LCH and other Helicopters Discussion Thread

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Jul 2013 02:45

Radar.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 27 Jul 2013 03:35

for mountain corps, the ideal radar is the longbow one.. i hope it comes without any operational strips and strings. the kind of air defence system and weapons location plays importance here. what does pakis and chippanda have?

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 27 Jul 2013 04:03

KrishnaK wrote:Vivek, what constraints would lead the IAF to choose the apaches as the platform of choice for SEAD, over say the Jaguars ? Clearly the USAF thought along those lines when they employed the apaches in that role in GW1.

The short answer to your question is: the element of surprise.

Back in GW1, iirc, the reasoning for going with the apaches instead of fixed wing aircraft (or even subsonic cruise missiles) was that while these aircraft could have probably deployed effective ECM and destroyed the radar site, they would have been detected long before (flying at altitude as they were and with the amount of noise, both electronic and audible that they would have made). This would have defeated the effort behind getting the F-117s and EF-111s through the radar picket lines deep inside Iraq (which, lest we forget, was thought to have a pretty robust air-defense environment) quietly before the entire defenses around Baghdad were alerted. The Apaches did this low and slow, sneaking up to the radar stations. The hellfire missiles were short on overall noise, destruction and fireball visibility. They were supersonic so that Iraqis didn't hear them coming. Once the station went down, the apaches mopped up and left quietly, leaving the main air campaign to start with the tactical surprise element.

I see this being applied differently in the Indian context. The point being that the urban environment will preclude the IAF from carrying out the kind of missions as described above. More to the point, the IAF is not likely to be the one opening the war with the first shots anyway. Maybe.

But here's the other issue: helicopter gunships, when operating in stand-off mode in an urban clutter environment, can take shots at the enemy with relative impunity. And this has not changed in the last thirty years. The Gazelles used by the Syrians in 1982 wrecked havoc with the morale of the Israeli tankers and blunted the surgical nature of the intended offensives. Relatively few losses were incurred by the Syrians despite the heavy nature of the Israeli air dominance.

Now, a lot has changed between 1982 and 2012, and surely an Apache is no Gazelle, and is far better equipped to handle itself. If the Longbow radar is applied, I see the Apaches of the IAF/IA being far more effective than the Syrian operators in 1982 and even the Cobra operators of the PA over the same urban terrain.

And the nature of SEAD has not changed. If the location is robustly protected by a layered defense system, the Jaguars will be seen long way off and will have to either have escorts to wade through the enemy fighters, have to have heavy electronic support, or fly really low (as was originally intended for them anyway) to the target, which means that they cannot do standoff attacks; forcing them to overfly their targets. A deadly proposition.

The standoff capability of the Apaches using urban clutter will allow them to remove the SHORADs on the periphery of the layered defense and slice into the long range systems. Sort of like peeling the layers of onions.

-Vivek

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 27 Jul 2013 04:29

Also note that the SEAD role is not going to be the prerogative of the IAF Apaches alone. Any helicopters, be they IAF or IA, are going to have to deal with SEAD regardless of what they do after, i.e. attack front-line targets or go deep behind the lines to take out the next layer of the enemy air defenses.

The mission goals will vary, but the execution will be surprisingly similar.

This is exactly why I am still not clear why the Apache force is being split for these varying missions. To me this highlights the absence of true integration between the IAF and IA, despite all the show-the-flag programs for integration. Both sides feel that their missions will be scrubbed or rendered secondary to the other side's whims and fancy. Hence the zeal to have their own dedicated forces. Its not so much a turf war as it is a lack of trust and belief that everybody is making their way to the same goal.

And to me that's more dangerous than any air-defense system our enemies have to offer.

-Vivek

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 27 Jul 2013 13:09

vivek_ahuja wrote:That's quite a leap you have taken from what I was saying. AWACS have their uses and are very effective. But against very specific type of threats: higher speeds, higher altitude and longer range threats. But like any weapon system, they have their limitations, least of which is against slow-moving, very low altitude rotary systems.

There are airborne systems (like the E-8 Joint STARS)that are dedicated to surface movement tracking which is obviously below the horizon. So I think it is wrong to assume that AWACS may be that limited in their capability in detecting low/slow flying aircraft.

Helicopters are slow(relatively) moving and it may not be possible for them to act in such a dynamic manner.
Hiding behind terrain and urban clutter does not require too much effort on the part of helicopters. All they need to know is the direction from which they are being looked at and that tells them how to use the terrain around them to keep obstacles between themselves and their would-be predators.

I think you are making it sound rather simple. The AWACS may not be move in a predictable manner. Also to assume that they will always have favourable terrain to use as cover is just wrong. What if they get caught with their pants down? They neither have the speed to run nor do can they adequately defend themselves even from obsolete fighters like the J-7.

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 27 Jul 2013 13:21

KrishnaK wrote:Adding to what vivek_ahuja just mentioned - having the capability allows for the IAF to employ such tactics if and when it makes sense. If you they don't induct such platforms and train for specific scenarios, they won't have the option at all.

This is just not a proven concept and it is hard to see how it is worth the ~ $2 Billion. Me thinks that the IAF is just playing up this SEAD role as an argument to keep control of the Apaches over the IA. Because SEAD might be looked at as more in IAF's domain as opposed to the tank busting/CAS duties that the attack helicopters usually are on.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 27 Jul 2013 19:47

the IAF-IA can be integrated via a common mission capability established from CnC HQs. we need systems and ops capability in place first. then integration can happen if APIs are open and available without bugs.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 27 Jul 2013 23:04

abhik wrote:There are airborne systems (like the E-8 Joint STARS)that are dedicated to surface movement tracking which is obviously below the horizon. So I think it is wrong to assume that AWACS may be that limited in their capability in detecting low/slow flying aircraft.

So, we were talking about AWACS, not JSTARS, weren't we? Yes, there are counter-measures for every measure. And if ground movement and slow flying helicopters need to be detected, there is a way to make that happen. Technologically, JSTARS employs very different tech than an AWACS and for good reason. If you have an enemy JSTARS type aircraft in the skies, everything from ground forces to helicopters are at risk. No question about it.

But AWACS alone is not going to cut it. Perhaps there are ways in which ground mapping tech can be integrated inside AWACS as a poor man's JSTARS. For one thing that's going to prove nasty to operate. For another, it might end up being the proper solution to neither requirement, air or ground.

Note also that JSTARS hasn't ever been tested in highly urban terrain. Iraqi Freedom doesn't count because the only times they were effective was in the open countryside where the mechanized divisions of the Iraqi army were exposed compared to the terrain around them. In urban terrain with a lot of civilian movement on the roads, it is impossible to clarify what is what. And much of the results then depend on each operator's interpretation of the data in front of him. Same thing with Enduring Freedom. Most of the successes there were in sparse terrain where the only motion was from man-made activity. Helicopters have been noted to have beaten the system in exercises by doing movements in leaps: pull into hover, slowly accelerate, decelerate and hover again. And sticking to the periphery of villages, towns etc means that there is no clear background to discern their differences.

Of course, all of this is moot because it will be a long time before a tried and tested JSTARS style capability is encountered in the Indian context. Until then, helicopter interdiction missions deep inside enemy terrain remain utterly viable.

I think you are making it sound rather simple. The AWACS may not be move in a predictable manner. Also to assume that they will always have favourable terrain to use as cover is just wrong. What if they get caught with their pants down? They neither have the speed to run nor do can they adequately defend themselves even from obsolete fighters like the J-7.

Of course I try to make things simple. This is after all a general discussion forum, not a technology conference or a military academy and I try to ensure that what I say is legible. I have never been a big proponent of using military jargon or acronyms unless there is no way around it.

Your comments move into the realm of ifs and buts. And this, IMO, is an open ended argument with little conclusion. Let me explain why: Any weapon system, no matter how great, can be beaten by the effective use of tactics, intelligence, weather and that all important factor: LUCK.

Yes the AWACS could move unpredictably; I already touched on this when I said that at very close ranges and large downward angles the AWACS can spot low level intruders. The weather could close in. The terrain my not be favorable always. If the chopper pilots are unlucky, an enemy fighter may pass them by and spot them with NVGs or IRST. And so on and so forth.

None of these invalidate the concept, however. They are, as always, variables that cannot be controlled at the outset of any mission. And a combination of factors can help the choppers get to their targets or ensure they die a fiery death somewhere. Such is the nature of warfare, after all.

But does that mean that the tactic itself is rendered inoperative or ineffective? And the short answer is: No.

Then again, that's all my own opinion.

-Vivek

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 27 Jul 2013 23:05

SaiK wrote:the IAF-IA can be integrated via a common mission capability established from CnC HQs. we need systems and ops capability in place first. then integration can happen if APIs are open and available without bugs.

Chicken and the egg.

Get me the C3I capability and I will integrate. Get me integrated and we can buy the C3I together (sure as hell I ain't paying for it, let the other guy do it).

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 28 Jul 2013 01:15

Sure.. but if you go for the chicken first, you will have a more live capability to situations [of course IAF-IA should sit on the table and decide how to pioritize their GSQR/ASQRs].. all depends on the needs.

now, once you have tasted the capability, and the denial of service attacks begin from the khans, is when our DRDO men get energized.. and deliver everything off the fertile eggs.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 29 Jul 2013 01:02

may be only related to fine tuning the requirement toptic, else OT:

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a- ... epage=true
A mountain strike corps is not the only option

Instead of pouring money into raising a force that can hardly address the Indian Army’s drawbacks at the border, our decision makers should have focussed on addressing China’s weaknesses in the Indian Ocean

In the history of Indian strategic thought, the decision to create a mountain strike corps against China will remain a landmark. While the file on the subject has apparently been circulating for a while, the absence of open discussion on so momentous a decision is deeply disappointing. Some commentators are of the view that the Chinese incursion in the Depsang plains swung the decision decisively in favour of the strike corps. If so, it doesn’t make much sense, for, where is Depsang and where is Panagarh — the headquarters of the mountain strike corps?

What irks a strategic commentator about this decision is the question whether our reaction is wiser, more mature and better institutionalised than it was in 1962. At that time, the Prime Minister had “instructed” the army to “throw out” the Chinese following which Brigadier Dalvi’s mountain brigade made its fateful advance across Namka Chu. The big question today is — what were our options? Did we examine more than one option and select the best one? Presumably, it is to guarantee that we go through an intellectual process that we now have a Chiefs of Staff Committee, an Integrated Staff, a National Security Council and Adviser, and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Did they actually look at alternatives, or was it a straightforward case of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for a mountain strike corps?

The first step

The first thought that strikes a strategic thinker is whether any non-military options were first examined. This is an inevitable first step in the long and tortuous process that leads up to military action. The Depsang incident, it will be remembered, took place in a part of the country which, before 1954, was always shown as un-demarcated or undefined. What, for instance, were the arguments in the CCS for and against the Johnson-Ardagh Line and the Macartney line? Those who are unfamiliar with these names can take a look at Wikipedia. It is the essence to understanding a possible settlement of the boundary dispute. The fact is that while our case in Arunachal Pradesh is strong and undisputed, the situation is not quite similar in the west where the recent intrusion took place. Admittedly, the political numbers simply don’t permit the government to commit itself to a grand bargain with China on territory. The Chinese are in a similar position. But if the border problem hinges for a solution on a strong, domestic government, it is indeed better for both countries to postpone the solution to the next generation — as the Chinese suggest. So how did we come to the conclusion that the Chinese may force the border issue now, leading us to raise a mountain strike corps?

It has been argued that China is a continental power with a huge land army. It is making amends by funding its Navy strongly, to change the balance. But its army reforms have converted its land forces into a large armoured and air mobile force capable of rapid redeployment.

Under these conditions, to raise an infantry heavy mountain strike corps has obvious disadvantages. First, it would be geographically confined to one or two axes of movement and capable of being blunted. Secondly, whatever we may do on land, we will remain an asymmetric power vis-à-vis the huge People’s Liberation Army (PLA), whose defence budget is thrice ours. Thirdly, a strike corps in the mountains denies us the time and place of a counter offensive, because it is geographically limited. These arguments should have come up during the process of examining options. If they didn’t, it is tragic and shows little improvement from the confusion and bluster of 1962 preceding the disaster.

Infantry heavy

The Indian Army is a fine institution and no one grudges it any funding. But it is also one of the most infantry heavy armies in the world. Its armour-to-infantry ratio is badly skewed, it is not air mobile, its manoeuvre capability is poor and Rs.60,000 crore would have addressed all these deficiencies and more. Instead, with the strike corps it will become even more infantry heavy and Rs.60,000 crore will have been wasted in barely addressing the tremendous disparity with the PLA’s mobility, numbers and manoeuvre capability. It must be remembered that we are addressing mountain warfare, where high altitude acclimatisation is a necessity for soldiers before being deployed. So the mountain strike corps would already be at high altitudes with little possibility of being redeployed without huge air mobility. All this should have been apparent to the Army Aviation Corps whose leaders seem bereft of strategic thinking, having flown light helicopters all their lives. Stopping the advancing Chinese in the mountains strung out through the valleys should have required specialised ground support aircraft like the A-10 Warthog, another strategic choice which was probably ignored by the army aviation branch. By not examining non-army options we seem to be repeating the mistakes of 1962 when the Sino-Indian war became a purely army-to-army affair for reasons that have still not been established.

Strengths & weaknesses

We are not privy to the notings in the file preceding the decision to raise a mountain strike corps, but it would certainly appear that the border issue appears to have been treated purely as an army problem for which only the army can find a solution, with the other arms of the government contributing nothing. Most of all, we appear not to have assessed the Chinese weakness and strengths. Their strength is the huge logistic network that they have built up in Tibet. By creating a one axis strike corps, we have played into their strengths. The Chinese weakness lies in the Indian Ocean, a fact that even Beijing will readily concede. The clash between their political system and economic prosperity requires resources and, increasingly, the Chinese resource pool is Africa, which generates massive sea lines of communication (SLOC) through the Indian Ocean. Today, they are merely SLOCs; tomorrow they will be the Chinese Jugular. Beijing’s paranoia about the Indian Ocean is therefore understandable but the threat according to its strategic commentators comes only from the U.S. Sixty thousand crore spent on strengthening the Indian Navy’s SLOC interdiction capability would have given us a stranglehold on the Chinese routes through the Indian Ocean. The Himalayan border, the entire border, could have been held hostage by our strength in the Indian Ocean with an investment of Rs.60,000 crore.

No one minimises the pinpricks that the Chinese are capable of but what we are looking for is an asymmetric capability to balance the Chinese four-fold advantage in GDP over India. Finding the solution requires all arms of the government to debate where our scarce resources should go. A geographically limited one axis offensive will not destabilise the PLA, but a flotilla of nuclear submarines and a three carrier air group in the Indian Ocean can economically cripple mainland China.

(Raja Menon retired as Rear Admiral in the Indian Navy)

sope, better look at this in a holistic sense.

Sagar G · Post by **Sagar G** » 31 Jul 2013 20:35

Philip I must congratulate you on having learnt the art of changing stance as soon as caught in a muddy situation just like our IA and IAF does when it comes to indigenization they either come up with ridiculous QR's or change it as soon as they realise that the system they had asked for is close to completion. Now you say that,

Philip wrote:Who is denying the fact that retd. or serving naval officers have been heads of shipyards? It's been a fact for decades.That is why the IN has had better success at indigenisation than the other two services.

While in the previous post you said,

Philip wrote:Why is the IN more successful than the other two services in indigenisation? It is because the warships are primarily designed by the naval design teams. Where they have experienced delays is with the PSU shipyards and development of weapon systems and sensors which we do not produce at home.

It's like malsi logic where multiple conditions are true even if one totally contradicts the other. This doesn't stop here you then continue and blame it on the "babudom" for all the ills of the DPSU. I agree partially with you here but then what happened to the BRF silver bullet of "a defence guy should be the head of any DPSU and everything will be hunky dory" theory ??? Since defence guys are head of the naval DPSU's shouldn't that have solved the problems ailing them ???

Coming to your next theory of " The DRDO did not want an IAF officer to head the project and show up its flaws ". What I fail to understand here is why an IAF guy/IAF was so desperate to head the project ??? The Navy doesn't mind working with DRDO and being a part of the process. From your post it seems like what the IAF wanted to do was only show muscle with "hire and fire" powers instead of actually caring for the project because had they cared for the project they would have backed it to hilt from day 1 instead of waiting till 2006 to become a part of the project. Howsoever much you try to show IAF as the good guy here but the fact is that the IAF was (according to me still is) a "reluctant customer" as put by an IAF man himself (sashtang pranaam from me to him for saying the truth). Instead of focusing on showing other's "flaws" the IAF should get it's house in order first.

Philip wrote:There is enough on file regarding the matter.As for "documents",please tell me how many classified documents have been revealed on BR since existence?

I absolutely didn't see this coming, so now when caught BSing you create this new smokescreen of "I have classified documents about which I can't talk about". This seems ingenious but at the end of the day is absolutely lame because if (a big if) you are in possession of classified documents then debating based on there content in a public forum is totally dumb. There is a reason that the documents are "classified" and I am absolutely sure that you have none in your possession.

Philip wrote:Perhaps it may be poss. to get him to speak at a BR get-together to clear the air in the future.

Invite him on BR, why make it exclusive in BR meet ???

Philip wrote:I posted an official report in the media months ago about the % of def, indigenisation.Here is a quite from a paper by Maj. Gen. (Retired) P K Chakravorty, VSM on "Indigenisation of Defence Technology".

Here's a more recent piece in Bus.Std. Even AKA is on record wanting to "reverse the 70:30 ratio".

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 057_1.html

Ajai Shukla: Indigenising defence - the 70:30 fallacy

In practice, indigenisation has been, with apologies to Greta Garbo, an illusion, wrapped in a fallacy, cloaked in deception

First of all I asked you to get the recent data about the indigenous content given by ex DRDO chief Dr. Saraswat but I understand why you couldn't muster up the courage to quote him. But calling a May 31, 2011 article by shukla a "recent piece" is a bit too stretched even by your standards don't you think ??? I am very sorry to see the respected retired army guy quoting old figures but then this is India so "chalta hain" onlee.

Philip wrote:PS:I don't hold a brief for the piece about "90% of Dhruv" being firang.It surprises me.Can this be critically examined?

CAG had said that 90% of the value of the material used in Dhruv is imported. It might be true but the question is whether foreign powers can impose any kind of restrictions on Dhruv ??? The answer is NO, hence I sleep well onlee.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 04 Aug 2013 07:59

Sagar,it was not the IAF who wanted a hire and fire head,it was from the MOD,so that the project could get serious.Let me put the chronology into perspective.As I was told,the first time only IAF officers were on the list,he was chosen.Then a Q was asked,why only IAF officers? Civvies/boffins too must have their opportunity.Chosen again by the panel.Then the panel was "upgraded",the choosers got even more heavyweight,chosen again,until it eventually went to the PM! He signed on,but the order was conveniently slowed down until the officer retd. This entire process took several years.Why is no one commenting on Kalam's great statement that 200 LCA will be built between 2003 and 2010? The entire country was taken for a ride including APJAK.

In other posts I've illustrated the babudom red tape that throttles quick decisionmaking.However,if the head of project is an end-user,it does help in reducing needless battles between DPSU and end-user on many issues.The friction between DPSU and end-user is legion.Look at the current spat between the Air Chief and HAL over the basic trainer,where HAL which has yet to produce one indigenous aircraft over the last 3 decades successfully-after the Kiran,wants to tie the IAF down to a paper-plane which has yet to fly,when the Pilatus-an approved buy,used by air forces worldwide, is being inducted in large number.Can we afford to have two different types of trainers in the future? The IAF point blank doesn't want the HTT-40,yet HAL is hell bent on shoving it down the IAF's throat.HAL has swallowed thousands of crores of taxpayers money and results are being demanded by the DM,ACM,etc.,on the LCA,IJT,in particular. With the experience of the Deepak behind it,will any air force worldwide buy an HAL designed and built trainer?

Where have I said that I posses classified documents? When you demanded "proof" I asked a simple Q what "proof" in the form of official docs. has been seen on BR? When the time arrives if need be ,the good AM will deliver to BR his side of the LCA story.If you want to believe otherwise ,go ahead,you have your opinion,I have mine and I stand by my statements.

Your statement that while "90%" of Dhruv may be imported as per CAG's observations,but we can "sleep well" knowing that a firang power cannot impose restrictions,is incredible.What happens if the French turn off the tap for the engine? Or the Yanquis refuse to give us GE engines for the LCA if we N-test again? Let's face facts,we are heavily dependent upon foreign powers/entities for approx. 70% of our military hardware.Unless there is a sea change in attitude towards the entire aspect of defence procurement ,and performance of the DPSUs,so that the services are not without weaponry,while there is a steady increase in reducing the % of imported eqpt. and components,this figure will remain.

Now for your accusations about my posting old stats. and % of indigenisation.Here is a May 14/2013 one ,in a report in the Hindu on the same and how policy has "allowed DPSUs to loot the exchequer":

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/in ... 712277.ece

In the mid-1990s, a committee headed by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam said it would increase the indigenous content of weaponry from 30 to 70 per cent by 2005. But in 2013, we are still importing 70 per cent. We are manufacturing high-end products like the SU 30 MKI fighters, Brahmos missiles and Scorpene subs, but these are licence productions of foreign designed weapons, and even here we know that key assemblies will be imported till the very end of the programme.

While other sectors of the manufacturing industry in the country, notably automobiles, have become world class sectors, the record of our government-run arms industry which employs 1.5 million people, remains one of failure and disappointment. In 1991, the Arun Singh Committee on Defence Expenditure was the first to point out the obsolescence of the ordnance factories and recommended the shutting down of five and letting the private sector handle items like clothing. Instead of shutting down, they are flourishing, including the premier Vehicle Factory Jabalpur which simply assembles Ashok Leyland Stallion and Tata LPTA 713 trucks.

The performance of the Ordnance factories and Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) has been, to use a polite word, below par. According to a report of the Boston Consulting Group, the annual output per employee in the Ordnance Factories and the DPSU is of the order of Rs 15.4 lakh while the average across the manufacturing sector is Rs 30.40 lakh. The parliamentary Defence Service Estimates of 2012-13 show that despite this, Rs 556 crore had been allotted for overtime pay in the Ordnance factories’ budget.

Loot of the exchequer

Just how we have short-changed our defence capabilities and allowed DPSUs to loot the exchequer is brought out by two figures. One reveals that build times for indigenous warships are unconscionably long. The Delhi class (6,500 tonnes) took 114 months to be built while equivalent ships take 29-30 months in the U.S. and Japan. Delhi, the first in its class, may have involved a learning curve, but sadly, the follow on Mysore and Mumbai also took 117 and 106 months. The Shivalik class which were contracted for 60 months took 112 months.

Another metric emerges from the fact that Indian-made Sukhoi 30 MKI costs Rs 80 crore per unit more than those imported from Russia. The fact we are tying up to design the fifth generation fighter with the Russians indicates that there was little or no learning process involved in the indigenous manufacture of the Su-30 by the HAL.

In the past one year, we have seen two other aspects of the problem. A CBI probe has shown how the management of the Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) undermined the 1986 agreement with Tatra of the erstwhile Czechoslovakia for the supply of its T815 trucks. But instead of a projected 85 per cent indigenisation by 1991, we were left below 50 per cent in 2012.

Evidence suggests that our DPSU managers have actually been going out of their way to serve the interests of the foreign “partner,” rather than the PSU they head. This is not a disease confined to BEML alone; almost all DPSUs suffer from it.

The roots of this could well lie in that other problem which was revealed by the second major scandal, relating to the import of 12 VVIP helicopters — corruption. The VVIP helicopter deal suggested that not a single major defence purchase arrangement had escaped corruption, excluding, perhaps, the US FMS arrangements.

The formal thrust of the DPP has been incorporated in the “Buy”, “Buy and Make” and “Make” acquisition strategies. As outlined by the DPP 2011, “Buy” would mean an outright purchase of equipment and could be “Buy (Indian)” or “Buy” (Global)’. “Indian” would mean Indian vendors only and “Global” would mean foreign as well as Indian vendors. “Buy” Indian’ must have minimum 30 per cent indigenous content if the systems are being integrated by an Indian vendor.

“Buy & Make” would mean purchase from a foreign vendor followed by licensed production/indigenous manufacture in the country. “Buy & Make (Indian)” would mean purchase from an Indian vendor including an Indian company forming joint venture/establishing production arrangement with an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) followed by licensed production in the country. “Buy & Make (Indian)” must have minimum 50 per cent indigenous content on a cost basis.

“Make” would include high technology complex systems to be designed, developed and produced indigenously. Note that the budget outlay for the “make” category which was Rs 89 crore last year has been cut to just Rs 1 crore in this year’s budget.

The new steps taken by the MoD indicate that it is reluctantly moving in the right direction, but as of now it remains much too protective towards the government military industrial complex which has failed us so badly.

The DPP changes have reordered the priorities for acquisition by making “Buy (Indian)” the number one option followed by “Buy and Make” (Indian), “Make” and so on. But by refusing to touch FDI rules, they will ensure that this policy will remain unworkable.

The time has come to bluntly acknowledge that the continuing dysfunctionality of our defence research and development setup, our public sector defence industry and our purchase procedures, have resulted from its higher management by the Ministry of Defence. In all fairness, it is too much to expect the babus of the MoD to initiate a revolutionary change in their departments. This is the job of the political leadership. Lamentably, however, it has failed repeatedly to provide the kind of leadership that would give this country a vibrant defence industrial sector.

Please keep on defending the indefensible DPSUs!

PS:If true,this is a stunning observation,showing the duplicity of the Govt.preaching indigenisation but practising something else.

“Make” would include high technology complex systems to be designed, developed and produced indigenously. Note that the budget outlay for the “make” category which was Rs 89 crore last year has been cut to just Rs 1 crore in this year’s budget.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 04 Aug 2013 08:12

Some more viewpoints:

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... ernisation

FDI to our defence: Dependence on imports can be cut by allowing foreign companies to produce weapons in India

A strong case for both increasing the FDI and sharing the LTIPP was made in a seminar at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses five years ago. But it took a defence scandal to engender a change in policy.

Are there so many negatives in relaxing our FDI policy? A careful analysis would reveal that there is much to be gained in taking a more liberal approach.

First, among the nations with comparable or large military budgets, or even the Brics, none are so dependent on imports as India is. Russia and China are in a completely different league, though the latter has only recently built its capacity through a slew of measures ranging from clandestine procurement of technology to reverse engineering.

Around 70% of India`s defence equipment is imported and if the total value of the foreign components in the equipment/platforms assembled/manufactured in India is computed, the dependency would be higher. As a result, of the estimated $80-100 billion capital acquisition over the next five years, defence wares worth upwards of $63 billion would have to be imported. This will hurt our security more than higher foreign equity of some defence companies may. A nation that would have to face several challenges as it strives to become a greater economic power, cannot afford to be so dependent on imported weapons.

To reduce dependence on imports, the creation of an ecosystem that allows foreign companies to establish industries in the country is imperative. We could, perhaps, take some lessons from the Brazilian experience of bolstering its military-industrial complex, harnessing foreign technology through a liberal policy.

Brazil amended its restrictive 1988 federal constitution that prohibited foreign investment in certain sectors, including defence, in 1995, allowing even 100% investment by foreign companies in the defence sector. The policy has helped expand the country`s domestic production capability and enhanced its defence export prospects. For instance, Helibras of Brazil, which manufactures/assembles advanced helicopters for the three forces, is 85% owned by Eurocopter, the European aviation giant.

Secondly, India`s domestic defence industry requires foreign technology to build production capacity to supply sophisticated weapons to our armed forces. It has to be sourced from companies/nations that safeguard their defence technologies jealously by encouraging them through a compensatory mechanism.

Thirdly, 26% FDI is too small to attract major players. According to Indian company law, 26% equity holding only enables the shareholder to prevent special resolutions. It does not give them the freedom to appoint directors or determine their remunerations. It also limits the profit of such companies. Why then should a company transfer technology and create competition for the parent companies?

Here is an ISS paper on the same.

.. bureaucratic inefficiency, rather than lack of funds, are the main causes of the slow pace of modernization.

http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/ ... chive.html

Although the Indian armed forces have drawn up elaborate plans for modernizing and qualitatively upgrading their capabilities for future combat, including the ability to secure the sea lanes of communication and project power in India’s area of strategic interest, the pace of modernization has been slow due to the lack of adequate funding, delayed decision-making, and a low-tech defense industrial base. India’s defense budget is pegged at less than 2% of its GDP at present, and the bulk of the expenditure is on the revenue account—that is, pay and allowances, rations, fuel, oil and lubricants, ammunition, and vehicles. [2] Very little remains in the capital account to be spent on modernization. In the case of the army, spending on modernization is as little as 20% to 25% of total capital expenditure in 2012–13. [3] According to Indian defense minister A.K. Antony, “New procurements have commenced...but we are still lagging by 15 years.” [4] Nonetheless, an inadequate defense industrial base—imports constitute 70% of defense acquisitions—and bureaucratic inefficiency, rather than lack of funds, are the main causes of the slow pace of modernization. India is expected to procure defense equipment worth $100 billion, most of it imported, over the next two five-year plans. Simultaneously, however, efforts are being stepped up to enhance indigenous capabilities and thereby reduce India’s dependence on imports by an order of magnitude. The following three sections will survey India’s modernization of its army, navy, and air force.

pragnya · Post by **pragnya** » 08 Aug 2013 10:14

The weaponised version of Rudra i.e. ALH Mk-IV will be equipped with French Nexter THL-20 chin mounted gun turret housing a 20 mm M621 cannon. It would be able to carry Belgian 70 mm rockets, MBDA air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, such as the anti-tank Helina missiles –later to be replaced by the indigenous Nag anti-armour missiles.

The above weaponry would be available in the Army and the IAF versions. The naval version, could instead, carry 2 torpedoes/depth charges and two anti-ship missiles.

The ALH Mk-III version of Rudra is an EW (Electronic Warfare) platform with requisite sensors, countermeasures and targeting systems but, will not feature weapons.

Indian Army inducts 'Rudras'into its Air Wing

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 08 Aug 2013 10:19

The weaponised version of Rudra i.e. ALH Mk-IV will be equipped with French Nexter THL-20 chin mounted gun turret housing a 20 mm M621 cannon. It would be able to carry Belgian 70 mm rockets, MBDA air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, such as the anti-tank Helina missiles –later to be replaced by the indigenous Nag anti-armour missiles.

So Helina is apparently an MBDA product.

Edit: I was going to say DDM , but the article is written by Air Marshal (Retd) VK Jimmy Bhatia.

krishnan · Post by **krishnan** » 08 Aug 2013 10:45

, he got all confused , HELINA is not MBDA product and NAG is not air launched missile

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 08 Aug 2013 13:19

about the EW platform of Rudra, the blackhawk had a similar role and variant was made in 1980s..not sure if they exist but here is a pic and writeup..the SOTAS thing was probably a early attempt at GMTI sensor to guide artillery and tactical air (warthogs) onto potentially mobile enemy formations from long range.
http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng ... ickfix.php

While the EH-60C is intended to locate, classify and disrupt enemy signals traffic, the EH-60B was developed specifically to carry the Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) radar. The EH-60B was characterized by the long box-shaped SOTAS scanner mounted below the main cabin, and was equipped with backward-retracting main landing gear legs to allow the SOTAS antenna to rotate a full 360 degrees in flight. The sole EH-60B prototype made its maiden flight in February 1981, but the SOTAS development programme was cancelled the following September and the aircraft was subsequently converted to EH-60A/C standard.

Sagar G · Post by **Sagar G** » 09 Aug 2013 11:35

Philip wrote:Sagar,it was not the IAF who wanted a hire and fire head,it was from the MOD,so that the project could get serious.Let me put the chronology into perspective.As I was told,the first time only IAF officers were on the list,he was chosen.Then a Q was asked,why only IAF officers? Civvies/boffins too must have their opportunity.Chosen again by the panel.Then the panel was "upgraded",the choosers got even more heavyweight,chosen again,until it eventually went to the PM! He signed on,but the order was conveniently slowed down until the officer retd. This entire process took several years.Why is no one commenting on Kalam's great statement that 200 LCA will be built between 2003 and 2010? The entire country was taken for a ride including APJAK.

Whoever did that did good. What has IAF done for indigenization that it deserves to become the head of the project and have such powers in it's hand ??? If the IAF wants to become a leader of any defence project then it must show leadership capabilities with regards to that. "We are the end users", "we are in the army", "bahhh civilians", washing dirty linen in international airshow, not backing up national projects, playing down the hard work of our scientists and engineers, changing GSQR at will and many such arrogant attitudes is only going to get the amount of respect that they right now command from our defence scientists/engineers community which sadly is pretty low. It's a law of nature that to get respect you must first learn to give it and I have yet to see this "law" being broken. IAF should start doing the basic right before it asks to command the men/women it wants to when the day it does IAF wouldn't have to beg infront of MoD or PMO to give them the leadership position. Why aren't you commenting about the "reluctant customer" IAF was (is) w.r.t. LCA ??? What Dr. Kalam said or did is well in the past but IAF's behaviour towards LCA can still be seen at present why don't you talk about that ??? Just because you love to live in the past doesn't mean everybody else has to also follow suite.

Philip wrote:In other posts I've illustrated the babudom red tape that throttles quick decisionmaking. However,if the head of project is an end-user,it does help in reducing needless battles between DPSU and end-user on many issues.The friction between DPSU and end-user is legion.

Passing off the same BS again and again doesn't make it true Agni's, Akash, Arjun, LCA-IAF/IN, B-05, K-4, various radars in all these cases and in many many more cases the "end user" hasn't been the head of the project but still they have been successful. Armed forces and you also should chuck off the "bahhhh civilians" attitude and instead focus on working together with them. Thinking that because you are in armed forces and hence above all is going to earn you a big "ghanta" in terms of respect. Like I said before give respect if you want some back in return.

Philip wrote:Look at the current spat between the Air Chief and HAL over the basic trainer,where HAL which has yet to produce one indigenous aircraft over the last 3 decades successfully-after the Kiran,wants to tie the IAF down to a paper-plane which has yet to fly,when the Pilatus-an approved buy,used by air forces worldwide, is being inducted in large number.Can we afford to have two different types of trainers in the future? The IAF point blank doesn't want the HTT-40,yet HAL is hell bent on shoving it down the IAF's throat.

Yeah a spat in which the chief is down to fudging figures so as to kill an indigenous project. Even when it has been shown that HAL did propose better trainers not once but twice and the IAF did nothing but sat on it's butt still it is only and only the HAL's fault for not coming up with a better trainer. If people want to remain delusional by choice then no one can make them see the facts on the ground. IAF seems to have no logistics problem from the wallmart type collection of aircrafts it has but a single indigenous trainer brings in so much khujli and heartburn that the IAF chief resorts to lying so that it doesn't see the light of the day. All this must be acceptable in la la land only.

Philip wrote:HAL has swallowed thousands of crores of taxpayers money and results are being demanded by the DM,ACM,etc.,on the LCA,IJT,in particular. With the experience of the Deepak behind it,will any air force worldwide buy an HAL designed and built trainer?

IAF has swallowed thousands of crores of taxpayers money and brought aircrafts from every nook and corner of the world but still lacks in terms of technology and sanctioned squadron strength. See how easy it is to paint a gory picture of any organization if that's only what one wants to do instead of analysing the situation and finding facts. LCA is done, IJT is shaky. Done with the rants or the rinse and repeat cycle will continue ???

Philip wrote:Where have I said that I posses classified documents? When you demanded "proof" I asked a simple Q what "proof" in the form of official docs. has been seen on BR? When the time arrives if need be ,the good AM will deliver to BR his side of the LCA story.If you want to believe otherwise ,go ahead,you have your opinion,I have mine and I stand by my statements.

See Philip there is a limit to peddling lies and it seems that's only what you are interested in. I quote you only,

Philip wrote:There is enough on file regarding the matter.As for "documents",please tell me how many classified documents have been revealed on BR since existence?

When challenged now you are down hill skiing to "official docs". There is a world of difference between the two and you know it very well but since now you don't have anything to back up the garbage that you so masterly dish out hence hiding behind smokescreens like "classified documents", "official docs". I hope the time arrives soon and the AM gives his views about LCA. I don't have any problem with your BS till you don't post it on a public forum since many young minds also visit this place and I don't want them to have a doom and gloom view like yours hence the stand against your garbage peddling.

Philip wrote:Your statement that while "90%" of Dhruv may be imported as per CAG's observations,but we can "sleep well" knowing that a firang power cannot impose restrictions,is incredible.What happens if the French turn off the tap for the engine?

Impose restrictions on a JV ???

“The Shakti engine, developed jointly by Turbomeca (French) and HAL, develops almost 30 per cent more power compared to the TM 333-2B2 engine, with 19 per cent content of Indian development,” Mr Baweja said.

If they dare to do that then they are the one who will lose billions of dollars in business. Dhruv will still keep flying, we have more than enough competence to deal with any such situation.

Philip wrote:Or the Yanquis refuse to give us GE engines for the LCA if we N-test again?

I am not at all happy with the LCA decision but then I don't have power to change that. Further since our scientific community has already faced American "love" before hence I will assume that they must have a backup plan to fight out of such a situation if the need arises.

Philip wrote:Let's face facts,we are heavily dependent upon foreign powers/entities for approx. 70% of our military hardware.Unless there is a sea change in attitude towards the entire aspect of defence procurement ,and performance of the DPSUs,so that the services are not without weaponry,while there is a steady increase in reducing the % of imported eqpt. and components,this figure will remain.

Now for your accusations about my posting old stats. and % of indigenisation.Here is a May 14/2013 one ,in a report in the Hindu on the same and how policy has "allowed DPSUs to loot the exchequer":

Please keep on defending the indefensible DPSUs!

Even after asking multiple times for Dr. Saraswat to be quoted for the figure of indigenous content in defence production which he got from a national body you have consistently side stepped from quoting him since it will expose the constant bullshit peddling by you and as habitual have posted a lot of junk in full instead of from the said person whose word in this regard has more weight than any other whom you have quoted yet or will quote. Add to that the same old rants, rinse and repeat and I have defined you.

Who is defending the DPSU's, I challenge you to find a post of mine where I have said that they are the best effing thing we have got and I would leave BR. In the same vein I dare you to quote Dr. Saraswat regarding the indigenous content figure. Lets see do you have the balls for that.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 09 Aug 2013 11:41

good addition to IA if they can replicate this in Rudra. hopefully this will seamlessly integrate with the ground based SAMYUKTA units and artillery networks.
--------------
EH-60A Quick Fix
Quick Fix is a tactical, heliborne intercept and electronic countermeasures system deployed on a modified utility helicopter. Quick Fix helicopters are organic to the division, separate brigade, and armored cavalry regiment. As with SEMA airspace requirements, Quick Fix flight profiles are situationally dependent on mission requirements, aircraft and system capabilities, air defense threat, and weather. A flight profile requires airspace within the division or corps area of operations and at altitudes above the coordinating altitude. In addition to its airspace requirements, Quick Fix requires the monitoring of electronic warfare (EW) operations to coordinate the use of the electromagnetic spectrum by all forces.

The AN/ALQ-151 (V)2, QUICKFIX, Special Purpose Countermeasures System, is an aviation asset. Installed in an EH-60A, Blackhawk Helicopter with a primary mission to intercept, locate and jam enemy communications and pass such intelligence to Military Intelligence elements. The EH-60A Helicopter, its Avionics, Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE), and Integrated Inertial Navigation System (IINS) is maintained under the Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM), Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) and Depot maintenance philosophy. The Mission Equipment Package (MEP) is maintained under the four level maintenance concept: Unit Level (UL), Direct Support (DS), General Support (GS) and Depot.

The EH-60A Quickfix capabilities include Intercept (1.5-150 Mhz), Direction Finder (20-76 Mhz), Jammer (20-80 Mhz) Standoff Jamming 15-30 Km behind FLOT. At the division and armored cavalry regiment, the EH-60A Quickfix is an important special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA). asset for conducting intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW). The EH-60A (Quickfix) and the follow on EH-60L (Advanced Quickfix) provide the commander with signal intelligence and electronic jamming capability using the advantage of aviation mobility.

The earlier EH-1H Quick Fix IA/IB was an UH-1H Huey modified with electronic equipment to intercept, and jam enemy communications. The principal EW system was the ESL AN/ALQ-151 jamming system. The mission gross weight was 8,800 lb (3,992 kg), 1,050 lb (476 kg). Range is 250 nm (288 mi; 463 km) and endurance is 17/10 hours. At least 30 EH-1H modifications were completed. All have been replaced by EH-60A and EH-60L Quick Fix two aircraft. The EH-1X QUICK FIX 2 and QUICK FIX 2A aircraft was an Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) variant of the Huey designed to intercept and jam enemy communications. It also had direction finding (DF) and location capabilities and could downlink the info to an Army ground station. Only ten EH-1Xs were built.

EH-60A QUICK FIX 2B has capabilities similar to the EH-1X QUICK FIX 2 and QUICK FIX 2A aircraft. The UH-60A was chosen for QUICK FIX 2B because it could carry a much heavier load than the EH-1X "Huey". This Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) variant had a unique external antenna designed to intercept and jam enemy communications. It also had direction finding (DF) and location capabilities and could downlink the info to an Army ground station. The EH-60A was powered by two General Electric T700-GE-700 1622 shp turboshaft engines.

Sixty-one EH-60As were fielded. The special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) community operates a total of 67 EH-60 Quick-Fix aircraft of various configurations, including several research and development models.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 09 Aug 2013 11:47

Sagar,here is the "proof" you have asked for,so from now on keep your obnoxious personal views to yourself and apologise for calling me a liar.Moderators,if no apology is forthcoming,please ban this nauseating poster.

By 28 Feb 1993 ***** had reached his age of retirement. He was then a full Air Marshal holding the post of Vice Chief of the Air Staff. Dr Abdul Kalam was then the SA to RM. He wanted ***** to take over the LCA project in the existing vacancy of Director General ADA as he had done good work earlier on the very successful “Jaguar Darin” project. ***** was willing to take on the challenge provided his name was proposed jointly by DRDO & Air Force so that he was not identified as an “Air Force” man or a “DRDO” man and he could function freely in the interests of the project. Accordingly, the SA to RM routed the file through the CAS who concurred with the proposal and forwarded it to the RM Sri Sharad Pawar in Feb 93. It is learnt that the same got approval from three out of the four members of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) within a couple of months but was held up by the PMO for more than two years on various pretexts. It was examined by a few more search Committees all of whom had concurred with the original selection of *****. Dr Kalam intervened again and ***** appointment was finally cleared by the PM in Jun 95. The file was then passed to the Establishment Directorate for issue of an official letter of appointment. Even after another one full year, this letter had not been issued. It looked as if no one other than Dr Kalam was interested in strengthening the LCA project Management, and even he was powerless to enforce his will in the face of departmental apathy/antipathy. ***** was determined not to pursue his own case but act only if the formal appointment letter was issued. That post still remains vacant after almost two decades! That was that.

Now a days when I think about the Tejas, many scenarios, many ‘what if’ s if you like, cross my mind. What if we had allowed the HAL design team to handle the development without going through the ADA route? What if ***** or I were allowed to take on the project management? in 1983 – in 1986 – in 1993 – in 1996 ? What if we had the guts to depend on our own people for the development of the digital flight control system, some thing that we were ultimately forced to do anyway? What if we had listened to internal doubts expressed in muted tones and then in thunderous debates that the Kavery project will not and cannot match with the Tejas project in good time? This obvious decision had to be forced down our gullet after a long period of wasted time. (Those readers who had not been aware of the Tejas Project at that time may like to look up the transcript of the Address made by ***** at the ASTE Seminar on Flight Testing on 10 December 1997. The full transcript was published by the Vayu Magazine). What if we had realized a couple of years earlier that the MMR will need foreign collaboration to fit into the Tejas program? What if we had coordinated our testing program more tightly with the existing assets of ASTE and HAL Flight Test Division rather than creating a brand new set-up of NFTC for the purpose? (I hasten to add that NFTC and Phillip Raj Kumar who was tasked to set it up did perform excellently. I only wonder whether we could have saved some time and resources?)

And here the author on the original IAF evaluation of the LCA project at inception.

We felt that the proposed aircraft was over-ambitious. We felt that we were not likely to succeed in building the aircraft within a decade. We hastened to add that we had no quarrels with the concept of dreaming big; we only needed to remain practical and credible in our endeavor.
We felt that development of critical technologies in radar and engine should be pursued with vigor but that effort must not be tied to an aircraft project clearly identified for time-bound induction into the air-force as the risk of delay or failure of the project would be too high

We reminded ourselves that in ten years time our force strength would decline. We felt that our energies would be better spent in upgrading our present strength of aircraft with better technologies in sensors and weapons. We felt that in the MiG 21 BIS we had the most optimized 7 ton fighter aircraft available in the whole world. It was however already more that 20 years old. It was therefore attractive as a target platform for substantial technological up-gradation. If we could modernize its avionics, give it a nav-attack system, add electronic self-defence capabilities, add more modern communications and add newer guided weapons and hopefully put in a modern by-pass engine into the airframe then we would have a formidable aircraft on our hands. We felt that we would be capable of handling such a development.

Having cleared our own minds, we got down to the task of preparing a presentation to convince the rest of the Air Force.

It is easy to have a gut-feeling. It is also easy to convince yourself that your feeling is based on logic and reason. Perhaps it is even easy to find support for the ideas you are feeling from amongst your friends and your immediate colleagues. It is quite a different thing how ever to present your idea in front of a large audience comprising your bosses and perhaps a segment of critical friends. It was therefore a hard grind to prepare the presentation that was to be given to the AOC in C at Jodhpur.

We started the presentation with a bald and bold set of statements laying out the three summary views we had arrived at. We were sure that such a start would shake up the audience. To substantiate the first point we put the outline of the proposed LCA as received under a microscope, put every goal stated to a comparative study with the standards achieved by the MiG21 BIS, the Mirage 2000 and a general study of achievements within public knowledge anywhere in the world. We talked of structural weight and structural volume, we talked of clean aircraft design and of drag and lift, and we talked of thrust weigh ratios and of range and endurance. We talked of Specific Fuel Consumption and fuel carrying capacities within the airframe. Bit by bit we tried to prove that to create a structure that was somewhat lighter than the MiG21 and then extract aerodynamic performance from it that almost equaled the Mirage 2000 (which was about two tons heavier) would need us to technologically improve our performance in every single element of design and construction of the airframe and engine by at least fifteen to twenty percent from our currently known capabilities or aspirations. (We were yet to build a single operational jet engine). We felt that a time frame of ten years for this scale of achievements was implausible.

We now took up the case of proposed sensors. The proposal put out by the DRDO did not include a laser rangefinder for air to ground role. The assumption therefore was that the onboard radar would have to provide primary range data for air to ground role as well as air to air role. The problem as we saw it was we had never designed any airborne radar of any sort. The radar on the MiG 21 was rudimentary. None of the aircraft of the older generation like the Hunter/Gnat/Mystere/Marut had any airborne radar. The radar fitted in the maritime Jaguars were yet to enter service. The radar fitted to the Mirage 2000 had come without any transfer of technology. It was not clear whether we were capable or creating a duplicate that would be even better in performance. The proposed LCA was smaller that the Mirage 2000. Even if we had access to Mirage 2000 radar, would it fit into the smaller volume of the LCA? There was no indication that this had been considered. Therefore, we were totally dependent on the success of the proposed MMR. If that failed or was subjected to any delay the whole LCA project would be endangered.

We also dwelt on the Kaveri as the proposed engine for the LCA. The engine was far from a reality. Even if the first few prototypes of the LCA flew on some other engine, to commit to a production run of an aircraft yet to be built based on a maiden venture on an engine yet to be designed needed a leap of faith we were unable to make.

Thus I made our first point: If the DRDO is confident of achieving everything they have aimed at, God-Speed to them. We are however skeptical about their time frame of one decade. Therefore, we recommend that the effort of the DRDO be taken up as a national project not related to Air Force funds and plans. If the DRDO succeeds in its venture and a useable aircraft is produced, the Air Force can always induct that product as soon as it is available.

We then moved over to the second point of our presentation. A modern offensive air weapon system like a fighter aircraft contains many technologically advanced components that in 1982 were not produced in the country. Apart from an aero engine and an air interception radar, many other things like secure communication, Electronic Countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, pilots’ man/machine interface, survival equipment for the aircrew, oxygen systems, intelligent weapons and advanced sensors and so on. If we ever wanted to be capable of independent and effective military air and space operations, it would be necessary for us to master these technologies. We therefore felt that any research and development under taken by DRDO in these fields should be vigorously supported by the Air Force. Successes in these fields would enhance our abilities across the board. There was therefore no need to tie any of these R&D to any specific project. R&D on all component development should proceed vigorously.

The third point of our presentation was centered on our need to get some useable and effective aircraft into the air force within a decade. We mentioned that the Gnat was a spent force, the Hunters were becoming difficult to maintain, the SU-7 and the Type 77s would soon finish their lives. We needed credible replacements and we saw no inductions on the horizon. We therefore felt that a midlife upgrade for the MiG21BIS Type 75 was urgently needed. We felt that an upgrade should concentrate on new electronics and weapons. We also felt that if a less thirsty engine could be found for induction that would increase its radius of action it would be very good. We felt confident that the talent available in India was capable of delivering such an upgrade. We suggested that irrespective of what the DRDO plans about a project called LCA, the MiG21BIS upgrade program must be taken up without delay.

Having created the presentation, we polished it for a couple of days. The task of verbal delivery of the presentation was shouldered mainly by me and Pinky Pillai with able help from the rest of the members of the team. We had many talented young officers on the station. Our audio visual support for the planned presentation came to a high standard. We then proceeded to Jodhpur for the conference.

The other two major stations of the SWAC, Jodhpur and Bhuj, had kept their presentations simple. They functioned on the premise that the DRDO would deliver what ever was being promised. They just asked for a few additional items like laser ranger. The presentation at Jodhpur was an easy walk-over for us. We evoked a lot of opposition that we readily overcame. Our presentation was technically superior as we had much more resources and manpower than the other stations. After a day of debate we were chosen as the SWAC team for the presentation at the Air HQ.

The Gathering at the Air HQ was big. Mr Shahariyar, the Scientific Advisor to the Chief of the Air Staff was the organizer for the meeting as he represented the DRDO to the Air Force. However, the Directorate of Air Staff Requirements (DASR) under Air Vice Marshal JW (Johney) Greene took over the actual conduct of the conference, as ultimately they would have to become the nodal agency for induction of an indigenous aircraft.

In 1982, the SWAC was the youngest of the operational commands. We were therefore called upon to make our presentation after the other commands had had their say. The morning was tending to become a bit monotonous. It seemed to me that most of the presentations were based on thin air! At long last it was my turn. The auditorium was full of dignitaries. The Chief, Air Chif Marshal Idris Latif was present. All his PSOs and most of the ACASs and Directors were also present. There was a senior rep from the Navy. The HAL, the NAL and many other DRDO Labs were represented. The hall was actually overflowing with middle ranking officers, many of them standing two or three deep in the rear. The SWAC team took the stage. Very soon all the monotony of the morning was gone. The audacity and challenge of our presentation shook up the audience. I am however not sure whether the Chief took to our presentation kindly. He was an ardent supporter of the concept of the LCA. Our open disbelief of the DRDO’s claims and aims ran contrary to the theme of the conference. There was a frown on his face as we rambled on, and he left the hall before we came to the end of our presentation. He did however come back to be present during the vociferous Q&A session that followed.

There were some more presentations to be done after we finished. The day rolled on after a lunch break. Some time before the end of the proceeding and the summing up, I was told not to plan my departure from the Air HQ without checking with the DASR. We had planned to return on the following day. Pinky and I cancelled our plans and stayed back. Next day when we reported to the DASR, we were asked to prepare a paper summary of our presentation that included not only what we had said in the presentation but also the substance of the discussions that had followed. We struggled for a couple of days and submitted a paper. It was not a very hopeful one.

I also wonder if my original presentation in 1982 had any effect on the responses of the Air Force in relation to the LCA project? I have never regretted stating my opinion and my assessments during that presentation. I am glad that we were not swayed by over enthusiasm. I am glad that our assessment of the time required for the LCA project were more real than what was then the current wisdom. I am glad that the up-grade project of MiG21BIS to BISON standard came about. I am however sad that our professional judgement on our courses of actions to fulfill the task allotted to the Air Force is now criticized by people who do not carry the responsibility of keeping the Air Force fit for its tasks. And above all, I am saddened by the realization that in this project of developing the LCA we seem to have not reached our true potential. I know we can reach where we aim to. It has taken a long time. We are not yet there. But, we must continue till we succeed. A definitive determination to be honest to the nation, Politically, Administratively, Technologically and Morally, would help. There is no room for defeatism.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 09 Aug 2013 11:57

Here's the CAG on IJT delays and ALH engines.

http://www.newsx.com/national/nation/ca ... jt-project

09 August 2013 Edited by Ravindra (With inputs from PTI) |
CAG raps HAL for delays in IJT project

New Delhi: The CAG today rapped Hindustan Aeronautics limited (HAL) for being "unsuccessful" in producing an indigenous Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) aircraft even 13 years after the project was initiated.

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) also pulled up the aerospace PSU for incurring a loss of Rs 52 crore in supplying Advanced Light Helicopters to Ecuador by selling them at less than their prime cost.

"The project suffered at every stage of its execution. While the planning went awry with indecisiveness about the weight, thrust and life of the engine at design stage itself, taking up production without Initial Operational Clearance did not serve the purpose of the IAF which had projected requirement for the aircraft way back in 1999," the report said.

The project, sanctioned by the Defence Ministry in July 1999 at a cost of Rs 60 crore, was to be completed by the July 2004.

"The project slipped the target date of July 2004 by almost a decade and target for completion was reset to December 2013 by HAL, for which the Defence Ministry approval is still awaited," it said.

The Government auditor said Defence Ministry had also released Rs 3074 crore towards the project but the sole aerospace PSU in the country could spend only Rs 167 crore leaving 95 per cent of the funds unutilised.

The CAG also pulled up the HAL for its inability to produce an indigenous engine for the Advanced Light Helicopter resulting in delay in induction of Dhruv choppers in armed forces and avoidable expenditure of Rs 204 crore to the firm.

Indigenisation,some hometruths!
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2013/06/m ... ation.html

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 3rd May 13

On Saturday, the defence ministry (MoD) released the Defence Procurement Procedure of 2013 (DPP-2013), which had only been outlined earlier. The full policy document contains unprecedented clauses and rules that add teeth to the MoD’s declared intention to promote indigenisation.

A key step towards this is a far more stringent definition of “indigenous equipment.” So far, successive DPPs of 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 and 2011 have regarded all equipment purchased from Indian suppliers as “indigenous”, even when it contains 80-90 per cent foreign-built items, with just 10-20 per cent Indian components, often in secondary fields like assembly and delivery. Now, indigenisation will be gauged all the way down the chain of vendors and sub-vendors. The MoD has ruled, “Import content in the products supplied by the sub-vendors will not qualify towards indigenous content.”

Companies like Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), which traditionally do large volumes of “indigenous” business that actually consist of assembling imported components, will struggle to meet the MoD’s new definition of indigenisation.

An entire new Appendix to DPP-2013 precisely defines “indigenous content.” It stipulates that the following will be deducted from the cost of indigenous equipment: the direct costs “of all materials, components, sub-assemblies, assemblies and products imported into India”; costs of all services obtained from non-Indian entities; all royalties, license fees, technical fees etc. that are paid abroad.

The new procurement policy charges the prime vendor (with which the MoD has signed a procurement contract) with compiling the actual indigenisation achieved by all his sub-vendors. Each level of manufacture/production/assembly is required to compile and report their actual level of indigenisation --- based on the MoD’s new definition --- to the level above them. The policy stipulates, “The final aggregation of indigenous content shall be undertaken by the prime (main) contractor with whom an acquisition contract is signed by the Ministry.”

Here is the IDSA July 2013 monograph on "Indian Defence Industry,Issues of Self Reliance".
http://www.idsa.in/system/files/monograph21.pdf

It quotes Kalam in 1992 wanting to change the 70:30 import indigenous ratio to 30:70 by 2005,but even today the ratio is the same! If one goes by the new MOD rules posted just above,the true % of import content will shock one!

Sagar G · Post by **Sagar G** » 09 Aug 2013 13:18

Philip wrote:Sagar,here is the "proof" you have asked for,so from now on keep your obnoxious personal views to yourself and apologise for calling me a liar.Moderators,if no apology is forthcoming,please ban this nauseating poster.

Philip the taste of your own medicine isn't good na

What kind of proof is this ??? Do you even remember for which of your claim I asked "proof" for ??? In the name of "proof" what you have is views about what could have been done or not in hindsight even for which you don't have the courtesy to post the link a basic requirement when backing up one's claim but I understand since it hasn't been your habit to do so. If you don't like my "obnoxious personal views" then take a look at your posts since that's exactly what they are. I only came down to your level and gave you reply in a language that you understand well. Forget about any kind of apology coming from me you are free to go ahead and report my post let the mods decide who is who, I stand by each and every word I have typed and I still say that you are a "liar".

Even after daring you to post Dr. Saraswat's quote unsurprisingly you have again side stepped it and have now resorted to playing the "victim card" and hence trying to take the high moral ground since getting caught lying. I have no doubt that you don't have the balls to accept your fault and won't quote him and will keep creating smokescreens after smokescreens to peddle the same garbage again and again. So I now post the link for the same and hence prove my point that you are a liar

Indigenous content of our country has gone up to 55% today

Yeah that's the bloody headline itself, download the pdf go to pg.11 and read the question asked and his following answer regarding the same.

I am in a good mood today so here's another link from another source

Defence and Security Alert: Everybody agrees with the dire need for Indigenisation. How can we become a major global power without autarky in critical weapon systems? The recent AgustaWestland scandal has only highlighted the need for indigenisation. Why then are we still dependent on imports to the tune of 70 per cent of our defence needs? How can we speed up the process of indigenisation?

Dr Saraswat: First and foremost, I would like to question the figures of just 30 per cent indigenisation that are usually put out in our media. This was true of 1995. The Indian Council of Economic Research and Analysis and our own empirical calculations have shown that the extent of indigenisation in Defence items now stands at 55 per cent. Sanctions by DAC over a 10 year period confirm this. Some Rs 1,42,000 crore worth of DRDO developed indigenous defence products are under production now. So I would like to correct that erroneous impression.

However, the fact is that we would like to aim for 70-80 per cent indigenisation. The need for indigenisation has always been strongly felt. We want it to happen. Imports of defence items are forced due to a gap in our capabilities. You can’t jeopardise the security of our country and hence we have to import in areas where we lack the indigenous capacity. It is not as if the need for indigenisation has been felt only now due to the recent painful episode. It has been in our blood for the last 30 years and more. Indigenisation in fact is the mandate of the DRDO. We have taken a whole range of measures to increase indigenous content in defence items. However it is important for us to define what we mean by indigenisation. 100 per cent indigenous content is not valid in the current global context. Even for commercial firms, producing electronic goods or even textiles, there is a considerable amount of foreign component. Today, there is a large global market with up and downstream linkages, and importing components is the norm.

Defence indigenisation must be considered in respect of capability to make the nation strong. The Geopolitical situation can deny you the much needed equipment and technology in critical situations. We must achieve a critical mass in terms of indigenous technology. This implies that we must be independent of all existing and future controls / restrictions and technology denial regimes. That is why the DRDO does not engage itself in production of easily available products / low cost high volume items, which are available from multiple sources. There is no fear that these supplies will ever get choked. The critical mass for indigenisation therefore focuses on cutting edge technology sectors like missiles, electronic warfare, radars, SONARs, special materials, Life sciences products etc that are specific to our terrain. Technology denial regimes and unwillingness of other countries to sell such items, makes it essential for us to develop our own in-house capacities. The aim is to keep us independent of controls. This implies developing the integrated sum of academic institutions, industrial capacity, national laboratories and DRDO to meet national objectives. There is a gap currently and this must be bridged in a big way.

Philip wrote:It quotes Kalam in 1992 wanting to change the 70:30 import indigenous ratio to 30:70 by 2005,but even today the ratio is the same! If one goes by the new MOD rules posted just above,the true % of import content will shock one!

A quote for you Philip "Satyamev Jayate". Now go and whine to your mod friends to take action I stand by my words.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 09 Aug 2013 15:12

And that flies in the face of all the avaialble official evidence that 70/30 is the content today.There are any number of posts to that effect.So the IDS,CAG,etc. are all liars by your std. and I've posted how even the so-0called "indigenous" systems are mainly full of imported components! When you cannot debate in a civil manner,you resort to the vilest form of abuse and hate that has no place in a civilised forum such as BR.

It is sad that you have stooped with your vile,sickening,distastetful,language and tone of your posts to the level of the sewer ,which you wallow in.I will not henceforth demean myself in any form of communication with you in future or descend in debate to your level of mental faeces

Webmasters/moderators,this has gone too far.If you want BR to remain decent and civilised take action or the website will lose its reputation.

PS:For the record:

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 019_1.html
MoD's new tough rules on indigenisation

Yesterday, the defence ministry (MoD) released the Defence Procurement Policy of 2013 (DPP-2013), which had only been outlined earlier. The full policy contains unprecedented clauses and rules that add teeth to the MoD's declared intention to promote indigenisation.

A key step is a far more stringent definition of 'indigenous equipment'. So far, successive DPPs of 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 and 2011 have regarded all equipment purchased from Indian suppliers as 'indigenous', even when it contains 80-90 per cent foreign-built items, with just 10-20 per cent Indian components, often in secondary fields like assembly and delivery. Now, indigenisation will be gauged all the way down the chain of vendors and sub-vendors. The MoD has ruled, "Import content in the products supplied by the sub-vendors will not qualify towards indigenous content."

Companies such as Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), which traditionally do large volumes of 'indigenous' business that actually consist of assembling imported components, will struggle to meet the MoD's new definition. An entire new Appendix to DPP-2013 precisely defines 'indigenous content'. It stipulates the following will be deducted from the cost of indigenous equipment: the direct costs "of all materials, components, sub-assemblies, assemblies and products imported into India"; costs of all services obtained from non-Indian entities; all royalties, licence fees, technical fees, etc, paid abroad.

The new procurement policy charges the prime vendor (with which MoD has signed a procurement contract) with compiling the actual indigenisation achieved by all his sub-vendors. Each level of manufacture/production/assembly is required to compile and report their actual level of indigenisation, based on MoD's new definition, to the level above.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2013/03/d ... udget.html

Indigenous defence projects allocated just Rs 1 crore, down from Rs 89 crore last year

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 7th Mar 13

The Defence Budget for 2013-14 starkly underlines the gap between the minister's proclamations about the need to indigenise defence equipment on the one hand, and the money his ministry allocates for developing equipment on the other.

On February 20, buffeted by allegations of wrongdoing in the Ministry of Defence (MoD)'s Rs 4,000-crore purchase of VVIP helicopters, Minister A K Antony declared the indigenisation was essential to eliminate corruption in arms procurement.

Just eight days after, it was clear this would not be pursued seriously, at least during the coming financial year. In the Defence Budget for 2013-14, the 'Prototype Development' head, from which indigenous projects are funded, was allocated just Rs 1 crore, down from Rs 89 crore in the previous year.

The allocations for 'Prototype Development' are made under Major Head 4076 of MoD Demand No 27, Capital Outlay on Defence Services.

Sagar G · Post by **Sagar G** » 09 Aug 2013 17:26

Philip wrote:And that flies in the face of all the avaialble official evidence that 70/30 is the content today.There are any number of posts to that effect.So the IDS,CAG,etc. are all liars by your std. and I've posted how even the so-0called "indigenous" systems are mainly full of imported components!

There hasn't been any recent report from CAG with comprehensive data which shows that the total content still follows the 70:30 ratio, just because you believe in old data and hence continue with your incessant rants follow the rinse repeat cycle with unmatchable efficiency doesn't mean that you are adding anything valuable to the forum unlike what you like to believe. The underlined thing shows you live in your make belief world where you think that you are somehow "educating" Indians about how effed up they are when it comes to defence production. We are surely not in a great situation but at the same time haven't done bad given the multiple negative things about out system. If you haven't got it yet then let me tell you half of your post is filled with junk info which is either totally unrelated with the thread topic or has little informative value and the rest of the half has the same old whines which if I had the power I would have given you the copyrights for. So please stop flattering yourself with the claims (again without no proof off) of having educated others of this or that.

Philip wrote:When you cannot debate in a civil manner,you resort to the vilest form of abuse and hate that has no place in a civilised forum such as BR.

It is sad that you have stooped with your vile,sickening,distastetful,language and tone of your posts to the level of the sewer ,which you wallow in.I will not henceforth demean myself in any form of communication with you in future or descend in debate to your level of mental faeces

Totally exposed for the outright lies that you were wilfully dishing out now you resort to playing the "victim card" which is your last resort and hope to save H&D. See Philip exercising your angrezi skills doesn't mean that what you say are true as well especially when everything that has happened is public for everybody to take note off. I wasn't exactly enjoying my "sessions" with you but had to do it so that others more frequently start calling out the BS that you generally post in each and every thread possible. So accuse me for whatever you want too and try to take the moral high ground but you cannot make a fool out of everybody all the time.

Philip wrote:Webmasters/moderators,this has gone too far.If you want BR to remain decent and civilised take action or the website will lose its reputation.

Ignoring the irony, exactly my question as well how come a person is allowed to rant incessantly, allowed to talk in a demeaning term w.r.t. established organizations and above all lie continuously around all over BRF yet any kind of mod action escapes him.

PS: Posting link after link in full doesn't add to the thread necessarily. Yeah but it surely does help you in increasing your post count and hence getting the "oldie" tag.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 09 Aug 2013 17:49

Philip, seriously enough of playing the victim please.

You are clearly on the wrong foot here, when it comes to defence indigenization percentages, and your attempting to spin away the non-equivocal data presented by Dr Saraswat, that too on an analysis done by a Govt body itself won't do either.

In the past and even now, you continue to selectively cherry pick articles and only post views which support your jaundiced mindset when it comes to anything & everything Indian, you post articles from sources which are known to be discredited. You can't even distinguish between what is credible and what is not, why a few days back, you were posting rubbish from Izvestia, quoted verbatim by an Indian paper, and were using that to attack Indian agencies for being treasonous and what not.

In contrast, anything and everything Russian or otherwise, off you go to ridiculous lengths defending them.

You accuse Sagar G of being rude & uncivilized. But sorry, you are no paragon of virtue either, with your blinkers on & deliberate misrepresentation of facts. This latest stuff from you, wherein you deliberately ignore what VKS himself says, is just one more example.

From Jan 2013.

Dr Saraswat mentioned that according to the Economic Analysis Wing of the Government of India, the Self Reliance Index of the DRDO has increased to 55% from the earlier 30% and the DRDO currently has orders worth Rs 1.42 lakh crore.

Anybody who tracks Indian defence would know this, given the significant successes achieved across multiple domains in terms of confirmed production orders. Something which the entire Indian industry is benefiting from.

http://tarmak007.blogspot.in/2011/12/ha ... chers.html

And regarding your calls to the moderator or otherwise, to maintain the standards or otherwise of the forum, you too should be held to the same standards. Posting dishonest insinuations, and shilling for the Russians in discussion after discussion, does not equate improving any standards.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 09 Aug 2013 17:59

Philip wrote:http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 019_1.html
MoD's new tough rules on indigenisation

Yesterday, the defence ministry (MoD) released the Defence Procurement Policy of 2013 (DPP-2013), which had only been outlined earlier. The full policy contains unprecedented clauses and rules that add teeth to the MoD's declared intention to promote indigenisation.

A key step is a far more stringent definition of 'indigenous equipment'. So far, successive DPPs of 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 and 2011 have regarded all equipment purchased from Indian suppliers as 'indigenous', even when it contains 80-90 per cent foreign-built items, with just 10-20 per cent Indian components, often in secondary fields like assembly and delivery. Now, indigenisation will be gauged all the way down the chain of vendors and sub-vendors. The MoD has ruled, "Import content in the products supplied by the sub-vendors will not qualify towards indigenous content."

Companies such as Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), which traditionally do large volumes of 'indigenous' business that actually consist of assembling imported components, will struggle to meet the MoD's new definition. An entire new Appendix to DPP-2013 precisely defines 'indigenous content'. It stipulates the following will be deducted from the cost of indigenous equipment: the direct costs "of all materials, components, sub-assemblies, assemblies and products imported into India"; costs of all services obtained from non-Indian entities; all royalties, licence fees, technical fees, etc, paid abroad.

The new procurement policy charges the prime vendor (with which MoD has signed a procurement contract) with compiling the actual indigenisation achieved by all his sub-vendors. Each level of manufacture/production/assembly is required to compile and report their actual level of indigenisation, based on MoD's new definition, to the level above.

A perfect example of how badly mixed up your awareness of anything and everything Indian defence related is and you end up copy pasting stuff which is barely relevant.

The above refers only to the DPP!! Which had a lacunae in terms of how it classified equipment purchased from local vendors! Similarly, BELs classification of what is indigenous or what is not is again irrelevant, since BEL follows its own metrics and their metrics actually differ from those of the DPP (which in its last version mentioned a "by value component of 50% and above" for a project to be termed indigenous). BEL's metrics in fact judging by their annual reports, are about anything which has a BEL R&D/own input in, being transferred to the indigenous bucket!

In contrast, the SRI % talks about the overall index, an entirely different metric, affected by programs led by DRDO, which have resulted in a massive spike towards local industry, despite increases in imports. The thousands of crores of orders placed on DRDO designed equipment, across radars, sonars or missiles, is obvious to anyone except those who have their blinkers on! The DRDO as matter of fact does a detailed audit, and have publicly stated the indigenous content of each program, and even mentioned (both by LRU count & cost) how their programs stack up.

Whats credible is that this increase in SRI from 30% to 55% happened despite mega deals for imported equipment being signed by the MOD.
And as regards "foreign components" - don't know whatever profession you seem to be in, but by sure its not remotely technical. Your beloved Russians end up going COTS for everything nowadays, their gizmos are also full of TI/Intel etc chips, they make their aircraft on German CNC machines, have Siemens PLM for documentation, use CATIA and what not for design..Seriously, what are you talking about?

Even the most complex of Indian programs (and I am talking entire platforms here) have ~50% LRUs indigenized, with efforts going on for the rest.

Please stop copy pasting articles which you don't seem to even understand.

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 09 Aug 2013 21:56

Now I have seen everything, philip on the defensive and playing victim!! Well one should know that misrepresentation, cherry picking and prejudice is gonna end up catching up to oneself, eventually. Now that he got got his a$$ handed to himself, after being caught red-handed in a lie, he has no choice but to play the victim. Frankly, I have always wondered how he has time to saturate almost all threads with his BS. Must be some cushy job with lots of free time or he must be retired. Well, frankly when one starts contradicting the head of DRDO on indigenous content of military material, one has to cut losses and crawl back into a hole. Hopefully, people will forget and sooner or later one can post BS again.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 09 Aug 2013 22:17

If you guys want to ignore facts,do so.They remain! This is a free country and website so I believe. I will post what is relevant and if you cannot understand what they contain,the truth,too bad.You can stay ignorant and believe in your wet dreams about our actual state of indigenisation and delivery of weapon systems on time and within budget.

Keep on with your cretinous and moronic diatribes and invective.They only reveal to everyone the utter lack of character of yourselves,and like the lawyers whose arguments are weak,keep on thumping their desks!

I have just a few quotes for intelligent members to get the overall picture and health of indigenisation.talk about people being "unable to see the wood for the trees.."!

http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-new ... 32196.aspx

Why India is poor at making its own weapons
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Hindustan Times New Delhi, March 28, 2012

No government agency talks more about indigenisation and self-reliance than the ministry of defence and has a worse record to show for it. India earned a top ranking in the latest international arms transfer report of the Swedish think tank, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, as the world's largest arms importer.

It is a position, says retired Vice-Admiral Premvir Das, India will hold for years to come because its armed forces need to buy $ 40 - 50 billion in capital equipment.

There are two broad reasons why India fails so miserably to become more self-reliant in arms production.

One is a superstructure of inefficiency that is held in place by corruption and inertia. The Tatra truck deal has long been a byword in arms procurement incompetence. Over 25 years, the Indian army bought 7000 trucks from the Czech Republic at roughly double the cost they are sold in their home country. The indigenisation rate was so poor the trucks do not have right-hand drive to this day. General VK Singh's claim he was offered Rs. 140 million to keep India buying Tatras would explain why this absurd state of affairs existed for as long as it did. http://www.hindustantimes.com/Images/Po ... etro8d.jpg

India has a reputation in the international arms industry for importing substandard equipment at inflated prices. As the SIPRI report points out, measured over a five-year period, Russia has remained India’s largest weapons supplier. But Russia’s comparative advantage in military sales is partly an ability to give huge kickbacks. The Russian Accounting Chamber, its CAG equivalent, in 2001 noted that the umbrella arms exporting firm, Rosoboroneksport, kept such convoluted finances it could not understand them. Trade experts privately say Indian middlemen in Moscow sales get 10 to 15% of the contract and 5%, curiously, has to be paid to the Russian government.

The second reason is the nexus between the mandarins of the defence ministry and the state-owned arms companies that keeps private Indian firms at arm’s length. As defence ministry officials privately admit, institutions like the Defence Research and Development Organisation and Hindustan Aeronautics prefer to import foreign-made weapons rather than allow the Tatas and Mahindras to get a real share of the contracts. Their fear: the competence of the private sector will marginalise them.

Even the official defence indigenisation figure of 30% being Made in India is a myth says retired Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal of the Combat Land Warfare School. “Ten to 12 percentage points of that is screwdriver usage – importing kits, assembling them and giving the smallest value addition.”

The Brigadier is echoing my earlier post,citing an example of a DPSU.I repeat the IDSA report of July 2013 too here:

Here is the IDSA July 2013 monograph on "Indian Defence Industry,Issues of Self Reliance".
http://www.idsa.in/system/files/monograph21.pdf

It quotes Kalam in 1992 wanting to change the 70:30 import indigenous ratio to 30:70 by 2005,but even today the ratio is the same! If one goes by the new MOD rules posted just above,the true % of import content will shock one,it will be even lower!

Another quote with SIPRI stats and a statement by AKA to parliament.In fact,the % of defence imports by India has been going up each year,where we are now the world's largest importer of arms!

According to SIPRI, in terms of the import of defence hardware, India has in the last decade overtaken China to emerge as the largest arms importing country. Rightly, Antony has strongly advocated that India should reverse the trend of 70% defence imports in favour of domestic sources and bring down imports to 30%. As it is, Antony had recently informed the Indian Parliament that “Between April 2012 and Feb.2013, the country’s provisional expenditure on defence import was Rs.251,260-million which is the highest in the last three decades.”

Strange? I thought that from those posters in denial,it was reducing thanks to our huge % in "indigenisation"! Is Anthony a "liar" too?

http://articles.economictimes.indiatime ... s-importer

India replaced China as the world's leading importer of weapons in 2011 and has retained the distinction since. Despite criticism of its import dependency -India imports 70% of its armament needs - and failure to develop a defence industrial base at home by engaging the private sector, India accounted for 12% of global imports during 2008-12.

During this period, India's imports were 109% higher than that of China, which was the second largest importer of weapons. The key difference between India and China has been that while the latter has used years of imports to develop a thriving domestic defence industrial base and become the world's fifth largest exporter of weapons, India's domestic defence industry remains a public sector monopoly and government policies keep the private sector out.

"What we need to do is clear. India needs to become an exporter of weapons. India needs to develop indigenous weapons systems," said former chief of army staff, General (Retd) Shankar Roy Choudhury. "Government policy does not allow the private sector to come up. It does not allow export of weapons made in India. We have a network of state-owned defence production companies and ordnance factories. They have failed to produce anything new. It is the vested interest of the bureaucracy that is perpetuating this system," he added.

During the five year period 2008-12, India's arms imports rose 59% from 2003-07.

Here is Mr.AKA on the issue as recently as May this year.

The Indian government has stepped up pressure on the Indian defence industry’s leading body, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and Defence Minister A.K. Antony has recently used some very tough words for the DRDO. Antony asked the DRDO to put its act together, take steps to become more competitive, and warned that the only choice before the DRDO was to “perform or perish”.

The Indian government is peeved with the harsh reality that the DRDO has failed to do much in ensuring India’s indigenisation drive despite billions of dollars having already been funneled into the DRDO kitty for decades. What came as a hard reality check for the DRDO bosses was Antony’s tongue lashing at the DRDO annual awards function in New Delhi on May 30, 2013.

Some notes on the true % of indigenisation in shipbuilding.

On the face of it, that would appear like a healthy 66 per cent indigenisation rate, close to Antony's target. Unfortunately, only a small share of this goes to the Indian shipbuilder.

MDL retains just 25 per cent of the cost of each warship it produces, with 75 per cent being paid to foreign suppliers for the systems mentioned above. GRSE pays out 65 per cent and GSL remits 55 per cent abroad, not because they are better at indigenising but because their vessels use lower-end technology that is available in India.

The shocking statistic is that India has a 100 per cent indigenisation rate in jungle boots and blankets and similar low-tech equipment.

But in critical technologies, we import 85 per cent of our needs. And in warship-grade and aerospace-grade components, we have indigenised just 5 per cent of our requirement; 95 per cent still comes from abroad.

Xcpt from a Rajya Sabha Q in 2012

The
increasing share of domestic procurement does not, however, mean
an increase in self-reliance. This is because a significant portion of the
procurement from domestic sources consists of what can be termed
as ‘indirect defence imports’ which is nothing but imports by the Indian
defence industry—primarily by the DPSUs and OFs—for production
and supplies for the armed forces.
The indirect imports consist of raw materials,components and spare parts,capital goods and special tools.It also includes the amount spent in foreign currency in the form of royalty,licence and documentation fee,
and foreign consultancy.
It is to

So if everything is all hunky-dory with indigenisation,despite the evidence posted above which shows the true health of indigenisation,I repeat,why is the DM making statements like this?

DEFENCE Minister A.K. Antony has said on numerous occasions that India still meets around 70 per cent of its military hardware and software requirements through imports. This makes India the world’s largest importer of major conventional weapons, which means it is vulnerable to supply lines being chocked at inappropriate times and arms procurement scandals (Bofors howitzer, Tatra truck, and more recently AugustaWestland VVIP helicopter) erupting occasionally. It also reflects poorly on the country’s capabilities and efforts to indigenise its military requirements. According to data released recently by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India in 2008-12 accounted for 12 per cent of global arms imports, significantly ahead of second-placed China.

(AKA) warned that the only choice before the DRDO was to “perform or perish”.
[/quote]

http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/thscrip/p ... &prd=fline&

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 09 Aug 2013 22:37

^As usual, comes up with more and more fantastic arguments. Now it is "you are too stupid to understand my arguments/logic." I can't believe that this guy has the gall to contradict the former DRDO chief. Of course, he has a legion of foreign obsessed fanboys, vested interests and DDM articles on his side, but no matter how many times you lie, it is still a lie.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 09 Aug 2013 22:44

Of course it is when AKA,and others say it (70%)! Too bad species like you are illiterate.

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 09 Aug 2013 23:04

^This guy can call others names, but when called out to be liar, he goes berserk. He insists on peddling old data as current and quoting Indian politicians, who are at best misinformed and at worst corrupt (or representing something grossly corrupt like the UPA). His menagerie of quotes come from various vested interests, foreigners and military fanboys (including generals). Yet, he cannot take Dr. Saraswat for his word. This cherry picking and selective amnesia is symptomatic of a disease afflicting much of our senior military establishment. A visceral hatred of DRDO and scorn/contempt for indigenous efforts (how dare these SDREs thwart me from getting my foreign toys!!!). Once in a while he is forced to make favorable statements, but he never forgets to mention supposed Russian contributions, whether it has anything to do with the subject at hand or not. After all this, THIS GUY is playing the VICTIM? Some people have thick skin indeed.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 09 Aug 2013 23:22

Philip wrote:If you guys want to ignore facts,do so.They remain! This is a free country and website so I believe. I will post what is relevant and if you cannot understand what they contain,the truth,too bad.You can stay ignorant and believe in your wet dreams about our actual state of indigenisation and delivery of weapon systems on time and within budget.

Keep on with your cretinous and moronic diatribes and invective.They only reveal to everyone the utter lack of character of yourselves,and like the lawyers whose arguments are weak,keep on thumping their desks!

I have just a few quotes for intelligent members to get the overall picture and health of indigenisation.talk about people being "unable to see the wood for the trees.."!

http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-new ... 32196.aspx

Why India is poor at making its own weapons
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Hindustan Times New Delhi, March 28, 2012

No government agency talks more about indigenisation and self-reliance than the ministry of defence and has a worse record to show for it. India earned a top ranking in the latest international arms transfer report of the Swedish think tank, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, as the world's largest arms importer.

It is a position, says retired Vice-Admiral Premvir Das, India will hold for years to come because its armed forces need to buy $ 40 - 50 billion in capital equipment.

There are two broad reasons why India fails so miserably to become more self-reliant in arms production.

One is a superstructure of inefficiency that is held in place by corruption and inertia. The Tatra truck deal has long been a byword in arms procurement incompetence. Over 25 years, the Indian army bought 7000 trucks from the Czech Republic at roughly double the cost they are sold in their home country. The indigenisation rate was so poor the trucks do not have right-hand drive to this day. General VK Singh's claim he was offered Rs. 140 million to keep India buying Tatras would explain why this absurd state of affairs existed for as long as it did. http://www.hindustantimes.com/Images/Po ... etro8d.jpg

India has a reputation in the international arms industry for importing substandard equipment at inflated prices. As the SIPRI report points out, measured over a five-year period, Russia has remained India’s largest weapons supplier. But Russia’s comparative advantage in military sales is partly an ability to give huge kickbacks. The Russian Accounting Chamber, its CAG equivalent, in 2001 noted that the umbrella arms exporting firm, Rosoboroneksport, kept such convoluted finances it could not understand them. Trade experts privately say Indian middlemen in Moscow sales get 10 to 15% of the contract and 5%, curiously, has to be paid to the Russian government.

The second reason is the nexus between the mandarins of the defence ministry and the state-owned arms companies that keeps private Indian firms at arm’s length. As defence ministry officials privately admit, institutions like the Defence Research and Development Organisation and Hindustan Aeronautics prefer to import foreign-made weapons rather than allow the Tatas and Mahindras to get a real share of the contracts. Their fear: the competence of the private sector will marginalise them.

Even the official defence indigenisation figure of 30% being Made in India is a myth says retired Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal of the Combat Land Warfare School. “Ten to 12 percentage points of that is screwdriver usage – importing kits, assembling them and giving the smallest value addition.”
The Brigadier is echoing my earlier post,citing an example of a DPSU.I repeat the IDSA report of July 2013 too here:

Here is the IDSA July 2013 monograph on "Indian Defence Industry,Issues of Self Reliance".
http://www.idsa.in/system/files/monograph21.pdf

It quotes Kalam in 1992 wanting to change the 70:30 import indigenous ratio to 30:70 by 2005,but even today the ratio is the same! If one goes by the new MOD rules posted just above,the true % of import content will shock one,it will be even lower!

This is a very good example of how you misinterpret things and many a times actually change the entire picture.

In the context of this 70:30 topic you have ridiculed Kalam (multiple time), when he is right. His expectations that India can reduce imports from 70 to 30% is right. That it has not happened is a problem with corrupt Indians AND as this article states, corrupt Russians. Nothing to do with Indian ability or desire in general. Remove the corruption and things should improve.

On the bolded part, Kanwal says that the %age is still low - he does not attribute it to any reason you may think it to be.

This article actually proves three things:
1) That a person like Kalam has the right perspective and expectations (besides being a good manager),
2) The problem lies within the corrupt Indian and so are most vendors (perhaps egged by Indians), AND, most important of all IMHO,
3) Seeming Russian fondness for India - including why we got the Akula - IS corruption. I bet the T-90 is ALSO a product of corruption. Smerch. FGFA. Arihant. ................................ As I have said a few times, Russians do not do things for India because they love India. Now we know why - corruption.

Thanks for posting that article. To get rid of imports (NOT reduce imports) all India/Indians have to do is get rid of corruption.

THE horror of it all comes to the forefront when one thinks of all the Heads of ALL services OVER the years have been witnesses to this. : (

anjan · Post by **anjan** » 09 Aug 2013 23:39

Arun Menon wrote:^This guy can call others names, but when called out to be liar, he goes berserk. He insists on peddling old data as current and quoting Indian politicians, who are at best misinformed and at worst corrupt (or representing something grossly corrupt like the UPA). His menagerie of quotes come from various vested interests, foreigners and military fanboys (including generals). Yet, he cannot take Dr. Saraswat for his word. This cherry picking and selective amnesia is symptomatic of a disease afflicting much of our senior military establishment. A visceral hatred of DRDO and scorn/contempt for indigenous efforts (how dare these SDREs thwart me from getting my foreign toys!!!). Once in a while he is forced to make favorable statements, but he never forgets to mention supposed Russian contributions, whether it has anything to do with the subject at hand or not. After all this, THIS GUY is playing the VICTIM? Some people have thick skin indeed.

This is awesome. It is satire, isn't it? Otherwise this entire spiel about cherry picking data while going on to list the gamut of people you won't listen to (turns out that's a large part of the government, military, media, and legislature) while treating 1 man's word as factual truth is just... sad. BTW this isn't even a commentary on your position. Just the standard of debate on this subject.

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 10 Aug 2013 00:03

^There are lots of corrupt and vain people as well as vested interests in "large parts of the government, military, media, and legislature." So, peppering anyone with a host of quotes from "large parts of the government, military, media, and legislature" is hardly a measure of their veracity or validity. We all chose whom we listen to. The fact that some people listen to "large parts of the government, military, media, and legislature" rather than Dr. Saraswat, who has a sterling record of service to the nation and its progress, reflects on their biases more than anything else. Who are you kidding when you chose the words of AKA over Dr. Saraswat? Maybe you can take a leaf from AKA's book and rationalize lies through verbal contortions. Maybe you are doing it already, albeit woefully ineptly.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 10 Aug 2013 00:21

I've called people names first?! Who is the "liar" now? I have been a victim of personal abuse for a long time and have never descended like my inveterate abusers,habitual offenders, to the level of malodorous liquid waste. And if individuals like AKA,former senior service officers,analysts,thinktanks at home and abroad,the media, all report the same facts,which I've reported/posted,and arrive at similar conclusions,then I'm most glad that I am on the side of intelligence and reason,instead of wallowing in the bog of mental myopia and subjective invective.

I would leave you to ponder about the advice what AKA gave recently this year to the DRDO,the same holds good for those species on BR who imagine that personal attacks at the poster of an unpleasant truth can suffice for a poverty of grey matter,to win their case,"perform or perish".

PS: NR,I agree with some of what you have said and I've also said it before if you have studied my multifarious posts in detail.

I repeat,The govts. attitude towards indigenisation is often bogus.I posted how the amount to promote desi wares was reduced from 89 crores to just one crore in this year's budget.The politico-babu nexus ensures that imports are made,that the DPSUs also have a very high imported content, and pass off the same as being entirely indigenous.Once again Gen Choudhury:

former chief of army staff, General (Retd) Shankar Roy Choudhury. "Government policy does not allow the private sector to come up. It does not allow export of weapons made in India. We have a network of state-owned defence production companies and ordnance factories. They have failed to produce anything new. It is the vested interest of the bureaucracy that is perpetuating this system," he added.

Here is another quote for those who mistakenly accuse me of being an agent for mother R. If one imagines that FMS deals are sacrosant,think again.There are several examples of kickbacks involving western manufacturers and govts. from single vendors.

Trade experts privately say Indian middlemen in Moscow sales get 10 to 15% of the contract and 5%, curiously, has to be paid to the Russian government.

However,it is an inescapable fact that Russia has provided us with high-tech weaponry that the west/US has never offered us like nuclear sub-tech for the ATV,Akulas,Brahmos,a carrier,Sukhois,etc.yes,they've come at a price,but compare them with rival wares and their performance. Look at the entire relationship holistically with the USSR/Russia in comparison with that of the US.It is slowly dawning upon the US that it also has to up the ante to compete with Russia,Israel and Europe.

There is a table/stats I didn't post (from a parliament doc) showing the major time delays and huge cost escalation in our key defence projects.The reasons for this are manifold,as we've been debating it for ages (poor management,low tech base,lack of trust from the services,govt. apathy,etc.). But these delays allow the services to demand imports to keep us fighting fit, ready for any crisis that might erupt suddenly.Who can blame them for DPSU incompetence or deliberate design?

The Q then arises,can we totally ban almost all major imports to encourage/promote desi efforts? Can we succeed? The answer is look at China. Ostracised by the world,unable to acquire modern def. eqpt.,barring some second level stuff from the Soviets.For decades their armed forces were a laughing stock.Along came Deng,who opened up the country and then they begged,borrowed,bought and stole..a lot,mainly from the west.They have now made considerable progress.We like China will never be able to succeed independently unless JVs are established for core tech which we do not have or cannot develop in time,as the speed with which tech changes demands acquiring tech from abroad.We thus have a slew of projects with Russia,Israel and Europe and are looking at the US too for "joint production". The list of what we've developed is indeed impressive,but the list of what we've failed to achieve is also depressing and the list of what we need to achieve in the future is going to be extremely challenging. Mere importing components from abroad-by a DPSU as posted ,and assembling them does not make the item indigenous.The new MOD assessment/evaluation is going to make it hard for some DPSUs to meet indigenisation targets.

I do not know if you remember a post of mine about a year ago.A fauji told me a tale where allegedly a DPSU funded well to develop an item,said it couldn't be done,when they had actually perfected it,and advised an import.The "import" was the very same item which they had developed and had passed on the same to a friang manufacturer who sold our very own tech/item back to us at an exorbitant price!

Now if the politicos,babus and DPSUs all play the same game,while the services whose views generally come last in the pecking order,are indifferent,there is little hope that the ambitious new figure of "75%" indigenisation that the new DRDO chief wants will ever be achieved,unless those at the top are genuine about it and apply the right leadership and pressure from the top down and demand desi accountability as the rest of the world does.

So ultimately,when the bean counting is done,will it still be a case of "plus ca change...?"

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 10 Aug 2013 01:01

Philip wrote:I've called people names first?! Who is the "liar" now? I have been a victim of personal abuse for a long time and have never descended like my inveterate abusers,habitual offenders, to the level of malodorous liquid waste. And if individuals like AKA,former senior service officers,analysts,thinktanks at home and abroad,the media, all report the same facts,which I've reported/posted,and arrive at similar conclusions,then I'm most glad that I am on the side of intelligence and reason,instead of wallowing in the bog of mental myopia and subjective invective.

Wow, if that isn't a case of verbal diarrhea, I don't know what is. From defending your previous misinformation about the 70/30 equation, you have gone on to rant about the corrupt DPSU-politco-Russian nexus. While you do this you may want to hope that we forget your fanboyish excitement about everything Russian and slavish gratitude for their hallowed old-time assistance, such things are hardly easy to forget. Particularly when every other news item is accompanied by one of your posts extolling some or the other Russian product, berating SDRE Indians for not making such TFTA miracles and reminding us about our debt of gratitude that we owe the Russians for whatever they supposedly did for us in the past. When you pull of these tricks all the time, people will start to notice. So, please cut back on the BS.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 10 Aug 2013 07:55

AM,With your head stuffed with your own "BS" how can one expect you to see or think with intelligence? You cannot discern objective analysis from your partisan and subjective personal rantings and ravings,the product of a diseased mind.As for 70/30,the overwhelming stats have been time and time again mentioned by the DM himself,and a host of other individuals whose track record of serving in the armed forces or as being part of well-known defence thinktanks and the media too are misinformed or are all "liars"! If you cannot disagree with civility,keep silent.

The armed forces have for decades used Russian eqpt. to good use.If they were crap,as some crappy juvenile posters seem fit to imagine,why are we still buying them in large qtys? I've always said "horses for courses".If we have to buy from abroad,we need to choose the right system that fits the bill.If we are developing/buying Brahmos,MI-17s,FGFA,SU-30s,T-90s,frigates,Akulas,etc.,I have more confidence in the armed forces and their chiefs' intelligent decisions in acquisitions than simply abusing them,insulting them,slandering them as corrupt some are disgracefully doing on BR.Corruption exists in defence acquisitions and one would be naive to think that it is confined to just a few nations or manufacturers as the AW scam has shown,but as many have pointed out,this is the grey area where the MOD/babudom negotiate and finalise costs,prices,etc and the final decision is made by the political bosses.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 10 Aug 2013 09:34

what is the reason for this long argument on the LCH thread?
its best suited for the indian defence R&D thread imo.

Sagar G · Post by **Sagar G** » 10 Aug 2013 10:19

^^^ Actually this wouldn't have started if Philip wouldn't have posted his usual BS and I wouldn't have questioned it. If you want to take a look at what happened go to pg. 75 and follow the ensuing exchange. But like a dog's tail some people never learn the said person is still continuing with his usual unrelated BS trying to force his point down other's throat even when it has been shown that he is completely wrong and clueless (well that's not any surprise) and whoever refuses to buy his BS is being called names and his intelligence being questioned. I know it's all ironic but that's what Philip is isn't it