Intelligence & National Security Discussion

sunny y · Post by **sunny y** » 03 Jan 2010 13:05

Chinese Doppler Radar Returned by India

http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/201 ... india.html

Why are we looking at Chinese Doppler radars ??
AFAIK BEL already develops them. Don't they ??

sumshyam · Post by **sumshyam** » 03 Jan 2010 14:49

sunny y wrote:Chinese Doppler Radar Returned by India

http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/201 ... india.html

Chineese Radars.....

?

It is the craziest thing I have ever heard of....!

wiki says that

Indian Doppler Radars are in in production at BEL (Bharat Electronics Limited) and are being used by the Indian Armed Forces. A few systems have been exported to Sri Lanka and have been used to detect planes of the LTTE's air wing.

If wiki is true...as,I think, it is....for what we need to import defense items from China..!

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 03 Jan 2010 14:54

If wiki is true...as,I think, it is....for what we need to import defense items from China..!

oh dear ! read carefully before commenting guys. this is a meteorological radar (weather radar for the uninitiated), that is not a defence equipment. met dept chose it because it came cheaper IIRC.

kit · Post by **kit** » 03 Jan 2010 18:06

sunny y wrote:Chinese Doppler Radar Returned by India

http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/201 ... india.html

Why are we looking at Chinese Doppler radars ??
AFAIK BEL already develops them. Don't they ??

kit Post subject: Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Posted: 29 Dec 2009 07:33 am

BRFite

Joined: 13 Jul 2006 12:46 pm
Posts: 289 Couldn't resist posting from a slightly unsavory source but here it is

China has a growing reputation for taking every opportunity to do a little espionage on the side, especially an overseas business operation is close to a military base. For example, the U.S. government is threatening to block a Chinese firm from developing a mine in Nevada, because the operation would be too close (80 kilometers) to Fallon Naval Air Station, where experimental work is done. Earlier in the year, Australia also blocked Chinese investment in a mining operation that was near Woomera (where missiles are tested.) In Taiwan, Chinese government officials are not allowed to own real estate. While there are some national security concerns at play here, Taiwan is mainly concerned with preventing corrupt Chinese officials from hiding their loot in the form of Taiwanese commercial and residential property.
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/china/a ... 91228.aspx

A new Doppler weather radar (Chinese) near to the country's prime naval base in mumbai comes to mind ! Was the Navy sleeping ?

Some one read !?! most probably action was taken before i wrote

The China-made radar, lying unused for more than six months at the compound of the weather bureau office in Colaba, was shifted to Delhi in the last week of December

George J · Post by **George J** » 03 Jan 2010 21:40

You kids are getting lazier by the day, everyone wants to be spoon fed.

livemint.com wrote: ..............Because of the delay in installing the radar, which was to be set up at the Naval Colony in Colaba and primarily used to warn of cloudbursts of the kind that deluged Mumbai in 2005, IMD is in talks with government-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) to install its locally manufactured radars. IMD had rejected the BEL radars last year, saying they were at an experimental stage and not ready for operational forecasts.

.............MD bought 12 Doppler weather radars on 30 May from Beijing Metstar Radar Co. Ltd, a 49:51 venture of China National Huayun Technology Development Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of China Meteorological Administration and US-based Lockheed Martin Corp.

...............Beijing Metstar outbid BEL, which develops weather radars based on proprietary technology of the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro), and Germany’s Selex Gematronik GmbH, for IMD contract to install the radars in 12 cities and key ports at Mumbai, Delhi, Agartala, Mohanbari, Paradip, Bhopal, Nagpur, Patna, Lucknow, Karaikal, Patiala and Goa. The radars, to be supplied, installed and commissioned by Metstar cost about $17.8 million (around Rs85 crore now).

The Isro radars, say experts, didn’t make the cut as there was a lot of room for improvement in their software. The plan, according to IMD, was to consider Isro radars for the second stage of modernization that would include installing 33 radars in other parts of the country.

“The Isro radars are very good....But the software wasn’t good enough for forecast purposes. So, we told them, then, that the radars would be tested for two years and then considered for evaluation in the second round of acquisition.”................

Really shoddy discussion, everyone and their uncle as an inane point to make but no one is willing do to any legwork:
http://www.livemint.com/2009/09/2900343 ... r.htm.html

abhishekm · Post by **abhishekm** » 04 Jan 2010 15:21

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_re ... ts_1330615

Mumbai: Alarmed by the growing influence of China in the Northeast and overt or covert support to terrorist activities by other neighbouring countries, the Research and Analysis (RAW) has embarked upon hiring border language experts to strengthen its intelligence network in these sensitive areas.

Regular intelligence officers suffer from a language barrier and cannot interact with the local populace or informants who speak only in their mother tongue. Hence RAW will recruit a large but unspecified number of language experts, research officers, field officers and interpreters in several languages spoken in the neighbouring countries, sources said.

Experts in Bodo, Nagamese, Chinese Cantonese and Chinese Mandarin languages would be posted as field officers and interpreters.

Similarly, the growing influence of Nepal-based Maoists in Indian affairs has forced the premier intelligence agency to hire specialists in Nepalese language. To further strengthen the existing network in J&K, more specialists in Urdu, Arabic and Kashmiri language are also being roped in.

Specialists in Sinhala and Turkish were being sought to monitor the international drug and arms running mafia which has been active in the region for the past two decades, the sources further revealed. The language experts would help the agency in studying, decoding and translating sensitive documents and internet or telephonic interceptions of the suspects being questioned, they said.

Whine alert

We have only just "embarked upon hiring" language experts? I heard our Chinese/Arabic language capabilities consisted chiefly of linguists from JNU but hope R&AW now has full time specialists on its rolls...

Venkarl · Post by **Venkarl** » 04 Jan 2010 20:57

ASPuar wrote:Ad in todays paper for vacancies for "Research Officer" in R&AW. Theyre wanted for technical cadres though. Anyone with an engineering degree/physics degree/MCA/Bsc Comp Science can apply.

What kind of preparation would help to take on this? civils services preps ? or any domain specific like computers etc??

Thanks in advance

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Jan 2010 21:39

Rosetta Stone software is pretty good in developing language skills in a short period of ~ six months. Its available in many of the languages of interest to India.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 04 Jan 2010 21:45

SIgh DDM

Its not like we did not have any language experts in Mandarin (even if they are Tamil or Punjabi slanted Mandarin

)

We need a lot more and also really start broadening the base by having Univs offer more language courses so that later on we can ramp up as needed.

Anabhaya · Post by **Anabhaya** » 06 Jan 2010 02:25

Back to NCTC, PC repeatedly refers to the US NCTC as the inspiration.

I believe the MAC will be subsumed by the NCTC. The present MAC will be core of NCTC,with investigative(NIA) and operational wings added.

I agree with you on NIA - the CBI could have done it really. Afterall Chidu wants NCTC oversight over CBI, RAW and just about every other agency out there - 'to the extent that they dealt with terror'.

The way I see it the proposed NCTC should subsume the MAC and allow the NIA to dissolve itselves into the CBI. The CBI in turn can be brought under NCTC 'co-ordination to the extent that they deal with terrorism'.

It's a good idea to have one body which has oversight over others dealing with terrorism.

Marut · Post by **Marut** » 06 Jan 2010 07:49

Surya wrote:SIgh DDM

Its not like we did not have any language experts in Mandarin (even if they are Tamil or Punjabi slanted Mandarin )

We need a lot more and also really start broadening the base by having Univs offer more language courses so that later on we can ramp up as needed.

That DDM article seems to be in response to the ad for the kaccha folks posted by ASPaur & vipins - http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 85#p799485

All the languages in the ad are listed in the article. Seems some smart guy looked through the ad and decided to write a story woven around it since no one is officially quoted in the story!

ps: I support Surya's stand that we need many many more language experts.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 06 Jan 2010 08:03

Language skills are probably the most prized skills in the intel world..And its scarce as well..India found out during IC814 that it was woefully short of Pashto and Dari..the US had similar problems..

For field intel, it is often not enough to have simple "translation skills", in depth knowledge, including a "feel" for the nuances, cultural finer points, dialects, accents are important..It takes years and years for an agent to develop such skills, and these agents are really scarce..That is why the Chapman incident is a HUGE blow to the CIA and the US...Its also a bit puzzling how the entire CIA unit, the base chief included, sat in the same room with one informer..Shows the degree of comfort they had with the bomber, as also the level of sophisitication the "other" side has in deception!

animesharma · Post by **animesharma** » 06 Jan 2010 13:55

Venkarl wrote:
ASPuar wrote:Ad in todays paper for vacancies for "Research Officer" in R&AW. Theyre wanted for technical cadres though. Anyone with an engineering degree/physics degree/MCA/Bsc Comp Science can apply.
What kind of preparation would help to take on this? civils services preps ? or any domain specific like computers etc??

Thanks in advance

I believe their stress will be more on individual ability and general knowledge (along with technical skills).. similar was the case with the recent IB grade 2 vacancy...

bad for me, am not eligible now!

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 07 Jan 2010 04:48

Dawood is a terrorist, has 'strategic alliance' with ISI, says US
A CLASSIC TOLD YA SO MOMENT

"A US Congressional report released Tuesday identified the D-company as a "5,000-member criminal syndicate operating mostly in Pakistan, India, and the United Arab Emirates," which has a "strategic alliance" with ISI and has "forged relationships with Islamists, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and al-Qaida."

The report, prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the research wing of Congress, is aimed at priming US lawmakers on various issues, and has no immediate policy implications. The US Department of Treasury has already designated Ibrahim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in 2006 and President Bush designated him, as well as his D-Company organization, as a Significant Foreign Narcotics Trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.
......
Outraged by the attacks on fellow Muslims and believing the Indian government acted indifferently to their plight, Ibrahim decided to retaliate. Reportedly with assistance ISI, D-Company launched a series of bombing attacks on March 12, 1993, killing 257 people. Following the attacks, Ibrahim moved his organization’s headquarters to Karachi, Pakistan," the report says, mincing no words about the terrorist don’s Pakistani location and patronage.

Stan_Savljevic · Post by **Stan_Savljevic** » 07 Jan 2010 05:15

Regarding language skills, you can take a look at the MEA report for last year (2007-08) which lists how many IFS cadre have skills in a specific language. It is a 212 page report that will download slowly. Chinese or Arabic is not the big-deal issue, Urdu is not specified, the issue is with languages such as Sinhalese (1 proficient speaker), Nepali (3), Swahili (single digit number) where India-Africa developments are taking place at a rapid pace, Burman, etc. Regional insecurities are better voiced in vernacular languages and intel gathering or policy decisions are better with that knowledge. Mandarin IIRC is no 1 or 2 choice, so rest assured many folks go after Mandarin. And the list says "proficient", not a "working knowledge of."

Omar · Post by **Omar** » 07 Jan 2010 06:30

B Raman says the same situation existed when he left his position in RAW in his book "The KAO-boys of RAW"

amdavadi · Post by **amdavadi** » 07 Jan 2010 06:54

GOI should invest into language institute similar to defence language institute in monterey california.

sum · Post by **sum** » 07 Jan 2010 09:09

A US Congressional report released Tuesday identified the D-company as a "5,000-member criminal syndicate operating mostly in Pakistan, India, and the United Arab Emirates," which has a "strategic alliance" with ISI and has "forged relationships with Islamists, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and al-Qaida."

The report, prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the research wing of Congress, is aimed at priming US lawmakers on various issues, and has no immediate policy implications. The US Department of Treasury has already designated Ibrahim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in 2006 and President Bush designated him, as well as his D-Company organization, as a Significant Foreign Narcotics Trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.

Big joke is the report is where it mentions that most of the Hindus left the D-company after Dawood openly turned a terrorist from a smuggler but due to the "secular"

nature of top echolon of D-company, it may not merge itself with Al-Q or LeT.

Are the Amir-khans really so dumb?

satya · Post by **satya** » 07 Jan 2010 16:21

Nightwatch take on Intel Ops

NightWatch has limited comments on Major General Flynn’s report because the report already informs the Taliban and the Afghan English-reading population that US operations are blind, as one well-placed, highly experienced and dispassionate intelligence professional described to NightWatch… in dismay.

The Taliban and the Afghan government are likely to conclude that US forces have been executing and continue to execute operations based on bad intelligence and general ignorance. That is an information operations and tactical intelligence cornucopia for the enemies of the Kabul government.

It represents a distressing admission for President Karzai’s government. This would help explain the proliferation of civilian casualties from Coalition ground and air operations that have resulted in increasing local support for the Taliban and public demonstrations. The admissions in the study could make people liable for war crimes before the International Criminal Court, which Afghanistan supports.

The report is advocacy, not an objective treatment of the intelligence support. It is fundamentally tactical, which is Central Command’s responsibility in the division of labor, not the responsibility of the national agencies. Moreover the report is myopic in focusing on Afghanistan and ignoring other larger national issues such as Iranian nuclear development, stability in Afghanistan, and North Korean proliferation.

It is a theater view as it should be. But the theater view has limits. The authors accuse the national agencies of failure without balance. The view from Bagram and Kabul is not the same as the view from Washington. North Korea really can attack US territory and our allies. Iran can attack Israel. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Why should Afghanistan have higher call on the “best” analysts?

.These questions should raise red flags for Readers that the report has lots of “spin.”

The report raises a few useful points, such as the smarmy satisfaction that the Washington agencies adopt when they establish portals for handling requests for information, instead of doing the obvious base line work proactively and continuously in support of fellow citizens in combat. Responding to questions is not the same as providing support.

However, the authors seem to be naïve in their understanding of the division of labor among national agencies and between the center and the commands. The authors are flat incorrect in their description of the national intelligence community, its role and its primary customers.

The authors also seem to confuse strategy, policy and tactics. There is no blurring of lines about the use of information. Information has always had different uses at different levels of command. It troubling that some might think it is new, just because they had an epiphany.

Much of what is discussed is a rediscovery of what have been the basics of military intelligence for more than 60 years, albeit badly neglected in the past two decades. DIA once excelled at this work, for example. Claims about new ways of doing business that are in fact reinventions of old wheels are churlish and show a lack of historic grounding.

The report contains few new insights about the nature and needs of military intelligence in support of fighting an insurgency. Its attempt to distinguish conventional war is artificial and uninformed. This is old lore that some entities discarded and have forgotten. Nevertheless, new or old, the intelligence work has not been done, should have been done and needs to be done.

Intelligence has lost its way when it cannot support troops in combat. There is plenty of blame to go around. The key question is whether Flynn’s blueprint addresses the systemic, cognitive problems. The answer, lamentably, is no, it does not.

In the past 60 years, US intelligence has responded to intelligence failures with six standard responses. The first and most common is to reorganize. Every major intelligence failure has spawned organizational change as a remedy, regardless of the cause of the failure. The report has adopted that response, though it has camouflaged it elegantly with a sweeping public denunciation.

More than 60 years of experience in US intelligence proves that organizational change never remedies cognitive failure or management incompetence, neither of which are mentioned in the report, but which are what has victimized the general.

He seems to know what information is needed, apparently, but the report describes no plan for how to get it. New specialized teams and more layers are not serious solutions. The Command lacks the time to make the changes General Flynn wants and lacks the clout.

The careful reader is left with a list of anecdotal gripes, stories and many bromides. A few of these are valid for military intelligence, but many should be directed at the Department of State and other non-military agencies. The report spotlights tactical intelligence shortcomings accurately, but the blueprint for relevancy is never presented. For example, the US is still undertaking a strategic surge without having sized the enemy, the definition of operating blind.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 09 Jan 2010 13:25

Madeleine Albright discusses Nigerian/Yemeni terror plot

http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/ ... ebcast.cnn

KiranM · Post by **KiranM** » 09 Jan 2010 14:37

Apologies if already posted. More insight on the Al-Qaida attack on CIA in Afghanistan in The Week. An asset working for Al-Qaida turned double and helped Jordanian Intelligence to prevent a terrorist attack inside Jordan. Jordan then handed over the asset to CIA for giving out information of interest to Khans. Hence, 7 top guys of the Afghan desk had turned up to talk to him. That asset turned a triple agent and blew them to Kingdom come.

At this rate, Keedas will soon give Mossad a run for its money on Intelligence.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 11 Jan 2010 07:23

Useful piece from Praveen Swami on NCTC and the real gaps:

http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/11/stories ... 220800.htm

Nikhil T · Post by **Nikhil T** » 11 Jan 2010 07:56

Shocking complicity of Zia with ULFA.

Musharraf met ULFA leader in Dhaka: Minister

A senior Minister in the Sheikh Hasina government has alleged that the previous Bangladesh government led by Khaleda Zia arranged a meeting between the former Pakistani President, General (retired) Pervez Musharraf, and United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) leader Anup Chetia in Dhaka.

Local Government Minister Syed Ashraful Islam, who is also general secretary of the ruling Awami League, made the claim on Friday at a roundtable on Ms. Hasina’s coming visit to India.

“Pervez Musharraf had a one-and-a-half-hour meeting with the detained ULFA leader, Anup Chetia, at his hotel room during a visit when the BNP [and the Jamaat-e-Islami] were in power,” he told the roundtable held at the National Press Club here on Friday.

General (retired) Musharraf visited Bangladesh in July, 2002. ULFA secretary-general Chetia has been under detention in a Bangladesh jail since his arrest in 1998.

Indian media reported last month that the Bangladesh government had deported the secessionist outfit’s chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa and Raju Barua, deputy commander of ULFA’s armed wing, to India. But Dhaka has denied it.

The Minister said Ms. Hasina’s visit to India from January 10 would be political. The main objective of the visit was to build trust between the two neighbours.

The Minister told the roundtable that the relationship between Dhaka and New Delhi had not been “normal” in the last seven years. Rather, it had been superficial.

Mr. Ashraf said the Musharraf-Chetia meeting and 10 ten truckload of weapons seized in Bangladesh had affected the relationship. He said the weapons seized in Chittagong and the 30 million bullets seized in Bogra were meant for use by Indian separatists.

He blamed the previous BNP government and its allies for the worsening of relations with India.

The Minister said the government wanted to develop road and rail communications with China as well as India.

“We had a discussion on trade, bilateral and political as well as strategic relationships with China,” he said, adding that the Prime Minister would also visit China and the Chinese Vice-President would visit Bangladesh.

The country needed to increase trade with its neighbours and, to do so, construction of a deep-sea port was needed, he said. The deep-sea port in Chittagong would not be possible without China’s support.

sum · Post by **sum** » 11 Jan 2010 08:56

The spies who got left in the cold

As I reflect on disturbing events of recent weeks — the massacre of seven CIA officers in Khost, Afghanistan, and the near bombing of Northwest Flight 253 on its way to Detroit — I can see in my mind’s eye a young man. He is West Asian, with a thin, mustachioed face and pallid skin, and he stands nervously in the middle of a very public square, unnoticed amid a swirling crowd. Glancing furtively at his watch, he begins to walk, as he was instructed, along a prescribed route.

Another young man, an American who is a CIA case officer, has already circled the square, shielded by the passers-by. He is alert to anything out of place, to someone loitering near a motorcycle, to a group of men sitting aimlessly in a car, to anyone who may be paying attention to his source. He is dressed to look like any other dark-haired male of no particular account in this dusty and obscure third-world city in the 1980s.
Under the officer’s sweater is a crude bulletproof vest, giving him the barrel-chested look of a wrestler. The vest is of limited protection, but a partial insurance against faults of judgment.

The case officer begins to follow his source at a discreet distance. He knows the young man well, or believes he does. His assessment, upon which his life may depend, is that the source, though a member of a terrorist organisation and willing to put his life at risk to meet an American spy, is a physical coward. Personal loyalty is important to him, as is his relationship with the American, from which he hopes to benefit.

Circumstances can change, however, and with them, motivations. In a world of fear and desperation, today’s friend can become tomorrow’s deadly enemy. The case officer is confident that while the source could perhaps find the opportunity to shoot him, he lacks the courage ever to do it himself. While this lack of fortitude may be a blessing, it could easily lead him, if discovered and placed under pressure, to guide others to their American target, to do what he himself could not.

Satisfied at length that no one is watching the source, the case officer suddenly approaches him from behind, grabs him by the elbow and pulls him abruptly down a cobblestone alley, in a direction the source could not have anticipated.

In this case, the officer’s faith is rewarded. The West Asian becomes a valuable asset. But the case officer is not always so fortunate. A year later, in a different city, he has just inherited a new source. Working against the government of a state sponsor of terrorism, the source is what is referred to in the business as a ‘principal agent’, running his own network of subordinate spies. With the case officer’s encouragement, the principal agent has managed to lure a potential subagent out from the police state where he lives. They hold a series of meetings during which the principal agent vets his friend, assesses him and formally recruits him into the network, all under the watchful guidance of the case officer.

As I look back at that young case officer poised at that moment in time, I wish I could speak with him now. I wish I could remind him that his own confidence, his ambition and his desire for success are in fact his worst enemies.

Some of the story concerning that principal agent we will never know. We will never know precisely why one day, in setting up another meeting with his old friend, he ignored his training. He had been told — hadn’t he? — that he must never allow himself to fall into a pattern, that he must never be predictable. And his case officer, in spite of endless soul-searching, would never know whether any of the myriad things he might have done differently would have saved a brave man whom he had sworn to protect.

Betrayal

What we do know is that one evening, the principal agent and his boyhood pal, now his betrayer, had dinner at a shabby seaside restaurant; that they sat at the same table they had occupied the night before; that a group of four men in a car drove slowly around the block twice; that two of the men entered the restaurant and strolled over in front of the principal agent’s table; that each then emptied his pistol into the agent’s chest.

In the wake of President Obama’s speech on intelligence last week, there is much soul-searching going on, at CIA headquarters in Langley and elsewhere, about what happened in Khost on December 30. It comes as a cold slap in the face, but one that implicates us all. For these men and women, like the uniformed troops they serve alongside, have assumed great risks, and they have assumed them to keep the rest of us safe at home.
.....
The importance of the human intelligence work done by officers like those we lost at Khost is only increasing over time. The growing sophistication of our enemies, as they react to the grievous losses they have suffered, makes us all the more reliant on human spies.

Trainees who aspire to join the National Clandestine Service, the undercover arm of the CIA, get careful instruction. They are instilled with a proper regard for their mission, for the laws they must follow, for the sacred obligation to sources, and for their duty to one another. Much stress is placed on loyalty. Loyalty can take many forms, but when all is said and done, loyalty is essentially tribal. That is as true for us as it is for any Afghan. CIA officers undertake risks not for any ideology, but to protect Americans from those who would want only kill them. At a time when calamity is a poignant reminder of the loyalty displayed by CIA officers toward us, we might reflect on what we owe them in return.

Sacrificing intelligence operatives out of political expediency is a bipartisan sport. Officials in the George W Bush administration did not hesitate to blame the spies when it suited them and the Obama administration is proving, if anything, worse. Last spring’s decision to release secret justice department memos on the interrogations of suspected terrorists was a blatantly partisan act. It was designed to win political advantage by holding intelligence officers up to opprobrium and scorn.

How, in the face of such betrayal, can we expect to bring new generations into the intelligence ranks? It is possible to reward loyalty with loyalty while still insisting on the highest standards of professionalism from our intelligence officers. Indeed, we can better reinforce excellence in intelligence when we judge it with honesty, realism and a sense of proportion. Politicians will behave dishonourably so long as it benefits them. It is up to the rest of us to tell them, “Enough.”

Last few lines confirm a massive cold war between the intel community and Obama administration.

Sudip · Post by **Sudip** » 12 Jan 2010 03:19

Slightly OT, but an Ex-CIA officer has given good feedback about CIA weaknesses in Af-Pak.

Retired CIA officer: Fix the Agency

Its most senior officers have virtually no experience in combating the types of targets against which the organization is currently directed. Increasingly, it is dominated at all levels, not by seasoned operators with years of service abroad, but by individuals who have served the bulk of their careers at headquarters.
Counterterrorist operations are all too often limited to the conduct of meetings with friendly liaison services, who actually run the sources and collect the information. Operations officers who have really run terrorist sources on the street and operated outside the wire in dangerous areas are in short supply.
Frequently, to fill posts abroad and to maintain a mandated level of staffing, individuals are being sent abroad to frontline posts who have no significant operational experience and may not even be fully trained to function as ops officers. Those that have been trained are likely brand new and without any real world experience.

Sudip · Post by **Sudip** » 12 Jan 2010 03:29

Slightly OT, but an Israeli security expert explains passenger handling by El Al Israeli airlines. Does it make sense to have anything like this for us?

How the Israelis do airport security

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 12 Jan 2010 11:34

somnath wrote:Useful piece from Praveen Swami on NCTC and the real gaps:

http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/11/stories ... 220800.htm

Well, Im not so sure about all this. NCTC/NIA, etc etc seem to me to be mere duplication of money and effort, which would have been better spent in updating the NCRB/CBI/IB.

As to external intelligence, the Secretary (R) used to report directly to the PM, and I think this is how it should have remained. Global intel is an important resource, and the PM should have it as one of his prime inputs. This is why the Secy (R) was placed in the Cabinet Secretariat in the first place.

The currently vague system, where he de facto reports to the NSA, and administratively reports to the cabinet secretary seems a recipe for dilution of intel to me.

The PM should directly receive external intel inputs, and act on the basis of the same.

Lastly, I must say, the R&AW has had its share of tough times, always, from the beginning.

The Morarji Desai government tried to wind it down.

The IK Gujral government reportedly shut down ops against Pakistan, in a bizarre display of candle kissing goodwill.

Sankaran Nair, one of the old time stalwarts of the agency, when he took over, was demoted to "Director, R&AW", instead of Secretary. Being a man of the old school, he resigned, saying that the office should not be demeaned in that way. The designation was eventually restored to secretary.

IB etc have started running ops abroad again, causing complete chaos. When R&AW was formed, it was decided that it, and only it will have authority abroad. Now, for the demand of foreign assignments from grandees of these other agencies, multiplicity of operators has emerged again.

I know PC is a competent man, but a competent man using his skill and efficiency in the wrong places, can wreak havoc. I hope that is not what is happening here.

sum · Post by **sum** » 12 Jan 2010 11:43

IB/NIA/DRI etc have started running ops abroad again, causing complete chaos. When R&AW was formed, it was decided that it, and only it will have authority abroad. Now, for the demand of foreign assignments from grandees of these other agencies, multiplicity of operators has emerg

IIRC, IB always operates in select countries? Even the NIA is now operating abroad?

This is a sureshot recipe for massive turf wars of the GRU/ KGB kind where they worked at cross purposes and ended up killing each others missions inadvertently..

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 12 Jan 2010 12:13

Sorry, I didnt mean NIA.

IB used to operate abroad before R&AW was formed. Its international ops were completely stopped when the R&AW was created, effectively by bifurcating IB.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 12 Jan 2010 12:21

^^^ASPuar,

Substantially agree with you. The setting up of NIA is a waste of effort, but NCTC in principle, and the MAC not so..But the NCTC is now being sought to be morphed into a supra intel agency itself, which is another stupid turf grab effort..

IB has the responsibility for counter intel, so it has always had operatives stationed abroad in embassies..There are also some inevitable overlaps - for example, tackling Maoists in India is an IB job.But the trail may lead upto NEpalese Maoists, with IB in tow! Similarly, any anti-jihadi covert ops would lead the trail up to Pakistan..

There is a lot of flak that our intel agencies cop on the coordination point, but the fact is that globally, coordination is THE toughest job in the business..The US goes through periodic restructuring - notice the office of the DNI, the NCTC, and they have the most resources devoted to this area!

BTW, this point on IK Gujral winding up JIT(X) is a bit of a red herring - gets pointed out all the time, but none of the actors in the "know" ever really allude to it...

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 12 Jan 2010 12:30

Somnath,

Would this be authentic enough for you?

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2219/ ... 503000.htm

For reasons that are still unclear - some people believe Indian strategists did not wish to undermine the moral legitimacy of their complaints about Pakistani cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir - the covert offensive soon wound down. None of those in office at the time will, not surprisingly, discuss the issue on record, but Raman asserted in a 2003 article that the decision to terminate India's offensive covert capabilities directed at Pakistan was made by Prime Minister I.K. Gujral.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 12 Jan 2010 12:44

Found it, straight from the horse mouth, i.e. Raw counter intelligence head until 1994, B.Raman's blog

http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot. ... rther.html

STEP No. 2: Revive immediately the covert action capability of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), which was wound up by Inder Gujral, when he was the Prime Minister in 1997,

In intelligence you cant get more authentic than this.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 12 Jan 2010 13:19

somnath wrote:^^^ASPuar,

Substantially agree with you. The setting up of NIA is a waste of effort, but NCTC in principle, and the MAC not so..But the NCTC is now being sought to be morphed into a supra intel agency itself, which is another stupid turf grab effort..

IB has the responsibility for counter intel, so it has always had operatives stationed abroad in embassies..There are also some inevitable overlaps - for example, tackling Maoists in India is an IB job.But the trail may lead upto NEpalese Maoists, with IB in tow! Similarly, any anti-jihadi covert ops would lead the trail up to Pakistan..

There is a lot of flak that our intel agencies cop on the coordination point, but the fact is that globally, coordination is THE toughest job in the business..The US goes through periodic restructuring - notice the office of the DNI, the NCTC, and they have the most resources devoted to this area!

As I say, PC is a smart chap, but perhaps it would have been better if he stuck to doing what he was mandated to do, rather than trying out other hats.

Of course, the US is the past master of bureaucratic turf wars. The office of the DNI is routinely subverted and ignored, including at a point where the DNI sent a memo stating such and such person should be appointed at X station, and immediately, the DCIA immediately sent a counter memo saying another person should be appointed to the same post.

Supposedly DNI is supposed to have precedence, but the White House went with the advice of the DCIA.

As to your point on coordination, I agree, but I think that the current upheaval in the intel climate in India, is unnecessary, and will lead to an existential fight between the various agencies in coming times.

In the absence of a strong Prime Ministerial leadership, which could say we will go with Plan A, or Plan B, we tend to go along with Plan A, B, C & D, (encouraged by bureaucrats, who want more high level posts accorded to them), and leading to chaos.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 12 Jan 2010 18:41

Ravi_ku,

I respect B Raman's credibility, but there are others who are not all that open..Brajesh Mishra, for one, once (after 26/11) vehemently denied that we wound down covert capabilities against Pak..The reason I am sceptical about this is that India's bureaucracy is permanent, and hence it is really difficult for the political leadership to radically alter policy/capability..Morarji Desai was staunch anti-nuclear, but as Goerge Perkovich's account shows, he too bent more than he managed to bend (the bureaucracy)!For IK Gujral, running a govt on its death bed from the begining, it seems too rich..

On the point of coordination, it is so important for intel that it becomes THE prime variable..Dont know how many people realise, Mossad started its life as an "intel coordination" agency, and the head of Mossad in terms of protocol actually reported to the head of Aman (military intel)...But aura around Mossad is very diiferent today, isnt it?

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 12 Jan 2010 18:54

Isnt the problem much more than mere policy of successive governments ? Most of the top intelligence agencies have IPS officers who lead them or military officers in other agencies where the case may be. Is there a dedicated civil service for Intelligence agents only ? Do they have an "intelligence budget" ? Are there any schools that teach espionage and intelligence gathering etc like the CIA's "farm" at Camp Peary in India ?

As long as these things aren't set in motion and Intelligence is seen as some auxiliary activity of State security, the policies of successive governments crafted by bureaucrats will remain haphazard when it comes to intelligence.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 12 Jan 2010 19:00

ASPuar wrote:Sorry, I didnt mean NIA.

IB used to operate abroad before R&AW was formed. Its international ops were completely stopped when the R&AW was created, effectively by bifurcating IB.

I am not sure if that is true, IB is routinely used to keep an eye on R&AW operatives abroad. IB officers are posted to select countries too like Nepal for example.

Sachin · Post by **Sachin** » 12 Jan 2010 20:38

Brando wrote:Is there a dedicated civil service for Intelligence agents only ?

There is. If I am not mistaken it is known as the RAS cadre. Officers who move over to the Intelligence agencies have an option to move over to this cadre as well.

Do they have an "intelligence budget" ? Are there any schools that teach espionage and intelligence gathering etc like the CIA's "farm" at Camp Peary in India ?

Intelligence agencies would be having a budget (naturally), but the actual amounts are not revealed (even during budget sessions). Same goes for information on the "farms"

.

As long as these things aren't set in motion and Intelligence is seen as some auxiliary activity of State security, the policies of successive governments crafted by bureaucrats will remain haphazard when it comes to intelligence.

Only state level Special Branch CIDs are working under the respective state police.

sum · Post by **sum** » 12 Jan 2010 21:58

Are there any schools that teach espionage and intelligence gathering etc like the CIA's "farm" at Camp Peary in India ?

Their main school is in Gurgaon ( sector xx ) but im sure there will be loads of other establishments across the country.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 13 Jan 2010 00:53

shyamd wrote: I am not sure if that is true, IB is routinely used to keep an eye on R&AW operatives abroad. IB officers are posted to select countries too like Nepal for example.

According to B. Raman, this trend began only in the 1990s. From the '60s to the '90s, R&AW reigned supreme in the external intel space.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 13 Jan 2010 00:56

somnath wrote:
The reason I am sceptical about this is that India's bureaucracy is permanent, and hence it is really difficult for the political leadership to radically alter policy/capability..

Perhaps therein lies the trouble.