "Slave".

.....

...

Clause 456.1
US owns all urininium, thoranum, and Pu found anywhere in India, and has appointed Halliburtin Inc as sole source contractor empowered to seize it and put it in the basement of the US Embassy at any time.

Clause 456.2
In the event of a new clear test by Slave, all reactors on Slave territory shall be immediately declared possessions of the Master.

Clause 456.3
In consideration of this Agreement, Slave agrees to do exactly as Master says in all matters of foreign policy.



Please don't tell anyone I told you. It's Top Secret. Hidden under Mouse Mohini Mooshik's pillow.


:((

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 03 Aug 2007 16:21

HEEEEEERRE's the start:

"As part of the Full Nuclear cooperation, we expected enrichment technology, reprocessing and heavy water technology would also be part of the 123 Agreement and which was possible but in the draft it is mentioned that it would be only part of the future agreement," said Srinivasan, who is currently a member of the AEC.

He also pointed out that regarding dual use equipment, the draft makes requirement of an agreement between the two parties necessary.

"This is less than what we expected, but I think we have to live with it," Srinivasan said.


How is that special Reprocessing Plant For US Fuel (as opposed to Enrichment Program for Big US companies) gonna work if it has no reprocessing technology??? :?: :?:

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Postby NRao » 03 Aug 2007 16:54

Has the US released their text? I could not find it on the net.

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Postby sunilUpa » 03 Aug 2007 17:01

NRao wrote:Has the US released their text? I could not find it on the net.


Err it's due today (It's not 9:00 am yet on East coast :wink: ) and their text and our text is supposed to be same isn't it? Afterall it's an agreement signed by India and US and you would expect them to sign same set of documents.

oooops...it's released. Here is the link

Link

Here is the PDF link

PDF link

Article 14, specially Paragraph 5 is interesting. :wink:

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Postby Raj Malhotra » 03 Aug 2007 17:11

Sometimes vague agreements bring more benefits then a non-agreement. It is matter of confidence and off course luck. As one famous general said that in War - Who is (infilterated/breached) behind whose lines is more of a matter of confidence rather than charts.

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Postby NRao » 03 Aug 2007 17:16

N^^3,

The battle to retain J18 is still on. So, from a political stream the 'state of the art' reproc facility is the biggest feather, but, from a technical PoV, it can only be used for GNEP or subset of it. It is a legit battle for one big reason: the push is on for NWS and all its legit access to be a consumer and supplier.

I will grant you this, were the tables turned, the players would do exactly the same - to you, that is nothing new I am sure, for dogs can only bark.

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Postby abhischekcc » 03 Aug 2007 17:29

sunilUpa wrote:Article 14, specially Paragraph 5 is interesting. :wink:


Yes, it does seem to be a major check on check. So, it seems that the US has not actually tried to pull a fast one over us. This deal looks more like a pre-nup document - who does what to whom, and the consequences thereof, but the negotioations, etc. etc.

Looks truly like a 'mangoes for nukes' deal. :D

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Postby abhischekcc » 03 Aug 2007 17:34

Another interesting fact is that this is not a deal for perpetuity, it will remain in force for 40 years, then for periods of 10 years if agreed upon. Hmmm.

I suppose all he people who negotiated this deal who be long dead by then.



----------
PS.

This text is so boring. Where are all the matchsticks? :twisted:

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Postby milindc » 03 Aug 2007 17:53

One thing this deal makes clear is that we can't depend on US reactors for power generation. It has to be 1 or 2 reactors just for showcase unless we add specific clauses to the supplier of reactors to help us accumulate fuel for at least 10 years of operation.

Again, all the paragraph 5 of article 15 states is that special consideration will be taken for fuel supply during consultations which means nothing in legal sense.
As Arun_S stated there isn't a perpetual fuel supply guarantee for perpetual safeguards.

One thing the clever yindoos have put in the agreement is compensation. This allows us to keep the nuclear material by claiming that other party isn't giving enough compensation. Basically, both parties get out of the agreement by claiming that other party has breached the agreement.

The quantities of fuel we can accumulate as part of 'strategic fuel reserve' is what matters. Lets wait for Uncle's spin on this.

Basically, it is very good deal for French and Russian since we can negotiate hard on the amount of fuel reserves for the sourced reactor.
This is bad deal for US companies since they will still be bound by the 1 yr limit of Hyde act.

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Postby CRamS » 03 Aug 2007 18:05

Er.. I guess it did not occur to the postor that Ms. Ghose probably had full access to the 123 text before, during and at the end of the negotiation, unlike "BC" and "DNM" and all the other CLs.



Need I say more.

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Postby John Snow » 03 Aug 2007 18:42

I think this agreement is a splendid one, hats off to the babus, If BRF after so much discussions is unable to agree on any thing, then tis iron cald in vagueness, hence prone to interpretation so we do what we feel like doing and let cotus and gotus do what they feel like doing and thats called sovereignty!

I am on the bandwagon

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Postby vsudhir » 03 Aug 2007 19:06

We're off to a decent start, seems like.

Time to focus energies on what tricks unkil might play at the IAEA (not very likely; anyway AK has sized up the place) and the NSG (potential for mischief hajaar here). In the NSg, guard against unkil using proxies to extract more 'concessions' - stuff that's make using US reactors and fuel appear more attarctive than any other .

Besides, gotta watch out for unkil-chinkil tag teaming up at the NSG level as well. Not too sure they will but constraining a potential rival is in both's interests, IMO.

Lez watch and wait for reactions to the outed text first. If the commies make a lotta noise abt it, we can rest assured it can't be that bad a deal, you know.

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Postby ksmahesh » 03 Aug 2007 19:06

http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/aug/03guest.htm

Seemed important enough and sorry if it is repost:



Disturbing implications of 123 Agreement

A quick perusal of the 123 Agreement released today shows that many of India's concerns have not been fully addressed.

The Hyde Act: When the Hyde Act was passed last year, we were told that it was an internal matter that did not concern India. But now it has been formally admitted that in the negotiations, India accepted the US position that they could not go outside the framework of the Hyde Act.

Article 2.1 of the 123 Agreement makes it very clear that the Hyde Act and other US laws will prevail. What has happened to our concerns about the "extraneous" and "prescriptive" provisions of the Hyde Act?

Nuclear Apartheid: For all the spin given by the protagonists of the agreement that this would liberate India from `nuclear apartheid', Article 5.2 of the 123 Agreement rules out transfer of any sensitive nuclear technology. This will have to be amended before any such transfer can take place.

Coverage: The Indo-US nuclear tango

Furthermore, there is no change in the position regarding dual-use items. These remain subject to the prevailing laws, regulations etc. in USA. Where are the much-touted benefits of access to technology?

Reprocessing: Article 6 (iii) does talk of "consent to reprocess." However, it kicks in only after India has set up a dedicated reprocessing facility and the two sides have agreed on arrangements and procedures.

There is silence on what would happen if the two sides do not reach agreement on these arrangements and procedures. All that is envisaged is that consultations will begin within 6 months and conclude within one year. It is not clear whether this one-year period is from the time of the request being made, or from the beginning of consultations.

So the US has at least one year, if not eighteen months, to delay reprocessing permission, during which multiple pressures would be applied on India not to go ahead with it.

But even then, there is no guarantee that reprocessing rights will in fact be given. The language does not permit India to go ahead without an agreement on the US side. On the other hand, the US has retained the right to withhold permission.

Thus, Article 14.9 provides that under "exceptional circumstances" (which have not been defined) the US can suspend the arrangements and procedures agreed upon. This is very disturbing, since it gives a virtual veto to the US on reprocessing.

Fallback safeguards: Article 10.4 does envisage fallback safeguards. The language is emphatic: "The supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures."

Consultations: Article 13.2 gives both US and India the right to seek consultations if either side feels that the other is not complying with the agreement, but this does not change the reality that the agreement will remain in force for 40 years, as envisaged under Article 16.2.

Termination clauses: Article 14 is extremely important and deserves very careful reading.

Under Articles 14.1 and 14.2, India can't just walk away from the agreement. It has to give one year's notice, and also give reasons for seeking termination of the agreement. It also has to hold consultations with the US. If there is no agreement during the consultations, then India merely gets the right to seek termination.

Article 14.2 implicitly looks at the issue of India undertaking a nuclear test. But India won't be able to take such a decision unilaterally. It is obliged, together with the US, "to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation."

Discussions will "take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's (read: India's) serious concern about a changed security environment, or as a response to similar actions by other States which could affect national security."

Obviously, this is an escape clause for India to test, should it decide to do so in response to testing by China, Pakistan or by any other country. The US can be expected to put pressure on India to desist from testing. In any case, a one-year notice for testing means that India cannot quickly decide to test in response to external stimuli.

Article 14.3 ensures that India doesn't just walk away citing a violation of the agreement by the US. It has to be either a material violation or breach as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties or as determined by the IAEA Board of Governors.

Article 14.4 gives a categorical right of return to the US.

Article 14.5 merely recognises that should the US exercise its right of return, this would have negative consequences for Indo-US relations as a whole, and it would upset India's ongoing nuclear energy and other projects.

Article 14.6 provides for US compensation to India. But neither Article 14.5 nor Article 14.6 gives any legal rights to India. More important, it is categorically stated in Article 14.8 that the provisions of Article 14 regarding the right of return will not affect India's obligations under Article 5.6, which envisages safeguards in perpetuity within the framework of the safeguards agreement that India would have signed with the IAEA.

Disputes: Article 15 only provides for a negotiated settlement of disputes regarding interpretation or implementation. Such negotiations could be open-ended. India has no recourse to any arbitration or courts.

Agreement in perpetuity: Article 16.2 says that the agreement is in force for 40 years, with only "possible" amendments envisaged under Article 16.4.

But under Article 16.3, India is tied forever to the restrictive provisions of the agreement, including IAEA safeguards in perpetuity (Articles 5.6(c) and 10), the provisions regarding reprocessing (Article 6), storage (Article 7), physical protection (Article 8), diversion for nuclear weapons or military purposes (Article 9), and negotiated settlement of disputes (Article 15).

There is another disturbing aspect, which does not figure in the 123 Agreement, but has profound implications for India's future nuclear energy plans.

Under the Separation Plan agreed to between India and the US on March 2, 2006, and tabled in Parliament on March 7, 2006, it was clearly stated that a civilian facility would be one that India has determined not to be relevant to its strategic programme, and that India retains the sole right to determine which future thermal power reactors and breeder reactors would be termed civilian.

Curiously, however, in his briefing last week as well as in an interview on August 2 to the Council for Foreign Relations, Nick Burns has stated that all future fast breeder reactors would be under safeguards, and that within 25 years, 90-95 per cent of India's nuclear establishment would be fully safeguarded.

What is the Indian side's response to the remarks of Burns?

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Postby mandrake » 03 Aug 2007 19:17

Moderators some of the previous nuke pagss which are in trash would be great if archived, specially in the last one Gerard has posted excellent details of many issues.

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Postby Malayappan » 03 Aug 2007 19:21

One read on the agreement!

Looks quite good. I am not sure if it will be possible for US to give more.

One can see the actual hand of our Babus in so many places in the text.

There is so much reversion to "this is about Civil Nuclear Cooperation" line.

Some things that struck me:

- The preamble saying AFFIRMING....between two states possessing advanced nuclear technology, both parties having same benefits and advantages...

- Article 2.2 ....may pursue co-operation...to include... (c) Facilitation of exchange of scientists for visits, meetings, symposia and collaborative research

- Article 2.4 ...Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear co-operation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either party...

And all those operative parts!

If the COTUS gives an up vote well they would have done so on a variety of issues!

And something in me gives the confidence that we will be able to get a more open (freer) arrangement with France and Russia. They have other fish to fry!

And with this kind of draft, sequencing IAEA - NSG - COTUS is not a big deal? If NSG says okay and COTUS thumbs down, I suppose it may not be a terrible thing? or am I missing something?

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Postby Rahul Shukla » 03 Aug 2007 19:44

Page 4

Article 2 (e) - Scope of Cooperation

Development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's recactors.


Article 2 (j) - Scope of Cooperation

Controlled thermonuclear fusion including in multilateral projects.

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Postby Kati » 03 Aug 2007 19:48

Fallout of the 123-pact.

Russia isn't happy, and Groshkov will be delayed by more than THREE years.

More fallouts to follow.


A quick question: Can't we get Uranium from Russia also? - without any strings attached?

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Postby Rahul Shukla » 03 Aug 2007 19:49

Page 7

Article 5 (4)

The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this agreement shall be consistent with... : the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime...

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Postby Rahul Shukla » 03 Aug 2007 19:53

Page 7 & 8

Article 5 [6(b)]

To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:

i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.

ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.

iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.

iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 03 Aug 2007 19:56

As one famous general said that in War - Who is (infilterated/breached) behind whose lines is more of a matter of confidence rather than charts.


Jarnail Gola, Speech From Zia Point (looking up at Tiger Hill), February 1999, b4 he skiied downhill to Skardu.

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Postby Rahul Shukla » 03 Aug 2007 20:00

Page 9

Article 6 (iii)

With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred.

To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility.

Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year.

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Postby Rahul Shukla » 03 Aug 2007 20:11

Page 11

Article 10 (2)

2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA [identifying data] and an Additional Protocol, when in force.


Article 10 (3)

Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and an Additional Protocol, when in force.


Article 10 [8]

The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities...

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Postby Gerard » 03 Aug 2007 20:13

International Atomic Energy Agency
INFORMATION CIRCULAR - INFCIRC/225/Rev.4

The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Docume ... ntent.html

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Postby Gerard » 03 Aug 2007 20:19

Applies to NNWS only... India as a SNW but not a NWS will negotiate its own specific agreement.

How far can inspectors go?
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21726/B ... A_48.2.pdf

A look at experience in Iran and North Korea and the origins of the NPT and safeguards in the 1960s - insights into the authority of IAEA nuclear inspectors

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Postby Rahul Shukla » 03 Aug 2007 20:32

ARTICLE 14 - TERMINATION AND CESSATION OF COOPERATION
1. Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the other Party…

2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations…

3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise and whether the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.

4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use…

6. If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.

7. Prior to return of nuclear items, the Parties shall satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and physical protection measures have been ensured in accordance with their existing national regulations and that the transfers pose no unreasonable risk to either Party, countries through which the nuclear items may transit and to the global environment and are in accordance with existing international regulations.


ARTICLE 16 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of40 years. It shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 10 years each. Each Party may, by giving 6 months written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial 40 year period or at the end of any subsequent 10 year period.

3. Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.


As far as I can see... there is no mention of 'testing'.

Also, the provision of 'compensation' in addition to provisions for ensuring safe transport of nuclear waste/equipments back to US makes disruption of this agreement very costly for the 'other' party! Such compensation is to be made at 'market value' and 'prior to' removal of such fuel/equipment.

US Congress will never allow that much radioactive stuff heading for the USA.

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Postby Gerard » 03 Aug 2007 20:41

US Congress will never allow that much radioactive stuff heading for the USA.


Not only that.. they have to pay for it too... billions of dollars for tons of radioactive concrete and steel...

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Postby williams » 03 Aug 2007 20:41

Kati wrote:Fallout of the 123-pact.

Russia isn't happy, and Groshkov will be delayed by more than THREE years.

More fallouts to follow.


A quick question: Can't we get Uranium from Russia also? - without any strings attached?


I don't think this is related to 123. Russians are only happy because they know America Bahadur's unreliability and India's first preference will be Russian or French supplies.

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Postby NRao » 03 Aug 2007 20:49

sunilUpa wrote:
NRao wrote:One more thought.

Both Burns statements the other day and that of Tellis now are to put pressure on MMS to deliver. IMHO, the comments made by Tellis were uncalled for - probably His Mater's Voice.

Not to forget the statements of the US Amby to India.

Trend setters. Wonder if it has predictive capabilities.


Not really. Just like GoI has to deal with detractors at home, Bush administration has to drum up support in Congress and pacify the NPA. Saying that India got all it wanted, in return giving up little not going to help in any way.

It may be wise to listen to what Mulford actually said rather than reading DDM interpretation.


You are right.

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Postby CRamS » 03 Aug 2007 21:00

NRao, Ramana, Shaurya et. al:

What is your take on the 123 text? I skimmed through, and prima facie, I can say its a draw. Byt the devil is between the lines is it not?

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Postby Ananth » 03 Aug 2007 21:36

Kati wrote:Fallout of the 123-pact.

Russia isn't happy, and Groshkov will be delayed by more than THREE years.

More fallouts to follow.


A quick question: Can't we get Uranium from Russia also? - without any strings attached?


How can they not be? They were among those who pushed us to get clearence from NSG. Groshkov is currently a misunderstanding which needs to be cleared.

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Postby nkumar » 03 Aug 2007 21:41

I skimmed through, and prima facie, I can say its a draw.


I agree. It looks like a 1-1 after half time. We have to wait for what happens in IAEA and NSG. But IMO, US has the upper hand till now. Although there is provision for strategic reserve, India will ultimately lose if France, Russia, Japan etc use this 123 as a template and this assumes significance because of a recent Henry Kissinger meeting with Russians on non-proliferation in Moscow. After making a lot noises, India succumbed to 'extraneous' conditions of Hyde Act. Though US gave reprocessing rights upfront, a subsequent agreement is still required. India has also not yet responded to Burns claim that all future breeders will be under safeguards. And as Arun mentioned, we do not have perpetual fuel supply for perpetual safeguards. Also, the agreement does not explicitly say that we can terminate the IAEA safeguard arrangement IF US terminates the agreement.

IMO, it is definitely not a clean Indian victory as has been made out in some sections of media.

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Postby NRao » 03 Aug 2007 21:43

The ball has been picked to set it rolling.

A UNSC seat would set it rolling.

IF in 5-10 years India gets NWS status this deal is worth it (as a deal that started the process).

However, in the very short term one can see some benefits. This document is well written to allow for more +ve arguments than opposing ones - it is decent political document.

Considering the past efforts put in by Indian scicom, it needs a LOT more beef in it. Scicom and the country deserve better. Good start, I would say.

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Postby arun » 03 Aug 2007 21:46

[quote="ksmahesh"]http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/aug/03guest.htm

Seemed important enough and sorry if it is repost: ...............
quote]

Don't be bashful :wink: ........ worth thinking about ........

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Postby Mort Walker » 03 Aug 2007 21:49

Also, the agreement does not explicitly say that we can terminate the IAEA safeguard arrangement IF US terminates the agreement.


Much will depend on how the India specific IAEA safeguards are written and implemented. That is now up to MMS and company if they can get it done in the next few months. The Bush administration wants Congress to vote this agreement in by end of year.

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Postby arun » 03 Aug 2007 21:50

Deleted.
Last edited by arun on 03 Aug 2007 21:57, edited 1 time in total.

arun
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Postby arun » 03 Aug 2007 21:53

ksmahesh wrote:http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/aug/03guest.htm

Seemed important enough and sorry if it is repost: ...............


Don't be bashful :wink: ........ worth thinking about ........

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Postby Paul » 03 Aug 2007 21:53

My take on the current misunderstanding with Russia is that while they wanted us to reach an agreement with the US, they do not want us to give the store away....and their increased demands (more money, AG delay) etc. are a manifestation of their frustruations. If we give the MRCA contract to the Americans, we may see further slowdown in supplies of spares for crtical systems like the Sukhois, T90s etc. from the Russians.

There is no room for three superpowers wannabes in Asia. At least one has to come down. Do not rule out China provoking India on Russis's urging in the coming years as the tango with Unkil gets more clinching.

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Postby arun » 03 Aug 2007 21:53

Duplicate deleted.

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Postby arun » 03 Aug 2007 21:56

Double oops ............. :oops:


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