Katare wrote:Even if India tests and they put sanctions there is no way they can take the power plants/hardware back or stop the supply immediately. Technically and commercially it is not possible. Also most of the imported reactors would be financed by exporting country, sanctions would mean that they loose that equity money (aka Dabhol/Enron/GE). Even the reactors and hardware Indian imported pre Smiling Bhudhha are being run with imported fuel supplies on the basis of safety concerns etc. On top of it, we would have a significant stockpile, technology and capacity to ease the pain through transition.
Arun_S wrote:1. First, they sell India the equipment. Then the Indian budgetary constraints whittles down India's indigenous capabilities, to the extent that whatever talent pool is left is hard pressed to run and maintain even those reactors outside the separation plan in civil side. They cant run the new reactors for which they have no experience compounded by manpower shortages. Plus, the hypothetical imported reactors are different designs, with which the native (sic) Indians are unfamiliar with. It takes ~5 years of hand holding to master a new reactor design. The case of Kudankulam is good benchmark. Getting a reactors operators accredition takes 3-5 years. In CANDU's case, the exercise to obtain complete indigenization was excruciatingly painful, and lasted nearly a decade. You may not have forgotten the progress (or lack thereof ) in late 70's.
Civilian nuclear deal would increase India's indigenous capacity manifold by bringing new capital, technology and management practices. Budget support and constraints would only go down as more commercial money would be available for commercial purposes and goI could focus on strategic research. New designs would certainly take years to master and would require hand-holding which would actually be immensely helpful and learning experience for Indian scientists. Productivity gains through infusion of new/western technology, management practices and capital is how developing countries manage to grow much faster than developed countries.
Arun_S wrote:2. Then, they cite the breakage of clauses of the NSG deal to stop fuel supplies. If everything was so hunky-dory, what happened to the Tarapur (TAPP 1 & 2) fuel supplies? In this case, other suppliers could step in because no commitment to them was broken! Further, in the case of TAPP 1 & 2, there was no overt objections raised by the US. In the new hypothetical scenario, there will be strenuous efforts from the US to stop ANY supplies to the Indian reactors. In any case, the Hyde Act puts a stop to this in its explanatory notes.
There are enough safeguards in the deal to manage this situation admittedly with lotsa pain. Without the deal there won't be any plants to shut off. It is better to have them even if there is a danger that we may have to shut them off in some unlikely scenario. I doubt that other will abandon lucrative contracts and good partner just because USA is not supporting the deal. They haven't done that before and IMHO, its highly unlikely Russia/Fr or even Britain would do that in future.
Arun_S wrote:3. Running the reactors on indigenous supplies will deplete/erase India's "significant stockpile", thus foreclosing the FBR and AHWR options, and crippling the strategic program permanently.
Stockpile can't be used for unsafeguarded reactors and for every safeguarded reactor there is a provision for stockpile for its entire commercial life. Domestic supplies could be used exclusively for unsafeguarded reactors making Plutonium
Also most of the imported reactors would be financed by exporting country, sanctions would mean that they loose that equity money (aka Dabhol/Enron/GE)
Arun_S wrote:How can you be so sure at this stage as to the details of the funding? It could also involve sizable Indian participation in the funding!
This is not funding detail but standard procedure and norms for commercial Imports. The exporting country provides subsidized loans (through (EXIM Banks) and equipment supplier takes equity in project to achieve financial closure of project.
Anyhow the strategic program is funded through defense budget and budgetary support for civilian program depends on the need and reserves of NPCL/BHAVANi which are running well over a billion each IIRC.
Arun_S wrote:Bullshit, what are you smoking to conjure this? BARC, IGCAR/MAPP, and the U enrichment plant at Rattehalli are central to the strategic program, and they have been hit hard by the budgetary constraints. The decision to add an additional few thousands centrifuges at Rattehalli has been put off because of these constraints. These are supported by DAE funds and not from the defense budget, with the exception of the ATV reactor project in IGCAR.
This is completely wrong statement Arun and spun by DDM and leftist journalists, check the budget document itself. There are no budget constraints but lotsa capacity constraints. Last year DAE could not spend allocated budget and returned 28% of it back unused. The capacity to spend money comes from maturity of industry which is not there and civilian nuclear deal may be a step in that direction.Also DAE budget cuts for this year is incorrect, DAE's budget has been increased by 25% this year on what they spent last year.
India is not making any commitment to any country that it'll not test nuclear devices in future. The commitment would only involve material imported from those countries would not be used for strategic program which is fair IMO.
Arun_S wrote:Sure, India has made no such tacit promise. But its various actions like the 123/NSG goal and its whittling down of strategic assets tacitly points in that direction. Nobody said that India cannot test even after signing the 123/NSG deal. But then again, going by that train of logic, there is nothing stopping anybody from going to the top of a tall building and jumping, especially if one is determined to do so. And MM Singh provided GOI funding of lobbyists to help pass the Hyde Act on US terms not Indian.
That is why I asked what would be the cost of jumping from the tall building. IMO, It would be the same or less than what we would have already paid by not signing the deal.
Burn can say what he wants, Pranav also said a lot of things what you believe is your choice. About FMCT/CTBT/Missile, I don't believe it is possible for any nation to force this on us
1. There's a huge difference between Burns and Pranab.
Have you even read the Hyde Act and its objectives? It is the clearest statement of intent published as of date, which explicitly states the desire to cap India's nuclear program/deterrent
. By subscribing to the Hyde act, India tacitly subscribes to this theory too! Since many including Bala at el are uninformed, let me cite the Act and relevant Sections.
Yes I have read Hyde Act and 123 agreement in some details but I did not come to similar conclusions. You have more trust in American politicians than Indian ones. I don not subscribe to that view. Both parties are balancing their domestic politics so there is bound to be some differences in their statements which media would harp on. What counts is what we sign off to and the general goodwill of signing parties later. Although admittedly USofA has not been a reliable partner historically and this is a risk worth exploring before we sign on anything. I value your comments and insight immensely on that front. But I think in post cold war and civilian nuclear deal most of the thorny issues between India-US would have been removed. I can see a flourishing and mutually rewarding relationship between two of our nations if nurtured properly and based on common values.
Arun_S wrote:A. The Hyde Act envisages (Section-109) India to jointly participate with the U.S. in a programme involving the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration to further nuclear non-proliferation goals. To go a bit further, the Hyde Act requires the U.S. to "encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty."
Hyde act is not binding for India we are not signing off on hyde act. Also congress has limited power on enforcing international treaties at best it could call for congressional hearing and make some political noises thatâ€™s about it. Nuclear non-proliferation and stopping fissile material production are two of the stated goals of India (and almost every major nation) on its own conditions. I do not see any contradiction from our long stated position here
Arun_S wrote:B. Further, if one goes through the Hyde Act, the MTCR is brought into the picture without relevance (but with a specific objective) (so much for fluffy statement like 123/Hyde is about power and has no military relavence). Is this proof enough of the FMCT/Missile cap? Now lets's get specific. The Act draws a NEW distinction between an "MTCR adherent" and a "unilateral adherent" to expressly keep India within the sanctions purview of Section 73 of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act. That section decrees a wide spectrum and crippling trade and other sanctions in case MTCR-controlled items are transferred. But in keeping with MTCR's status as a cartel that regulates transfers outside the league but not within, Section 73 is not applicable to any export "that is authorized by the laws of an MTCR adherent" or is for "an end user in a country that is an MTCR adherent."
C. The Hyde Act's Section 107 explicitly states: "Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the purposes of Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act." In singling out India, the Hyde Act goes beyond the Arms Export Control Act, which defines an "MTCR adherent" as either "a country that participates in MTCR or that, pursuant to an international understanding to which the United States is a party, controls MTCR equipment or technology in accordance with the criteria and standards set forth in MTCR." India cannot "participate" in MTCR despite India's voluntary adherence to the MTCR guidelines, which have been conveniently brushed aside.
D. While the MTCR has treated China differently, the Hyde Act demands through its Section 104(b)(6)(B) that India tow the MTCR's current guidelines and "practices," followed by an exemplarily astounding statement requiring that a "unilateral adherent" is also required to abide by "any subsequent changes to the MTCR guidelines and annex." The dangers to the Indian missile program stemming from an open-ended Indian commitment have been underlined by the move of some MTCR states to institute what they call the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. This is a missile related NPT. Chellaney and Bharat Karnad have cried themselves hoarse on these issues!
India is and should be an adherent to MTCR. MTCR, as I know of it is about export control of long range missile and related technology which India has always followed and would/should follow in future. All members of MTCR have equal rights and its a voluntary organization with doors open to all. Anyhow still we are not signing off on anything related to MTCR. Nothing in MTCR is binding on China or India and there is no exception(or even a question of exceptions arises) have been made for China. MTCR works on consensus (no-veto) and its changes would largely reflect world view in which we also live. Better we can join the group and be a party in decision making.
Arun_S wrote:E. Sections 104G(i) is tantamount to an FMCT, and, Section 104(H)(i)-(iii) IS TANTAMOUNT TO ASKING INDIA TO SUBMIT ITS WEAPONS DESIGNS.
There is no subsection H in section104, I think you are talking about 104(g)(H) (i) to (iii) related to President's obligation to report to congress annual estimate of India's nuclear activity. There is no obligation for India to share any details of its strategic program, the obligation is for president to estimate and report to congress. It is absurd to even suggest that there could be such an agreement/demand from USofA. In any case USA makes estimate of every nations nuclear activity anyhow, now it'll have to share that report/estimate with congress.
Arun_S wrote:F. The most galling part in an already inflammatory Act is Section 110(5), the act seeks to hold India to a bizarre standard for continuation of cooperation by mandating a cutoff of all exports "if an Indian person engages in transfers that are not consistent with NSG or MTCR guidelines". The act's Section 110(5) defines the term "Indian person" as encompassing both entities and individuals (including "non-Indian nationals") under India's jurisdiction. COULD NOT SUCH A PERSON BE FABRICATED OR PLANTED??2. So, judging by the above, what's the difference between the Hyde Act and the Treaty of Versailles?
Section 110 only gives definitions to the terms and words used in the act elsewhere and subsection 5 of section 110 defines term Indian which is generic and common legal concept IMO. I can't see how can you leave out any individual or entity out of the purview of our law if it exists under Indian govt jurisdiction.
Arun_S wrote:3. Have you heard of the quote by Dean Rusk (JFK's Secy of State) - "Once you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow".
I had never heard this quote until today! I do not think USofA can get to India's balls, even when we didn't have enough food to eat we didn't capitulate with a bright future ahead of us I do not think resurgent Indian's got much to fear from west.