India Nuclear News & Discussion - 9 Sept 2007

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Arun_S
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India Nuclear News & Discussion - 9 Sept 2007

Post by Arun_S »

Old thread is here

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ramana wrote:Rye,
Thats why I am wary of this 123/321, Hyde/Seek now. Let the UPA fall and a new govt start allover again. Yes India might have to wait but for 3~7% she cannot give away her rights fought so hard by the freedom fighters. It took ~200 years to get rid of the British yoke and a visceral Partition. The early wheelers and dealers too thought that it was an agreement of convenience with East India Company to get rid of Siraj-ud-dowlah. Look where it got them!


I don't buy N^3or anyone else's arguments. I think they are mistaking a mirage for an end.

Three things give me misgivings:

1)MMS refusal to debate the deal in the Lok Sabha. Such a major treaty should have the elected representatives discuss it to ensure continuity and consensus. He doesnt get it as his power flows from the INC and not the people.
2) The scientists who are not in govt are refusing steadfastly to sing on. They all cant be obscurantist.
3) The case of the dogs that didn't bark_ SK Sikka and R. Chidambaram. All along they refused to have a peer review or issue a white paper and even now when the issue of testing came up in Hyde and 123 they are still silent.

all this points to black lentils and goes against native wisdom.
Ramana I agree. The 3 misgiving are definite signs of HUGE weakness and indicative of BIG black lentils.

Indians have shown to be prone to undercut a temporal rival to cut deals with foreigners and fail to see that not only their petty community but the whole nation's future for many generations is sold for few nickel worth benefit.
Last edited by Arun_S on 09 Sep 2007 21:27, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by NRao »

If the test is needed desperately don't you think Sikka and RC whould have shouted louder than AK?
AK went from "all or nothing" to "acceptable".

Sikka or RC talking would have opened too much for the world.

Ramana,

Your list is too short. It is my understanding that MMS did not even involve INC. It seems like that this deal, meant to support the economy, was negotiated by a handful. In some sort of secrecy!!!!!

Note that the opposition, from no matter which source, is leaning towards a flawed strategic component. :) . Dr. Prasad is questioning the infrastructural angle (what else is new? same thing is happening in the transportation segment). But, no one has questioned the economic benefits from it.
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Post by Rye »

Kapil Sibal's lies are unacceptable.
He dismissed as "unacceptable" and "uninformed opinion" the Left's view that the Henry Hyde Act on the deal passed by the US Congress overrode the 123 agreement. "It is on its face unacceptable. It is uninformed opinion", he added.
123 has not yet been ratified, so how can this fellow make such claims... unconditional statements like "we cannot renegotiate" (even if IAEA and NSG guidelines are not acceptable to India) and "123 takes precedence over Hyde act" (even if 123 is not ratified by the US congress) smells of MMS and Co. acting in bad faith.

Here is some more bullshit from Kapil Sibal

link
Quotating articles 6 of US constitution Sibal said that all treaties made under the authority of US shall be supreme law of the land and judges shall be bound by them anything in constitution and laws notwithstanding. Under 123 agreement is regarded as Supreme Law of land and override all other laws including the Hyde Act and as 123 is made under Atomic Energy act 1954 and is required to be approved by US congress.
The bolded part is true *if and only if* the US congress ratifies 123.

There is no such requirement that 123 *has* to be ratified by the US congress -- Kapil Sibal just pulled that out of his shorts.


This article seems to say that MMS and Co. are going to sign up for the 123 BEFORE THE US RATIFIES THE DEAL!!!! This is unacceptable. MMS is signing India up for the CTBT + NPT without any public mandate, if 123 is to be operationalized post-haste. MMS needs to be thrown out of power and some future govt. needs to make sure thar 123 is only operationalized after it has been ratified by the US congress.

link

Kapil Sibal quote:
Further to the left objects he added that the deal cannot be
operationalized until India does the negotiation with IAEA with India
specific and NSG under safeguards agreement is worked out.
This is just wrong. 123 must not be operationalized before the IAEA and NSG details are worked out. So India is going to "trust" the US will ensure that the NSG and IAEA details will be in India's favour? Burns has already made statements to the contrary -- that the burden is on India in the NSG and IAEA, so what is this stunt KSibal is trying to pull by misleading the public?

So, if KSibal's mouthings are correct, then the plan is to ensure that India will sign a bilateral agreement with the USA before verifying that the US follows through on its promise to get a fair deal for India in the NSG and IAEA and before the US congress ratifies the agreement.

Clearly, the bozos in charge are too thick or too corrupt to comprehend the wisdom in "trust, but verify".
Last edited by Rye on 09 Sep 2007 05:53, edited 6 times in total.
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Post by Gerard »

"The US is attempting to contain us quality wise and limit us size wise. Chinese missiles which are aimed against India are tipped with an one megaton N-warhead. In contrast, the yield of the Indian n-warheads is a mere 20 kiloton," Karnad said.
I thought BK was over his megaton fetish... seems he has regressed...

Ex-AEC boss lifts lid off N-submarine programme
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Post by Rye »

The following sequence seems very plausible:

1) MMS operationalizes the deal binding India to the 123
2) The NSG and IAEA negotiations fall through, and end up being as restrictive as the Hyde Act -- However, India is bound to 123 since it has already operationalized 123.
3) US congress fails to ratify 123 on some excuse or other

Now India would have basically been tricked into signing up for CTBT via the 123 and of course, the only way out is for India to not import foreign reactors after operationalizing 123, but commercial interests and greed will have kicked into high gear by then for any reversal to occur.



Any criticism/comments on this and previous posts are most welcome.
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Post by vsudhir »

Rye wrote:The following sequence seems very plausible:

1) MMS operationalizes the deal binding India to the 123
2) The NSG and IAEA negotiations fall through, and end up being as restrictive as the Hyde Act -- However, India is bound to 123 since it has already operationalized 123.
3) US congress fails to ratify 123 on some excuse or other

Now India would have basically been tricked into signing up for CTBT via the 123 and of course, the only way out is for India to not import foreign reactors after operationalizing 123, but commercial interests and greed will have kicked into high gear by then for any reversal to occur.
Well put.

A simple legislative provision to 'ratify' this deal *before* Incia shall consider it operational is pure common-sensical.
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Post by NRao »

Rye,

Can there be adeal w/o US Congress approval? However, thsi is too much what-if.
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Post by Rye »

NRao wrote:
Can there be adeal w/o US Congress approval? However, thsi is too much what-if.
NRao,

Even if you ignore step 3 in the above sequence, there is still a major problem with operationalizing 123 without ensuring that IAEA and NSG rules will be as promised by MMS and Co. Already the refrain is "we cannot walk away now!!" even before the deal is operationalized..why would that change if the NSG and IAEA rules end up mirroring the Hyde Act? What is the MMS admin's "Plan B" in such an eventuality?

SV article from Aug. 12 talks of this exact eventuality.

http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/12/stories ... 201000.htm
or example, U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns told the Council of Foreign Relations on August 2 that “the Indians will need to convince the Nuclear Suppliers Group … that it should give the same kind of international treatment in terms of civil nuclear trade to India that the United States would have just given bilaterally.â€
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Post by Roop »

Rye:

I don't understand what you mean by 'operationalize'. In fact it's not just you, lots of people are slinging this term around. What precisely does it mean? As far as I know, the 123 agreement is inactive and of no significance until all of the following steps are complete (in the specified order):
  1. The deal is formally approved by the GoI. We are currently stuck arguing over this stage. If this stage fails, forget about 2 and 3.
  2. India formally signs agreements with IAEA and NSG. It is up to each party to ensure that their interests are preserved. If the IAEA/NSG try to impose unacceptable conditions (anything more than 123), India will simply reject it and walk away. If this stage fails, forget about 3.
  3. The US Congress 'ratifies' (this is a tricky word. More on this later) the 123 deal. Sure, they will look at the terms of India's agreements with IAEA and NSG before they do this, but ultimately they will either agree or disagree. If they agree, that is when the deal comes into effect (i.e. the exchange of diplomatic notes etc.). If they disagree, it is legally the same as if Steps 1 or 2 failed, i.e. the 123 agreement is null and void.
Where are you getting this feeling that somehow India will start implementing 123 at Step 1 without concern for Steps 2 and 3? Any GoI doing this would be truly insane, but who says it's going to happen?

Re. "ratification" by te US Congress: this will probably be treated as regular Bill, requiring only simple majorities in the House and Senate and signature by the President. If it were a treaty, it would require a two-thirds majority in the Senate to ratify it, plus signature by the President. The House of Representatives is not involved in ratification of treaties.
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Post by Tilak »

Rye wrote:MMS wants to hand over the keys to the vault before ensuring that US does what it supposedly "promised".
Wait for the parliament session to end.. upto now Govt. has been indulging in foot dragging. I don't think Condi will go to India. Probably, Pranab M will head to US for the "signing-up" , tying up the ~loose end.. before something happens.. :roll:

No benefit of doubt left for the Govt..This whole thing reeks..

IMHO
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Post by Satya_anveshi »

Mohan Raju wrote:The deal is formally approved by the GoI. We are currently stuck arguing over this stage. If this stage fails, forget about 2 and 3.
I think this is wrong understanding of the issue at hand. Step 2 and Step3 are multilateral commitments and even if step 4 (ratification of congress) fails; I don't think you can go back on Step 2 ( NSG waiver ) and Step 3 ( IAEA agreement) without making a mockery of yourself on your international commitments.

Further, all commitments with IAEA are binding and can invoke Chapter 7 sanctions under violation. So, at the very least, US has our balls firmly by the time we go to IAEA with/without the agreement going final.

Look what MMS has done; for him US is way up the hierarchy than any other international body. What next? Do we really need a (separate) seat in UN?
Last edited by Satya_anveshi on 09 Sep 2007 07:10, edited 2 times in total.
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Post by ShauryaT »

csharma wrote:Ashley Tellis had mentioned that MMS govt is givig them something that the ABV govt did not. What is it? That itself is a big question mark.
Perpetuity and the size of the safeguarded sites - what else?
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Post by Laks »

Brahma Chellaney in Deccan Chronicle 9/6/07
A nuclear bind
By Brahma Chellaney

Part II

A cognitive disconnect bedevils official claims over the nuclear deal. The avowed rationale is nuclear energy, yet in reality, the deal can be of little help to India’s growing energy needs. Even with the import of a number of multibillion-dollar reactors, capital-intensive nuclear power’s share in India’s total electricity generation is likely to remain unimpressively small because the contribution of other energy sources will continue to rise faster (and more cheaply).

The deal actually is being driven by divergent US and Indian objectives. While India sees it as a path to closer engagement with the United States, the deal for Washington is anchored in non-proliferation. As undersecretary Nicholas Burns has put it, "within 25 years, I think 90 to 95 per cent of their entire (nuclear) establishment will be fully safeguarded. So the choice is: Should we isolate India for the next 35 years, or bring it in partially now and nearly totally in the future? I think that’s an easy choice for us to make strategically."

* 123 Agreement likely to bind India indefinitely.

Burns’ statement may explain why unlike America’s most other 123 Agreements that specify expiry in 30 years, the one with India is for an initial term of 40 years but is to continue in force infinitely in ten-year intervals until either party elects to end the accord. Given the US objective to tether India lastingly to the non-proliferation regime and the permanence of India’s own obligations to open its entire civil nuclear programme to international inspections, the agreement, once in force, will bind New Delhi indefinitely. An imports dependency instilled by the agreement would also serve as a disincentive to India electing to withdraw, say, after 40 years.

The Japan-US 123 accord provides that at the "request of either party, the parties shall consult with each other whether to amend this agreement or replace it with a new agreement." In contrast, the Indo-US agreement permits only amendment, not replacement.

* A new motif of Indian diplomatic naiveté.

While America’s Hyde Act has gained notoriety for seeking to apply the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulate India’s conduct in areas unrelated to nuclear energy, the bilateral 123 Agreement shows Indian diplomacy in unflattering light.

If the Hyde Act is a symbol of congressional condescension toward India, the 123 Agreement epitomises how Indian diplomacy continues to fare poorly at the negotiating table. Indeed, the agreement is a painful reminder of India living up to Spanish-born American philosopher George Santayana’s saying: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Not only have Indian negotiators failed to safeguard India’s interests in this agreement, as highlighted in yesterday’s article, but New Delhi also has been left clutching at straws, as the examples below show.

* Cosmetic corrective measures.

The PM told Parliament that the 123 Agreement "endorsed the right of India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supply." The fact is that the agreement not only fails to define what "corrective measures," if any, India could undertake, but also stops India unequivocally from embarking on correction that would matter.

When Manmohan Singh went back on his original pledge "never to accept discrimination" and agreed through the "Separation Plan" to permanent, legally immutable international inspections of the type applicable only to non-nuclear-weapons states, he assured Parliament in March 2006 that the perpetual safeguards would be tied to perpetual fuel supply. But the123 accord, which he says is "signed and sealed," represents another breach of promise because it negates the link between perpetual safeguards and perpetual fuel supply.

First, the agreement records that India’s safeguards obligations are irrevocably final and would survive even if the accord were prematurely terminated by one side. Second, it carries absolutely no reference to the continuation of India’s safeguards obligations being contingent on perpetual fuel supply. And third, the agreement explicitly blocks India from ever undertaking real correction in response to a fuel supply cut-off — the lifting of IAEA safeguards.

Put simply, India has willingly forfeited the right to enforce perpetual fuel supply through the threat to end IAEA inspections. Little surprise thus that the agreement in its Article I "Definitions" defines well-understood terms but not "corrective measures." As Burns has clarified, none of the fuel assurances in the 123 accord "contradicts or conflicts with the legal right of any American President" to terminate supply or invoke the right to demand the return of stockpiled fuel if India violated the stipulated conditions.

* Full cooperation becomes a mere concept.

The PM assured Parliament on August 17, 2006, that in keeping with the original deal’s commitment, he would insist on the "removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy, ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to reprocessing spent fuel." Lest there be any ambiguity, he added: "We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation as amplified above."

A year later, full cooperation has been reduced to a mere idea to be dangled before the nation like a carrot. "The concept of full civil nuclear cooperation has been clearly enshrined in this agreement," Singh told Parliament last month.

Look at the absurdity of the situation: India has agreed to build a special reprocessing facility that meets US expectations, but it will not be in a position to import any components for this safeguarded plant because its negotiators failed to persuade America to relax civil reprocessing and enrichment sanctions. Yet as the Hyde Act’s explanatory statement notes, civil reprocessing and enrichment cooperation "is not restricted" but "agreements for cooperation must specify if such cooperation is to take place." Articles 5 and 6 of the Japan-US 123 Agreement, for example, permit transfer of civil reprocessing and enrichment equipment.

The US signed a special agreement with Australia in 2000 to facilitate collaboration in civil laser enrichment, based on the Silex technology.

To be continued
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Post by Rye »

Looking back at the reports, it appears that MMS and Co. plan to exchange diplomatic notes before the IAEA and NSG negotiations (unless the GoI is confident that it will manage to complete the IAEA and NSG negotiations within a few weeks). Isn't it risky to sign up for 123 before knowing the outcome of the IAEA and NSG negotiations?

It appears that the GoI expected IAEA and NSG negotiations to be done within a month, which was the time given before Indian DM and US NSA met face to face to "exchange diplomatic notes" (don't see why they have to meet otherwise).

How realistic is it to expect the NSG and IAEA negotiations to be done within a few weeks, even with the US "sherpa"ing India in the NSG?
Last edited by Rye on 09 Sep 2007 07:20, edited 2 times in total.
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Post by Sriram »

Burns on Bringing India in from the Cold, and Isolating Iran
And within twenty-five years, I think 90 to 95 percent of their entire establishment will be fully safeguarded. So the choice is: Should we isolate India for the next thirty-five years, or bring it in partially now and nearly totally in the future? I think that’s an easy choice for us to make strategically.
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Post by ShauryaT »

enqyoob wrote:It also explains why Sanku does not want to compare the July 18 and the 123, because it would become clear that India got everything promised in J18, and much more.
I am not Sanku or NRao and speak only for myself, so please do not do the, you are with me or against me. My only question is - are you aware or read about the backgrounders, given by the PMO to Indian reporters, including some with people, closely involved with the negotiations, at the end of July 2005?
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Post by Tilak »

Strange.. looks like the SciCom[retd] are coming out all guns blazing...

Interesting time ahead...
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Post by NRao »

.....aware or read about the backgrounders.....
Also, looking for a web-article on the web site of the Indian Embassy in DC. (Which I am told was pulled out after pressure from the US State Department.)
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Post by Roop »

Rye wrote:Looking back at the reports, it appears that MMS and Co. plan to exchange diplomatic notes before the IAEA and NSG negotiations (unless the GoI is confident that it will manage to complete the IAEA and NSG negotiations within a few weeks), which seems like a bad idea
It would be a terrible idea, if true. In fact, it would be insane, as I said earlier. However, I see no evidence that it is true. I think what's happening here is that many people are very suspicious of MMS's bona fides, because of the way he started out these negotiations (i.e. last year when all the scientists and many retired diplomats/govt officials, even President AK, were against the deal, and MMS PMO was backstabbing the scientists with poison-pen newspaper articles etc.). Of course, I'm talking about people with genuine concerns, not the Commies (who would never support this deal regardless of terms and conditions. I also think that people like BC and BK would never support any deal no matter what).

If there really is so much heartburn over this, maybe it's best that the govt fall and India holds new elections, fought specifically on this point. Looks like they may be heading that way.
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Post by sraj »

Mohan Raju wrote: If the IAEA/NSG try to impose unacceptable conditions (anything more than 123), India will simply reject it and walk away. If this stage fails, forget about 3.
Is this the appropriate criteria?

123 allows for: i) right of return; ii) mandates safeguards in perpetuity while being fuzzy about fuel supply assurances and 'corrective measures'; and iii) does not allow US to export reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water technologies/equipment. Are we happy to have these become the template for NSG/IAEA?

Also, a) would abrogation of cooperation if India breaks its 'voluntary' moratorium be acceptable in the NSG Waiver language? Would abrogation at will (which is what 123 specifies instead of explicit reference to testing) be an acceptable fig leaf substitute for a) above? How about if the NSG Waiver creates any kind of link with or references to Hyde and/or 123?
Where are you getting this feeling that somehow India will start implementing 123 at Step 1 without concern for Steps 2 and 3? Any GoI doing this would be truly insane, but who says it's going to happen?
There have been reports that Condi Rice will visit India soon to formally sign this 123 with Pranab Mukherjee. This still does not make it "enter into force" until the exchange of diplomatic notes takes place (presumably after IAEA, NSG, and US Congress), but does make it seem even more 'cast in stone'. Remains to be seen if Left will allow this signing ceremony.
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Post by Rye »

This was reported in July, though a lot has happened since, so this is stale but relevant to the previous post. Add to this that this is the dork media, so a bucket of salt might be warranted -- this was reported in HT and other Indian media too, FWIW.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jul/25ndeal.htm
Indications are that Rice might be in India in August or September to give further finality to the 123 Agreement that is expected to fully materialise during a meeting between the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the US President George W Bush.
And from the files of the GOTUS.

This is from 2006, and US legislative changes here probably does not mean the Hyde act but ratification of 123.
Rice said that the administration has pressed India to move ahead in its discussions with the IAEA and said the U.S. legislative changes could not take effect until the IAEA safeguards are in place.
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Post by Arun_S »

NRao wrote:
If the test is needed desperately don't you think Sikka and RC whould have shouted louder than AK?
AK went from "all or nothing" to "acceptable".

Sikka or RC talking would have opened too much for the world.
No. The issue is: Is Indian strategic deterrence posture with 200kt TN weapons impeccable to internal Indian customers/institutions? They (RC, Santhanam, Air/Army/Navy ... ) have spoken on record few months after Buddha. After test the stakeholders gave their assessment of test result to PM. Based on R Chidambram's recommendation alone that PM overrode demand for re-test from all other stakeholders. RC carries big responsibility to deliver on Indian strategic security for next 500 years and answer peers of unquestionable integrity. He however has disparaged anyone (including PK.Iyangar) asking peer review {still recall the face of ACM Mehra recounting this} or questioning details on what it was/ is now and and progress to final milestone. That is important specially since it has to transcend human life and personality. RC has perhaps 10 more years to live and to put to safety the life of 1.1 billions now and its progeny for next 500 years on anything but an credible institution is critical for India. That institution must be built now and before RC passes away unchallenged.

Throw into the above a deal like 123 that must only go ahead if RC's declared Indian capability (of light weight 200kt TN) is beyond pale of doubt to military stakeholders institutions of India. No beating about the bush. I don't care if redesigned TN will give 500kt. If S1 design as it is today gives unquestioned 150-200Kt India can go ahead with 123, else STOP NOW. And for that RC/Sikka have to open their mouth to say they have insured Indian strategic deterrence and that 123 is compatible with it. Just like Prof. Kalam. But it has come from RC, for he carries that burden, not anyone else.

Worth reminding that that mil security is tightly coupled to economic, political, religious, and lifestyle security.

Just to make sure it is clear: as you can see from above this is based on current news reports and assessment, and nothing to do with claims/non-claims of RaviCV on this thread.

Every nuclear anybody and no-body has given their seal of approval or opposition to 123. So it is defeaning to note the dogs that did not bark in this meliu of 123+commies/MMS/BJP/Etc/Etc.

While PK Iyangar has now dared the governmant with opening shots on non-existant ATV & LWR statement.
Last edited by Arun_S on 09 Sep 2007 08:26, edited 2 times in total.
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Post by sraj »

SaiK wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:Because, he bans it for India.
Show me the ban?
Relevant Sections of Hyde Act:
SEC. 106. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIVERS.
A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title.
SEC. 110. DEFINITIONS.
................
(10) The terms ‘‘nuclear weapon’’ and ‘‘nuclear explosive device’’ mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation of one point (comment: apparently later clarified by State Dept to be a typo; with actual word being one 'pint'?) of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
Interestingly, CTBT talks about "Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion......."

I remember reading somewhere that the CTBT definition specifically allows for 'sub-critical' tests (in fact, apparently when India wanted sub-critical tests to be covered under this definition during the Geneva negotiations, it was not agreed to).

Happy to be proven wrong on this subject.
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Post by ShauryaT »

Thanks SRaj: I missed that one from SaiK.
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Post by John Snow »

Also adding to Arun gurus analysis

Who was the one who put in ABVs initial brief after POK II that India has H bum capability and subsequent press briefings did not carry that(or deleted the) claim . Was it at the behest of RC/Sikka? Was it not to their liking such explicit claim for what ever reasons?
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Post by Rye »

link
What is subcritical testing?

Subcritical nuclear tests are a component of the U.S. Department of Energy's Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Management Program (SSMP) and are intended to show whether nuclear weapons components such as Plutonium and Uranium will develop problems as they age. The blasts will not produce a nuclear chain-reaction explosion. They are called "subcritical" because they never reach "critical mass." Anti-nuclear peace activists claim that subcritical tests violate the spirit of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and could introduce a new round of the nuclear arms race.

As of October 1999 only two countries have acknowledged that they engaged in subcritical nuclear testing. These are the United States and Russia. France appears to have promised the United States to abstain from engaging in subcritical testing. On June 4, 1996, after two years of negotiations, France and the United States secretly enter into a pact to share nuclear weapons data from computer simulated nuclear explosions.
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Post by Rye »

Mohan Raju wrote:
It would be a terrible idea, if true.
MR, It appears I am mistaken. US NSA and Indian DM are only going to "sign the 123" which appears like a symbolic act. The exchange of notes stuff seems to be something that takes place outside of public view at the very end and even that seems like a formality in itself, even if it is the final step in the process.

sraj,

there seems to be a term called "point" associated with nuclear explosive power.

http://www.osti.gov/opennet/document/gu ... pubgf.html
One-Point Safe - A nuclear weapon is one-point safe if, when the HE is initiated and detonated at any single point, the probability of producing a nuclear yield exceeding 4 pounds TNT equivalent is less than 1 in one million.
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Post by sraj »

ShauryaT: you are welcome.

Folks: I am sure many of you are already aware of this, but it is worth pointing out:

Under the arrangements as currently structured:

1. While India has committed to "[refrain] from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread" on pain of instantaneous termination of this 123, the US has returned the favor by not allowing export of these very same technologies to India (with possible extension of this ban to export from all 45 countries of NSG - we will not know until the NSG Waiver language is available).

If you read the Q&A with Mark Hibbs at Carnegie posted by Gerard a few days ago, you will note that spreading of these technologies is Hibbs' single biggest concern (more than reactor technology).

2. Similarly, while India has committed to export controls in accordance with MTCR, the US has returned the favor by explicitly barring export of MTCR prohibited technologies to India by any country on pain of sanctions (Section 107 of Hyde Act).

So much for opening the door to dual-use technologies!
Rye
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Post by Rye »

Given the above definition of "one point safe" (which mentions 4 pounds of TNT), neither "one point of TNT" nor "one pint of TNT" seem to make any sense, since TNT quantities are specified by weight, not volume.

The definition of "nuclear explosive device" seems to make no sense at all.
Can any gurus clarify?
Last edited by Rye on 09 Sep 2007 09:13, edited 1 time in total.
ShauryaT
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Post by ShauryaT »

sraj wrote:2. Similarly, while India has committed to export controls in accordance with MTCR, the US has returned the favor by explicitly barring export of MTCR prohibited technologies to India by any country on pain of sanctions (Section 107 of Hyde Act).

So much for opening the door to dual-use technologies!
Very Important point and it seems to be one of the biggest impediments to the increased range Brahmos.
Singha
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Post by Singha »

that is why we have manpower export from Ru in JV with India. afaik the
human brain doesnt come under the MTCR or does it ? :eek:
Rye
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Post by Rye »

If India signs up for 123/NSG/etc. and down the line incidents of this sort happen...what recourse does India have?

http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_nsd_217.html

Seems to me that India has no legal recourse since 123 does not change US policy on what would consitute an "export violation".
bala
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Post by bala »

Arun_S wrote:Based on R Chidambram's recommendation alone that PM overrode demand for re-test from all other stakeholders.
I am a little skeptical of this assertion. Even if RC were to have given this opinion the PM should have considered all opinions and made up his mind about whether to call for moratorium. The buck stops at the PM. Even an iota of doubt should have swung the decision the other way about. PMs are not scientific savvy and rely on opinions of their trusted lieutenants. RC was one such lieutenant.
Arun_S
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Post by Arun_S »

bala wrote:
Arun_S wrote:Based on R Chidambram's recommendation alone that PM overrode demand for re-test from all other stakeholders.
I am a little skeptical of this assertion. Even if RC were to have given this opinion the PM should have considered all opinions and made up his mind about whether to call for moratorium. The buck stops at the PM. Even an iota of doubt should have swung the decision the other way about. PMs are not scientific savvy and rely on opinions of their trusted lieutenants. RC was one such lieutenant.
It is your prerogative to be skeptical, but that does no change truth. And this statement is not mine but a former NSAB member, that is also corroborated by a major stakeholder in Shakti team. And this is communicated in first person so there is no doubt to its varcity or room for mis-understanding.
SaiK
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Post by SaiK »

sraj, shauryaT, quite understandable on the "nuclear explosive test", and that can not be considered as nuclear test if it does not reach critical mass. It is an international accepted norm that all P5s do..

Now, how in the world you guys missed that? I can agree that our pessimism has gone beyond the critical mass value, but we should never shrug off from our advanced thinking minds, to setup test facilities for sub-critical testing. if unkill thinks India should not do subcriticals, and none in SDRE area can own la lawrence livermore, then we have a bigger issue on the 123..

MMS et al after the 123, and proceeding that we all agreed that the 123 does not reflect any restriction on our WMD developments.. but only testing. And, that should never include subcriticals.. If it does, we are worse than musharrafs' of the world.

btw, we are talking about 123 and not hyde act..that will be only invoked only if we failed any part of 123. And, imho, a subcritical test or million subcriticals does not make any stanze for them to invoke hyde.

I would like to know?

here is a link of the livermore labs.
http://www.llnl.gov/str/Conrad.html

bottom line: 2 paisa.. we are not bound by hyde to develop weapons and that includes subcritical testing and other lab testing including computer based simulations.

if it does, and if any of us can prove that, then forget 123 forever.
Sanatanan
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Post by Sanatanan »

Amit,

On 5th September, 2007 you asked me: (I think in Page 2 of the previous issue of this thread - India Nuclear News & Discussion - 4 Sept 2007)

Do you subscribe to the view expressed by many others who are against this deal that India has inherent economic, political and intellectual strength to hold out till it gets a better deal?

If so, pray can you tell me if India is so strong, how does it go into the self distruct mode the moment it signs this deal?


I apologise for not responding to you sooner.

In my view, it is not necessary for India to enter into a similar deal now or in the future.

As to why and how I think this deal will affect India's technology development efforts, I have put together a 3450 word 'paper' titled 'India and the Bush doctrine'. It covers some points that I have not made so far in BRF, besides views that I have earlier expressed. Not wanting to occupy precious band width in this forum, I have placed it here. I invite you (and other BRF-ites) to peruse the same.
nkumar
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Post by nkumar »

p_saggu, I like your post. Only thing, PKI and Prasad have been opposing this deal all along, not just now. But their objections have been brushed aside here as if they were some novices. Let us not forget these are 'retired' scientists who do not have any stakes in the system 'now'. Just think about it, what will they get by opposing the deal which is favaorable to India?
Gerard
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Post by Gerard »

In the definitions section as passed, a nuclear detonation was defined in terms of the equivalent energy released by "one point of TNT." On India's insistence, this was corrected subsequently to "one pound."
ShauryaT
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Post by ShauryaT »

Raju wrote:So the left is actually batting for India in asking govt not to 'operationalize the deal' ??

Who would have thought .. that left would bat for Indian interests.
Not in a million years. It just so happens, that, in this instance, elements of this deal are against Indian interests. The left is opposing, only because the counter party is the US of A. The left has only one goal, to destroy the unity of India and help the enemies of India.
Gerard
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Post by Gerard »

The very idea that Indian nuclear weapons may be more secure than their own is unthinkable to the LA Times Editors...

Errant missiles a wake-up call for U.S. nuclear policy
if such a slip-up can occur in the United States, which boasts the best nuclear command-and-control systems in the world, how likely are mishaps in the other eight declared and de facto nuclear states, which now include Pakistan, India and North Korea?
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