Intelligence & National Security Discussion

[Avinash R]

Chinese mobile firm Huawei under DRI scanner

New Delhi, Sep 14 (PTI) Chinese telecom firm Huawei is under the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence scanner for a case relating to duty evasion.

Top sources in the DRI said that some time back the Hyderabad unit of the agency had registered a case with regard to certain duty evasion by a firm which had trading links with the Chinese entity.

As part of its investigations into the actions of a particular firm, the Delhi zonal unit of DRI had recently carried out a raid at the Gurgaon office of Huawei.

Sources said that the investigating agency had seized at least three laptops along with certain documents from the firm which have now been sent to Hyderabad for further investigation.

"The case is registered against a different company and not against Huawei. But during the investigation, name of Huawei came up and hence we had to check certain transactions of the firm. The laptops and documents were seized in this regard," a senior DRI official said.

Officials of Huawei could not be reached immediately for comments.

Huawei has been operating in India since 1998 when it set up its first R&D centre here followed by its marketing and sales office in 2002.

The company claims to have been a preferred vendor of leading service providers like Reliance Communications, Vodafone-Essar, Bharti Airtel, BSNL and Idea.

[sum]

Link

NEW DELHI: The government has decrypted the data on Research In Motion’s (RIM) BlackBerry network.

The department of telecommunication (DoT), Intelligence Bureau and security agency National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) have done tests on service providers such as Bharti Airtel, BPL Mobile, Reliance Communications and Vodafone-Essar network for interception of Internet messages from BlackBerry to non-BlackBerry devices.

Initially, there were difficulties in cracking the same on Vodafone-Essar network but that has also been solved. This means that the email messages sent on Internet through your BlackBerry sets would no longer be exclusive and government would be able to track them.

“Decompression is being tested in operator’s network with three successful testing on Bharti Airtel, Reliance Communication and BPL Mobile,” a source in DoT said.

He, however, added that the solution reached upon would not be shared with anybody including the national telecom service providers like BSNL or MTNL.

“The test is being conducted wholly for non-enterprise solutions,” he said. The Union cabinet has also been apprised of the recent developments by the DoT.

Makers of BlackBerry set, RIM, could not be contacted for comment. An official in Vodafone-Essar, however, on conditions of anonymity said that there has been substantial progress in decoding the BlackBerry encryptions and DoT has got success on decompressing the data on the networks of all the major service providers.

The test would be conducted on all the network of all the BlackBerry service providers and the service providers, on whose network the interception does not happen smoothly, would be asked to make technical changes in their services to make them compatible for decompression.

Decompression is the process of decoding information with an aim to transfer the data to a different medium like data to voice, data to video or data to text.

The DoT had earlier asked RIM to provide the master key to allow access to contents transferred over their handsets. RIM had, however, said that it could not handover the message encryption key to the government as its security structure does not allow any third party or even the company to read the information transferred over its network.

The BlackBerry issue surfaced earlier this year when DoT asked Tata Tele-services to delay the launch of the service till appropriate security mechanisms were in place. Currently, there are over one lakh BlackBerry users in the country.

Bharti Airtel, Reliance Communications, Vodafone Essar and BPL Mobile are offering this service in the country. Tata Teleservices has also been allowed to offer the BlackBerry services recently.

Incidentally, Tata Teleservices launched the service after telecom secretary Siddhartha Behura said that the government has no role in stopping the company from offering the service.

Interesting...
So,our COMMINT capabilities are not as bad as thought of?

[k prasad]

Hmm... after the spate of vitriol pieces and bad news, finally, some good news on the work being done by NTRO, although I'd have preferred keeping them like a real jasoosi org - "we dont exist".. Mogambo Khush hua.

[shetty]

He is saying Decompression, I think he means Decrypting doesn't he? Those words mean two different thing to me.

[Rahul M]

http://maloykrishnadhar.com/india-its-s ... -and-spies

Better forget about Nathan Hale, the American “patriot spy” who was hanged in UK in 1917, Mata Hari, hanged in France in 1917 and other famous names like Burgess, Blunt, and MacLean, Philby Guy Francis (Cambridge group) who basked in international limelight and have been transported to the folklore of espionage.

In independent India Col. Bhattachariya, arrested by East Pakistan intelligence allegedly in the act of contacting his Pakistani agent in North West Bengal border had attained national attention, because of prevailing warlike situation between India and Pakistan in early sixties. Bhattachariya was a spymaster and not a spy. He was arrested in the handling process. Later postmortem process established that the MI officer had not scrupulously applied all the tradecraft precautions before trying to contact his trans-border agent.

During last decade and a half the electronic and print media have attained the stature of national ombudsmen. They have reached every nook and corner of national, regional and international activities. Their sweep covers mundane to marvelous happenings.

Sensationalisation of news and events beyond all proportions without any respect and regards for space, privacy and secrecy required by national intelligence agencies increase TRP of the channels. However, in the process, either by adding wailings of the relatives of the claimed spy, they generate mass hysteria and force the governments to move tactically, diplomatically and often foolishly to satisfy the voters.

However, while highlighting the plights of “Indian Spies” detained in Pakistan and utter neglect by the government of India, in case they are lucky enough to escape the gallows and black-death behind dark prison walls, the media focus emphasis on humanitarian aspects and inevitably suggest that some institutional, if not constitutional, safeguards should be devised for the patriotic spies.

I am afraid such hypes, though laudable as humanitarian concern, are based on certain misperceptions. Espionage is a part of Statecraft, extended diplomacy and elongated efforts for war and peace. War and Peace are integral parts of a nation’s philosophy of existence and survival. There cannot be any Ramrajya where there would not be any war and there would not be any need for espionage. Such chimera exists in the souls of saints and philosophers who are not trained to think in terms of cultural, ethnic and geopolitical nationhood. Absence of these very ingredients in ancient India had led to fragmented clan and dynastic nationalities. The Europe and many parts of Asia have gone through this process and the concept of ‘Nationhood’ is rather a gift of new human identity achieved during fifteenth and sixteenth century. In India the concept had started emerging after the British conquest of India, spread of modern education and the spark of Renaissance. The unintended attitude of treating Bharat as a Ramrajya by the Nehru government had pushed India into the throes of a humiliating military and diplomatic defeat in the hands of China. India is still unable to emerge out of that ghostly shadow of Ramrajya experiment.

Our examination of the trade of Espionage cannot be complete without falling back to the Arthashashtra of Kautilya.

Espionage is the assigned Trade of the spy agencies. They use Tradecrafts to hone their professional approaches to the task of creation of Human Intelligence Assets (HumInt). This is a complicated subject and would require a few volumes to explain the details.

This concept is as old as the organised human society is. Interested readers may like to glance through chapter eleven, section seven, eight, nine onwards of Kautilyan Arthasastra by M. B. Chande (Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi). Kautilya had compiled his treatise on various aspects of espionage as it suited the kings of his days. However, the eternal aspects of human fallibility have been explained by him, by exploiting which the trained intelligence generators create their agents. This is called Tradecraft, techniques of the trade of espionage.

The concept has remained unchanged: at the end of the day a curious housewife wants to what is cooked in her neighbour’s pot what and who sleeps with her rival neighbour under her sheets. Enlarge the inquisitive individual. This simple information is vital for “chaupal” gossip and important for social cohesiveness. Enlarge this orbit. A modern nation state cannot survive without having prior warning about its neighbour’s intentions. Whenever some stupid state scions like to indulge in the luxury of indulgent ignorance or philosophical utopianism we get surprised by broken China of Hindi-Chini Bahi Bahi and Kargil. Unfortunately, in India such slumbering philosophers are treated as national heroes and blundering officers are crowned with governor’s laurels.

It is not my intention to drag you through the minefields of intelligence generation tools. This is a vast subject and cannot be narrated in a column. My intention is to narrate certain developments involving national crisis reactions in the public and the media, which have exposed the raw sides of weakness and unpreparedness of our governing tools and vulnerability of our media and members of the public.

Hijacking of IC 814 from Kathmandu to Kandahar is a glaring example of intelligence and security failure of the governments of India and Nepal. This single incident had created several chain reactions-creation of new jihadi tanzeems called Jais-e-Mohammad, killing of Daniel Pearl, a grand kidnapping for ransom in Kolkata, transfer of part of the ransom money to Mohammad Atta by the ISI and utilization of that fund in the 9/11 attacks on Twin Towers and the Indian Parliament. The chain reaction continues even today, the USA behaving like a Nation State and India reacting as a lump of clay. The USA had brought in Homeland Security Act; India enacted and abolished POTA to prove that it is a better secular country and more democratic than the USA. Long live Bharat!

Besides these monumental cascading consequences I would like to draw attention of the readers to the video footages of demonstration by family members and workers of certain secular political parties, beating chest and wailing and forcing a government to free the hijacked passengers and the plain at great national humiliation and cost. The sounds of humiliation still echoes; political parties blaming each other in the name of communalism and secularism and faux pas committed and uncommitted.

Have you ever seen on electronic and print media the peoples of Israel and USA surrounding the Knesset and the White House to force the governments to take action to get their relatives released or declare wars on the perpetrators? Even at the height of national crisis the US media and people displayed dignified and solemn reactions-no chest-beating and no electronic wailing.

The same thing happened over the issue of death sentence awarded to one Manjit Singh by the Apex Court in Pakistan on charges of his alleged involvement in subversive and sabotage activities. His severity of the sentence was not because of his alleged involvement in espionage activities. Around the same time another person was repatriated from Pakistan after he completed jail sentence on charges of espionage inside Pakistan. The gentleman entered India raising hands and proclaiming before print and electronic media that he was an Indian spy and the government of India neglected to honour his welfare. His wails were beamed to attract national attention and to the alleged fact that India does not look after its spies.

I have no point to make on the issue if Manjit Singh had acted as an Indian saboteur inside Pakistan. I have no knowledge and no government would ever admit that it carries out espionage and acts of sabotage and subversion in another country. Whenever, such incidents happen in India we blame Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence agencies and their agent-organisations. Similarly they also blame our intelligence agencies.

The point to make is that no people in any nation in the West behaved in war and peace times during World Wars and Cold War conundrum. Their media did not wail and expose the nation’s raw hides with vengeance. An unwritten code is followed by the countries of the Dollar and Euro world as well as the countries behind the so-called Iron and Bamboo Curtains. In India we do not pretend to have any curtains at all. We dance nakedly at national discomfiture. We dance in electronic media, do some “Bahnagra” and Bharat Natyam in print media and leave the matters to “secular” and “communal” political parties to slug at each other with the holy objective of exposing our rotten national bones.

We must understand a few home truths:

• Every informer is not a SPY, but every Spy is an informer.

• No government would ever admit charges of carrying out espionage and sabotage activities.

• Spies are, if they are, a group of professionals, who are exposed to usual professional risk, like a soldier at the front and a policeman before a rioting mob. They are trained to get killed and maimed. They do not come back home amidst sounds of cymbals and horns. They return, if they return at all, quietly and live as quietly for which they are trained and paid.

• Espionage is not a salariat (in Urdu), meaning salaried job with encoded service rules. This trade is based on unwritten laws governing their tradecraft training, single or continued compensation package, security instructions, and no lost baggage claim principle.

• The entire trade is outside the purview of media glare and not based on any Act of the country.

• The media have unwritten sets of rules to honour national secrets and to ignore certain facts even if such hypes are likely to increase their TRP.

• The Public are expected to be more patriotic and heroic to the point suffering great personal loss, which nave been exhibited in cases of our soldiers and security personnel martyring themselves in action fields. Millions have perished in several wars, but nations have survived. Individuals and organised societies survive honourably only when the people gain strength to suffer silently. War losses are not matters for street-wailing. Intelligence warfare is another kind of war nations wage through extended diplomatic activities.

From the lowest category of spies or agents to the highest category there exist several intermediary layers. A mere trans-border smuggler used as a “single task” informer or a “deep penetration itinerary spy” is different from a well trained, embedded Long Term Resident Agent (LTRA) or a trained saboteur. Sabotage and subversion activities are unadmitted tools of silent or proxy-warfare. Most nations do and deny it. The ultimate test of success is the desired results and Deniability. No country would own up a lost, caught and punished spy. No country makes a hero out of a spy like Pakistan did to Abdul Kader Khan, the great nuclear bandit and pirate, aka a scientist.

Self-confessed informers like Mohanlal Bhashkar, Ruplal and Kashmir Singh (as claimed by them) are single task border smugglers and itinerants. They work on a specific task and after successful completion; failure or abortion the handling officer has no legal and moral responsibility towards their welfare. One-package-compensation is the law of the game. The person who agrees to do the job does so willingly out of a genuine or generated motivation. Creation of motivation is part of the tradecraft. Getting motivated is part either a part of patriotic feeling or simple greed for easy money.

Their brief is limited and the tasks are specific. Most of these trans-border human assets are not elaborately trained and briefed. As most of these border smugglers and illegal traders are left to device their own security aspects. They move like eels across international borders and straightaway sent to the frying pan when caught. Such assets are “feed and milk” type human agents. Some of them are known as “double agents.” A same talent may work for Indian and Pakistani agencies.

However, well trained, indoctrinated and Tradecraft oriented deep penetration Long Term Resident Agents are akin to classical agents of the type of Philby, Ethel and Julius Rosenburg etc. Such spies are very rare to come by. The agency takes full responsibility of locating, cultivating and if possible retrieving such highly priced agents. The lucky ones manage to trek back. Some are retrieved and most are lost, once detected by the agencies of the target countries. Some are forgotten and some are transported to folklore.

Spies are unsung soldiers and heroes of Statecraft. No country would admit spying in another country. They would deny existence of any agent, once they are caught in action and maintain deathly silence even if the media hype up such incidents. Normally the media has an unwritten understanding of the rules of the game and acts of successful or failed espionage activities do not form part of TRP increase marketing device. Every nation follows this golden rule, except, perhaps India, the infinite free country, where one is free to peep into the forbidden areas of statecraft.

Espionage is both real and unreal.

Every Trade and every Profession has inbuilt advantages and risks. A soldier is trained to die on the front. A policeman is taught to face brickbats and bullets and a spy is taught to gather intelligence and forget that he had any emotional, legal and moral bondage with his handler.

Some spies mix up smuggling, trans-border illegal trading with tidbit intelligence gathering. Some are prepared to face the gallows if caught in more serious violation of the laws of the country where they are stationed.

During Cold War the US, USSR, West and West Germany often “traded in” exchange of “Security Prisoners”- a euphemism for spies. India and Pakistan have not developed such bilateral convention of periodical exchange. No Pakistani spy or saboteur has so far been sentenced to death by any Indian court. Pakistan have awarded death sentence on some compromised Indian agents. This unwritten systemic protocol is rarely tinkered with at diplomatic level. However, India was forced on few occasions to intercede diplomatically without success.

Stealing national secrets is an offence under respective Official Secrets Acts and other Penal provisions. Once exposed and caught the spies are tried and punished. Governments decline to admit existence of such spies. This is the reason that leads to incarceration of Indian and Pakistani spies in jails for unspecified periods. Perhaps sufficient confidence building measures have not been established to reach that level of international protocol, which can facilitate periodical exchange of routine spies caught in actions of espionage.

There is no question of “bad” or “good” treatment to informers, often hyped as spies. The agencies are known to be reasonably responsive to the families of distressed informers. Often the compensation package is fat.

There is simply no institutionalised mechanism to attend to the human aspect of the Spy-trade. Response of the agencies depend on category of the concerned spy, importance of the mission, magnitude of results delivered and bondage of trust between the agent and his handling agency. Hyping up in expectation of a fat package of compensation does not always pay. Intelligence agencies are like proverbial leeches. They shrink back when sprayed with salts of media hype.

It is patriotic, heroic and great honour to be a high grade SPY, if one understands the rules of the game clearly. It is simply give and take, feed and milk and forget…forget…forget game; not to be immersed in emotional tears.

Intelligence is as remorseless a war as frontline wars are. The citizens are expected to honour this unwritten law of unwritten saga of statecraft.

[Aditya_V]

Timesnow is just reporting.

Major threats to TN temples especially Madurai Meenaskhi temple. Hope this is just a hoax. if anything happens, then the nawab of Arcot and MK should be held responsible.

[Anshul]

Chinese mobile firm Huawei under DRI scanner

I have a feel that they have significant espionage assets hidden at their Leela Palace Office.They are bang opposite the Intel India R&D Center.They have a good line of sight at NAL,ISRO and HAL.I am sure that it can be used to monitor activities of CABS and HAL.

Singha can shed some more light on that.

[sum]

Palace,Lhasa
Avinash R wrote:
Chinese mobile firm Huawei under DRI scanner

I have a feel that they have significant espionage assets hidden at their Leela Palace Office.They are bang opposite the Intel India R&D Center.

Havent they shifted their office now?

[Venkarl]

Chinese mobile firm Huawei under DRI scanner

I have a feel that they have significant espionage assets hidden at their Leela Palace Office.They are bang opposite the Intel India R&D Center.They have a good line of sight at NAL,ISRO and HAL.I am sure that it can be used to monitor activities of CABS and HAL.

Singha can shed some more light on that.

well.....I bet my fortune that we have some IB/Raw agents working with huwei...these agents should plant some bombs there and push it on Indian mujahideen or SIMI..

[Anshul]

well.....I bet my fortune that we have some IB/Raw agents working with huwei...these agents should plant some bombs there and push it on Indian mujahideen or SIMI..

Counter Espionage
The best we can do is setup a listening station opposite their offices.They could be transmitting a lot of data in the guise of testing new encryption algos.Also a lot of stuff must be getting transmitted via SAT links.

I am not sure what kind of military assets are available in Guangzhou and Shenzen.We could use the high number of Indian IT Training and Consulting Companies for placing RAW agents.

[shyamd]

All can be done, but, is there political will power to do something of that sort?

[malushahi]

Chinese mobile firm Huawei under DRI scanner

The article is from 2001, but provide an interesting read in the backdrop of Chinese hack attacks, rise of Huawei etc. There has been significant specualtion on all this being a part of Shashou Jiang ('Assassin's Mace').

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/04/03 ... ter_virus/

Chinese Feds demand computer virus samples

By Thomas C Greene in Washington DC

Posted in Business, 3rd April 2001 07:49 GMT

China's Ministry of Public Security has been requiring Western anti-virus vendors to supply samples of malicious code as a condition of doing business with Mainland consumers, the Wall Street Journal reports.

The official Chinese explanation would have us believe that the secret police have lately gone into the consumer protection business by claiming that the samples are necessary to enable the Feds to test the effectiveness of the software being sold.

Tantalized by the glittering promise of 1.2 billion (largely penniless) consumers, Network Associates, Symantec and Trend Micro have graciously complied, offering up approximately 300 virus samples to curry favor enough to sell their products in the PRC.

What the Chinese Feds really intend with these samples is unclear, but we can be confident that the consumer-protection cover story is the last explanation likely to be true.

It's long been known that China is developing a cyber-warfare capability, since it lacks the technological sophistication, manufacturing capacity and raw capital required to compete head-to-head with military juggernauts like the USA, EU, and, until recent years, Russia.

Beijing clearly sees information warfare as an inexpensive battlefield equalizer. But according to the Journal report, only the most common malicious programs in circulation -- all of which are easily detected -- have been surrendered.

Most of these are available on the Web to anyone capable of using a search engine with a modicum of ingenuity.

It seems implausible, then, that the PLA and internal security apparatus would rely on submissions from vendors when a thorough Web search will yield much the same raw material.

Nevertheless it's beyond question that the Chinese authorities intend to secure for themselves the capability of launching devastating cyber attacks. With that in mind, we might make sense of this trend if we consider that they might wish to see a broad sample of detectable viruses in hopes of modifying them to evade detection without diluting their effectiveness.

We can also be confident that they're gleefully breaking every copyright law known to man, reversing the anti-virus software in search of other weaknesses they can exploit along those lines.

Incredibly, Network Associates Research Director Vincent Gullotto is quoted by the Journal saying that he's "met with [the Ministry of Public Security], developed a certain level of trust, and believes they're doing what they're talking to us about."

Isn't it remarkable how greed can instantly transform a jaded businessman into a gullible Pollyanna?

[malushahi]

This one is a subscription-only article from WSJ from March 2001.

http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB9 ... 563410.htm

China Is Asking Software Firms To Provide Samples of Viruses

By TED BRIDIS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON -- Security officials in Beijing have been requiring that in order to sell their products in China, leading antivirus-software companies must provide samples of destructive computer programs and rogue wiretap software from their research labs.

Between 1999 and the end of last year, three of the industry's largest vendors -- Network Associates Inc. and Symantec Corp., both based in the U.S., and Trend Micro Inc. of Tokyo -- gave the Chinese security ministry roughly 300 different samples of the most common, malicious software found on the Internet, in exchange for permission to market their products in China. The three companies collectively represent nearly 75% of the $1.2 billion world-wide antivirus-software market.

Executives at the three companies said China's Ministry of Public Security, the nation's principal police authority, told them that they needed virus samples to independently test the effectiveness of their software products before they could be sold to consumers.

"We've met with this organization, developed a certain level of trust and believe they're doing what they're talking to us about," said Vincent Gullotto, senior director of the research labs at Network Associate's McAfee Corp. unit in Beaverton, Ore.

Still, the move has raised concerns among some international-trade and national-security officials here who worry about China developing information-warfare tools.

Others characterized the request as a potential time-saver for China that could provide researchers there with insights into developing not just future viruses but also an increasingly popular class of surreptitious monitoring software known as "back doors."

It is also possible that the Chinese ministry could be looking to use the viruses to develop their own antivirus products at the expense of research done by foreign companies, although the authorities didn't seek access to the more useful source code that the software companies use to write antivirus products.

An official at the press office of the Chinese embassy directed calls to its Commercial Office here. Repeated phone calls to that office weren't returned. Executives at the three companies said they rejected persistent Chinese demands for their broader research collections of viruses and other malicious software.

A fourth company, F-Secure Inc. of Finland, said it negotiated last summer to let Chinese researchers conduct virus studies at its new laboratory in Beijing, but declined to surrender the samples directly.

"This is very unusual," said Mikko Hypponen, virus-research manager at F-Secure. "No other country has anything similar to this."

McAfee President Gene Hodges said that within 90 days of complying with the Chinese request, his company notified the U.S. government that it had provided the samples. "No specific concern was expressed" by the government officials that the company spoke with, Mr. Hodges said. He declined to say who or which U.S. government department his company contacted.

Meanwhile, experts also were divided about the potential military usefulness of the common viruses turned over to China. Many of those samples can be found within rogue virus collections already on the Internet, though others are more rare. Mr. Gullotto of McAfee estimated that determined Chinese researchers "might be able to find 80% to 90%" of what the companies provided, and noted that antivirus software currently protects against those samples.

Still, the unprecedented request to trade virus samples and other software programs for market access surprised some researchers at the companies. Sharing of viruses for research purposes is usually restricted to fewer than three dozen members world-wide of the loosely organized Computer Antivirus Researchers Organization. Software firms keep their sample virus collections -- code zoos -- in secure rooms and on separate computer networks that are off-limits to all but a handful of experienced employees.

U.S. international-trade and national-security officials expressed disappointment with the companies' decisions to share any malicious software with China's government. They noted that the ministry has an intelligence division, and that China's military is developing a "Net Force" of young computer experts trained in information warfare. In late 1999, the Chinese army's official newspaper discussed the need for "software and technology for Net offensives so as to be able to launch attacks and countermeasures on the Net."

These same officials said they were somewhat mollified that the software companies had negotiated to hand over to China only samples of relatively common viruses, not their more substantial collections of tens of thousands of dangerous programs. The shared collection was described as easily stored on a single CD-ROM disk.

"The concept is troubling," said Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch, the outgoing head of the U.S. Bureau of Export Administration. "We don't want to promote or encourage information warfare or the further dissemination of viruses that even unintentionally could bring down our systems." He added that the Bush administration may need to consider restricting in some ways the intentional export of malicious software to some countries.

[kit]

Something India needs to do asap .. to keep its home terrorists and the explosives

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr ... 80925.aspx

The Honeywell corporation found that by adding some ammonium sulfate to the ammonium nitrate, you actually improve the fertilizing ability of the mix (by making the treated soil less acidic), and prevent the fertilizer from being used as an explosive

[Lalmohan]

Something India needs to do asap .. to keep its home terrorists and the explosives

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr ... 80925.aspx

The Honeywell corporation found that by adding some ammonium sulfate to the ammonium nitrate, you actually improve the fertilizing ability of the mix (by making the treated soil less acidic), and prevent the fertilizer from being used as an explosive

similarly, other additives are routinely added to sodium chlorate to prevent its use in blasting mixtures

[kit]

I guess this is being / going to get done

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Govt ... 545627.cms

[sum]

Link

B to go hi-tech, get more manpower to fight terror
6 Oct 2008, 0324 hrs IST, Vishwa Mohan,TNN

NEW DELHI: Intelligence Bureau — which has come under flak for its failure to keep tabs on tech savvy jihadis — is set for major revamp with the g
overnment recruiting 6,000 more spies to strengthen its existing cadre of nearly 25,000 personnel. The IB will also get modern gadgets to monitor cyber communication.

The idea is to turn the internal spy agency into a potent force to fight terrorists through effective intelligence in the age of modern communication systems. While new-age gadgets will give IB an edge through technology, the increased manpower will widen the scope for human intelligence (humint) — which played an important role in cracking recent terror attack cases.

The home ministry also plans to set up an exclusive "research & technology centre" within IB to keep a complete databank of terrorists and suspicious persons under one umbrella. The job of the new centre will also be to "research and analyse" the technological aspects of threats which have, of late, multiplied due to extensive use of the Internet by the new breed of educated terrorists.

"Widespread use of cyber technology — like Wi-Fi system — in the recent terror attacks, where terrorists of Indian Mujahideen (IM) had not only used it for sending emails but also for networking among their cadres for planning and execution of their operations, has forced us to rethink our strategy," said a senior home ministry official.

The plan for modernisation and increasing the strength of IB — which has already got Cabinet nod — came up for review recently when home minister Shivraj Patil asked the agency to complete the recruitment process of 6,000 additional spies, including technical and cyber experts, by next year. The emphasis in the meeting — attended by IB chief P C Haldar and home secretary Madhukar Gupta among others — was on impressing upon states to strengthen their special branches (intelligence wing) with the Centre helping them out with funds and expertise.

Referring to how new technologies were increasingly being used by jihadis for assembling bombs (using integrated chips for the first time in Bangalore and Surat operations) and networking among themselves through Internet, the official said, "Since terrorists the world over are using new communication technologies as 'weapon of mass influence' for the warfare, we cannot afford to function in the traditional way — even though it has its own importance."

Though the official did not disclose the kind of methodology being adopted to fight tech savvy jihadis, he mentioned the possibility of bringing certain changes in the Information & Technology Act to widen the scope of cyber intercepts, including snooping on text messages.

Hope that all these are put to use against actual enemies of the state and not just opposition parties!!!!

[ramana]

There is a book review post by Raju thats very relevant here. Please post it.

[ramana]

IB to get manpower

IB to go hi-tech, get more manpower to fight terror
6 Oct, 2008, 1200 hrs IST,Vishwa Mohan, TNN

NEW DELHI: Intelligence Bureau, which has come under flak for its failure to keep tabs on tech savvy jihadis, is set for major revamp with the government recruiting 6,000 more spies to strengthen its existing cadre of nearly 25,000 personnel. The IB will also get modern gadgets to monitor cyber communication.

The idea is to turn the internal spy agency into a potent force to fight terrorists through effective intelligence in the age of modern communication systems. While new-age gadgets will give IB an edge through technology, the increased manpower will widen the scope for human intelligence (humint), which played an important role in cracking recent terror attack cases.

The home ministry also plans to set up an exclusive "research & technology centre" within IB to keep a complete databank of terrorists and suspicious persons under one umbrella. The job of the new centre will also be to "research and analyse" the technological aspects of threats which have, of late, multiplied due to extensive use of the Internet by the new breed of educated terrorists.

"Widespread use of cyber technology, like Wi-Fi system, in the recent terror attacks, where terrorists of Indian Mujahideen (IM) had not only used it for sending emails but also for networking among their cadres for planning and execution of their operations, has forced us to rethink our strategy," said a senior home ministry official.

The plan for modernisation and increasing the strength of IB, which has already got Cabinet nod, came up for review recently when home minister Shivraj Patil asked the agency to complete the recruitment process of 6,000 additional spies, including technical and cyber experts, by next year.

The emphasis in the meeting, attended by IB chief P C Haldar and home secretary Madhukar Gupta among others, was on impressing upon states to strengthen their special branches (intelligence wing) with the Centre helping them out with funds and expertise.

Referring to how new technologies were increasingly being used by jihadis for assembling bombs (using integrated chips for the first time in Bangalore and Surat operations) and networking among themselves through Internet, the official said, "Since terrorists the world over are using new communication technologies as 'weapon of mass influence' for the warfare, we cannot afford to function in the traditional way, even though it has its own importance."

Though the official did not disclose the kind of methodology being adopted to fight tech savvy jihadis, he mentioned the possibility of bringing certain changes in the Information & Technology Act to widen the scope of cyber intercepts, including snooping on text messages.

[sum]

Hi ramana-garu,
same article has been posted two posts above yours....

[Avinash R]

There is a book review post by Raju thats very relevant here. Please post it.

Nation of Secrets: The Threat to Democracy and the American Way of Life (Hardcover)
by Ted Gup (Author)

SR: Ted, your book is called “Nation of Secrets.” I want to ask you about some of the journalistic dimensions of this because you teach journalism as well as being an investigative reporter yourself. …There are some things in this book that people don’t know about.

TG: There are a number of things that are unknown, that I stumbled upon. One of them… and some of these are obscure and historical and some are not …one of them involves a covert operation the CIA ran back in the ‘60’s in India which may have had a profound effect on the government of India. It went awry and I won’t go into all the details… but a Prime Minister named Shastri died suddenly. A covert operative tells me that he fears that this covert operation than went awry may have contributed to the death of the prime minister. Which, if true, is extraordinary.

[Philip]

...and after Roald Dahl,the celebrated author and "cocksman" supreme,we now have another secret British spy who was tagically killed,shot down by the Luftwaffe ,who reportedly kept Spain out of the war.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2008/oct ... ndworldwar

British film star was secret agent, claims author• Leslie Howard 'died after mission for Churchill'
• Franco meeting kept Spain out of war, says writerGiles Tremlett in Madrid The Guardian, Monday October 6 2008
Article history

Leslie Howard, right, with Vivien Leigh and Olivia De Havilland in Gone With The Wind (1939). Photograph: Kobal

He is remembered as the obsessive love interest of Scarlett O'Hara in Gone with the Wind, but Leslie Howard should also be recalled as a British secret agent who died returning from a clandestine war mission, claims a Spanish author.

José Rey-Xímena said that Howard, who was in a passenger aircraft shot down by the Luftwaffe in 1943, had just been to a secret meeting with General Franco, allegedly on a special mission for Winston Churchill, who wanted to get a secret message to the Spanish dictator.

"Thanks to him, at least in theory, Spain was persuaded to stay out of the war," Rey-Xímena claimed of the actor famous for his portrayal of the unattainable southern gentleman Ashley Wilkes, in the 1939 film Gone with the Wind.

The alleged message conveyed by Howard was just one of the British attempts to keep Franco, who had come to power with the support of Hitler and Mussolini, from joining the wartime Axis alliance, Rey-Xímena said yesterday.

Howard used his contacts with a former lover, Conchita Montenegro, to get through to Franco and deliver the message, the writer said. Montenegro, a Spanish actor, told Rey-Xímena the full story of Howard's visit to Madrid shortly before her death at the age of 95 last year.

Montenegro, once dubbed the Spanish Greta Garbo, allegedly had an affair with Howard whom she met while shooting Never the Twain Shall Meet in 1931. She later married Ricardo Giménez-Arnau, who was in charge of foreign relations for the far-right Falangist party, which backed Franco's military uprising against the Republican government.

It was through her husband's family, whose members occupied several posts under Franco, that Howard managed to see Spain's ruler, the actor said.

Montenegro told Rey-Xímena that Howard's interview with Franco was supposedly about whether he would take the role of Columbus in a Spanish film. Franco was interested in cinema. The arrival in Madrid of a Hollywood star, at a time when Spain's rightwing dictatorship meant the country was widely shunned, caused a stir. Howard enraged British officials in Madrid, however, by refusing to attend many events organised for him. This, Montenegro said, was because he was preparing to meet Franco behind the back of the British ambassador.

Rey-Xímena, who has just published a book on the subject, has not revealed the full contents of the meeting. Howard left Madrid in June 1943 for Lisbon, and then boarded a DC-3 passenger airliner bound for London. The plane was intercepted off Spain by German fighters and went down in the Atlantic, killing all on board.

A rumour later circulated that the Germans thought Churchill himself was on board. Howard's manager, who also died in the crash, was said to resemble the British war leader.

Rey-Xímena said Howard's secret went down with the plane: "He has never been recognised either as a spy or as a hero."

PS:In a recent Indian mag,there was this review about the book on Sheikh Abdullah, with the astonishing fact that his wife was earlier married in secret to none other than a certain Col.T.E.Lawrence,who was in India undercover! "Lawrence of Arabia" had to divorce her and she subsequently married the Sheikh.

From Wik:
In 1933 he married Akbar Jahan, the daughter of Michael Harry Nedou, the eldest son of the European proprietor of a chain of hotels in India including Nedous Hotel in Srinagar, and his Kashmiri wife Mirjan. Michael Harry Nedou was himself the proprietor of a hotel at the tourist resort of Gulmarg[1] (The writer Tariq Ali claims that Akbar Jehan was previously married in 1928 to an Arab Karam Shah who disappeared after a Calcutta newspaper Liberty reported that he was actually T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia)[2] a British Intelligence officer. He claims that Akbar Jehan was divorced by her first husband in 1929.

From Kushwant Singh's review of the book,

"He was a strapping, 6’4” tall, handsome young man; she the beautiful daughter of the owner of Nedous Hotel — an Austrian, Harry Nadou, who had converted to Islam to marry a Gujar beauty. (An aside information which is of interest is that Akbar Jahan had been earlier married to T.E. Lawrence of the British Intelligence in Lahore. He was the author of the classic, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He had organized Arab rebellion against the Ottomans, was captured by them and brutally sodomized. He was a homo-sexual. After a few months, he agreed to divorce Akbar Jahan.) Her marriage to Abdullah was a happy one. They had five children of whom Farooq was the eldest..."

[dinakar]

Behind the Batla House shootout
http://www.thehindu.com/2008/10/10/stor ... 621100.htm

“Sometimes,” said the Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, “I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”

Ever since last month’s encounter in New Delhi’s Jamia Nagar, critics have been claiming that the two men killed by the police were innocent students, not Indian Mujahideen terrorists. A number of well-meaning commentators and politicians have expressed concern over the encounter. Few seem to have paused to wonder if there was, in fact, anything mysterious about the shootout. If it was indeed fake, the story would read something like this: Hoping to redeem their anti-terrorism credentials and whip up anti-Muslim paranoia, the Delhi police shot dead two innocent Muslims. For some reason, though, they left a third innocent Muslim, Mohammad Saif, alive to tell the tale. Either because of incompetence or to get rid of an inconvenient honest officer, depending on who is telling the story — the Delhi police also killed one of their own. They also shot another officer, but let him live.

A riveting fiction? The truth about Batla House is, in comparison, mundane.

When inspector Mohan Chand Sharma walked through the door of the flat where he was to die, all he knew was that he was looking for a man with two missing front teeth. Soon after the Gujarat bombings, a Bharuch resident contacted the police to report that the vehicles used as car bombs in Ahmedabad had been parked by his tenant. Gujarat Crime Branch Deputy Commissioner Abhay Chudasma had little to go on, bar one small clue: the mobile phone used by the tenant to communicate with the landlord. It turned out that the phone went silent after the Ahmedabad bombings.

Based on the interrogation of suspects, Gujarat police investigators determined that the cell phone was one of the five used by the perpetrators between July 7 and 26 — the day of the serial bombings. They learned that the perpetrators had observed rigorous communication security procedures, calling these numbers only from public telephones. Between July 16 and July 22, the investigators learned, another of the five Gujarat phones had been used in the Jamia Nagar area. This phone had received just five calls, all from public phones at Jamia Nagar. Then, on July 24, the phone became active again in Ahmedabad.

The investigators also found evidence of a second link between the Ahmedabad bombings and the Jamia Nagar area. On July 19, the Bharuch cell phone received a call from Mumbai, made from an eastern Uttar Pradesh number — the sole break in the communication-security procedure. Immediately after this, a call was made from the eastern U.P. phone to a number at Jamia Nagar, registered to local resident Mohammad Atif Amin. The authorities mounted a discreet watch on his phone but decided not to question him in the hope that he would again be contacted by the perpetrators.

Mumbai police crime branch chief Rakesh Maria made the next breakthrough last month, when his investigators held Afzal Usmani, a long-standing lieutenant of ganglord-turned-jihadist Riyaz Bhatkal. From Usmani, the investigators learned that top commander ‘Bashir’ and his assault squad left Ahmedabad on July 26 for a safe house at Jamia Nagar. Armed with this information, the investigators came to believe that Atif Amin either provided Bashir shelter or the two were one and the same person. Inspector Sharma was asked to settle the issue.
‘Vodaphone salesman’

Sub-inspector Dharmindar Kumar was given the unhappy task of trudging up the stairs in the sweltering heat, searching for Bashir. Dressed in a tie and shirt, just like other members of Sharma’s team, Kumar pretended to be a salesman for Vodaphone. At the door of Amin’s flat, he heard noises — and called his boss.

According to head constable Balwant Rana, who was by Sharma’s side, the two men knocked on the front door, identifying themselves as police officers. There was no response. Then, the officers walked down an ‘L’ shaped corridor which led to a second door. This door was unlocked. Sharma and Rana, as they entered, were fired upon from the front of and to the right of the door. When the rest of the special team, armed only with small arms, went in to support Sharma and Rana, two terrorists ran out through the now-unguarded front door. Saif wisely locked himself up in a toilet.

It takes little to see that Sharma’s team made several tactical errors. However, as anyone who has actually faced hostile fire will testify, combat tends not to be orderly. In the United States or Europe, a Batla House-style operation would have been carried out by a highly trained assault unit equipped with state-of-the-art surveillance equipment. Given their resources and training, Sharma and his men did as well as could be expected.

Judging by Sharma’s injuries, as recorded by doctors at the Holy Family Hospital in New Friend’s Colony and later re-examined at the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences’ Trauma Centre, he was fired at from two directions. One bullet hit him in the left shoulder and exited through the left upper arm; the other hit the right side of the abdomen, exiting through the hip. The investigators believe that the abdomen wound was inflicted with Amin’s weapon and the shoulder hit, by Mohammad Sajid.

Much has been made of a newspaper photograph which shows that Sharma’s shirt was not covered in blood, with some charging that it demonstrates he was shot in the back. Forensic experts, however, note that bleeding from firearms injuries takes place through exit wounds — not, as in bad pop films, at the point of entry. In the photograph, signs of a bullet having ripped through Sharma’s shirt are evident on his visible shoulder; so, too, is evidence of the profuse bleeding from the back.

In some sense, the allegations levelled over the encounter tell us more about the critics than the event itself. In part, the allegations have been driven by poor reporting and confusion — the product, more often than not, by journalists who have not followed the Indian Mujahideen story. More important, though, the controversy was driven by the Muslim religious right-wing whose myth-making, as politician Arif Mohammad Khan recently pointed out, has passed largely unchallenged.

In a recent article, the University of Delaware’s Director of Islamic Studies, Muqtedar Khan, lashed out at the “intellectually dishonest” representatives of Muslims who “live in denial.” “They first deny that there is such a thing as jihadi terrorism,” Dr. Khan noted, “resorting to conspiracy theories blaming every act of jihadi violence either on Israel, the U.S. or India. Then they argue that unjust wars by these three nations [in Palestine, Iraq and Kashmir] are the primary cause for jihadi violence; a phenomenon whose very existence they have already denied.”

It is easy to rip apart the pseudo-facts that drove the claim that the Jamia Nagar encounter was fake — or that the Indian Mujahideen is a fiction. Much political work, though, is needed to drain the swamps of denial and deceit in which the lies have bred.

Now what Mr.Amar singh is going to say.....

[sum]

Pravin Swami sure seems to have been worked up got a bit...Have never noticed such a aggressive tone in any of his articles before!!!

If it was indeed fake, the story would read something like this: Hoping to redeem their anti-terrorism credentials and whip up anti-Muslim paranoia, the Delhi police shot dead two innocent Muslims. For some reason, though, they left a third innocent Muslim, Mohammad Saif, alive to tell the tale. Either because of incompetence or to get rid of an inconvenient honest officer, depending on who is telling the story — the Delhi police also killed one of their own. They also shot another officer, but let him live.

Straight out of the BR sarcasm book....

When the rest of the special team, armed only with small arms, went in to support Sharma and Rana, two terrorists ran out through the now-unguarded front door. Saif wisely locked himself up in a toilet.

Hope that this isnt true and the two "escaped" folks are squealing their guts out hanging upside down somewhere...

It takes little to see that Sharma’s team made several tactical errors. However, as anyone who has actually faced hostile fire will testify, combat tends not to be orderly. In the United States or Europe, a Batla House-style operation would have been carried out by a highly trained assault unit equipped with state-of-the-art surveillance equipment. Given their resources and training, Sharma and his men did as well as could be expected.

Exactly what N^3 had said about how Amrikans would have handled the situation....The only thing i can imagine happening due to the pinko-"secular" crowd rantings is that the police will give up the soft approach of first going in mufti etc and will instead storm into every suspected $hit-hole to avoid their own causalities(since its anyways impossible to satisfy our 5th columnists and there is no point of a "humane" approach)...

In some sense, the allegations levelled over the encounter tell us more about the critics than the event itself.

1000% agree...

It is easy to rip apart the pseudo-facts that drove the claim that the Jamia Nagar encounter was fake — or that the Indian Mujahideen is a fiction. Much political work, though, is needed to drain the swamps of denial and deceit in which the lies have bred.

Wonder what is stopping the DP from going on a overdrive with all these facts?


Someone needs to put this article inside a hard-bound 1000 page book and beat the living daylights out of Shri.Javed Akthar, Mahesh Bhatt, teesta and other pinkos till they see the light...

[Aditya_V]

All these allegations make ones blood boil, since the terrorists never attack the Mahesh Bhatt's, Amar SIngh, A Roy's, Sarabhai's, Teesta's of this world they go happily supporting them. These people will never learn until thier Kith and Kin get killed by Terrorists.

[kit]

I think this topic is more appropriate in this thread .It is regarding asymmetric warfare capabilities. Knowing your friend more than your enemy is important in Geopolitics. If any one can hazard a guess as to who has the the biggest espionage network inside the US of all places ..(well i would say maybe the best since that position has changed recently !) .. its uncles bosom pal in west Asia . Anyway at this point I would like to discuss on who was accessing all the world bank data through Sat yam .... was it India ..I would say highly unlikely

[satya]

Intelligence in India's Sri Lanka War

A review of India's military intervention in Sri Lanka (1987-90) now after two decades has the benefit of hindsight. During those two decades a number of global developments have enlarged the concept of strategic security. As a result, Military Intelligence (MI) has undergone changes in form, content and expectations.

When Indian forces operated in Sri Lanka, the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was at its peak after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The US-Pakistan relations were perhaps at the closest, making India's Pakistan-centric security focus more acute. Only two months before signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in July 1987, Operation Brass Tacks, in which the two countries almost went to war, had concluded. Indian army suffered from this Pakistan-centric preoccupation and Indian army had to pay a price for it in Sri Lanka.

Viewed in the overall context of India-Sri Lanka relations, India's war in Sri Lanka might be termed as Indian state's reactive military response to a largely internal political situation in Sri Lanka that affected India's interests also. Unfortunately, at that time the nation did not have a structural frame work to plan, conduct and monitor such overseas response. There was no integrated body with accountability to take informed decisions on national security issues. Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) was the only forum to carry out this task. During the Sri Lanka operations, a Core Group was formed to look after the day to day issues. This empowered group functioned under the Chairmanship of the Minister of State, External Affairs.

Sri Lanka operation was India's first -ever overseas force projection. Before that Indian troops had operated overseas only as part of United Nations forces. For the first time all the three services were involved in an overseas joint operation. Perhaps it was also the first time Indian army was drawn into a counter insurgency operation for which it had either planned or prepared in advance. To cap it all, the counter insurgency conflict involved operating in urban as well as jungle settings.

Communication technology was just making its early breakthroughs. The battlefield competencies of armed forces were yet to benefit from them. The MI did not enjoy the advantages imparted by information technology and its applications. It was essentially a HUMINT and COMBATINT operation.

MI had limited organic HUMINT capability and what little was there was focused on Pakistan. By modern standards, the then available ELINT and SIGINT resources would be considered primitive. However, over the years the MI had gained certain amount of expertise in HUMINT operations and interrogation in counter insurgency setting. The divisional intelligence units deployed in insurgency affected regions were the main sources of this expertise.

When the Sri Lanka army's crackdown on Tamil militants reached a critical stage in Jaffna Peninsula around April 1987, Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) moved a small MI team to Chennai to cover Sri Lanka. It had very limited capability. Thus till Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was inducted into Sri Lanka, this MI team was DGMI's sole organic source of intelligence. Of course, it had access to some of the inputs of the external intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) and the counter intelligence service Intelligence Bureau (IB). The IB had been keeping a watchful eye on the activities of thousands of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees present in Tamil Nadu. It also had very good knowledge of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s activities in Tamil Nadu. However, the DGMI had no access to the Tamil Nadu State Police (Q Branch) which was yet another rich source of intelligence on Sri Lanka Tamil militancy.

Intelligence before the outbreak of war

Southern Command based in Pune established the Operational Force Commander's Headquarters (OFC HQ) at Chennai to for the task of overseeing the operation when India decided to send troops to Sri Lanka to help implementation of the ISLA. As soon as the ISLA was signed on July 29, 1987, opposition to the Agreement snowballed in Sri Lanka threatening the stability of the regime of President JR Jayawardane. 54 Infantry Division (less most of the support arms) was hastily despatched to Sri Lanka in the first week of August 1987 as a show of support to the President and the Tamils. The Southern Army Commander as the OFC had an ambiguous mandate on Sri Lanka. As a corollary 54 Infantry Division also was not given a clear role at that stage.

The DGMI attached a dozen Tamil speaking Intelligence Corps officers and NCOs to the OFC HQ at Chennai to assist the OFC. The attachment of the MI team was fire fighting measure as it had neither exposure to Sri Lanka nor had a briefing on its task. The team moved to Jaffna (Palali) in the first week of August, a few days after 54 Infantry Division arrived there. The OFC HQ assigned no specific task to the MI team except to 'keep an eye' on the happenings there. The team was provided no functional resources

The MI team tasked itself to study and understand the environment in north-eastern Sri Lanka. It familiarized itself with the terrain, and important personalities and decision makers among militant groups notably the LTTE. The team forwarded its reports directly to DGMI under whose command it operated. There was very little intelligence input from either DGMI or from civil intelligence agencies to either OFC HQ and as a result 54 Infantry Division had only marginal information.

From September 1987 onwards the LTTE showed marked reluctance in implementing the ISLA refusing to surrender of the arms it held. As the IPKF task looked a long haul, DGMI moved 57 Mtn Div Int & FS Company to Palali to augment MI resources in the island. Tamil speaking officers and NCOs were posted to man the unit.

The Divisional Headquarters in Palali perhaps due to the confusing command and control structure of the MI team did not use it. In fact the Divisional Headquarters kept the MI team out of all its interactions and political parleys with the LTTE. The Division Headquarters also did not project specific intelligence requirements of any kind to the MI team. For reasons not very clear, the services of the MI team were never used during the Division's operational planning process prior to the Jaffna operations. (According to the RAW, the Army Headquarters also did not take the RAW into confidence or sought its advice prior to the Jaffna operations). Thus the Division launched the Jaffna operation on its own steam.

Intelligence during the operations

Only after the Jaffna operation commenced and troops were rapidly inducted from mainland, the Division asked the Officer Commanding, 57 Div Int & FS Coy to brief the troops prior to their induction into the war zone! Similarly, as the operation progressed, the intelligence unit was tasked to interrogate suspected civilians and prisoners.

There was no advance planning at either the OFC HQ, or the Divisional HQ for screening of civilian population or holding prisoners. This was in direct contrast to 1971 operational experience in eastern theatre when we had meticulously planned in advance the handling and interrogation of prisoners. Short duration training was also imparted to NCOs from infantry units on combat interrogation. This resulted in the failure to gain tactical information through interrogation in the early stages of operation.

However, by the time Jaffna operations ended, the force level of IPKF was increased with the induction of two more divisions. The command and control structure of the Advance Headquarters of the OFC at Chennai was also streamlined. In addition to the 57 Int and FS Coy, another intelligence unit was specifically raised for the IPKF operations and inducted. The unit had both intelligence acquisition and interrogation capabilities. The unit had its headquarters in Chennai; one team and an interrogation centre each from this unit were deployed in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. 57 Int and FS Coy provided the intelligence cover for 54 Div sector including Kilinochchi. Both the units served under the command of Col GS (Int) of the Advance HQ OFC.

Communication intelligence was provided by the SIGINT detachments and EWCP. Though they were under Army Headquarters, they worked closely with forward troops and provided accurate real time information.

The RAW after its initial false start, improved its linkages with the Advance HQ OFC, after the Jafffna operations commenced. From then onwards, the Chennai RAW unit maintained close touch with the Advance HQ OFC, and provided valuable inputs particularly on political developments in Sri Lanka. Though RAW provided up to date information on overall developments, it could not provide specific information on the LTTE's military capabilities or cogent assessments on their likely course of action.

Despite the MI officers enjoying excellent rapport at the senior level, both the Q Branch of the Tamil Nadu State Police and the IB at Chennai provided no information to the IPKF throughout the period of operation. Their information resources on the LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu could have helped the IPKF in planning and conduct of its operations. Thanks to the vehement opposition of the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party to the IPKF operations, the Tamil Nadu government issued no formal orders to the Q Branch on sharing of information relevant to the IPKF. The IB fared no better. It usually fobbed off our requests saying that they had no military information, though political information had a lot of relevance to IPKF operations.

MI performance: Army Headquarters level

There was practically no intelligence sharing between the three services intelligence wings at the functional level in Sri Lanka. Perhaps the confusion in the overall command and control equation among the three services was the reason for this aberration. The DGMI also probably did not identify and articulate its needs to the other two services.



The DGMI had built no intelligence assets on Sri Lanka before the ISLA. It is surprising that this requirement was not visualised, despite India's close political involvements there since 1983. This was only symptomatic of the lack of mission clarity that had marked Indian army's foray into Sri Lanka. Thus DGMI could not provide timely information to the forces in Sri Lanka either during the political parleys with the LTTE or before Jaffna operations. However, once the role of the IPKF was crystallised, the DGMI rose to the occasion. It made available maximum possible intelligence resources within the first few months. It also assisted in recruiting Sinhala knowing Tamils migrants from Sri Lanka to help MI and SIGINT units.

But the biggest failure of the Army HQ and the DGMI was in their inability to change the Tamil Nadu government's negative attitude not only on information sharing but also in taking follow up actions requested by the IPKF on specific LTTE activity in the state. During the entire period of operations, the LTTE had an unprecedented freedom to operate with impunity in Tamil Nadu despite being at war with Indian state. This not only exposed the troops traversing the state to potential LTTE threat but reflected the callousness with which the whole operation was treated. This created a great feeling of insecurity among Tamil sources, who felt the MI did not have enough "influence" to ensure their security even at home. This lack of confidence affected MI's performance.

The DGMI's also showed its inability to provide down assessments to the IPKF, even though it received regular inputs from RAW, IB and other agencies at the Army HQ. Similarly the HQ Southern Command GS (Int) also failed to provide useful assessments or inputs, presumably because it had no operational responsibility. The absence of such top down assessments handicapped the MI planning and collection process at the Advance HQ OFC. The DGMI could have helped the IPKF to assess the situation better with appropriate and timely inputs on developments at home that had impacted MI's intelligence operations in Sri Lanka.

MI performance: OFC MI

At the field level, OFC MI had set itself the task of keeping abreast of three strategic developments that could destabilise the IPKF operations. These were: the acquisition of MANPADS by the LTTE, contacts between the LTTE and the Marxist Sinhala militant group Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) operating in other parts of Sri Lanka, and collaboration between the LTTE and elements of the Government of Sri Lanka. In all the three aspects, the OFC MI all along kept abreast of the developments. Despite the initial glitches of command and control and limited resources, the MI units in Sri Lanka made some positive contributions. Their assessments were generally more accurate than any other national intelligence agency.

OFC MI had used the period of troubled peace from August to October 1987, to create useful assets both within the LTTE and among influential pro-LTTE elements in Jaffna and Trincomalee. These assets came in handy when the operations started. They provided valuable inputs on political and strategic moves of the LTTE as well as Sri Lanka government. During the IPKF's consolidation phase, after Jaffna was cleared, the OFC MI's was able to provide useful information on movement of LTTE pistol groups within Jaffna and in eastern Sri Lanka. It also provided clinching evidence of collusion between elements of the Sri Lankan government and army, and the LTTE. These helped us to understand the changing operational environment and assess the depth of the emerging equation between the Sri Lanka President and the LTTE.

Generally frontline troops had high expectation of tactical intelligence from OFC MI units. To certain extent these were met wherever close coordination existed between the MI elements and troops, notably in Jaffna, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa sectors. Unfortunately this could not be achieved fully in Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts where the jungle terrain made HUMINT operations difficult. Troops in those areas had to depend upon their own combat intelligence. However, the front line infantry units lacked adequate intelligence awareness to successfully carry out combat intelligence tasks. On the other hand, Para Commando units showed excellent response and added some 'muscle' to MI operations conducted with their help. And naturally their operational performance was far superior to regular infantry units.

The OFC MI established useful links with Sri Lanka's National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Though some of the NIB information was misleading, it helped in understanding the official line of Sri Lanka. The OFC MI had to maintain constant vigilance against NIB efforts to thwart its operations, particularly in the year 1988-89.

Communication and electronic intelligence produced valuable inputs. However, such information was not validated adequately due to paucity of intelligence staff. In future operations of force projection such inputs are likely to increase enormously. In order to get the overall picture, intelligence staff at the formation level would require better training to evolve realistic assessments combining HUMINT, ELINT and SIGINT inputs.

There was practically no input from Air and Naval Intelligence sources. Presumably MI failed to seek specific information from them. Navy could have been useful particularly in gaining information on the LTTE's supplies from Tamil Nadu across the Palk Strait. MI did not fully tap the Tamil media both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka that were rich open sources of information.

Coordination with civil intelligence agencies

Coordination between the MI as the user and the RAW as the provider had always been one sided. The RAW usually did not meet DGMI's military intelligence requirements in a usable form. Presumably RAW's own priorities were different from those of the armed forces. Ideally when the IPKF was inducted, the RAW had the capability to produce a comprehensive handbook on Sri Lanka containing all the information forces required. Probably the DGMI did not project such a requirement nor did the RAW anticipate it. This speaks for the limited coordination that had existed between the Army and the RAW. However, after initial hiccups on this count in Sri Lanka, the RAW – Army cooperation improved once the Advance HQ OFC was created.

Though over a period of time, some form of top level agency coordination emerged in New Delhi it never percolated down to formation level in Sri Lanka. At present interaction between the Army and RAW counterparts is based only on personal equation established between the two in the absence of standard operating procedures for information sharing. Thus officers on both sides grow up in a culture of denial rather than sharing. Perhaps we can take a leaf out of the Japanese industrial management practice of forming Small Group Activity for the user and producer to understand the user's problems to evolve workable solutions.

As far as the IB was concerned, internal political intelligence appeared to be their focus. Functionally in critical internal situations in India the IB representatives had been forthcoming in sharing information of military interest. However, this does not apply to IB's political intelligence sharing with the army even in counter insurgency situation in India. However, in the case of counter insurgency operations in Sri Lanka, the fine line dividing political and operational intelligence got blurred. Perhaps the IB was not able to appreciate this need for forces operating in alien environment. That would explain its reluctance to share information of any kind relating to Sri Lanka with the IPKF.

The failure of the State police machinery to share intelligence relevant to the IPKF represented the dissonance in our national security perceptions. The failure of the Tamil Nadu Home Department to act in the interest of national security for political reasons had kept up the morale of LTTE fighting with our forces in Sri Lanka. This has been well documented in the Jain Commission report. The precedent set by Tamil Nadu Government during the IPKF operations on this count taking roots now in the political culture cannot be ruled out. To avoid a similar contingency arising in our future overseas operations, it would be prudent for the armed forces to handle with more alacrity by demanding clear mandates in advance with clear guidelines and responsibilities.

Intelligence in overseas operations of the future

The IPKF operations in the early stages were hastily conceived, inadequately planned and executed because there was a lack of role clarity. This was mainly due to the absence of an empowered national decision making body on national security at the government level. Similarly there was an inadequate framework for conducting combined operations overseas at the joint services level. Remedial action has been taken since then to address these limitations, though they might not be wholly satisfactory as the Kargil war had demonstrated. However, it is likely to improve as the nation gradually gains more experience in handling strategic security issues on a global perspective.

Intelligence on a real time basis will be the catalyst of success of armed forces in future overseas operations. MI will be required to meticulously plan and be ready to meet the intelligence requirements in overseas operations before and after the induction of troops. As sources of information have enlarged in scope and width, MI should be in a position to provide reasonable assessments in real time to forces operating in battle fields dominated by larger force levels, great mobility and high fire power. This would require a greater degree of intelligence integration of MI with its counterparts in other services as well as civil intelligence agencies. Thus there is an urgent need to integrate this need in perspective planning of operations for such contingencies.

To achieve such readiness, MI will require clear policy formulations applicable to the three services as well as civil intelligence agencies, better integration and coordination of inputs and assessments through a structured mechanism. It will also require coordinated advance planning by all the intelligence stakeholders at various levels.

Over the long term, MI will also have to build its own expertise in areas of potential operational interest. Ideally, a defence university will be the appropriate forum to create such knowledge banks. In the absence of such an institution, repositories of knowledge can be created in selected academies of excellence like university departments of defence studies so that there is continuity of effort. Intelligence Corps officers should be encouraged to specialise in regions or countries of national interest. Unless MI plans and evolves such an integrated intelligence matrix, success in future overseas operations will come only at great cost of men and material.

Military intelligence is a specialised job that requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information needs of the battle field and provide useful assessments to the fighting forces. In future operational environments, MI staff will be required to make real time assessments to assist operational decision making. No doubt the quantum jump in communication and information technology provides useful tools for the MI to meet this requirement. However, much of its success would depend upon the training imparted to intelligence staff to be technologically savvy in keeping with the dynamics of the emerging battle field needs.

With the nation poised to emerge as a regional power in the near future, MI has to transform itself into a technology driven organisation to meld TECHINT, ELINT, SIGINT and HUMINT inputs to meet the requirements of force projection overseas. Focus on intelligence management rather than mere information management has become the order of the day. That will remove the aberrations of intelligence acquisition and coordination at all levels and contribute meaningfully to operational planning and execution.

[kit]

Using terahertz to find terrorists

http://www.janes.com/news/transport/jar ... _1_n.shtml

[K Mehta]

Intelligence in India's Sri Lanka War

completely shocking

[Philip]

Yes,it was a complete cock-up,general chaos all round.The intriguing fact is that for several years before the IPKF's induction,the SL Army had been battling the LTTE and suffered greivous losses due to its land mine/IED tactics .What the Indian intel. establishment and the Indian diplomatic mission in Colombo learnt during that time appears to have been precious little.During this time,we,that is India,armed the Tamil "militants',until the LTTE started bumping off all its rivals (tearfully bemoaned by Karunanadhi ,"Yunity Yillai",today) and behaved badly when Rajiv called Prabhakaran to Delhi to work out the Rajiv/JRJ accord.The attitude of Prabhakaran was such that some who accompanied him reportedly felt that he was a great danger to India and should receive an "exit pass".

When the IPKF was atatcked by the LTTE and had to start fighting it,which astonishingly was never anticipated by our worthy planners,who totally misread the well-known ruthlessness,double-crossing nature of Prabhakaran for years, India discovered that the LTTE possessed weaponry far beyond the scale/lethality of what it had been given by India.It was clueless about the terrain,soldiers who were inducted in haste,lacked maps and proper equipment to fight an enemy who was living and fighting in his own lair.It is to the credit of the Indian armed forces that the IPKF eventually after grievous losses,smashed the LTTE to the extent that the entire north and east was under its control,elections were held and a puppet,Perumal, (like Malaiki in Iraq) installed as CM! It is to everlasting shame that VP Singh unceremoniously pulled out the IPKF without the political part of the agreement carried out by the GOSL under Premadasa,who conspired with the LTTE,sent them arms in SL Army lorries to fight the IPKF,and received the ultimate reward for his services to the cause of gross stupidity by being bumped off in return.

The cretinous clowns in Chennai today must be giving the LTTE's fuhrer acute ribtickles of delight,as they prance and peform their act of betrayal of the country of their birth,for the insidious cause of "Tamil" terrorism.

[ramana]

So LTTE initially might have had Indian support but it got additional sponsors who armed it with all that weaponry. Who was it and are they still sponsoring them? And looks like there was a blindspot on Indian side due to earlier contacts.

[Arun_S]

So LTTE initially might have had Indian support but it got additional sponsors who armed it with all that weaponry. Who was it and are they still sponsoring them? And looks like there was a blindspot on Indian side due to earlier contacts.

When people dwell deeper into this (via public source information) they can see some countries that call themselves friend of India (apart from the old and current colonial masters of India) were double crossing.

[ramana]

At crucial times the DMK govt always intervened and helped to support the LTTE even if it was gaisnt Indian interests. They went for 'alleged' Tamil interests. It could be they were looking to prop up LTTE to fight another day.

[shyamd]

So LTTE initially might have had Indian support but it got additional sponsors who armed it with all that weaponry. Who was it and are they still sponsoring them? And looks like there was a blindspot on Indian side due to earlier contacts.

When people dwell deeper into this (via public source information) they can see some countries that call themselves friend of India (apart from the old and current colonial masters of India) were double crossing.

Thanks for that Arun. Israel being one of them and has been mentioned on this forum. Yet no one raises their voice when, the Israeli's (who were just looking to earn some cash) were training the Indian troops as well as LTTE. Look at the way Russia is repaying the Israeli's now after the Israeli's were helping the Georgians.

Ramana, for DMK, it is all about tamil interests. The tamil culture and people are above everything else, and as far as their concerned, they couldnt give a shit about any of the others "outside".

[Pranay]

Folks,
Just finished reading Comrade J by Pete Earley, about the defection of a Russian spy, Sergei Tretyakov in 2000 in the US. There are many references re: India and Indians in that book.

Has there ever been any documented instances of Pakistani spies defecting to India?

How about Indian Intelligence agents defecting to Pakistan or other countries? The recent case of Rabinder Singh is noted.

[kit]

A Million Grains of Sand

http://china.suite101.com/article.cfm/a ... ns_of_sand

[kit]

Chinese ‘gifts’ worry Indian intelligence

http://naxalwatch.wordpress.com/2006/11 ... elligence/

[Anabhaya]

So LTTE initially might have had Indian support but it got additional sponsors who armed it with all that weaponry. Who was it and are they still sponsoring them? And looks like there was a blindspot on Indian side due to earlier contacts.

Premadasa would qualify as one supporter as well!

Indian agencies always saw Anton Balasingham as an agent of other agencies. Anton married an Australian by birth. Mrs. Balasingham also went on to become a prominent figure although to what extent we dont know. They married back in late 70's.IIRC one of LTTE chiefs son's also studied in Aus. It was Anton who represented LTTE in almost every dialogue. The guy worked at the Sri Lankan High.Comm in London initially. Went on to become a British citizen.

This page is informative.

Maybe I didn't provide an answer to the question...but then!

[Philip]

It is common knowledge that several organisations with dubious reputations were operating in Lanka at the time,like the Asia Foundation,presenting "books" to the people of Jaffna.Its head was an American with very powerful connections (read a post in the SL thread) in Washington.Premadasa was vehemently anti-India and pro-US.He boycotted the JR-Rajiv signing of the Indo-Lanka accord and allegedly instigated local disturbances in the aftermath of the signing.Premadasa's handing over of arms to the LTTE in army lorries to fight the IPKF is well documented .The plan was to get India stuck in a rut,destroy the Indian armed forces' image,which had earlier risen dramatically thanks to our involvement in Lanka and the Maldives (counter-coup) operation.Eventually,he became so autocratic and put down the JVP with such brutatlity,that he antagonised almost his entire party,especially the elite and his pro-western/US rivals of Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake.He was unceremoniously bumped off at a May Day rally by Mr.P. to the accompaniment of crackers.They departed too in similar fashion .The Israelis (brought in to help the Lankans by Gen.Walters) were also playing both sides;selling fast attack craft to the SL govt. and training the LTTE (in the adjacent base) how to sabotage it! As long as Mr.P.knew his "station in life",the west indulged him.Once he became too unpredictable and refused to obey orders,his outfit was finally proscribed.The turning point was his brutal assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar,Chandrika's brilliant FM,who was much admired and respected worldwide,also a Tamil.Colombo was a "turd-world " equivalent of Berlin during the Cold War,with so many vested interests and nations,rubbing shoulders in a small town by the sea!

[Tuan]

So LTTE initially might have had Indian support but it got additional sponsors who armed it with all that weaponry. Who was it and are they still sponsoring them? And looks like there was a blindspot on Indian side due to earlier contacts.

Rohan Gunaratna (currently head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore) wrote in his book “Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis & National Security" that ISI had provided its intelligence training manuals to LTTE, quoting a former LTTE intelligence wing cadre. He also revealed in the book that the LTTE intelligence agent handling is replica of the ISI model.

Gunaratna also wrote in one of his other controversial book “Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror”, that the LTTE provided forged passports for Ramzi Yousef (specialists close to the WTC 1 trials dispute this assertion). Also, while allied with the Pakistani government in the late 1980s and early 1990s the LTTE smuggled weapons from Pakistan-based Islamists to their counterparts in the Philippines.

Naturally, allies of the Sri Lankan government are playing up this possible link between their local enemy and the enemy which is the focus of international attention. However, if this cooperation occurred it should not be construed as a grand strategic alliance. The LTTE has an international network of support among the Tamil diaspora and, because of Sri Lanka's strategic location astride shipping lanes, its own fleet of sea-going vessels. So it is well positioned to play a role in trans-national criminal activity. The alleged LTTE passport sales highlight how terrorism is the tip of the iceberg of trans-national threats.

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/03 ... ment_1.php