CT & COIN Operations in India: News, Images and Discussion

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 16 Nov 2010 00:54

Hey guys.. sorry, Ive been really busy of late, so havent been responding in time.

1. IG SFF is usually IPS. but not always. The first few were former army officers.

2. No, there is no direct translation of military service the civil side anymore. Ended with the Janata govt of the 70s. The logic is that armed forces need officers, and cannot spare them for other services. (Civilian Logic). Prior to this, armed forces officers joined the civil services with their seniority protected, and entered the IFAS, or the IAS and IPS, uptil the mid 1970s. Among other EC/SSC civil service officers, we had EN Rammohan, G Parthasarthy (Former foreign sec), and Shekhar Dutt, Sena Medal, (Former Def Sec, and current gov of chattisgarh). These are just a few of the many!

3. Armed forces officers still enter R&AW etc with full seniority protected.

Best,
ASP

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 16 Nov 2010 19:36

Actually, just checked for IG SFF online, and according to open sources, IG SFF was an Army officer as recently as August 2008.

Airavat · Post by **Airavat** » 29 Nov 2010 07:49

Hizbul terrorists killed in Doda cave

DIG Doda-Ramban range Manish Kumar Sinha told the Excelsior that a police party identified hideout of the militants in a very long natural cave surrounded by the forests at Kalamul on outskirts of village Morha Budi under the jurisdiction of Gandoh police station. Police party in the operation was led by Head Constable Sanjeet Singh, Incharge Operations Group and was supervised by SSP Doda Prabhat Singh. Troops of 26 Rashtriya Rifles joined the operation and a first contact with the militants was established at 10 am today.

Mr Sinha said one of the militants was killed at 4 pm while his associate was gunned down around 6 pm. He added that police parties had to engage militants in the gunbattle for quite a long time before eliminating them in view of deep curves inside the hideout. Recoveries made from their possession included one LMG, one pistol, magazines and rounds of both the weapons, a mobile telephone which the ultras had damaged before being killed and currency notes which they had torn inside the hideout.

Airavat · Post by **Airavat** » 30 Nov 2010 11:56

Dhoni's morale boosting visit with the Jharkhand Jaguars

Indian skipper Mahendra Singh Dhoni, known for avoiding media queries and controversies, opened up before armed personnel of Jharkhand Jaguar, a special force of the state police raised to tackle armed rebels and insurgency. "I would be with you and answer all your questions till you are satisfied," was the opening remark of Dhoni, who admitted that he had always been attracted by the Jaguar personnel every time he used to pass by them on his way to cricket stadium. "I always wanted to sit together and talk to you all at length," he said. Mahi praised the commitment, dedication and bravery of the police personnel. (PTI photo)

Vril · Post by **Vril** » 08 Dec 2010 13:51

Army officer injured in Kashmir encounter dies

An army captain, who was injured in an encounter with militants in Sopore town of Baramulla district, succumbed to injuries on Wednesday.

The army officer was injured when militants opened indiscriminate fire on security forces, which had launched an operation in Model Town area of Sopore, 52 kms from Srinagar, on Wednesday.

The captain was shifted to a hospital in Srinagar for treatment where he succumbed to his wounds. The army is yet to identify him.

The encounter is still going on and at least two Lashkar militants are suspected to be hiding in a house in the area.

http://www.rediff.com/news/report/army- ... 101208.htm

Sandipan · Post by **Sandipan** » 15 Dec 2010 19:05

http://telegraphindia.com/1101215/jsp/f ... 302722.jsp

Bhutan attack was betrayal, says Ulfa leader
- 7 years to the day, mama relives Operation all Clear
The women cadres were making pithas for the King of Bhutan while the men were sprucing up the camp to welcome him when the first shots rang out, breaking the morning calm.

The gunshots signalled the launch of Operation All Clear, which, by the time it ended after three days, not only left Ulfa in utter disarray, but, more importantly, dealt a crippling blow to its confidence and the fight for a sovereign Assam. That was on December 15, 2003.

Seven years later and free for the first time since then, Ulfa’s adviser Bhimkanta Buragohain or Mama, a term of endearment and respect, relives those defining moments till his arrest in a conversation with Ripunjoy Das at his ancestral house at Ahomgaon in Dhola of Tinsukia district

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 15 Dec 2010 19:11

Bhutan attack was betrayal, says Ulfa leader
- 7 years to the day, mama relives Operation all Clear
The women cadres were making pithas for the King of Bhutan while the men were sprucing up the camp to welcome him when the first shots rang out, breaking the morning calm.

oh sure and the birds were chirping and all was idyllic like a little village in Gaul

nits · Post by **nits** » 15 Dec 2010 19:30

There is no major News on Maoist operations from some time... is some thing being planned hush hush or i just missed it...

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 16 Dec 2010 03:37

It is a surprising tactic. The fighters would have been alert and ready expecting the king.

Note that it is was RBA attack in this particular case and not by IA. Though I believe in other places our own army was operating.

Sandipan wrote:http://telegraphindia.com/1101215/jsp/f ... 302722.jsp
Bhutan attack was betrayal, says Ulfa leader

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 16 Dec 2010 08:11

Two photographs, scanned from FRONTLINE from 2003 (the issue that wrote about the operaions)

Both show Bhutan Army personnel during the ULFA ops..

rkhanna · Post by **rkhanna** » 16 Dec 2010 18:01

BTW just as an FYI ..recently travelled to Bhutan . The queen has built a memorial for soldiers (called 108 STUPA) who fought the ULFA (and the dead ofcourse) . The Indian Unit named at the memorial is 9 SF

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 17 Dec 2010 03:27

In one of the TV channels talk show one speaker had cited bhutan as one of the (few) cases of our special operations.

In BBC there were reports of ULFA fighters reporting hindi speaking troops attacking them in Bhutan - even before Op All Clear.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 17 Dec 2010 03:46

once again I don't see the need to speculate whether we were there or not.

Officially we were not there.

rkhanna · Post by **rkhanna** » 17 Dec 2010 04:01

but with the memorial the bhutanese have made them official no?

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 17 Dec 2010 04:12

They can - so will the Chinese

BTW did the Bhutanese put a date on the memorial ??

if you a pic email me - you have my id

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 17 Dec 2010 12:10

rkhanna wrote:<SNIP> The Indian Unit named at the memorial is 9 SF

9 SF and 1 SF and Assam/North-East - that does bring back some memories......

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 17 Dec 2010 13:21

I am reading this book written by a Lt Col of Indian Army. It is a good book. Gurus please suggest other books on CT/COIN in India.

http://www.amazon.com/Low-Intensity-Con ... 761933255/

rkhanna · Post by **rkhanna** » 17 Dec 2010 14:17

They can - so will the Chinese

BTW did the Bhutanese put a date on the memorial ??

if you a pic email me - you have my id

I have a picture of the Stupa from outside. No pictures allowed inside (where the plaque is). Its a place of worship so picture taking is a big insult. There was no date on the memorial other than "in memory off ..."

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 21 Dec 2010 10:18

http://www.zeenews.com/news675780.html
Why do they make such news public so quickly
It serves against the cause

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 22 Dec 2010 04:15

Samay wrote:http://www.zeenews.com/news675780.html
Why do they make such news public so quickly
It serves against the cause

It is not news. This cooperation has been ongoing with Myanmar since days of Op Golden Bird.

nits · Post by **nits** » 17 Jan 2011 13:41

Maoists lose leaders in security surge

Though security agencies have been facing major losses on the ground in the fight against the Maoists, the defining development in recent months is the crippling losses the Maoists' central leadership have suffered."What is really crucial is that their brains trust has been severely depleted. The situation at the senior level is really bad," said a senior intelligence official, who did not want to be named in this report.

In 2004, the Communist Party of India-Maoists Central Committee had 38 members, its Politburo had 13, and the Central Military Commission had 10. The figures in 2007 were 34, 14, 9. But in the last three years, the security forces have landed crippling blows to the Maoists, with 15 Central Committee members having either been arrested or killed. Two died natural deaths.

Towards the end of 2010, the party's senior leadership looks alarmingly depleted: 25 Central Committee members, 9 Politburo, and 8 in the CMC. On December 4, a West Bengal police team arrested another Central Committee member, Kanchan. This ties up with the home ministry agenda to target the top Maoist leadership.

nits · Post by **nits** » 24 Jan 2011 13:20

A new breed of fighters against Naxals

Security forces deployed for anti-Naxal operations will soon be assisted by a specialised breed of imported Belgian shepherd dogs in 'infantry patrols' and also to provide pre-ambush warning to the troops.

Almost seven such "Malinois" breed dogs have been trained by the premier police dog training centre of the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) at their academy near Chandigarh for about 22 weeks.

This is the first time that police and central security forces will be using canines in operations in the Naxal hotbeds of the country, a practice in line with the Israeli defence forces

Nihat · Post by **Nihat** » 28 Jan 2011 13:08

Nine Maoists killed in Jharkhand encounter

I'm delighted that Security forces appear to be turning the corner and inflicting proportionate casualties on these terrorists. This is perhaps the first step to crushing the insurgency and hopefully is followed by a comprehensive grip on Naxals in terms of cardre losses which forces them into a corner and towards talks. Something like what happened with ULFA.

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 22 Feb 2011 19:00

Nihat wrote:Nine Maoists killed in Jharkhand encounter

I'm delighted that Security forces appear to be turning the corner and inflicting proportionate casualties on these terrorists. This is perhaps the first step to crushing the insurgency and hopefully is followed by a comprehensive grip on Naxals in terms of cardre losses which forces them into a corner and towards talks. Something like what happened with ULFA.

Good move, perhaps, new CRPF chief has got some thing to do with this positive change ?

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 23 Feb 2011 13:17

The real reason why we'll be still vulnerable to 2008 type terror strikes in the near future, that no rifle or aircraft or gizmo can compensate for -
http://mumbaimirror.com/printarticle.as ... e&subsite=
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city ... 263817.cms

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 23 Feb 2011 14:43

tsarkar wrote:The real reason why we'll be still vulnerable to 2008 type terror strikes in the near future, that no rifle or aircraft or gizmo can compensate for -
http://mumbaimirror.com/printarticle.as ... e&subsite=
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city ... 263817.cms

Mumbai already has a 250 man NSG detachment on call. No point in duplicating their structure unless Force One is intended for Tier-II cities or anti-Naxal operations.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 23 Feb 2011 15:28

Viv S wrote:Mumbai already has a 250 man NSG detachment on call. No point in duplicating their structure unless Force One is intended for Tier-II cities or anti-Naxal operations.

The pool of operators from which NSG draws its resources is already stretched thin. Plus NSG operators in Mumbai are on deputation. Very few speak local language and are accustomed to local topography & peculiarities.

Most importantly, by such attacks, a major Pakistani objective of dispersing scarce Indian resources is achieved. To conserve existing resources, and thwart such objective, a local force frees national forces like NSG to conserve & concentrate their energies for larger tasks.

A local force using local intelligence is always a better bet for local actions, which is why the British raised Frontier Force or Assam Rifles rather than having a 250 man British detachment on call.

Once local forces mature, they can release well trained resources for national tasks, reducing the need for NSG to draw operators from the Army.

Since the city and its leadership, and citizens like you have formed their opinion that outsourcing security to NSG will suffice, and there is no need to volunteer or rigourously train, then the writing on the wall is clear. We suddenly cant buy a Colt M4 and expect the constable to be proficient. If the city had competent and well trained constables, even the 2A1 7.62 mm rifle would have shown effective results.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 23 Feb 2011 15:43

^^ Yeah I do agree we need a local force with local intelligence that can deal at very short notice and neutralise the threat or hold its own till such time NSG or other Special Forces can join it or should feel the need to join in. There is no alternative to Mumbai having its own special anti-terror forces which is well trained and well equipped and have their own intelligence unit or well meshed up with CID and National Anti-Terror intelligence.

Knowing Mumbai city i can say the next terror threat is round the corner and if we havent learnt from 26/11 then we will never learn from any thing else.

If you see the terror attacks in Mumbai and pattern it out , there is always a major strike every 5 years or so ,its a well established pattern right from 92 Blast , Mumbai has seen esclating and well planned attacks and ISI/terrorist managed to outbeat the Indian Intel Agency every time all the time.

If past is any thing to go by , I am fairly certain our neighbour will plan and beat Indian Intel next time as well , but having a local terror force will just reduce the civilian casualty on our side.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 23 Feb 2011 16:59

tsarkar wrote:
Viv S wrote:Mumbai already has a 250 man NSG detachment on call. No point in duplicating their structure unless Force One is intended for Tier-II cities or anti-Naxal operations.
The pool of operators from which NSG draws its resources is already stretched thin. Plus NSG operators in Mumbai are on deputation. Very few speak local language and are accustomed to local topography & peculiarities.

Most importantly, by such attacks, a major Pakistani objective of dispersing scarce Indian resources is achieved. To conserve existing resources, and thwart such objective, a local force frees national forces like NSG to conserve & concentrate their energies for larger tasks.

A local force using local intelligence is always a better bet for local actions, which is why the British raised Frontier Force or Assam Rifles rather than having a 250 man British detachment on call.

Once local forces mature, they can release well trained resources for national tasks, reducing the need for NSG to draw operators from the Army.

Depends on the objective of the force. If policing action is the priority, then yes you need a local force. But, if the force is specifically for CT/HR operations, then there isn't much point in having two of them for the exact same task. There's no parallel to the Assam Rifles or Ladakh Scouts to be made here. Also, seeing as manpower is an issue, the NSG ought to be using operators sourced from police organisations more efficiently instead of relying solely on the SAG for all aggressive actions.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 23 Feb 2011 18:47

tsarkar wrote:The real reason why we'll be still vulnerable to 2008 type terror strikes in the near future, that no rifle or aircraft or gizmo can compensate for -
http://mumbaimirror.com/printarticle.as ... e&subsite=
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city ... 263817.cms

If that's the general attitude towards training, then more modern weapons are actually a danger to themselves and the public. How much of this goes into the Islamists' calculation for launching attacks, I don't know... but it should be a serious cause for rethinking the Indian security mechanism now that the knee-jerk reactions have subsided.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 23 Feb 2011 18:51

Viv S wrote:But, if the force is specifically for CT/HR operations, then there isn't much point in having two of them for the exact same task.

How will a non-local Counter Terrorism/Hostage Rescue team perform when they dont know the lay of the land, nor have any local intelligence assets, not speak the local language nor aware of any local social/cultural/political nuances? Lets see some examples -

Hostage Rescue - How effective were British SAS while rescuing their citizens kidnapped in Kashmir? Zero
Counter Terrorism - How effective were US Special Forces at Takar Gur? Zero. They were not acclimatized because they were helidropped, and were panting for breath.
Did they know the lay of the land? No
Did either have local intelligence? No
Did they speak the local language? No
Were they aware of local terrorist modus opprandi? No
What supplies did the terrorists build up? No
What entry/egress routes did the terrorists take? No
Could they monitor/ambush those routes? No
Who are their local sympathizers? No
Could they neutralize local sympathizers without affecting civilians? No
Did thermal imagers pick up cold HMG/Mortars or Taliban insulated in caves? No

Local units can cover all these lacunae. You need to stop thinking of CT/HR as helidropping and door breaking. A whole lot of homework requires to be done in advance for successful CT/HR. A stitch in time saves nine.

Viv S wrote:Also, seeing as manpower is an issue, the NSG ought to be using operators sourced from police organisations more efficiently instead of relying solely on the SAG for all aggressive actions.

How will NSG use operators sourced from police when those policemen cannot shoot? Should rifle firing be taught after they're inducted at NSG?

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 23 Feb 2011 19:44

tsarkar wrote:
Viv S wrote:But, if the force is specifically for CT/HR operations, then there isn't much point in having two of them for the exact same task.
How will a non-local Counter Terrorism/Hostage Rescue team perform when they dont know the lay of the land, nor have any local intelligence assets, not speak the local language nor aware of any local social/cultural/political nuances?

Then there would be no rationale behind deploying the NSG or any similar federal CT team in the world since those drawbacks are universal.

Hostage Rescue - How effective were British SAS while rescuing their citizens kidnapped in Kashmir? Zero
Counter Terrorism - How effective were US Special Forces at Takar Gur? Zero. They were not acclimatized because they were helidropped, and were panting for breath.
.
.
.
Who are their local sympathizers? No
Could they neutralize local sympathizers without affecting civilians? No
Did thermal imagers pick up cold HMG/Mortars or Taliban insulated in caves? No

I think we need a little clarity here. Are we talking about counter insurgency operations in rural areas or counter terrorism operations in urban/sub-urban areas? Are we thinking about a force like the Greyhounds, ideally suited for local COIN operations but lacking the NSG's proficiency at CQB/CT/HR type operations, or something along the lines of a city SWAT team? In the event of another Mumbai like incident happening or say... the ATS needing some backup in a dangerous situation, there's little that Force One can do that the NSG can't.

Local units can cover all these lacunae. You need to stop thinking of CT/HR as helidropping and door breaking. A whole lot of homework requires to be done in advance for successful CT/HR. A stitch in time saves nine.

I don't think you're being fair to the NSG. It does train for a lot more than just helidropping and door breaking.

Viv S wrote:Also, seeing as manpower is an issue, the NSG ought to be using operators sourced from police organisations more efficiently instead of relying solely on the SAG for all aggressive actions.
How will NSG use operators sourced from police when those policemen cannot shoot? Should rifle firing be taught after they're inducted at NSG?

Seeing as the NSG recruits its SRG cadre from paramilitary forces like the BSF and CRPF in addition to state police forces, I'd say the calibre of the average constable in its recruitment pool is a good deal better than Force One's, which unless I'm mistaken recruits solely from the Mumbai and Maharashtra Police.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 23 Feb 2011 20:14

NSG brings training, experience & other hard skills, however soft skills like intel, understanding lay of land and liaising with local populace are always provided by local police and IB. If we built in training & hard skills into these local forces, we dont need NSG in the first place.

But you still dont get the big picture, do you?

Because of NSG operators training and experience, it should be the last line of defence and not first or only line as suggested by you. Mumbai Police ATS/Crime Branch is the first line, that doesn’t train. Force 1 is the next line that has an officer crunch. Stationing NSG in Mumbai & other cities makes it the first line/last line/only line of defence, and no other cards remaining.

NSG is the trump card. In an ideal situation, it shouldn’t be dealt. Ideally Mumbai Police ATS/Crime Branch/Force 1 officers/constables who perform should move up NSG.

Pakistan picks up dregs off its streets and look at the cost we paid man-to-man. And even worse, we’re forced to divert precious resources and personnel defending the hinterland. This is the real Pakistani objective – diverting resources and attention. Every Army Officer deputed to NSG in Mumbai or Chennai is one less in Kashmir or Kutch. So during their next Kargil type adventure will face IA battalions with depleted officer strength.

An effective Mumbai Police / Force 1 would counter this strategy. Not just Mumbai, every part of India.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 24 Feb 2011 06:15

^^^+1..There is no alternative to a local police SWAT team for first line of defence in CT/HR situations..The problem with this NSG solution is 3 folds:

1. Manpower - its not just a case of "stretching thin"...Its also a case of maintaining the "elitism" of the unit...FBI HRT for example, AFAIK has operators in low 3 digit numbers. ..An "elite unit" of 2000 cannot maintain their cutting edge if their numbers are required to beefed up to 7000 in quick time..

2. Infrastructure - a "pradropped" force (metaphorically speaking) like NSG creating its own grounds up infrastructure in 6-7 different locations is enormously wasteful and difficult - e are seeing that in WB already...Using the local police infra to set up a local force is faster and more efficient..

3. Local knowledge - tsarkar obvioulsy knows more than many..But in India, where city plans, building plans, maps of various localities are notoriously diffiult to come by, having local boys would be the difference between learning on the job in a situation and knowing the "beat", literally speaking..In 26/11, plans of even the Taj were not available on tap...And Chabad House? I would be willing to bet a very large amount that half of mumbai hadnt even heard of a place like that before 26/11..A force whose members are from the city, have grown up there and live there permamnently will be more suitable than a deputationist force like the NSG..

My 2 pence idea - the central govt should sponsor a JNNURM-type programme for upgrading local police forces...So Centre pays 60-70% of the costs, the state govt pays the balance, and central disbursal is outcome-driven (rather than outlay-driven)...I think something is there, but only for insurgency-afected areas..

And it shouldnt be too difficult - states like Andhra, TN, Punjab, Delhi already have fairly well trained "special" forces - to create SWAT team out of them shouldnt be too difficult..

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 24 Feb 2011 06:28

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 24 Feb 2011 10:21

tsarkar wrote:NSG brings training, experience & other hard skills, however soft skills like intel, understanding lay of land and liaising with local populace are always provided by local police and IB. If we built in training & hard skills into these local forces, we dont need NSG in the first place.

But you still dont get the big picture, do you?

Because of NSG operators training and experience, it should be the last line of defence and not first or only line as suggested by you. Mumbai Police ATS/Crime Branch is the first line, that doesn’t train. Force 1 is the next line that has an officer crunch. Stationing NSG in Mumbai & other cities makes it the first line/last line/only line of defence, and no other cards remaining.

The ATS and Crime Branch will always be the first line of defence. Its not being suggested that the NSG take over those duties.

NSG is the trump card. In an ideal situation, it shouldn’t be dealt. Ideally Mumbai Police ATS/Crime Branch/Force 1 officers/constables who perform should move up NSG.

Pakistan picks up dregs off its streets and look at the cost we paid man-to-man. And even worse, we’re forced to divert precious resources and personnel defending the hinterland. This is the real Pakistani objective – diverting resources and attention. Every Army Officer deputed to NSG in Mumbai or Chennai is one less in Kashmir or Kutch. So during their next Kargil type adventure will face IA battalions with depleted officer strength.

That's where you have me wrong. I never thought the NSG's manpower expansion or setting up its hubs all over the country side was a good move. But since the infrastructure has been put in place and appears to be a permanent arrangement, one of the two forces will be redundant in time of a crisis. Instead of the NSG's SAG detachment or Force One, an SRG unit with perhaps a greater proportion of recruits sourced from the Maharashtra and Police Forces would be a better bet. And yes aliasing with local authorities is a must - something I'm betting the NSG isn't ignoring right now.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 24 Feb 2011 10:39

somnath wrote:^^^+1..There is no alternative to a local police SWAT team for first line of defence in CT/HR situations..The problem with this NSG solution is 3 folds:

1. Manpower - its not just a case of "stretching thin"...Its also a case of maintaining the "elitism" of the unit...FBI HRT for example, AFAIK has operators in low 3 digit numbers. ..An "elite unit" of 2000 cannot maintain their cutting edge if their numbers are required to beefed up to 7000 in quick time..

Ideally speaking, the NSG was never required to be raised. The army's special forces (or a JSOC-type organisation in the future) had the wherewithal to create a world-class CT force permanently on call for all contingencies. Something on the lines of the SAS's Counter Revolutionary Warfare wing. But seeing as the NSG already has already well established and already has extensive training infrastructure, and recruits from all state police forces, it needs to be the nodal agency for all CT training nationwide.

Marut · Post by **Marut** » 24 Feb 2011 11:51

Viv S wrote: Ideally speaking, the NSG was never required to be raised. The army's special forces (or a JSOC-type organisation in the future) had the wherewithal to create a world-class CT force permanently on call for all contingencies. Something on the lines of the SAS's Counter Revolutionary Warfare wing. But seeing as the NSG already has already well established and already has extensive training infrastructure, and recruits from all state police forces, it needs to be the nodal agency for all CT training nationwide.

The NSG was specifically raised to not have the regular SF tackle such domestic contigencies. The impetus for NSG was Op Bluestar in 1984, where the use of army special forces escalated the situation in the eyes of the people. The fact that the military is used for domestic law & order situation has a big impact on general populace. Also training & tactics required for urban HR/CT ops are quite different from the regular SF doctrine. Thus the NSG, which comes under the MHA, is a very wise move. Having the NSG staffed by army chaps with SF background alongside paramil & police personnel was a very good move. However the plot was lost when the NSG was deployed for VVIP security. Once that happened, the primary objective of the NSG got diluted and its resources stretched to the limits on non-core tasks.

Of late though after 26/11, they have recused themselves from some of the inane tasks which are sufficiently handled by other forces. NSG was always meant to be a last line of defence force, but depending on situation they may be the first/main response agency viz hijacking, etc. The central govt had encouraged the states to depute personnel to NSG and then used them as a nucleus to form their own special police teams for tackling local incidents. Hardly any were proactive about this, except for AP & TN (These are the ones I know of, there may have been others too). Most states wanted the NSG to do the work of local police, who were rather lazy to get of their bums. Prime example is Karnataka, where the NSG was used for combing operations for Veerappan! The NSG, very rightly, walked of the operation since they are not geared for such ops and it's not part of their SOP resulting in underutilization of resources.

States such as AP & TN realised the advantages of having a crack police force to do some heavy lifting and raised their own commando force. The TNCF and Greyhounds have been nurtured well by NSG trained local officers and they regulary exercise with the NSG to keep themselves updated. The success of TNCF & Greyhounds also illustrates the points being belaboured by tsarkar, Austin, et al. that only a local force can tackle/contain the imminent threat due to terrorists/hostiles. No operation can be successful without local intelligence and backup as seen from the Veerappan operation by TNCF or the anti-Naxal ops by Greyhounds, all of which had immense intelligence gathering and preparation before the final climax.

Coming to Mumbai's woes, I had posted about the farce of F1 earlier - Click here

F1 cannot grow until it is made to apply for entire Maharashtra and given a place above the Mumbai police in terms of chain of command/heirarchy. Else it is going to be a still born which will die in due course. Also the proliferation of many units viz. ATS, Crime Branch, Special Branch, QRT and now F1 along with its turf battles has fubar'ed the situation. Anyone remember the Mumbai Police commandos raised a decade ago by MN Singh and trained by Col. MP Choudhury. The force was disbanded within 2-3 years.

TNCF and Greyhounds have a clear mandate and are free of any turf battles as well as political interferences to a maximum extent. In a sense these forces offer refuge to folks who want to go about policing without getting into the corruption. TN & AP police are as corrupt as the next state but realized that having a effective sword arm staffed with motivated people keeps the public at large happy about the law & order situation, which allows the regular force to go about their 'business'

Mumbai needs a similar detente to be arrived at before we can think of an effective local SWAT team. In other words, Mumbai is well and truly naked when (not if) the next terrorist attack takes place.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 24 Feb 2011 12:06

Viv S wrote:Something on the lines of the SAS's Counter Revolutionary Warfare wing.

Unlike popular perception, the SAS CRW wing's main role is not really CT in HRT context though it was originally raised for that function and continues to service the rotations of each team through it for CT/HRT duty. As an aside, it is quite funny that SAS admirers love to cling fondly to the memories of the Iranian embassy siege which happened over 2 decades ago and comparatively was not really an extraordinary operation by any means.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 24 Feb 2011 12:14

Marut wrote: The NSG was specifically raised to not have the regular SF tackle such domestic contigencies. The impetus for NSG was Op Bluestar in 1984, where the use of army special forces escalated the situation in the eyes of the people.

Actually that is incorrect. NSG was primarily formed because both SFF and 1 Para Cdo proved to have inadequate skills in CQB and hostage rescue during the operation.

Marut wrote: Prime example is Karnataka, where the NSG was used for combing operations for Veerappan! The NSG, very rightly, walked of the operation since they are not geared for such ops and it's not part of their SOP resulting in underutilization of resources.

One of the books on Veerappan has some B&W pics of NSG commandos in mufti (well, lungi) during their hunt for Veerappan. The NSG contingent was commanded by Brig. Raj Sitapathy who immediately after that walk out also led the Akshardham operation where Hav. Suresh Yadav was KIA and later Surjan Singh Bhandari DOW.