India Nuclear News & Discussion - 10 Aug 2007

Manne
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Postby Manne » 12 Aug 2007 11:18

sraj,

Useful calculations. I do not see any flaw as such but here is what I have to say.

1. Areva et al will put up costs that includes license fees in addition to construction costs. So, the ratio would have been applicable if we were to import a reproc facility. If we are going to setup our own - no license fees. And that can be a major chunk of the total package.

2. Perhaps PPP would be a more useful mechanism to consider here than just exchange rate.

3. To give you an example, something that we were paying nearly 1 lac for, an equivalent is made for ~ 20K. I have already said that the differential is not uniform but wherever there is internal stuff available or wherever MoC is not too exotic (Inconel doesn't count as too exotic) our cost will work out much less.

Yes, cost of power will go up but it will also depend on how many reactors it ends up servicing. Also, whether it ends up working in a contract mode for other countries. Not unthinkable. Many months ago - somewhere around J18-M2 - I said that this would be a great business to be in. If we play it right, Unkil may actually choose to cooperate with us in that direction.

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Postby sraj » 12 Aug 2007 12:42

Manne wrote:Yes, cost of power will go up but it will also depend on how many reactors it ends up servicing. Also, whether it ends up working in a contract mode for other countries. Not unthinkable. Many months ago - somewhere around J18-M2 - I said that this would be a great business to be in. If we play it right, Unkil may actually choose to cooperate with us in that direction.

Thanks, Manne. Your point about PPP is well taken; suggests local costs could be significantly lower.

On levaraging this dedicated facility in a contract mode for other countries, there will be political NIMBY type issues to deal with domestically, as well as a need to ensure that India is a full principal in any GNEP-type setup with the same political benefits accruing to it as to other principals, not just a contracted service provider doing stuff that the US does not wish to do or cannot get done elsewhere.

Also, above should be contingent on the NSG deciding not to replicate the US denial of reprocessing et al technologies.

The US agenda at NSG will become clear fairly soon if they allow one of their minions to slip in stuff relating to 'sensitive' technologies/equipment, testing, etc. that has no relevance in the context of other NSG countries' national laws. Even Bush is on record in 2004 stating that the US would strive to deny reprocessing/enrichment technologies to states that do not already have them (India obviously is not covered by this definition). Our negotiators should have held Burns & co to this standard, but I guess that's water under the bridge. However, it is certainly a point that NSG needs to take into account.

Otherwise, the final NSG language on these issues may still torpedo the whole deal (we have heard talk about a 'multilateral legality' which is more onerous than CTBT!)

btw, if Russia is willing to provide fuel with prior reprocessing consent and does not insist on a dedicated reprocessing facility (is Koodankulam a precedent?), then perhaps another option will be not to incur the additional capital costs of a new facility if it is not needed in the immediate future.

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Postby SSridhar » 12 Aug 2007 14:31

Ananth,
last year there was an interview with Dr. Baldev raj and other top honchoes at Kalpakkam and it was alluded to that sodium coolant is still some distance away.

Ananth, I did not read that interview. However, the FBTR which has completed two decades has used sodium all along. Of course, the size of operations is vastly different between FBTR and PFBR.

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Postby MN Kumar » 12 Aug 2007 16:20


Calvin
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Postby Calvin » 12 Aug 2007 17:12

The clamor over this agreement suggests that the body politic in India is not convinced of the credibility of India's deterrent. They believe their government not only doesn't believe in a nuclear deterrent, but is willing to give up whatever deterrent they have.

Since our technical capability to build and deliver a bomb is well known, the lack of credibility can only come from THE PERCEPTION OF A LACK OF WILL.

This is a potentially catastrophic slippery slope we are on - when our own people question our will to act in the event of a nuclear strike. This is the real subtext to the discussion.

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 12 Aug 2007 18:32

Your point about PPP is well taken; suggests local costs could be significantly lower.


Only if quality is compromised. Is there any hard evidence that construction costs of really world-class facilities in India is any lower than those in the West?

And if so, are such efficiencies practical in the public sector / anything where the Commie Unions and politicians have a hand?

I have some pointers. Real estate in Indian cities is as expensive in converted dollars as it is in most parts of California, and MORE expensive than in most US cities. Perhaps Britain/ Singapore/ other crowded places may be as expensive.

Construction using traditional Indian labor-intensive methods is "cheaper" because of the dismally poor wages and benefits paid to the workers who actually work, and the preponderance of Union bozos, Bribe-Babus/Babunis and other non-productive humanoids that have to be tolerated. However, the resulting quality is also dismal. The outer shell may be impressive as in steel (hopefully not rusted through) and concrete (hopefully with some cement in it as well) but much of the rest is human-sweat bricks laid one at a time. Leaks are very very common. Settling/foundation issues are very common. Earthquake-engineered construction is probably not common.

Delays are VERY common, and hugely increase cost.

Indian private sector construction companies, on the other hand, can achieve efficiencies because someone cares about costs, but most of them cut so many corners and treat employees shabbily and don't believe in building large teams - most of the teams have 2 or 3 super-effective ppl who stay for a long time, and the rest are hired daily.

So where is the evidence that India can achieve actual construction results that are any cheaper in real terms? The posh news hotels LOOK super in the glossy pictures, but if you look up close, you see that they are going to run down in short order, if not fall down. There are, of course, exceptions.

Now this is not to say that it CAN'T be done. For another few years at least, Indian wages will continue to be far lower than western equivalents, and quality per dollar will thus be quite reasonable. But along with money-pinching management knowhow, of which the banias have no shortage, there needs to be modern, enlightened (Not Enlighted Moderation, thank u!) quality boosting, and this needs to be an integral part of the bidding / rewards process.

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 12 Aug 2007 18:42

This is the real subtext to the discussion.


Ah! Calvin, the whole point to moi wasting time here, is precisely because this is NOT the REAL subtext to the discussion. To understand this, you may want to spend some time researching the fine Pu-throwing about the SethuSamudram Canal Project (SSCP).

This is 400% shameless party politics by losers. Yeah, I know, I can expect some more shrillness here, but so far, the point has been clearly proven. Those "arguing against" the 123 out of claimed "concern about the national interest" have not been able to articulate a single valid point. Fundamental reason is that their objections are not based on any honest research into the facts and their implications. It is, as I said, 400% political posturing of the ugliest kind.

Yes, I should not call them "EBs". But that is only because I am being waaaaay too kind to them, and way too understated.

There is no evidence of any national doubt, because the same MMS&Co who are so widely dissed here as cowardly, spineless, traitorous, etc. etc. etc. keep winning elections by margins so huge that you wonder which side the Opposition is on (they are just busy scoring self-goals and kicking themselves on the butt and stepping on their own little Cheneys.)

The tragic thing is that several entities whom we admired for their strong articulation of Indian interests in the past, have come out with pathetically imbecile pieces that exhibit their hollowness in putting party politics above national interest. So you could say that there is every reason for a national loss of confidence in the integrity of the Indian strategic "thinker" community. Even B. Raman does not impress at all here, but then he has never been in the business of writing anything positive, so at least that's consistent.

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Time to move forward to meet India’s energy crunch?

Postby Prabu » 12 Aug 2007 18:53

Time to move forward to meet India’s energy crunch?
Divya Gandhi

[url=http://http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/11/stories/2007081158212200.htm]Linkhere[url]

THE HINDU dated 11th Aug,2007


[quote]BANGALORE: It might appear to be rather too simple a solution to the energy crisis. Could a mere tweak of the hands of the clock, setting it forward by half an hour, significantly lower evening peak electricity demand to save India Rs. 1,000 crore annually?

By setting Indian Standard Time forward six hours ahead of Universal Coordinated Time (now it is five and a half), as much as 16 per cent of the evening peak energy demand would be saved, concludes a research paper published in Current Science.

The extra half-hour of daylight that we will gain will be particularly useful in keeping lights off in the domestic sector that accounts for 23 per cent of total energy consumption, say authors Dilip R. Ahuja, Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS); D. P. Sen Gupta, Honorary Professor at NIAS; and V. K. Agrawal, Director, Southern Regional Load Dispatch Centre.
Basing their estimate on regional and seasonal load curves, they explain: “A typical load curve has a double-hump shape. The morning peaks, caused mainly by water-heating (in winters, also some amount of space heating), are generally lower than the evening peaks, caused mainly by domestic, commercial and street lighting loads.â€

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Nuke deal to open investments worth $40 bn

Postby Prabu » 12 Aug 2007 19:12

Nuke deal to open investments worth $40 bn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Press Trust of India

Sunday, August 12, 2007 (Mumbai):


The Indo-US civil nuclear deal has opened up the possibility of investments worth $40 billion over the next 15 years to step up nuclear power generation, with leading firms like White Westinghouse, General Electric, Rosatom and Siemens unveiling plans to do business with the country.

After nearly 33 years of nuclear isolation, India's nuclear power generation capacity is expected to rise to 40,000 MW by 2025 with access to several 1,000 MW-plus advanced light water reactors and a committed fuel supply, and nuclear commerce is expected to go up to $40 billion, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Chairman S K Jain said.

"Once all the necessary steps are taken by India and the US and after getting a signal from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, India will get to do global nuclear commerce which will not only enhance the indigenous programme with imported fuel but also help accelerate nuclear power with imported power plants as an additional," Jain said.

New players

As a spin-off of the Indo-US deal, Indian companies participating in the nuclear power programme and new players in the field like the Tatas, Reliance Energy, Birlas and Vedanta will benefit immensely as it is estimated that 50 per cent of the total investments would benefit Indian industry, he said.

For new entrants like Tatas and Reliance, it may possibly take four to five years for them to participate fully once necessary amendments are made to the Atomic Energy Act, Jain said.

Imported plants using light water reactors are likely to come up at Jaitapur in Maharashtra, Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu and other coastal sites that are being identified in states like Gujarat, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, he said.

Only the Nuclear Power Corporation will be authorised to construct plants using imported reactors till other state-owned power companies like the National Thermal Power Corporation get clearance from the Department of Atomic Energy in this regard, he said.

Beneficial to Indian industries

The deal with the US will be beneficial to Indian industries and the NSG, including the US, as it is planned that India will buy at least 20 or 25 reactors, each worth around $2 billion, in the next 15 years. These reactors may need 800 tonne of uranium worth $2-3 billion while spare parts alone would be worth one billion dollar.
"In other words, there will be assured business for the next 60 years as the life span of each plant will be 40 years," Jain said.

He said there would be business orders for 100 reactors across the world in the next five to six years but the manufacturing capacity of NSG members is far short of the expected orders.

"The only choice for the nuclear community is to augment their manufacturing facilities. The NSG is also looking for various places where facilities can be augmented," Jain added.

"Indian industries which are participating in the country's nuclear power programme can make use of this opportunity to have tie-ups in technology transfer and upgrade technologies and thus make India a regional nuclear supply hub, he said.

Support to atomic programme

Indian industry will not only have enough orders to support the country's atomic programme but also offer components at competitive prices to become a global player, he pointed out.

Russia has drawn up a plan to build two reactors a year. China too is going ahead at the same rate and plans to generate 40,000 MW of nuclear power in 20 years. India is planning to create a similar capacity and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has already received applications for 30 reactors, he said.

Of the expected business worth $40 billion, 50 per cent could go to Indian industries as all the foreign firms cannot provide certain equipment, which will be made through Indian industries. "India's technical manpower and expertise is going to be another area of human resource which could be part of this large global business," he said.

Without any initial borrowings, the Nuclear Power Corporation is confident it can fund equity for up to 10,000 MW or 15,000 MW at the rate of two billion dollars for a 1,000 -MW reactor. "If our accruals increase, we can have more equity in the programme and by 2009-10 we can begin the new projects," he said.

The nuclear industry chief also said most vendors are experts in making fast deliveries -- White Westinghouse's gestation period for a plant is 36 months while it is 45 months for GE and 50 months for Areva.[img]
[/img]



NRao was talking about the reactors (and perhaps he meant the numbers too !) now the numbers are getting clearer ! (earlier theye were talking about just 8! )

# We will buy 20 to 25 reactors in total.

It is nice to know that we will have 50 % Desi participation !! : :)

PRABU

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 12 Aug 2007 19:13

You could just decide to turn the lights on a bit later, if the visibility is good.

I miss the point of this scheme, esp. when the author gets into the tear-jerker/life-saver mode by preventing train accidents, plane crashes, life-threatening sickness, etc. Yes, Daylight Saving time does encourage people to get up a bit earlier, and for many modern-day desis, incl. BRFis this may be a revelation, as in seeing the sun rising. But most farmers already know how to get up early, and ppl turn the lights on in the evening only because it is dark, not because it is 6pm or 7pm. In most of South India there is not much difference in day/night length with the seasons, and twilight is over quickly.

I do agree that GMT+5.5 is too late for the ppl in the Northeast. A different time zone may be merited there, but again, I think many nations manage to have different time zones without that causing train crashes etc.

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Postby Calvin » 12 Aug 2007 19:56

Those "arguing against" the 123 out of claimed "concern about the national interest" have not been able to articulate a single valid point.


They haven't been able to articulate a "valid point" because they haven't been able to put a finger on their unhappiness about the deal. Most often, they conclude that this has to do with testing. Testing is a marker for credibility. This suggests that people are uncomfortable with the credibility of our second-strike capability. Anyone who knows anything about nuclear weapons deterrence knows that the weapons are themselves credible.

Nevertheless, there is discomfort. The reason that people are unable to put their finger on it, is because it is not related to technology. Hence the hypothesis that the discomfort is related to will.

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Postby NRao » 12 Aug 2007 20:08

We will buy 20 to 25 reactors in total


Both AK and Burns are on record stating that India will buy 8 reactors.

Now this 25 is a new figure. Way back it was close to 50 reactors.

However, "India will buy" does it mean from abroad or abroad + Indian?

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Postby ShauryaT » 12 Aug 2007 20:09

Calvin wrote:They haven't been able to articulate a "valid point" because they haven't been able to put a finger on their unhappiness about the deal.
"They" put their "finger" to what is wrong with this deal, many moons back. It is one word "parity" - dismissed as not a valid point, H&D, 400% political opportunists and what not. Each to his own.

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Postby Calvin » 12 Aug 2007 20:20

Shaurya: Could you please refresh us on this "parity" point? Genuine Request.

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Postby SSridhar » 12 Aug 2007 20:34

NRao,
However, "India will buy" does it mean from abroad or abroad + Indian?

The goal is to generate 30 GW by 2020. Whatever it takes to do that will need to be done, mostly imported plus some Indian. It is one reason why DAE is interested in metallic fuels rather than oxide fuels.

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Postby ShauryaT » 12 Aug 2007 20:40

Calvin wrote:Shaurya: Could you please refresh us on this "parity" point? Genuine Request.


Almost my entire objections to this deal, stem from my faith in this one person. Admittedly, there are political swipes and some alarmist statements herein but one liners of dismissal for his arguments, is not going to shake my faith, in this person, who I had the honor to meet. Here goes his volume of work on the issue, including a copy of this RS 8/17/06 speech.

[url=http://www.indianexpress.com/printerFriendly/11097.html] Rescued from the Abyss - AUG 22, 2006
[/url]

AUG 23, 2006 - This is about energy, did you say?

AUG 24, 2006 - ‘Parity’, did you say?


[url=http://www.indianexpress.com/story/17431.html]November 28, 2006
- Now let the PM square this circle [/url]

[url=http://www.indianexpress.com/story/17492.html]November 29, 2006
- Not one concern has registered [/url]

[url=http://www.indianexpress.com/story/17571.html]November 29, 2006
- Time to deal with the aftermath [/url]

[url=http://www.indianexpress.com/story/18935.html]December 20, 2006
- ‘But you must wait for the 123 Agreement’ [/url]

[url=http://www.indianexpress.com/story/18995.html]December 21, 2006
- The ‘non-binding’ myth [/url]

[url=http://www.indianexpress.com/story/19137.html]December 22, 2006
- Facts versus the government’s fiction [/url]

[url=http://www.indianexpress.com/story/19185.html]December 23, 2006
- The way out [/url]

[quote]
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, it is one of the most important issues that this House has had the opportunity to discuss. I am and everybody here is for cooperation with all countries, including the United States. But, as the hon. Prime Minister has emphasized, as everybody has emphasized, and Digvijay was just now saying that we are for cooperation of an independent and strong India with other countries. I will seek your permission to point out that what has, actually, been done by this agreement is closed the options of India and will, ultimately, if it goes through, you will see that India will be consigned to accepting the umbrella of the United States for protection even in this region. You will please permit me to elaborate on how this is being done. All of us, who have studied strategic matters, have seen that in regard to nuclear weapons, especially in regard to India, the USA has had four objectives. The first one is that one way or the other to get India to abide by the NPT even if you cannot make it sign. And one of the architects of this agreement, an Indian, who is now an advisor on National Security Affairs to the US President and has testified to the Congress, he told the US Congress, Mr. Ashley Telles, that, actually, this time India is accepting conditions which are more harmonious than the NPT. The second point, which they have had, was that India must be made to accept safeguards as a non-nuclear weapon State. Condoleeza Rice was quoted. I will give you three other remarks of this kind in which they were absolutely candid in this regard. But the third objective of the US, you keep quoting Shri Jaswant Singh and Stuart Talbot, has been that India must abide by the CTBT conditions. Even though the CTBT is not ratified and even though the US Senate has itself thrown out the CTBT, India must be made to sign those more onerously in the sense that the CTBT, as you know, Sir, so well, and I remember Mr. Pranab Mukherjee was raising this point here, and I was there; I answered him by reading the CTBT clause. The CTBT has a supreme national interest exit clause. Now, as I will show you, in this agreement, and what is being read into it, there is no exit clause at all. The fourth thing was that the US had aimed at what the Bill specifically uses these words -- to halt, to roll back, and eventually eliminate. These are the three expressions: ''halt'', ''roll back'', and ''eventually eliminate'' the nuclear capability of a country, like India. Now, these objectives are being achieved by this Bill. I will come to the legislative process of the USA, on which my pretty dear and close friend, Shri Anand Sharma, dwelt so much. The operational consequence of the difference in the legislative process of the US and ours is the opposite. That''s why the US House so overwhelmingly voted for the Bill because it overwhelmingly supports their objectives. And, you will see, Sir, Mr. Anand was saying that there is an elaborate legislative process. The other day, when Mr. Yashwant Sinha had put a question to the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister also said, "It is just a step and we shall see what the final outcome will be". The House passes, the Senate passes a Bill; then, there is a Reconciliation Committee; then, there is an
4.00 p.m.
agreement, this one, two, three...Now, you will see what happens. Actually it is the opposite. If it were the Indian Parliament, the Executive can enter into an international treaty and we can only discuss it. But in the American legislative process, it is the opposite. The Senate is the final authority on international treaties. The big example, as you remember, is: One of the Presidents of the US, Mr. Wilson, was also the architect of the League of Nations, and the Senate threw out that treaty. Now, in the CTBT the United States Executive was far advanced in those discussions and the US Senate threw it out. So, to tell us that actually what is happening now is only a stage, and there will be a final thing which will be different from the things that are coming up, is to give us sleeping pills, because actually speaking what will happen is that the US Administration will also be bound by it, it cannot but do anything than what has been sanctioned by the US Congress, in particular, by the US Senate. ...(Interruptions)... Just a second, Mr. Anand. ...(Interruptions)... Sir, because of the shortage of time, I will only take up two points which the Prime Minister has been emphasising. ...(Interruptions)... in this matter again. The first has been the question of parity. You keep citing the agreement of July, 18. The July, 18, Agreement is a statement of intact. Anything can be read into it. There is not a person in this House who could have seen that one of the only two reactors, which we have, which produce weapons Plutonium, that is, the Cyrus, which has recently been renovated, and which the US itself has said to their Congressional Committees that it is not conclusively proved at all that India has violated any treaty in regard to the Cyrus. We have agreed to close down that within four years. That was supplying, I pronounce it openly because scientists have said it, one-third of the weapons-grade Plutonium that India would be using for its nuclear arsenal. You show me a person who can read from the July 18 Agreement that we will agree to close this Cyrus Reactor when we do not have another reactor to produce that same kind of thing. So, all sorts of things are being read into it. But what is said on the face of it? It said, "President Bush affirmed that as a responsible State with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other States." And what did Prime Minister pledge India to? He said, "India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibility and practices, and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology such as the United States." Now, Sir, as you see, Shri Yashwant Sinhaji was reminding us, immediately after this, within two days, the Prime Minister''s Office issued a background. We are from the Press, so, we get the background. In five places that background said that we will acquire the same status and the safeguards as a nuclear weapons state. A principal negotiator on behalf of India, he said that our objective is to be recognised as a nuclear weapon state and the quotation is, "Nothing more, and nothing less". Now, I will come to that. Today also Shri Anand Sharma said that great play was made of the fact that safeguards will be India-specific. I will tell you whether that condition is seen at all in this case.
Secondly, we were told all along that this is an agreement about energy and that under no circumstances, does the Agreement bind India to capping the nuclear weapons programme. I will read out only one sentence from the Prime Minister''s reply in the Lok Sabha on the 10th March this year. He was mentioning this. "We have not compromised our autonomy with regard to our strategic programme. We have not agreed to any formula or any proposal which would amount to a cap on our nuclear programme. I have taken full care about it. We have made sure that we have taken care of India''s present requirements and future requirements as far as possible humanly. We have not accepted a cap on the nuclear programme. There is no question of India accepting a cap on our deterrent potential." This is the understanding of the Prime Minister. Now, we just see what is the understanding of the U.S. on this. Not only understanding verbally, what is it that they have legislated by which the U.S. Executive will be bound. Now, Sir, section 2(5) of the Bill which has been passed says that the objective is to bring within the ambit of the NPT discipline countries that have not signed up. Just now, Shri Digvijay Singh was also reading out what Dr. Condoleezza Rice told the U.S. House in this. She said, "India is not, and is not going to become a Member of the NPT as a nuclear weapon state. We are simply seeking to address an untenable situation." What is that situation? India has never been a party to the NPT and this Agreement does bring India into the non-proliferation framework and thus strengthen the regime. This is their declared objective. Then, Sir, you see section 2(6)(c) of the Bill. It says that the Agreement, which both the President and the Prime Minister have signed, induces the country to refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons programme. Section 3(b) (5) states that the policy of the U.S. in pursuing this deal is to seek, to halt the increase of nuclear weapons arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination. And we are told this is about energy! Even Dr. Kasturirangan just now said that this FMCT is a multilateral agreement for which we have to wait. He gave us his sage advice that we have ten years interval. They are saying in their legislation, in section 3(b)(7) that the U.S. aim shall be to encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium. So, even before that moratorium comes into being, the US has clearly stated its aim. Section 3 (a) (i) specifies: "That the United States through the agreement and other devices will oppose the development of a capability ...(Interruptions)... to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon State within or outside the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." In fact, the Bills of the Senate and of the House go even further, "we are thinking only on the US." Dr. Kasturirangan was telling us about the time we have on multilateral things, but see what they are saying. Section 3 (a)(iii) of the Bill says:- "The United States Executive will work to strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines concerning consultation by Members of violations by any country of this particular agreement, and by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG Members to all such violations, including the termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient that discourages individual NSG Members from continuing cooperation to such recipient in any form whatsoever." So, it is not just that they are going to do it, but they are going to make sure that the entire Nuclear Suppliers Group will act as one to discipline the country, so that their objectives are going to be furthered. In section 4 (2) (d) (iv), it says, "If nuclear transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this act, the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment materials or technology from other participating Governments in the NSG from any other source." So, they are saying that we are going to discipline you. We have a clear objective. We are going to ensure that, and we are going to make sure that the entire cartel of 45 countries will do this. My friend, Anand, was talking of nuclear apartheid. This is the foundation for the nuclear apartheid that will be created, and now, I will come to you with the conditions which they will say...(Interruptions)...
SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Would you please yield for a minute, please? You are actually misleading. ...(Interruptions)...Will you yield for a minute? You are reading something which is not material at all. ...(Interruptions)...
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Please, just one second, Sir...(Interruptions)...
SHRI ANAND SHARMA: We made it very clear what matters to us within the agreement.
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Right, Sir.
SHRI ANAND SHARMA: And, this does not apply to us ...(Interruptions)...
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: We will see that...(Interruptions)...
SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Don''t try to mislead..(Interruptions)...
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: That is right. As Mr. Yashwant Sinha said, as nothing applies to some people; the other people are passing their laws. This certainly applies to the US President who is signing the agreement with the Indian Prime Minister...(Interruptions)... Not only that, Dr. Kasturirangan was saying that, yes, we will negotiate an FMC Treaty. But as he knows, the US has already put in a draft in May in the Geneva Conference, and it does not have what you were saying, what others have always been emphasizing, which has been the consistent stand, as Mr. Natwar singh will bear out of Indian Governments for 20 years that unless there is a universal credible verification mechanism, we will not proceed. Not a word of that clause is in the draft Treaty and they have put in a clause saying that this will come into force the moment the P-5 have signed it. And, not only that, Sir, in the Bill, in section 4 (c) (2) (d), it says: "That the US has taken and will take steps to encourage India, to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally." Now, we are not to wait for anybody; they are not waiting for anybody. They are saying, actually, pending that Treaty, you have to declare a date unilaterally. The US President is certainly bound to work on these guidelines, on these mandatory laws. Sir, the Senate Bill is the ultimate Bill. The Senate has the power to ratify or reject treaties or agreements which the US President sign, unlike us. That Bill says in Section 103 (1) that it shall be policy of the United Sates -- the US will do what will it do vis-a-vis India -- to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and any other nuclear explosive devices. Section 103(9) says that "exports of nuclear fuel to India should not contribute to, or, in any way, encourage, increases in the production by India of fissile material for non-civilian purposes." This is a very important clause because they say that ''you have to do it consistently with the obligations of the US under article 1 of the NPT. Many of us would not know that article 1 of the NPT says that that country will not do anything which will directly or indirectly help the other non-nuclear weapon States to acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore, in some of the briefings, it was suggested ...(Time-bell)... Sir, I will just take a few things.
MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please conclude because I have to regulate the time.
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, I am only confining myself to this Bill.
MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I have to regulate the time.
SHRI C. RAMACHANDRAIAH: Sir, we can sit for one more hour.
MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: That is all right. But since the time is fixed for it, we have to regulate the time also. Please try to confine to the time.
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: I am requesting some more time from you only because ... ...(Interruptions)...
MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I have given you the maximum time. You have already taken extra time.
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, article 1 of the NPT says, "Neither directly nor indirectly." Now, they export uranium to us. It was suggested and implied to many persons here, -- ''no; no; we have a lot of uranium. So, when they give us some uranium, we can use our own uranium to produce nuclear weapons.'' This is what is meant to stop, that you cannot directly or indirectly do this in any way. In fact, India and Pakistan must be disclosing, securing, capping and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, and this will be done ''pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime. Now, Sir, these are just very few of the clauses. I can give you many such examples in which this is put out. It is made mandatory for the US President to work for these things. We are told to be ''macabres; no; no; keep waiting, something might turn up. We can''t be made a nation of macabres, ...(Interruptions)... end products. The end products will be macabre. We are waiting. Something will turn up.
The second point, Sir, is this. Sir, my friend Anand read about the voluntary moratorium; a moratorium with the tests at that time. Moratorium means a temporarily suspension and it was voluntary. Now, just see, Sir, what Condoleezza Rice says. The Senate clause says, -- she told the House Congressional Committee -- we have been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of the safeguards is the permanence of the safeguards, without condition.'' As you know, credible minimum deterrent, which was talked of, is a function, not that ''I will acquire thirty pounds and keep thirty pounds in that credit.'' To be credible, the deterrent has to be pegged to what your potential adversary might have. It is a changing capability and the sophistication is not just a number; it is a sophistication of your weapons. Now, Sir, that was the point. Look here. I am just giving you an example of China. The China has acquired x, y, and z capability, and, therefore, we must now test or do something else or increase our fissile material production. Condoleezza Rice says, "No; we have been clear; we have been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of the safeguards is the permanence of the safeguards, without condition; China or no China; sophistication of weapons or no sophistication of weapons.'' It is said, "In fact, we reserve the right, should India test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in any way violate the IAEA safeguard agreement -- to which I will just come -- to which it would be adhering that the deal from our point of view would be at that point be off." This is not Condaleeza Rice!
Now, Section 110 of the Senate Bill clearly says that any waiver under Section 104, which you were talking of, saying that President is going to get that waiver, shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the enactment of this Act. So, where is the option that is left with us? And, as I told you, it is more onerous than the ....
MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please, conclude.
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, I shall make only one more point and then finish. There are several points to be made but I would only take up one point.
Sir, there is no option; options are being closed. A cartel is being set up to make sure that India will not budge an inch, not only vis-a-vis the US, but once the US determines, all the 45 countries will have to ensure it as well. And please, remember, China is one of those. Anybody trying to give a favourable interpretation to anything India does would be subject to China''s veto. Why? That is because the US Bill requires of the President that he must in the NSG proceed by a consensus. That is the word that they have used. So, consensus will mean that everybody there will get a veto. And you know how this world is! We keep talking of energy security. Everybody is aware of the fact that not only have the prices of Uranium gone up by 300 per cent in two years, but it is also controlled by a much stronger cartel than oil. Governments interfere with it. You may look at Australia. Australia is selling Uranium to China, but it has refused to sell it to India because it is part of an arrangement. So, that arrangement is being perfected through this legislation. And not only is the US President going to be bound by it, but the important point is, you keep hoping that the US Administration will do something, but please read the statements of the US Administration after the Bill was passed by the House. They said it is a tremendous step forward. They did not object to any clause in the Agreement.
Now, Sir, I come to this point that was made much of and has been made much of in the earlier statements also, that these safeguards will be India-specific. Sir, it is a fantasy. The Senate Bill says in Clause 113 that the agreement that India will have to enter into with the IAEA will be in accordance with the standards, principles, policies and practices of the IAEA as set out in the Information Circular 540. That Circular 540 applied only to non-nuclear weapon States. There is no option. And it is probably not seen that the model agreement -- some people might be innocent of these matters and they may access it from the Internet -- itself says that such protocols shall contain all the measures of this model protocol. There is no option! Where is the option of India-specific things? It can only be ...(time bell).. Two minutes, Sir.
The impression that was given was that we would have some protocol with the IAEA, which will be minus the model protocol. Actually, it will have to be that model protocol plus some further agreements, because we would have bound ourselves in this way and the nuclear weapon states. I would only read one item to you, Sir.
MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have already taken a lot of time.
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, I shall take only a little more time.
MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You may take it, but I will not be able to control the time. If each individual Member takes his own time, it would be very difficult for me. You must understand. You must understand the position of the Chair. If every Member wants to speak earlier, every Member wants to go out of his turn, it would not be possible to do it.
SHRI S.S. AHLUWALIA: Sir, we don''t want to speak earlier, we only wish to contribute.
MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Definitely everybody wants to contribute. But then, why do you fix the time limit?
SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, I shall give you an example. We have already placed two-thirds of our reactors under these safeguards. The Bush Administration has said that as all new reactors are going to be under safeguards, soon, India will be placing 90 per cent of its reactors under safeguards. Do you know what the position is with the other countries? Sir, there are 217 nuclear reactors in these P-5. Of them, only 11 are under safeguards. In the US, there are 104 nuclear reactors and only five are under safeguards and the protocol applicable to the US says that it shall be a voluntary offer agreement, and in this, those measures will be incorporated which the Nuclear Weapons State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency of the NPT. It is left up to them. The protocol says, "The Agency, that is, IAEA shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibility." Information pertaining to the facilities of only those five out of 104 shall be the minimum necessary. All these things will need not be examined on the plans and designs, which we will have to submit to them in Vienna. They say that these will be examined only on the premises of those facilities; we will not take them out. Clause 33 specifically says, and I will end only with that single example so as not to tax you, that the agreement should provide that safeguards shall not apply thereunder to material in mining or ore processing activities. You contrast this, and I am ending with that. You contrast this and I am ending with that. There is one contrast. Section 4(o)(2)(B) of the Senate Bill says that the US President shall get from India (1) an estimate for the previous year of the amount of Uranium mined in India; (2) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; (3) the rate of production of (i) the fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; (ii) nuclear explosive devices; and (iii) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected such rate of production, etc. ˆ®ÖÛúÖê ÛúÆüÖ Æîü ×Ûú †Ö¯ÖÛêú uranium †Öî¸ü ores Ûêú ²ÖÖ¸êü ´Öë Æü´Ö Ûãúâ€

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Postby Calvin » 12 Aug 2007 20:50

So anything short of recognition as an NWS under NPT would fail the "parity" test?

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Postby ShauryaT » 12 Aug 2007 20:57

Calvin wrote:So anything short of recognition as an NWS under NPT would fail the "parity" test?
Not at all. That would be the other extreme. If on a scale of 0 to 10, if NNWS is 0 and NWS is 10, this deal gets us to about 2 on the scale, there is scope to get us at the level of 8 or so, without changes in the NPT, if done, right and at the right time.

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Postby Calvin » 12 Aug 2007 21:07

Shaurya: Would be able to characterize the concessions that take us from 2 to 8, at least in your mind (if not in Shourie's)?

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 12 Aug 2007 21:10

The argument that there is not parity between the US and India on nuclear energy is of course valid, but that situation is not going to be remedied by just wishing for it.

Le's summarize Mr. Shouri's articulate presentation, in his own concluding words:

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: In the energy field, we are going to be just closed in into dependence on imported reactors and imported fuel and, secondly, on the security field, we are going to become dependent on a nuclear umbrella of the US even to survive within our own region. It is not a good agreement and I would sincerely appeal to the Prime Minister, who, I know, has the interest of the country at heart, to please reconsider this issue, and as your friend and as a person who has known you for 30 years, I will plead with you and with the Government, please do not make this particular agreement a matter of personal prestige at all. Thank you.


1.
In the energy field, we are going to be just closed in into dependence on imported reactors and imported fuel


Do the facts support this contention? What in the 123 agreement prevents India from building reactors using Indian technology for power plants? What in the 123 agreement prevents India from using Indian indigenous fuel (the only kind that is available WITHOUT this agreement) to power those plants for all time?


2.
on the security field, we are going to become dependent on a nuclear umbrella of the US even to survive within our own region.


What facts justify that assertion? It could happen with a government that takes the Nadkarni Easy Street, and just decides to scrap all domestic defense development programs, and buys into the US "umbrella". But what about this government shows any such intention? What in the 123 agreement indicates such intentions from the GOI?

Now the contention may be that we could have held out for a better deal. Do the deliberations of the COTUS indicate optimism in this regard?

Do the statements of ANY US presidential candidates indicate optimism in this regard?

Do the statements of any US military/ strategic analysts indicate optimism in this regard?

Do the statements of any FOREIGN leaders other than US indicate optimism in this regard? Putin? The Kaliph-e-Kangaroostan? Poodlestan? Japan? Ghana? Nigeria? China? Sarkozy?
*********************

What alternatives do Shourie & Co promise India?

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Postby NRao » 12 Aug 2007 21:16

What in the 123 agreement prevents India from building reactors using Indian technology for power plants? What in the 123 agreement prevents India from using Indian indigenous fuel (the only kind that is available WITHOUT this agreement) to power those plants for all time?


Good enough.

Then we can all agree to dump 123.

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 12 Aug 2007 21:26

NRaoji:

Spoken like a Nadkarni, who said: "Now that the LCA has been flown (successfully), it is time to cancel the project".

ShauryaT has produced a series of statements from Mr. Arun Shourie, who is considered an articulate thinker. We are discussing those.

Would you mind switching to a "Read" mode, if not a "think" mode, and hold off on the "tripe" mode for a while, please?
Last edited by enqyoobOLD on 12 Aug 2007 21:28, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby ShauryaT » 12 Aug 2007 21:28

Calvin wrote:Shaurya: Would be able to characterize the concessions that take us from 2 to 8, at least in your mind (if not in Shourie's)?


First, I do not think this is the right time for India to be asking for an all encompassing "full" civilian nuclear deal, at this time. The entire, thing should have been done in stages. Nevertheless, the principle one being, non-perpetual safeguards replaced by a long term safeguards agreement for a separate fuel cycle. The safeguards agreement not modeled after circular 540 of the IAEA. A US congress not in a state to attach extraneous issues to the India exemption.

The promise of a "full" civilian agreement has complicated the issue and set the bar too high for things, such as reprocessing, enrichment, dual technology, etc and hence the price tag of the deal.

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Postby NRao » 12 Aug 2007 21:38

N^^3,

I had not read AS, but had come up with the same arg long back. All the outsiders have to do is make their stuff far cheaper and you will never see "Made in India" again.

I do not expect an outsider to address that concern. Nor has anyone here addressed it - so far.

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 12 Aug 2007 21:59

I see. That is a valid concern too. It is a danger in the defense business too - just when a technology is mastered after decades of sanctions and obstruction, the sanctions disappear and the items become available - "cheap".

So this is an argument for complete protection of the Indian nuclear industry from any foreign technology. Protectionism in the nuclear industry.

You are right, that's a brand-new argument here for not ending nuclear apartheid against India.

The cost of power might go down if we let the durned fawrners in. The power cuts are so much fun - great for astronomy!

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Postby Sanjay M » 12 Aug 2007 22:01

I too am not seeing the merit in what Shourie wrote.

It's not like the thorium cycle is taking off and about to supply us with oodles of power. I'm hearing dates like 2040 for commercial nuclear power in India to take off, and that's far too distant.

As far as worrying about LCA/MCA/DCA(delayed combat aircraft), I can only point to the dismal, delayed track record of Arjun. Better the 123 bird in the hand than whatever we're hoping to pull out of the indigenous bush.
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Postby ldev » 12 Aug 2007 22:06

Calvin wrote:They haven't been able to articulate a "valid point" because they haven't been able to put a finger on their unhappiness about the deal. Most often, they conclude that this has to do with testing. Testing is a marker for credibility. This suggests that people are uncomfortable with the credibility of our second-strike capability. Anyone who knows anything about nuclear weapons deterrence knows that the weapons are themselves credible.


If the Sangh Parivar types have doubts about the credibility of the second strike, what did they do make that entire issue less opaque by the end of the NDA term in 2003? This ambiguity and opaqueness which was a hallmark of the Indian nuclear posture from 1974 to 1998 unfortunately continues today. But for the NDA types to base their reservations on the credibility of the second strike is itself less than credible. After all they were in power for 5 years after the 1998 tests.

One other interesting titbit which I came into recently which validates the opaqueness is from a friend's third cousin's uncle. And that is that even after weaponization first occurred in India with delivery to be done by the Air Force, the then chief of Air Staff was not aware of it. Also that what was tested in 1998 essentially validated the computer simulations that were done in the preceding years. And also that GOI had clear and unambigious evidence of "complete packages" being transferred by China to Pakistan. Also that the culinary institute also knew of this and informed GOI and interacted with GOI about it. Evidently such interaction with the culinary institute may not have been exactly cordial. And hence the recent commentary about the present NSA visiting SecDef during his recent visit to finalize the 123 agreement and how ,"India viewed the mission of the then boss of the culinary institute with "utter contempt"". Now, none of this is in the public domain and certainly not the exact year/month when such events occurred. I guess there will always be a debate about the efficacy of putting all of this information out in the public domain and then letting there be a honest debate about it. But the fact is neither the NDA nor the UPA have done it.

And so I believe that the present NDA carping is just that, to score political points. Because while they were in government, they would have been apprised of this history that predates 1998.

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 12 Aug 2007 22:19

Shaurya makes the argument that what is wrong is that this is (or claims to be) a "full" civilian nuke agreement, and instead it should have been done in stages.

I would be curious to hear what these stages might have been, because, try as I might, I cannot come up with any that look very promising. Let's see:

1. India gets foreign fuel, but does not have a safeguarded process and facilities before getting it.

Trouble is that this would directly break national laws, so it's a non-starter.

Secondly, this is far worse, assuming the next step gets done:

2. India gets foreign fuel BEFORE separating civilian and strategic facilities.

This would mean that any foreign fuel coming in, would be like a virus or Trojan Horse - it would bring IAEA inspectors into Indian strategic facilities.

3. Foreign companies start selling reactors to India before any agreement on separation, safeguarding or fuel supply.

First, they would go to jail for transferring nuke technology to India in violation of ITAR and whatever else. Secondly, other NSG nations would ban them immediately. Thirdly, they would have to be loony to send reactors without fuel supply, and fourthly, India would have to be loony to pay for reactors without assured fuel.

So again, I am waiting to hear about this "staged nuclear agreement" process and sequence. Surely if Mr. Shourie had this in mind, we need to read about it...

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Postby Tilak » 12 Aug 2007 22:33

The FMCT threat
Shireen M Mazari

....
At other levels, we are seeing the US moving fast on the nuclear track in ways that directly threaten to undermine the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence, even as India's nuclear weapons' capability is being bolstered. There is the Indo-US nuclear deal which has now been revised to accommodate the Indian demand that no conditionalities be put on future testing by India in terms of assurance of nuclear fuel supplies. Now an even more ominous development is threatening to come to the fore.

This is the US effort to fast track an international Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in the multilateral UN forum of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, and India is committed to working actively with the US on the FMCT as one of the conditions of its nuclear deal with the US. The problem that has arisen is due once again to the US efforts to contravene the norms that have been agreed to in this very forum in connection with such a Treaty. The arrangements agreed to in terms of the content of a fissile material treaty were embodied in the Shannon Report of March 1995. The parameters laid out for a future FMCT and the mandate provided to the Ad Hoc Committee for this purpose were reflective of Resolution 48/75L of the UN General Assembly and so the Committee was directed to negotiate a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty" while the issue of existing stockpiles and Prevention of a Race in Outer Space (PAROS) was to be part of the discussions within the Committee as it evolved an acceptable FMCT.

Unfortunately, the US is seeking to alter all these parameters in order to get a half-baked FMCT that, like the NPT, has an in-built discriminatory clause because of the US refusal to include the issue of reductions and eventual destruction of existing stockpiles of fissile materials within the FMCT. Nor is the US prepared to include international verification procedures -- something that is an intrinsic part of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of the CTBT (still-born, thanks to the US Congressional rejection). As for PAROS -- a major issue for countries like China -- the US is at the very least not interested and at worse is actively opposed to the notion given its efforts to develop Missile Defence which has a space based component.

So if the US is attempting to fast track its distorted version of a FMCT, why should countries like Pakistan worry given that the international consensus reflected in the Shannon Report runs counter to this US design? Unfortunately, the US has managed to bully the international community once again by threatening to make the CD redundant if it failed to fast track the US FMCT draft. The draft itself was introduced before the CD in May 2006 in a most arrogant fashion, so reflective of the Bush Administration, in which it was made clear that the "challenge to effective multilateralism" was for international bodies like the CD to accept "US priorities" and focus on these issues which were important to "US security" -- or else the US would bypass these legitimate organisations and opt for the "coalitions of the willing" model. So, effectively, the US was holding the CD hostage to its demands even though these were in direct contravention to an international consensus already arrived at on the FMCT negotiations.

Following this arrogant approach to the FMCT, we have seen the CD renege on its own mandate on the FMCT even as its March 2007 Presidential Draft Decision tries to offer a poor sop to member states by suggesting the formulation of four coordinators to discuss separately the previously linked issues of disarmament, PAROS, negative security assurances and an internationally verifiable FMCT. While the Coordinator for the FMCT was given a mandate for negotiating, "without any preconditions", an FMCT -- with no mention of international verification provisions -- the other Coordinators were merely to preside over "substantive discussions" on the remaining issues! So once again the rest of the world was being duped by the US and its allies in duplicity.

For Pakistan, the form of a FMCT is crucial on two counts: First, if there are no provisions for reductions in existing stockpiles of fissile material, it will be at a permanent disadvantage in terms of its nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis India. Worse still, eventually this deterrence capability will be compromised especially in the face of the Indo-US nuclear deal which will allow India to use its "liberated" and unsafeguarded nuclear fuel form its civil reactors for weapons production -- given that the US will now be supplying the fuel for Indian civilian reactors. Second, without international verification provisions, and with existing trust deficits, who will ensure the provisions of the FMCT are indeed being enforced? Can Pakistan forget how it was deceived by India on the issue of Chemical Weapons in a bilateral agreement when it declared it had no such weapons; and only when it became a party to the internationally verifiable multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention it had to admit to possessing these weapons which were subsequently destroyed!

So the new US ruse on the FMCT must be countered and in time since the CD has begun meeting on this issue in Geneva. There is too much at stake for Pakistan in the long term in terms of the FMCT. We were strangely sanguine, despite warnings, on the Congressional Bill and this is going to be costly for us over the next few years. But the US-sponsored FMCT will be even worse, since it will directly undermine our nuclear capability and the credibility of our deterrence over the long term. Even if we are the only ones holding out -- and the CD does work on the consensus principle -- we must do so without flinching. To compromise on this would be to compromise on our security and eventually our very existence as a state. If we still needed proof of Pakistan and the US having intrinsically divergent strategic interests even on global issues of arms control and disarmament, the present FMCT debate should be a stark reality check.

Additionally, while national cohesion is critical to the stability and development of our state, so is our ability to hold our own externally. Neither can be compromised and although we are rightly so drawn towards our internal dynamics presently, we cannot afford to ignore vital external developments impacting our well-being in the long run. Here, the insidious designs of the US portend to be our major source of threat for the future.


So will India be a part of the "Coalition of the Willing" being bargained by the US for P5 ?? . I guess India already knows the answer especially when it was made to sit out on the GNEP .. 8)

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Postby Calvin » 12 Aug 2007 23:11

First, I do not think this is the right time for India to be asking for an all encompassing "full" civilian nuclear deal, at this time. The entire, thing should have been done in stages.


enqyoob has directly addressed this. What incentives does the US have to do this in stages?

Nevertheless, the principle one being, non-perpetual safeguards replaced by a long term safeguards agreement for a separate fuel cycle.


Are we in agreement that the safeguards are only applicable for foreign-origin facilities that use foreign-fuel and when FBR becomes the norm, the safeguards go out the window. So, effectively what we have is a "non-perpetual safeguards" situation.

The safeguards agreement not modeled after circular 540 of the IAEA.


Specifically what clauses do you not want in any "safeguards agreement", and what leads you think that we have given in, on those clauses?

A US congress not in a state to attach extraneous issues to the India exemption.


How would you propose to address this, given the geopolitical power distribution in the world today?[/quote]

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Postby NRao » 12 Aug 2007 23:37

Protectionism in the nuclear industry


You miss the point.

This deal is being peddled as an economical one for India. But, $50 BILLION is nothing for the US. So, it is a strategic deal for the US and they do not love India THAT much to give India anything.

And, if one looks hard enough at it, this deal has the potential to touch India strategic decisions. IF India could not cross the border during Kargil, bet they will never use a nuke without getting an OK from DC. Even A3 MMS browned his pants. MMS had to be advised by his own CofArmyS that Siachen cannot be made into a peace mountain, now he is after LoC as peace line, etc.

And, of course MMS will never take Bush on his 'Hyde Act is not binding'. It took Tellis to remind India that it is binding!!!! That is why MMS cannot renegotiate this deal, not because of any principles.

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Postby Sparsh » 12 Aug 2007 23:40

Ldev,

ACM Mehra and his successors were fully aware when weaponization first occurred via the air dropped route. Live drops of actual bombs (minus their nuclear fuel of course) were also practiced and carried out. The IAF was involved from the beginning.

WOP has the details.

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Postby Calvin » 12 Aug 2007 23:46

And, of course MMS will never take Bush on his 'Hyde Act is not binding'. It took Tellis to remind India that it is binding!!!! That is why MMS cannot renegotiate this deal, not because of any principles.


Hyde is binding, its just not relevant.

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Postby Gerard » 12 Aug 2007 23:57

enqyoob wrote:This would mean that any foreign fuel coming in, would be like a virus or Trojan Horse - it would bring IAEA inspectors into Indian strategic facilities.


The IAEA have already been inside Indian fuel fabrication and spent fuel reprocessing plants (though perhaps not IGCAR or BARC), under campaign safeguards.

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Postby Sanjay M » 13 Aug 2007 00:28

NRao wrote:And, of course MMS will never take Bush on his 'Hyde Act is not binding'. It took Tellis to remind India that it is binding!!!! That is why MMS cannot renegotiate this deal, not because of any principles.


The point is that as the MK Narayanans and Karnads tell us, when this deal becomes too confining we will not seek to renegotiate it, but rather to terminate/abrogate it.

As you say, Hyde Act will not permit a broadening/loosening/renegotiation of this agreement down the road. But 123 deal permits all that consultation stuff for us to find other supplies later on, which is not part of Hyde Act. So really what we have to examine is how Hyde Act will permit the consultation stuff for getting India alternate supplies, when it comes time for India to terminate its participation.

Our 123 Employment Contract doesn't contain any scope for job promotions or wage or benefits increases down the road, but it does contain a Golden Parachute, and that's all we need.

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Postby Manne » 13 Aug 2007 00:46

enqyoob wrote:So where is the evidence that India can achieve actual construction results that are any cheaper in real terms?


I have given one example of a high precision component costing nearly 20 percent of the imported cost. The other evidences are TAPP-3 and 4. Also Kudankulam construction and project management.

I can understand where you are coming from and what you are driving at but it has already been done and there are witnesses aplenty.

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 13 Aug 2007 01:13

Tilak, I won't even pretend to have begun to understand anything in that Shrillen rant, so can't imagine where you saw there that India had become a member of the COW. As far as I know, India has stayed out of Iraq and Afghanistan adventures (except for supporting the Northern Alliance from 1992 to 2002, through the liberation of Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul). Shrillen rants do not constitute sensible anything.

NRao: I am trying to understand the "point" in this:
This deal is being peddled as an economical one for India. But, $50 BILLION is nothing for the US. So, it is a strategic deal for the US and they do not love India THAT much to give India anything.


OK, so I'll agree that the US is not giving away anything to India, it's a commercial deal. IOW, Indian companies have as much right to compete in fair pricing for the construction and supply of reactors as anyone else. So I don't see where that supports your theory that this deal means the end of the "Made in India" reactors. Far from it. It provides a way to build the infrastructure, and the power plant facilities and the grid, so that when Indian "three-stage" or whatever is ready to go commercial, they don't have to re-invent everything and build the infrastructure from scratch. They can experiment in peace and quiet in the "protected" sector. So, what this deal does, is to bring the latest commercial reactor technology to India where Indians can become comfortable with it, Indian universities can teach Indian students about it, and the Indian "protected sector" can learn everything they want from it.

In fact, the other implications I've seen are that worldwide demand for nuke reactors is about to shoot through the roof, and so Indian reactor technology, which IS more focused on conserving and re-using fissile material, and using materials that can be obtained in India or similar economies, can be sold to developing nations. So "Made in India" may in fact be seen on reactors all over the world, when the Indian nuclear economy really gets going.

Without this deal, all that is dead - no Indian reactor technology is going out. So your argument just defeated its own postulate.

And, if one looks hard enough at it, this deal has the potential to touch India strategic decisions. IF India could not cross the border during Kargil, bet they will never use a nuke without getting an OK from DC. Even A3 MMS browned his pants. MMS had to be advised by his own CofArmyS that Siachen cannot be made into a peace mountain, now he is after LoC as peace line, etc.


First, here's where your argument REALLY defeats itself: If MMS is so under the US thumb, how come the Army was able to get him to back down from his Siachen folly? Getting India to give up Siachen would have been an absolute triumph for DupleeCity to present to its pet Al-Lie. Musharraf feels far worse about the Siachen loss than about his many other routs at the hands of India (Asal Uttar 1965, Chittagong 1971, Kashmir 1971, Kargil 1999). This is beccause he was personally in charge of the Paki side in Siachen, and even tried launching a suicidal counter-attack (I mean for his subordinates) to impress Zia ul Haq. Over a 1000 Pakis are reported to have died in that (recent post of Paki report here on that).

So, even at the most sensitive stage of negotiating this deal, India did not kow-tow to US wishes or strike any deal of trading our land for $$. So again, your argument sounds like hollow party-political prejudice rather than anything logical.

And finally about India having to clear decisions to use nukes, with DupleeCity.

The only circumstance where India contemplates using nukes is in the event of a first strike against India. With a million dead and dying in Indian cities, probably first in Delhi, what is there to fear, even for the cowardly MMS as per your model, in pressing the Big Blue Button (BBB)?

So here, your argument falls on 2 points. First, that you imagine a circumstance where India uses nukes, that does NOT involve the first use of nukes against India. This goes against stated Indian doctrine, and if you harbor such crazy notions, I am glad the GOI is not run by anyone who will contemplate such a thing.

Seccondly, that doctrine was set up by the NDA govt. So blaming this deal for it is again a false argument.

OK, so your 3 arguments now lie exposed as false:

1. That the deal, and the resulting availability of foreign reactors, will mean "Never any more Made In India reactors".
2. That the deal means acquiescing to the US on things like whether we should hold on to Siachen
3. That the deal hinders Indian use of nukes under conditions prescribed in the nuclear doctrine.

Anything else?

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 13 Aug 2007 01:17

I have given one example of a high precision component costing nearly 20 percent of the imported cost. The other evidences are TAPP-3 and 4. Also Kudankulam construction and project management.

I can understand where you are coming from and what you are driving at but it has already been done and there are witnesses aplenty.


Delighted, thanks!

The swank new construction in Bangalore near the airport also seems pretty first-class. The housing developments and the hotels and industrial parks seem very well-built.

This means that Indian construction companies can quickly get experience with the nuke electricity plant construction - and take that experience elsewhere and win.

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Postby Manne » 13 Aug 2007 01:28

Our bigger worry right now should be the fresh crop of engineers and scientists for future. GoI and the industry need to act fast.

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Postby NRao » 13 Aug 2007 01:37

N^^3,

Give me a wee bit. Have to run. Will be back l8r this PM.


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