Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

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ramana
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Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by ramana »

X-Posted...
Rangudu wrote:HERE'S a copy of the safeguards agreement. Top Secret? I think not!

The NPAs seem to hate it!

Two quick points:

1. No mention of "in perpetuity" - meaning that India can reclassify a reactor for military use after all imported fuel has been passed through the system

2. No physical separation required

Both are IDENTICAL to the NPT NWS rights.

First of all kudos to Rangudu for unearthing this document so quickly.

Since this document was the bone of contention and has lead to govt turmoil in Delhi, I would like a para by para commentary on the document just as we did the DND when it came out.

Calvin, I need you help here. Time to come to the fore.

Thanks, ramana

Please no polemics or bad language or even cross wise looks. Autoban! Not the German highway.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by NRao »

Strange. On page 1:
Recommended Action
• It is recommended that the Board authorize the Director General to conclude with the
Government of India, and subsequently implement, the draft Safeguards Agreement reproduced
in the Attachment hereto.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by NRao »

Also on Page 1:
Restricted Distribution
R must have some pulls. :)
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by ramana »

Paras 23 and 84.

Whats the matter about 20 mt of Thorium?

He got it from the armscontrolwonk who has the pull!
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Rangudu »

Since armscontrolwonk.com or specifically Jeffrey Lewis got the scoop, we might as well start with his first take on the safeguards agreement:
India Safeguards Agreement Stinks

I have a copy of the India-specific safeguards agreement, IAEA/2008/30. Here is the full-text.

The word “perpetuity” appears not once.

The section on termination of safeguards states that termination “shall be implemented taking into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973).”

That is a worrisome clause — it appears to offer a loophole that I wrote about in October 2006 after Mark Hibbs published a pair of articles on the agreement:
GOV/1621 is restricted, so I don’t actually know what it says. Sources, however, told Hibbs that GOV/1621 has to do specifically with safeguarding items which are transferred to a state from third parties—a loophole those experts told Hibbs would allow India to interpret the agreement as excluding the 8 indigenous Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors New Delhi offered to place under safeguards pursuant to the US-India agreement …

That would mean that India’s safeguards obligations on the reactors are voluntary, allowing India to terminate or suspend safeguards on these 8 reactors after removing any imported fuel.
I am interested in whether other people share my reading of the agreement.

It appears to me that a reactor becomes subjects to safeguards if (1) it is listed in the Annex (which I don’t have) or (2) uses imported fuel. According to the text of the agreement, India may suspend safeguards on a facility listed in the Annex (case 1) if India and the IAEA “jointly determine that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards”. As far as I can tell, the agreement is silent on what happens to safeguards on facilities not in the annex (case 2) after India removes all safeguarded fuel.

That leaves the very distressing possibility that Hibbs was correct — that once India removes any imported fuel leaves from any of the 8 indigenous pressurized heavy water reactors, which are unlikely to be listed in the Annex, India can unilaterally terminate the safeguards on the facility.

The remedy would quite straightforward: The IAEA BOG should insist that the reactors themselves are put under safeguards “in perpetuity”—not just the material or other items supplied under the safeguards agreement.

There are other aspects of the agreement that I find worrisome — the co-mingling of military and civilian plutonium (separation is an accounting device, rather than a physical separation) and the suspension of existing safeguards agreements in favor of the new agreement.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Rangudu »

Ladies and Gents,

First key point is that there is no Annex in this document. That is what has all the gory details about the specific facilities and parts of facilities affected by this agreement. So, FYI, we don't have 100% of the picture here. IIRC, there was some controversy about conditions favoring or disadvantageous to India being placed in the annex. We need to keep that in mind.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Prem »

When are they going to vote on it ?
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Rangudu »

July 28. This is still not the final text. We could have a situation where Country X manages to assemble a coalition that says unofficially to India or US - "We need the text to be changed in a,b,c fashion to vote Yes"

NPAs will fight tooth and nail both at the IAEA and at the NSG. The good news is that we have four of the P5 and the IAEA chief backing this very strongly.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Muppalla »

Just like J18 was nice and then came Hyde and 123. Draft is a start to negotiations and it will be nice and time will tell how much India will give away or hold forte.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by sraj »

Rangudu wrote:July 28. This is still not the final text. We could have a situation where Country X manages to assemble a coalition that says unofficially to India or US - "We need the text to be changed in a,b,c fashion to vote Yes"

NPAs will fight tooth and nail both at the IAEA and at the NSG. The good news is that we have four of the P5 and the IAEA chief backing this very strongly.
The text of this draft cannot be changed without India's agreement. The Board of Governors is free to vote it up or down, but they cannot put in language unilaterally -- unlike what happened with Hyde.

BTW, have you noticed the text is no longer downloadable from the link you posted? Hopefully someone has saved it separately already.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by doordarshi »

The really authoritative analysis is out:
: From: kalyan97@gmail.com
Reply-to: hinducivilization@yahoogroups.com
Sent: 7/9/2008 5:54:46 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time
Subj: [hc] 5+1? Or, just above Paki? Scoop on nuke agreement with IAEA

5-plus-1 tag in nuke draft


Delhi dashes to Vienna with pact
K.P. NAYAR (Kolkata, Telegraph, July 10, 2008)


Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with US President George W Bush in Hokkaido on Wednesday. (PTI)

Washington, July 9: A 20-page text of the nuclear safeguards agreement circulated in Vienna today places India in the global non-proliferation regime a notch above Pakistan and North Korea.

But it leaves New Delhi in a category below the five nuclear weapons states — Russia, China, France, Britain and the US — that are recognised under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), according to diplomats who formally received the agreement from the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) this afternoon.

The text is titled 'Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities'.

India, Pakistan and North Korea are the only three countries outside the NPT regime that have tested nuclear weapons. Israel is well-known to have the bomb, but it refuses to acknowledge that it has even mastered the scientific cycles that precede the production of atom bombs.

Diplomats in Vienna are already referring to India and the five recognised nuclear weapons states collectively following the circulation of the agreement as "five plus one".

This means India will be in a special category within the global non-proliferation regime if the IAEA's board of governors approve the safeguards agreement at its yet to be scheduled meeting.

IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming emphasised that "the text of the draft agreement is not public" and that the agency's officials have been told not to give any interviews to the media on the subject "at this time".

But the Vienna International Centre on the banks of the Danube, the IAEA property leased from the Austrian government for 99 years, leaks like a sieve: it is, therefore possible to construct an idea of what India can expect from the safeguards pact from diplomats who are willing to talk about it on background.

Diplomats who have perused today's text said it has many structural similarities with the Hyde Act approved by the US Congress to facilitate the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Like the Hyde Act, the IAEA's agreement with India is long on preamble which sums up the reasons for bringing India into a special category in the current global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Like the Hyde Act, whose preamble and non-operative parts were necessary to satisfy the diverse lobbies and constituencies in the US Congress, the one in the Vienna document was also necessary to bring round those members of the IAEA board who have reservations about a safeguards agreement that overlooks New Delhi's refusal to sign the NPT.

It was not immediately clear if today's document satisfactorily answers the five questions raised by Left parties in their joint statement about the UPA government's negotiations with the IAEA.

But diplomats said the safeguards agreement will "definitely not" permit spare parts or fuel — even in the event of any shortage — to be transferred between nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and those outside it as part of India's weapons programme.

Fleming said the chairman of the board, Milenko Skoknic of Chile, had already begun consultations with fellow governors to fix a date for convening a board meeting to approve the agreement.

Issue Date: Thursday , July 10 , 2008
http://telegraphindia.com/1080710/jsp/f ... 529905.jsp#

IAEA Press Releases

Press Release 2008/08
Draft India Safeguards Agreement Circulated to IAEA Board Members

9 July 2008 | At the request of the Government of India, the IAEA Secretariat today circulated to Members of the IAEA Board of Governors for their consideration the draft of an Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities.

The Chairman of the Board is consulting with Board Members to agree on a date for a Board meeting when the Agreement would be considered.

Note to editors: The text of the draft Agreement is not public. IAEA Officials will not be giving interviews at this time.
Press Contact

Melissa Fleming
Spokesperson and Head, Media and Outreach Section
Division of Public Information
[43-1] 2600-21273
press at iaea.org
About the IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world's foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Established as an autonomous organization under the United Nations (UN) in 1957, the IAEA carries out programmes to maximize the useful contribution of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use.

NOTE TO EDITORS: For additional information visit the Press Section of the IAEA's website (http://www.iaea.org/Resources/Journalists/), or call the IAEA's Division of Public Information at (431) 2600-21270. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressRel ... 00808.html
__._,_.___

Dharmo rakshati rakshitah
ramana
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by ramana »

:). First rule download and then read.

I read all the paras in the bus. My concerns are with the two paras 23 & 84 I mentioned above. I also need to read slowly para 11.
I suggest people read it para by para and digest it. Dont go by any 'expert''s views.
When you come to a wall ask. I think there are a lot eyes on this thread.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by ramana »

X-Posted...
RamaY wrote:
God bless you Rangudu-ji... you saved commis from committing suicide... I was worried they will die before seeing this agreement, because Pranabda wouldn't show them...


32. Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have
jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the
point of view of safeguards. Safeguards on non-nuclear material, equipment and components
subject to this Agreement may be terminated as and when the non-nuclear material, equipment or
components have been returned to the supplier
or arrangements have been made by the Agency to
safeguard the non-nuclear material, equipment or components in the State to which it is being
transferred, or when India and the Agency have jointly determined that the non-nuclear material,
equipment or component in question has been consumed, is no longer usable for any nuclear
activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practicably irrecoverable.
Safeguards may be terminated on heavy water upon India’s placing under safeguards as substitute
the same amount of heavy water of equivalent or better heavy water concentration.


Inferring...
1. GOI puts one of its existing 15 reactors under safeguards in say 2009. And runs it using imported raw-material (Say from Aussis) for 10 years... and decides to move it back to un-safeguard mode. Then all we have to do is return the imported raw-material (or equivalent amount) to Aussis... and get back our reactor...

2. If this is the case, GOI can put some of its reactors and use the remaining reactors to run at full capacity to meet its strategic needs.

3. As and when the FBRs design proved and come online, we can put them under safeguards to run them at full capacity... and use the output to build new FBRs (under safeguards) to move the third-stage (Thorium based) at the earliest.

So the key is to

A. Ensure GOI builds the reactors in-house. Then we are not losing the reactors/components to external suppliers. Once we move to the third-stage we can start using internal Thorium resources and slowly return the U/Pu materials... if that is how it works...

B. Run a parallel chain of 1st/2nd/3rd stage program to meet strategic needs and research needs....

Piece of (yellow)cake :D
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by NRao »

Just like J18 was nice and then came Hyde and 123. Draft is a start to negotiations and it will be nice and time will tell how much India will give away or hold forte.
doordarshi,

AK came up with this "agreement". And, he knows IAEA inside out. This and associated docs cannot be taken lightly. This doc will be tighter than 123. Remember that AK has been "negotiating" with the IAEA for some 8-10 years.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Rangudu »

Rule# 3.1415 - When NPAs scream in unison against something, it's probably good for India.

India's nuclear agreement with IAEA has loopholes
By GEORGE JAHN – 4 hours ago

VIENNA, Austria (AP) — India's agreement with the U.N. atomic watchdog agency contains restrictions that could limit international oversight of its civilian nuclear program, according to a confidential document obtained Thursday by The Associated Press.

The accord is meant to open the way for India to do business with a group of 45 states that export nuclear fuel and technology, but the deal first has to be approved by the 35-nation board of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Much of the 23-page document is in line with similar agreements the IAEA has with other countries. But a key clause appears to call into question the effectiveness of any IAEA effort to ensure India's civilian nuclear activities do not aid its military's atomic weapons program.

The draft says India "may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies."

While ambiguous, the phrasing appears to open the door for India to end IAEA oversight of some facilities, potentially allowing it to shift those sites from manufacturing fuel for atomic reactors that generate electricity to the production of fissile material usable in warheads.

In addition, an annex supposed to list the nuclear facilities that India is prepared to put under IAEA supervision is blank, essentially meaning the IAEA's board members are being asked to approve an agreement without knowing what it will apply to. :?: :!:

"The board should ask what 'corrective measures' are supposed to mean," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. "It could mean, 'We will withdraw from safeguards those facilities that we need to withdraw from and we will use in those facilities other, unsupervised fuel sources.'" :P :P

As for the blank annex, "it matters which facilities you are placing under safeguards because some of India's facilities have greater or lesser relevance to its (military) nuclear program," Kimball said. "It is standard practice for the board of governors to understand which facilities are covered."

Without the board's approval of a safeguard agreement, India will not be able to do business with countries that export nuclear technology, which are grouped in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India is struggling to find enough uranium to supply both its power sector and its nuclear arms facilities.

The group, which includes the United States, has since 1992 restricted nuclear trade with states that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or don't have comprehensive safeguards monitored by the IAEA.

India, which hasn't signed the treaty, first conducted a nuclear test explosion 24 years ago as it broke out of its foreign-supplied civilian program to develop atomic arms.

The U.S. effort to help India with nuclear technology while continuing to shun other states that haven't signed the nuclear treaty, like Pakistan and Israel, is opposed by critics who say it will free up more of New Delhi's domestic capabilities for its atomic weapons program and undermine the treaty.

Even if the board approves the India-IAEA agreement in a special session late this month or in early August, the nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group are not expected to discuss an exemption to the rules for India until September.

That would likely delay attempts by the Bush administration to push Congress to approve a landmark 2005 U.S.-India deal that calls for the sharing of U.S. civilian nuclear know-how with India. Both countries are eager to wrap up loose ends before President Bush leaves office.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by bhavin »

sraj wrote:
Rangudu wrote:July 28. This is still not the final text. We could have a situation where Country X manages to assemble a coalition that says unofficially to India or US - "We need the text to be changed in a,b,c fashion to vote Yes"

NPAs will fight tooth and nail both at the IAEA and at the NSG. The good news is that we have four of the P5 and the IAEA chief backing this very strongly.
The text of this draft cannot be changed without India's agreement. The Board of Governors is free to vote it up or down, but they cannot put in language unilaterally -- unlike what happened with Hyde.

BTW, have you noticed the text is no longer downloadable from the link you posted? Hopefully someone has saved it separately already.
sraj, you can download it from here MegaUpload Link
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Rangudu »

The old link still works for me. Anyway, here is another link:

http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20080709 ... guards.pdf
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by amit »

Here's a thought, the arms control wonks (in honour of the place where Rangudu first discovered the draft :) ) are already up and running drumming up a coalition of the willing to get NPA language into the draft.

What would have happened if in interests of democracy, free speech yada, yada the Indian government released the draft to the Indian political chatterati before submitting it to the IAEA? K P Nayyar wrote IAEA leaks like a sieve. In comparison the Indian political chatterati is a high drain.

The vote is going to be on July 28, that leaves less than 20 days to drum up opposition. If this had been released say one month ago, that would have give NPAs and, may I mention China, that much more time.

MMS has played his cards pretty well so far, considering the fragile nature of his government. If the deal is done (there's still a big IF unfortunately) then IMVHO he will be remembered - for the N-deal - much the same way PVNR is remembered for ushering in economic reforms, despite heading a minority government.
Last edited by amit on 10 Jul 2008 07:03, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by CRamS »

Naive thinking Sir. That India should be de-nukes is shared by all across the board from NPAs to non NPAs, These disagreemenst are only to extract the maximum juice, every bit possible. NPAs would be perfectly happy with MMS going along as is.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by amit »

CRamS wrote: Naive thinking Sir. That India should be de-nukes is shared by all across the board from NPAs to non NPAs, These disagreemenst are only to extract the maximum juice, every bit possible. NPAs would be perfectly happy with MMS going along as is.
CRS,

Every nuclear power in this world has a best case scenario, including India. And that is that it would be the only country with N bums while the rest of the world becomes Nuke nood.

So saying that a lot of folks would like India to be de-nuked is a nobrainer IMO.

What you need to say and prove is whether the draft, as it stands, read along with the 123 and Hyde, de-nukes India or not.

JMT
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Raju »

>> What would have happened if in interests of democracy, free speech yada, yada the Indian government released the draft to the Indian political chatterati before submitting it to the IAEA? K P Nayyar wrote IAEA leaks like a sieve. In comparison the Indian political chatterati is a high drain.


Indeed what may have happened ?
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by doordarshi »

Page 3.
I.B.5. Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall implement safeguards in a manner designed to avoid hampering India’s economic or technological development, and not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by India independent of this Agreement for its own purposes.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Rangudu »

CRS,

The other thread had a discussion on logical fallacies. What you say is also one of them. It goes something like this:

1. India has treacherous leaders
2. Leaders say X
3. Therefore X is bad for India
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by enqyoob »

Amit, I don't see that early release would have affected China any - surely the IAEA negotiators included reps of the PRC junta? In fact I don't see what is the PRC game is. The news reports say that China plans to support India's proposal at the NSG. Then why did the Comrades in India commit political hara kiri? The text off the agreement as I see it, seems eminently saleable to the Indian public, since there is no gimmick seen here, and in fact the only reference to the US-India agreement is to the JULY 18, not to "Hyde&Singh". The above excerpt posted by DD says it all about the NWS status, explicity recognizing the existence and halalitude of materials, equipment and facilities outside the IAEA agreement. There is no reference to the "t" word. The "Annex" seems to be just the list of facilities that India volunteeers.

This is as it should be - the agreement is to enable construction and sales of new reactors and other equipment, and the handling of imported fuel lifecycle. So it says clearly that as new facilities are added, the Annex will be updated and published. IOW, there is really no requirements to place existing reactors there at all - except that fuel may not be provided under this agreement to those reactors. This last point may bother, say, Russia-Kodamkulam if Russian fuel / heavy water was supposed to be used here. Or maybe it is "grandfathered" in. Probably, India wants to add Kodamkulam to the Annex - why not?

So, as CRamS says, there may be treachery involved, and I agree there is, if China and the Commies are involved. What is their game, and why did the Left go so far out on a limb for this if China is going to agree? is it timing?
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by enqyoob »

Do u note the lack of interest by ppl in this thread, since it deals with facts (the actual text) rather than superstition? :rotfl:
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by NRao »

We have to realise that this is a DAE-IAEA agreement, and while 123 had plenty of political involvment (as expected), this has the obvious lack of that presence. The text where it states things such as "sole determination", while in the political side could be considered as defiance, it is not so in this context ...... just normal text.

Talking of Annex:

Page 4, #13:
13. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, and a determination by India that all conditions
conducive to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement are in place, India shall file
with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian
nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in a phased manner.
The agreement has to be accepted, then India will decide if all is in place, then file ......
14.
(a) India, (i)on the basis of its sole determination, (ii)shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision
to offer
for Agency safeguards a facility identified by India in the Declaration referred to in
paragraph 13, or any other facility to be determined by India. Any facility so notified by
India to the Agency will be included in the Annex,
and become subject to this Agreement, as
of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
The Annex will be built after the IAEA agrees to this doc.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by ramana »

Folks I want only comments on the IAEA draft agreement. All other discussions are verboten. Kapiche?
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Sanjay M »

India gives nuclear plans to IAEA (BBC)


India has submitted its plans for safeguarding its civilian nuclear facilities to the world nuclear regulatory body.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by amit »

Narayanan,

Boss, following Ramana Ji Bradmin diktat ( :) ), I'm posting a reply in the Nuke thread.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Dileep »

This draft is made by professionals of the relevant fields, not politicians. And that aspects amply shows.

I agree with N guru. It is sure saleable here. I am waiting for people to spin the bad side up.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by venkat_r »

doordarshi wrote:The really authoritative analysis is out:

But diplomats said the safeguards agreement will "definitely not" permit spare parts or fuel — even in the event of any shortage — to be transferred between nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and those outside it as part of India's weapons programme.
http://telegraphindia.com/1080710/jsp/f ... 29905.jsp#
From the above link - So if India develops or is developing any parts in those facilities that are not under IAEA, then they cannot be used in the facilities under IAEA - Which seems unnecessary.

So does this mean
1. Once a facility is put under IAEA, then all future parts and fuel to that facility also come from other facilities in India under IAEA or buy from outside.
2. In any future developments in India, any new tech, parts developed cannot be applied to the facilities under IAEA without putting the facility that developed the tech/parts/fuel under IAEA
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Gerard »

I don't see the dreaded "pursuit" and "perpetuity" clauses. They are not mentioned explicitly and don't seem be be implied under the referenced INFCIRCs.

The "substitution" of safeguarded material will raise some eyebrows I suspect. No NNWS state can substitute unsafeguarded material for safeguarded material (that is removed from safeguards). The NWS can, but they can remove stuff without substitution.

Presumably the exemptions (1 kg of special/20 mt of LEU/Th) are to facilitate operations unhindered by continuous inspections? The worry about IAEA audit of missing Pu seems to have been handled by reference to "normal" "operational" amounts of missing fissile material in the production chain.

Truly an India specific agreement. AK has done well. Only another DAE negotiator can pick holes in this IMHO.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Suppiah »

Just downloading and reading through...what I can see in the first page itself is that IAEA babus have covered their first class fairs, karaoke-bars, et al by asking for more money in the name of India.

Oops we are going to invite nuclear terrorism, if the Congress is right, by releasing this draft

http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/10/stories ... 681200.htm
Suppiah
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Suppiah »

The agreement has specific conditions under which safeguards will no longer apply - these mainly relate to taking them out of India - which means they are perpetual, but only with respect to items covered under the agreement - which means declared facilities and allied facilities provided such are notified by India. So the coverage is not blanket,it is selective based on India's choice. But once covered, it is covered in perpetuity.

The initial clause about india protecting its supplies is too vague to mean anything
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by enqyoob »

I don't see any bar to using parts developed in India in the safeguarded facilities, but once they are brought in, they cannot be taken back into unsafeguarded ones without going through IAEA permission. If a part is "developed" in India, then presumably India already has the technology, so can build more of the same for non-IAEA facilities, so I don't see the issue there. The problem may come when production of, say, shiny centrifuges, or those cute "Hasina AtimBum" signs lags demand in the "other" facilities. In that case we can always put in an order to Abdul Xerox Khan LLC like everyone else does, I suppose..

Re: baksheesh, I too thought it was cute that the first section of the document says: "Oiros 1.2M per facility Inspection Costs in first year s'il vous plait, pliss, Msieur!" That's 752 Lakh Rupees Per Year Per Facility, if my Binori arithmetic is right.

When the Left reads that, they will realize how much they can gain by putting red AITUC flags and sitting outside the plants charging admission to the IAEA Inspecteurs.
Sanjay M
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by Sanjay M »

For another copy of the complete text of India-IAEA safeguard agreement, visit:

http://im.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/iaea.pdf
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by sugriva »

The agreement everywhere says "place its civilian nuclear facilities under" as in Pg 2.
Nowhere does it say "place some of its civilian" or "place chosen plants"
under safeguards. The implication being that ALL of India's civilian nuclear power
plants, including the existing ones will be put under safeguards. The inference being that any
unit not under safeguard is then not a civilian reactor. Some might argue that this was the
very purpose of going for the agreement. But what is the necessity of putting all of our civilian
reactors under safeguards and getting foreign stuff. There are temporary shortages for all of
our existing reactors. I think we should leave out as many civilian reactors as can be
supported by our local yellow maal. These desi reactors then can then be used for our other
purposes, like expediating thoorium cycle process. If we use imported yellow maal for our FBR
business then those reactors using it can never be removed from IAEA stuff.

To give an analogy this agreement seems to be similar to GNU GPL, the software license for GNU
software. All derived stuff from free stuff is free. Similarly, all derived stuff from safeguarded
IAEA yellow maal is safeguarded for perpetuity.
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by ramana »

No. It means those civilian plants that India chose to put in the Annex. And India plans to pt in the Annex those plants that need imported raw materials both imported and indigenous. Lets not find dungeons in the castles in the air.

Again whats up with the thorium? I didnt know its controlled material. Is it linked to the future FBRs ?
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Post by sivab »

ramana wrote:Again whats up with the thorium? I didnt know its controlled material. Is it linked to the future FBRs ?
The way I read it it applies to imported Thorium. Imported thorium is subject to safeguards. Upto 20 tonnes of imported and safeguarded thorium total (this is after accounting for losses during processing) will be allowed to go unaccounted for without providing substitute from Indian stock of Thorium.
23. Nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted
from safeguards at the request of India, provided that the material so exempted in India
may not at any time exceed:
(a) 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more
of the following:
(i) Plutonium;
(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20 %) and above, taken account of by
multiplying its weight by its enrichment;
(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20 %) and above that of natural uranium,
taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment
above 0.005 (0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
Last edited by sivab on 10 Jul 2008 20:26, edited 1 time in total.
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