Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

enqyoob
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2658
Joined: 06 Jul 2008 20:25

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 14 Jul 2008 22:59

Thats the Draft agreement id number.


Ramana, where do you see that on the document? What I see is GOV_2008_30. IOW, do we have the right document? The one I have is what I downloaded from the link on your first post in this thread.

Acharya, the precise text of the China 1988 agreement and the India draft agreement 2008 is posted (see link given by shiv, or on the SRR thread). Please refer arguments to what is in there, or please indicate where else they are given, thanks! They do say in the China agreement that it is with a NWS, and is hence different from what is signed with a NNWS, (I'll stipulate that, like Perry Mason does), but then compare the agreements themselves.
(Oooooo! I worked so hard to be able to say that! :mrgreen: )

svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14223
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby svinayak » 14 Jul 2008 23:04

narayanan wrote:
Acharya, the precise text of the China 1988 agreement and the India draft agreement 2008 is posted (see link given by shiv, or on the SRR thread). Please refer arguments to what is in there, or please indicate where else they are given, thanks! They do say in the China agreement that it is with a NWS, and is hence different from what is signed with a NNWS, (I'll stipulate that, like Perry Mason does), but then compare the agreements themselves.
(Oooooo! I worked so hard to be able to say that! :mrgreen: )

He He He! I understand your sweat. But my comment was not on the doc but what is accepted fact that India is not a NWS as defined in NPT and P5 as per UNSC. That is all.

Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Gerard » 14 Jul 2008 23:18

NRao wrote:What are those questions referring to?


The alleged betrayal wrt perpetuity.

I'm wondering what the big deal is regarding perpetual safeguards on the 8 PHWRs. The other 6 reactors of the 14 on the civilian list (2 BWRs, 2 VVERs and 2 PHWRs) are already under perpetual safeguards. So 8 more 220 MW reactors get added to the list. Even if they are fuelled by domestic Indian Uranium, does it really matter if they are under safeguards? They are for the production of electricity and any WpnGr production (1/16 of a core?) will be quite modest. Nothing that a single Dhruva clone could not make up for. Or running the 8 military PHWRs with half their cores dedicated for low burnup (if the refuelling robot can indeed handle this). Or better yet, simply building more Dhruvas and more PFBRs.

And why the fuss regarding perpetual safeguards on a civilian research facility. So what? Isn't BARC off limits? Can't personnel be shifted there as needs be? What is the need to revoke safeguards on a civilian facility?

There is a lot of noise about INFCIRC66 safeguards being not applicable to a NWS. That may be so but they are no longer applicable to a NNWS either. They are all under full scope.

There is no NNWS that gets to island off fuel, reactors, reseach facilities, reprocessing plants and enrichment plants for the production of nuclear weapons. India gets to do this with INFCIRC66 type safeguards applying only to its civilian sector.

I don't see what the fuss is about. As long as the addional protocol restricts pursuit into the military facilities and the NSG exemption is clean (no mention of CTBT, FMCT etc), the Hyde act can say anything. I don't understand the criticism of the IAEA agreement. Did people think the IAEA can grant NWS status? Or a seat on the UNSC? Or supply Uranium ? Or negate US laws?
Last edited by Gerard on 14 Jul 2008 23:23, edited 1 time in total.

ldev
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2007
Joined: 06 Nov 2002 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ldev » 14 Jul 2008 23:19

Acharya wrote:
Safeguards that erode security.
The UPA government has ended up with an agreement entirely harmful to the nation's interests
-Bharat Karnad


We have two different take on the same draft. Isn;t it wonderful.
One is a propaganda.



Yes, isnt it a pity that BK is resorting to propaganda. :)

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 17088
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 14 Jul 2008 23:20

Suraj,

Missing the point.

China is attempting to secure supplies first. They are NOT assured about the cost of this supply.

On owning the mines: I suspect it gives them secured supply. NOT cost.

Also, it is interesting that the Oz article states that one of the sources for India is China!!

ldev
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2007
Joined: 06 Nov 2002 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ldev » 14 Jul 2008 23:28

NRao wrote:Suraj,

Missing the point.

China is attempting to secure supplies first. They are NOT assured about the cost of this supply.

On owning the mines: I suspect it gives them secured supply. NOT cost.

Also, it is interesting that the Oz article states that one of the sources for India is China!!


Nobody is assured of the supply of any commodity for any length of time in today's world. Just look at the extraordinary lengths (military and political) the US has gone to for the last 50 years to assure itself and its global trading partners the supply of oil from the Gulf. So its a utopian dream to talk about 100 years assured supply of uranium based on some kind of agreement or guarantee. The real world does not operate on that basis.

Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Gerard » 14 Jul 2008 23:32

With the growing foreign uranium stake (sales, services, fuel supply and commissions) in the economy and polity, India’s testing option will be rendered progressively thin and theoretical


It works the other way too... there will be financial incentives for supplier countries to make only token noises regarding an Indian test. Why jeopardize billions in contracts.....

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 17088
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 14 Jul 2008 23:48

ldev,

I think (not an expert here - getting sucked into something that I was only trying to help out), China is looking at 10-25 years for the time being. Also, they are going in for in-house techs with the help of RU.

Unlike oil, Uranium does lend itself to enrichment that will have more meaning in the longer term I would imagine.

ldev
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2007
Joined: 06 Nov 2002 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ldev » 15 Jul 2008 00:10

NRao,

If you google you will find somewhere global energy consumption by country and global energy production by country, broken down into the 4 main categories i.e. oil, gas, coal and uranium. This big picture will put China's needs into perspective.

India as far as I can see has a very specific game plan in terms of this agreement. At some point of time, India will have to import for about 20-35 years (dont hold me to this time band), uranium to create the stockpile of fissile material to begin large scale activation of its thorium resources. Without this import, India's thorium reserves may as well be dead and dormant (at least from a large scale commercial viability standpoint). The current GOI believes that now is the opportune time for this window to open. Some agree with this and others do not.

Right now, there is no mad scramble for global uranium resources and the current controls are designed for a non proliferation stance. But a time will come when the scramble for uranium will be for power generation. And it is better IMO for India to get its 20-35 year window over and done with before that scramble starts. (And I believe that China will be a big part of that scramble). And so that India will by then be set on the thorium route with a assured domestic supply of fertile material and an adequately large stockpile of fissile material to fuel the thorium.

So... that is all that India needs, that window... and it is ludicrous to talk about 100 years. That is irrelevant. But it is feasible to talk about some kind of control via ownership and other forms of political influence into countries which have the required uranium resources such as Niger, Namibhia or Kazhakstan under the current global political infrastructure so that the vulnerabilites when that window is open for 20-35 years are mitigated to some degree.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 55358
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 15 Jul 2008 00:18

narayanan, Sorry the GOV 1621 document you wanted is an older restricted document issued in 1973. I was mistaken that it was this draft.

The Uranium shortage is being used to open the window on getting out of NPT restrictions.

Usual design life of reactors pressure vessels is 40 years. 100 years is more than double that.

Suraj
Forum Moderator
Posts: 14413
Joined: 20 Jan 2002 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Suraj » 15 Jul 2008 00:25

NRao: Let me clarify - you might have some degree of assurance on supply, or you might be able to assure cost to a limited extent - in each case, in terms of amount and duration. But you will not be able to guarantee either, and certainly not both, particularly not in view of the long term.

Further, it's not clear to me how a theoretical supply assurance is of any use if you can't pay for the supply.

Everyone would like to assure supplies of energy sources. That's been a continuous effort regardless of what the primary energy source is - coal, oil or uranium. Even so, it doesn't prevent supplier cartels from forming. If we were a supplier of a valued energy source, I'd see us as just as inclined to form a supplier cartel.

Note that I'm not suggesting there's nothing we can do. It's not a bad idea to obtain stakes in ore mines where we can. It doesn't necessarily mean we are guaranteed supplies for 10-20 years. Has anyone researched the current dynamics of the uranium trade ? What is the dominant means of purchase ? Spot ? 6-month or 12-month contracts ?

enqyoob
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2658
Joined: 06 Jul 2008 20:25

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 15 Jul 2008 00:26

ramana: From the China (1988) and present India draft, I get the sense that both are driven by impending doom for the NPT. The China document is very clearly driven by panic over Chinese transfers to TSP and other places, which threatened to blow the cover off the NPT and leave it nanga. The India one also comes at a time when the NPT is falling apart, with Iran and North Korea situations (if anyone believes the NoKo charade of de-nuclearizing, I have a few bridges on which they can buy options). In 1988 they needed some fig-leaf to say that China was a "responsible member of NPT" whereas now cooperation with India is the way forward to salvage an NPT-2. I don't say this in the "NPT is bad for India" sense. Many people see a new NPT as the only hope to avoid global nuclear war.

Suraj
Forum Moderator
Posts: 14413
Joined: 20 Jan 2002 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Suraj » 15 Jul 2008 00:40

I posted the China safeguards agreement on the nuke thread:
Suraj wrote:I believe these are the relevant IAEA safeguards agreement documents with respect to China. I posted it here rather than in the Indian draft discussion thread so as not to distract that thread:
INFCIRC 369 (1989)
INFCIRC 369 Add.1 (2002)

I could not find US-IAEA safeguards documents on the IAEA site itself, but it appears to be listed on the US State Dept website:
Agreement Between The United States of America and The International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (and Protocol Thereto)
Signed at Vienna November 18, 1977
Entered into force December 9, 1980

enqyoob
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2658
Joined: 06 Jul 2008 20:25

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 15 Jul 2008 02:02

So! The critical argument is about IAEA Baksheesh and the impact of inspections on commercial competitiveness of plants. See how the Americans got out - they offered 200,000,000,000 nuclear facilities, and biweekly accounting and inventory reports from every one for examination. "Snow Job" IOW.

What we need in a few years is a good ICC Match-Fixing type scandal involving IAEA Inspecteurs and Indian bookies / Haji Mastaan - Mumbai Mob, and the inspections will be reduced to nothing. Imagine the enthusiasm of IAEA Inspecteurs to go and inspect in, say, Assam during rainy season or Bihar anytime, or Rajasthan in summer. In Kerala, they should be taken by road trip from Kozhikode airport to Koodamkulam. They'll never come back.

putnanja
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4542
Joined: 26 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: searching for the next al-qaida #3

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby putnanja » 15 Jul 2008 02:35

Judge the nuclear deal on facts, not convictions

Judge the nuclear deal on facts, not convictions

Ashok Parthasarathi

In highly complex politico-techno-legal agreements, facts must totally override convictions, whoever’s convictions they may be.

A recent newspaper editorial says: “It always takes political courage to stake one’s government on a matter of conviction.” This is most surprising. All public policies must be based on facts — here facts about the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement. A phrase repeated ad nauseam by the deal’s protagonists has been it is in the “national interest.” Is it? I am afraid not. Why? Because of the nature, scope, content, intent, and detailed provisions of Hyde and the 123.

The Hyde Act is categorical that if we test, the whole deal collapses. It restricts U.S. supplies of fuel to only that quantity needed for “normal operating conditions” of all our nuclear reactors. Hyde is against our building up any “strategic reserve of fuel” to ensure our reactors continue to operate stably even if the U.S. terminates fuel supplies. But Hyde requires that even if we build up a reserve, the U.S. government should ensure that the size of that reserve is not so large as to enable India to ride out any fuel supply cut-off and civil nuclear sanctions that the U.S. Congress would impose as soon as we undertake any nuclear explosive test.

Hyde requires the U.S. government to extract from the Indian government a “specific future date” after which we will not produce weapon grade plutonium even from our own unsafeguarded reactors. This will be a body blow to our weapons programme. India is also required to follow U.S. diplomatic and negotiating positions on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), although our position on the Treaty differs cardinally from the U.S. position. As though this were not enough, the Act calls on the U.S. government to further tighten NSG Guidelines, particularly for India.

Not confining itself to nuclear matters, the Act requires the Indian government to adopt a foreign policy across the board fully concordant with the U.S. government. Specifically, the Indian government must follow the United States to even apply sanctions on Iran. How can we accept such a stipulation when we have longstanding cordial relations of a civilisational character with Iran, and are about to conclude two very major 25-year natural gas supply agreements vital to our energy security?

As for the 123 agreement, a key Bush commitment in the U.S.-India Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 was that the U. S. would ensure “full” civil nuclear energy cooperation, that is, covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle from making uranium fuel to reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium – a key input into our Fast Breeder Reactor Programme. However, the actual 123 does not cover U.S. supply of technology and technical facilities relating to two crucial steps in the fuel cycle, namely uranium enrichment and heavy water production. Moreover, even in the case of the third crucial step of reprocessing, there will be no supply of technology and facilities, but only the U.S. agreeing to our reprocessing using our own technology and technical facilities. In contrast, 123s with Japan and South Korea provide for U.S. supply of technology and technical facilities for all three steps in the nuclear fuel cycle. Moreover, in regard to reprocessing, these have already been provided by the U.S. to Japan.
Reprocessing plat

However, to operationalise this major concession of ‘allowing’ us to reprocess spent fuel, we must build, at our own cost, a national reprocessing plant, estimated to cost Rs. 10,000 crores. Furthermore, before we actually start building such a plant, we must provide all detailed drawings and other technical documentation, data, calculations, and so on to the International Atomic Energy Agency to review and clear. This means providing highly sensitive and classified documentation, embargoed to us by the West and generated by us after many years of R&D, formally to the IAEA, which is as much a political body as anything else.

Another requirement is our accepting a whole range of “arrangements and procedures” stipulated by the U.S. to run our own national plant. After that we have also to sign another agreement with the U.S. government, under Section 131 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which must be approved by Congress. This Section 131 approval is not even alluded to, let alone indicated, in any way, in the 123. Why did our negotiating team not insist on its inclusion? Or did it not know about it?

Shockingly, 123 contains no arbitration clause. Japan spent two years to negotiate and get an elaborate arbitration clause from the U.S. The clause on “Dispute Settlement” in our 123 merely says: “if any disagreement between the Parties [India and the U.S.] arises, they will be negotiated and settled.” This is an amazing blunder on the part of our negotiators of the 123 for which we will pay a very high price in future. What happens if disagreements cannot be resolved through negotiations? Even commercial contracts incorporate arbitration clauses. Yet our 123 is silent on this vital matter.
One-sided provisions

The termination clause has several one-sided provisions. One is that if, after “either party” notifies the other that it proposes to terminate the 123, consultations will be “promptly” held. However, the party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation if it decides not just that a mutually acceptable resolution of its reasons for seeking termination has not been possible, but that it cannot be achieved through consultations! So, all the U.S. has to do is to hold two consultation meetings and then say: “we have decided our reasons for seeking termination cannot be resolved through consultations”! If not consultations, then how? The 123 is silent on this. Without a satisfactory arbitration clause, India will totally be at the mercy of the supplier over the 40-year life of the 123.

As for nuclear testing, the 123 states: “Parties agree to take into account whether circumstances that may lead to termination [pursuant to a nuclear test by us] resulted from a Party’s [that is, our] serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.” Firstly, the U.S. only agrees to “take into account” our circumstances, not necessarily accept them. Secondly, as soon as we test, all hell will break loose! Nobody will look at the elaborate convoluted wording in the 123. The U.S. Congress will immediately demand the cancellation of the nuclear deal under Hyde. So statements by top officials of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Department of Atomic Energy that neither the Hyde Act nor the 123 prevents us from testing are totally incorrect.

Finally, a sub-clause of the termination clause relating to “arrangements and procedures” stipulated by the U.S. for our operating our National Reprocessing Plant -- without which the plant cannot be operated -- shall be subject to suspension by either party in “exceptional circumstances.” What is need at all for such a clause? It gives a strong impression that the consent to reprocess that is being given with one hand is being taken away with the other. And what is the nature and scope of “exceptional circumstances”? There is no description, let alone definition.

How long will suspension last? What will be the terms and conditions of suspension? What will our rights and obligations be during the period of suspension? Will the U.S. pay us damages for our Rs.10,000 crore nuclear reprocessing plant having to lie idle because of suspension? A sub-clause states that “exceptional circumstances” will be defined by the two parties after consultations. However, it goes on to state that such consultations are for reaching a mutually acceptable resolution of “outstanding issues.” This makes it clear that suspension is on account of “outstanding issues.” But no reference to such issues has been made in first part of the clause dealing with suspension or anywhere else.

Badly-worded clause

How are “exceptional circumstances” and “outstanding issues” related? The clause is extremely badly worded and full of ambiguities, with key phrases remaining undefined. As it is worded, the clause cries out for disputes and differences that would normally inevitably lead to arbitration. However, here dispute settlement will be prolonged, open-ended, and finally result in infructuous negotiations, as in the Tarapur case.

These facts and the analysis based on them clearly establish that in such highly complex politico-techno-legal agreements, facts must totally override convictions, whoever’s convictions they may be. No amount of ad nauseam repetition that the nuclear deal is in the national interest will help. As the great Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping prescribed to his party and people (quoting Mao Zedong): “Seek the truth from facts.”

(The writer was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.)

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 55358
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 15 Jul 2008 02:43

Exceptional circumustances are when one of the two parties becomes ultra vires. Everything is hunky dory till that time. Again go back to the half full and half empty bit. If the plan is to have the same amount of wastage and x'n losses as in current pweor grid then its becomes very moot all this plans. Then even if its overflowing is not good enough.

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 17088
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 15 Jul 2008 03:29

Reprocessing, the bone of contention:

As for the 123 agreement, a key Bush commitment in the U.S.-India Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 was that the U. S. would ensure “full” civil nuclear energy cooperation, that is, covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle from making uranium fuel to reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium – a key input into our Fast Breeder Reactor Programme. However, the actual 123 does not cover U.S. supply of technology and technical facilities relating to two crucial steps in the fuel cycle, namely uranium enrichment and heavy water production. Moreover, even in the case of the third crucial step of reprocessing, there will be no supply of technology and facilities, but only the U.S. agreeing to our reprocessing using our own technology and technical facilities. In contrast, 123s with Japan and South Korea provide for U.S. supply of technology and technical facilities for all three steps in the nuclear fuel cycle. Moreover, in regard to reprocessing, these have already been provided by the U.S. to Japan.
Reprocessing plat

However, to operationalise this major concession of ‘allowing’ us to reprocess spent fuel, we must build, at our own cost, a national reprocessing plant, estimated to cost Rs. 10,000 crores. Furthermore, before we actually start building such a plant, we must provide all detailed drawings and other technical documentation, data, calculations, and so on to the International Atomic Energy Agency to review and clear. This means providing highly sensitive and classified documentation, embargoed to us by the West and generated by us after many years of R&D, formally to the IAEA, which is as much a political body as anything else.


We can expect in our life time for this issue to raise its head.

I suspect the West will not take back the byproducts, nor allow India to reprocess unless India agrees to complete safeguards.

India will need a leader as early as 2015-17.

The only way I can see this resolved - is Indian techs are used - is for the IAEA to have accountants for input and output. In between is a black box to IAEA. And, no Yucca Mountains in India please.

svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14223
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby svinayak » 15 Jul 2008 03:48

ldev wrote:
Acharya wrote:
Safeguards that erode security.
The UPA government has ended up with an agreement entirely harmful to the nation's interests
-Bharat Karnad


We have two different take on the same draft. Isn;t it wonderful.
One is a propaganda.



Yes, isnt it a pity that BK is resorting to propaganda. :)


Something like this 'The Indians wanted an agreement that will be acceptable to Prakash Karat and the IAEA wanted to make sure that Uncle Sam was on board. '

So this deal is for PK



sraj
BRFite
Posts: 260
Joined: 12 Feb 2006 07:04

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sraj » 15 Jul 2008 06:55

Suraj wrote:Note that I'm not suggesting there's nothing we can do. It's not a bad idea to obtain stakes in ore mines where we can. It doesn't necessarily mean we are guaranteed supplies for 10-20 years. Has anyone researched the current dynamics of the uranium trade ? What is the dominant means of purchase ? Spot ? 6-month or 12-month contracts ?

Any deal with Areva for reactors should include a deal for Areva to give India an equity stake in some of the Uranium mines it owns in Niger and elsewhere, as well as in new exploration concessions Areva gets.

Also, the equity stake agreement should explicitly entitle India to a proportionate level of "equity Uranium" which it will "own" the moment it is produced and/or the right to buy 'X' % of Uranium produced by that mine at a price based on an agreed price formula.

GoI routinely puts this clause into the oil/gas exploration concessions it gives to foreign companies, where GoI has the right to buy the production based on an agreed price formula .
Last edited by sraj on 15 Jul 2008 07:08, edited 2 times in total.

sraj
BRFite
Posts: 260
Joined: 12 Feb 2006 07:04

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sraj » 15 Jul 2008 07:00

RaviBg wrote:Judge the nuclear deal on facts, not convictions
Ashok Parthasarathi

This article analyses the problems with Hyde and 123 well.

The key is to separate the IAEA and NSG process from Hyde/123.

Hyde/123 will need to be dealt with separately.

rocky
BRFite
Posts: 142
Joined: 08 Mar 2006 22:52

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby rocky » 15 Jul 2008 07:21

Suraj, in the nuclear fuels market, long term locked deals are the norm. This is done ostensibly to ensure guarantee of supply, irrespective of cost. There are higher overriding concerns for the parties concerned than the cost. However, the nuclear fuels market (atleast for yellowcake) is quite independent of the spot market.

The spot market is heavily dominated by hedge funds, who absolutely spin the futures. There is almost no correlation between yellowcake spot prices and the actual prices at which deals are struck.

Please note that there has been quite a bit of problem with uranium mining worldwide. Even the mammoth Canadian reserves are slowly winding down, and with the Megatons to Megawatts deal slowly coming to an end, there is going to be a mammoth and real demand-supply issue coming up as soon as 2013. That's when we will be competing with American nuclear power plants for yellowcake supply.

sraj
BRFite
Posts: 260
Joined: 12 Feb 2006 07:04

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sraj » 15 Jul 2008 07:28

From the Hindu piece on ‘Perpetuity of safeguards only with perpetuity of fuel supply’ posted earlier:
Dr. Kakodkar said India was not looking for formal recognition as a nuclear weapon state but for opening up to civil nuclear cooperation. “We are a nuclear weapon state, we know that and the world knows that. The definitions of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states are embedded in the NPT and we are not a party to [it]. Certainly, we don’t need to be so attracted to NPT definitions.”

This statement needs to be highlighted.

India is neither a NWS or a NNWS (which are both definitions used solely for States who are Party to NPT).

India is a SNW which is not a State Party to NPT.

India needs to keep track of two things:

1. Do any international agreements it signs have the effect of qualitatively or quantitatively capping its nuclear weapons vis-a-vis other powers?

2. Wherever provisions in any agreement it signs are open to different interpretations, does it have sufficient leverage over the party doing this interpreting to ensure that its interests are not adversely affected by such interpretation?

This is why this deal (in its totality, not in parts - which may go ahead earlier) should only be consummated once India is a member of the UNSC (the ultimate interpreter of international agreements in the current international system).

svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14223
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby svinayak » 15 Jul 2008 07:33

sraj wrote:
RaviBg wrote:Judge the nuclear deal on facts, not convictions
Ashok Parthasarathi

This article analyses the problems with Hyde and 123 well.

The key is to separate the IAEA and NSG process from Hyde/123.

Hyde/123 will need to be dealt with separately.

Why is this difficult to understand. Hyde act and its preamble is relavent for India wince it is attached to 123 no matter what anyone says

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Rangudu » 15 Jul 2008 07:37

Hyde Act has less than zero meaning if the NSG clearance is clean and the IAEA safeguards agreement is passed as it is now.

India will not buy one nut or bolt from Unkil. We will deal with those that supply us without strings.

svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14223
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby svinayak » 15 Jul 2008 07:48

It does not matter since India is signing as a soverign country and needs remedy for this act. It can be done by a domestic law.

enqyoob
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2658
Joined: 06 Jul 2008 20:25

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 15 Jul 2008 07:54

From the hints I've seen, the GOI (both sides) intends to bring new Bills in Parliament that clean up the India side. Note something interesting: The IAEA- PRC deal is between IAEA and PRC. The IAEA-India deal is between IAEA and GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. Not with the Republic of India. Strange. Any comments? The Govrmand can change, hey?

Rangudu, my sense is also that the Hyde hobbles American companies in competition, if the NSG accepts this IAEA deal. After that, US companies will be racing with Oiropean and Russian ones, with one leg and hands tied behind their back. There must be some provision that the GOTUS has taken to prevent that happening, or I am not seeing some other side to this deal. They are not THAT stupid, and they would have explained that to the COTUS in Classified sessions.

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Rangudu » 15 Jul 2008 07:59

N,

Henry Sokolski wrote this in one of his anti-deal articles - No US nuclear company will be able to sell a reactor to India unless the Govt of the US ponies up the financing and liability insurance. In China I believe the liability was taken care of by the PRC government. Some people in the know who I had spoken to soon after Hyde said that it essentially killed any possible reactor deal but may infact prove to be a blessing because now India can be a supplier to the US. Believe it or not, US has sourced some key nuclear reactor technology from India over the years on an ad-hoc basis because US reactor industry has stagnated.

sugriva
BRFite
Posts: 318
Joined: 15 Jun 2005 20:16
Location: Exposing the uber communist luddites masquerading as capitalists

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sugriva » 15 Jul 2008 10:34

I hadn't noted the nuance that Ambassador Sreenivasan points out - in the case of India, it is the imported fuel and components that are tracked, not the facilities themselves.


N^3, :idea:
Blizz to eggzplain the aboove in light of multiple references to nooklear facilities in preamble
and the operative part, for example article 11a

Raju

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Raju » 15 Jul 2008 11:01

I hadn't noted the nuance that Ambassador Sreenivasan points out - in the case of India, it is the imported fuel and components that are tracked, not the facilities themselves.


well then T. P. Sreenivasan needs to explain why research reactors and heavy water facilities are included in the safeguards list if it is purely materials based safeguards.

Rangudu
BRFite
Posts: 1751
Joined: 03 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Rangudu » 15 Jul 2008 16:10

People need to understand that even NPT NWS like China have listed facilities ihat are safeguarded while the mechanism of safeguards is just tracking weights of fissile material goig in and comin out. For instance, before hbuying Uranium from Australia, China agreed to put reactors using Aussie Uranium under IAEA safeguards. Theoretica lly, IAEA will have the right to go into the power reactor facilities and "inspect" things. As a practical matter, IAEA will not do that because the worry is not about China building bombs - it already can - but the only issue is China not building additional bombs using Aussie Uranium. Similarly, even though India lists facilities that are safeguarded, the biggest goal of the IAEA would be to ensure that India not use the additional foreign Uranium it gets to put in those facilities for making bombs.

sugriva
BRFite
Posts: 318
Joined: 15 Jun 2005 20:16
Location: Exposing the uber communist luddites masquerading as capitalists

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sugriva » 15 Jul 2008 17:20

People need to understand that even NPT NWS like China have listed facilities ihat are safeguarded while the mechanism of safeguards is just tracking weights of fissile material goig in and comin out.


How does one count what went into a system and what came out of it, if it does not know about the system. To enforce any
form of atom counting, it has to count input atoms going into reactor, for which it has to know where the reactor is, and at the
end of the process count the output atoms. Hence the reason for putting facilities under safeguards also.

If the system is not under observation/safeguards, how does one know whether atims went into reactor or transmorgifier. To
make sure that India is applying the input atoms to a reactor only and not on a transmorgifier (that probably multiplies the
number of atoms) it has to have control over both input atoms and reactor. Merely counting input and output atoms will not
help, as then India could have used the transmorgifier instead of the reactor and produced many times more output atoms than
allowed. Like the good school children that we are, we would have shown the inspectors only as many atoms as they wanted to
see and hoarded the rest. Hence the need for facility safeguards also.

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 17088
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 15 Jul 2008 18:16

Similarly, even though India lists facilities that are safeguarded, the biggest goal of the IAEA would be to ensure that India not use the additional foreign Uranium it gets to put in those facilities for making bombs.


That is very, very true, but only half the story. And, I do not think that is what anyone is really concerned about, including NPAs.

It is FM that does not fall under IAEA or the Hyde Act or the 123 that they are concerned about. Which is why they will never provide reproc techs until India places everything under IAEA.

How does one count what went into a system and what came out of it, if it does not know about the system. To enforce any form of atom counting, it has to count input atoms going into reactor, for which it has to know where the reactor is, and at the end of the process count the output atoms. Hence the reason for putting facilities under safeguards also.


The issue is not with outside supplied techs, they know very well how to count atoms (although, very wisely they have said just the opposite when it comes to GNEP!!! - they want total control).

They will cry about Indian techs too. Until they get their hands on Indian techs (which could take years AFTER India gives them anything), they will not provide India with complete set.

This thing about India becoming a supplier? India has also provided heavy water to teh US - twice in teh past year IIRC. I very much doubt they will allow India to become a SR partner in any venture - they cannot, their own companies are liable to sink (they are rather concerned about space as we write).

FR and RU .......... I think they both ahev subscribed to GNEP. IF (Big If) that is true, bye, bye.

I think the bottom line is that if the US REALLY wanted to let India become a civilian nuclear power (forget a NWS) it would have done so. I think the key missing part right now is the reproc techs.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 55358
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 15 Jul 2008 20:53

Meanwhile op-ed in Pioneer

We need nuclear tests

Venkata Vemuri

When will India stand up for its own rights? The ongoing debate on the India-US nuclear deal skirts long-term issues linked to India's nuclear deterrence. It's facetious to describe the deal, as it exists, as good for India -- it is exactly the opposite

The level of political debate in India on the nuclear deal with the US is as abysmal as the surreptitious attempt by the Indian bureaucracy to push it through on the ground that it is a matter of 'national pride'. Neither the Left, nor the Opposition, and certainly not the Manmohan Singh Government, has taken the people of India into confidence on the real issues that are of concern.


These issues are crucial for India's long-term foreign and nuclear policies. We should be more concerned with India's strategic role vis-à-vis a futuristic -- but possible -- stand-off between China and the US, rather than the short-term gains in terms of nuclear energy or the one-upmanship game with Pakistan. India is already capable of tackling the last two.

Let us proceed step by step. What did we achieve after the 1998 nuclear tests? It is an unspoken truth that the tests failed to validate some of India's warhead designs. Couple this with the fact that India is yet to possess comprehensive missile technology which can deliver warheads up to China, not merely Pakistan. Only when we have such a combination can we be confident that India has a credible nuclear deterrent. How do we reach that stage? By conducting more nuclear tests while continuing to make progress with the missile systems.

Is India in a position to conduct more nuclear tests? India has offered a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing. If the nuclear deal comes through, the moratorium will no longer be voluntary, but legally binding on us. The proposed amendment to the US law that will make the nuclear deal official is that the American President will, from time to time, certify that India has not tested a nuclear device. Which means, if India conducts a test in the future, the deal becomes void.

So, without a nuclear test, any thought of becoming a nuclear power or having a credible nuclear deterrent is a pipe dream.

Then comes the issue related to availability of fissionable material for nuclear weaponisation. India has agreed, under the draft agreement of the deal, to identify and separate civil and military nuclear programmes. India has also agreed to place the civil facilities under IAEA safeguards.

There are two issues here. First, the deal will not overnight give India the status of a nuclear weapons state. Far from it. It will be recognised as a non-nuclear weapons state which is not a signatory to the NPT. To that extent, India will be better off than Pakistan. That is not what India will be satisfied with, but has no option but to accept it.

Second, once the civil facilities are under IAEA safeguards, there will be restrictions on the fissionable material for use in India's military facilities. India's nuclear doctrine depends on the availability of this material. For, the number of nuclear warheads India wishes to have to achieve the critical state of deterrence is determined by, first of all, India's threat perception and next, the material available for weaponisation.

According to India's nuclear doctrine as it stands today, the limit of critical deterrence depends on its threat perception. Which means India can increase its nuclear stockpile if the threat perception increases. Such a doctrine allows India the advantage of not having to tie itself to a certain number of warheads. However, the IAEA safeguards will mean, at least theoretically, a weakened deterrence if India's adversaries increase their stockpiles. For, in such a situation, increasing India's own stockpile will depend on how much un-safeguarded material is available to it.

According to an AP report on the draft of the safeguards agreement, a "key clause appears to call into question the effectiveness of any IAEA effort to ensure India's civilian nuclear activities do not aid its military's atomic weapons programme". The draft agreement in the preamble talks of India taking "corrective measures" to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civil nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of supplies. Possibly the only 'corrective measure' is India withdrawing some of the safeguarded civil facilities from the IAEA list so that the fissionable material can be used for military purposes.

Having said that, the safeguards issue is not as serious as the moratorium on testing. It is well known that India has the capability to develop its own nuclear plants. Moreover, despite the agreement it will remain India's right to classify future nuclear plants as civil or military, thus giving the country an escape valve.

What the entire debate on the deal boils down to, is this: Does India feel it requires a credible nuclear deterrent against China? If so, it has to clearly state its position before the current form of the deal is signed. Otherwise, its dream of having a credible deterrent and being a major nuclear power is washed out.

Yes, India needs a nuclear deterrent against China insofar as its future geo-political stakes are concerned. Then why is the UPA Government shying away from stating this to the US? One point that goes in India's favour -- and a very vital one at that -- is that the US cannot face a standoff with China without the support of India. For facing China, both need each other. It is also true that the US excursions into Asia have a black and bleak record of failure. Vietnam, for example. In the future, any standoff with China can only be on the issue of Taiwan. And the odds of the US going it alone, without India's aid, are high.

Let us just assume that the current deal actually goes through. Theoretically it is possible that the US itself may go in for nuclear testing in the future, thus allowing India to do so too. How is that possible? The current deal has a clause which says that India will assume responsibilities and reap the same benefits as accruing to states with advanced nuclear technology like the US. The flip side, however, is what if the US does not undertake tests in future? It is a big if.

The nuclear deal by itself does not much harm Indian interests as long as India retains the right to conduct nuclear tests in the future. Indian bureaucrats, like the messy mice that they are, are already indulging in vacuous arguments that India's moratorium on tests is unilateral and, therefore, what is a unilateral proposition cannot be bound by an agreement. The why not get this included in the piece of paper?

India is at present in a political turmoil over the deal. It may all come to a naught if the deal is not passed in the current session of the US Congress. The basic legal paper of the deal, called the Hyde Act, 2006, has a provision that the final agreement between the US and India can be taken up by the Congress for passage only if the Congress is in a continuous session for 30 days. There is a recess of the Congress in August, which leaves less than 40 days before the Congress adjourns on September 26, 2008.

The 123 Agreement cannot come for passage until the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group okay the deal. How long will that take? It may come up for passage by IAEA in the coming three weeks, but indications are that the NSG may not convene on the issue till September. If so, there is no option but to wait for the post-Bush Administration to assume office. What have the Democrats in mind about the deal?

More importantly, when will India stand up for its own rights? That is the prime issue. What is happening in India right now has so far nothing to do with this serious debate.

-- The writer, a senior journalist, is doing his PhD at Bournemouth University, UK.



Pretty fair article that lays out the issues without covering up unpleasant facts. Must be somehting in the Krishna/Godavari waters that make the Andhra folks so clear headed about national interests! No axes to grind an no lifafas. Just the facts folks.

Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Gerard » 16 Jul 2008 00:28

I suspect the West will not take back the byproducts, nor allow India to reprocess unless India agrees to complete safeguards.


The last deal India signed (with Russia) gave reprocessing rights.

Given that India does not intend to store spent fuel forever, the supplier nations will either have to take it back (very unlikely) or let India reprocess it under IAEA safeguards.
The agreement allows campaign safeguards (for the Russian fuel).

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 17088
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 16 Jul 2008 01:22

Gerard,

My read is that past "deals" will not apply, specially WRT Russia. I just cannot see Russia any longer as the knight in that shining armor. I think Russia will toe US lines but for her own benefit ...... they are already viewing India as a competitor (and rightly so).

I feel that India will have to force one issue for sure: reprocessing. My prediction is that IF the US refuses to part with the reproc techs, India will be forced to use her own without IAEA safeguards (and rightly so), which will lead to a dicey situation. (I think for the reprocessing facility to be fully operational in 2020, they will need to start building in 2015 at least, which means that the technical details will have to be handed over by some 2012-13 - so they can start designing the building. So, by prediction is that the whole issue will come to a head in 2011 - the one year period then kicks in.)

WRT the national grid, thx for the response. It is my understanding that it is not IAEA that prohibits it, it is the "supplier" nations that have this restriction. More on this l8r.

Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Gerard » 16 Jul 2008 01:43

IIRC, the Russian minister who advocated IAEA/NSG so that Russia could sell more reactors boasted that deals with Russia would give reprocessing rights, just as the previous VVER deal did.

In any event, given that India's reprocessing plants have already been safeguarded during campaigns, there is nothing left to see in a new safeguarded facility built using domestic technology. The IAEA has already been all over India's reprocessing plants.

PUREX and MOX fabrication isn't an Indian secret.

The IAEA will not be in any dual purpose facility when the fuel from the eight military PHWRs are present. Unkil will have to guess how many spent rods are being dissolved and what is the Pu output.

Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Gerard » 16 Jul 2008 02:04

A post on the Ayatollah blog
link

Anyway, this all raises the question of whether the Agency will be applying the state-level approach in India.

Obviously it can’t apply a state-level approach per se since India’s military facilities will remain unsafeguarded. However, if India cleanly splits it civilian and military facilities, I can see no reason why the Agency can’t apply a state-level approach to the whole of India’s civilian fuel cycle: a state within a state, if you will. Using this kind of analysis in India will significantly enhance the credibility of conclusions drawn by the Agency.
Euratom must face a similar problem in applying safeguards in the UK and France. Like India, the UK and France have a military fuel-cycle but their civilian fuel cycles are comprehensively safeguarded (by Euratom). Does Euratom adopt a state-level approach in the UK and France? I don’t know, but I’d like to find out.

In any event, I think that the India safeguards agreement does give the IAEA the necessary authority to use the state-level approach. Specifically, article 11 specifies which facilities, material and equipment require safeguards. Its authority appears to be sufficiently broad to enable the Agency to ‘track’ all nuclear material around the fuel cycle, wherever that leads.


Looks like the ayatollahs and arms-inspector-fanboys still harbor dreams of 'pursuit' and enhancing the 'credibility' of the IAEA.

Laloo needs to lead the negotiation wrt funding of these inspections.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 55358
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 16 Jul 2008 02:25

NRao and Gerard, MMS already said there will be new reprocessing facility that willbe under safeguards and that was hailed as a deal maker. When that happens the current one will go back to being out of safeguards.

Also the Pioneer article has one shortcoming when it assumes testing can happen only US will test. The statement about supreme national interests that PMO made after Amar Singh's questions makes it clear.


Return to “Nuclear Issues Archive”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 3 guests