Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

NRao
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 11 Jul 2008 07:08

R,

Henry S makes the point that US vendors will enter India only after some no fault clause. So, per him, that topic is irrelevant.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 11 Jul 2008 07:34

Something does not make sense there. So the US is going to all this trouble to altruistically open the Indian market to all the NSG - notably Russia and France - while taking the terrible risk that the COTUS will cut off American access to the same market? Strange.. So if the NSG approves it, which is supposed to be what the White House is pushing for, then the COTUS really has 2 choices:
1. Cut American businesses out of the must lucrative nuclear bazaar
2. Vote the deal in.

If they fail to act b4 the elections, the NSG goes forward, and the Republicans hammer the COTUS for betraying American industry.

If they shoot it down, same.
If they approve the deal, the NPAs all :(( :((

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Sanjay M » 11 Jul 2008 08:03

narayanan wrote:If they fail to act b4 the elections, the NSG goes forward, and the Republicans hammer the COTUS for betraying American industry.

If they shoot it down, same.
If they approve the deal, the NPAs all :(( :((


Why do you think NYT is suddenly hollering for safeguards on the NSG rules for India:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/05/opinion/05sat3.html

NYT

Editorial
No Rush, Please

Published: July 5, 2008

Three years ago, President Bush offered India a far-too-generous nuclear deal. India’s illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons would effectively be forgiven. And for the first time in 30 years, it would be allowed to buy nuclear fuel and equipment for its civilian energy program from the United States and other nations.

Instead of celebrating a big political win, the deal quickly turned into a political nightmare for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, nearly toppling his government. India’s Communist Party, his junior coalition partner, is dead set against the agreement and any broader strategic relationship with the United States.

President Bush, who is eager for any foreign policy win before he goes back to Crawford, Tex., is pressing Mr. Singh hard to finally work this out. Mr. Singh is now looking for new allies.

As far as we’re concerned, there is no reason at all to rush. President Bush gave away far too much and got far too little for this deal. No promise from India to stop producing bomb-making material. No promise not to expand its arsenal. And no promise not to resume nuclear testing.

Mr. Bush may be running out of time, but Congress, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (the 45 nations that set the rules for nuclear trade) will need plenty of it to review the agreement before deciding whether to grant their respective approvals. At a minimum, they must insist that international suppliers halt nuclear trade if India tests another nuclear weapon, as it last did in 1998. And they must insist that India accept the fullest possible monitoring of its civilian nuclear facilities by I.A.E.A. inspectors.

The United States must ensure that any rule the suppliers’ group adopts for selling technology to India is not weaker than anything already in American law. Otherwise, New Delhi will be able to end run Washington and buy technology and fuel from states — like Russia and France — that are even more eager for the business and even less punctilious than this country.

Mr. Bush was right to build on the Clinton administration legacy and forge stronger ties with India, a burgeoning power whose democratic values provide a unique basis for cooperation. But it was a mistake to let India and industry lobbyists persuade him to make the nuclear deal the centerpiece.

If Mr. Singh finds a way to push the deal forward, it would be a mistake for the United States to try and ram through the remaining approvals — by the I.A.E.A. board, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Congress — just to meet the artificial deadline of Mr. Bush’s presidency.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby rocky » 11 Jul 2008 08:15

I was thinking along the same lines as Rangudu - what is the exact relevance of the US signing or not signing the 123 agreement with India if the IAEA board signs this draft?

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sugriva » 11 Jul 2008 08:47

I was thinking along the same lines as Rangudu - what is the exact relevance of the US signing or not signing the 123 agreement with India if the IAEA board signs this draft?


I think they are independent of each other. Once IAEA board and NSG sign the deal,
India can get yellow maal from France or Russia. Once US passes into law its own 123
it gets to join the party. They can choose to do it even in the next presidency or never at
all. I don't think a time limit makes any sense in this context.

However getting the Amirkhans to supply the yellow stuff was only a secondary
object of the deal. As previous posters have pointed out, the salient features of this agreement
are
1) safeguards are till perpetuity
2) desi thoorium used with videsi uranium is safeguarded. So cannot be used in
unsafeguarded FBR's, thereby kaputing both the thoorium cycle and strategic
independence.
3) The devil is in the details. Subsidiary agreements will lay out the details.
4) There is a provision of "special inspections" that allow IAEA to call for
"inspections" at any time, in case of "doubt".
5) It will be interesting to see what facilities are offered by India under Annex 1
6) The cost of separating the civilian and military facilities will be enormous.
In the short term at least, the military sector will definitely be impacted.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Sanjay M » 11 Jul 2008 09:04

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121562768791139877.html

Wall Street Journal

OPINION

Negotiating India's Next Nuclear Explosion
By HENRY SOKOLSKI
FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL ASIA
July 10, 2008

One of the most notable events of the G-8 meeting in Tokyo this week had little to do with economic growth. In a conversation yesterday, U.S. President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh discussed a civilian nuclear deal that has been in the works for nearly three years. The pact, known as the 123 Agreement under U.S. law, would allow American firms to invest and trade in civil nuclear technologies with India -- a significant event if it occurs, given that India hasn't signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and has not allowed full inspections of its nuclear plants.
[Negotiating India's Next Nuclear Explosion]
David Gothard

With only months left before Congress breaks for the U.S. Presidential elections, the time needed to finalize the deal this year may be running out. In addition to securing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approvals, U.S. law requires Congress to pass a joint resolution of approval.

All of this is causing the deal's backers to wring their hands, despite yesterday's sideline chat. If the 123 Agreement is not approved on Mr. Singh's and Mr. Bush's watch, it could encounter additional difficulties next year. The leadership of the Indian political party most likely to succeed Mr. Singh's Congress-led coalition, the Bharatiya Janata Party, has already announced that it wouldn't "mind another [nuclear] blast if it is necessitated." Meanwhile, John McCain and Barack Obama have pledged to ratify or amend the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Not much of this is mentioned when the deal is being sold in Washington. Within the Beltway, the deal is the business opportunity of the century, one that will strengthen global nonproliferation efforts and bring India into the international nonproliferation fold. Enabling legislation, known as the Hyde Act, requires that all U.S. nuclear assistance be suspended if India resumes testing, that the U.S. do nothing to violate its own pledges under the NPT, and that India place all of its civilian reactors under IAEA nuclear inspections in perpetuity. When questioned earlier this year House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Howard Berman, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice confirmed that the deal is and must be "completely consistent with the Hyde Act."

All of this sounds pretty good. There's only one problem: To garner the political support necessary to proceed with the deal, Mr. Singh and his supporters have been making a pitch back home that's the polar opposite of Washington's story board. Thus just last week, to gain the support of the Samajwadi Party (an Indian political group previously opposed the deal), the prime minister's office announced that "the 123 Agreement clearly overrides the Hyde Act" and that, as such, "there is nothing in the agreement which places an embargo on India's right to carry out a nuclear test if it thinks this is necessary in India's supreme national interest."

In the next few weeks, India is also expected to submit a safeguards agreement before the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna. India will make a unilateral statement aimed at reserving its right to expel IAEA inspectors from reactor sites if the U.S., or other fuel suppliers, suspend nuclear fuel shipments for any reason -- including Indian resumption of testing. Indian officials are also likely to plead for nuclear fuel supply guarantees so the country can stockpile uranium fuel against future nuclear fuel supplier cutoffs that might occur -- again, following a future nuclear test. If, as expected, no IAEA board member or NSG country objects to these Indian statements, India will construe the silence as assent.

The U.S. State Department is quite aware of these views. It's a key reason why late last year, State pleaded with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs not to release the Department's unclassified answers to whether or not the Executive believed the deal required the U.S. to cut off nuclear supplies to India if it tests; if the Department thought India could stockpile U.S. nuclear fuel to reduce U.S. influence on Indian nuclear testing policies; and precisely what kind of safeguards India must agree to. Oddly, the Committee agreed to keep State's answers under wraps. This suggests American diplomats want India to think it can test with impunity while it is telling Congress India can't.

But there's more: Earlier this year, Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee suggested India "delink" finalizing the U.S. nuclear deal from getting the IAEA and the NSG approvals. His idea was to get the U.S. to convince the IAEA and NSG to allow India to do business with any nuclear supplier state. This would then allow India to import Russian and French nuclear goods, instead of American goods which would be laden with troublesome nonproliferation conditions.

His pitch was more than hype. The U.S. actually has been twisting arms at the NSG, threatening to leave and so dissolve the group if countries critical of the India deal did not fall into line on India. Also, as a practical matter, U.S. reactor sales to India won't happen even if New Delhi refuses to buy Russian or French. Why? No private U.S. nuclear firm would risk doing business with India until it establishes a sufficient amount of Indian nuclear damage liability coverage. Given India's horrific experience with the American-built Union Carbine chemical-plant accident at Bhopal, when this will occur is anybody's guess.
* * *

All of which raises the question, if this "peaceful" nuclear deal isn't to pump up U.S. reactor sales, just what is it about? One could argue that India could use more foreign uranium. It's recently run so low on domestic fuel that it's had to reduce the power production level of its civilian reactors significantly. It also needs foreign uranium because its own uranium production has remained relatively flat, while its civilian and military requirements have risen.

This is where the trouble begins. It turns out that fueling India's civilian reactors with foreign fuel is not all that peaceful. As K. Subrahmanyam, former head of India's National Security Advisory board noted, "Given India's uranium ore crunch . . . it is to India's advantage to categorize as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refueled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons grade plutonium production."

India, however, doesn't need more weapons to keep up with Pakistan; it needs more and better ones to match China. That's why India has been developing intercontinental range ballistic missiles -- weapons that could use more, smaller, lighter, efficient advanced thermonuclear warheads. This, in turn, is why India's hawks are so interested in resuming nuclear testing. That Pakistan is committed to matching India's nuclear progress, is perhaps why New Delhi has yet to ramp up. But once New Delhi has all the uranium it needs for both its civilian and military program, it will surely revisit this.

Unfortunately, glossing over these points is the most the Americans and the Indians now seem willing do. This may be diplomatically clever but strategically, it's spring loaded to produce misunderstanding and tragedy. The U.S. certainly should not finalize the deal until either India agrees it should stop upgrading its arsenal significantly or we clearly decide that we no longer care if it does. For the record, right now just the opposite applies.

Mr. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit research organization in Washington, D.C., and editor of "Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom" (Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Sanjay M » 11 Jul 2008 09:07

I think you guys are forgetting one problem with our Thorium program -- it only generates U233 fuel, and not U235 fuel. So the U233 which it generates can't be used for N-weapons, but only for reactors.
This means that any uranium bombs we want to build have to be made using domestic natural uranium supplies.

Under the 123 Deal, any uranium bombs we want to build still have to be made using domestic natural uranium. But at least we get the foreign natural uranium to make energy with. The advantage is that we can develop expertise in utilization of this natural uranium, so that we can then utilize even our domestic supplies of this stuff more efficiently.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby negi » 11 Jul 2008 09:41

sugriva wrote:
(2) desi thoorium used with videsi uranium is safeguarded. So cannot be used in
unsafeguarded FBR's, thereby kaputing both the thoorium cycle and strategic
independence.

Used none the less...i.e. deal will at least facilitate efficient utlisation of our vast Thorium reserves which currently are underutilised to say the least. As for Unsafegaurded FBR's to be honest how many of such we aim to keep ?
I mean we are not in a race to blow the planet umpteen times , so unless we intend to keep
a substantial no of facilities outside the IAEA safegaurd we should be fine.



6) The cost of separating the civilian and military facilities will be enormous.

1. Please substantiate what costs are we talking about ?
2. Secondly do weigh them against the merits of the deal in the long term.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 11 Jul 2008 09:45

Folks the DDM might say American website put the draft and all that but I bet a $ to donut hole they got first inkling from BRF. What I am saying is the nitty gritty discussion should not be here for jobless NPA will earn their pay trawling through here. So no point in posting full ideas here. Mind you I am not suggesting take it off line. Just keep them to yourself till the dust clears.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Anujan » 11 Jul 2008 11:46

ramana wrote:jash_p, Your last question is very intriguing and I spent last evening talking to one of our members on the very subject. Need to post it in the Geopolitics thread. Thanks, ramana

Ramana-saar,

If I may add, Chini silence cannot be taken to mean India is falling into a trap (as of now). For some reason or the other, chinis seem to believe in behind the scenes action against India lately. For example:
Revealed: how Pak and China didn’t want India at UN high table

New Delhi has obtained “documented evidence” of Beijing acting in concert with Islamabad to stall India’s efforts for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

This runs in the face of Chinese public position of maintaining neutrality and telling New Delhi that it “supports India’s aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations, including the Security Council”.

wonder what manoeuvrings they have in store vis-a-vis IAEA and NSG.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Raja Ram » 11 Jul 2008 12:02

Section 32 is key and should be scrutinised. The way I interpreted that while that IAEA and India will have to jointly agree for a facility to be withdrawn, I think the decision to take a facility out of IAEA safeguard will be and can be taken by India. The jointness part of the decision is only to the extent of determining that all material and equipment supplied under the agreeement has been returned and accounted for to the satisfaction of IAEA. Should there be a dispute in this, the arbitration rules of the agreement provide for enough fall backs.

Also, the provisions that clearly mentions that no unilateral action by IAEA can be done without consulting and giving India an opportunity to sort out the matter of dispute and an overarching statement that this agreement will in no way come in the way of India's technical, economical use of nuclear assets for any other purpose provides enough ammunation for India to take a facility out and deny any access to IAEA post satisfaction of deal commitments in terms of returing/making good fissile material or equipment provided during safeguard period.

Now others here have interpreted it in a different way that can be the most conservative or limiting interpretation from Indian POV. It is not any less valid. But I guess, we all have to recognise that at that point in time it is more the political will of India that will decide which interpretation that we will be able to take.

There is enough in the draft, in my opinion, to let India have the ability to make the right interpretation. Therefore it need not be interpreted that a facility once under safeguard will be in perpetuity.

However, we need to wait for more details that will be there in Additional Protocols and the agreement that is reached in NSG.

Also on a different note on this deal, in my opinion, the Hyde Act is definitely not on. It has to be countered by an Indian Act that specifies that any such national provisions taken by the USG will not be binding on GOI and that GOI will not be bound by any demands arising from this Act. Only what is agreed bilaterally will hold. Furthermore that Act should enshrine that in the case of National Soverignity and National Strategic options being called to question by any interpretation of International Treaties signed by India, the GOI shall withdraw from such treaties and will not be bound by any terms of the treaty.

If the USG can claim that Hyde Act is USG's look out then GOI can claim that such an act is our lookout. So please dont worry. It is not relevant to the topic of this thread so I shall stop here.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby amit » 11 Jul 2008 12:18

Raja Ram wrote: Also on a different note on this deal, in my opinion, the Hyde Act is definitely not on. It has to be countered by an Indian Act that specifies that any such national provisions taken by the USG will not be binding on GOI and that GOI will not be bound by any demands arising from this Act. Only what is agreed bilaterally will hold. Furthermore that Act should enshrine that in the case of National Soverignity and National Strategic options being called to question by any interpretation of International Treaties signed by India, the GOI shall withdraw from such treaties and will not be bound by any terms of the treaty.

If the USG can claim that Hyde Act is USG's look out then GOI can claim that such an act is our lookout. So please dont worry. It is not relevant to the topic of this thread so I shall stop here.


Raja Ram,

I happen to agree to the need for an Indian Act on the lines you outline. But I'm curious to know when do you think would be a good time to enact such an Act?

Personally I think the best time for such an Act would be after the NSG process not before. An Act on such lines before the IAEA-NSG stages would IMO only give more ammunition to the NPA-China lobby to raise a ruckus - aimed at the fence sitters. Also, after the NSG gives India that much more clarity on what should be the wording of such an Act, again IMO.

It would be interesting to know what's your take on this.

Thanks.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Raja Ram » 11 Jul 2008 15:35

amit,

At this stage it is better that we pass this after the NSG and US Congress vote. But it has been my contention that the government missed the plot precisely here. They should have let go of their partisan and really stupid attitude towards the BJP and other NDA allies and taken them in the consensus process from the word go. Instead he trusted the left communists who I am convinced are not acting in the best interests of our country.

Manmohan Singh reached out to ABV and Brajesh late and still does not want to talk to Advani. This superior than thou small mindedness has caused Indian a lot of heartburn and disonnance.

Anyway let us keep to the thread focus on the draft and not discuss further on this here on this thread.

ramana- sorry for this digression.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sanjaychoudhry » 11 Jul 2008 17:17

Translated from Dainik Jagaran of today:

All Apprehensions have been Proved Right, PM’s Assurances were Deceptive
By Arun Shourie

This is nothing but a brazen betrayal. A complete going back on one’s promise. It was only two or three days ago that Indian foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee had told us that he has spoken to prime minister Manmohan Singh. The government is going to observe all parliamentary niceties and uphold its traditions. The government will approach International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only after it has passed the majority test in the Parliament.

But now we find that the government has already given a draft of the agreement to the IAEA. Neither did UPA government show it to the people of India, nor to the opposition. Even those upon whose crutches the government has been limping along till now never got to see a glimpse of the draft.

Information about the draft, when finally released, got released in America, not in India! This is nothing but betrayal of the people of India. A minority government simply has no right to proceed on its own on such an important international agreement.

Now the draft that has come before us has proved that all our apprehensions and doubts were correct. Whatever assurances that the Prime Minister had given to the country and the parliament were nothing but a bluff. I have said it before that this agreement is nothing more than a way to impose upon India the terms and conditions that are meant for non-nuclear states of the world.

The terms given in IAEA’s information circular 66 which are meant to be applicable to non-nuclear powers of the world are being imposed upon India through this agreement – even the wording of both is exactly the same with absolutely no changes! The prime minister used to tell us that there will be an “India-specific special agreement” with the IAEA. But here we can see nothing special at all. American secretary of state Condoleza Rice had told the American Congress that she wants to bind India under Circular 66 of the IAEA. This is exactly what is happening.

It is quite distressing the way a huge and nuclear-capable country such as India is being treated at the international stage. There are five recognized nuclear powers in the world. They operate about 500 nuclear reactors. Only five of these are under the supervision of the IAEA. In contrast, India has agreed to put 14 of its 22 reactors under IAEA safe guards! Not only this, American president George Bush is on record saying that the Manmohan Singh government has assured him that 90 percent of Indian nuclear reactors will be brought under the IAEA supervision in the near future.

Our hands are being tied forever through this agreement. Our reactors have an enrichment capacity of over 60 kilograms. In this scenario, IAEA inspectors can visit them anytime and as many times as they want in a year to inspect them.

It is very worrisome that under the draft of the agreement, not only 14 civil reactors but also 35 Indian institutions engaged in nuclear research and development have come under the IAEA supervision. It says in clause 117 of the draft that not only the nuclear reactors but every institution that receives nuclear fuel will also come under the ambit of the IAEA inspectors.

According to the interpretation of clause 127, this includes all institutions engaged in R&D in the area of nuclear technology. If our institutions are doing research to develop or further improve nuclear weapons, then too the IAEA inspectors will have a right to visit them any time for inspections.

The Hyde Act related to nuclear agreement with the US clearly says that the end objective of this deal is to first roll back and then totally kill India’s nuclear capability.

It is being said that if India wants, it can walk out of the agreement anytime. According to the conditions of the agreement, if Indian tests a nuclear bomb or rescinds the agreement, America and other countries of the nuclear suppliers group will have the right to take back from India everything they have given to us such as nuclear reactors, components and fuel.

Anil Kakodkar, the head of our nuclear energy commission, had told me that he will never give his nod to the agreement if it does not permit India to maintain a strategic fuel reserve. But in the 123 agreement signed with the US, presidential candidate Barak Obama moved a clause that took away precisely this right from India.

We are to be allowed only as much nuclear fuel as is required to run the reactors and no more. It is easy to understand what kind of a trap has been laid out for us. Not only this, we will be promised the limited nuclear fuel to run our reactors only after we have signed on the dotted line of the agreement.

It is argued that even China has done a similar agreement with the US. However, there is a difference. In the agreement with China, it is clearly written that no national law of the two countries can make any changes or modifications to the 123 Act. This is not the case with the agreement that is being signed by India. That is why the Hyde Act becomes very important for us.

The agreement states that if the supply of nuclear fuel to India is interrupted for any reason, India will have the right to take alternative measures. This is precisely what we want to ask the government. What will India do in a situation where the supply of nuclear fuel is blocked for any reason after we have signed the agreement?


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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 11 Jul 2008 20:00

Rajaram, I too was thinking of that line of action but after the US approval of the 123 just as you are thinking. I guess that old legal gene runs thru us both!.

While I agree that the deal could have been coordinated better and the expectations managed better I am of the opinion that the GOI did the right thing by lettig the US pass their Hyde Act which has all the bile and venom (halahal) of the NPA and the Stratergy community towards India. If the India-US 123 does not have the same language as the PRC-US 123 with respect to inapplicability of domestic laws to the agreement, then India should pass her Jekyll Act. This would ensure reciprocity. Doing it before that would stymie the whole process. First the US has to move from its rigid stance and that Hyde does with all kinds of HiranyaKashaypa conditions. How I miss the steady hand of P.V. Narasimha rao garu.

Meanwhile about managing expectations:

Pioneer, 12 July 2008

Safeguards text has nothing India-specific

Shobori Ganguli | New Delhi

Red-faced over the orchestrated "leak" of the text of India's safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Wednesday night across more than 40 international websites, the Ministry of External Affairs officially put the same on its website on Thursday.

While supporters of the deal have looked for "concessions" in the draft, the fine print reveals that the Agreement will pin India to a strict non-proliferation regime with stringent action in case of default. Additionally, while the text is specific about IAEA safeguards in perpetuity, it holds little assurance for India on fuel supply in perpetuity.

Unlike the impression created in July 2005 -- that the IAEA would accord special status to India with India-specific safeguards -- the Agreement in its current form strongly resembles all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states, not acknowledging India as a nuclear power.

As for the "corrective measures" India can take in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies, those against the deal in the US and those for it in India have interpreted this phrase as granting India de facto right to block some of its civilian nuclear facilities from IAEA oversight in order to employ the same for fissile weapons material manufacture. The IAEA text does not provide such licence.

A worried Daryl Kimball,( :(( er) executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, has been quoted as saying, "The board should ask what 'corrective measures' are supposed to mean...It could mean 'we will withdraw from safeguards those facilities that we need to withdraw from and we will use in those facilities other, unsupervised fuel sources.'" :(( :(( :((

Contesting this belief, Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research says, "corrective measures" is merely a "cosmetic reference" in the preamble of the Agreement, which in fact denies India the right to take any such measures. Pointing to the 123 agreement with the US which instead of granting

India the right to take corrective measures in the event of fuel supply disruption, merely said New Delhi should seek such a right with the IAEA, Chellaney says "no such right has been secured in definable terms" in the agreement.

The preamble says, "India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." Asserting it is a question of "may" and not "shall", Chellaney says India has no "legal entitlement."

Indeed, while the text dwells at length on the make-up of the safeguards regime complete with IAEA inspections and reports, it does not elaborate on India's rights in case of fuel disruption. What is apparent instead is that under the safeguards agreement India will find it difficult, if not impossible, to walk away from its non-proliferation commitments.

Chellaney says, "Under no circumstance will India be allowed to withdraw from its safeguard obligations, which are legally immutable." He adds that the accord "paves way for the IAEA inspectors to enforce safeguards with the same stringency applicable to non-nuclear weapons states."

As for guaranteed fuel supply, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's assurance to Parliament, linking perpetual IAEA inspections to perpetual fuel supply, has been turned on its head. Nowhere does the text guarantee life-long fuel supplies. Chellaney feels India has "willingly forfeited" its right to perpetual supply by agreeing "to remain powerless in a Tarapur-style fuel cut-off situation."

Admittedly the preamble says India's concurrence with IAEA safeguards would depend on international agreements on India's guaranteed "access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors".

However, the text is silent on both "fuel supply" and a "strategic reserve of nuclear fuel". Dismissing their "ornamental reference," Chellaney says, "The harsh truth is that no such international arrangements have thus far been concluded." Therefore, it in no way ties the IAEA to an assured fuel supply to India.

As for safeguards in perpetuity, the accord, like the 123 agreement, is in consonance with the Hyde Act which says the US Congress will ratify the deal only after India and the IAEA reach an agreement "requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973) to India's civil nuclear facilities..."

Although GOV/1621 is not a public document, Chellaney says its stipulation is well-known -- that facility-specific safeguards shall be "in perpetuity", allowing for "no suspension of international safeguards and shutting out room for corrective measures."

At a whopping cost of 1.2 million euro annually for each facility -- India will open up 14 facilities -- India has committed a high price, albeit to be shared by the IAEA.

In effect, Chellaney feels "India has agreed to be subject to rigorous safeguards, not the token inspections the IAEA carries out in nuclear weapon states."


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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby John Snow » 11 Jul 2008 20:13

1) 'In every agreement there is a built in disagreement'
2) 'In real world all agreements are only arrangements'
3) Agreements are between unequals, between equals it only a truce before the agreement fails’
4) 'Agreements are never meant to be implemented or followed, only to be interpreted and Violated '
5) 'Justice is seldom derived from agreements, its merely imposed'

Pancha Sheel of Spinster

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 11 Jul 2008 21:18

Section 32 is key and should be scrutinised. The way I interpreted that while that IAEA and India will have to jointly agree for a facility to be withdrawn, I think the decision to take a facility out of IAEA safeguard will be and can be taken by India. The jointness part of the decision is only to the extent of determining that all material and equipment supplied under the agreeement has been returned and accounted for to the satisfaction of IAEA. Should there be a dispute in this, the arbitration rules of the agreement provide for enough fall backs.


You need to go one step further. Possible scenarios:

1) Imported reactor and imported fuel
2) Imported reactor and Indian fuel
3) Indian reactor and imported fuel
4) Indian reactor and Indian fuel

32 does not apply for #4 for sure, and, #1 means returning everything. #2 is really useless ...... dismantling reactor, etc. So, really only #3 makes sense .......... just return the fuel and use Indian fuel.

Per AKs slides, he proposes, starting 2020, that Indian FBRs use reprocessed fuel from imported LWRs. Once they all come up to speed and India can breed and use "Indian" atoms, DAE can then remove the imported fuel and use only Indian fuel in Indian reactors.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Raja Ram » 11 Jul 2008 21:21

spinster,

We should frame that in gold and hang it in MEA and every ministry. Absolutely brilliant panch sheel with punch!

Good to see you back at your best in summing up things. Otherwise we get spun around.

ramana - The draft agreement is half full or half empty, depending on how you look at it. Reading Arun Shourie it is confirms our worst fears. But the in details is the devil, so watch out for additional protocols. We need a stithapragyna like PVN or even ABV now. Manmohan has a view of India as a power like Japan, therein lies the problem.Topic for another thread.

One thing though, if this deal goes thro' it will be a mortal blow to the entire NPT edifice, and its noxious sons - CTBT and FMCT, both arrangements are the biggest attempted gang rape against India.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 11 Jul 2008 21:43

R^2 wrote:ramana - The draft agreement is half full or half empty, depending on how you look at it. Reading Arun Shourie it is confirms our worst fears. But the in details is the devil, so watch out for additional protocols. We need a stithapragyna like PVN or even ABV now. Manmohan has a view of India as a power like Japan, therein lies the problem.Topic for another thread.

One thing though, if this deal goes thro' it will be a mortal blow to the entire NPT edifice, and its noxious sons - CTBT and FMCT, both arrangements are the biggest attempted gang rape against India.


I am now convinced that only MMS colud have pulled this deal off. The West wouldnt offer it to a Rajiv/Rahul or an LKA and definitely not Karat. The reason is MMS protrays the image of a weak doddering leader but has stiff inner core. And the office of the PM of India has its own dynamics and the mantle shapes the person who bears it.

Folks might not agree but the weak coalition dynamics was the reason for MMS to be able to get the half full glass. It would have been no glass. Its upto India what it makes with the half full glass. Do we want to whine about the half empty or go ahead and make use of the half full. Recall Rahu Ketu needed only the drops and what did Lankeshwar achieve with the empty pot!

I dont see it as the end of the three and four letter treaties but as the remaking of anew world order for the new century. It needs new structures and that is what is happeneing. The old structure had a false premise. Churchillian world view that relegated India to the paraiah status. Thats changing incrementally as India is showing its viablity and vitality. We could have our Barak moment had the INC stalwarts had eschewed DIEnasty politics and supported Jagjivan Ram.

But gatham gathah! On to the new century. If INC targets Mayawati can write off the second chance.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 11 Jul 2008 21:59

Giovanni Tushar:

Pls add: (to the tune of "In Serenity You Find Truth")
In Ambiguity Lies Infinite Baksheesh
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby John Snow » 11 Jul 2008 22:24

Raja Ram garu Thanks.

Narayanan
What you say is already covered by Guru Sankara of Kaladi in Nirvana Shatakam, I dare not approach Sankara they way I approach Narayanan

" Seelam enthyana viduva jalannu raaa...

Nee Siva diksha paru ralanu ra....

Siva siva guru vakhya meeranu raa

Nee Siva diskha paru ralanu ra'

Javali sung by S Janaki ( The rasikas of carnatic music will understand the dvaitha philosphy behind this song , those who have initiation to Telugu will even more appreciate the romantic and Bakthi bhavana. All the more it breaks the monopoly of narayanan about romantic tunes!)

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Arun_S » 11 Jul 2008 22:27

ramana wrote: We could have our Barak moment had the INC stalwarts had eschewed DIEnasty politics and supported Jagjivan Ram.

Fully agree.

But gatham gathah! On to the new century. If INC targets Mayawati can write off the second chance.

That is indeed Brahma Satya.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Arun_S » 11 Jul 2008 22:32

BJP steps up opposition on N-deal
11 Jul 2008, 1934 hrs IST,PTI
NEW DELHI: BJP on Friday stepped up its opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal alleging "sweeping" military and defence implications of the draft India specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The main opposition also sought to poke holes in government claims that India has been given a favoured status by the US and said it was a routine agreement with any non-nuclear state.

Addressing reporters here, party spokesperson Ravi Shankar Prasad claimed the draft also undermined the nuclear weapon state status of the country.

"It is not an India specific agreement. It is a routine agreement and India has not been treated as a Nuclear Weapon state," he said.

The agreement, if materialised will have sweeping implications on India's military and defence programme, he added.

BJP claimed that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's assurance to the Parliament on March 7 last year has not been honoured as per the draft.

"There is nothing like what the Prime Minister had assured. His assurances have not been honoured by his own government. There is no clause to ensure perpetual supply of fuel," Prasad said.

The Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) can block the supply anytime and no remedial measure is being defined in the draft, he added.

The saffron party also claimed that the draft "lacks clarity on how India can come out of the deal."

The party would be coming out with a structured response on the draft later, Prasad said.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 11 Jul 2008 22:34

I dont see it as the end of the three and four letter treaties but as the remaking of anew world order for the new century.


if this deal goes thro' it will be a mortal blow to the entire NPT edifice, and its noxious sons - CTBT and FMCT,


Said this before, it is called GNEP. Only in GNEP there will be no FBRs, Indian for sure. Which is what AK is fighting when he says three-stage is a must for India.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby svinayak » 11 Jul 2008 22:35

ramana wrote:

I am now convinced that only MMS colud have pulled this deal off. The West wouldnt offer it to a Rajiv/Rahul or an LKA and definitely not Karat. The reason is MMS protrays the image of a weak doddering leader but has stiff inner core. And the office of the PM of India has its own dynamics and the mantle shapes the person who bears it.

Folks might not agree but the weak coalition dynamics was the reason for MMS to be able to get the half full glass. It would have been no glass. Its upto India what it makes with the half full glass. Do we want to whine about the half empty or go ahead and make use of the half full. Recall Rahu Ketu needed only the drops and what did Lankeshwar achieve with the empty pot!

This is precisely where the problem is. It would be dangerous if the agreement is based on personality and few small groups.
It is not based on the country and its people or a large social group which represent the country.
Temporary images do not matter but long term national interest matters.
Temporary images do not fool the other party and they can easily change the terms of the agreement to restrict the country.

Your post reveals that they are doing social engineering using this deal on a massive scale on the country.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 11 Jul 2008 22:49

Quoting Mr. Shourie:
It says in clause 117 of the draft that not only the nuclear reactors but every institution that receives nuclear fuel will also come under the ambit of the IAEA inspectors.

According to the interpretation of clause 127, this includes all institutions engaged in R&D in the area of nuclear technology. If our institutions are doing research to develop or further improve nuclear weapons, then too the IAEA inspectors will have a right to visit them any time for inspections.

As I see it, the draft agreement is not "half-empty", but articles such as Mr. Shourie's are certainly less than half true.

It is not "every institution that receives nuclear fuel". It is "every institution that receives IMPORTED, SAFEGUARDED nuclear fuel MEANT FOR CIVILIAN USE". Article length limits forced Mr. Shourie to delete that important qualifier? Or did lack of honesty force it?

Likewise, he says: "If our institutions are doing research to develop or further improve nuclear weapons, then too the IAEA inspectors will have a right to visit them any time for inspections."

I don't see that. If an institution that RECEIVES IMPORTED / SAFEGUARDED FUEL meant for CIVILIAN USE, AND IS VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO IAEA BY INDIA, then yes, inspections will occur. Can Mr. Shourie not see the difference?

The willingness of people like Mr. Shourie and Mr. Chellaney to use misleading and arguably dishonest tactics in their articles, is what gives them a bad name, and reduces them to the stature of the NonProllotullahs. Very unfortunate.

Is there any reason why the writings of these persons should not be subjected to the same level of examination that the draft agreement text is subjected to? Are they so arrogant that they imagine that no one will dare to do that? Or do they just not care and would rather mislead the Indian people?

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby svinayak » 11 Jul 2008 23:01

Critics always have the upper hand since they did not start first

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 11 Jul 2008 23:05

I would think the Opposition should express their confidence on the price rise issue, inflation etc and keep this matter out of discusssions. Its not appropriate yet.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby John Snow » 11 Jul 2008 23:09

Time to take out P and add two PP by all Ps

Meaning Time to take out Politics and make it "Power to the People" by all Parties.

The PM has done what he has done ( as ramana garu said) now mocha ka faida uttao.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 11 Jul 2008 23:18

Indian mind and body politic is too complex to do social engineering. If it succeeds with one group there is another group waitng to be engineered. And meantime the earlier engineered group finds out the realities or exigencies of power and gets back to technician level.

Anyway the next hurdle is the NSG waiver which I bet will be also clean and on to US Cogress approval of the 123 so that this draft can be put into force and the Annex 1 populated. if the US Congress 123 has riders then the draft wont be implemented. The crux will come in the bi/multi-lateral agreements and the Additional protocols negotiated. I dont know if its per facility or what? When US/Blond Knights negotiate their version it will have all sorts of stuff in it. The remedy is not to buy that stuff.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 11 Jul 2008 23:45

This is again where the catch really is. Surely they have thought through what happens when the NSG says OK - after that it is a dog-eat-dog between the "Al-Lies"? The advantage then will be with the buyer, so I expect some serious IEDs in the road.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby pradeepe » 12 Jul 2008 00:00

I would assume some India-US deal will be announced before the NSG votes it up or down.
Is the MRCA contract at that stage yet?

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Abhijit » 12 Jul 2008 00:24

IMVHO it is very essential for stalwarts like BC and Shourie to play the bad cop. Somebody has to. We should never be gung-ho, at least overtly, about a deal that we can see is only 'half-glass'. From a long forgotten class I took, a deal is good when all the parties feel equally exploited and are up in arms but not ready to ditch the deal.
jmtnp

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Sai » 12 Jul 2008 00:43

narayanan wrote:

It is not "every institution that receives nuclear fuel". It is "every institution that receives IMPORTED, SAFEGUARDED nuclear fuel MEANT FOR CIVILIAN USE". Article length limits forced Mr. Shourie to delete that important qualifier? Or did lack of honesty force it?



It's very disappointing to see this come from Shourie. I'd attribute it to a careless reading of the draft agreement than to dishonesty. He seems to have forgetten 11(f) when he read 117 & 127.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 12 Jul 2008 00:46

narayanan wrote:Quoting Mr. Shourie:
It says in clause 117 of the draft that not only the nuclear reactors but every institution that receives nuclear fuel will also come under the ambit of the IAEA inspectors.

According to the interpretation of clause 127, this includes all institutions engaged in R&D in the area of nuclear technology. If our institutions are doing research to develop or further improve nuclear weapons, then too the IAEA inspectors will have a right to visit them any time for inspections.

As I see it, the draft agreement is not "half-empty", but articles such as Mr. Shourie's are certainly less than half true.

It is not "every institution that receives nuclear fuel". It is "every institution that receives IMPORTED, SAFEGUARDED nuclear fuel MEANT FOR CIVILIAN USE". Article length limits forced Mr. Shourie to delete that important qualifier? Or did lack of honesty force it?

Likewise, he says: "If our institutions are doing research to develop or further improve nuclear weapons, then too the IAEA inspectors will have a right to visit them any time for inspections."

I don't see that. If an institution that RECEIVES IMPORTED / SAFEGUARDED FUEL meant for CIVILIAN USE, AND IS VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO IAEA BY INDIA, then yes, inspections will occur. Can Mr. Shourie not see the difference?

The willingness of people like Mr. Shourie and Mr. Chellaney to use misleading and arguably dishonest tactics in their articles, is what gives them a bad name, and reduces them to the stature of the NonProllotullahs. Very unfortunate.

Is there any reason why the writings of these persons should not be subjected to the same level of examination that the draft agreement text is subjected to? Are they so arrogant that they imagine that no one will dare to do that? Or do they just not care and would rather mislead the Indian people?


In fact this from #70:

70. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in a research and
development facility shall be that specified in the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement for the
total amount of material in the facility.


Although just looking at 127:

127. “Research and development facility” means a facility, other than a principal nuclear facility,
used for research or development in the field of nuclear energy.


one could ................

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Rangudu » 12 Jul 2008 00:58

Even bad cops cannot afford to lose credibility by misstating facts.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sanjaychoudhry » 12 Jul 2008 01:02

Biraders, don't crucify Mr. Shourie. I have translated his article from Hindi to English, and some things may have got lost in translation, though I have translated the thing precisely word by word taking great care, but one is never sure. I had no idea you would be concentrating on every word and turn of the phrase .... otherwise I would have been double careful.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby putnanja » 12 Jul 2008 01:06

Parsing the India-specific safeguards agreement news analysis

Parsing the India-specific safeguards agreement news analysis

Siddharth Varadarajan

The draft text negotiated with the IAEA places the country mid-way between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in terms of its rights and obligations.

By going about its business of approaching the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency for approval of India’s safeguards agreement with stealth and even subterfuge, the United Progressive Alliance government has scored a political own-goal which is likely to detract from the debate over the contents of the safeguards text itself.

This is unfortunate because the 23-page document, negotiated over five rounds of meetings between India and the IAEA Secretariat, contains much that is worthy of comment and analysis. The bulk of the technical aspects of the document — especially on safeguards procedures — with one or two important exceptions is virtually a carbon copy of the provisions found in the Agency’s template document for site-specific safeguards in a non-nuclear weapon state (Infcirc 66/Rev.2). But it is in the crucial provisions dealing with (1) what is to be safeguarded and for how long, and (2) the purpose and objective of the safeguards agreement and the conditions under which it is operative, that the draft takes on an “India-specific” character that is radically different from the ones applicable to NNWSs.

If the non-nuclear weapon states have virtually no rights and only obligations vis-À-vis the IAEA and the five official nuclear weapons states have only rights and virtually no obligations, India has negotiated for itself a position more or less in between. As a country with nuclear weapons voluntarily offering some civilian facilities for safeguards, it has many more rights and fewer obligations than an NNWS; at the same time, it has fewer rights than an NWS and certainly more obligations.
Scope and structure

Broadly speaking, rather than islanding its military nuclear sector and placing every other nuclear facility under safeguards, the Indian agreement essentially offers an island of self-defined facilities drawn from its civilian sector for potential safeguarding. And that too only if India feels that by doing so the “implementation of relevant bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party” are fulfilled (Art. 13, 14 and 5).

In other words, safeguards are being accepted by India pursuant to these arrangements and for no other reason. The preamble invokes an article of the IAEA statute authorising it to “apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State to any of the State’s activities in the field of atomic energy.” In this context, it notes “the relevance for this agreement” of the Indo-U.S. joint statement of July 2005 in which India “has stated its willingness to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner,” file a Declaration with the IAEA regarding its civilian nuclear facilities and “place voluntarily” those civilian facilities under safeguards.

The most important part of the Agreement from the perspective of international law is the preambular assertion that “an essential basis of India’s concurrence to accept Agency safeguards” is (1) the conclusion of international arrangements for the uninterrupted and continuous access to nuclear fuel, and (2) support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel. The same section of the preamble also notes that “India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear facilities in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.”

This condition, which first began life as a unilateral assertion by India in its separation plan of March 2006 and was subsequently accorded political recognition by the U.S. in the 123 agreement, emerges here as a legally binding condition upon which the entire edifice of the Safeguards Agreement is constructed.

While non-proliferation activists abroad have denounced these provisions, a controversy has arisen within India about the inclusion of these phrases in the preambular rather than the operational section of the agreement. The government’s critics say that since “corrective measures” are not mentioned anywhere other than the preamble, they are not “legally binding.” The government insists this makes no difference. In reality, the truth probably lies in between.

The preamble is an integral part of the agreement and cannot be separated from the operational section without the latter part losing its entire context. In the Indian case, the legal linkage between the preambular and operational section is made stronger by stating at the end of the preamble: “Now, therefore, taking into account the above, India and the Agency have agreed as follows:” No Infcirc/153 preamble contains the words “taking into account the above.”

For non-nuclear weapons states, the need for a safeguards agreement stems from their obligations under the NPT. For India, the need arises from its bilateral and multilateral arrangements and the understandings therein. Thus, the context in which the need for safeguards arises is absolutely crucial here. The application of safeguards is conditional on the implementation of these arrangements. Thus the linkage between preamble and operational text is tighter than in other legal contexts.

At the same time, it is a fact that Indian negotiators had initially sought to insert the right to take corrective measures in at least four different places. As the talks with the IAEA Secretariat progressed, this was whittled down to the reference that remains, which the Indian negotiators felt was sufficient. As a result, the right to take corrective measures comes in implicitly, through the conditions precedent to the need for safeguards. If India were ever to invoke these measures, it would no doubt face flak (depending on what those measures were) but it would nevertheless have a legal leg to stand on.

Given the controversy over these provisions, a concern has arisen about what India could do if it is suddenly denied access to nuclear fuel for its imported and indigenously produced civilian reactors. Would safeguards remain in force “in perpetuity” even if fuel supplies are cut off? Though the word “perpetuity” does not figure in the agreement, the answer is ‘yes’ in the case of imported reactors since lifetime safeguards are written into Article 29’s reference to “termination of safeguards” being implemented “taking into account the provisions of GOV/1621.”

GOV/1621 was a document introduced by the IAEA in 1973 with two principal provisions. The first has to do with continuation of safeguards on safeguardable material, the duration of which it extends to the time such material needs to be safeguarded. The second aspect is termination. The Hyde Act introduced the reference to this document in order to define the perpetuity safeguards that India had agreed to in March 2006 in such a way as to prevent India from removing imported facilities from IAEA supervision. However, non-supplied facilities — that is, those that India indigenously manufactures and voluntarily offers for safeguards — will be subjected to safeguards only as long as they use imported fuel. In other words, India does not even need to invoke its separate right to corrective measures; the protection here is in-built. This provision provides a major incentive for the international community to ensure continuity of fuel supplies for these reactors.

The problem of ensuring operating continuity for imported reactors in case of a supplier reneging on a commitment remains. In principle, India may invoke its right to take corrective measures but any “retaliatory” step can at best serve as a pressure tactic; it cannot provide fuel where none exists. With the ghost of Tarapur always fresh in its mind, India in recent years has sought to protect itself from this possibility in various ways. The Kudankulam safeguards agreement covering imported VVER reactors from Russia, for example, provides for lifetime fuel supply under a sovereign guarantee of the Russian Federation. The safeguards agreement goes one step further by establishing a template wherein fuel supply guarantees are an essential part of any transfer to India of safeguarded reactors with the added layer of protection provided by the corrective measures envisaged in the preamble. Suppliers who are not able to provide such a guarantee or deal with the possibility of India invoking its right to corrective measures will find the country unwilling to buy their wares.

In any event, the safeguards agreement provides for India to report to the IAEA without delay “any disruption of operation of [safeguarded] facilities on account of material violation or breach of bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party” (Art. 52 (c)). Articles 105 and 106 allow India to raise these violations directly with the IAEA Board. This is clearly a reference to the eventuality — mentioned in Article 14 of the U.S.-India 123 Agreement — on ‘termination and cessation of cooperation’ by the United States. Some critics in India had noted the absence of a reference to the supremacy of international law in the 123 agreement in the event of unilateral termination of supplies by the U.S. A fix has been attempted in the Safeguards Agreement in Article 10 — a provision not found in standard safeguards agreements for NNWSs — when it states, “Nothing in this Agreement shall affect other rights and obligations of India under international law.”

The safeguards agreement represents an attempt to tie down the political commitments of July 2005 and March 2006 into a legal framework in which India has clearly defined rights. Some of these rights are explicit, others are implicit. But as with any legal regime, implementation of the agreement in a manner consistent with India’s expectations and interests will depend on a range of political factors, including both the attitude of the international community and the willingness of future governments in India to assert the country’s rights when the chips are down.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby putnanja » 12 Jul 2008 01:07

BJP’s ‘questions’ on IAEA draft

NEW DELHI: The Bharatiya Janata Party on Friday posed “some questions” related to the draft agreement India proposes to sign with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), starting with its criticism that the agency does not recognise India as a nuclear weapon State.

“No special status is being given to India as a nuclear weapon State,” BJP spokesperson Ravi Shankar Prasad said. He claimed the proposed agreement was “in the same format as agreements the agency has signed [in the past] with non-nuclear weapon States”.

Ignoring the specific reference on page 2 of the draft agreement to India’s right “to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities” and its sole discretion to decide which of its facilities it wants to place under safeguards, Mr. Prasad said the proposed agreement would “cap India’s military nuclear programme.”

The draft agreement, however, makes it clear that the IAEA would implement safeguards in a manner as “not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by India independent of this Agreement for its own purposes.”

And, in a joint statement on the issue made by BJP leaders Yashwant Sinha and Arun Shourie on August 4 last year, they admitted that at least 10 per cent, if not more, nuclear reactors would remain outside the safeguards agreement. In short, India would be free to use these reactors for furthering its nuclear military programme.
Apprehensions

Mr. Prasad expressed the BJP’s apprehensions on the question of fuel supplies to India’s nuclear reactors although the draft agreement clearly states that “an essential basis for India’s concurrence to accept Agency [IAEA] safeguards” is “international cooperation” in creating conditions that would allow India “to obtain access to the international [nuclear] fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations” to support India’s effort to develop “a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel …”

The party felt this would not ensure continuous supply.

Mr. Prasad wanted to know what “corrective measures” India could take if promises of fuel supply for the lifetime of a reactor were violated. The “corrective measures” have not been spelt out in the draft agreement, he said.


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