Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

enqyoob
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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 16 Jul 2008 06:07

It is useful in all this, to remember how UQ, China, Pakistan and Israel got the technology to make bombs. IMO, there is nothing so sacred about H-bum technology that it cannot be passed on unlike, say, the procedures for heart transplants or air traffic control. Everything can be passed on. Not as "here is the Official Bomb-Making SOP Manual", but in the form of, say, validation data for certain codes. Or comparison of output from one simulation vs. another simulation. When top scientists and engineers get to look each other in the eye, the answers to all questions can be found. So we come around in the argument again, to why it is not a smart move to go "test", or to :P at useful agreements on the theory that you MAY want to do tests at some time (though that looks ever more unlikely with each passing month).

So it is unfortunate that Mr. Vemuri ignores that part of the debate and assumes that this "testing freedom" is deal-breaker issue.

The pro-deal people would say that if relations with the NSG are good enough, then if a time comes that testing is essential, India can make that case effectively enough and get away with minimal "consequences" other than Strong Notes of Protest. On the other hand, continuing to :P at all the world when THERE IS NO NEED TO DO SO, is the course that countries like Iran and North Korea adopt.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 16 Jul 2008 07:52

He is not suggesting :P.
He is stating the facts like they are. And is if it were so easy we wouldnt be here discussing what happened.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sraj » 16 Jul 2008 17:52

Gov/1621 - The full text
Siddharth Varadarajan: Article 29 of the Indian safeguards agreement ties the termination of the agreement to the conditions outlined in an obscure document of the IAEA Governing Board. I am now making it available online for the first time (of course, it's been around in books, but who reads those anymore?!).

[Note: his analysis of this document is posted separately]

For the text of the document (Gov/1621) alone, see below.

Duration and termination of INFCIRC/66 agreements

Item 1(b) of the provisional agenda (GOV/1620)

SAFEGUARDS

(b) THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS UNDER THE AGENCY’S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (1965, AS PREVIOUSLY EXTENDED IN 1966 AND 1968)

Memoradum by the Director General

1. A substantial number of Governors have urged that there should be a greater degree of statndarisation than in the past with respect to the duration and termination of such agreements as may henceforth be concluded under the Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968)1 for the application of safeguards in connection with nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material supplied to States by third parties. To achieve this, it is recommended that the following two concepts should be reflected in there agreements:
(a) That the duration of the agreement should be related to the period of actual use of the items in the recipient State; and
(b) That the provisions for terminating the agreement should be formulated in such a way that the rights and obligations of the parties continue to apply in connection with supplied nuclear material and with special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material, until such time as the Agency has terminated the application of safeguards thereto, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 26 or 27 of the Agency’s Safeguarded System.

A short exposition with respect to the application of these concepts in annexed hereto.

2. The proposed standardization would appear likely to facilitate the uniform application of safeguards measures. It is furthermore to be noted that the combined operation of the two concepts would be consistent with the application of the general principle embodied in paragraph 16 of the Agency’s Safeguards System.

Requested action by the Board

3. In bringing this matter to the Board’s attention, the Director General seeks the views of the Board as to whether it concurs with the two concepts set out in paragraph 1 above.

ANNEX

1. In the case of receipt by a State of source or special fissionable material, equipment facilities or non-nucler material from a supplier outside that State, the duration of the relevant agreement under the Agency’s Safeguards System would be related to the actual use in the recipient State of the material or items supplied. This may be accomplished by requiring, in accordance with present practice, that the material or items supplied be listed in the inventory called for by the agreement.

2. The primary effect of termination of the agreement, either by act of the parties or effluxion of time, would be that no further supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material could be added to the inventory. On the other hand, the rights and obligations of the parties, as provided for in the agreement, would continue to apply in connection with any supplied material or items and with any special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with any supplied material or items which had been included in the inventory, until such material or items had been removed from the inventory.

3. With respect to nuclear material, conditions for removal are those set out in paragraph 26 or 27 of the Agency’s Safeguards System; with respect to equipment, facilities and non-nuclear material, conditions for removal could be based on paragraph 26. A number of agreements already concluded have prescribed such conditions in part, by providing for deletion from the inventory of nuclear material, equipment and facilities which are returned to the supplying State or transferred (under safeguards) to a third State. The additional provisions contemplated would stipulate that items or non-nuclear material could be removed from the purview of the agreement if they had been consumed, were no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from from the point of view of safeguards or had become practically irrecoverable.

4. The effect of reflecting the two concepts in agreements would be that special fissionable material which had been produced, processed or used in or in connection with supplied material or items before they were removed from the scope of the agreement, would remain or be listed in the inventory, and such special fissionable material, together with any supplied nuclear material remaining in the inventory, would be subject to safeguards until the Agency had terminated safeguards on that special fissionable and nuclear material in accordance with the provisions of the Agency’s Safeguards System. Thus, the actual termination of the operation of the provisions of the agreement would take place only when everything had been removed from the inventory.

Note:
1. The Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968) set forth in document INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2.

Source: Appendix VI of Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Jozef Goldblat (Taylor & Francis, 1985).

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sraj » 16 Jul 2008 17:57

Termination of safeguards on indigenous reactors: What Gov/1621 really says
Siddharth Varadarajan
In the event of a supplier abrogating a fuel supply arrangement for indigenous facility X, say, the continuation of which is essential to the accomplishment of the objective of safeguards on that facility, India could determine that the conditions specified in the safeguards agreement, pursuant to which it was subject to Agency safeguards, no longer apply (i.e. the termination condition allowed by GOV/1621) and end safeguards on that facility once all foreign supplied material has been removed.

But again, it is important to reiterate a fundamental point with the safeguards agreement and indeed the entire civil nuclear initiative India is going in for.

Agreements may provide rights but this does not mean asserting them or implementing them will be easy. India may be on firm legal ground in invoking Paragraph 29, for example, in order to deal with the consequences of a fuel supply disruption, but the political opposition it will encounter internationally should not be minimized. Even if the right to withdraw facilities from safeguards were stated explicitly and upfront, as some critics seem to suggest India should have insisted on, the level of international opposition as and when India were to invoke that right would hardly be less strident.

The prudential strategy, therefore, is not to be complacent about one’s right to take corrective measures but to utilize all the pre-emptive rights the agreement provides for in terms of fuel supply arrangements and stockpiles so that at any time, the country has, on its own territory, a buffer of 5 to 7 years of nuclear fuel for each of the reactors it is placing under safeguards. A prudential strategy would also involve importing the least possible number of reactors, especially from the United States, which is seeking to impose extraneous conditions aimed at impinging on the country's sovereignty.

"Possession is nine-tenths of the law"

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Sanatanan » 16 Jul 2008 18:41

Gerard wrote (14 Jul 2008 05:48 pm)
I'm wondering what the big deal is regarding perpetual safeguards on the 8 PHWRs. The other 6 reactors of the 14 on the civilian list (2 BWRs, 2 VVERs and 2 PHWRs) are already under perpetual safeguards. So 8 more 220 MW reactors get added to the list. Even if they are fuelled by domestic Indian Uranium, does it really matter if they are under safeguards?


My view is as follows:

The two PHWRs that are under safeguards at present are Rajasthan 1 and 2. Rajasthan 1 is entirely Canadian and Rajasthan 2 is predominantly Canadian.

On the other hand, the other PHWRs now being offered for safeguards inspections are all India-built. I believe that by the very nature of the technology control regime in force at the time when these reactors were designed and built by India, ipr issues might be there to a significant extent. Thus, for similar reasons as in the case of FBRs which are being kept away from the civilian list (at least for a long time from now), India-built PHWRs also should not be placed under safeguards. Mismatch in availability of Nat U (which is only temporary and arising out of many misjudgments in policy implementation), being given as a reason for placing India-built PHWRs under safeguards is not a valid one. And for me, it is also not the appropriate strategy.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby enqyoob » 16 Jul 2008 19:40

So if I am reading this GOV1621 discussion right, India had the right all along to reprocess Tarapur fuel, but did not.
And ppl want me to believe that India is going to conduct more nuclear tests???? :roll: This sounds like the quintessential desi lobster aka mangy-dog-in-the-manger argument. A complete non-starter.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 16 Jul 2008 19:58

MMS already said there will be new reprocessing facility that willbe under safeguards and that was hailed as a deal maker. When that happens the current one will go back to being out of safeguards.


I do not buy that - yet.

It became a deal maker only because the verbiage allowed both sides to declare victory ..... the can got kicked.

The technical problem still remains and will rear its head in 2012 or so.

Listening to the US, I feel, that the first step to gain control over this mess is to account for ALL atoms, without exceptions. (Then reduce their presence based on %age. Goal being to reduce the bad atoms to zero.)

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Rangudu » 16 Jul 2008 20:11

After the post-Pokhran-1 US sanctions, Americans did not move for years about the spent fuel that was derived from US supplied material. In the 1990s, India reached out to the Americans and said, please take it back. After thinking about, Americans told us - "No thanks, you can have it indefinitely" :lol:

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby ramana » 16 Jul 2008 20:20

At same time they woudlnt give the permission to reprocess the fuel.

Even though the law is on your side and you have possession its prudent to seek permission to reprocess as that allows you to build a case for such a step.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 16 Jul 2008 20:49

As usual we are not seeing both sides of the coin.

I do not think what has happened in the past counts - not that the analysis or accounting is bad or wrong. I just think that what the US has got to know in the past 2-3 years trumps ALL that.

The US has got to know that proliferation has occurred - in large scale, large enough to scare them and attempt to totally clamp down.

This really has nothing to do with India. BUT, since India has nuclear techs and is willing to buy from outside, the US has to lock down India - no two ways about it. That is teh battle within the Hyde Act, 123 and now the IAEA draft proposal.

It really does not matter what India wants or does not want to do, as long as US certified atom accountants can be let loose all is OK.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby John Snow » 16 Jul 2008 21:35

R saar is missing an important date,
after that date US (and the world changed) a quite a lot.

That date is as you know 9/11/2001.

Every atom loose in ether now counts and has to be safe bound.

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby sraj » 16 Jul 2008 21:36

NRao wrote:Listening to the US, I feel, that the first step to gain control over this mess is to account for ALL atoms, without exceptions. (Then reduce their presence based on %age. Goal being to reduce the bad atoms to zero.)

This really has nothing to do with India. BUT, since India has nuclear techs and is willing to buy from outside, the US has to lock down India - no two ways about it. That is teh battle within the Hyde Act, 123 and now the IAEA draft proposal.

I don't understand these statements:

"account for ALL atoms, without exceptions" -- what happens to the atoms in China? Are they accounted for?

"since India has nuclear techs and is willing to buy from outside, the US has to lock down India - no two ways about it" -- China is buying from outside, how is the US planning to lock down China?

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 16 Jul 2008 22:35

what happens to the atoms in China? Are they accounted for?


ALL. Everyone. China specially.

Recall that the last time the US "looked the other way" was when all this mess started. They knew it too. However, they never dreamt of a non-state enemy. Check out the speech given by Obama, today, in Lafayette, IN.

You can hear "proliferation" from every US politicians mouth. The next word is "non-state" or something similar.

"since India has nuclear techs and is willing to buy from outside, the US has to lock down India - no two ways about it" -- China is buying from outside, how is the US planning to lock down China?


GNEP is my thinking. I have done quite a bit of research - never had the time to put it together. But, GNEP coming out (Jan, 2007), the OpEd in WSJ by Henry K, visit to India by Henry K around others visiting India, etc all points to GNEP.

FR and RU have bought into GNEP. India was offered GNEP seat (recall when they called AK the 600 lb gorilla? Same meeting).

However, there are few very interesting questions that need to be answered, or at least I have not come across the answer for them.

Check out GNEP. And, its reprocessing thinking too. Interesting stuff. (I had posted one very interesting link to GNEP-India thinking some time back.)

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Gerard » 17 Jul 2008 05:22

Strengthening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions
By Mark Goodman and Dunbar Lockwood, U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and Michael D. Rosenthal, Brookhaven National Laboratory

http://www.pubs.bnl.gov/documents/43106.pdf

Presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 49th Annual Meeting
Nashville, TN, July 13-17, 2008

ABSTRACT
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in
major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes
include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and
approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical
tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to
strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-
Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of
safeguards.


In legal terms, the IAEA has moved from INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreements, which
apply safeguards to specific listed items; to CSA, which apply safeguards to all nuclear
material in all peaceful nuclear activities; to CSA plus an AP, which together cover the
full peaceful nuclear fuel cycle and include complementary access rights whose purpose
includes detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities.


Safeguards Resources: The Agency faces both short- and long-term budget issues
because of the increase in the number of facilities, the enlarged scope of safeguards (e.g.,
the AP, the new Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), SERs, etc.), and the possible
application of new/additional safeguards in nuclear weapon states (NWS). Analyzing
and evaluating how to establish priorities for allocating safeguards resources to detecting
diversion at declared facilities, detecting undeclared facilities, and implementing
safeguards in NWS and, perhaps at additional facilities in India will remain a continuing
challenge.


In addition to the coverage of safeguards, the question of the duration of any continuing
safeguards would need to be addressed. Obligations that survive NPT withdrawal will
generally call for safeguards that last indefinitely, at least until the items are consumed or
become no longer relevant to safeguards. In the other cases, ideally, coverage would be
indefinite but consideration could be given to calling for safeguards for a fixed period of
time, perhaps, ten years.


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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby NRao » 19 Jul 2008 07:53



they observed, adding that analysts had convincingly refuted the government’s main reason for pushing the deal — energy security to the country.


What is he talking about? I seem to have missed that refutation.


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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby putnanja » 20 Jul 2008 01:23

Agreeing to permanent IAEA safeguards is on the basis of permanent fuel supplies: Kakodkar

Agreeing to permanent IAEA safeguards is on the basis of permanent fuel supplies: Kakodkar



T.S. Subramanian


Dr. Anil Kakodkar, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, during an interview with The Hindu, in Mumbai on Friday.

“The corrective measures are what I describe as unspecified sovereign actions. We can decide at the appropriate point of time,” Anil Kakodkar, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission told The Hindu in an exclusive interview in Mumbai on July 18. He was responding to a question asking him to spell out the “corrective measures” that India would take to ensure uninterrupted fuel supply for the nuclear power reactors that it would put under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s permanent safeguards.

In the interview, Dr. Kakodkar, who is also the Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, emphasised that “our agreeing to permanent safeguards is on the basis of permanent supplies [of fuel].” He also made the point that there were provisions in the India-specific safeguards agreement for “building up a stockpile [of fuel] to last for the full operating life of the reactors and our own ability to take corrective measures.”

Excerpts from the interview:

Question: The DAE is putting reactors under safeguards in perpetuity as a reciprocal measure or a quid pro quo for uninterrupted fuel supplies to those reactors. How is the uninterrupted fuel supply incorporated in the India-Specific Safeguards Agreement (ISSA) that you have concluded with the IAEA secretariat?

Dr. Kakodkar: Basically, you should understand that this safeguards agreement that we have developed with the IAEA has a background. The background is the civil nuclear cooperation that we have negotiated with the U.S., Russia, and France. Particularly that part of the understanding with the U.S., where we have agreed that we will identify some of our facilities as civilian facilities and that they will be placed under safeguards with an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This also spells out that the facilities which are not identified as civilian will have no external hindrance of any sort.

So we are talking about the ISSA, which is an umbrella-document restricted to facilities that India identifies as civilian. Our identifying any facility as civilian is conditional on that facility benefiting from full civil nuclear cooperation. This will mean that the reactors we identify as civilian and place under safeguards under the ISSA will receive full, assured fuel supply from outside. We also have incorporated provisions for building up a stockpile [of fuel] to last for the full operating life of the reactors and our own ability to take corrective measures. So our agreeing to permanent safeguards is on the basis of permanent supplies [of fuel].

Why are the corrective measures unspecified in the ISSA? Why have you not explicitly spelt them out? What corrective steps will India take if the fuel supply is cut off?

The corrective measures are what I describe as unspecified sovereign actions. We can decide [them] at the appropriate point of time.

The corrective measures that we can take and the strategic fuel reserve that we can build up find mention only in the preamble to the ISSA. There is a fear that this will lack teeth because they are not mentioned in the operative part of the ISSA. Why did you not include them in the operative part?

That is not correct. I think that if we go by international law, it specifies that any agreement has to be seen as a whole. More specifically, the ISSA preamble is tightly linked with the operative portion.

If India were to conduct a nuclear test, it will attract the Hyde Act of the U.S. and the fuel supply for the reactors will be cut off. So what are the corrective measures that you will take?

As far as we are concerned, we are governed by the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation that we have negotiated.

With Russia, the U.S. and France?

I am talking about the U.S. I am talking about the 123 nuclear agreement that we have negotiated with the U.S. There is no mention of [nuclear explosive] tests in that text.

The ISSA does not grant us full, civil nuclear cooperation, which means that we will not get the technologies for reprocessing the spent fuel and uranium enrichment. How are you going to face this problem? Under the agreement with the U.S. for the first two Tarapur reactors, we had the right to reprocess the spent fuel from those two imported reactors. But we could never enforce that right with the U.S.

The safeguards agreement is an agreement between India and the IAEA, which was established at India’s request and it will apply to facilities that India will identify as civilian and ask the IAEA to safeguard. The ISSA covers reactors as well as fuel cycle facilities, including reprocessing.

You have said that the indigenous reactors that we put under safeguards are entitled to receive fuel supplies from abroad and that they would be under permanent safeguards. If that fuel supply is cut off and we use our own fuel, will those reactors continue to be under safeguards in perpetuity?

No, no. First of all, we would have built up a stockpile. There is no chance of stoppage of reactors because the stockpile will be available.

During that time [if the fuel supply stops], we can take necessary action.

You told me earlier that the India-Specific Safeguards Agreement should recognise India as a nuclear weapon State. Does it recognise India as a nuclear weapon State?

First of all, the title of the ISSA is that it is an agreement for India’s “civilian nuclear facilities.” Further, the text of the agreement provides for non-hindrance to facilities and activities which are not covered by the safeguards agreement. This clearly means that while the safeguards agreement is only for civilian facilities, India is free to pursue its own domestic development, including the development of its strategic areas.

The Hyde Act makes the specific requirement of “safeguards to be in perpetuity…in accordance with the IAEA document of GOV/1621 of August 20, 1973.” The ISSA also invokes GOV/1621, which makes it clear that the reactors we put under safeguards will be under safeguards in perpetuity even if we use domestic fuel for them.

GOV/1621 is about supplied materials and supplied facilities. As part of the cooperation agreement with other countries, we will ensure that the fuel is stockpiled to meet the lifetime requirement of our reactors.

If the IAEA Board of Governors clears the ISSA, what do you expect from the Nuclear Suppliers Group? You said earlier that you wanted clean, unconditional exemptions from the NSG.

We expect clean, unconditional exemptions for nuclear commerce with India.

The Department of Atomic Energy has agreed to put even research facilities and heavy water plants under safeguards. How are they different from the nuclear power reactors coming under safeguards?

As I told you, whatever we identify as civilian must also benefit from unrestricted, international cooperation. The research that we carry out in our autonomous research and development institutions should benefit from an environment of unrestricted scientific collaboration. When we declare something as civilian, the condition for that is that it should benefit from international civil nuclear cooperation. Our autonomous R and D institutions should benefit from unrestricted international scientific collaboration. We should also recognise that the activities of these institutions are irrelevant from the point of view of safeguards.

You are the father of thorium reactor technology in India. You said in Bangalore recently that if India could import 40,000 MWe of nuclear power between 2012 and 2020, we can wipe out the gap between the demand and the supply of power by 2050 – by building more fast breeder reactors using the spent fuel arising from these imported reactors. But you also said that thorium does not have properties that allow for faster growth of power generation. Media commentators have alleged that this amounts to India abandoning its third stage of building thorium-fuelled reactors.

Right from the beginning all the way up to now, there is absolutely no contradiction between my statements on thorium utilisation strategies.

These are based on detailed analyses and they remain valid. [Dr. R.] Ramachandran’s article in Frontline (August 1, 2008) is either from a result of lack of understanding or misinterpretation. The three-stage nuclear power development programme based on domestic efforts remains a priority activity and would be implemented unhindered.

To optimise the benefits of thorium utilisation, the timing of the introduction of thorium has to be judiciously planned. In any case, it has to follow significant build-up of nuclear power generation capacity through deployment of fast breeder reactors. The point to realise is the fact that India’s electricity requirements are growing faster. The gap between electricity demand and supply that can be managed on indigenous resources is widening and it would exceed 400,000 MWe by 2050.

The question that one needs to address is how soon we can bridge this gap through the growth potential that is possible with fast reactors. Clearly, this necessitates emphasis on deployment of fast breeder reactors with the shortest possible doubling time. The timing of the introduction of thorium needs to be adjusted such that the demand-supply gap is bridged at the earliest and at the same time, we derive full benefit of the vast energy potential of our thorium resources for centuries to come.

The import of 40,000 MWe of power as an additionality [to the domestic nuclear power programme] bridges not only this gap by 2050 but it would avoid the necessity of import of much larger fossil energy resources and at the same time enable earlier deployment of thorium, meeting the objectives stated above.

The point is even after we pursue the domestic three-stage nuclear power programme, which we will pursue on a priority basis in any case, there will be a gap of 400,000 MWe. If we introduce thorium earlier, this gap will become larger and the three-stage programme will become smaller. On the other hand, if we can get this 40,000 MWe from outside [by importing reactors], we can bridge this gap, and at the same time, we can advance the deployment of thorium.

Is the DAE delaying the start of the construction of the indigenous 700 MWe Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) and the criticality of the three new PHWRs of 220 MWe each at Rajasthan and Kaiga for want of uranium?

It is true that presently there is a mismatch in the demand and supply of indigenous natural uranium. But things are about to start improving now. The capacity factor of the reactors is about to start improving. This is because the production [of yellow cake from uranium] from the mill at Turamdih in Jharkhand will start coming in now. We are working on the uranium mining and milling project at Tummlapalle in Andhra Pradesh. I am hopeful about the Meghalaya uranium project. There are also other sites. Our efforts for increasing the domestic production of uranium are continuing

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Re: Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

Postby Neshant » 20 Jul 2008 02:21

> India’s testing option will be rendered progressively thin and theoretical. Without further
> testing, the country’s nuclear strategic forces will continue to feature untested and
> unproven thermonuclear armaments that lack credibility.

this is really the aim isn't it given the one failed h-bomb test conducted in 1998.


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