Deterrence

[Anand K]

So if I understand correctly, your view is that India is not going to do an all-out FU. I thought in your above post you meant India was scared of going all-out in any scenario.
I agree, India will not go all out FU. I don’t think it will go for FU even in the case of small tactical strike… the majority of public will not be able to process that kind of aggression and will not countenance it. Which is why, I believe, we are quite comfortable with a very circumscribed NFU policy.....

Yes. As much as I hate that "take the punches" stand.

As per Hersh IIRC, Israel's Samson Option apparently will target all major Paki(?) and Middle East metropolises, Mecca-Medina, Meshed, Karbala and Qom. (PS: Judaism survived the Temple Destruction, changed and thrived actually - do they think Islam, not fundamentally tied to Mecca like old Judaism was to the temple, won't survive the loss of their shrines? Heck, Mecca Sharief is supposed to fly away one day!) Its one reason why some thrillers show Americans pre-empting this carnage by surface strikes on Israeli silos once they realized Israel cannot be salvaged. Now if we plan to go out anyway and plan retribution on all...... then I guess a Karnad-esque Maximalist position is indeed secretly in place. On that note, remember that short story that came in some magazine long time ago about secret Indian silos in LTTE territory to meet such a contingency? The one about US and Israel pre-empting the Indian strike after a massive JDAM in Mumbai?

But here's something I heard from a anti-nuke peacenik friend of mine. What if the ruling power in India wants that kind of Dhamaka so that it can go all-out reshape what's left of India... as they always wanted? Hint. Hint. Won't they seek nuke war in the same way an Argmageddon-high Mullah would? Well it's right outta a bad dystopian novel - it's essentially what "Swamiji" and his ultra-secret organization wanted in Vikram Chandra's Sacred Games (the weakest link IMO in an otherwise good novel). Anyway, I dismissed the notion that WE would seek that kind of war. Too many unknowns and I refuse to believe ANY Indian Government will be that crazy.

[member_20317]

I am not being flippant about it. I just give out that impression most times. I thought, I was fairly easy to figure out that way. In fact to the contrary I am quite serious. The point is - how to draw conclusions of safety/superiority/deterrence from something as un-quantifiable and ambiguous as fear. What sort of confidence can be reposed on a parameter like fear when there is an equal and competing parameter of opportunity.

For example, the people who used nukes when they had a numbers advantage of say 3:0 decided not to use it when they had the advantage at 17000:300. While all the time everybody is deterred by Nukes the confirmation of which was never provided (Noko, Iraq, Pak, Israel at different points in their history) or when the very existence of Nukes was denied (India). Then again the alien warlords also keep telling us how the humanity is so and so minutes away from annihilation and how the Prez in his white horse saved the world peace. If I remember correct we are 10 minutes away now in the global atomic death watch or whatever its called.

So if fear ultimately is the essence of deterrence and if fear is always supposed to be more powerful than the opportunity then I guess bigger the fear better it is. Second, Third .... strikes then make better sense hence more nukes and more ambiguous stances should be useful. But what we see is that that may or may not be the case.

.....................

Minor nitpik (may be useful later) - That would be Saka JE Menon saar. Jauhar is after Saka by menfolk. Jauhar is sure death and sure conversion of anybody living thereafter. Saka is going out in the face of sure death.

[shiv]

May I introduce a concept which I call the "deterrence paradox"?

I see a lot of discussions on here about the damage that nuclear war may do in India. That may seem wise and rational but worries about what nuclear attacks may do in India have two things going against them
1. They (nuclear attacks on India) may be totally unavoidable no matter how much "worry" is expended on them, given that we have nuclear armed neighbors and many overt threats have been made.
2. Worrying about nuclear attacks only reduces our resolve to fight for victory, and encourages us to surrender or do less than is needed to win or dominate in conflict

This brings me to the concept of the deterrence paradox. the deterrence paradox is to completely ignore thoughts of any nuclear damage that may occur to us and how people may react, but to concentrate on what damage we can do to the other guy.

This is a paradox because it is counter intuitive. Why would you avoid fighting with a tiger? Because the tiger will maul you. But the problem is the tiger could maul you anyway, whether you fought or surrendered. If you fight you have an outside chance of hurting the tiger enough to survive. So fighting the tiger is advisable even if it is counter intuitive.

All talk of how much damage Pakistani or Chinese nukes can do to us only improves deterrence for Pakistan and China because Indians are shivering in their <insert garment name>. If you want to talk about how well China and Pakistan deter us Indians, talk about how much damage they can do to us.

if on the other hand, you want to talk about how you want to deter them from attacking us, you have to consider how to damage them and damage them badly so that they will deeply regret an attack on India. The deterrence paradox is to be ready to damage them unacceptably despite being hurt badly yourself. For us deterrence is NOT about how Chinese nukes are scary and how we must avoid war because we are scared. Deterrence is about what we do to scare others. The amount of damage that occurs to us is irrelevant because one nuclear war occurs we will be damaged whether we hit back or not. What matters is ONLY our ability to hit them. Only that can care them. their superiority over us does not deter them so we need to stop wasting time on that issue.

Now can someone please look at some questions:

We call ourselves rational.. As regards Pakistan, we have people caliing Pakistanis both rational and irrational. Some people say, Pakistanis are rational because they seek to deter India which offers an existential threat. Others say, we cannot deter Pakistan because they are irrational. Similar conclusions have been reached about the Chinese - whom paople have claimed as being either rational or irrational (will not care about millions of deaths)

But let us look at some details here

1. How many cities are the Chinese willing to lose and still not care and laugh as they nuke us out of existence? One? Two? Five? Would the Chinese be rational if they accepted the loss of one city but reacted badly to the loss of three?

2. What are the Pakistanis readily willing to lose in nuclear war. What losses would the Pakistani laugh away as negligible before they nuke us out of existence? Would the Pakis laugh and ignore 5 nukes each on Lahore, islamabad and Rawalpindi and 10 bombs on Karachi? Where does the Pakistani rationality line lie. given that we believe that we Indians are oh so civilized and rational?

[Anand K]

Just letting off a few thought balloons here.... a maximalist position actually from POV of our foes.

We all laughed at the "Mineshaft Gap" and "Multiple Fertile Women per Man" snippets in Dr. Strangelove but I think the key here is continuity of State, under the current ruling elements of course - with a minimum acceptable level of survival weighed against the prize to be won.

Both our foes are not responsible to their citizens, give fu(k-all to their brethren and are strongly deep-states. TSP more than PRC in this regard. The Paki Elites would be okay with living in their Four Fathers' countries and entertain the very likely possibility of returning under the aegis of 3.5 and other nations. The crazy Mullah types are of course another matter - Ghazwa-i-Hind and Ghazidom and all that and might be even willing to court death personally unlike the RAPES/3.5. For both types, the price of a few million dead is worth the end of Indian state perhaps? The sheeple can be coaxed back if 3.5 and those-who-claim-to-speak-for-Allah help. The Chinese people OTOH are not crazy Pakis but their leadership would see the carnage as no different from the Taiping Revolt or Yellow Turban or An Lushan which saw millions upon millions dead in a few months if not years.... heck, even the massive famines of Maoist era. But if they pull off the survival of key elements and forces and by virtue of their regimentalized society (and HUGE number of police/militia types) that minimum level of survival could be met. One thing about the Chinese, they will not let any 3.5 lord over them overtly - the Humiliating Treaties of 19th century and the Manchu rule before that is too ingrained IMO. Anything short of that should be okay, even the party is expendable. The absolute end of the only Asian state that could challenge them, which sure ain't Japan, may be worth the loss of some infrastructure and a few million?

Again, IMHO, the absolute end of the Indian State as we know today for good in a serious nuclear war is a certainty and a most attractive prize for both parties. Minimum acceptable level of survival can be achieved against certain the end of the strong Indian State as we know today. Also, this gives both of the Pakis and Chinese leadership a chance to violently recast their societies - something they are not squeamish about unlike India. Perhaps they seek such change strongly and this is an opportunity only a destructive war provides. Remember how Sparta used the border scrimmages and the Helot wars to change from a normal Greek State to a bunch of militaristic a$$holes. Well, they were conquered at the end but the ideology of a few sour pr1cks held sway for centuries, to the detriment of many.
IMO the absolute end of the Indian state is certain due to with so many centrifugal forces and horizontal and vertical fault-lines in society (which will be exacerbated in a nuclear war) and the losses and confusions of a post-nuke war. I think the "outer" parts will be easy pickings for physical or mental conquests. I mean, with no more Eastern Commands and New Delhi/KolKata gone dark, could not the separatists in the NE states gain ascendance and current administration do a palat-mar? Would a Dravida Demagogue use this crisis to show "Northie Aryans" as responsible for the carnage that has also hit Tamil Nadu and gain ascendancy in the absence of the state power? Such a nuclear carnage will also no doubt induce fatalistic/end-of-times/Judgement Day memes in these times - a development which can be used by proselytizing forces who will descend from the West with "aid". What kind of an India will this be? Even if these areas are won back with force - what will we turn into?
Once again, many here say our elite are DIE/SLIME/sellout whatever - but will they gamble like the ChiComm Elite or the RAPE would? What prize do they seek to win for this trouble? Enduring Peace? Tibet? POK? I think the Deterrence Issue could be around the ultimate prize the ChiComs & Pakis seek and the Indian Fear...... and what would scare the Pakis/ChiComs from taking this gamble.

JM2c.

[shiv]

How can India avoid being attacked by nuclear weapons?

1. If there were no nuclear weapons at all
2. If anyone with nuclear weapons were afraid of punishment if they attack India with nuclear weapons.

Point no1 is false and can be discarded. Only point 2 needs consideration.

Suppose our foes/adversaries had nuclear weapons and we did not have any. Suppose Pakistan and China had nukes and we did not have any. Could we avoid being attacked by them? Certainly not. In fact they could attack India and laugh away any serious damage to themselves if India had no nuclear weapons.

Since we do have nuclear weapons, suppose we decided not to use them at all, under any circumstances. Would that keep us safe from nuclear attack? Certainly not. Once again Pakistan and/or China could attack India with impunity and laugh away any serious damage to themselves.

The only possibility left is for us to be ready to use our nuclear weapons on China or Pakistan.

But even if we are ready to use our weapons on them, would that prevent a nuclear attack on India? Not necessarily, but the most likely method of deterring Chinese or Pakistani aggression is to be ready to retaliate with nuclear weapons. If we were to be weak kneed and argue, as too many Indians, including Bharat Karnad do, and say "Hey Pakistan has more nukes than us" or "hey China has megatonne nukes, we only have kilotonne nukes" implying that we should be afraid of provoking them since somehow they are not afraid of us, then this only means that we can get attacked by them because we are afraid. Such arguments do not protect us from nuclear attack.

The argument that X has "more nukes" or Y has "bigger nukes" only state why we are deterred by them and why we are arguing against attacking them. That is a serious mistake. It illustrates the deterrence paradox.

There is no rational reason why a country with more nukes or nukes with higher yield should not be deterred by a country with fewer nukes of lesser yield. They will not be deterred only if we are scared of using our nukes. But as mentioned above, if we are scared of using our "paltry, puny" nukes or if we had no nukes - that is no guarantee that we will not be nuked. We can get nuked anyway.

So whatever way you look at the issue, the threat of definitely retaliating against China or Pakistan with nuclear weapons once a particular Rubicon is crossed is the only way of deterring them. That is the only chance we have of not getting attacked by nuclear weapons. Our fears of damage that we may sustain, or fears about number and yield do not go even one millimeter in protecting us from attack. Only resolve to hit back can be effective. One might argue that more Indians than Chinese will be dead after a nuclear war - but both sides will have lost too much. Reassuring adversaries that we_will_definitely_nuke_them with all we have is the best deterrence. Not arguments about how much they have or how much we will get hurt.

[shiv]

Again, IMHO, the absolute end of the Indian State as we know today for good in a serious nuclear war is a certainty <snip> and what would scare the Pakis/ChiComs from taking this gamble.

You were right only insofar as calling your post "thought balloons".

Your thoughts may or may not be correct, but I put it to you that they are irrelevant to the question of deterrence.

You are talking about the consequences of failure of deterrence and you write a particular scenario and state that this is more or less how things will pan out.

Let me say, OK. You are absolutely correct. What you say is exactly what will occur. With this in mind I ask you:
Can India do anything to avoid this?

1. if the answer is no, we simply sit and wait. No need to think about it at all.
2. if the answer is yes, does the answer involve

• a. The non use of Indian nuclear weapons
  b. The use of nuclear weapons

If the answer does not involve the use of Indian nuclear weapons, should we disarm and default to simply wait for the inevitable

or..

Should we nuke China/Pakistan with all we have and then accept the inevitable.

If we do nuke them, what should we hit? What damage can we expect to do to them? What consequences do you see for them in terms of their being able to function effectively with some game plan?

Without answering such questions, your thought balloons are simply one example of irrational emotive pessimism that reflect particular strains of thought that you seem to have with no attempt at rational analysis.

[Pratyush]

Shiv ji,

You have just highlighted the light in which we have to see the the maximum response strategy.

Regards

[Anand K]

Shiv,
The fact that nukes exist in the dynamics is never in doubt. Neither is the fact that there should be a strategy of response. You take the "length of the sword" point again which imo is just one aspect of deterrence. Before coming to the fun part about how big our sword should be, what about the questions of why are nukes pointed our way and why there is a chance that they will use it.
So the natural follow up would be why the sword, what exactly is behind the length of their sword and why they are rattling it us now. This also lets us imagine how grievously they aim to hurt us with it. Is it a slash or decapitation or thundam thundam slice. Once we know this we can go to the length of the sword part.

[shiv]

Shiv,
The fact that nukes exist in the dynamics is never in doubt. Neither is the fact that there should be a strategy of response. You take the "length of the sword" point again which imo is just one aspect of deterrence. Before coming to the fun part about how big our sword should be, what about the questions of why are nukes pointed our way and why there is a chance that they will use it.
So the natural follow up would be why the sword, what exactly is behind the length of their sword and why they are rattling it us now. This also lets us imagine how grievously they aim to hurt us with it. Is it a slash or decapitation or thundam thundam slice. Once we know this we can go to the length of the sword part.

Anand your post is full of innuendo, analogies and ill defined concepts. It sounds more like poetry than logic. In a vague sense you sound like Arjuna worrying about why he is on the battlefield, when discussions about nuclear deterrence and war should be centered around the basic concept of killing the opponent and not worrying about the consequences. Why is he my opponent? Why is his sword pointed at me? Whose sword is longer? Who will be left after the fight etc are philosophical questions left to poets and philosophers. In terms of Pakistan and/or China threatening nuclear war, none of this is relevant or productive. Our duty would be to nuke the crap out of people who attack (base on our nuclear doctrine) and to avoid philosophizing.

[member_28108]

If there is nuclear war it has to be a decapitation strike nothing less.Vitrification of the entire area is the goal- The threat of that is the deterrence.

[Anand K]

...

Anand your post is full of innuendo, analogies and ill defined concepts. It sounds more like poetry than logic. In a vague sense you sound like Arjuna worrying about why he is on the battlefield, when discussions about nuclear deterrence and war should be centered around the basic concept of killing the opponent and not worrying about the consequences. Why is he my opponent? Why is his sword pointed at me? Whose sword is longer? Who will be left after the fight etc are philosophical questions left to poets and philosophers. In terms of Pakistan and/or China threatening nuclear war, none of this is relevant or productive. Our duty would be to nuke the crap out of people who attack (base on our nuclear doctrine) and to avoid philosophizing.

Deterrence is a changing landscape. The funda of deterrence between US/USSR in 50s is not the same in 60s and so on. The questions like, "What does the Bear want? Worldwide Communism? Is that why he is building up all these nukes? I justed wanted to rebuild Europe with my Marshall Plan". Or "WTF? Whats up in Mount Yamantau actually? 10o Tsar Bombas with a dead-hand seismic alert? Is he crazy? Is he trying to make sure America is wiped off for good. Did I do something to make him that scared?" Or "Why MIRV? Is to ensure at least one gets through or is to make sure the confluence of separate warheads does a better job in killing my people"? Or "He has an SDI now. What made him build that.... what will he do next now that he has this? Fight World war 3 now? Overthrow WarPact now and jeer at us well meaning Communists?". The deterrence equation between US and China changed too similarly over the years but underneath it all was China's understanding of American hedging. In India-Pakistan case this is even more dynamic as seen by the nuclearization issues of various platforms. Also, this is more important since we do not apparently keep delivery platform and weapons mated 24/7 with patrolling bombers and prowling boomers. So unless you go behind these questions you cannot fully game what you are trying to deter and what gets you deterred and consequently the length of your sword.

Added later: BTW, in India-Pak, the more addictive and unpredictable religion factor.... which is much stronger than ideology.... is involved. So there's another variable to worry about.

[member_28108]

With the Arihant going to be active I am not sure that the demated concept actually exists.
Prasanna

[shiv]

So unless you go behind these questions you cannot fully game what you are trying to deter and what gets you deterred and consequently the length of your sword.

All that we are trying to deter is nuclear war. That is perfectly clear.

The question is whether we can deter nuclear attack from Pakistan and/or China with or without nuclear weapons.

The possibilities are
1. We can deter them by diplomacy, civilizational methods and other things and do not need nuclear weapons. I do not believe this to be possible
2. We can deter then using a combination of "in your face" deterrence using our nuclear weapons and background methods that do not involve nuclear weapons as above
3. We can deter them with nuclear weapons alone. Nothing else is needed.

No matter how much the scenario changed between the US and the USSR the fundamental rules of deterrence did not change. Each side was afraid of the other side. It was mutually agreed by both sides that the mutual fear should be increased by avoiding building BMD so that both sides would remain afraid of each others nukes.

The only thing that can change the India Pakistan equation is BMD. I predict that it will not be long before Pakistan gets a BMD of its own from China, with the blessing of the US and Saudi Arabia. So back to square one.

[Anand K]

>>Prasannanarasimha

As I said, deterrence is a changing landscape - but what made us go for the expensive triad, i.e. a second or third strike capability? Is it just the numbers game or for the heck of it or is it also due to our some new threat matrix and new perception of Pakis and Chinese strategic and warfighting intent? What made us think things will go to a second and third exchange? Were we simply copying the Americans by having a triad? I remember 80s era Sunderji-Vijay Nair books which only went as far as a second strike..... from our side against a tactical Paki strike. Not good anymore given how pakis have changed in many ways eh?

[shiv]

Added later: BTW, in India-Pak, the more addictive and unpredictable religion factor.... which is much stronger than ideology.... is involved. So there's another variable to worry about.

Our worries only help to deter "us" from attacking "them". Our worries are pointless and useless in deterring "them". Our worries increase their confidence that we are deterred and that they can continue to provoke. Deterrence from our perspective is to make "them" worry. Our religion may or may not make them worry, but our nukes can. Similarly. "their religion" is not particularly worrisome without nukes. Ultimately they have to worry about our nukes and worry that we are not worried about their nukes.

[member_20317]

@AnandK ji,

Indians have experienced mass deaths even if not in war. I would like to believe that a proactive defense would be preferable to even the most die hard pacifist (principled guy - all bets off on an unprincipled one) instead of an abject death imposed by somebody else. BTW Indians have experienced mass deaths in war too. Though for the crown only.

I believe only the most phattu would freeze in fear. Most reasonable people would rather fight back when presented with such high stakes.

Even in your example (@Post #p1633523 subject: Re: Deterrence PostPosted: 22 Apr 2014 15:29) of the Chinese capacity for punishment you are also counting as a factor, their civilizational history of non-war deaths. Though admittedly their deaths are not wished for but then which one is (except the hourie hunters).


Though I would agree with the characterization of opportunistic insurgencies. But then again that also opens up the hands of the central power at Delhi. In this regard I believe the manner in which these opportunistic insurgencies would play out would depend on what phase of the fight the Central Authority decides to take them on.

………………..

@Shiv ji,
You have raised such questions about deterrence at other times. You probably can do better justice to the question being more involved in it. The way it appears to me, the final equation is something like the one or more of the following:
1) Deterrence * Opportunity; and
2) Deterrence !* Opportunity

where * means balance

Now if both parties are sure of their own and the other guys red line then only the first equation would hold. Which is how it is usually presented to us by the Captain Amerikha and his Avengers.

Now if we do not know in a reasonable manner (reasonable by a few megatons) the Red lines of the opponent (presuming we know our own and have made known our own redlines which is not the case at present) then the second situation is actually two different but not unrelated inequations such that:

2a) Deterrence * unknown
2b) Opportunity * unknown

And we are essentially dealing with the unknown on both counts. This can be taken by the world powers as a cause for more fear than is warranted, ultimately hurting the chances of the détente. Thus, Captain Amerikha considers it his onerous responsibility to push us towards (1) to ensure world peace.

Those who care less for Captain Amerikha would rather try to fine tune their (2a) & (2b)

So in essence these are competing requirements.

[shiv]

Now if we do not know in a reasonable manner (reasonable by a few megatons) the Red lines of the opponent (presuming we know our own and have made known our own redlines which is not the case at present) then the second situation is actually two different but not unrelated inequations such that:

2a) Deterrence * unknown
2b) Opportunity * unknown

And we are essentially dealing with the unknown on both counts. This can be taken by the world powers as a cause for more fear than is warranted, ultimately hurting the chances of the détente. Thus, Captain Amerikha considers it his onerous responsibility to push us towards (1) to ensure world peace.

This is essentially the case in all circumstances - so it is essential to try and know, guess or find out the state of mind of the adversary and what he might fear. The US lays very great importance on psychoanalysing an adversary - to the extent that even recently there was news of trying to read Putin's body language. One of the less well known stories of the cold war was that the US discovered that the Soviets too were rational and were afraid of being nuked by the US and were not really going to nuke America during the Cuban missile crisis - unlike public characterizations of the Soviets as mad and irrational. I would assume that an essential role of ALL intelligence organizations is to have a psychological profile of anyone who is anyone in any nation they deal with.

One very important role of track 2 diplomacy is to gather private thoughts of people who are genuine friends across the border. This can give a very accurate picture of what Pakistan's red lines are. Similarly, intelligence sharing, where Amrika has friendly private conversations with Pakis, shares that with close friends who share with us also serve as important reducers of tension. This would be one argument for uninterrupted dialog.

Having said that (and digressing) I don't think it is my duty as member of public to agree with the governments "uninterrupted dialog". I will still thrash about and protest even if it has utility. The essence of democracy is to let a thousand thoughts bloom - and that scares the crap out of totalitarian regimes because they don't know which maniac will get democratically elected.

[RKumar]

My personal views...

He says:
1. Pakistan will first use a nuke on its own territory and knock out 14 tanks and 45 soldiers (might be true)
2. India wiil then massively retaliate and expend all its nukes
3. Pakistan which has more nukes than India, all safely hidden away will then strike back and nuke India with all it has got (might be true)

He is underestimating complexity ... the main enemy is not what he think is. So we will use only up to xx percentage masala on dud land (to make it dud), once threshold is crossed it is MAD case. Another pointer, don´t go into western numbers game there too many other factors, to name few e.g. reliability, yield, accuracy, targets.

In MAD case, causality numbers do not matter and more the better as it is for breaking the will of nation(s) psychologically so that the other party(ies) losses the will to use their remaining stock because of fear (that is the case even before MAD). If we fire all stock in one go what is their left in deterrence for others or the proxy. As we are dharmic and would like to avoid massacre of innocent people but the problem is that neither we can expect nor will get it in return from our opponent(s). So that is why "Massive Retaliation" to clear out intent from the start. It is neither one bullet vs one bullet nor state actor vs non sate actor, if you cant secure and manage the stuff then give up.

Simple rational in noclear is how to save nation and its people (everything else is immaterial).

We do not need a certificate from any outside country that what we did is right to protect our country. We will judge and use, when we feel is the requirement.

[ramana]

Deterrence consists of three elements:

- A declaration of what one wants to deter and what one would do if others do something of value
- Have the weapons and delivery system
- Have a fail safe command system to ensure it happens no matter what.

India has all those three.

[ramana]

Looks like deterrence experts are coming out of woodworks to shape the opinion.

Deterrence Dilemmas

Deterrence debates and defence
Happymon Jacob

The perceived failure of deterrence, despite the possession of nuclear weapons by India, could lead to greater instability in Indo-Pak bilateral relations should there be another crisis with Pakistan.

India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is scheduled to conduct a ballistic missile interceptor test later this month which forms part of a series of tests to develop and deploy a limited Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) shield in the country, a project that has been in steady development since the mid-1990s. BMD pessimists — I used to be one myself — have traditionally argued that notwithstanding the fact that BMD is neither foolproof nor cheap, induction of such systems can be deeply destabilising between nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the instability argument assumes the existence of a Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)-induced textbook deterrence dyad such as the U.S.-USSR nuclear rivalry of the Cold War vintage. The deterrence stability of the Cold War years, premised on the existence of rational, unitary actors, does not exist in nuclear South Asia and hence to believe that mutual vulnerability increases stability is dangerous. No matter how many nuclear warheads India makes and how often it reviews its doctrinal postures, New Delhi’s deterrence dilemmas are likely to persist.


India can, to a great extent, address these dilemmas by mainstreaming and articulating the strategic objectives of its BMD programme which, at the moment, does not form part of the country’s politically articulated nuclear strategy.


India’s deterrence dilemmas

The deterrence effect of nuclear weapons is yet to mature in South Asia. More so, the South Asian nuclear contest is severely complicated by the presence of non-state actors and their ability to draw states into armed conflicts. These and other related issues have been posing multiple deterrence dilemmas for India.

[First fallacy. All non-state actors are in TSP and are controlled by the TSPA. Just because they wear shalwar kameez instead of uniroms they still are extensions of the TSPA. This myth of non-state actors has to be discarded. The motto of TSPA is jihad-sibullah and motto of the non-state-actors is jihad-i-fistula.}

First of all, there are fears in India about the potential implications of a situation wherein Pakistan-based non-state actors gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. There is also speculation about the repercussions of rogue elements in the Pakistani armed forces engaging in unauthorised nuclear activities. It could be an unauthorised nuclear strike against India or similar to what the former American Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson argued: “Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GoP [Government of Pakistan] facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon.” Besides, there could also be genuinely accidental launches of nuclear weapons.

{There are no rogue elements in TSPA. All are rogues. There will be no colonels coup in TSPA. It will be a consensus of Corps(e) commanders following orders of the COAS. TSPA is not Libya or some third rate South American dictatorship.}

The political angle


India’s failure to respond to Pakistani aggression — state sponsored, non-state actor attack, non-state sponsored, non-state actor attack, or attack by rogue elements from within establishment — has domestic political costs as well. The Indian government is widely criticised for not responding to Pakistan adequately, not being able to see through Pakistan’s ploy of using non-state actors and not showing enough resolve, among other aspects. This perceived failure of deterrence, despite the possession of nuclear weapons by India, could lead to greater instability in India-Pakistan bilateral relations should there be another crisis with Pakistan, especially if New Delhi has a right-wing government in power.

{These are whines. Not real issues. This is not failure of deterrence. If one reads the MND document, deterrence is for use of nuke weaposn and not war or terrorism. This brings one ot what is the purpose of the Indian nuke weapons. It is core deterrence to prevent use of nukes by challnegers and not expanded deterrence to prevent all wars.}


Despite the animated debate in India on the desirability of withdrawing the no first use (NFU) pledge, any government in New Delhi is likely to think twice before doing so since its NFU pledge is key to its status of a “responsible nuclear power” which in turn has been aiding India’s ongoing integration into the global nuclear order. Any move from the Indian side to renege on the NFU pledge or conduct a thermonuclear test to showcase its deterrent capability will only alienate the international community. Hence, New Delhi finds itself in a self-imposed normative bind wherein it is unable to doctrinally or materially pursue strategies to respond to Pakistani acts or behaviour which it thinks has undermined its deterrence capability.

{Here again confusion that Indian deterrence is based on proven TN. Its not. About aleinating international community, Indian politicans who dont observe muncipal corporation laws will not hesitate to test whateven when ever if they are forced into a corner. Its the scientific & military community that has to be ready to provide the test articles if needed.}


There have also been concerns about the robustness of the Indian nuclear deterrent for a variety of doctrinal and material reasons. As Admiral Raja Menon wrote in The Hindu (“A mismatch of nuclear doctrines,” January 22, 2014), there are a number of “structural and operational weaknesses in the Indian nuclear arsenal.” For one, experts have questioned the use of “massive retaliation” in the Indian doctrine which is not a credible enough threat to deter Pakistani conventional or sub-conventional aggression. The other argument about the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrence is the criticism that its command and control (C&C) structures are not yet sophisticated enough. Another related concern is regarding the credibility of India’s declared nuclear capability. For instance, India claimed after the 1998 tests that its thermonuclear test was a success. However, this claim has been authoritatively challenged making the country’s official claims concerning nuclear weapons look weaker. Then, there are also fears about the material performance failures of the Indian nuclear arsenal.


{A lot of statements in one para. Experts who question use of 'massive retaliation' to deter Paki conventional or sub-conventional aggression have not read the doctrine nor understand the concept of core and expanded deterrence. So they are not qualified to talk on the subject. C&C is adequate to ensure the retaliation occurs with 100% probability. Yes the TN that was tested did not perform to expectation. That is all.}


Doctrinal and material credibility about a state’s nuclear weapons lie at the heart of the deterrence effect that it seeks to derive from its weapons. If so, there are a number of credibility issues attached to India’s nuclear deterrent which it should address if it wishes to make its deterrent work. Merely doing away with NFU or conducting another round of tests cannot take care of these fundamental deterrence dilemmas that India faces today.


What, therefore, needs to be done urgently is a strategic review of the country’s nuclear doctrine to make it more credible. But even more importantly, most of the deterrence dilemmas (mentioned earlier) that the country faces can be resolved by introducing enhanced strategic depth, political commitment and a sense of purpose into India’s ongoing BMD programme.


Demonstrating that one can defend oneself strengthens deterrence. If Pakistan believes that it can take out New Delhi and with it a considerable amount of the latter’s C&C systems and political leadership in a first strike, such a belief will weaken the deterrence stability in the region. On the other hand, if the Indian political leadership and its nuclear C&C can be made reasonably invulnerable from a decapitation strike, then deterrence stability increases considerably.


In this context, a limited BMD system increases deterrence by denial. The deterrence effect of BMD is not only applicable between rational state actors but also when non-state (rational or irrational) actors target state actors. For instance, if Pakistan-based non-state actors or rogue elements from the Pakistani armed forces target India with nuclear weapons, New Delhi — considering that such an attack is most likely to be very limited — will be able to properly comprehend and analyse the situation before contemplating an appropriate response. This is only possible if the political decision-making mechanisms and nuclear C&C in New Delhi survive such an attack.

{he is scaring himslef and contradciting himself. First there are no Non Sate actors in TSP. All are funded maintained, trained, controlled by TSPA. TTP does not come into this category asits is an insurgency. Again no rogues. All of TSPA is a jihadi force by training and by oath. So lets get that rogue elements and Non State actors out of the picture. Now if a very limited strike happens on Delhi and takes it out the vast array of assets in many locations will still be there. Further the Warrant of Precedence has the line of succession very clear down ot the last Class IV employee of the GOI.So C&C is intact.}

More importantly, a limited BMD can also deter a state with revisionist intentions that would want to carry out a bolt-from-the-blue-strike. In other words, if generating dissuasion in the mind of the aggressor is central to nuclear deterrence, a limited BMD shield could potentially achieve that in the South Asian context.

{Finally makes sense. yes BMD with massive retaliation show that deterrence is enhanced. }

The demands from within Indian strategic/political circles to give up on NFU and conduct another round of thermonuclear tests have one thing in common: the desire to make the Indian deterrent more credible. While it may be a fair demand in itself, New Delhi may not be able to do that precisely due to various normative constraints. A limited BMD is perhaps one way of positively responding to these demands without crossing the normative redlines. Not only are BMD developments in the country unlikely to face any normative opposition from the international community such as the United States and its NATO allies, they may indeed be willing to collaborate with India on its BMD programme.

{So what he is adovcating is a limited BMD in lieu of tests. I suggest its not a trade but both are needed. Dont bring in others for deterrence or you will lose everything.}


Managing reputational impact


A limited BMD capability aimed at providing area defence to the national capital and C&C structures could be showcased as demonstrating the country’s willingness and readiness to face any eventuality. The argument then would be that since the country is only going in for a limited BMD (as opposed to going in for a National Missile Defence system which would have given it invulnerability), if it ever becomes a success, it does not want to secure itself completely and then engage in a first strike. In other words, a limited BMD can reinforce India’s NFU posture as well as make it more credible. Those in India who critique the Indian NFU posture as an inadequate response to Pakistan can be assuaged by the argument that a limited BMD will provide the country with the necessary wherewithal to retaliate in all certainty thereby increasing its deterrence credibility.

{Again bad language. its not showcase. Its a necessary element. Limited BMD harks back to ABM around Moscow during Cold War. India needs more than that. BMD to protect land based launch sites and C&C. Its not about assuaging people in India but assuring people in TSP that they will not last if any strike happens on Indians. Indians worrying about issues wotn help deterrence.}


Another potential implication of a limited BMD in India would be the continuation of the country’s de-mated and de-alerted nuclear posture. Even as New Delhi remains steadfast in its commitment to continuing its de-mated and de-alerted posture, critiques have questioned the wisdom behind it. Such concerns can also be addressed by a limited BMD which provides an assured capability for retaliation thereby strengthening deterrence.

{Once Arihant takes up deterrent patrols theis concept goes away. ALso pleae study measures taken during Kargil and Operation Parakram to ensure conflict stays conventional.}

Therefore, those demanding the withdrawal of NFU should consider the potential of a limited BMD system in strengthening India’s deterrence rather than advocating the adoption of offensive doctrines and technologies.


(Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

Author seems to be obsessed by a peaceful posture. It doesnt help in deterrent matters.
All kind of peaceniks and deluded folks had jumped on the deterrence bandwagon and are realising the India-Pak situation is not the same as US-USSR.

[shiv]

Looks like deterrence experts are coming out of woodworks to shape the opinion.

Deterrence Dilemmas

Deterrence debates and defence
Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

I would like to do a point by point repudiation of this article because I think we really need to look critically at what our "experts" are saying and point it out if they are talking crap

The deterrence effect of nuclear weapons is yet to mature in South Asia. More so, the South Asian nuclear contest is severely complicated by the presence of non-state actors and their ability to draw states into armed conflicts. These and other related issues have been posing multiple deterrence dilemmas for India.

An unnecessary and meaningless statement that suggests that deterrence can "mature" like a fruit and the Indian subcontinent is not there yet. There is no "mature nuclear deterrence" any more than there can be mature terrorism. In fact the author - supposedly a teacher at a school of international studies forgets that nuclear weapons do not bring stability at all. Only the old Indian demand that everyone should give up nuclear weapons can go anywhere near bringing nuclear stability. Maturity in deterrence is an absolute goal that can only be achieved through everybody giving up nukes. Why is this man forgetting a primary Indian demand to the world?

This perceived failure of deterrence, despite the possession of nuclear weapons by India, could lead to greater instability in India-Pakistan bilateral relations

This man makes a common mistake that is rampant even among "experts" let alone mango people. Deterrence fails only when nuclear war occurs. You cannot say that deterrence has failed if nuclear war does not occur.

The example that the man gives (Parliament attack, 26/11) are not failures of deterrence but resounding successes of Pakistani deterrence against India. India did not spark off war because India was afraid of escalation that could lead to nuclear war. Pakistani deterrence succeeded. But that does not mean Indian deterrence failed. IF India had attacked maybe Pakistan would have been deterred from using nukes. So there was no failure of nuclear deterrence at any time. People are wrong in imagining that nuclear deterrence avoids conventional conflict or terrorism. That is a specific myth that came about because of the balance between the US and USSR.

For one, experts have questioned the use of “massive retaliation” in the Indian doctrine which is not a credible enough threat to deter Pakistani conventional or sub-conventional aggression. The other argument about the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrence is the criticism that its command and control (C&C) structures are not yet sophisticated enough. Another related concern is regarding the credibility of India’s declared nuclear capability. For instance, India claimed after the 1998 tests that its thermonuclear test was a success. However, this claim has been authoritatively challenged making the country’s official claims concerning nuclear weapons look weaker. Then, there are also fears about the material performance failures of the Indian nuclear arsenal.

Again there is a massive error here. One is allowed to feel that the Indian nuclear arsenal and doctrine are not deterring anyone. But those same experts always feel that the Pakistani and Chinese arsenals are good enough to deter India from using even its "puny" arsenal. In other words "Their" deterrence is very good. We are deterred. But our deterrence is not good. That means that they are not deterred by us and they may conduct nuclear strikes on us without fear of retaliation.

This conclusion itself may be wrong. Whatever the perceived weaknesses of the Indian arsenal there is enough declared, generally accepted (by "international" experts) and proven capacity to take out at least 20 cities in China or Pakistan (80 to 90 weapons). If that does not constitute "massive retaliation" or is not "enough" or "credible" deterrence then we are assuming that neither China nor Pakistan are rational, and are willing to contemplate that magnitude of loss in exchange for starting nuclear war with India.

If that is the case that "experts" make then surely there is no stronger argument for enlarging our arsenal and conducting further tests while removing the NFU posture - all of which the author seems to be arguing against. And while we go about doing that "experts" can decide how large a nuclear arsenal is actually necessary to deter Pakistan and/or China. It is easy to say '"X is not enough" . But what is the magic figure that is enough?

A limited BMD capability aimed at providing area defence to the national capital and C&C structures could be showcased as demonstrating the country’s willingness and readiness to face any eventuality. The argument then would be that since the country is only going in for a limited BMD (as opposed to going in for a National Missile Defence system which would have given it invulnerability), if it ever becomes a success, it does not want to secure itself completely and then engage in a first strike. In other words, a limited BMD can reinforce India’s NFU posture as well as make it more credible

This is the most ridiculous argument- a "limited BMD" rather than "national BMD" introducing a caste system for BMD and then using that argument to argue against removing NFU.

[JE Menon]

This is my comment posted to that pro-China "Hindu" newspaper (I suggest that everytime anyone mentions "The Hindu" newspaper, people identify it as a pro-China newspaper. There is enough evidence to back it up). I don't know if they will publish it:

________________________________
A ridiculous article shot through with self-doubt, timidity and what seems to be a comprehensive lack of understanding about the state of the world today. Start with the title "Deterrence and Debate". This is like writing an article about gravity and calling it "The Universe & The Solar System". The writer, instead of beating about the bush, should simply have come straight to the point and do what he is trying to do in the first place, which is argue for a "limited BMD".

The trouble is that then he would have to answer the query: "limited by what"? And that would be problematic, because it seems his case is limited mainly by a poor understanding of national interest, and an apparently ideological inability to speak forcefully in favour of it. Which other nuclear nation speaks of "limited" BMD? That is precisely because no one speaks of "unlimited BMD".

Essentially, "limited BMD" is a cowardly posture, fearful and furtive. There is no need for India to be that way.

[ShauryaT]

Shyam Saran: The dangers of nuclear revisionism

Arguments to abandon India's 'no first use' policy for nuclear weapons are fallacious

Some analysts have tried to cast doubt on the credibility of massive retaliation that the Indian doctrine envisages in response to an attack by so-called tactical nuclear weapons on military targets by an adversary. Why, it is argued, should one retaliate with all of one's nuclear assets if a tank brigade or some military installations are destroyed in a tactical nuclear attack, and thereby ensure the incineration of most of our cities and populace in a further and inevitable counter-attack using strategic nuclear weapons?

This is a fallacious argument for two reasons. One, the very distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is untenable, precisely because these are weapons of mass destruction. As pointed out by a US nuclear analyst, Richard Weitz: "Nuclear weapons have an inherent potential for rapid and dramatic destruction, shock and death, regardless of whether they yield one megatonne or 20 kilotonnes. Distinguishing between 'strategic' and 'tactical' in that sense is more or less academic."

Two, even if there is use of a tactical nuclear weapon with a relatively low yield to begin with, escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange is virtually inevitable. To quote another analyst familiar with war gaming, Henry S Rowen, any use of nuclear weapons at any level in multiple scenarios inevitably escalated to an all-out strategic exchange resulting in massive destruction and loss of life, making any notion of victory or loss a meaningless vulgarity. He points out: "All the options led to the same dead end of escalation, strategic retaliation and catastrophe."

It is true that, during the Cold War, strategists of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) did wrestle with the uncomfortable paradoxes with which nuclear deterrence confronts any state with nuclear weapons. The theory of "flexible response" or "graduated response" posited the possibility of matching retaliation at each level of armed hostility, from a conventional threshold all the way up through the use of tactical weapons to an all-out strategic exchange. While neat and seemingly credible in theory, it was never implemented in operational terms precisely because of the contradictions involved.

For example, in archives now available, President John F Kennedy and even his defence secretary, Robert McNamara, interpreted flexible response to require greater investment in conventional forces, so as to postpone as far as possible the threshold of the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet conventional attack. In other documents, it appears that Nato allies initially wanted the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on their soil precisely in order to have a trigger that would lower the threshold of nuclear use and ensure escalation to the strategic level and through this achieve more effective deterrence against a Soviet attack. In the 1980s, perceptions changed when the frontline Nato states realised that use of tactical weapons against advancing Soviet forces in their territories would leave them devastated even if the expected escalation could somehow be contained. In 1987, the Warsaw Pact and Nato concluded the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which banned all US and Soviet ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometres. It is ironic that Pakistani and now some Indian analysts, oblivious of this history, should be trotting out a bankrupt concept to lend an illusory muscularity to India's nuclear deterrent.

India has been well served by a doctrine that acknowledges that nuclear weapons are not weapons of war but can only serve as a deterrent. It is nevertheless true that the credibility of the nuclear deterrent demands the creation of tangible assets that are required by the doctrine that governs the use of these weapons. In the case of India, "no first use" and retaliation-only require the development and deployment of a strategic triad, including land-based, air-delivered and submarine-based nuclear assets. The last mentioned capability is the most significant in ensuring a second strike capability even after suffering extensive damage in a first strike.

The credibility of our deterrent is, therefore, linked to whether or not we have in place the capabilities and assets that are aligned with our doctrine. That has to be the main endeavour on the part of our political leadership rather than falling prey to the temptation, encouraged by ill-informed analysts, to make declaratory statements not backed by the capabilities and assets they require. The infrastructure required for a first use or flexible response doctrine would be very different from what we have so far invested in, and would require different command and control mechanisms. We should be mindful of the significant implications of any departure from the existing doctrine quite apart from what it would signal to both our friends and adversaries.

The possession of nuclear weapons provides a potent instrument for deterrence against powerful and inimical adversaries. They also impose immense responsibility and demand prudence and sobriety in how we conduct ourselves in the community of nations. A Pakistani display of suicidal tendencies - real or feigned - must be met with a consistent and mature posture on our part, rejecting the notion that a nuclear war could be fought and won or that a limited nuclear war is at all credible. To say that our current doctrine is not credible to Pakistan is to fall into the trap of having our strategies and structure of forces being determined in Islamabad and not in Delhi.

First and foremost, our doctrine must carry credibility with our own people. We should constantly review and update our nuclear posture, but the objective of this exercise should be to strengthen the credibility of our existing doctrine rather than to seek its abandonment. The BJP prime minister who endorsed the current doctrine was a wise and sagacious leader. The party would do well not to tinker thoughtlessly with his legacy in this critical area of national security. Fortunately for us, Narendra Modi has made swift amends for his party's wobble on this score.

The writer, a former foreign secretary, is chairman of the National Security Advisory Board and of RIS as well as a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

[ramana]

SS just made the case for retesting!

[shiv]

Interesting...

I had earlier said:

Ideally, we must not test the other person's rationality for validity and then decide our response.

Shyam Saran says

Shyam Saran: The dangers of nuclear revisionism
To say that our current doctrine is not credible to Pakistan is to fall into the trap of having our strategies and structure of forces being determined in Islamabad and not in Delhi.

It's not about what "they" have or what "they" might do. It's about us. We have to have our response fixed to a T no matter which way the other guy sways, bends, howls, boasts or thrashes about.

Unfortunately even people as prominent as Bharat Karnad talk about responding to what "they" have and what "they" might do. If our response is fixed and assured it matters little whether anyone else is threatening us with megaton nukes, terrorist nukes, strategic nukes or tactical nukes. It is our response that we need to keep looking at, updating and refining and not howling about "They have this" or "they will do that"

"They" have to know exactly how surely they will be punished no matter what they throw at us or how they choose to throw it at us. That is what defines deterrence. Ideas that say "They have x nukes of Y megatons using Z technology" and so we must be scared and they need not be scared are nonsense spouted by people who have not thought the idea of deterrence through to its logical conclusion,

[Philip]

Yes,SS has outed the secret strategy of the nuclear hypocrasies,that India must be stunted in its N-weapons tech,warhead yield,numbers of warheads and delivery systems. Pakistan will be allowed to possess any amount of such "deterrence",because the CIA and your favourite rent-boy the ISI have been inter-caste sodomites for over 60 years! There has been so much filth strewn around the globe through your fornicating and dirty "tricks", that you will stoop to the lowest level of degradation to accommodate your rent-boy's perversity against India.

India needs not just the abandonment of the NFU policy,but acquiring several thousands of N-warheads and suitable triad delivery systems to possess the insurance against a pre-emptive strike by our mortal enemies,plus the fatal damage that a rogue US president may do when possessed with madness.It cannot be ruled out.Reagan had his "Star Wars" and Evil Empire" doctrine which is now coming to fruit,with lasers and rail guns making their appearance.EMP weapons and cyberwarfare are already in vogue. Bush,the neo-cons and his "Christian soldiers" invaded Iraq on a pretext of blatant lies and chicanery. States all across the Middle East,Eastern Europe and Asia have seen the effects of what the Brits call "expeditionary warfare",as if they were off on an archaeological dig,carrying a picnic lunch in a wicker hamper from Fortnum & Mason's! "Toodle-ooo old bean,which country shall we invade for our next weekend hunt and picnic lunch,what? Uncle Sam,his NRA pals and the Klan,the Frogs,the Huns and the Kangaroos from Oz are joining us for the shoot.......the blackamoors,injuns and the street arabs.The war hounds are straining at their leash.Smelt Mr Fux already! Should be spiffing fun old sport,what? Plenty of,scalps,trinkets,wenches to take home as souvenirs too! Tally Ho!"

[Anand K]

Maybe it's the GOI public posturing against TSP "Government" which is absolutely careless about dropping the N-word (or just appearing to be suicidal). Like "Oh, you'll tac-nuke us if we capture even your Gyari wh0re-house? Then we'll nuke your top 20 cities and the rivers of blood will wash away the rest of your filth!". Now, there is indeed a perceived deterrence and a reverse psychology (and a hedge against our uncertainty/risk of their stated intent) in such a public policy - but surely the GoI would at least game what the repercussions from nuking major Paki cities in response to them dropping a ChiCom Chotu on our brigade in PoK. Not just the military response from TSP-China, but the other kinds of response from the rest of the world AND from within India (even if we get away such a massive retaliation). They would surely at least game responses like "The Pakistani Government used a tac-nuke on a force invading their territory, a quite valid target! But you decided to snuff out 30 Million humans and doom another 30 Million in return. The horror of it all! You're on my eternal sh1t-list". The root cause of the war, even a 26/11 times ten will not stack up against 60 Million causalities at the end of the day IMO. Unless you are Amrika.

So, if SS is indeed telling the truth, the GoI has taken all thee into account, adopted a "Jo hoga, so hoga. Sab maya hai anyway" fatalist policy and a maximalist nuke weapons policy under the hood to cater for the larger number of targets and to well... deter any other righteous posses trying to ride into our Dodge City. And it also means we are lying through our teeth about the publicly implied minimal onlee nuclear weapons. Or maybe SS is posturing just like those Pakis posture all the time tod keep them guessing too.
So whats going on?

And more importantly, how far will Pakis or Chinese believe SS?

[shiv]

but surely the GoI would at least game what the repercussions from nuking major Paki cities in response to them dropping a ChiCom Chotu on our brigade in PoK. Not just the military response from TSP-China, but the other kinds of response from the rest of the world AND from within India (even if we get away such a massive retaliation).

<snip snip snip>

And more importantly, how far will Pakis or Chinese believe SS?

I am sure everything is gamed/ought to be gamed. But our posture of threatening a potential nuclear attacker should not be based on what we think their response or anyone else's response might be. Our response needs to be assured and massive. For our response to be assured and massive - it is our nukes and our doctrines that we need to refine and define and not compare them with others and then refine them based on comparisons. Others actions should not dictate or sway our response. Our response has to be very clear and certain.

As regards the second question of "How far will Pakis or Chinese believe anyone" is irrelevant. We can never know what they believe or do not believe. We can only assure them that should they attack, they will be punished.

Expanding further on the question of whether China or Pakistan believe or do not believe what Shyam Saran or anyone else might say, it is possible for us to game this and I have repeatedly asked questions in earlier posts which no one has taken a shot at answering.

Let us assume that India has a very firm and assured nuclear response planned as retaliation for a Chinese or Pakistani nuclear attack. let us assume that neither China nor Pakistan actually believe a single word of what India says about retaliation and India's nukes and doctrine only cause ROTFL in Beijing and islamabad.

All that is required for India to do is to respond with a massive nuclear retaliation. I will not bother guessing whether it is 10 cities or 20 cities. Three possibilities emerge from this scenario

• Option 1. The Chinese and Pakistanis have already decided that they are willing to pay a price and that they are willing to lose 10 or 20 or whatever number of cities. They don't really care as long as they take India out with all they have got. They will keep laughing at the end of the nuclear exchange
  
  Option 2. The Chinese and Pakistanis are willing to lose X number of cities but would find it painful and not worth it to lose more than X cities in war with India
  
  Option 3. The Chinese and Pakistanis are not willing to lose any cities simply to nuke India - they might be willing to look at alternatives other than nuclear war.

If ChinaPak follow Option 1, they are totally irrational and nothing we do can deter them. Our best and only option would be to punish them as hard as we can because we are getting hit anyway.

If they follow option 2 - they are still irrational. They don't know whether India will nuke more cities or less cities than they are willing to lose. They are gambling and the price may be too high for them. Our best option for us is to hit them with all we have got

If ChinaPak follow option 3 they will be deterred. They will not start nuclear war

But here's the curious thing - it does not matter whether ChinaPak are followers of Option 1, 2 or 3 - India's response needs to be exactly the same - that of massive retaliation with all we have got. Its NOT about what THEY think. It's about what we are preparing to do.

If, on the other hand, we calibrate our response depending on what we imagine ChinaPak are thinking then our response may not be maximal - in fact we may not respond at all and that would be very lucky and beneficial to ChinaPak whether they are rational or irrational. We suffer in any case.


So it really does not matter what "they" believe us or not. It is to our ultimate advantage to respond maximally

[ShauryaT]

NFU and Massive Retaliation are both inter related. The latter flows from the former, based on our doctrine. NFU itself flows from how we see nuclear weapons as something that we ideally do not want for ourselves or anyone else to have. While others have it, we have no choice but to keep them too and hence the doctrine to balance the realistic need to acquire these weapons and yet at the same time, our conceptual abhorrence of them. Left to our own devices, we would have not acquired them and in some sense also send a message that the use of force has limits, where force resulting in annihilations is to be abhorred and violates the laws of nature. Very Dharmic viewpoint and firmly rooted in our principles.

While we may have our own firm views and a clear articulation of the same for all to see and observe, there are tow issues that still need to be addressed.

1. Does massive retaliation resulting in unacceptable damage to "any" weapon of mass destruction used in any scenario serve Indian Interests for all such scenarios, against all potential adversaries?

2. If as per the doctrine, massive retaliation is assured, would not an adversary calibrate this type of a response and seek to inflict a punitive massive first strike to disable our own arsenals, C&C, etc. So, does it serve our interests to spell out NFU and massive retaliation is a written doctrine for all scenarios? While others such as France or the US and not to mention Pakistan are free to use a doctrine of force, can a doctrine of retaliation deter weapons of force? Can a strong defense offset the offense? Will not the offense, simply calibrate for the lack of offense and seek to take advantage?

The truth of the matter is except for India, no one else has such a restricted doctrine that not only seeks to use these weapons only as a response and then respond in a specific manner.

[shiv]

1. Does massive retaliation resulting in unacceptable damage to "any" weapon of mass destruction used in any scenario serve Indian Interests for all such scenarios, against all potential adversaries?

Shyam Saran has written (above) and I have read from multiple sources that in all wargamed scenarios "a little" response to "a little" attack are only the first steps in inevitable escalation.

Pakistan nukes Indian tanks. India nukes an airbase, and war continues and India keeps making inroads. Pakistan then nulkes two tank formations and three air bases. India responds with 6 or 8 nukes - and so on. Pakistan Or any other nation) must not be allowed to think that the use of a nuke is a cheap opiton with small consequences. So yes it does "serve Indian Interests for all such scenarios, against all potential adversaries"

2. If as per the doctrine, massive retaliation is assured, would not an adversary calibrate this type of a response and seek to inflict a punitive massive first strike to disable our own arsenals, C&C, etc. So, does it serve our interests to spell out NFU and massive retaliation is a written doctrine for all scenarios?

Of course they can do that. They could do that without warning, even before we do a first strike. Either we sit back and take it, or prepare to hit them back massively in a second strike

While others such as France or the US and not to mention Pakistan are free to use a doctrine of force, can a doctrine of retaliation deter weapons of force? Can a strong defense offset the offense? Will not the offense, simply calibrate for the lack of offense and seek to take advantage?

This is a moral decision on India's part. The moral decision is that "we will not use nukes first to provoke the use of nukes" The onus of starting nuclear war is taken away from us, but by maintaining a credible second strike force the promise of punishing one who uses it first remains with us.

Note that "first use" per se can never guarantee that all nuclear weapons of an adversary can be knocked out. This was true even when the US was gaming taking out all of the USSR with thousands of nukes. They could not guarantee that the Soviets would never be able to retaliate with at east one nuke and they were unwilling to lose even one city.

The truth of the matter is except for India, no one else has such a restricted doctrine that not only seeks to use these weapons only as a response and then respond in a specific manner.

What, in your view, would be the advantages of copying a doctrine laid down by someone else for their own defence and saying that this would be more suitable for us than one of massive response? Even first users will get badly beaten in a nuclear war.

[shiv]

I don't know if there is anyone who says BOTH the things below. Many say one or the other, but if someone says BOTH, then he/she is totally wrong and profoundly confused

1. We must allow ourselves the freedom to use nukes first (reject NFU)
2. If we are nuked by a single tactical nuke, we must not inflict massive retaliation but must calibrate our retaliation depending on how much was damaged in that attack.

These two taken together are contradictory.

A person who feels that "massive retaliation" for a "limited/small nuclear attack" would be overkill would hardly be the person to agree on a massive first strike. He would likely moot a puny "limited/tactical" first strike which would mean very little in a war.

Whether we resort to first strike or an NFU based retaliation, our strike should be massive and unrestrained. No half measures.

Note that if we are willing to inflict nuclear damage on anyone as a first strike when no one has dropped any nukes on us, we have no business worrying that a retaliation strike in case someone attacks us might be "too large" or "too massive"

This is where the Pakistani doctrine of using a tactical nuke fails. Whether they use tactical nukes or not they will only get massive retaliation - whether or not the damage from their nuke was "minimal" such as a few tanks. If someone is going to hit India they had better hit us with massive strikes and then ready themselves for a massive retaliation.

Do people sometimes forget that even if we are ready for "First use" someone may nuke us before we use our nukes and then our response has to be one of retaliation as if it was NFU onlee.

[member_20317]

I don't know if there is anyone who says BOTH the things below. Many say one or the other, but if someone says BOTH, then he/she is totally wrong and profoundly confused

1. We must allow ourselves the freedom to use nukes first (reject NFU)
2. If we are nuked by a single tactical nuke, we must not inflict massive retaliation but must calibrate our retaliation depending on how much was damaged in that attack.

These two taken together are contradictory.

A person who feels that "massive retaliation" for a "limited/small nuclear attack" would be overkill would hardly be the person to agree on a massive first strike. He would likely moot a puny "limited/tactical" first strike which would mean very little in a war.

Whether we resort to first strike or an NFU based retaliation, our strike should be massive and unrestrained. No half measures.

Note that if we are willing to inflict nuclear damage on anyone as a first strike when no one has dropped any nukes on us, we have no business worrying that a retaliation strike in case someone attacks us might be "too large" or "too massive"

This is where the Pakistani doctrine of using a tactical nuke fails. Whether they use tactical nukes or not they will only get massive retaliation - whether or not the damage from their nuke was "minimal" such as a few tanks. If someone is going to hit India they had better hit us with massive strikes and then ready themselves for a massive retaliation.

Do people sometimes forget that even if we are ready for "First use" someone may nuke us before we use our nukes and then our response has to be one of retaliation as if it was NFU onlee.

Shiv ji,

I am not sure but I think that a reconciliation can be achieved between a First Use ('FU') and Graduated Response ('GR').

If the GR instead of being based completely on assessment of damage to self, instead is based on an assessment of damage to others (primarily).

In such a scenario the planner instead of merely worrying about how much further damage we can take also begins to see how much damage the other guy can take. Essentially turning the exchange into a test of the other guys limits, while not being blind to our own limits.

As you rightly pointed out losing even one city is unthinkable if losing 14 tanks is unthinkable. But just as the 14 tanks can be put in harms way so can a much larger number. Essentially meaning that the test is of the ability to reach the other's threshold limit to give up, faster then he can reach your threshold limit of giving up.

At a certain level giving up is a valid option for all sides considering especially that everybody wants to avoid the exchange in the first place. Giving up is not exactly unthinkable haram (virtually every country has thrown up its hands at some point). Valid from all PoVs except the Izzat-O-Gairat PoV. But then the Izzat-O-Gairat PoV cannot realistically be made a goal/benchmark, for the war planners who are expected to be professionals. I guess .

Added later : Essentially the uncertainty is there even before the first stirke howsoever small and remains till one side gives up for sure. Probably even after that its uncertain. So what is the harm in acknowledging it in terms of doctrines. VV Agreed.

[shiv]

If the GR instead of being based completely on assessment of damage to self, instead is based on an assessment of damage to others (primarily).

In such a scenario the planner instead of merely worrying about how much further damage we can take also begins to see how much damage the other guy can take. Essentially turning the exchange into a test of the other guys limits, while not being blind to our own limits.

Such a policy should never become a public and declared part of nuclear doctrine. Making it so would mean that planners accept that it is possible to fight "limited nuclear war" by backing out of war after a particular level of damage has occurred.

Now imagine a scenario like this:

1. Pakistan launches a tactical nuke knowing that India's publicly declared doctrine is one of calibrated escalation rather than massive total retaliation
2. India commences its calibrated escalation as punishment to "test" Pakistan's pain threshold
3. Pakistan instantly calls for a cease fire and India declares victory, and stops further attacks on Pakistan. The Pakistan army leadership that started the war survive and they never come to justice despite murdering thousands of Indians
4. Because India is seen as the bigger and more powerful nation with lesser damage - aid pours into Pakistan for recovery. Pakistan keep their nukes, get stronger and live to hit India another day
5. Other nations, encouraged by the idea that nuclear war is survivable proliferate, leading ultimately to pressure and sanctions on India

That would be a mistake.

if Pakistan hits India/Indian forces with a teensy weensy nuke, Pakistan simply must be finished to the maximum possible extent.

[ShauryaT]

And more importantly, how far will Pakis or Chinese believe SS?

SS is saying no different from what is clearly spelled out in B&W in our doctrine. The question of belief comes in not if they do not believe SS but do not believe in the doctrine itself. The doctrine exists independent of what SS may or may not say. ALL credible evidence points to Indian posture geared for assured massive retaliation, some lack of capabilities notwithstanding.

[ShauryaT]

Interesting. Includes India, but only a technical point, India never signed on to the NPT!
Former U.S. test site sues nuclear nations for disarmament failure

The tiny Pacific republic of the Marshall Islands, scene of massive U.S. nuclear tests in the 1950s, sued the United States and eight other nuclear-armed countries on Thursday, accusing them of failing in their obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

The Pacific country accused all nine nuclear-armed states of "flagrant violation of international law" for failing to pursue the negotiations required by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[ramana]

To reiterate what shiv and Shyam Saranji has said its for Indians to believe.
Everyone else is moot.

[ramdas]

SS just made the case for retesting!

How ? Because of the need for operational SLBMs? But the R.C led establishment can always claim that warheads developed using computer simulations are ``credible"…So, how is SS's article a call for retesting ?

[Prem]

To reiterate what shiv and Shyam Saranji has said its for Indians to believe. Everyone else is moot.

This is what i said when i mentioned Non Congi PM. Political will is important as out outgoing PM did not exhibit assuring behavior in this field. Public will never know and dont need to know who else is in 2nd/3rd incharge for assured massive retaliation.Still think 2k Nukes are mimimum for India. Anymore can only be better,3k ideal and 4k in numbers comfy to provide real weigh/ meaning behind the word Massive. .

[member_28502]

It is best to keep everything vague
Massive retalliation what is massive?
LNW: what is limited, and to whom is it limited
FU: Who used it ? are there any arbitrators to say who did it??

Is conventional war a prelude to nuke usage. which means gradual escalation.
one must re visit writing on the wall Gen Paddy book

[shiv]

FU: Who used it ? are there any arbitrators to say who did it??

Since the topic keeps coming up, let me ask a question to tickle a few minds. Let us take Ajai Shukla's scenario - an India armoured thrust in Pakistan is nuked.

How will anyone know that it has been nuked?

How long before the army, later the government and later the people find out that the armoured thrust has been nuked?

In war - every statement by one side is called a lie by the other side. How will it be established beyond reasonable doubt that one nuke has been used against Indian forces inside Pakistan?

Is it necessary for anyone other than armed forces and government to know if quick and massive retaliation is to be commenced?

How quick does massive retaliation have to be?