Intelligence & National Security Discussion

sum
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9966
Joined: 08 May 2007 17:04
Location: (IT-vity && DRDO) nagar

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 06 Dec 2011 09:11

GoI seems to have declassified its dealings with Mansoor Ijaz now that he is facing the heat and in the news:

Billionaire at heart of Pakistan political crisis offered RAW help with ISI-linked jihadists

Ijaz met former RAW chief Sahay, claiming to have blessings of White House to broker a secret India-Pakistan deal on J&K

Mansoor Ijaz, the billionaire businessman now at the heart of a scandal that is threatening to bring down Pakistan's democratic government, had earlier approached India's intelligence services with an offer to broker peace between New Delhi and jihadists linked to the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, highly placed government sources have told The Hindu.

The billionaire businessman, the sources said, made contact with C.D. Sahay—who went on to serve as RAW's chief from 2003 to 2005 —claiming to have the blessings of the White House to broker a secret India-Pakistan deal on Jammu and Kashmir.

In October this year, Mr. Ijaz revealed that Husain Haqqani, Islamabad's ambassador to the United States, had recruited him into plot to ease Pakistan's generals out of positions of power. He went public with a memo calling on the United States to help Pakistan's government rid itself of the Army, and then made over evidence of his conversations with Mr. Haqqani to the ISI's chief, General Shuja Pasha.

President Asif Ali Zardari has since been forced to recall Mr. Haqqani—and many analysts believe what is being called “MemoGate” could end in a frontal showdown between the military and the elected government.

Mr. Ijaz's Kashmir mission reveals the businessman had a long history of participating in political intrigue — but failing to deliver on his promises, and then falling out with partners in public.

Ijaz's Mission Kashmir

Mr. Ijaz's offer came even as key Hizb ul-Mujahideen commander Abdul Majid Dar and former RAW chief A.S. Dulat were engaged in secret discussions aimed at bringing about a ceasefire. Mr. Dar and Mr. Dulat, the sources said, met in the United Arab Emirates after the Kargil war. Srinagar-based sources close to Mr. Dar admitted the meeting took place, but said it came about after the jihad commander experienced a spiritual epiphany while caught among a crush of pilgrims in Mecca.

Less than a fortnight after the July 25, 2000, ceasefire announcement, though the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen's Pakistan-backed chief, Muhammad Yusuf Shah, backed out under ISI pressure—sparking off a bitter internecine war that would claim the lives of several members of the hardline faction, as well as Mr. Dar himself.

Eight weeks before the ceasefire, Mr. Ijaz was flown to Srinagar under RAW escort, where he met with top officials including then-XV corps commander Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal and Director-General of Police Gurbachan Jagat. Former Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Farooq Abdullah hosted a dinner for the businessman on May 10, 2000.


In a November 22 article in the International Herald Tribune, Mr. Ijaz claimed credit for having organised the ceasefire, saying he implored Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, to “persuade the Mujahideen under his control to opt for non-violent means”. In the course of a three hour meeting, Mr. Ijaz wrote, “I told him that every civilian I met in Kashmir earlier that month had tired as much of the incessant violence imparted by Pakistan's militia forces.”

The ceasefire, Mr. Ijaz's account of events has it, fell apart, after “Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalists got wind of the proposal”. General Musharraf in turn “got cold feet”.

Mr. Sahay, RAW sources said, received calls from Mr. Ijaz on several subsequent occasions—one time, claiming to have the former head of Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami, Qazi Husain Ahmad, on the line.

RAW's opinion, however, was that Mr. Ijaz did not have the influence to deliver on promises he made. His claims to have had a role in organising the ceasefire caused amusement



The Sudan affair

India's spies weren't the only players to lose faith in Mr. Ijaz. In the 1990s, Mr. Ijaz—who runs an investment bank in New York, and was a major donor to the Democratic party—claimed to have been relaying messages from Sudan's Islamist government to the White House. Mr. Ijaz later wrote his mission had given the United States an opportunity to eliminate Osama bin-Laden.

sum
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9966
Joined: 08 May 2007 17:04
Location: (IT-vity && DRDO) nagar

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 06 Dec 2011 15:57

X-post:
Arms and the rogue

THE WEEK investigates a conspiracy hatched by the ISI to arm insurgents in India


It was past midnight on April 1, 2004, in the coastal city of Chittagong in southeastern Bangladesh. Two trawlers carrying munitions, enough to arm a brigade and procured from the company China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), reached the harbour. Top officials of Bangladesh's foreign intelligence and internal security intelligence guided the trawlers from St Martin's Island in the Bay of Bengal to the Chittagong jetty, and Nurul Amin, a senior official at the industries ministry, was expected to arrive from Dhaka to supervise the unloading and distribution of the consignment.
Everything went on smoothly, until two policemen, Mohammad Alauddin and Helal Uddin, saw the consignment and blew the whistle, perhaps unaware of the orders from higher authorities.

It was New Delhi, not Dhaka, which was shocked by the haul, as it was revealed that the arms were meant for insurgent groups in India. Bangladesh has become, says an Indian military report on the haul, “a key focal point in the transit route of illegal arms in the subcontinent.”


The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of Bangladesh investigated the case till July this year, and the police have filed charges against some of the country's top politicians and intelligence officers, including two former ministers and intelligence chiefs.
THE WEEK has unearthed official records on the case in India and Bangladesh, and has got exclusive access to the 3,500-page Chittagong case diary. It has also got the confessional statement of the main accused in the case, notorious Bangladeshi arms dealer Hafiz Rehman, and many important court documents. The documents reveal startling details of how Pakistan procured weapons from China to fuel insurgency in India. And the case is the strongest evidence of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and China coming together to use Bangladeshi soil against India.
The four-member team of Bangladesh army's ordnance branch, which investigated the arms haul, has also confirmed that all 10 truckloads of arms and ammunition were manufactured in China by NORINCO, a state-owned arms manufacturer. The seized consignment, which included 1,290 submachine guns, 400 semi-automatic guns, 400 Thompson submachine guns, 150 rocket launchers, 2,000 grenade-launching tubes, 840 rockets, 24,996 hand-grenades and 11,40,520 bullets, was the largest arms haul in Bangladesh's history.

The case diary says the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, or DGFI, which is Bangladesh's military intelligence agency, was penetrated by the ISI to the extent that its then director, Maj.-Gen. (retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury, was an ISI mole. Chowdhury was later promoted as the chief of Bangladesh's National Security Intelligence. The NSI, too, was penetrated by the ISI and its then chief, Brig.-Gen. (retd) Abdur Rahim, who reports to the prime minister like the DGFI chief, was discreetly working for the ISI.

The case diary says Chowdhury and Rahim travelled to London and to a Middle East country to meet the ISI's top brass to plan covert anti-India operations (using passports Z0171247 and O0397451). And they often directed sources by using their own cell phones (01812271769 and 01711565850). The investigators have confirmed their contacts with other military and government officials and other ISI moles through emails, phone intercepts, witness accounts and other evidence.
Both Chowdhury and Rahim, currently in prison, were cultivated by two ISI officers posted at the Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka, Brig. Mogisuddin and Col Shahed Mahmud. Mogisuddin facilitated their meetings with ISI officials and arms dealers in Bangladesh, Dubai and London. “Our investigation has found that the weapons came from China and were procured by Pakistan with the help of Bangladesh's top intelligence officials,” said Moniruzaman Chaudhory, chief investigating officer. “All [weapons] were destined for India.” He said his team had figured out six of seven issues that a Chittagong court had directed it to solve during the investigation. “The only unsolved issue is the identification of the vessel that transported the arms consignment,” he said.
The conspiracy began in 2000, when Bangladesh was in political unrest owing to the enmity between the ruling the Awami League and the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Many leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, who were accused of collaborating with Pakistan during the liberation war and committing war crimes, had returned to the country. The BNP came to power in 2001, forming a coalition with the Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Oikye Jote.
During this time, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, under intense pressure from the US after the 9/11 attacks, declared that no Pakistan-based group would be allowed to commit terrorism in the name of religion. He banned five jihadi groups that his army had long nurtured. Though the camps were closed, terrorists were shifted to hideaways. The ISI shifted at least 100 terrorist commanders, including Arab fighters of al Qaeda, from Pakistan to Bangladesh in special Pakistan International Airlines flights from Karachi to Dhaka. In Dhaka, the houses they stayed in were owned and protected by the DGFI and NSI. Some terrorist commanders were even kept at the NSI director-general's house in the tony Gulshan area in Dhaka.
Saleem Samad, a Dhaka-based journalist who tried to interview a terrorist who was shifted to the city, was arrested by the intelligence agencies and was threatened with death. “My ordeal began the day I went to interview an Arab fighter in Dhaka,” said Samad. Once he got bail he escaped from Bangladesh and took refuge in Canada. (See the box)
Around this time, many Indian terrorist groups were expanding their activities to Bangladesh. This correspondent visited Sector 3 in Uttara, VIP Road in Karnail and Dhanmondi in Dhaka, where commanders of the United Liberation Front of Asom, a militant separatist group in India's northeast, lived for years. It was in Dhaka that Ulfa's military chief Paresh Baruah alias Kamruj Zaman came under the radar of the ISI. He was flown to Pakistan many a time, and at least once to Afghanistan, where he met warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
In Dhaka, Baruah's handler was Mogisuddin. He introduced him to pro-Pakistan Bangladeshi politicians and intelligence officials. One of them was Gulam Faruk Obhi, a Jatiya Party parliament member. It was Obhi who introduced Baruah to arms smuggler Hafizur Rahman. “We met at a fast food joint at Rapa Plaza in Dhaka. Paresh told me that he might need my help in importing some goods,” said Rehman in his confession statement. THE WEEK has a copy of the statement. He said Ulfa leaders and their families were protected by the DGFI and NSI.
According to the CID's case diary, the ISI took the help of a Middle East-based Pakistani channel to fund and smuggle weapons. Brig. Rahim and Mogisuddin held several meetings with the channel's people in Dhaka and abroad. Rahim later admitted that he was hooked to the religious programmes on the channel. “Sahabuddin [then director of the NSI] observed this. He told me that I should start a local franchise with the channel,” said Rahim.
One of the meetings, according to the case diary, was held in a Middle East country in 2003 and another in Dhaka in 2004. The owner of the channel came to Dhaka and was received at the airport by NSI officials. The expenses of his stay were met from Bangladesh's national intelligence fund. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's son Tarique Rahman was also present at the meeting. Currently living in London, Tarique is widely expected to succeed his mother as BNP chief.
Rahim once met the ISI chief in London. The ISI had not received the payment of 2.5 crore takas of the mobile phone bugging devices that the Bangladesh intelligence agencies had bought from Pakistan. “The ISI chief said the devices were a gift from Pakistan,” said Rahim. He, however, did not say anything in his confession on how and when the weapons were procured from China. The investigators suspect that Bangladeshi intelligence officials were not aware of Pakistan's business contacts with NORINCO.
Headquartered in Beijing, NORINCO is the third largest defence company in China and makes precision strike systems, amphibious assault weapons, anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, night vision products and small arms. It has a long-standing relationship with the Pakistan army. In 1996, the FBI arrested a group of Chinese arms dealers, including three NORINCO representatives, who were trying to smuggle small arms and shoulder-held missile launchers to California. And in August 2003, the US imposed sanctions on NORINCO after it was caught providing Iran speciality steel used in its missile programmes.
Indian security agencies had information on NORINCO's involvement in supplying arms to insurgents. Jayadeva Ranade, former additional secretary, Research and Analysis Wing, said India had informed China about it but the Chinese repeatedly denied it. “The problem was, neither India's military intelligence nor R&AW had any intelligence or evidence to prove it,” he said.
According to the CID's case diary, the weapons might have been procured in 2003 and a ship, most probably, had come from the Chinese port of Beihai in Qingdao. Confession statements by Hafiz Rehman and another arms dealer, Deam Mohamad, in a Chittagong court revealed that the ship passed through Hong Kong and Myanmar, and when it reached St Martin's Island near the Myanmar border, the consignment was reloaded into two trawlers. “When I asked him [Baruah] about the required permission from the Bangladesh navy, coast guard and customs, he said the NSI and DGFI chiefs had made all arrangements, and the jetty permission had also been obtained,” said Rehman in his confession.
During the final stages of the plan, a tall, stocky man was brought in from Manila to Dhaka via Bangkok. He was Anthony Shimray, the chief arms procurer of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, or NSCN(IM), the biggest insurgent outfit in the northeast. Shimray was arrested by India's National Investigation Agency on October 2, 2010. He said he had procured arms from Chinese defence companies several times with the help of his middleman in Bangkok, Willy Narue.
From Dhaka Shimray went to Chittagong and checked in at the Golden Inn hotel on March 28, 2004. In the hotel ledger he gave his address as 97/5 Sher-e-Bangla road, Mohammadpur, Dhaka. Shimray and Rehman hired two trawlers—Amanat and FB Khazardan—and, along with some other people, took them to St Martin's Island. There they shifted the weapons and ammunition from the ship to the trawlers.
The trawlers passed through Teknaf, in Cox's Bazar district in Chittagong, on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Escorted by Bangladesh's coast guard, the consignment reached the Chittagong Urea Fertiliser Ltd Jetty across the Karnaphuli river, where the trawlers pulled in. The jetty was under the industries ministry, which was headed by Jamaat-e-Islami leader Motiur Rahman Nizami. He is in prison for his role in the smuggling.
As soon as the weapons were seized, the ISI and its operatives in Bangladesh began their attempts to derail the investigation. Chittagong was notorious for arms smuggling and the BNP government tried to pass it off as a routine incident. Lutfozzaman Babar, then home minister, was allegedly involved in this. Babar was arrested last year and is currently in Dhaka Central Jail. His lawyer Mofizul Hoq Bhuiyan, however, told THE WEEK that he was being victimised. “It is a politically motivated case. He was a bright young politician. His only fault was that he was in the BNP,” he said.
It was a blind case in the beginning. But an unexpected confession changed its course. “We traced Habibullah Rahman, the man who gave trucks for unloading the arms at Chittagong jetty. During the interrogation he told us that one officer from Bangladesh intelligence wing, field officer Mohamed Akbar Hossain, had taken trucks from him,” said Chaudhory. Once Hossain was arrested and interrogated he revealed the name of his boss, NSI director Wing Commander (retd) Shahabuddin Ahmed, and when Shahabuddin was interrogated he disclosed the name of his boss, Brig.-Gen. Rahim. It was Rahim who revealed the involvement of DGFI chief Maj.-Gen. Chowdhury.
When the investigation in the case started, a plot was allegedly hatched by some members of the BNP to assassinate Sheikh Hasina, the opposition leader. Three months after the arms were seized in Chittagong, grenades were hurled from the roofs of neighbouring buildings towards a truck on which she was addressing a crowd in Dhaka. Eighteen people were killed, though Hasina escaped. Now the investigators have found that the assassination was planned by her own security officers.
Things changed when Hasina's Awami League defeated the BNP-led four-party alliance in the parliament elections in 2008. A few days after she became prime minister, Hasina initiated a multi-agency review of ISI contacts in the DGFI and NSI. She also arrested Ulfa leaders and handed them over to India, including its chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa. “When we took power we realised that there were a lot of wrong things happening in our country,” said Bangladesh Home Minister Shahara Khatun. “We made a clear decision that we are not going to tolerate any act of terrorism in our country.”
The trial of Chittagong arms case at the metropolitan court in Chittagong boils down to the names that would pop up. As the testimony has begun at the court, Bangladesh is brimming with speculation. Outside the court-room, the walls of the town, which witnessed many atrocities during the liberation war, are painted with graffiti extolling the 1971 heroes. “The guys who were supposed to protect our country from any internal and external security threat were moles of a foreign agency. It was a doomsday scenario for us,” said Maj.-Gen. (retd) Syed Muhammad Ibrahim, who fought against Pakistan in 1971.

sum
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9966
Joined: 08 May 2007 17:04
Location: (IT-vity && DRDO) nagar

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 08 Dec 2011 09:38

After IB and NTRO,The Hindu now turns towards DGMI:

Indian Army blinded by controversial equipment

Military Intelligence paid hundreds of crores of rupees for outdated software, documents obtained by The Hindu show

The Indian Army's imagery interpretation capabilities, critical to providing information on the locations of enemy troops and their military assets, have been compromised by flawed contracts placed with a company that has failed to provide critical software upgrades, an investigation by The Hindu has found.

Documents obtained by The Hindu from the Ministry of Defence show that the firm responsible for supplying and integrating software used in critical image intelligence analysis was relieved of its responsibility to provide free upgrades in 2008 — and is now on the verge of receiving a Rs.165-crore contract for the supply of software it may no longer have licensing rights for.

MI17 — the super-secret military intelligence department that analyses data provided by India's spy satellites — relies on software provided by global software giants Intergraph, Oracle, and Bentley.


Rolta, an Indian company, supplied photogrammetry and geographical information system software licensed from these firms to the Army in 1996, integrating them into a single package to meet MI17's specific needs. From then to 2008, things went well — when a new contract for 14 photogrammetry and geographical information system packages came up to be signed.

The earlier contract bound Rolta to provide software “updates and upgrades” free of cost, as part of a maintenance contract. In 2008, though, the phrasing was changed to just “updates”— freeing Rolta of the obligation to provide the most recent software released by the original equipment manufacturer.

Rolta was paid Rs.506.45 crore for equipment purchased between 1998 and 2008. In addition, it received annual maintenance contracts for equipment purchased during this period; as of December 2008, their cumulative value was Rs. 40.66 crore per annum.

But by early this year, highly-placed military sources said, MI17's image-processing speeds had fallen to just a seventh of those being obtained by the National Technical Research Organisation, which also analyses the same data using similar software with the latest upgrades, Intergraph-Erdas.


Dubious negotiations

The records of the contract negotiation committee, or CNC, show a series of questionable decisions led to this outcome. In the fourth meeting of the CNC, one member noted that an odd change had been made to the name of the software being supplied to MI17: “the vendor,” he observed, “had added [the] company name ‘Rolta' in all the software being provided by him.” The change of name implied that the equipment being supplied was not the same as was purchased in 1996, which would have necessitated fresh acquisition procedures to be initiated.

Atul Tayal, Rolta's representative, responded in the fifth meeting of the CNC that only the brand name was changing — not the equipment itself. During Rolta's “association with the Indian Armed Forces over more than one decade,” he said, “the company had developed a number of customised modules specifically designed to address the needs of the Military Intelligence Directorate.”

“These customised modules,” he wrote, “are integrated with the basic equipment and supplied to the user. Due to this the company has decided to supply these equipments [sic.] under the brand name of Rolta India Limited after the necessary approval of M/S Intergraph, USA, and other parties.”

The CNC guarded its flanks, the minutes of its fourth meeting show, with its chairman insisting that “a certificate from the vendor be obtained certifying that software offered in the present and previous contract are the same.” It was further directed, the minutes record, “that adequate provisions will be made in the contract to confirm the fact at PDI [pre-delivery inspection] and ATP [acceptance test procedures] stage.”

In a September 2010 letter, Rolta certified it would “have full guarantee and warranty from Intergraph Corporation with respect to the goods sourced from them for IIT [imagery interpretation team] equipment under replacement.” The certificate was signed by Brigadier Anjum Shahab, the Regional Director of Defence Sales for Rolta – and the same individual who, as Deputy Director General of Military Intelligence in 2008, served on the controversial CNC.

The actual “full guarantee and warranty” from Intergraph was never provided, for the simple reason that the 2008 contract did not call on Rolta to hand it over. From other documents, however, it seems apparent that no such guarantee actually exists. In a letter to the Defence Secretary, written on July 8, 2011, Intergraph said it had “reliably learnt from a number of Ministry of Defence officers that the Indian Army may have been supplied Intergraph GIS software under a different name.”

It asserted that Intergraph had at no point authorised anyone “to customise any of the products and/or to sell the Products under the name and/or branding of the Distributor or any other company.” Put simply, that meant Rolta had no rights to license Intergraph software to the Army — and that Intergraph would not, therefore, supply the periodic upgrades that came with the package.

Nonetheless, the Indian Army is now firming up plans to purchase another Rs.165 crore worth of equipment from Rolta. MI17 sources said no fresh procurement procedure will have to be carried out because the vendor continues to be Rolta — even though its elements are likely to be assembled from modules supplied by a Canada-based software company, PCI Geomatics.

More than half the cost of the new order, sources said, is made up of software giving capabilities that MI17 would have had anyway, if upgrades had been obtained since 2008. Documents available with The Hindu also reveal that the Planning Officer of the Directorate of Planning and Coordination, Department of Defence Procurement, had written a letter on November 17, 2009, recommending that fresh “equipment may be procured through competitive bidding.”

Seems to be more of paranoia from reporter's side than the actual issue being too serious ( seems more of a financial contract bungling).

But still sad to see DGMI and NTRO using the same Software but with different contacts and rates.

sum
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9966
Joined: 08 May 2007 17:04
Location: (IT-vity && DRDO) nagar

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 08 Dec 2011 09:40

Images of the contracts signed are also put up!!

Image

member_20067
BRFite
Posts: 627
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby member_20067 » 08 Dec 2011 11:14

sum wrote:After IB and NTRO,The Hindu now turns towards DGMI:

Indian Army blinded by controversial equipment

Military Intelligence paid hundreds of crores of rupees for outdated software, documents obtained by The Hindu show

The Indian Army's imagery interpretation capabilities, critical to providing information on the locations of enemy troops and their military assets, have been compromised by flawed contracts placed with a company that has failed to provide critical software upgrades, an investigation by The Hindu has found.

Documents obtained by The Hindu from the Ministry of Defence show that the firm responsible for supplying and integrating software used in critical image intelligence analysis was relieved of its responsibility to provide free upgrades in 2008 — and is now on the verge of receiving a Rs.165-crore contract for the supply of software it may no longer have licensing rights for.

MI17 — the super-secret military intelligence department that analyses data provided by India's spy satellites — relies on software provided by global software giants Intergraph, Oracle, and Bentley.


Rolta, an Indian company, supplied photogrammetry and geographical information system software licensed from these firms to the Army in 1996, integrating them into a single package to meet MI17's specific needs. From then to 2008, things went well — when a new contract for 14 photogrammetry and geographical information system packages came up to be signed.

The earlier contract bound Rolta to provide software “updates and upgrades” free of cost, as part of a maintenance contract. In 2008, though, the phrasing was changed to just “updates”— freeing Rolta of the obligation to provide the most recent software released by the original equipment manufacturer.

Rolta was paid Rs.506.45 crore for equipment purchased between 1998 and 2008. In addition, it received annual maintenance contracts for equipment purchased during this period; as of December 2008, their cumulative value was Rs. 40.66 crore per annum.

But by early this year, highly-placed military sources said, MI17's image-processing speeds had fallen to just a seventh of those being obtained by the National Technical Research Organisation, which also analyses the same data using similar software with the latest upgrades, Intergraph-Erdas.


Dubious negotiations

The records of the contract negotiation committee, or CNC, show a series of questionable decisions led to this outcome. In the fourth meeting of the CNC, one member noted that an odd change had been made to the name of the software being supplied to MI17: “the vendor,” he observed, “had added [the] company name ‘Rolta' in all the software being provided by him.” The change of name implied that the equipment being supplied was not the same as was purchased in 1996, which would have necessitated fresh acquisition procedures to be initiated.

Atul Tayal, Rolta's representative, responded in the fifth meeting of the CNC that only the brand name was changing — not the equipment itself. During Rolta's “association with the Indian Armed Forces over more than one decade,” he said, “the company had developed a number of customised modules specifically designed to address the needs of the Military Intelligence Directorate.”

“These customised modules,” he wrote, “are integrated with the basic equipment and supplied to the user. Due to this the company has decided to supply these equipments [sic.] under the brand name of Rolta India Limited after the necessary approval of M/S Intergraph, USA, and other parties.”

The CNC guarded its flanks, the minutes of its fourth meeting show, with its chairman insisting that “a certificate from the vendor be obtained certifying that software offered in the present and previous contract are the same.” It was further directed, the minutes record, “that adequate provisions will be made in the contract to confirm the fact at PDI [pre-delivery inspection] and ATP [acceptance test procedures] stage.”

In a September 2010 letter, Rolta certified it would “have full guarantee and warranty from Intergraph Corporation with respect to the goods sourced from them for IIT [imagery interpretation team] equipment under replacement.” The certificate was signed by Brigadier Anjum Shahab, the Regional Director of Defence Sales for Rolta – and the same individual who, as Deputy Director General of Military Intelligence in 2008, served on the controversial CNC.

The actual “full guarantee and warranty” from Intergraph was never provided, for the simple reason that the 2008 contract did not call on Rolta to hand it over. From other documents, however, it seems apparent that no such guarantee actually exists. In a letter to the Defence Secretary, written on July 8, 2011, Intergraph said it had “reliably learnt from a number of Ministry of Defence officers that the Indian Army may have been supplied Intergraph GIS software under a different name.”

It asserted that Intergraph had at no point authorised anyone “to customise any of the products and/or to sell the Products under the name and/or branding of the Distributor or any other company.” Put simply, that meant Rolta had no rights to license Intergraph software to the Army — and that Intergraph would not, therefore, supply the periodic upgrades that came with the package.

Nonetheless, the Indian Army is now firming up plans to purchase another Rs.165 crore worth of equipment from Rolta. MI17 sources said no fresh procurement procedure will have to be carried out because the vendor continues to be Rolta — even though its elements are likely to be assembled from modules supplied by a Canada-based software company, PCI Geomatics.

More than half the cost of the new order, sources said, is made up of software giving capabilities that MI17 would have had anyway, if upgrades had been obtained since 2008. Documents available with The Hindu also reveal that the Planning Officer of the Directorate of Planning and Coordination, Department of Defence Procurement, had written a letter on November 17, 2009, recommending that fresh “equipment may be procured through competitive bidding.”

Seems to be more of paranoia from reporter's side than the actual issue being too serious ( seems more of a financial contract bungling).

But still sad to see DGMI and NTRO using the same Software but with different contacts and rates.


is there a public domain article on MI-17.. ..!!

sum
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9966
Joined: 08 May 2007 17:04
Location: (IT-vity && DRDO) nagar

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 09 Dec 2011 10:35

Follow on to yesterday's scoop:
Antony orders probe into controversial Rs. 500-crore contract

Army Headquarters orders investigation into leakage of documents to The Hindu

Defence Minister A.K. Antony has ordered the Army to begin an internal investigation based on The Hindu's revelation that possible corruption in the procurement of Rs. 500-crore worth of equipment had compromised its ability to use satellite images of enemy troop movements and assets.

Sitanshu Kar, Additional Director-General in-charge of media relations at the Ministry of Defence, told journalists on Thursday that Mr. Antony ordered the inquiry first thing in the morning, after meeting with officials.

Mr. Kar said he could not comment on who would carry out the investigation, and by when its findings were expected to be made.

The Hindu had reported on Thursday that the Army's image-analysis capabilities, which allow it to cull information of military relevance from satellite images, were hit by a controversial 2008 contract.


Highly placed military sources said the Army Headquarters had ordered a simultaneous investigation of how documents related to the contract were leaked to The Hindu.

Hope that this doesnt derail our intel related procurement and go the way of the artillery and other sundry ongoing sagas.

Prabu
BRFite
Posts: 422
Joined: 22 Jul 2006 17:51
Location: In the middle of a Desert

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Prabu » 12 Dec 2011 14:16

What are our counter measures for this ??!! :shock:
China to open its first military base abroad in Indian Ocean

SagarAg
BRFite
Posts: 1164
Joined: 12 May 2011 15:51

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby SagarAg » 12 Dec 2011 15:08

Prabu wrote:What are our counter measures for this ??!! :shock:
China to open its first military base abroad in Indian Ocean


Diego Garcia is nearby :mrgreen:

symontk
BRFite
Posts: 904
Joined: 01 Nov 2001 12:31
Location: Bangalore

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby symontk » 12 Dec 2011 15:39

is it good that even BR is showing the Colonels associated with **-**, if that is supposed to be the super secret org?

Let some newspaper get the 15 mts of fame, lets not do that

shyamd
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6822
Joined: 08 Aug 2006 18:43

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 12 Dec 2011 15:45

Prabu wrote:What are our counter measures for this ??!! :shock:
China to open its first military base abroad in Indian Ocean

We've had stuff in Maritius&Mozambique for over 4 years now.

Prabu
BRFite
Posts: 422
Joined: 22 Jul 2006 17:51
Location: In the middle of a Desert

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Prabu » 12 Dec 2011 17:24

shyamd wrote:
Prabu wrote:What are our counter measures for this ??!! :shock:
China to open its first military base abroad in Indian Ocean

We've had stuff in Maritius&Mozambique for over 4 years now.


Thanks, Shyamad Ji, can you elaborate a bit.

uddu
BRFite
Posts: 1847
Joined: 15 Aug 2004 17:09

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby uddu » 12 Dec 2011 18:28

Seychelles, be threatened coerced and we must be parking our own ships before any Chinese ones comes. Also there can be pressure mounted from the international ones on Seychelles like the U.S. We must never allow the Chinese to ever set foot there. I do think this is again a failure of the UPA govt becoz some months ago there was a request from the Seychelles govt to Indian govt to help them fight piracy. I think it's not late for us to park our ships there and say yes we are taking over the anti-piracy operation. And to this Chinese move, there must be a base in Vietnam and also other ASEAN country for our navy.

shyamd
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6822
Joined: 08 Aug 2006 18:43

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 12 Dec 2011 18:40

Prabu . from what has been released to the public. We have intelligence, surveillance bases with limited ship refueling facilities in the northern part of madagascar. Our drones routinely land in the region on surveillance missions. Mauritius has offered us an island too for lease. It will all be released when the time is right.

Uddu, we aren't worried - The PRC don't have significant capabilities right now. The one to watch is actually Gwadar. The PRC have told us privately that if we activate Chabahar, they will have a large naval base in Gwadar to protect oil supplies. Hence why India actually slowed Chabahar expansion.

We thought, there is no point in instigating Chinese to expand Gwadar, the oil supplies to PRC flow round our coast anyway so we don't need to have a base in Chabahar and our ships can cut them off in the hormuz and in malacca chokepoints.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 53475
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 13 Dec 2011 02:26

Tinker Tailor Chinese Spy

An article on spying by PRC on US.

Prabu
BRFite
Posts: 422
Joined: 22 Jul 2006 17:51
Location: In the middle of a Desert

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Prabu » 13 Dec 2011 14:00

This comes at a time when all other spy agencies are doubling up their efforts !! We do NOT require any enemy to defeat our country. The present Govt is capable enough ! What the fc*k current NSA, home ministry, Defence ministry and PMO doing ? God save this country from corrupt, in efficient UPA. :((

RAW becomes a dump yard for favourites :shock: :((



P.K. Hormese Tharakan’s career in RAW was unspectacular, initiating “Trust in the Enemy” policies in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh that within years has resulted in steep drops in Indian influence in all three. Tharakan was a protégé of then National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, and never strayed from the line dictated to him by the strong-willed NSA.

Since the UPA came into office in 2004, it has followed Morarji Desai in throwing away the Indira Gandhi legacy of nurturing RAW as the Indian version of the CIA or MI5-6. :shock:

The UPA has converted it into one more incompetent administrative and police service. This has been done by systematically downgrading the intelligence professionals from the Research Administrative Service (RAS) who work there. Since 2004, RAW alone has seen four changes at the top, all of whom have a police background. Although the first UPA pick, P.K. Hormese Tharakan, was known for integrity, his career in RAW was unspectacular, initiating "Trust in the Enemy" policies in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh that within years has resulted in steep drops in Indian influence in all three. Tharakan was a protégé of then National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, and never strayed from the line dictated to him by the strong-willed NSA.

sum
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9966
Joined: 08 May 2007 17:04
Location: (IT-vity && DRDO) nagar

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 13 Dec 2011 14:11

^^ Real depressing read.... can hope and pray that the rank and file are doing their duty well unlike the top-brass.

Craig Alpert
BRFite
Posts: 1440
Joined: 09 Oct 2009 17:36
Location: Behind Enemy Lines

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Craig Alpert » 13 Dec 2011 21:24


ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 53475
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 14 Dec 2011 01:12

Relatives And Wives :RAW

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 53475
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 15 Dec 2011 10:04

Prepare or Perish

Gen Krishna Rao

Page 109 comments on Intelligence in 1962 war.

Looks like the ignorance of PRC divisions in Tibet was repeated even in 1965 about TSP Armored Division and again in 1999 Kargil.


Upendra
BRFite
Posts: 192
Joined: 11 Sep 2011 13:14

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Upendra » 18 Dec 2011 09:13



Highly placed government sources said the RAW's addition to the list is aimed at giving it a legal cover for intercepting phone calls, e-mails and voice and data communication domestically.

Without any debate in the parliament the government does what it wants, just like a fascist dictatorship

On the questions of a citizen's rights and privacy, the Home Ministry had reiterated that law enforcement agencies could tap phones of any individual for security or operational reasons for 72 hours even without permission from the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary.

So even warrants are not required for casual spying of citizens opposing government corruption.

But senior officials admit that the goof-ups have put a question mark on the integrity of the system which is not foolproof. They do not rule out the possibility of more innocent citizens being put on the list of suspects.

And no officials were punished for these lapses, just like a dictatorship... do what you want with lives of public, nobody will question you is the policy

nitinr
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 89
Joined: 10 Aug 2008 17:35

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby nitinr » 18 Dec 2011 12:54

What are problems / issues / consequences of bringing in Intelligence agencies under the law?
Why can we not study different modalities and laws of other nations to get a understanding and then move in to bring these agencies under some kind of oversight not by a single dept. / individual but of parliament.
We got to make a start somewhere.
Any ideas by guru's. Thanks

sum
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9966
Joined: 08 May 2007 17:04
Location: (IT-vity && DRDO) nagar

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 19 Dec 2011 12:55

Honey traps on social networking sites

The government has directed senior officials from paramilitary and armed forces to refrain from flaunting their career details on social networking sites, or stay away from such sites altogether, after instances of cyber espionage came to light.

Sources said officials of paramilitary forces, posted at sensitive locations, were found chatting with foreign agents across the border posing as women.


Following a spate of similar incidents, meetings were held to prohibit the use of official computers for social networking on the internet and officials were sensitised on the latest modus operandi of the spies.

Sources in the Telecom Department said an effective mechanism was being put in place to keep a vigil on officials posted in sensitive areas.

In some instances, officials were found indulging in objectionable activities through video chat, recordings of which were later used by the spies to blackmail to extract strategic and commercial information. The errant officials have been removed from their current postings and departmental action has been initiated, sources said.

Some officials were seen posing in their uniforms, armed with AK-47 rifles and service revolvers, which they admittedly did for impressing women, sources said.


While the number of such incidents were more in paramilitary forces, few instances were also reported in the armed forces.

Airavat
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2326
Joined: 29 Jul 2003 11:31
Location: dishum-bishum
Contact:

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Airavat » 20 Dec 2011 07:08

SOG Rajasthan arrests govt employee spying for ISI:

The clerk, Pawan Kumar Sharma (25), working at the SDM office in Suratgarh town in Sriganganagar district, used to forward information to his Pakistani handlers regarding army exercise in the area in which the permission of district administration is required. The army headquarters usually send applications requesting permission for any exercise to the SDM office. It is suspected that he was spying for ISI for the past one-and-a half years. "The mobile he used was a pre-paid one and was recharged by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency. To avoid detection, he would use this SIM card to give information to the ISI," an official source said.

shyamd
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6822
Joined: 08 Aug 2006 18:43

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 21 Dec 2011 16:56

Naresh Chandra strat. review comm ready to submit rpt. will reco specific mandates for int agencies particularly RAW and DIA

karan_mc
BRFite
Posts: 690
Joined: 02 Dec 2006 20:53

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby karan_mc » 22 Dec 2011 21:42

India A.Q. Khan’s mysterious fourth customer : US arms control expert

I dint knew to laugh or go in denial mode . but its still a absurd claim :mrgreen:

amdavadi
BRFite
Posts: 1468
Joined: 16 Oct 2002 11:31

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby amdavadi » 23 Dec 2011 00:12

^^^ Didnt you know, unkil was 4th customer. Pakis were nook capable since gazanvi time.

They are the founder of
nook tech,and what i know they also helped unkil with manhattan project as well.... :D

Boreas
BRFite
Posts: 315
Joined: 23 Jan 2011 11:24

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Boreas » 23 Dec 2011 03:08



Once he became RAW chief, one of Chaturvedi's tasks was to act as a courier for cash sent abroad to the relatives of a prominent Indian politician. He used to accompany bags of cash taken from RAW's secret funds, sometimes even in diplomatic bags, handing over the stash in European cities to delighted relatives of the neta.

At the time of his appointment, I wrote a note on one social media portal listing his "other" achivements. One of the biggest blunders of congress..


A former Union minister in a key portfolio was being harassed by the ED over a deal involving Iraq under Saddam Hussein. And when the former minister made private threats (four years ago) in the presence of a young major that he would expose the involvement in the "oily" scam of the son-in-law of a prominent lady politician, this conversation was quickly conveyed to the governor of a small northern state, whose ADC the military officer was. This elderly worthy promptly did his patriotic duty by informing the lady politician's political factotums about the danger of exposure of the son-in-law's dealings. Swift action followed, the upshot being that the former minister was freed from the attention of government agencies that were looking into his business dealings, followed by his grateful silence on the role of the son-in-law. P

Love the word selection of the author :)

Guess who are the underlined persons!

Virupaksha
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 3110
Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Virupaksha » 23 Dec 2011 03:13

former Union minister - Natwar Singh
Son in law- Robert Vadra
Prominent lady Politician - Rajmata
Governor of small northern state - no idea

Boreas
BRFite
Posts: 315
Joined: 23 Jan 2011 11:24

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Boreas » 23 Dec 2011 03:28

Small Northern State = Punjab

Virupaksha
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 3110
Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Virupaksha » 23 Dec 2011 04:07

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunith_Francis_Rodrigues

So the governor is above Mr. SF Rodrigues who was chief of Indian army from 90-93.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aide-de-camp#India
Regarding ADCs info is above.

George J
BRFite
Posts: 312
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby George J » 23 Dec 2011 09:01

The Governor of the states has two ADCs, one each from the army and the state police service.

Nope ADCs to the gov. of a state can be from the services + IPS (not state police).

Also how can the ADC to a state gov be of the rank of a "Major" at the time he was an ADC. If he is IA would have to be to a "Captain" to serve as an ADC.

sum
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9966
Joined: 08 May 2007 17:04
Location: (IT-vity && DRDO) nagar

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 26 Dec 2011 08:55

India's secret war in Bangladesh

Even as the role of the Indian military in giving birth to the new nation is celebrated, the role of its intelligence services remains largely unknown.

Forty-five minutes before 12.00 pm on December 14, 1971, Indian Air Force pilots at Hashimpara and Gauhati received instructions to attack an unusual target: a sprawling colonial-era building in the middle of Dacca that had no apparent military value whatsoever.

There were nothing but tourist maps available to guide the pilots to their target — but the results were still lethal. The first wave of combat jets, four MiG21 jets armed with rockets, destroyed a conference hall; two more MiGs and two Hunter bombers levelled a third of the main building.

Inside the building — the Government House — East Pakistan's Cabinet had begun an emergency meeting to discuss the political measures to avoid the looming surrender of their army at Dacca 55 minutes before the bombs hit. It turned out to be the last-ever meeting of the Cabinet. A.M. Malik, head of the East Pakistan government, survived the bombing along with his Cabinet — but resigned on the spot, among the burning ruins; the nervous system, as it were, of decision-making had been destroyed.


For years now, military historians have wondered precisely how the Government House was targeted with such precision; rumours that a spy was present have proliferated. From the still-classified official history of the 1971 war, we now know the answer. Indian cryptanalysts, or code-breakers, had succeeded in breaking Pakistan's military cipher — giving the country's intelligence services real-time information on the enemy's strategic decision-making.

India's Army, Navy and Air Force were lauded, during the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of Bangladesh's independence, for their role in ending a genocide and giving birth to a new nation. The enormous strategic contribution of India's intelligence services, however, has gone largely unacknowledged.

Seven months before the December 3 Pakistan Air Force raid that marked the beginning of the war, India's Chief of Army Staff issued a secret order to the General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command, initiating the campaign that would end with the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Operation Instruction 52 formally committed the Indian forces to “assist the Provisional Government of Bangladesh to rally the people of East Bengal in support of the liberation movement,” and “to raise, equip and train East Bengal cadres for guerrilla operations for employment in their own native land.”

The Eastern Command was to ensure that the guerrilla forces were to work towards “tying down the Pak [Pakistan] Military forces in protective tasks in East Bengal,” “sap and corrode the morale of the Pak forces in the Eastern theatre and simultaneously to impair their logistic capability for undertaking any offensive against Assam and West Bengal,” and, finally, be used along with the regular Indian troops “in the event of Pakistan initiating hostilities against us.”

Secret army

The task of realising these orders fell on Sujan Singh Uban. Brigadier — later Major-General — Uban was an artillery officer who had been handpicked to lead the Special Frontier Force, a secret army set up decades earlier with the assistance of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency to harry the Chinese forces in Tibet. The SFF, which until recently served as a kind of armed wing of India's external covert service, the Research and Analysis Wing, never did fight in China. In Bangladesh, the contributions of its men and officers would be invaluable.

Brigadier Uban — whose enthusiasm for irregular warfare was rivalled, contemporaries recall, only by his eccentric spiritualism — later said he had received a year's advance warning of the task that lay ahead from the Bengali mystic, Baba Onkarnath.

Less-than-holy war

The war he waged, though, was less-than-holy. In July 1971, India's war history records, the first Bangladesh irregulars were infiltrated across the border at Madaripur. This first group of 110 guerrillas destroyed tea gardens, riverboats and railway tracks — acts that tied down troops, undermined East Pakistan's economy and, the history says, destroyed “communications between Dhaka, Comilla and Chittagong.”

Much of the guerrilla war, however, was waged by the volunteers of the Gano Bahini, a volunteer force. The Indian forces initially set up six camps for recruiting and training volunteers, which were soon swamped. At one camp, some 3,000 young men had to wait up to two months for induction, although the “hygienic condition was pitiable and food and water supply almost non-existent.”

By September 1971, though, Indian training operations had expanded dramatically in scale, processing a staggering 20,000 guerrillas each month. Eight Indian soldiers were committed to every 100 trainees at 10 camps. On the eve of the war, at the end of November 1971, over 83,000 Gano Bahini fighters had been trained, 51,000 of whom were operating in East Pakistan — a guerrilla operation perhaps unrivalled in scale until that time. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Brigadier Uban sent in Indian soldiers or, to be more exact, CIA-trained, Indian-funded Tibetans using hastily-imported Bulgarian assault rifles and U.S.-manufactured carbines to obscure their links to India. Fighting under the direct command of RAW's legendary spymaster Rameshwar Kao, Brig. Uban's forces engaged in a series of low-grade border skirmishes.

Founded in 1962, the SFF had originally been called Establishment 22 — and still has a road named after it in New Delhi, next to the headquarters of the Defence Ministry. The organisation received extensive special operations training from the U.S., as part of a package of military assistance. In September 1967, the control of these assets was formally handed over to RAW — and used in Bangladesh to lethal effect.

From December 3, 1971, Brig. Uban's force began an extraordinary campaign of sabotage and harassment. At the cost of just 56 dead and 190 wounded, the SFF succeeded in destroying several key bridges, and in ensuring that Pakistan's 97 Independent Brigade and crack 2 Commando Battalion remained bogged down in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Some 580 members of Brig. Uban's covert force were awarded cash, medals and prizes by the Government of India.

November 1971 saw the Indian-backed low-intensity war in East Pakistan escalate to levels Pakistan found intolerable — pushing it to act. On December 3, Pakistan attempted to relieve the pressure on its eastern wing by carrying out strikes on major Indian airbases. India retaliated with an offensive of extraordinary speed that has been described as a “blitzkrieg without tanks.”

.....

How important was the covert war to this victory, and what cost did it come at?

India's new communications intelligence technologies were clearly critical; three decades on, the government would be advised to make fuller accounts public, and publicly honour the anonymous cryptanalysts who achieved so much.

The 1971 war history records that their efforts meant “several important communications and projections of the Pak[istani] high command were intercepted, decoded and suitable action [was] taken.” Indian communications interception, the history states, even prevented a last-minute effort to evacuate the Pakistani troops from Dacca, using five disguised merchant ships.

The role of irregular forces, though, needs a more nuanced assessment. There is no doubt that they served to tie down Pakistani troops, and derail their logistical backbone. They were also, however, responsible for large-scale human rights abuses targeting Pakistani sympathisers and the ethnic Bihari population. There is no moral equivalence between these crimes and those of the Pakistani armed forces in 1971 — but the fact also is that the irregular forces bequeathed to Bangladesh a militarised political culture that would have deadly consequences of its own.

India's secret war in Bangladesh would have served little purpose without a conventional, disciplined military force to secure a decisive victory — a lesson of the utility and limitations of sub-conventional warfare that ought to be closely studied today by the several states that rely on these tactics.

Good article but more juciy stuff on what else our covert services did also could have been included

Also, it mentions that SFF was under RAW till some time back. Whom does it report to now, MHA?

SagarAg
BRFite
Posts: 1164
Joined: 12 May 2011 15:51

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby SagarAg » 29 Dec 2011 04:15


Kati
BRFite
Posts: 1220
Joined: 27 Jun 1999 11:31
Location: The planet Earth

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Kati » 29 Dec 2011 04:29

Have had discussions with some people in BD and WB regarding the current state of affairs. Pretty depressing when it comes to border management.......Forget TECHINT,....just getting HUMINT is becoming difficult due to rampant corruption in the intel set-up. Don't want to spill the beans here in this open forum for the sake of nat'al security, but this is something the country needs to pay attention at before another disaster happens.......

shyamd
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6822
Joined: 08 Aug 2006 18:43

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 02 Jan 2012 00:43

Sad to hear. The mood in the country is lets make as much money as possible. Right from the ministers to the taluk office worker.


Bolasani
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 50
Joined: 22 Sep 2005 10:43
Location: Hyderabad
Contact:

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Bolasani » 07 Jan 2012 10:16

Cross posted from Cyber Warfare discussion:

Hacker Group claims to have hacked India’s military and intelligence servers

The hackers claim to have discovered Symantec’s source code in a hack they conducted on India’s military and intelligence servers. In their online post, the hackers said, “We have discovered within the Indian Spy Program source codes of a dozen software companies,” which the hackers said had signed agreements with an Indian defense program and India’s Central Bureau of Investigation.


They posted images of emails of the U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION which were intercepted by India as proof of the hack.

Clicky

chetak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 20526
Joined: 16 May 2008 12:00

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby chetak » 07 Jan 2012 11:22

Kati wrote:Have had discussions with some people in BD and WB regarding the current state of affairs. Pretty depressing when it comes to border management.......Forget TECHINT,....just getting HUMINT is becoming difficult due to rampant corruption in the intel set-up. Don't want to spill the beans here in this open forum for the sake of nat'al security, but this is something the country needs to pay attention at before another disaster happens.......


This has always been the Achilles heel. :twisted:

pgbhat
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4081
Joined: 16 Dec 2008 21:47
Location: Hayden's Ferry

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby pgbhat » 08 Jan 2012 08:44

Delhi court frames charges against former Indian diplomat
A Delhi court on Saturday framed charges against former Indian diplomat Madhuri Gupta for allegedly passing on sensitive information to Pakistan’s ISI. Additional Sessions Judge Pawan Kumar Jain charged Gupta under Section 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act for spying and also section 120B of the Indian Penal Code for criminal conspiracy. The court fixed March 22 for starting the trial.
She has been charged with breach of trust, criminal conspiracy and various other provisions of the Official Secrets Act. It was alleged that Gupta revealed certain classified information to Pakistani officials and was in touch with two ISI officials, Mubshar Raza Rana and Jamshed.

According to the charge sheet filed in July 2010, Gupta was involved in a relationship with Jamshed whom she planned to marry. She used to communicate with Jamshed who had a code name ‘Jim’.


Return to “History & Current Affairs Archive”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest