Arun_S wrote:kit wrote:ps : Is Arun_S running for president ? Hope he does
I do not have any deserving quality to be President.
But does the office of President have power to play a decisive role in defending and defining the future of Bharat? Or pay enough to take care of my extended family? I doubt.
Sanku wrote:Why?
JE Menon wrote:The SeS statement was a blunder, not a strategic error, and it is not irretrievable by any means. If someone should be held responsible for that one, I would think that person is SS Menon. GoI does make mistakes on occasion.
JE Menon wrote:But that is beside the point on this CTBT issue. While trashing MMS, perhaps it is pertinent to point out that the BJP of ABV went further down that road than Congress ever did.
JE Menon wrote:But, and this is the point, neither BJP nor Congress has ever indicated a readiness to sign on the dotted line of the CTBT.
Raja Ram wrote:..........
Anujan wrote:
What angle is it ?
John Snow wrote:Is kanson a incarination of SS Maverick? the sizemic signature of his posts seem to be having the same resonance frequency.
I wonder
Anujan wrote:Sanku wrote:Why?
Because that would be missing the forest for the trees. In both cases, the answer is simple -- we must test.
The question about whether Santhanam was speaking out against the guvrmand (which will cause our guvrmand to go into ostrich mode) or speaking for the guvrmand (which will cause scientist and bhajpha to go into ostrich mode), will prevent the only possible solution from being carried out. We must test.
Remember what it took to do Pok-II, PVN passing a note to ABV and ABV giving a go ahead with the cooperation of the top echelons of the scientific community. Such a cooperation is needed for any future testing. So lets not debate who was the culprit, this will only cause one or more parties whose cooperation is needed, to go into hunker down mode.
Let us discuss angles. There are only three angles, the cheeni angle and the US angle. (The paki angle is irrelevant, we have enough fission bums and delivery systems to glass them thrice over.). Testing now can serve only one of three purposes. 1. To demonstrate to the cheenis that we are able, willing and ready. 2. To demonstrate to unkil, if he pressurizes us on shittybitty and other 3 or 4 letter treaties, we *will* test. Desh has enough rabble rousers to whip up a frenzy among aam aadmi and so manipulating a few people in the guvrmand wont work. 3. Internal coup of scientists against the top echelon who conducted the test.
What angle is it ?
Kalam Directed
Chidambaram Conceived
Anil produced
Santhanam Chipped
Mahajan clapped
LKg gloated
Jasoo bloated
India Shined
Uncle Sanctioned.
ABV declared
Wallace faulted
MMS signed
Parliament defaulted
Now Naked.
He said, "Based upon the seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over, it is clear that the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed. I think it is well documented and that is why I assert that India should not rush into signing the CTBT."
Sources claim that Santhanam had admitted that the test was a fizzle during a discussion on CTBT organised by IDSA.
NEW DELHI - Top defence scientist Dr.K. Santhanam said on Thursday that the scientific community in India had felt after the May 1998 nuclear tests that there should be another test to complete the research.
Speaking to ANI after controversially revealing that Pokhran II tests were not entirely successful Santhanam said: “The Science and Technology Community as a whole wanted to have some more tests.”
“…but conducting a nuclear test is a highly political decision, and no matter the wish of scientific community may be, the political leadership of the country will have its say,” he added.
Santhanam also clarified that he had at no stage said the tests were a complete failure.
“I didn’t say it was a failure but partially successful,” Santhanam added.
He also said that in the reports given to the government, the scientists had mentioned the outcome of their experiments.
“The scientific community placed its reports about the out come of the tests. They are highly classified and the political leadership of the country is aware about that,” he said.
Maintaining his stand to go for more tests before signing CTBT or NPT Santhanam said, “Many people in the administration knew that India is in need of another test.”
“The energy released after the blast were measured and the energy release was much lower than what was expected by the designers. It was not a surprise to me,” Santhanam recalled.
India tested five nuclear devices including two-sub kilo category of thermo nuclear devices code named “Operation Shakti,” on May 11 and 13, 1998 at Pokhran in Rajasthan.
Countering Santhanam’s views, former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra said: “When they (scientists) said about the success of the tests in 1998, May 11 and 13, we asked whether they want to go for another test, but they (scientists) said No, and were satisfied by the tests.”
“It was very clear that based on their report only, we have announced it to the world. We have not lied to any one,” Mishra said adding it was only then that plans developed to discuss civil nuclear co-operation with the United States.
” In the entire scientific history, no country has gained 100 percent success in its first test of thermo nuclear device…if we get a chance, India should go for another test, especially of a thermonuclear device.” Santhanam said.
He, however, cautioned the country’s political leadership against signing either Comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) or Non - proliferation treaty (NPT).
The NPT is a highly discriminative treaty and divides the whole world into a nuclear haves and have nots, “Santhanam claimed.
Santhanam said the new Indo- US nuclear deal does not come in the way of going for more tests.
“There is one clause in the Indo- US nuclear deal that if the security scenario around the country changes, then we can go for a test, and the country’s leadership should take a decision to go for a test taking confidence of all the factors involved,” Santhanam said. By Shreeraj Gudi(ANI)
Yes, Virginia, India’s H-bomb fizzled.
K Santhanam (who was director of test site preparations for India’s 1998 nuclear tests; pictured above, handing the firing keys to the range safety officer) has admitted what everyone else has known for a long time — that India’s 1998 test of a thermonuclear device was unsuccessful:
“Based upon the seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over, it is clear that the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed. I think it is well documented and that is why I assert that India should not rush into signing the CTBT,’‘ Santhanam told [the Times of India] on Wednesday.
[snip]
Sources said that Santhanam had admitted that the test was a fizzle during a discussion on CTBT organised by IDSA. Karnad also participated in the seminar. He told TOI that no country has succeeded in achieving targets with only its first test of a thermonuclear device.
“Two things are clear; that India should not sign CTBT and that it needs more thermonuclear device tests,’‘ said Santhanam.
This is a subject we have covered in some detail here at Arms Control Wonk.com (see The Bomb, Dmitry. The Hydrogen Bomb, 10 April 2005.)
1. Yes, India’s thermonuclear device probably probably did fizzle, looking at the seismic data.
2. Some Indian scientists, including the former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission PK Iyengar and now Santhanam, keep pointing out this somewhat embarrassing fact because it is part of an argument for India to resume nuclear testing.
3. India’s evident need to resume testing to complete development of a thermonuclear device is the principal reason that I opposed a “clean” NSG exemption for India (See: Will India Test Again?, 23 June 2008 ).
Here is my original post on the subject, reproduced because I am lazy and I recall the reading list was somewhat helpful:
Did India successfully test a two-stage thermonuclear device in May 1998?
There are substantial reasons for skepticism. India claimed that it detonated three devices on 11 May 1998 at Pokhran (right)—a 43-kiloton thermonuclear explosion, a 12-kiloton fission explosion and a 0.2-kiloton fission explosion. (India then claims to have conducted low yield tests on 13 May 1998.)
Seismic analyses (particularly Wallace et al) conclude the cumulative yield for the 11 May tests was only 12-kilotons. A yield that low is probably “too small to have been a full test of a thermonuclear weapon”—suggesting the test fizzled.
The US intelligence community reportedly shares this conclusion. Govenment officials told Mark Hibbs of Nucleonics Week that analysts from Livermore’s Z Division “have now concluded that the second stage of a two-stage Indian hydrogen bomb device failed to ignite as planned.” Subsequently, “senior U.S. expert” confirmed to Hibbs that this account was correct.
Indian scientists have been quick to dispute these estimates, arguing that Western scientists have made inaccurate assumptions about the geography of the Indian test site. This argument has always struck me as unconvincing, in part because of data that has been presented from the 1974 test.
A former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, PK Iyengar, has used calculations similar to those of Wallace et al to suggest that the second stage of the two-stage thermonuclear weapon failed to ignite—“the fusion core burnt only partially, perhaps less than 10 per cent.” Iyengar, however, has an axe to grind—he wants India to resume nuclear testing.
Such failures have plagued new nuclear designers before. China’s seventh nuclear test (CHICOM 7)—and second thermonuclear weapon—also fizzled, resulting in a yield estimated at the time between 15-25 KT.
Similarly, Livermore’s first attempt at “super” also failed—resulting from what Herb York called “a simple design flaw … engendered by the novelty of the technology and by our inexperience.”
Sources:
Brian Barker et al, “Monitoring Nuclear Tests,” Science 281:5385 (25 September 25, 1998) 1967-68 (subscription).
Mark Hibbs,”India May Test Again Because H-Bomb Failed, U.S. Believes,” Nucleonics Week 39:48 (26 November 1998) 1.
Mark Hibbs, “Because H-Bomb Fuel Didn’t Burn, Iyengar Pleads For Second Test,” Nucleonics Week (1 June 2000) 6.
PK Iyengar, “Nuclear Nuances,” The Times of India (22 August 2000) (full text in the comments).
SK Sikka et al,”The recent Indian Nuclear Tests: A Seismic Overview,” Current Science 79:9 (10 November 2000) 1359-1366 (draft).
Gregory van der Vink et al, “False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty,” Arms Control Today 28:4 (May 1998) 7-13).
Terry C. Wallace, “The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests,” Seismological Research Letters 69 (September 1998) 386-393 (preprint).]
Herbert York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (Basic Books, 1987) 78.
Comment
Nuclear Nuances
Credible Deterrent Through Testing
By P K IYENGAR, August 2000
(The author is former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission)
AFTER a long period of indecision and ambivalence regarding its nuclear preparedness, India detonated five nuclear devices in May 1998. Consequently, it declared itself a nuclear weapons country. However, it is unlikely that we will be accepted as a weapons country under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), because there is no provision for threshold states maturing to become nuclear powers.
When Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visits the US next month, the CTBT will certainly be one of the important issues raised by the Americans. There may be political arguments both for and against signing the CTBT, but if we have decided to follow a policy of nuclear deterrence, which will require weaponisation, then, scientifically, we have no option but to continue testing. It is the scientific case that I wish to make here.
If one goes by the numbers for the total nuclear yield put out by the Department of Atomic Energy, which I see no reason to dispute, the yield of the thermonuclear device detonated on May 11, 1998 was around 40 kilotons. This is a rather low yield. If the yield was deliberately kept low to restrict damage to the nearby villages, then surely it would have been more sensible to test the thermonuclear device separately, and not along with the 15 kt fission device. Now, the thermonuclear device itself consisted of two parts: the fission trigger and the fusion core.
The crucial question is not what the total yield of the device was, but what was the ratio of fission energy to fusion energy? Clearly, for a given total yield, the greater the fraction of the fusion energy, the more efficient is your thermonuclear device. In my opinion, that ratio musts have been around 1:1, and no one has so far, to my knowledge either publicly or privately, disputed that number. Therefore, by my estimate, the fusion yield could not have been more than 20 kt. Further, it seems likely that a fission `spark-plug’ was used at the centre of the fusion core, in which case the actual fusion yield would have been even less.
Sticking to the larger number of a 20 kt fusion yield, one can easily calculate that the amount of LiD fusion material needed would be only around 400 grams or around 500 cc. This is a very small size for the fusion core, and the actual core used must certainly have been much larger. This suggests that the fusion core burnt only partially, perhaps less than 10 per cent. This can easily be checked; if the burn was only partial, there should have been a lot of tritium produced, which should have been detected after the explosions.
In such a complex system as a two-stage thermonuclear device, getting any burn at all is a credit to the abilities of the scientists and engineers of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). However, a thermonuclear device that only burns partially is certainly inefficient. Logically and scientifically, the next step would be to improve the design of the device to achieve greater efficiency. This is particularly important from the point of view of a weaponisation programme.
The government has declared a policy of maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence means that we have a demonstrable nuclear capability that deters a potential adversary from attacking us. For us to have a nuclear deterrent we must weaponise. For this, we must have fusion weapons, because these are smaller, lighter, and more efficient than fission weapons. But for that deterrent to be viable, we must master all aspects of thermonuclear weapons, and demonstrate that expertise not just in one, but many thermonuclear designs, particularly those of greater efficiency.
Whether that should include a neutron bomb or not, is not of the essence. In a neutron bomb, one establishes a thermonuclear burn by igniting only a part of the core, and making the burn propagate. This is the crux of the matter in designing an efficient thermonuclear device. One may not have a neutron bomb in one’s arsenal, but it would strengthen our abilities if we successfully tested one.
Some people argue that we have benchmarked our computer simulations using the data from the Pokhran tests, and, therefore, further weapons can be designed based on those computer simulations. We should note that we have conducted only one thermonuclear test, and that too of low yield. It is, as mentioned before, likely that this device burnt only partially. Devices that are more efficient will have to be built. In order to weaponise, we will need missile-mountable devices, which will have a different geometry. They will also have to be of higher yield. Then these will have to be made compact, and integrated with delivery as well as command and control systems. Can our nuclear deterrent be credible if we go through this long process of weaponisation without a single additional test? The bottom line is that we just cannot hand over to the army, or deter potential aggressors with, weapons based on computer simulations.
It is unscientific to embark on a long programme of weaponisation, and develop elaborate plans for maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, all based on just one, low yield, thermonuclear test. When we do not do this for the Agni or Prithvi missiles, why would we want to take this risk for nuclear weapons? I am sure that the BARC scientists themselves, like their DRDO counterparts, would prefer to take a more conservative approach and test further to refine their designs and their capabilities. This is the scientific way. It would be wrong for the government to pressure the scientists to put a premature end to nuclear tests, for political expediency.
In principle, India accepts nuclear disarmament, and hopes its problems will be solved if all countries accept non-discriminatory, global, nuclear disarmament. Yet, this is unlikely to happen, from what we see around us as well as in the `N5’ (five nuclear weapons) countries. In spite of long and friendly discussions with the US, we haven’t come to any concrete decision relating to a new status under the CTBT. If we are to maintain our independence in today’s world, it is essential for us to have a credible nuclear deterrent, and this requires us to continue testing.
— Jeffrey Lewis · Aug 27, 09:08 AM ·
Mnhm-hmnh. As the prospect of ratifying the CTBT draws closer, we can expect to hear more of how everyone’s weapons don’t work well enough to give up testing.
That’s not to say that I don’t believe that India’s H-bomb didn’t work as planned. The evidence is there.
From the United States, we can expect to hear that there are hitherto undisclosed safety questions that can only be resolved by testing, although this ploy becomes less and less credible with repetition, along with the assurances that the RRW doesn’t need testing.
Or, come to think of it, maybe it does!
— Cheryl Rofer · Aug 27, 09:18 AM ·
Is this cool or what?
I remember what happened when I wrote that article in the fall of 1998 saying in the headline that the US had concluded that the Indian “H-Bomb failed.”
Almost overnight after the article was published I got a huge bundle of papers from BARC and DAE sent to me by diplomatic pouch from Mumbai informing me with all kinds of numbers that I was wrong.
I gave the papers to laboratory geoscientists at several European countries and the US. One main CTBTO monitoring scientist told me explicitly: “Nope. The stuff in these papers is shitty science. They haven’t shown that you are wrong.”
That having been said, please note however that, as PK Iyengar had made the case to me back a decade ago, once again this “news” is surfacing in India because their bomb makers want to keep testing. Some things in India are changing fast. Other things aren’t.
— mark hibbs · Aug 27, 09:57 AM ·
I got into a huge pissing match with the Indians on this issue as I was the principal author of Barker et. al. 1998 which had the yield estimates far below the Indian press releases. A number of Indian scientists tried to submit a comment to Science rebutting our analysis. We asked them to provide the in-country seismic data on which they based their analysis, but they refused. Luckily, in the end, their comment was rejected and never published.
On a related note, I saw the other day that wikipedia has a glowing description of the Indian 1998 tests, citing the inflated yields and saying the tests were a huge technical accomplishment. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pokhran-II
In the next day or so, I plan to submit a corrected analysis.
— charles meade · Aug 27, 10:48 AM ·
Charles, I recall one of your co-authors back then explained to me in nitty-gritty detail your frustration on this with these guys. Please do correct the record for posterity.
— mark hibbs · Aug 27, 11:14 AM ·
Their arguments at the time were quite remarkable. They said that our seismic data didn’t reflect the true yield because of a complex interference pattern caused by the simultaneous tests. Under these circumstances, they said that one could only obtain the correct yield from near field data. We said, “fine, show it to us”. They refused and that was the end of their paper.
— charles meade · Aug 27, 12:24 PM ·
The Indian argument:
For us to have a nuclear deterrent we must weaponise. For this, we must have fusion weapons, because these are smaller, lighter, and more efficient than fission weapons.
is a lot of hooey.
They claim to be building a deterrent force, not a war-fighting arsenal with a counter-force capability.
For the size and mass of their likely early-generation fusion designs, they can instead use basic fission bombs yielding in the multi-dekakiloton range – multiples of the hell weapons that incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
That should be sufficient to deter any rational adversary. And if they aren’t rational, then you have no deterrent.
=========================
A nice discussion of the actual yields of the Indian tests is from Carey Sublette back in 2001, here
— Yale Simkin · Aug 27, 12:40 PM ·
John Snow wrote:Is kanson a incarination of SS Maverick? the sizemic signature of his posts seem to be having the same resonance frequency.
I wonder
Pls link the post where he concurred with me so i too can enjoy.Anujan wrote: The question about whether Santhanam was speaking out against the guvrmand (which will cause our guvrmand to go into ostrich mode) or speaking for the guvrmand (which will cause scientist and bhajpha to go into ostrich mode), will prevent the only possible solution from being carried out. We must test.
Kanson wrote:
What he says is different from what BK and other are saying. To sample it, he says, We cannot sign CTBT, need to conduct many more tests. But it has political implication and there also economic ramification. Becoz of these we cannot test so we should not sign CTBT.
Sanku wrote:Kanson wrote:
What he says is different from what BK and other are saying. To sample it, he says, We cannot sign CTBT, need to conduct many more tests. But it has political implication and there also economic ramification. Becoz of these we cannot test so we should not sign CTBT.
I am not sure if he is saying that, but even if he is, Makes sense to me, you want to score 10 out of 10 in the exam, but cant but that does not mean you dont try and score 7/10 and instead leave the paper blank.
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