India Nuclear News & Discussion - 24 August 2007

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ldev
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India Nuclear News & Discussion - 24 August 2007

Post by ldev »

I have copied what I thought were relevant posts which needed to be followed up from the last nuked thread. I will respond to Arun S shortly. Guys please refrain from inviting the wrath of the admins. Thanks.


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ldev
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Posted: 23 Aug 2007 05:20 pm Post subject:

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NRao wrote:
N-power is three times cost of coal


Now this is just the kind of headline which should be dissected a little. Because one does not have to be a rocket scientist to get to the bottom of this.

Indian thermal power stations of the kind built by NTPC have a capital cost of Rs 4 crores per MW of installed capacity - these are actual numbers achieved in the last few years. Rs 4 crores is about USD 1 million capital cost installed.

Imported nuclear plants to be built by Westinghouse, GE, Areva etc. should have a capital cost of about USD 1.5 Million per MW.

A 2400MW coal fired thermal plant needs about 10,000 tons of coal per day. Cost of coal is now about USD 75 per ton. This plant generates about 4200 tons of ash per day.

A 2400 MW LWR nuclear plant requires about 54 tons of uranium yellowcake per year. Cost of yellowcake which had touched a high of USD 130/lb is now down to just below USD 100/lb.

Assume that the economic life of both plants is 40 years and also assume for the sake of simplicity that all of the capital cost will be provided by loans/debt as opposed to the normal 70/30 debt/equity ratio. And take an interest rate of say 7% per annum with a payback to be achieved in 20 years.

Without taking into account the cost of actual operation i.e. staff and maintainance, and with just the two components of capital cost and fuel cost, work out what the basic numbers will be for 1 unit of electricity i.e. per kwh. You can vary the interest rate from the base of 7% and the payback from the base of 20 years resulting in minor changes in the cost per kwh.

I have already done the numbers but others may run them for their own satisfaction. Because what these so called experts talk about that nuclear energy is 3 times costlier than coal is plain bulls**t.

Last edited by ldev on 23 Aug 2007 05:29 pm; edited 2 times in total

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SaiK
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Someone need to explain how BARC is planning to reduce to Rs. 2 per unit from the current value of Rs. 3+?

ps:

btw, an interesting find:- 2005 data

domestic pay more than industries all over the world, with India being the exception (approximate reverse of American tariff).

here is a latest one:-
http://www.livemint.com/2007/08/2014575 ... stria.html.

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ldev
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Posted: 23 Aug 2007 05:47 pm Post subject:

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SaiK wrote:


here is a latest one:-
http://www.livemint.com/2007/08/2014575 ... stria.html.


ldev
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Posted: 23 Aug 2007 05:47 pm Post subject:

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ldev
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Posted: 23 Aug 2007 05:47 pm Post subject:



SaiK, thanks for that link. It needs to be posted in full so folks realize that India pays as much if not more than industrialized nations for electricity and inspite of that, it is not available:


Quote:
Electricity tariff for household consumers in India is comparable with many developed nations but charges paid by industrial users are much higher in some cases, the Rajya Sabha was informed on 20 August.

Household consumers in China (Taipei) pay only Rs2.83 per unit of power against Rs1.14 to Rs5.16 a unit in India. Household users in US pay Rs3.94 a unit, Rs5.59 in France, Rs6.47 in UK and the highest Rs8.05 in Japan, Power Minister Sushilkumar Shinde said in a written reply.
While industrial users in India paid between Rs1.57 to Rs8.04 per unit, France charged Rs1.98, China (Taipei) Rs2.10, US Rs2.25, UK Rs4.11 and Japan Rs5.21 per unit.

Shinde said the average per capita consumption of power in the country was about 631 kilowatt hours as compared to 17,176 units per person in Canada, 13,338 in USA, 11,126 in Australia, 8,076 in Japan, 7,689 in France, 7,030 in Germany, 6,206 in UK, 5,642 in Russia and 5,644 kWh in Italy.
“The National Electricity Policy notified in February 2005 envisages that the per capita availability of electricity will be increased to over 1000 units by 2012,â€
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Post by Philip »

I was reading a old issue of JDW (just hijacked by an unknown "commando") where there was a news item about our MIG-27 engine upgrade-same engine being sold to the Chinese.The interesting part is that the Russians propose using our old engines (for us)as power plants. A figure of 20MW was mentioned.
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Post by vsudhir »

ldev
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Post by ldev »

Arun_S wrote:No one else seems to have replied, so let me try:

Code:
Thermal Power Nuclear
Installation cost
Cost /Mwe (Rs) 40,000,000 -
Cost /Mwe ($) 1,000,000 1,500,000

Fuel Cost
Fuel Qty/Year 638.75 tonne/Yr 22.5 Kg/year
Cost/unit fuel $75 /tonne $220 /kg
Cost/Mwe/Year $47,906 /MWe/yr $4,950 /MWe/yr

Lifetime period 40 Yr 40 Yr
Lifetime cost $2.9 Million $1.7 Million
% lifecycyle cost 100% 58%
I have taken a slightly different approach by recognizing that money has a time value i.e. money invested upfront is more valuable compared to money to be spent 20 years down the road. As such I have tried to work out the cost per kwh for both rather than total lifetime costs.


First, the capital cost:

1. USD 1.5 Million capital cost with a payback of 20 years at 7% per annum, works out to an equated monthly payment of 11,629 dollars or 387.65 dollars per day. A 24 hour period will generate 24 MWh or 24,000 kwh/units. So the capital cost per kwh is 387.65/24,000= 1.62 cents. If the capital cost rises to USD 1.75 million per installed MW, then ofcourse the per kwh cost will rise to 1.89 cents.

2. Based on the same numbers, the cost per kwh for a coal fired thermal power station at Rs 4 crores per MW will work out to 1.08 cents.


Now for the fuel costs:

1. Uranium yellowcake costing $100/lb works out to USD 11.88 Million for the entire year for the plant at a consumption of 54 tons for the year. That translates into USD 33,000 per day (based on a 360 day financial year), for a capacity of 2400 MW. Per MW the cost will be USD 33,000/2400= USD 13.75 per day. USD 13.75 per 24 hours is the uranium cost for 24 MWh or 24,000 kwh. So the cost per kwh is USD 13.75/24,000= 0.05 cents.

2. For the coal fired power plant, the coal requirement for a 24 hour period per MW is: 10,000/2400= 4.166 tons. At USD 75/ton, the coal cost for 24MWh is USD 312.50. Therefore the per kwh cost is 312.50/24000=1.3 cents per kwh.

Total costs:

Nuclear:

Capital 1.62 cents + fuel 0.05 cents = 1.67 cents/kwh.

Coal:

Capital 1.08 cents + fuel 1.3 cents = 2.38 cents/kwh.



Caveats:

This assumes 100% load factor. Obviously as the load factor declines to a more realistic 85%-90%, the capital costs remain the same even if fuel costs decline and hence the per kwh cost will go up 1.92 cents for the nuclear plant and 2.57 cents for the coal fired plant.

It is interesting to note that under these conditions, the price of uranium yellow cake will have to rise to about USD 1300/lb, about 13 times its present price for its total cost to be equal to that of a coal fired plant based on its current price of coal of USD 75/ton.

Any feedback is welcome.
Last edited by ldev on 24 Aug 2007 19:01, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by NRao »

Gents,

can we please keep discussions on political topics or parties out of this thread? Even with statements be cautious enough as to not to start a deviant discussion.

Somehow, it serves no purpose (on the topic of this thread).

Thx.
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Post by Kakkaji »

N3 Saar:

Your posts have created some conphooshun in my mind.

IIRC a short while ago you were posting that nuclear energy is not very important, or even desirable, for overcoming power shortages in India, and that India should move towards renewable sources instead.

Now you are making the argument that this deal is necessary to overcome power shortages.

What has changed for this change in your stance? :-?

Personally, I support the 123 deal in its current form even though I don't think it will make a big difference in the power shortage situation. I think the key reason to support this deal is that it removes the technology denial regime, and the economic and strategic benefits that will follow from this deal.
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Post by vsudhir »

Personally, I support the 123 deal in its current form even though I don't think it will make a big difference in the power shortage situation. I think the key reason to support this deal is that it removes the technology denial regime, and the economic and strategic benefits that will follow from this deal.
This nicely sums up my position too.

The clincher was the revelation by RC and AS here that our MCD is safe and further tests are not needed for minimum deterrant at least for the next decade+.

Besides, we can import just nuke fuel under safeguards. Nobody's forcing GOI to buy foreign reactors.

Would be nice if we can build up a strategic fuel reserve in the event of an arbitrary POTUS led deal-termination.
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Post by shiv »

NRao wrote:Gents,

can we please keep discussions on political topics or parties out of this thread? Even with statements be cautious enough as to not to start a deviant discussion.

Somehow, it serves no purpose (on the topic of this thread).

Thx.
political posts excised surgically.

If my fellow admins do not continue this overnight - (It is 9 PM ish here in India) - I may well end up pruning 2-3 pages by tomorrow morning to remove politicalparty haggling being discussed here by supporters and opponents of those parties.

If you post that it may not last 24 hours
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Post by enqyoobOLD »

IIRC a short while ago you were posting that nuclear energy is not very important, or even desirable, for overcoming power shortages in India, and that India should move towards renewable sources instead.


No. You do not recall correctly, saaar.
Now you are making the argument that this deal is necessary to overcome power shortages.
yes.
What has changed for this change in your stance? Confused
Nothing, but I agree that u may be confused. 8)

I have pointed out that nuclear power is not THE answer for all power needs, such as agricultural water pumping, and probably not for household airconditioning or a lot of lighting. Probably not for street lighting. Probably not for generating electricity to charge electric cars and golf carts. For all those, India should switch very quickly to RENEWABLE resources on a massive scale. Also, to bring power to off-grid places, renewables are probably the way to go, because they can be generated very close to the end-user.

But for BASELOAD power, there is no alternative to a large increase in nuclear power, and I have consistently pointed that out, please point out where I have said otherwise if you think I have done so.

If an explanation is needed on what is BASELOAD power, we can discuss that, but probably not here. The Destroyer Himself is out with the Hatchet..

Point is, baseload power sources are needed for large industry, and without that, there is no hope to generate the renewable energy systems and the infrastructure. If we use coal for baseload, a few years down the line, the West will slam our exports with huge tariffs claiming Global Warming. Think GCBT (Global Coal Ban Treaty).

The NPAs talking about "clean coal" etc. are all hoping that we will get suckered into these things, because on a large scale, these are all very non-competitive. Meanwhile, Medha and Angana have choked the hydroelectric option, and wood-burning is banned by the Deforestation Prevention lobby - think GWBBT (Global Wood Burning Ban Treaty). Nuclear is the only way, and will keep India competitive and the air clean (and put the glow in desis' cheeks..)

:eek: :eek:
Last edited by enqyoobOLD on 24 Aug 2007 21:01, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by Arun_S »

ldev wrote:
Arun_S wrote:No one else seems to have replied, so let me try:

Code:
Thermal Power Nuclear
Installation cost
Cost /Mwe (Rs) 40,000,000 -
Cost /Mwe ($) 1,000,000 1,500,000

Fuel Cost
Fuel Qty/Year 638.75 tonne/Yr 22.5 Kg/year
Cost/unit fuel $75 /tonne $220 /kg
Cost/Mwe/Year $47,906 /MWe/yr $4,950 /MWe/yr

Lifetime period 40 Yr 40 Yr
Lifetime cost $2.9 Million $1.7 Million
% lifecycyle cost 100% 58%
I have taken a slightly different approach by recognizing that money has a time value i.e. money invested upfront is more valuable compared to money to be spent 20 years down the road. As such I have tried to work out the cost per kwh for both rather than total lifetime costs.


First, the capital cost:

1. USD 1.5 Million capital cost with a payback of 20 years at 7% per annum, works out to an equated monthly payment of 11,629 dollars or 387.65 dollars per day. A 24 hour period will generate 24 MWh or 24,000 kwh/units. So the capital cost per kwh is 387.65/24,000= 1.62 cents. If the capital cost rises to USD 1.75 million per installed MW, then ofcourse the per kwh cost will rise to 1.89 cents.

2. Based on the same numbers, the cost per kwh for a coal fired thermal power station at Rs 4 crores per MW will work out to 1.08 cents.


Now for the fuel costs:

1. Uranium yellowcake costing $100/lb works out to USD 11.88 Million for the entire year for the plant at a consumption of 54 tons for the year. That translates into USD 33,000 per day (based on a 360 day financial year), for a capacity of 2400 MW. Per MW the cost will be USD 33,000/2400= USD 13.75 per day. USD 13.75 per 24 hours is the uranium cost for 24 MWh or 24,000 kwh. So the cost per kwh is USD 13.75/24,000= 0.05 cents.

2. For the coal fired power plant, the coal requirement for a 24 hour period per MW is: 10,000/2400= 4.166 tons. At USD 75/ton, the coal cost for 24MWh is USD 312.50. Therefore the per kwh cost is 312.50/24000=1.3 cents per kwh.

Total costs:

Nuclear:

Capital 1.62 cents + fuel 0.05 cents = 1.67 cents/kwh.


Coal:

Capital 1.08 cents + fuel 1.3 cents = 2.38 cents/kwh.



Caveats:

This assumes 100% load factor. Obviously as the load factor declines to a more realistic 85%-90%, the capital costs remain the same even if fuel costs decline and hence the per kwh cost will go up 1.92 cents for the nuclear plant and 2.57 cents for the coal fired plant.

It is interesting to note that under these conditions, the price of uranium yellow cake will have to rise to about USD 1300/lb, about 13 times its present price for its total cost to be equal to that of a coal fired plant based on its current price of coal of USD 75/ton.

Any feedback is welcome.
ldev: Thanks for detailing. {See I did not read the question fully before I started on the spreadsheet ;) }. Cost of capital spread over a period is an important consideration in financial investment and NAV is the correct assessment.

Now your cost of electricity by Coal vs Nuclear power is correct & unassailable.
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Post by SaiK »

what is the "nice to have" power distribution from resource should look like in the next 20 years, 40 years and up to next 100 years?

HYDRO% : GAS/COAL% : NUKE% : RENEWABLE% ?

for the 20 years?
20 : 50 : 20 : 10

for the next 40 years?
25 : 25 : 30 : 20

for the next 100 years?
20 : 20 : 30 : 30

------
Did I wish correct?
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Post by enqyoobOLD »

Of course I believe that EnQyoob Renewables Inc. can boost that to make Renewables 70%, within 5 years.
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Post by CRamS »

The NPAs talking about "clean coal" etc. are all hoping that we will get suckered into these things, because on a large scale, these are all very non-competitive.
Clean coal technologies like coal gasification and IGCC are very expensive, and the efficacy to curtail Co2 and NOx emissions are still to be established and a work in progress. This is definetly not an option for India.

For rural India, key distributed renewable energy sources - solar, perhaphs wind, bio-mass(?), and other CHP technologies (fuel cells, microturbines may be expensive) networked in the form of micr-grids will be the way to go. And of course nuke power to drive the industrial/manufacturing sector and urban areas. I am told that UCB and others are embarking upon a micro grid project to power a reasonable-sized area consisting of homes and shopping centers in Beijing using only distributed renewal ources. I am trying to get hold of the details of this project.
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Post by enqyoobOLD »

Hydro is nice, but these days you DO have to separate it from "Renewables" because "Renewables" has come to mean "Green". Hydro is not "Green" because Medha and Arundhati and Angana see Red.

If you think about it, FBR comes pretty close to "Renewable", hey? And Silicon Solar cell production causes more toxic waste than a nuclear power plant, per unit energy.

So Sai's way of classifying is correct. Don't include at least the Big Dams as "Renewables". Microhydro projects may still qualify.
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Post by Arun_S »

From previous thread:
abhischekcc wrote:Anyway, in the interests of maintaining decorum on the forum, I will refrain from answering unrelated kweschuns, since I happen to illeterate only, and have to ask the cyber cafe owner to type in my answers, after he has translated it from Bhojpuri.
Is one of most ingenious and hilarious joke in a long time. In the footsteps of 5 year child :lol:
"Ka ho kaisay banee? Ab hum U dabba'wa (qyoob) ko jabaab deytain hain, likho bhai likhoo ... . ." :wink:
enqyoob wrote:And Silicon Solar cell production causes more toxic waste than a nuclear power plant, per unit energy. .
I don't think so, you may wan to check library literature for 5 year old. Current semiconductor process is generates very low toxic waste. And whatever toxic waste it generates can be chemically converted into very stable compounds for safe disposal.
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Post by enqyoobOLD »

kindergarten library search throws up these:

Potential health hazards... associated with production of..
In large-scale manufacture of cadmium telluride, copper indium diselenide, and zinc phosphide photovoltaic cells, the materials and equipment used may present potential health and safety hazards to workers and the public.^These hazards were identified by reviewing data on process materials, availability of control technology, biomedical effects, and health and environmental standards.^Quantitative estimates of material inputs and outputs, and control technology costs for selected processes were based on preliminary engineering designs for hypothetical 10-MWp/yr photovoltaic cell production facilities.^In the fabrication of these devices, unusually large quantities of some toxic gases may be used; large demands for phosphine and hydrogen selenide are of special concern.^Because projected usage of these materials is much larger than the current one, a thorough evaluation of engineering controls will be needed before the technologies are commercialized.^These materials could also present occupational health hazards.^Some management options to reduce occupational exposures to these materials are presented.^Although specific federal and state regulations have not been promulgated for emissions from the photovoltaic industry, prudent engineering practice should be applied to all waste streams - solid, atmospheric, or liquid - containing toxic pollutants to limit discharges of these materials.^Control costs for most atmospheric waste streams should not be large (<0.01 cent per watt); for phosphine, however, costs are potentially much larger (4.4 cents per watt).^Some processes may also produce large quantities of solid waste defined as toxic or hazardous under US Environmental Protection Agency guidelines.^Disposal costs for these materials are presented.


Way over moi's head, sorree onlee.

But here's the GREENPEACE propaganda that says don't read the article above, just buy some more bridges:
Nontoxic and fully recyclable


Sillicon is the second most abundant element on earth. It’s the main component of solar cells. (Yeah, right. CowPu is the most abundant material on the 'net)

Solar cells mainly are composed of endowed sillicon. Sillicon is a nontoxic semi-conductor metal which is predominantly used in chip-industry. Also during operation, solar cells don’t produce any toxic material, only eco-friendly solar current. :roll:

The sillicon used for the production of solar cells is toxically completely harmless. It’s the second most abundant element in the earth’s crust. Also new technologies, such as the cadmium-telluride solar cells or the copper-indium-biselenious solar cells, don’t hold any high environmental risks compared to other forms of energy supply.

To use the sillicon for solar cells, it must first be purified and then doped with foreign atoms. A large part of the demand of pure sillicon is covered by waste of the chip-industry. By the enormous growth of the solar market, the demand for pure sillicon exceeds the present offer. Meanwhile there are several factories in construction for sillicon, especially for the solar industry. The first ones will be opened in 2007.

The environmental impact and the safety risk of solar cells are infinitesimally small compared to conventional sources of energy like coal, oil, gas or atomic energy. With the latter, the danger is global (emission of carbon-dioxide) and longterm (for example the problems of disposal of nuclear energy). This is regarding regular operation already. If we think about solar panels running for 30 years that don’t produce any pollutants, the environmental damage is obviously kept very limited.


(Yes, but if you see all those solar panels in India that turned green with moss inside 2 years and are now used mainly as Pu deposit stations (PDS) for birds, u get a slightly different picture...That reminds me - I need to go practice kicking that overpriced Solar Lamp that I installed at the end of the driveway - and lasted for about 3 months and brought a lot of :rotfl: from Supreme HQ ) In its prime, it caused many glowworms to come propose to it.

The process of production for solar cells is well developed and tested. From the chemical and toxin point of view, even a mass-production of solar cells will not implicate any significant environmental or health problems. (Except to people in and around the plant, and where the MegaCorp dumps its garbage along the highway..)

For the recycling of sillicon solar cells different methods were developed. The main problem at the time is the disassembly of solar cells into their consisting parts. Because the solar module doesn’t contain any toxic parts there isn’t going to be any harmful waste either. With an adequate technique of production photovoltaic systems can be recycled completely. Glass and sillicon can be recycled easily. A little more problematic is the disassembly of the composited modules which contain synthetics as well. BP Solar is testing with good results the recycling of solar cells out of modules by dissolving them chemically. Besides saving energy, a definite reduction of costs by recycling the solar cells can be reached. In the future solar modules will be constructed to make a full substantial recycling possible. If a solar system is disused, you can recycle all materials. The solar cells must be “refreshed“ and can be used with the same glass again, for a second period of operation. In particular the recycling process shows a positive balance of energy, so even if the sillicon – depending on the method – can’t be used for solar cells, but has to be used in other branches of the metal industry, the energy-input for the recycling is lower than the one for new sillicon.


Oooh! I feel so GREEN I could wave the Bakistani Flag!
Last edited by enqyoobOLD on 25 Aug 2007 01:02, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by enqyoobOLD »

[quote]India has at least 50,000 MW of untapped hydro electric potential,â€
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Post by Arun_S »

enqyoob wrote:kindergarten library search throws up these:

Potential health hazards... associated with production of..
In large-scale manufacture of cadmium telluride, copper indium diselenide, and zinc phosphide photovoltaic cells, the materials and equipment used may present potential health and safety hazards to workers and the public.^These hazards were identified by reviewing data on process materials, availability of control technology, biomedical effects, and health and environmental standards.^Quantitative estimates of material inputs and outputs, and control technology costs for selected processes were based on preliminary engineering designs for hypothetical 10-MWp/yr photovoltaic cell production facilities.^In the fabrication of these devices, unusually large quantities of some toxic gases may be used; large demands for phosphine and hydrogen selenide are of special concern.^Because projected usage of these materials is much larger than the current one, a thorough evaluation of engineering controls will be needed before the technologies are commercialized.^These materials could also present occupational health hazards.^Some management options to reduce occupational exposures to these materials are presented.^Although specific federal and state regulations have not been promulgated for emissions from the photovoltaic industry, prudent engineering practice should be applied to all waste streams - solid, atmospheric, or liquid - containing toxic pollutants to limit discharges of these materials.^Control costs for most atmospheric waste streams should not be large (<0.01 cent per watt); for phosphine, however, costs are potentially much larger (4.4 cents per watt).^Some processes may also produce large quantities of solid waste defined as toxic or hazardous under US Environmental Protection Agency guidelines.^Disposal costs for these materials are presented.


Way over moi's head, sorree onlee.
Poison is no problem if handled properly and disposed properly. We have been using Phosgene in wafer fab for good 35 years, safely (albeit a rare chemical alarm every year, but no death). Phosgene is essential for all Epitaxial Silicon growth, that eventually hosts the active (transistor/FET) components, the base/substrate is essentially to provide for mechanical rigidity & strength for wafer fab processes that end in back-grind to take away 95% of the original wafer body; photocell however retain the full body for strength.

Also some some nasty gases for plasma etch/deposition or aquaregia for film wetetch. Of course some of dopents in the front end of the process are unfriendly metals.

Back in my ol fab, we had gold fishes in the spent water tank to show to our visitor that the waste treated water is not poisonous before disposing it to the storm drain in Ang Mo Kio. Amreeka bahadur and Europe is even more strict in hazardous chemical waste safety.

No worry have curry. Make as many solar panels as you want, the pollution and safety is 1/100 as much lethal as the coal ash coning from one smokestack of the 200MWe Indra Prastha Power Station in amchi Dilli. Does a Bhartiya naagrik want to work in a semiconductor wafer fab or another job that requres bus commute in Dilli. The choice will tell the truth.
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Post by SaiK »

enqyoob saare, one can't live w/o politics.. I guess the issue was more due to biggies taking sides and deviating into "BJP v/s Congress" is a definite noise one could see. those one liner hints, and a story behind, with a para of yours, is well likeable. imho [and i expect, to read more if you can post more. got time?].

lets narrow it down to such pleasures, within the threshold of admins & gurus here would not be pushed to the corner. as long as the thread does not look trolled, it should be okay, with a nuclear context behind.

/2c
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Post by enqyoobOLD »

Someone should point out that Nuclear Plants can reduce the trip distance from, say, Bhopal to Pennsylvania or California by a huge amount. Much straighter route too... 8)
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Post by Arun_S »

Interesting Nuclear "khichri" where nuclear deal, nculear power, nuclear politics, nuclear Yindu being discussed, but now add the 'aaachar' in the Khichri to make it spicy. Like some weapons aka nuclear submarine and missiles.

Cross posting from
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 161#387159

[quote]This is important news so posting in full. And look who has been pushing for this capabelity, our Yankee butt kicker -- Bharat Karnad saab.

Have BRF members forgotten Rakesh pledge to distribute Mitahaee by the weight of the Akula. Pay up amigo. Unfortunately no option to eat crow instead, for the crow eater is MIA.

India Today:
DEFENCE: NUCLEAR SUBMARINE
The Secret Nuke Sub Deal

[quote]By Sandeep Unnithan

On June 15, 2008, the Indian Navy will commission the INS Chakra, a 12,000-tonne Akula-II class nuclear-powered attack submarine, from the far eastern Russian port of Vladivostok. The submarine, which is being built at a shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, marks the fruition of a $650-million (Rs 2,600 crore) secret deal signed by the NDA government three-and-a-half years ago, which said that India would finance the construction of an unfinished Russian nuclear submarine hull and then lease it for 10 years. The impending acquisition of the Chakra gives India the long-awaited third leg of the nuclear triad—the others being air and land-based nuclear delivery platforms—widely regarded as the most survivable mode of launching nuclear weapons.
“It is the most crucial strategic capability we are acquiring after testing nuclear weapons in 1998,â€
Last edited by Arun_S on 25 Aug 2007 02:29, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by Gerard »

Have BRF members forgotten Rakesh pledge to distribute Mitahaee by the weight of the Akula. Pay up amigo.
Rakesh has issued a RFI to mithai-wallahs. In true Indian defense procurement style, he will issue a RFP in a few years, followed by standard 5 years for price negotiations, kickbacks etc.
Assuming no CBI investigation and vendor disqualification, mithai will arrive in....
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Post by Arun_S »

No No... No slipper road to freedom from 12,000 tonne or even 1,200 tonne.
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Post by ramana »

So even this Akula (What does it mean Wolf?) is also an NDA legacy like the A3?

Seema Mustafa on Ronen Sen and headless chickens
Ronen Sen ko gussa kyon aata hai?
By Seema Mustafa

India’s envoy to the United States, Ronen Sen, is fuming. So much so that he quite forgot that he represents all of India and not just a coterie as the Indian ambassador abroad, and used words to describe critics of the civilian nuclear energy deal, that Parliament has since made him regret. Those who criticised the deal were described by the envoy as "headless chickens" and it took CPI leader D. Raja to gently point out that he was neither a chicken nor headless. Parliamentarians were reminded that 60 years after Independence they were still insecure, words of wisdom that rocked both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, with both the minister of external affairs Pranab Mukherjee and Mr Sen himself regretting the remarks and apologising for hurting the sentiments of the House.

The point is not what Mr Sen has said. The point is why does even a little criticism of the deal drive Mr Sen, national security adviser M.K. Narayanan and Prime Minister Singh mad? Why is it that a hint of opposition has them mouthing words and using phrases that are not usually heard from them, with Dr Manmohan Singh claiming that those who supported the deal were patriots (meaning those who opposed it were not), the NSA wondering at those who opposed the nuclear deal, with "sources" describing the critics as insecure and paranoid, and now Mr Sen setting Parliament on fire with his ill-advised criticism of those opposed to the deal? Why are they taking criticism so personally? After all, it was just an agreement that the Prime Minister reached with US President George W. Bush, and an agreement that the Prime Minister can just as easily drop, now that most of India has made it clear that it does not want this agreement to be signed within the framework of the Hyde Act.

Why this refusal to heed the majority in Parliament? And why the anger against those who are opposing the nuclear deal that goes against the interests and sovereignty of the nation? And if the government is right, surely it should counter the opposition with believable facts and figures, and not by hurling accusations wildly. The note prepared by the government and distributed to the UPA MPs is just a reiteration of the Prime Minister’s assurances to Parliament before the Hyde Act was passed by the US Congress. These assurances have been rejected by Parliament now as being inconsistent not just with the Hyde Act but also the 123 Agreement reached bilaterally between New Delhi and Washington. Mr Sen has merely lent his voice to the cacophony seeking to drown the legitimate criticism of the deal that represents a strategic alliance that the government is firming with the US amidst denials and disinformation.

Shining India is once again being repeated, but this time by the Congress party. Unable to respect the opposition to the deal, the leadership of the party and the government is using a systematic disinformation campaign to attack critics, be they respected nuclear scientists or the elected representatives of the people, and to make out that those opposed to the nuclear energy agreement with the US were either stupid, or brainless, or motivated, or in the pay of "China and Pakistan." The latest attack on the Left for being close to China, and now, interestingly enough, even to Pakistan, smacks of stupidity or desperation or both. Supposedly intelligent scribes are writing thousands of words seeking to point out to the Left that "even China" has done this, that or the other insofar as relations with the US are concerned. Where is the connection? Except of course, in the minds of the writers, all sharing the same desperation as exhibited by the Congress government since it started becoming clear that the deal might not materialise. At least, not without the government being reduced to a minority in Parliament.

Elections are a certainty if the Congress decides to operationalise the deal. And for those who do not read the printed word, let it once again be placed for the record: the first step towards operationalising the deal is when the government sends a team to the IAEA at Vienna to discuss the safeguards agreement. The 123 Agreement cannot be deemed to have been operationalised, if all that happens is the annual and routine visit by Atomic Energy Commission chief Dr Anil Kakodkar to the IAEA next month. The government knows that if it takes the next step, its term in office is over. And the country will go into a general election within six months.

It is also clear that if and when elections are held, these will be the first since Bofors swept the Congress off its feet where the country will be asked to vote for a major issue: for or against a strategic relationship with the US. It will be the first time, after years, that the people will be mobilised by new political realignments to give their verdict on whether they want India to carry her head high as an independent power, or whether they want her to allow the US that has invaded Iraq, is preparing to invade Iran, to dictate her economic, social and political policies. The campaign will be taken out of Delhi to the villages of India and again only a political novice will insist that the verdict will favour a strategic alliance with the US. The politicians opposing the deal in Parliament know this, even though those in power have still to realise this. India has deep-rooted pride in her sovereignty and will not allow this to be compromised by any power.

Strange kinds of polls are being conducted by television channels. Some have sampled only 500 odd voters in the big cities to reach the conclusion that India wants the nuclear deal. Senior Left leaders are being brought on to television to be pilloried. It is a strong campaign, as strong as it was when the NDA was insisting that India was shining. But the polls proved the spin masters wrong, and the BJP-led government was ousted from power. Today, when the campaign against the nuclear deal and a strategic alliance reaches rural India the verdict will shock the Congress party. The majority of the people will not support the deal, and the Congress that is currently isolated in Parliament will be isolated by the people as a pro-US party. The coterie around the Prime Minister and the Congress president does not realise this, or does not want to realise this, but there are the silent Congressmen who have begun to see the writing on the wall.

A hint of the campaign that will hit the streets once elections are certain, was visible during the short debate in Parliament for the recall of Mr Ronen Sen. Interestingly, Mr Sen sought to protect himself by saying he had not used the term headless chickens for the MPs but for the media! These words would have, even ten years ago, elicited a strong reaction from the journalists who would have insisted on an apology. Today, this attack is met with silence from the journalists who have long since sacrificed their freedom and independence for crumbs from the Establishment.

The fundamental questions remain: why are all of them so desperate to protect a deal that no one wants? Is a deal with the US more important than the government? Is the government more important than the nation?
And Bharat Karnad
‘India First’ Alternative to Nuclear Deal
By Bharat Karnad

The nuclear deal with the United States faces a swift end or a lingering death. The strategic vision-challenged Manmohan Singh government failed to convince Parliament because it over-sold its benefits just as the allegedly adverse consequences of its termination are now being flogged with large dollops of exaggeration.

The Opposition parties’ asking the government to treat the 123 Agreement as dead letter, has been interpreted as an irresponsible move that will "isolate" India globally. The facile assumption here being that India is easily isolatable, that its geopolitical standing is the result of American goodwill, not its inherent strengths.

An even worse implication is that Parliament is less important and less sovereign than the American legislature. Apparently, the US Congress’ voting the 2006 Hyde Act that violated the letter and the spirit of the July 2005 Joint Statement signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush, is fine, but a parliamentary majority seeking to protect India’s vital national interests in lieu of the PM’s failure to do so, is not.

Opposition to the deal is labelled a throwback to the knee-jerk anti-Americanism of the past. Enhancing its role and leverage in the 21st century, it is dubiously argued, requires India to not only side with America on Iran, non-proliferation, and the emerging great power politics in Asia, but also cede Washington its strategic space.

Still more problematically, the US is portrayed as the vehicle for India’s great power ambitions. If the cost of the ticket involves compromising national security, undermining the integrity of the dual-purpose Indian nuclear energy programme, and limiting its foreign policy freedom in small and big ways, hey, that is the price to pay if India wants to reach where it wants to go.

Underlying these points are some egregiously flawed premises. For instance, that nuclear arsenals are more hindrance than help in achieving great power, when, actually, the political value and utility of meaningful strategic nuclear and thermonuclear missile forces have never been higher; or that soft power represented by Bollywood and information technology talent transcends the hard, military, capabilities of the State and, by extension, that economic power unrelated to the military clout of a country, is what counts in international affairs, which is rubbish.

Further, India’s backing out of a deal when nothing has been signed and no treaty commitments undertaken, it is claimed, will isolate India globally, and reduce its credibility as a strategic interlocutor.

The United States withdrew unilaterally from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to deploy ballistic missile defences, and Russia is on the verge of disavowing the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty to counter Nato’s enlarged role with its own beefed up conventional military presence. Great powers routinely abandon treaties perceived as inconvenient and midway chuck those seen as injurious to national interest. The US signed but did not ratify and implement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

It will, however, be pointed out that India is not the equal of the US or even Russia. Exactly! In which case, how to explain the weak core at the centre of the nuclear deal — Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s factually silly and diplomatically dangerous conviction featured in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, which referred to India as a State with "advanced nuclear technology" on par with, and enjoying "the same advantages and benefits" as, the United States in the nuclear sphere?

The Indian government used this supposedly indirect American recognition of India as nuclear weapon state as cover for the serious compromises it knew it had to make, thus setting the country up for the non-proliferation kill. Because, thereafter, Indian negotiators could not resist the American demand that, like the US, India too should forsake nuclear testing, even though such prohibition will leave the country’s "credible minimum deterrent" progressively more minimal and less credible. That the phrase "State with advanced nuclear technology" trapped India in the NPT-CTBT web is evident in Washington’s insistence on the INFIRC 66 Rev 2 pertaining to non-nuclear weapon states as model for its "safeguards in perpetuity," which Delhi has accepted.

Let us rewind a bit. If the "tactical shortage" of natural uranium ore, is what originally motivated the deal, should the cultivation of the uranium ore-rich non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries not have been priority? An Indian firm has already signed a contract to begin uranium mining in Niger. The government of Uganda has invited India to explore and mine uranium in that country. Investing in uranium mining operations in non-NSG States, would have laid the foundation of a prudent policy.

With India having some 30%-40% of the world’s thorium reserves, nuclear energy is bound to play a big role in the future. So why has the Indian government since the Nineties when Manmohan Singh, incidentally, was finance minister, not invested massively in bringing the breeder reactor and thorium utilisation technologies on stream as quickly as is possible? Accessing non-NSG natural uranium will help fuel the indigenous power plants in the interim period until the plutonium breeders and thorium reactors become operational, leaving the estimated 70,000 tonnes of uranium ore in the country for exclusively military use. Both the mid-term and long-term nuclear energy needs will thus be met and India’s military requirements taken care of as well. The imperative in the short-term to run power reactors at lower capacity would appear to be a small price to pay to keep the country’s strategic independence intact.

For reasons unknown, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh continues to ballyhoo the deal as an energy windfall. But nuclear energy available from all power reactors, including 20 imported ones, according to a recent Planning Commission study, will account for only 5%-6% of the total energy produced in 2035 — a not very significant fraction. His other belief that the deal will be an "Open Sesame" to high technology is equally untenable. Advanced countries develop frontier technologies in autarchic regimes and are loath to sell or share them because technology is what gives them the edge. And, what high-value American technology is made available, in any case, will be on a case-by-case basis, deal or no nuclear deal.

But why did successive governments (Atal Behari Vajpayee’s and Manmohan Singh’s) alight on a policy template that turned a "Rising India" into a supplicant? Two reasons; one, because of the entrenched "have not-ism" — a defensive and diffident habit of mind compelling Indian politicians, officials, and members of the intelligentsia alike to seek handouts, curry favour and to seek approbation from the West. It follows that these Third World Calibans, inverting the obvious conclusions, would accuse those opposing the deal as lacking "self-respect" and "self-confidence." And secondly, because the country’s great power attributes have not been appreciated by the Indian policy establishment, whence no "India First" policies have ensued.

Seriously, do the US and the West have a choice other than to engage India on Indian terms in the regional security, trade, and energy fields?

As a vibrant democracy and economic and military powerhouse wedged in between the two biggest threats espied by the US and the West, namely, an authoritarian and aggrandising China and a zone stretching from the Karakoram to the Maghreb rife with radical Islam and terrorism, only India, with the necessary all round heft, can be system balancer and administrator. Tragically, lacking rulers with the strategic vision and the will to great power, India has thrashed around in the shallows — easy pickings for anyone with the wit to exploit the situation.

Bharat Karnad is Professor at the Centre for Policy Research and author of Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, now in its second edition
and some one else
Our headless chickens, not KFC’s
By Susenjit Guha

Ronen Sen’s outburst betrayed a frustration common among emissaries of a would-be vassal State when even softened "hard power" cannot be forced through.

"Hard power" is a US foreign policy phenomenon beginning with gentle to hard prods and pushes leading to the arm-twisting of erring nations that are anti-US in their belligerence. If they still don’t toe the US State department’s line, pre-emptive strikes evoking "shock and awe" follow, as we have seen recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even a child knows by now that WMDs were an excuse to invade Iraq.

In thriving, strategically located democracies with huge, potential markets for US goods and services, governments are talked into aligning themselves with the United States’ security concerns. Here, "soft power" is exerted in small measures. Linking World Bank largesse with self-sufficiency substitution, instead of import substitution, goes on an overdrive thanks to politicians on payroll. A barrage of "made in US" goods, services and technology floods the market. Fresh carrots with a hidden Malacca in the background make sovereign nations wholly dependent till they turn into vassal States of the US.

Ronen Sen’s remarks may have been triggered by US undersecretary of state Nicholas Burns’ interview to Outlook magazine where he said that the 123 Agreement was done and could not be renegotiated. Incidentally, he also pointed out provisions in the agreement which gave leverage to the US to suspend all nuclear cooperation in the event of another nuclear test by India. Despite all this talk, Ronen Sen beat around undergirding termination of cooperation would not be automatic. He further said US position remained at an authoritative level as it had been articulated earlier and India had the right to test as much as the US had the right to react. Having lobbed the ball into India’s court, the US now wants to leave the squabbling to our politicians while they stick to their stand. Acting US state department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos reiterated once again Burns’ position on the issue. No renegotiations. Period. Indian civilian reactors will be open for international inspection.

Where does India stand then in terms of sovereignty?

Isn’t it a Catch 22 situation?

The going logic behind falling hook, line and sinker for 123 is not to miss the Greyhound bus once again. Why not, when it is in US’ own interest to contain China with the help of a buffer India? Not going the whole hog and walking away from the deal would only benefit China and Pakistan. But China, with a rising financial clout in mainland US, is a different kettle of fish altogether. Leave alone hard power, even small doses of soft power is something the US would think twice before exercising.

Our banking on Japan’s support among NSG has been dashed with Shinzo Abe remaining non-committal, preferring to wait and watch India’s negotiations with the IAEA. On the flip side, he raised hopes with his "broader prosperity arc" which excluded China. With growing opposition at home from the Left and Right, and time ticking away, the government is gradually being pushed to the wall and might bang its head in the process. It may have to ask Ronen Sen what to run like before it gets too late.

Agreed the Left is traditionally soft on China and may have a stake in the ruckus. But we cannot get embroiled in knee-jerk US reactions in the wake of the deal to foist democracy on regimes they only consider despotic. As the deal hangs in limbo in India, Americans have cleverly put Iran on the backburner. If the deal is through, soft power will ensure India’s conformity with US hard policies on Iran.

In a bid to be the "town on the hill," the US has to go to nooks and corners of this planet to force-feed democracy and let freedom reign. True to its origins, it has assumed Biblical significance like never before in George Bush’s tenure, thanks to US mid-western voters. Misreading Hitler during the Thirties by the US automatically made all post World War II Presidents see his ghost in Indo-China, Latin America, East Europe, Central Asia throughout the Cold War era. Now the venue has shifted to rabid anti-US Islamic countries. Hitler too, has converted to Islam. Unfortunately, in all confrontations, "the town on the hill" as a beacon of light to hamlets down on the dale has been misinterpreted due to a lack of understanding of lesser worlds and non-Christian cultures. Getting on the jump seat with the US will affect our traditionally nurtured socio-cultural balance. Having turned Nehruvian foreign policy on the head when we neither stood left or right but upright, we would now fall flat on our faces.

Taking George Bush to be India’s best ever friend and going along with him will be a costly naiveté. Hyde Act is eternal to the US and whoever is in the White House, Republican or Democrat, will have to abide by it. Banking on a Democrat to wriggle out of Iraq and broker peace with all anti-US dissenters is wishful thinking. Wasn’t apocalyptic bombardment ratcheted up in Vietnam during President Lyndon B. Johnson’s time? We may be asked to provide foot soldiers for apocalyptic marine commanders in future.

It remains to be seen if Dr Singh can make a face saving exit out of this mess in the coming weeks and prevent our downslide. If he can force his way leaving the opposition in UPA smarting, barking ferociously but not biting, India will be reduced to a vassal State. If it bites, elections will bring back a disoriented BJP which may fall back on its pet agenda to reorient itself. Ronen Sen’s "to whom it may concern" headless chickens, later narrowed down to defile the media, are not the KFC’s Colonel’s, but our very own roosters who crow in the early hours of the morning to wake up India in the remotest villages.

Susenjit Guha is a freelance writer
Last edited by ramana on 25 Aug 2007 03:15, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by Vick »

ramana wrote:So even this Akula (What does it mean Wolf?) is also an NDA legacy like the A3?
Akula = Shark
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Post by putnanja »

Not time yet for n-deal in House
NEW DELHI, AUGUST 24: A Parliamentary debate on the nuclear issue was deferred for the second time amidst fresh efforts to find a common meeting ground between the Government and the Left. Congress President Sonia Gandhi set in motion the process for the latest peace bid soon after her return from South Africa on Friday.

Given the tight-rope walk which both sides have to undertake to resolve the issue, it is prudent for them to skirt a formal discussion in Parliament, which would warrant the Government to commit itself to a final position on wrapping up a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The postponement of the debate on the Indo-US deal became evident after Speaker Somnath Chatterjee announced in the Lok Sabha on Friday that the House would discuss the issue of rise in prices of essential commodities on August 29. The Business Advisory Committee (BAC) had earlier resolved to discuss the nuclear issue on August 29 and 30. Initially, the discussion was slated for August 21.

A calling attention motion on price rise was listed in the names of CPI leaders Gurudas Dasgupta and C K Chandrappan and CPI(M) leader Basudeb Acharia in Friday’s list of business. However, the Speaker converted it into a discussion under Rule 193 and scheduled it for August 29. The discussion may spill over to the next day. If it does, the nuclear deal may come up before Parliament in the first week of September, which would provide the Government with enough time and space to explore possibilities of a compromise with the Left.
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Post by enqyoobOLD »

Just out of curiosity, how many here have actually met and listened to Ronen Sen - and how he articulates the positions of India to the West?

He is far, far and away the best Indian Ambassador ever to the US. And take it from moi, his ripostes and nuclear-tipped but quiet missile attacks on those who diss India, have to be seen and heard to be truly appreciated.

When he calls the desi media headless chickens, he is being understated but on target.

The clamor from the headless chickens, caused by that comment says all that needs to said about the headless chickens.

Of course he is just not as suave and refined and soft-spoken like moi, who refers to them as Energizer Bunnies. 8)

BTW, I see that the demand to Amend the Constitution (Although There is Nothing Wrong With It) :roll: , so brilliantly articulated here by certain postors and now published by its authors M. Patkar, A. Roy and S. Pandey, has made it to the EB email list. Curiously, the EBs have noticed the signatures... now let me c how much they all agree to join forces and destroy India's future for another 40 years.
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Post by NRao »

Seriously, do the US and the West have a choice other than to engage India on Indian terms in the regional security, trade, and energy fields?
Something I had said long back. The US and the West have no option. I still feel that MMS has under sold - he should have got a lot more than he got.

IF this is an economic deal, then MMS should provide the detailed plan to make it happen. IF it is a strategic deal, then he should have taken others into confidence long back.
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Post by Roop »

enqyoob wrote:When he calls the desi media headless chickens, he is being understated but on target.
Yes, but I think the reason for the 'tempest in a teacup' about his remarks is that he *wasn't* just referring to journalists. I'm sure he had in mind various and sundry panic-mongers (the think-tank types like BC/BK, the politicians like Yechury/Karat, and the journos like Seema M. There is, in Pentagon jargon, a "target-rich environment" of headless chickens on this issue).

Sen's remarks were entirely appropriate, but not 'on the record'; his only mistake was assuming the professional bona-fides of the journalist, instead of explicitly insisting that his remarks were off the record.
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Post by Tilak »

India, US think differently on N-deal: US think tank
August 24, 2007 13:40 IST
Claiming that India and the United States appear to be interpreting key provisions of the nuclear agreement, including the consequences of resumption of testing by New Delhi, differently, two American scholars from a reputed think tank have warned that it could strain bilateral relations in future.

"The governments of Manmohan Singh [Images] and George W Bush [Images] appear to be interpreting key provisions of the agreement very differently, which can only cause more headaches in future," said Michael Krepon and Alex Stolar of the Washington DC-based Stimson Centre.


One area of the potential dispute relates to the consequences of the resumption of nuclear testing by India, they said.

"The US public law is clear in this regard, but the India finds solace in pledges that the Bush administration has given to cushion the potential blow. One provision in the 123 Agreement pledges to provide India, one way or another, with an ample fuel bank to guard against disruption caused by nuclear testing," they said. However, the legislative intent of the Hyde Act "places clear constraints on fuel supplies", the scholars said.

The scholars said that using the nuclear deal to break the decades of mistrust between the two countries was an odd and unfortunate choice.

"The previous Indian government -- led by the same BJP leaders who now oppose the deal -- showed poor judgement in making nuclear cooperation the litmus test of bilateral relations, and the Bush administration compounded this error by trying to change the rules of nuclear commerce -but only for a friend,"
they said.

Accusing the Bush administration of disregarding the legislative intent behind the Hyde Act while finalising the 123 Agreement, they said, "If crucial stakeholders demand exceptions for their friends, and place profit-taking above non-proliferation norms, the global system created to prevent proliferation will be battered."

If India decided to operationalise the deal, they said, the next stage would be to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"New Delhi has insisted that the agreement be India-specific, implying that if fuel is disrupted, safeguards can be dispensed with. In this regard, the 123 Agreement makes reference to India's right to corrective measures if fuel supplies are interrupted," they said.

"It also includes a clause that the US will assist India in its dealings with the IAEA," they said.

However, they contend that that it is very likely, that the IAEA will insist on safeguards in perpetuity, without conditions or reference to disrupted fuel supply.

"These and other implementation provisions are bound to cause greater difficulties in India and further fray relations with the US once it becomes evident that the 123 Agreement has papered over differences in interpretation, while disregarding congressional intent to reduce the deal's negative proliferation consequences," they said. "The Bush administration is inclined towards historic, game-changing, geo-strategic initiatives. The proposed US-India deal certainly fits this mold. This bold manoeuvre was launched with great fanfare and had immediate political appeal. But it was ill-advised and poorly executed. Payments for poor judgement are now coming due," Krepon and Stolar said.
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Post by shiv »

NRao wrote:..I still feel that MMS has under sold - he should have got a lot more than he got.

IF this is an economic deal, then MMS should provide the detailed plan to make it happen. IF it is a strategic deal, then he should have taken others into confidence long back.
NRao - how does this statement square up with one you made earlier in this thread?
NRao wrote:Gents,

can we please keep discussions on political topics or parties out of this thread? Even with statements be cautious enough as to not to start a deviant discussion.

Somehow, it serves no purpose (on the topic of this thread).

Thx.
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Post by Tilak »

IAEA and NSG will be no Cakewalk
August 24, 2007
The timing of the 'do or die' opposition of the Left to the nuclear deal has remained inexplicable. They had two long years to give a clear signal to the government that it was definitely a 'we or they' situation, but they chose to raise the alarm bells only when the 123 Agreement was done.

This was possibly because they thought that the US would never concede the points on testing and reprocessing. When they found that these hurdles were crossed and it appeared that the remaining steps like negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, were a mere formality, they chose to put their foot down.

The negotiations on an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA Governing Board and talks with members of the NSG to seek an exception for India are likely to be long and hazardous. The United States has considerable influence in the IAEA Board and, as the founder of the NSG it has the necessary clout to determine the outcome of the informal group. But, over the years, positions of individual countries have crystallized in these bodies and they are likely to give us a hard time despite the US being our 'sherpa' on the climb.

The commitment to non-proliferation is strong in both these bodies and it will be difficult for members to change their mindsets by a mere nod from the United States. Moreover, the United States stands to gain from an orchestrated debate in both these bodies, so that the right stage is set for the hard days ahead of implementation of the deal.

There is much speculation about the stage of drafting of the two documents, which should emerge from the IAEA and the NSG before the US Congress proceeds to vote on the 123 Agreement. But this should be the least of the problems. Neither our mission in Vienna, nor the Department of Atomic Energy would have remained idle since July 2005.

In fact, they had not remained idle even before: It was quite normal for them to prepare plans for the eventuality of an accommodation with the non-proliferation regime. As for India-specific safeguards as different from full-scope safeguards, these already exist for Tarapur, Rajasthan and Kudankulam. It is simply a matter of concluding such an agreement in the case of designated civilian facilities.

The general contours of such arrangements have already been discussed between Dr R Chidambaram and Dr Mohamed ElBaradei on a couple of occasions and the members of the Board, who are directly interested in the issue must have given their inputs to the IAEA.

It should also not be difficult for the IAEA Board and the General Conference to meet at short notice to approve such agreements at very short notice, if there is political will. Incidentally, Dr Anil Kakodkar, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, leads our delegation to the General Conference, while our ambassador in Vienna is on the Board of Governors.

An important point to note is that the Board has to recognise that there will be a qualitative difference in the status of India in the IAEA when the new arrangements are in place. We are presently in the company of Pakistan and Israel when it comes to safeguards issues. The three countries vote against an Egyptian-sponsored call for all member States to accept full-scope safeguards even though there is language in the resolution that this will be in accordance with their respective international obligations. The vote is often preceded by long and hard negotiations with Egypt and its supporters.

Even after the adoption of India-specific safeguards, India cannot endorse full-scope safeguards, but we will have to work out a way in which we distance ourselves from Israel and Pakistan. But the negotiations in the Board will be coloured by past acrimony on this issue.

Egypt and other countries, even while accepting the Indian arrangement, will maintain that India should eventually accept full-scope safeguards. They will also want to maintain their reservations on India's status till we become either a Nuclear Weapon State or a non-Nuclear Weapon State.

On the Indian side too, a change is imperative. In our bid to keep our distance from the regulatory role of the IAEA, we have devised a number of measures for ourselves. Though we are keen advocates of the technical cooperation programme, we do not accept technical assistance from it. (Pakistan and China accept such assistance.) We do not accept even safety inspections from the IAEA in our installations.

Our attitude to the department of safeguards of the IAEA should undergo a change. These changes will be slow in coming, considering our present regulations and attitudes.

The additional protocol to the safeguards agreement was devised by the IAEA to strengthen the inspection regime and most countries have routinely accepted the model protocol the Board has approved. We had considered signing an additional protocol to our own safeguards, but we found that it would be difficult to frame a protocol for our special circumstances.

By requiring India to sign 'an' additional protocol rather than 'the' additional protocol, the US negotiators are supposed to have shown flexibility in this regard. But it will take some time and effort to carry the Board with us on a text that recognises the new situation.


Another additional complication :?: :?: with the IAEA is that we do not want the Board to vote upon these documents before we are sure that the NSG and the US Congress are ready to follow through.

The NSG will be a particular challenge as negotiating for an exception for India from its guidelines will be like negotiating with Winston Churchill for the liquidation of the British Empire. The NSG was set up specifically to deny India nuclear fuel and technology after our explosion of 1974. France [Images], at that time a non-party to the NPT, had agreed to supply fuel to India and the formation of the group, originally of seven countries, including France, ended that deal.

In 1992, the revelations about Iraq's illicit nuclear weapons programme spurred the NSG to adopt controls on nuclear-related dual-use goods that could make a contribution to explosive technology in the hands of non-Nuclear Weapon States.

Between the original guidelines that required application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards and physical protection against unauthorised use of transferred material and the additional requirements of a strict regime for use of dual-use technology, there is a veritable fortress of rules and lists to prevent proliferation.

In 2004, the members even adopted a 'catch all' mechanism, which authorises members to block any export suspected to be destined to a nuclear weapons programme even if the export material does not appear on one of the control lists. The fact, of course, is that determined States and individuals like A Q Khan have been able to penetrate the fortress without any let or hindrance.

The regime is voluntary and there is no requirement for prior clearance of exports with the group, but as in the instance of Russia [Images]n supplies to India in 2001, the other members can exert pressure on individual countries, which violate the guidelines. Russia was able to supply in 2006 only with the implicit understanding of the US.

Members are supposed to report their export denials to each other so that potential proliferators cannot approach several suppliers with the same request and get different responses. They are also expected to refrain from making exports identical or similar to those denied by other members. The guidelines do not remain static, as members tend to add new items to the prohibited list, especially of dual-use items.

An informal grouping, the Zangger Committee, with a similar mandate was already in existence ever since the NPT came into force. The Zangger Committee characterises itself as a 'faithful interpreter of Article III paragraph 2 of the NPT.' The Group's objective was to reach a common understanding on the definition of 'equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material' and the conditions and procedures for such exports.

Though The NSG adopted the Zangger Committee's 'Trigger List' and depended on it to resolve some non-proliferation issues at a time when China had not yet joined the NSG, the Zangger Committee was not considered adequate to deal with the challenges of India and Iraq, first because the Zangger Committee dealt only with NPT signatories and its decisions were not legally binding on its members. Their common mission and their co-location in Vienna have made the Zangger Committee and the NSG non-proliferation twins born out of the NPT.

India had kept a distance from the NSG in the past as we did not want to give any impression that we had anything to do with the NPT institutions, even though we were using the NSG guidelines to regulate our own export of nuclear technology and materials. When the NSG began an outreach programme with non-NSG members in 2001, we participated in it once, but when we found that it was not aimed at accommodating our needs, we declined further contacts in Vienna.

We knew that we did not miss much as Israel and Pakistan, which went to such meetings, came back disappointed that the NSG had no intention to relax its guidelines. Under pressure from NSG members, who were otherwise friendly, we suggested that we would not be averse to talks in New Delhi.

Accordingly, a team of ambassadors from Vienna and some officials from NSG capitals came to New Delhi for an interaction. It was evident from these meetings that, unless there was a change in the US position, such meetings would be futile.

The NSG members at that time were aware of an Indian proposal to open up additional nuclear establishments for IAEA inspection in return for relaxation of the NSG guidelines, but the members, like the Americans, were not enthusiastic.

The atmosphere in the NSG improved after the India-US Joint Statement of 2005, though an American proposal to put the nuclear deal on the agenda of the NSG Plenary Meeting in May 2006 was not accepted as the deal had not become operational. On the Russian supply of fuel to India in 2006, the US State Department stated: 'Deals to supply that fuel should move forward on the basis of a joint initiative, on the basis of steps that India will take, but it has not yet taken.'

Japan [Images] and Australia were particularly firm on examining matters only after the India-US deal became operational. In the NSG, the general trend was for countries, which have nuclear power plants and other equipment to sell to be more positive than those, which had no business to transact under any new arrangement.

A fundamental premise of the NSG is that any country that receives supplies should accept full-scope safeguards. China initially joined the Zangger Committee and not the NSG because China was at that time in the process of supplying a reactor to Pakistan. Since the NPT does not require full scope safeguards as a condition of supply, China's membership of the Zangger Committee did not prevent them from supplying the reactor to Pakistan.

By joining the NSG at that time, China would have forsaken its right to supply nuclear equipment to Pakistan. A US representative to the NSG revealed this when China applied for NSG membership subsequently.


Since India will not accept full-scope safeguards under the deal, the NSG will need to make a change in its fundamental position. The India-specific safeguards, which the IAEA approves, will be subjected to an analysis to see whether it will have sufficient safeguards against diversion of nuclear material or dual use equipment.

For this reason, Russia is supposed to have advised India to circulate its draft of the safeguards to the members of the NSG in advance.


The strategy of the United States in the context of the NSG will be to ask the NSG members to take note of the steps that India has taken as a 'contributing partner' in the non-proliferation regime. It will also ask NSG members to transfer the trigger list items and related technologies only to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India as long as India continues to meet the other requirements of the NSG. The relaxation will be sought on the ground that India has accepted IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for its civilian nuclear facilities, it has a moratorium on testing in place, it will sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, it has stringent export controls and it will adhere strictly to the NSG guidelines on exports.

Here, interested governments will argue that India had no intention to be a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime as the Indian position is that the nuclear deal is merely an energy agreement.

Another requirement of the NSG is that adequate verification measures should be in place to ensure that the supplies of the participating states are not diverted to weapons purposes. The bilateral agreement between India and the US envisages IAEA inspections of civilian establishments in India and a certain amount of trust is an element in the agreement. A multilateral group like the NSG might want other verification measures, which may prove anathema to India.

China's position will be the most crucial in the entire NSG exercise. At the first NSG meeting after the India-US Joint Statement, China had pressed the US for a similar deal for Pakistan. China has been lying low, but it has not made secret of its opposition to the deal. But China tends to be eminently reasonable in the international arena and, therefore, may point out that the exception should be criteria based rather than country based. If other countries adopt similar measures as India has done, they should be treated in a similar manner.

Though the US position is that no other exception will be made, it may close its eyes to the advantage it may give to Pakistan and China to enhance their nuclear cooperation. The Chinese position may enjoy some support among the other NSG members. China will also look for some gains for itself in the light of the impression that the 123 Agreement with China is not as favourable to China as in the Indian case.

Although nuclear tests are not mentioned in the 123 Agreement, it is premised on an Indian moratorium on testing, which finds mention in the India-US Joint Statement of 2005. The debate in Parliament and elsewhere about the need for India to protect its sovereign right to test may well have created suspicion in the minds of the NSG members and they may well make a reference in the revised guidelines to the termination of the arrangements in the event of a nuclear test by India.

{So its no more a bilateral voluntary commitment [ala. wrt. US 123 ], but an International one..}

The US will naturally welcome such a provision, which, according to it, is already included in the 123 Agreement.

The extent of challenges within the NSG will depend on the degree of firmness with which the United States will defend the agreement and ensure that it is not changed to India's disadvantage. But at the same time, the US will not favour a situation, which will dismantle the NSG and leave it to the member States to deal with India and others in accordance with their own interests.

Although an exception for India will end the rationale for the existence of the group, the US will favour continuation of the Group and will do everything possible to maintain the integrity of the NSG.

The US has promised all help to persuade their friends and allies to accommodate India, but India will have to work bilaterally with each of the 45 members, as implementation of the guidelines is an individual rather than a collective responsibility. The success we have accomplished in befriending Brazil [Images] and South Africa should help us in the NSG. In the past, they have been rather adamant about full-scope safeguards.

The ultimate compromise that the NSG should make is to accept India as a member of the group. It will be logical as no other country has better credentials than India in terms of the objective of the NSG to prevent exports that will lead to proliferation. Even in the aftermath of our nuclear tests, authorities on export controls had certified that India had an impeccable record in export control.

If the criteria for membership of the NSG alone were to be considered, without considering our NPT status, there was no reason to exclude India from the NSG. Since India will soon have the capacity to export not only components, but also reactors, the NSG should welcome India to its fold. It may be seen today as a revolutionary move like admitting Russia into NATO, but today's miracles may be tomorrow's reality.

T P Sreenivasan, a former member of the Indian Foreign Service, was India's ambassador to the United Nations, Vienna, and governor for India, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
Ronen Sen ko gussa kyon aata hai?
By Seema Mustafa
One of the most incisive article's in recent times.. 8)

Remember it's "With us or against us" with no question of middle ground... Sure has rubbed off quite well with the Indian Govt. "Monkey see, Monkey Do"
nkumar
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Post by nkumar »

BTW, I see that the demand to Amend the Constitution (Although There is Nothing Wrong With It) Rolling Eyes , so brilliantly articulated here by certain postors and now published by its authors M. Patkar, A. Roy and S. Pandey, has made it to the EB email list. Curiously, the EBs have noticed the signatures... now let me c how much they all agree to join forces and destroy India's future for another 40 years.

>>N3, your oblique comment obviously points to me, though you have already explicitly congratulated me on joining the so-called elite company. Since you have very "intelligently" put me in the league of Patkars, Roys and Pandeys on the logic that they are also demanding something which is same as I am demanding, can I also take the liberty to use the same intelligent logic and put myself in the league on BC,BK, Dr. Prasad etc, the people who are also opposing the same N-deal in its current form. I know it sounds absurd but so is your clubbing. It seems you have not read the article by Patkar et al. Let me quote from their artile - "However, our basic objections to this deal stem from our opposition to the production and use of both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The irreversible dangers of radioactivity and its ongoing impact on health, water, and the environment are factors that are being summarily dismissed in an irresponsible manner."

1) Please note that their reason for deamding the amendment in consitution is entirely different from my reason.

2) I do not share anything in common with their article except for demanding an amendment in the consitution for the deal to be ratified by the Parliament in same way as Congress in US ratifies international treaties. IMO it provides an "internal check" in the system. It provides an extra check in the system from influential houses in West to sabotage our forein policy by providing personal benfits like giving US citizenship to the kin of policy makers, sending the children of PMO officials to Ivy League Colleges, by running campaign in mainstream newspapers etc. What will happen if Mayawati becomes PM? BTW, there is a distinct possibility of such an outcome in 2009. She will easily sold out for a mansion in US. Won't this amendment come in handy at that time?

BTW, I see that the demand to Amend the Constitution (Although There is Nothing Wrong With It)


>>To this I have already stated that there have been more than 90 amendments in the constituion, IIRC. Does this mean that the constituon was wrong? To put loosely, amendment is a kind upgradation. It does not mean that entire constitution is wrong. Not that the citizens can't live with the current constitution, but an amendment may be required for better governance.

As far as deal is concerned, I am NOT against it, but I am against the deal in its current form. In my very first post after 123 txt was released, I had said that it is like 1-1 after half time, though US seems to have the upper hand. I am basically against the fact that US has got our facilities to be put under safeguards forever, while we do not have guarantees of fuel supply. IMO, this is a big concession that we have given because NSG as far as I know, correct me if I am wrong, works by consensus. What if it is turned into a multilateral treaty? And US has DOES have the influence to make it so. We will be net losers if it happens by giving them a triumph card to arm twist us, by depending on fuel supplies from NSG member countries. This makes difficult to test later if we have to, even though we may have right to test. True, the agreement talks about "strategic reserves" but it does not mention when, how much? Do we get the reserve when we put founding stone of the reactor? Or when it goes critical? Or some other time? I hope you see my point. The other objection is giving US a 'strategic economic leverage', which I will talk about some other time.

It also worries me, when seniors like you do not acknowledge the obvious campaign being run in newspapers, television debates etc. True, the leftists are traitors but why their history is being highlighted when they are opposing the deal, why NOW? Why not when they opposed crucial reforms like pension and labor reforms? Is it because GoI can live it, but they can't live without concluding the deal now. Why not when they opposed 1998 test? IMO, this is to blunt the opposition to the deal. Why can't the GoI come up with a 'white-paper' as demanded by Phillips? Why GoI did not agree for JPC? Why not have an open debate in Parliament? It is happening only when left threatened to withdraw the support. Why not on the demand of the opposition? I have not seen the articles of BC, Bk in the mainstream newspapers. I remember reading articles of BC in ToI after J18 but when it became clear after Hyde that he is opposed to the deal, ToI stopped publishing his articles. IE has gone as far as even stating in their editorial that even though they are publishing the articles of AS, that it NOT their official position.

And finally, you seem to be nit-picking from my posts and making personal attacks: EBs, idiots, no-brainers etc. You may continue doing so, not that I worry about your reputation but I guess it reduces the efficacy of your arguments in the eyes of 3rd person.

PS: As others have requested, I will not make further posts on non-deal questions, topics.
Last edited by nkumar on 25 Aug 2007 09:20, edited 1 time in total.
ldev
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Post by ldev »

Seema Mustafa is sounding shrill like Shrileen Jelabi in her article. Lot of half-truths. Wonder where she gets her lifafa from? A combination of the Left and the Pakis? Her boss has also made some intemperate comments in his Op-Ed pieces. They seem to run in sync.
svinayak
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Post by svinayak »

Tilak wrote:
Ronen Sen ko gussa kyon aata hai?
By Seema Mustafa
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ExOckT1Wr0

An excerpt of Ronen Sen, Indian Ambassador to the United States, giving a talk at a Calit2 sponsored luncheon at UCSD.

Nuclear issues were high among Amb. Sen's talking points throughout the week, following President Bush's signing in December of legislation that will enable the U.S. to negotiate a permanent civilian nuclear agreement with India for the first time. (more) (less)
Tilak
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Post by Tilak »

nkumar wrote:BTW, I see that the demand to Amend the Constitution (Although There is Nothing Wrong With It) Rolling Eyes


"Nothing Wrong" ??, is that the way you see it... :roll: It is "the" most important+right thing to do, to safeguard Indian interests.. considering an uncertain future..

I don't care from whom the recommendation of amending the constitution [wrt. above], comes from (incl. Musharraf) himself. They have my vote.
Arun_S
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Post by Arun_S »

Arun_S wrote:No No... No slipper road to freedom from 12,000 tonne or even 1,200 tonne.
To put 12,000 tonne mithai in perspective that more than 0.1 Kg mitahi for every Indian citizen. :twisted:
But if BRFites eat it all they will soon be in Diabetic clinic.

Think about a win-win deal ! :wink:
ramana
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Posts: 59773
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Post by ramana »

From e-mail

[quote]
url

HINDUSTAN TIMES, AUGUST 23, 2007

Dr Heckle & Mr Hyde

AG Noorani

August 22, 2007

First Published: 23:57 IST(22/8/2007)
Last Updated: 00:21 IST(23/8/2007)

Dr Heckle & Mr Hyde

AG Noorani

August 22, 2007

First Published: 23:57 IST(22/8/2007)
Last Updated: 00:21 IST(23/8/2007)

The Hyde Act was enacted by the US Congress in December explicitly to promote ‘nuclear cooperation’ between India and the US and enable them to sign an agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1954. It is highly significant that the Agreement does not mention the Hyde Act at all. This is all the more so because it mentions other documents such as the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, repeatedly; the IAEA’s statute, its document on ‘The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities’ and the convention on the ‘Physical protection of Nuclear Material’. These are international instruments accepted by both sides. References to them constitute, in legal parlance, incorporation into the agreement by reference. In contrast, India is not bound by the Hyde Act, which is why the agreement does not refer to it even once. The omission is deliberate and of legal consequence.

Prakash Karat, whom I respect, is wrong in holding that “to say that the Hyde Act is not binding to (sic) India is irrelevant. The point is that it is binding on the US.â€
Supratik
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Post by Supratik »

What is the "some concern" he had about the full fusion yield?




**************
Arun_S wrote:

Dr Santhanam team leader POK-II (head of DRDO at that time and later SA to PM) is in no doubt about successful second stage ignition, although he has some concern about full fusion yield, which is similar to Dr PK.Iyanger.
shiv
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Post by shiv »

ramana wrote:From e-mail
Heck ramana that post had at least 6 separate urls that were screwing up forum readability! :((
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