ShauryaT wrote:Who said this? When? Bharat Karnad. I have found public references of BK and Iyengar stating the above in 1999. So, what is this talk of a holier than thou attitude towards any Government official. When these things were out in the open at least since 1999.Thus, for example, another test is an absolute imperative to test a reworked thermonuclear weapon design. The one tested in May 1998, many scientists even here believe, fizzled out. The doubt is about whether or not the shock wave set off the â€˜secondaryâ€™ (meaning, the store of thermonuclear fuel). Reading into the test data, the dissenting scientists who, incidentally, are in a majority, are convinced that most of the yield was due to the boosted fission trigger (or the â€˜primaryâ€™) and that there was virtually no thermonuclear burn.
He goes on to say the following:Now consider the Indian situation. Just one of the five Indian May â€™98 tests pertained to a thermonuclear device and that too is now suspect. Nevertheless, the information on innumerable performance variables available from just this one doubtful explosive test is deemed adequate by way of a database for sub-critical testing to facilitate production of newer, more advanced, thermonuclear weaponry! This level of self-confidence verging on scientific and technological hubris could be ignored were it not that it directly endangers the nuclear deterrent and national security in the long run by increasing the chances that any new and advanced weapons designs that might eventuate from Indian sub-criticals in the future will, in the absence of actual tests, run the risk of failing. And, in the larger context, that India may end up having an inventory full of supposedly â€˜decisiveâ€™ nuclear weapons that do not work. Proof of performance of the weapons systems in the deterrent force will then be available only in time of war. By then it will be too late to matter one way or the other.
And then he says this:No, he is not talking about the 123, The above was in context of the CTBT in 2000. The man is unsparing with a single mission, to protect Indiaâ€™s interests. He goes on to say the following.The haste in signing this wretched treaty is foolhardy in the extreme. Three beneficial things will, however, happen were the Government of India (GOI) to not sign this treaty. It will buy the country time and the legal space to test further, should that become necessary, in order to realise a more survivable deterrent with greater lethality, continue levelling the strategic playing field, and afford New Delhi the leverage derived from the promise of eventual adherence to the treaty to more substantively establish Indiaâ€™s geopolitical role and global interests in the coming century.
These are enormous advantages not to be frittered or gifted away in return for something as evanescent as Washingtonâ€™s goodwill and offers of loosened controls on credit and technology flows which, as will be argued here, will follow provided the GOI keeps unwaveringly to its economic reforms script. It would be gratuitous to expend Indiaâ€™s substantial bargaining power on something that is in the USâ€™ trade and commercial interest to affect and which no administration in Washington will be able to resist doing anyway.Any P-5 country, able to muster a majority in the verification council, can ask for and get an on-site inspection mandated under UN aegis of any facility or suspect installation in a signatory country. There is no protection against such deliberate harassment and policing measures. Go ask the Iraqis about the UN inspection teams searching for supposedly clandestine factories researching, developing and producing weapons of mass destruction!
Even a suggestion of CTBT, by the then officials of the GoI gets this man to react.The earlier impression of the â€˜security dialogueâ€™ as going nowhere is giving way to a view of a fatal Indian compromise in the offing, which was strengthened by Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singhâ€™s lengthy interview to The Hindu (29 November 1999). In it, he made the case for Indiaâ€™s signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) soon, notwithstanding its rejection by the US Senate and its non-ratification by the other major nuclear weapons states, Russia and China.
The haste in signing this wretched treaty is foolhardy in the extreme.
The question for us, now, is the same as it was when the following was written in 2000.the need for more tests if weapons in the megaton class or even 200 kiloton (kt) fusion warheads are to be developed, India will have to develop a suitable strategy to find a way around the CTBT to enable further testing without inviting a fresh round of sanctions and international opprobrium. In case India's nuclear warhead capability remains confined to 15 to 30 kt fission warheads, it will lead to the sub-optimal utilisation of India's meagre fissile material stockpile. With negotiations for the FMCT staring it in the face and the likelihood of an early agreement being reached, India would be hard put to stockpile adequate fissile stockpile for the total number of warheads that its retaliatory strategy and targeting philosophy may require. These are the tough issues confronting the development of a potent nuclear strategy. While there are no easy answers, a determined diplomatic stance and a tough negotiating position with some hard bargaining can achieve the desired results. The world is gradually getting used to the idea that a "cap, reduce, eliminate" policy is no longer feasible and that India's nuclear weapons, born primarily out of the need to safeguard national security, cannot now be rolled back.
The above para is not from BK but Gurmeet Kanwal. BK does not spare anyone and is not beholden to any political point of view. The man is either insane or a true patriot. It is time, we at BRF stop putting blind faith in whatever the GoI says and does and use our own mind and heart, if we can. If we cannot, we put faith in people, whom we trust.
The sad thing for me is what I call is the debating framework has been set in such a way that no matter, if or how we sign this agreement, India has lost one way or the other. If I were to say today that India should accept nothing less than FORMAL NWS status in the global world order, I am sure, I will be called an extremist, an H&D infatuated Paki and what not. When will we learn that the US is not going to give it to us, we will have to snatch it and if we cannot do it now then at least negotiate something with a CLEAR path to the cherished goal.
As we debate this agreement, the question and value of parity is almost lost and the only thing we debate here is if we should sign 123 or not and how. The US has in a master stroke invalidated the idea of an India as a global power, on par with other major powers.
Weak men and structures have been the reason for our fall in the past, Indians should recognize this pattern and correct them, instead of repeating the same old mistakes. We cannot say sign this deal now and say, we will change it later. Some things have a lasting impact on how we deal with the world. I am not ashamed, when India goes around with a begging bowl for support for a permanent UN seat, but it will not happen sweetly with the help of a begging bowl. The ONLY way this will happen is if, we have the will, capability and need to bring this order down and play on our own terms. I only wish that we had taken some effort from the very start learnt to play the great game, instead of living in utopia.
The gloves need to come off in the defense of the nation, there is no one or no institution above the nations interests.
Personally, I am hoping that the establishment scientists are under orders of the GoI to shut up, leaving only external and past members with the option to speak about the failed tests. If the TN test had indeed failed, it will most certainly not be in Indiaâ€™s interests to sign this deal, even if a Jekyl act is passed. (would not make sense). Surprised that some members want to shut up now, when the nations interests are under threat.
An eminently valuable post by ShauryaT is worth a second read.