Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal and Power - ONLY Articles

Igorr
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Post by Igorr »

Now, N-deal with Russia?
Rajeev Sharma
Tribune News Service

New Delhi, October 11
The Manmohan Singh government is quietly working on plan B (to have a nuclear deal with Russia on the lines of Indo-US 123 Agreement) and plan C (to purchase nuclear reactors from Canada) as the Indo-US civilian nuclear energy agreement is being put in a cold storage. On both counts, there has been quiet, but definite progress.

As far as the Indo-US nuclear deal is concerned, there is little forward movement. Though talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and IAEA chief Mohammed El Baradei continued for 90 minutes, there was no statement from either the Prime Minister’s Office or the Ministry of External Affairs giving the tone and tenor of the talks.

It is understood that the Prime Minister apprised El Baradei of the complex political situation and that the government would be taking a call on beginning formal negotiations with the IAEA only after sorting out the matter with the Left parties.

Even as the Indo-US deal is facing the risk of being put in cold storage by the Indian government, New Delhi may still find a way out to meet its growing energy needs by having a similar deal with Russia. An Indo-Russian nuclear deal, on the lines of the Indo-US 123 Agreement, is a politically correct move and has the potential of emerging as the mother of all political strokes by the Indian government.

Russia is understood to have asked India to work on a rough draft on a nuclear deal. Moscow has already sounded New Delhi on its keenness to have Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s official entourage when he visits Russia later this year. The idea behind the move is to have a meaningful discussion on civilian nuclear energy cooperation.

It is common knowledge that the Manmohan Singh government has been rapped on its knuckles by the BJP-led opposition, the so-called third front as well as the allies from the Left on the nuclear deal issue. While there has been palpable rapprochement between the UPA government and the Left parties and the fast-soaring political temperature has been brought down by both in past couple of days, a question mark continues to hang over the future of Indo-US nuclear deal.

A similar deal with Russia, India’s long-standing tried and tested friend, can do the trick for an energy-starved India. What’s more, this deal can be operational far quicker than the 123 Agreement with the US as the Russian government has total control over its legislature, unlike a powerful Congress in the US which cannot be bypassed by the US President.

Sometime in December, Manmohan Singh is expected to visit Russia for the annual summit meeting, though the dates of his Moscow visit are yet to be decided. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20071012/nation.htm#2
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Post by Arun_S »

India will not go to IAEA, PM tells Bush
16 Oct 2007, 0029 hrs IST,Diwakar,TNN

ABUJA (NIGERIA): Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Monday told US president George Bush that his government would not be able to hold safeguards negotiations with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in what brings down the curtain on a long and painstaking push for operationalisation of the deal during his tenure.

‘‘The Prime Minister explained to president Bush that certain difficulties have arisen with respect to the operationalisation of the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement,’’ tersely noted the official press release issued after the talks.

Save a three-line reference to the deal, the one-page statement focussed exclusively on the deadlocked WTO talks and how to take them forward. The shyness reflected the government’s embarrassment in being forced to cast aside, at least for now, what it sincerely felt was going to be a historic and honourable agreement for India.

Singh conceded his failure to get past the obstacles raised by the opponents of the deal, as well as allies leery of a confrontation with the Left on the matter, after Bush responded to the PM’s efforts to reach him.

Singh had, early on, failed to get through to Bush who was on Air Force One.

The conversation with Bush after the UPA government blinked in the face-off with the Left was necessary because he was, on the American side, the chief catalyst for the successful negotiation of the 123 Agreement. Bush defied strong resistance from non-proliferation hardliners, as well as lobbyists for Pakistan, in the state department and Pentagon who argued that ‘‘concessions’’ to India would tip the scales in the sub-continent towards India and annoy the old-time ally.

The US president had also vowed to lug the deal through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the US Congress in the face of continued opposition.

The statement said that the two leaders also discussed the divergences holding up the Doha Round. Reiterating that India was committed to the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, the statement said trade liberalisation had contributed immensely to the growth of the world economy.

The statement said the draft texts in circulation could be the basis for discussions towards an agreed outcome in agriculture and industrial tariffs (non-agricultural market access or NAMA). Although there were grey areas in the text and specific numbers which needed to be agreed upon, the texts gave a broad indication of the range of possibilities on most issues, the statement added. Singh said that India was comfortable with most of the elements of these texts.

It was a reasonable compromise between differing positions of various countries. As is true of any trade deal, it involved give and take by all and India was ready to do its share of giving in this regard.
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Post by Sanjay M »

NYT on Indo-US N-Deal

The Atlanticist mouthpieces are quick to gloat on this.
Well, I've previously often compared this N-Deal to the Dhabol Power Project. Because Dhabol was a deal that was heavily lobbied for by the US, with Cheney even doing some backroom negotiating with Sonia, and obtaining terms quite favourable for Enron. Then Shiv Sena came to power and threw out the deal. This set into motion the collapse of Enron, after CEO Rebecca Marx quit.

Similarly, Cheney & Co were a little cocky in the way they negotiated this deal, and took us for granted, even backsliding somewhat from the original July18 agreement. Now we see the result -- India is again pulling back from the deal. But what will be the ultimate fallout? A proportionally wider collapse of the entire geo-political agenda being pursued by the Bush admin?

I think there's going to be tremendous fallout for the Bush admin as a result of the collapse of this deal.
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Post by Sanjay M »

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Post by Prabu »

ramana wrote:US asks India to come clean on ties with Iran

US asks India to come clean on ties with Iran

PTI | Washington/New Delhi

Posted online: September 19, 2007

The US has asked India to come clean on its military ties with Iran but New Delhi played down its concerns asserting that friendly relations with one country will not affect ties with others.

In remarks that has raised the hackles of the Left on the back of the growing rift between the UPA and the Communist allies on the India-US civil nuclear deal, the US has said that the onus is on New Delhi to explain its military relationship with Tehran.

The US's position on India-Iranian ties was spelt out by Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Richard Boucher when asked to comment on apprehensions voiced by senior US lawmakers on India's military relations with Iran.

"I think that some of the fears are exaggerated. Some of the training it turns out to be cadet level; some of the exchanges don't lead to a lot...".

"But I think, it's more on the Indian side to try to explain exactly what is and what is not going on in its relations with Iran, as we are upfront in our relations with other countries like India," Boucher said at a meeting organised by the United States-India Business Alliance here.

"I'm sure India can explain it better than we can what their relationships are and are not..." ,he said, adding that New Delhi had made it clear that it was not interested in seeing the emergence of another nuclear power in that neighbourhood.

"The Indian Government is very well aware of the concerns of India's military relationship with Iran. What we are trying to do is for everybody to understand the facts of the matter," Boucher added.

Boucher's remarks saw India Government and its Left allies united with Defence Minister defending India-Iranian ties and the CPI saying the US has no business to tell India "what it should do and what it should not do."

Though it is a old article, its true that US will ans surely try to put more more pressure / Instruct India to be a Good boy to USA. But it should be our determination to with stand all pressure's from uncle ! :)
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India's Nuclear Supremacy Over United States & Electrici

Post by schandra »

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Post by alokgupt »

India fails to have its way with IAEA

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indi ... 693933.cms

NEW DELHI: Indian negotiators have so far failed to have their way with IAEA on two key issues in what will be yet another setback to the prospect of the operationalization of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal.

Though foreign secretary Shiv Shankar Menon on Friday said the three earlier rounds of talks with the international nuclear watchdog had progressed smoothly, expressing hope that "we would wrap it up in the next round of talks in mid-January", sources said India has failed to persuade IAEA to meet its concerns on two crucial issues.

One, India wants the "agreed text" to clearly mention its right to take "corrective measures" to ensure uninterrupted operation of its safeguarded civilian nuclear reactors if foreign fuel supplies are stopped for some reason, such as lifting of the moratorium on fresh tests.

And two, the negotiators from the two sides are yet to agree on the quantum of India's strategic fuel reserve needed for the entire lifeterm of its safeguarded reactors, which as per the separation plan will include 14 of the 22 nuclear power reactors in operation or under construction.

While pointing out that it's not in the business of supplying fuel, IAEA is also wary of conceding anything to India which may become a precedent for other countries to ask for the same.

India, on its part, wants the safeguards agreement to clearly reflect its concerns on fuel supply guarantee, the right to build a strategic nuclear fuel reserve to guard against any disruption in supplies for the safeguarded reactors, and the right to reprocess spent fuel under a specially-built facility placed under safeguards.

Apart from the technicalities, there is of course also the opposition from the Left as well as the strict timeline laid down by the Bush administration. The Left remains adamant that it will simply not allow the government to go back to IAEA once the outcome of the ongoing talks with the global nuclear watchdog is placed before the Left-UPA committee. IAEA's problems with India's proposal of "corrective measures" and the strategic fuel reserve will help them justify their stand.

The twin conditionalities were part of the brief the UPA government designed for itself. It's only after India and IAEA sew up the final agreed text, which has to be cleared by the agency's Board of Governors, that the US will go to the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to get an unconditional exemption for India to engage in nuclear commerce internationally.

The window of opportunity for the entire process is getting narrower since the Bush administration is keen to place the bilateral 123 agreement with India, along with the IAEA safeguards agreement and the NSG waiver, before the US Congress as soon as possible, preferably before this month ends.

The Bush administration has said it will find it more and more difficult to get Congressional approval for the 123 Agreement, which has to undergo a 90-day gestation period in the House, if there is a delay since the country will soon plunge headlong into the intricacies of its Presidential and Congressional elections in November. Sources said that government will have just over a week after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's return from China on January 15 to resolve the impasse.

Though sources indicated that the government could use the international interest — Russia and France have already expressed their interest and China is likely to do so during the PM's visit — to try to bring Left and BJP around, it is being widely recognised that the deal looks uncertain more than ever before.

Asked whether India would seek China's support at the NSG during the PM's visit, Menon said, "We have not actually come to that stage. We have not asked for anybody's support at this point. We will do it when it reaches the NSG." Sources, however, said the joint statement during the visit will reflect China's willingness to engage in nuclear commerce with India.
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Post by alokgupt »

Nuclear negotiators have not learnt from Tarapur experience

http://in.rediff.com/news/2008/jan/11guest1.htm
With the negotiations in progress regarding the IAEA safeguards agreement, the Indo-US nuclear deal seems to be inching forward to bring it in shape so as to facilitate clinching the same subject to the political hurdles being overcome. To what extent the pros and cons of the deal, hotly debated in the media and elsewhere so far, will have ultimate effect on the final outcome is not clear.

Since the implementation of the deal is "showcased" essentially in the way and the intensity with which the safeguards implementation is carried out, it is important to ensure that all the basic concerns are properly addressed technically as well as legally. Any laxity at this stage could prove disastrous in the long run as safeguards agreements with the IAEA, once in place, are practically irrevocable, more so when the commitments are in perpetuity. It is in this context it may be appropriate to examine some of the issues of concern in negotiating the safeguards agreement.

The US has made it clear both in the Hyde Act as well as clarifications issued subsequent to the finalisation of the 123 text that the safeguards agreement has to follow the standard IAEA practices, while India has committed to an 'India-specific' agreement. It would have been better if India had insisted right at the beginning and managed to get a safeguards arrangement similar to the one applicable to the weapons states. This would have been in the spirit of the July 18, 2005, joint statement where there was an expression of intent that India will be treated at par with other advanced countries such as the US.

Unfortunately this is not to be. In fact throughout the evolution of the deal, since India has not insisted on the parity issue and resigned itself to playing second fiddle as a 'client' State, there are problems galore in having to contend with a deal with conditions heavily loaded against India on technical and economic issues with political overtones.

The IAEA, as per established safeguards practice in dealing with non-weapon States not party to the non-proliferation treaty, will try to stick to the format of its own document INFCIRC 66/Rev2 with the major difference that even those facilities wholly designed and built by India and the R&D institutions as listed in the separation plan which were hitherto outside the scope of safeguards, as well as all the future civil facilities which will grow substantially in numbers, will be included in the safeguards agreement compulsorily with all the implications, even though in the separation plan document it is stated that the facilities which are to come under civil list will be decided solely by India, obviously only on paper! In contrast, the nuclear weapon States enjoy the privilege of moving facilities from civil to military and vice-versa, a flexibility denied to India.

One of the most contentious issues to be resolved while negotiating the safeguards agreement is to address the assurances of fuel supply and building-up strategic reserve to be linked to India agreeing to safeguards in perpetuity. This is a commitment to the nation by the prime minister himself.

The so-called 'corrective measures' should address this as well as various other issues such as fate of safeguards agreement when the cooperation agreement gets abrogated or terminated for any reason enumerated in the Hyde Act or any changes, revisions or new Acts passed by the US in future as it happened in the case of the Tarapur agreement when the 1963 Indo-US bilateral agreement was unilaterally dumped by the US when a new nuclear non-proliferation Act (NNPA) was promulgated in 1978 in the aftermath of the 1974 nuclear test by India.

This concern is relevant because in the 123 agreement India has initialed a blank cheque by agreeing to abide by the US national laws without any qualification by which it gets exposed to any future damaging changes in law. The 123 agreement also has no provision for arbitration in case disagreement persists. In fact, it could be said, 123 agreement provides India with generous opportunities to hold bilateral consultations to resolve disputes with no leverage, leaving the ultimate decision to US to be taken as per their national laws.

Unfortunately, India does not have laws to match the one like the Hyde Act which surely will dominate the operation of the agreement from behind with 123 staying in front for whatever it is worth contrary to what the supporters of the deal are swearing!

The way the sequencing of actions has evolved, it is clear that the Nuclear Suppliers Group wishes to see India firmly fixed in a system of commitment in perpetuity with IAEA by initialing and then unleash their own conditions for making changes in their guidelines. In all probability NSG will prominently demand no testing by India in future as a precondition. There could be other conditions as well. To forestall these dangers, India while finalising the safeguards agreement with IAEA should proactively avoid getting into a trap by insisting on clear unambiguous language.

This is important because in trying to get over stalemates on technical issues, diplomats under advice from politicians could find language fixes and push the issue to be resolved later when the focus is off. This could be really damaging in the long run. In fact, this is what has happened in the case of the finalisation of the 123 agreement which is a fine piece of artistry in language but quite damaging in content!

One classic example is, the way the core issue of 'reprocessing' is dealt with in the 123 text, which, in all probability, will tie India up in all sorts of knots forcing to wade through uncertainties. It is unfortunate, the negotiators have not learnt from Tarapur experience.

It will be interesting to know how this is being dealt with in the safeguards agreement.

One other aspect, which is crucial, is the status of discussion on the protocol additional to the safeguards agreement, which India has agreed to enter into. This is a document which cannot be taken lightly as it will include all the intrusive provisions of safeguards inspections. There is a possibility this could be under wrap or deferred to avoid immediate stalemate. This needs to be gone into in detail before taking any decision to go forward.

The pattern of presentation of the crucial documents to public scrutiny is now set. The 123 agreement was initialled and presented as a fait-accompli and it appears the same may be done in the case of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Instead of discussing the content and extent of damage without any scope for constructive suggestions and changes, one may be left with discussing the status and legality of 'initialing' vis-a-vis 'signing' the document!!

Dr A N Prasad is a former director, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and former member, Atomic Energy Commission
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Post by Neshant »

the so called deal looks murkier by the day :!:

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US govt 'gags' Congress on N-Deal: Report

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/US_g ... 025566.cms

Lynne Weil, a spokeswoman for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the State Department provided a lot of information on the deal, but the committee has agreed not to disclose the answers because "some data might be considered diplomatically sensitive."

However, the Washington Post said on Friday that the deal was in "such desperate" straits that the State Department had imposed the "unusually strict condition" asking the lawmakers to "keep secret" the answers it has provided.

One of the questions, it is said, pertains to whether the US would terminate nuclear trade if India resumes nuclear testing, a sensitive point in New Delhi.
Raju

Post by Raju »

yes, we are making a pact with the devil himself.

Up, up and frittered away

Brahma Chellaney
May 08, 2008
First Published: 22:30 IST(8/5/2008)
Last Updated: 22:35 IST(8/5/2008)


As the country observes this Sunday the 10th anniversary of the nuclear tests that enabled it to gatecrash the nuclear-weapons club, India stands out as a reluctant and tentative nuclear power, still chanting the disarmament mantra while conspicuously lacking even a barely minimal deterrent capability against China. Given that May 11 also coincides with the 34th anniversary of Pokhran I, it is important to remember that no country has struggled longer to build a minimal deterrent or paid heavier international costs for its nuclear programme than India.

The history of India’s nuclear explosive programme is actually a record of how it helped mould multilateral technology controls. The 1974 detonation impelled the secret formation of the London suppliers’ club, the reshaping of the non-proliferation regime, and export bans on dual-use items. The test helped remake US policy, spurring major reforms in export policy, the passage of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the attachment of non-proliferation conditions to foreign assistance, and the emergence of the sanctions approach. India’s space programme helped give birth to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Had India done a test in the mid-1960s when it acquired the nuclear explosive capability, it would have beaten the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) trap. Had Indira Gandhi pressed ahead with weaponisation after Pokhran I, India would not have faced a rising tide of technology sanctions. Had Atal Bihari Vajpayee dangled a test moratorium as a diplomatic carrot post-Pokhran II, instead of gifting it away gratuitously, the US would have hesitated to slap an array of new sanctions on India. And had Manmohan Singh sought to plug the yawning gaps in capability, instead of pushing a divisive deal with the US that offers dubious energy benefits to insidiously neuter India’s deterrent, a more-confident New Delhi today would not have had to propitiate China or any other power.

India has always been let down by its leaders. The more India got hit with technology controls, the more it sank into its proverbial indecision, instead of doggedly pressing ahead. Almost a quarter century passed between Pokhran I and II, as a stock-still India masochistically put up with punitive actions. A decade after Pokhran II, the present leadership is more interested in deal-making than deterrent-building. Exactly 25 years after the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) was launched, New Delhi has announced its mysterious closure — without a single Beijing-reachable missile in deployment, and even as Pakistan has conducted countless missile tests since last year.

While China ploughs 28 per cent of its mammoth, rapidly growing military spending into defence R&D, geared to modernising its deterrent, India’s total annual budget outlays for the nuclear deterrent make up less than one-tenth of the just-announced $11 billion quarterly profit of one US company, Exxon-Mobil. Yet, India does not shy away from squandering several billion dollars annually in importing questionable conventional weapons. Consider some recent examples.

The Indian Air Force barely inducts the first batch of the British Hawk jet trainer — an obsolescent system in which India invested $1.8 billion ostensibly to help minimise crashes — and a Hawk crashes. No sooner the US had sold India a 1971 vintage amphibious transport ship junked by its navy than a gas leak kills an Indian officer and five sailors on board. The Defence Minister now discloses, nine months after the delivery date has passed, that Russia wants $1.2 billion more and another three years to deliver a refurbished Soviet-era aircraft carrier that India had agreed to buy for $1.5 billion in early 2004, although it had been rusting since a mid-1990s boiler-room explosion.

Is India seeking to build a first-rate military with strategic reach and an independent deterrent, or a military that will remain irredeemably dependent on imports and serve as a money-spinning dumping ground for antiquated and junked weapons? The defence of India is becoming an unending scandal just when new threats are emerging and chinks in the Indian armour are obvious. Even CAG indictments make little difference.

In peacetime, China is stepping up military pressure along the Himalayas, intimidating India through intermittent cyberwarfare, and warning of another 1962-style invasion through one of its State-run institutes, which in a Mandarin commentary posted on http://www.chinaiiss.org/ has cautioned an “arrogant Indiaâ€
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Post by S.Abhisheik »

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/may/09iaea.htm

On May 7, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [Images] once again reiterated that he was hopeful about the India-US nuclear agreement being sealed. Obviously, it's difficult to not take his views seriously.

Silencing media speculation that the deal was dead, Dr Singh said, ' am hopeful so long as we are discussing it.'

The prime minister's hope must have been because the final draft of the safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency had arrived.

The political posturing by Dr Singh could be because the United Progressive Alliance government believes that India has bargained successfully at the IAEA.

rediff.com has collected from various sources reliable information on what has been India's gains and losses at the IAEA. None of the sources are ready to speak on record.

The agreement, which is still not made public, is finalised but not yet 'operationalised' by the government due to severe opposition from the Left parties. It is a 20-page plus document with a long preamble that explains the circumstances under which these negotiations were held after the Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation was signed in 2005.

1. According to information available, in the final drafts between India and the IAEA, India is accorded special status but is unlikely to be recognised clearly as a Nuclear Weapons State. India is expected to get 'a special status of Non-Nuclear Weapons State who is not signatory to the NPT'.

So, in effect, India is not one among the NWS -- the P5, as they are called -- but it will be five plus one. India is above Pakistan and North Korea, obviously, but surely not equal to the five declared nuclear powers.

2. Also, it is believed that the agreement with the IAEA will indirectly help India to exit in case of disruptions in supply of fuel to its civil nuclear energy establishments kept under safeguards, and take legal recourse. There will be a legal option available to come out of the safeguards.

3. The IAEA wants the issue of guarantee of assured fuel supplies to be dealt between the seller and buyer of fuel. India, the buyer country, will have to tackle it directly with the countries supplying fuel for producing civil nuclear energy.

4. Also, the inter-changeability of nuclear establishments kept under civil head and strategic head, available to countries like China, is not expected to be given to India.

The IAEA has safeguard agreements with some 140 nations which allow the Agency's inspectors to oversee nuclear and related facilities. These strict agreements protect the world against nuclear proliferation.

Before the current discussion with the IAEA started, India had discussed such a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in and around 1993.

The latest and highly controversial discussion with the IAEA was conducted by Dr R B Grover, director, Strategic Planning Group at the Department of Atomic Energy, and his team. Dr Grover is a mechanical engineer of repute.

He has, with the help of his DAE colleagues and a team of Indian diplomats, clinched a very complex agreement which will bind India in the coming generations.

Dr Singh's positivism is because of his deep political conviction that this deal is good for India, but there are many hurdles at every step ahead including at the IAEA. Also, one cannot forget that the critics of the deal within India, like the Left and the Bharatiya Janata Party, will not be satisfied with the favourable conditions of the India-specific safeguards agreement because they are more worried about the implications of the Hyde Act and the additional protocols agreement which the Singh government has not yet brokered with the IAEA.

That raises the question: Is the prime minister's hope realistic?

In the unlikely circumstances of the Left agreeing to give a green signal to move the India-specific agreement to the IAEA board for ratification, it will be a hard task to manage a 'clean exemption' from the IAEA board of governors and, later, from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The official position is that the Left-UPA meeting on May 6 on the nuclear deal failed to make any advance, and the two sides decided to meet again on May 28. The Left parties are saying they would meet on May 23 to decide on whether or not to allow the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Media reports claim that the Left parties want clarifications on guaranteed uninterrupted fuel supplies, full civil nuclear cooperation, the issue of reciprocity and implications of America's domestic Hyde Act on India's foreign and security policies.



This means that the Left parties have not moved an inch towards agreeing with the government's point of view even after eight meetings and after taking so much time. But, then, it may not be the correct conclusion because it is worth noting that the Left parties have not walked out of the meeting or stopped talking to the government. If the deal with the IAEA was not worthy of deliberations, they would have walked out and would have pulled the shutters down.

Also, it is strange to observe that at least officially speaking, the much-awaited final text of the safeguards agreement which India is stated to have concluded with the IAEA has been a no-show at the May 6 meeting of the Joint Committee with the Left parties. It is paradoxical that even those members who are most crucial in the decision-making process, leave alone the public, are denied access to scrutinise the full text while many in the international community, particularly those from the NSG countries, must be scanning it with a microscope!

The safeguards agreements being highly loaded legal documents couched in language usually subject to various interpretations, require careful scrutiny. Serious decisions based on excerpts could be misleading. So what kind of discussions will the Left parties do without the actual text?

One important aspect not focused in the ongoing debate so far as the India-specific safeguards negotiations with the IAEA is concerned, is the need for arriving at a satisfactory additional protocol to the safeguards agreement.
The Opposition to the deal is unlikely to go because the two (India-specific agreements and the additional protocol) are inseparable, and in fact the additional protocol spells out in specific terms and in detail the extent of intrusiveness with which the safeguards measures will be implemented. In short, while the basic safeguards agreement deals with broad parameters and the legalities, the additional protocol lists the stringent inspection measures as well as the contentious issues which can touch upon national pride.

The two are complementary. Hence, the critics of the deal argue, it is very essential to understand that even if the safeguards agreement is satisfactorily negotiated, the job is not fully done until the additional protocol is also complete and meets India's interests, in order to avoid future problems. The critics have already argued many times that if taken up later, it could likely be exposed to extraneous stringent provisions being introduced when the focus is off, conceding all the leverage away. In fact, in practice, the additional protocol is more difficult to deal with, even for countries like Japan [Images].

Neither External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee nor the Left parties, or the BJP for that matter, have spoken much on the issue of additional protocol publicly.

The text of the safeguards agreement is expected to address issues such as corrective measures and exercise of right of return (fuel or equipment) by suppliers in case of disruption of supplies or cessation of cooperation due to any of the reasons mentioned in the Hyde Act, as well as how assurances of uranium supply will be tied to safeguards in perpetuity.

Although India is a de facto nuclear power, since it has no formal recognition as a weapons state the safeguards arrangement, particularly the additional protocol as and when negotiated, may include safeguards provisions as applicable to non-weapon states.

For example, Nuclear Weapon States enjoy the freedom of switching and choosing nuclear facilities and materials for inclusion in the civil or military category at will, which is denied to India and expected to be denied to India.

According to information available, India is allowed to keep the certain portion of activity out of the IAEA's purview.



America's precondition is that India may get uranium from foreign countries to produce nuclear energy. To make that possible India needs to separate and place under IAEA safeguards its civil nuclear energy programme as distinct from weapons production units. This is the strategy to get India into the mainstream of nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Also, a significant privilege that P5 enjoys is not given to India in this unique and trend-setting agreement. The United States has certain unique rights in the name of its 'national security interest' in the agreement with the IAEA while China has the right to not put its own programme under additional protocols.

India has already agreed to put under safeguards its own internally developed civil nuclear energy programme (Kakrapar, Rajasthan etc) in this agreement which is irreversible unlike in the case of nuclear weapon states like China.


Critics of the deal think the nuclear deal in its present form is anchored on the Hyde Act which has been promulgated exclusively to 'fix' India. In short, the Left parties will continue opposing the deal even if India has got the best terms from the IAEA. The issue is the 123 Agreement and its linkages to the Hyde Act.

The joint UPA-Left committee has not moved an inch on resolving this contentious issue. Innumerable time assurances and spins have been given both by India and the US to the effect that the Hyde Act is not binding as it is only an enabling document for cooperation and only the 123 Agreement matters.

None of the parties opposing the deal has accepted this.

Rather, critics never fail to cite the glaring precedent with the Tarapur power plant. The 1963 bilateral 123 agreement was unilaterally abrogated by the US after India's nuclear test in May 1974 and a new Act called the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act passed in 1978 was made applicable.

Critics of the deal will not be satisfied with the safeguards agreement because they are more worried about the implications of the Hyde Act and the additional protocols agreement which the Singh government has not yet brokered with the IAEA.

In view of the above arguments, one wonders what makes Dr Singh so hopeful of the deal going through.

BJP MPs in Parliament say if the Congress does well in the Karnataka assembly election the government will go ahead with the nuclear deal and a consequent early general election since the Left will pull the government down.

Now, to link the highly complex matter of international affairs of nuclear proliferation and India's foreign policy to a state election is like anti-climax for India which wants to become a superpower in the coming decades.

Will the hopeful Dr Singh be spared of despair after the Karnataka election results are announced?
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Post by Tilak »

Let us seal IAEA, others may scuttle: UPA to Left
Posted online: Wednesday, May 07, 2008 at 0025 hrs
DK SINGH & CITHARA PAUL

[quote]NEW DELHI, MAY 6: Making a strong plea to the Left to at least allow it to confirm the India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, the Government today argued that if this didn’t happen, India stands the risk of allowing other countries to scuttle it.

At the eighth meeting of the UPA-Left committee on the Indo-US nuclear deal today, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said that time was running out for India as a change in the composition of the IAEA Board next September-October could imperil the current draft safeguards agreement. The Government also underlined that the safeguards agreement is unique — as it recognises India’s strategic programme and clearly restricts all application of safeguards to the civilian side — and that its approval is a pre-condition for nuclear commerce with any country.

The Left wanted to see the text of the agreement. Declining this request — on the grounds that it would be a breach of the negotiation process — the Government agreed to provide selective and relevant portions of the text by the next meeting of the UPA-Left committee on May 28.

For its part, the Left agreed it would “clarifyâ€
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Post by Gerard »

Tilak
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Post by Tilak »

BJP at odds with Kalam over Indo-US nuclear deal
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Post by svinayak »

Tilak wrote:BJP at odds with Kalam over Indo-US nuclear deal

BJP hits out at Kalam for backing N-deal
http://www.ibnlive.com/news/bjp-hits-ou ... 032-3.html

CNN-IBN

TimePublished on Sun, May 11, 2008 at 02:27 in Nation section

New Delhi: The BJP it appears is at odds with the man it made President over his endorsement of the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Former external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh trashed the view expressed by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam. He accused Kalam of abandoning the cause of India's autonomy as a nuclear weapons state. [Read Story]

Dr Kalam, the architect of India's missile programme and a symbol of India's quest for nuclear powerdom, had backed the Indo-US deal on Friday.

He had said the agreement would in no way compromise Indian security.

His remarks came close on the heels of similar views expressed by another top functionary during the NDA regime, former national security adviser Brajesh Mishra.

Jaswant Singh said the Indo-US agreement would weaken India's autonomy as a nuclear weapons state.

"Dr Kalam has schanged his views. We should abandon strategic autonomy and walk out of the agreement," Jaswant Singh stated.
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Post by putnanja »

Another May day, different music - YP Rajesh

[quote] It was just another Monday evening in Bangalore when my newly acquired mobile phone sprang to life and my boss in Delhi at the other end could not hide what sounded like a mixture of excitement and disbelief. “They have conducted nuclear tests!â€
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Post by Vivek_A »

TFT



No celebrating just yet




Moeed Yusuf
Those who argue that a successful conclusion of the Indo-US deal will make it easier for Pakistan to receive the same benefit from China overlook the fact that Beijing does not have the capacity to replicate the US offer

Adjust Font Size The Friday Times The Friday Times







After a prolonged intra-coalition tussle between the Congress and the communist Left, the Indo-US nuclear deal has been called off by New Delhi. Would this set the Indo-US strategic partnership back?

A surface analysis would say yes. The scrapping of the deal would, at the minimum, leave Washington disillusioned with New Delhi. After all, the Bush White House battled numerous legal and political hurdles to pave the way for this exceptional deal meant, among other things, to give India a place in the nuclear club outside of the NPT.

This would be a hasty conclusion. Those who are relieved to see the deal fall through (Islamabad, Beijing and the non-proliferation lobby, among others) need to take a second look. One, the impasse may only be temporary; two, even if the deal is not brought back to the table, it is unlikely to affect the overall Indo-US relationship.

The deal has fallen through solely due to the political formulation in the Indian parliament at this moment. An overwhelming majority of the Indian decision-making elite favour the arrangement. Even the BJP, which has opposed the deal in its “present formâ€
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Post by satyarthi »

N-deal will cripple India by Satish Chandra


N-deal will cripple India


Satish Chandra

The contention that the India-US nuclear deal will open the floodgates of technology transfer to the country is largely wishful thinking and not grounded in reality. Worse, our weapons programme will be compromised

As time runs out on the India-US nuclear deal, those supportive of it are engaged in a frenetic campaign to cause the hold outs against it, notably the BJP and the Left parties, to allow its concretisation. This exercise has been facilitated by the recent statements of Mr APJ Abdul Kalam and Mr Brajesh Mishra. While the former has been supportive of the deal for some time, the latter is a recent convert.

Though the arguments for and against the deal are well known, it would, nevertheless, be useful to examine those adduced most recently by the spin doctors and assess their validity.

The protagonists of the deal repeatedly assert that it in no way restricts India's sovereign right to test, that testing has always had and will continue to have onerous consequences, and that if India feels the need to test it can always go ahead do so. This line of argumentation is seriously flawed since, as per the legislation governing the nuclear deal, notably the Hyde Act, the US is bound, consequent upon an Indian test, not only to cease all further nuclear cooperation but also to exercise the right to recall all the nuclear materials and equipment transferred to India. Thus, an Indian test conducted following the deal will have far more serious consequences than those faced after Pokhran II.

Indeed, once hooked onto the nuclear deal, the huge financial investments made and the dependency created on imported nuclear materials and plants, would make it virtually impossible for India to withdraw from the deal or test because not only would it face the costs and highly disruptive consequences of termination of cooperation, but also those of return of equipment and material. In these circumstances, to state that India is free to test after having concluded the nuclear deal is akin to stating that an individual is free to commit suicide!

The contention that the nuclear deal in no way degrades our nuclear deterrent is down right ludicrous. First, by effectively closing the door for an Indian test for all time it compromises India's capability of improving the design, yield, etc, of its warheads. This would place India at a great disadvantage as and when other countries like China and Pakistan modernise their nuclear arsenals through testing. Second, by committing India to a fast track conclusion of the FMCT, it jeopardises the country's ability to enhance its stock of weapons grade fissile material. Third, since it entails the closure of the Cirus research reactor, which contributes one-third of our production of weapons grade fissile material, it will limit the number of warheads that we can make. Fourth, placement of two-thirds of our reactors under IAEA in perpetuity safeguards will to that extent reduce our production capability of tritium -- a critical ingredient to boost the yield of nuclear warheads. Finally, it will deprive both our civil and military nuclear programmes of the benefits of synergy as it is based on their rigid separation: Something which has not been done by any nuclear weapon state except, to an extent, the US.

The argument that the non-conclusion of the nuclear deal will adversely affect our civil nuclear programme is untenable. While there will be short-term constraints due to the non-availability of processed uranium, the existing reserves are sufficient to support not only our weapons programme but also a power generation capacity of up to 10,000 MW for decades. Once these production levels are achieved, India will be in a position to tap into its thorium reserves, among the largest in the world, in order to develop a power generation capacity of up to 300,000 MW.

Accordingly, it would be unwise to allow a short term resource crunch -- the result of a go slow approach by successive Governments since the 1990s in the exploration and exploitation of indigenous uranium resources -- to cause us to enter into a deal which would mortgage in perpetuity the nature of our nuclear programme as well as our strategic and foreign policy autonomy. Noting the weakness in their argument on this score the spin doctors now quote Mr MR Srinivasan as stating that, in order for us to tap into our thorium resources, we need to have a nuclear power generation capacity of 50,000 MW and not merely 10,000 MW. They contend that this was kept unpublicised hitherto in order not to reveal India's vulnerabilities.

This argument is disingenuous. For decades our leading scientists from Bhabha onwards have been projecting a 10,000 MW capacity as being sufficient to sustain our proposed thorium cycle. It is too much to expect us to swallow a five-fold increase in this figure suddenly sprung upon the nation just prior to the conclusion of the deal. Had this been the case, our scientists would not have even looked at the thorium cycle, knowing full well that it was not sustainable.

The contention that the nuclear deal will open the floodgates of technology transfer to India is largely wishful thinking and not grounded in reality. Indeed, Article 5.2 of the much vaunted 123 Agreement categorically states that transfers of "sensitive nuclear technology" would require an amendment to that agreement and that transfers of "dual use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the parties' respective laws, regulations and licence policies". In other words under the nuclear deal India has not even secured full civil nuclear cooperation and transfer of technology from the US in this area will be less than complete.

It has also been made out that if Russia can contemplate a 123 Agreement with the US, India should have no compunction in doing likewise. The answer is that Russia does so as a nuclear weapon state without any of the restraints imposed on India such as a rigid separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, in perpetuity safeguards, prohibition on testing, etc.

Finally, it has been argued that non-conclusion of the nuclear deal would lead to a severe loss of face for India. This again is a weak argument. On the contrary, our not persisting with the deal for want of a consensus would enhance India's democratic credentials.

It is evident from that the arguments in support of the deal, far from being credible, are unconvincing and, regrettably, in many a case our spin doctors have been guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.

-- The writer, a career diplomat, is a former Deputy National Security Adviser
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Re: Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal and Power - ONLY Articles

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