Op Shakti : 13 years on

[Rahul M]

tribute to the day that changed India and to the people who made it happen !

13 years is a decently long time to gain a hindsight, so what does this vision tell us ?

# have we been able to achieve what we wanted to by those tests ?
# what were our objectives in the first place ?
# if we get the chance to do it again, would we do something different ? IOW, what could have been done better ?
# is India a safer place post 11th May 1998 ? (I guess it is a little too early to ask that question)

and on a personal note, what were your, i.e individual BRFite's reaction to op shakti ? I understand many of us were not forum members at the time. indeed many of us discovered BR in the post P-II days. what is your story ?

[RamaY]

My feelings : Achievement of a key milestone, pride and humility (there much to be achieved)

Benefits: NSG waiver, overt funding for nuke-triod, Overt sense of power to GoI while dealing with big5, disproving Guns vs Butter nonsense by positively coming out of sanctions regime.

Indirect benefits: World recognition of Paki perfidy, bust of AQK network (no need for it and scapegoting), shit on NPA faces.

Short comings: timidity w.r.t goals especially on Thermo Nukes, submission of UPA govt on nuke preparedness (atleast on the face) when it is not needed or demanded.

[Nandu]

RamaY, I don't see how Op Shakti was a factor in the creation or bust of Paki nuke peddling network (I don't want to maintain the fiction that it was a one man rogue op by calling it the AQK network).

[RamaY]

My hunch

After TSP's overt nuke tests the intricate nuke-proliferation network that enabled Paki-tests had to be destroyed...

[Airavat]

May 11 celebrated as National Technology Day after success of Op Shakti

[merlin]

# have we been able to achieve what we wanted to by those tests ?

Big NO from the technical perspective. I'm one who believes that we should have continued the series of tests after suitable time to analyse the data from the first round. Test until perfection and acceptability to people who will deliver the flowers. From the strategic side we have achieved objectives to a certain extent. No one can now say that we are a non-nuclear weapon state. We have created more strategic space for us as a country but have not managed to drive forward on this front as much as I would have liked.

# what were our objectives in the first place ?

I feel they were more strategic in nature. Arrive on the world stage as a nuclear weapon power with a bang. Unambiguously. From a technical perspective I feel that the first round was to collect data from different configurations tested. For complete weaponisable configurations more testing would have been required but have obviously not been planned for.

# if we get the chance to do it again, would we do something different ? IOW, what could have been done better ?

A more complete planned series of tests. A better strategy to capitalize on the post testing scenario.

# is India a safer place post 11th May 1998 ? (I guess it is a little too early to ask that question)

That's arguable but I feel its safer if only by a little bit.

[Rahul M]

agree with you on most counts. OTOH, so few responses about arguably the most important day of our history in the last 20-25 years while a dozen or so pakistan threads fill up in double quick time. I wonder what the piskological implication of that.

[negi]

^ Will post my rant sometime over the weekend.

[Klaus]

13 years on, there is still the hope that India will be able to finish what we started off (in a way with buddha) and come full circle with our capability. What was most remarkable was the ability of all those personnel to keep it a secret until the moment had passed and the tests were successful.

[Christopher Sidor]

According to a what a major scientist had said post Pokhran-II, India has now the ability to manufacture bombs upto 220 kt capability. The problem was India had never done 1 Mega Tonne capacity test. So our proven designs are not of much use beyond a certain threshold.
Further doubts were raised about our thermonuclear weapon capability, saying that the five test bombs were very small in intensity. But just like BMD capability can double up as ASAT capability, it is difficult to give credence to such claims.

Just like Pokhran-I we buckled under and did only 5 tests in Pokhran-II. Instead of going for a full series of 15-20 tests, which would include tactical and strategic warheads designs as well as plutonium, uranium and boosted-design warheads we undertook a so called "voluntary moratorium." This we did inspite of China testing more nuclear weapons than India combined, which included a one mega-ton bomb test when Indian president was in China.

So did India achieve much? We did validate our warhead designs to a certain point. Other than that we did not gain much. Was this test necessary yes, to validate our warheads it was important. But what galls me is that we undertook to stop testing, this so called "voluntary moratorium".

Did we achieve anything strategic, off course not we did not. Pakistan tested, one test more than ours, China continued to carry on its own merry way.
Did we deter China and Pakistan? No. Pakistan soon after Pokhran carried out the Kargil adventure. We threw then out of kargil at great human cost to our IA, but we did not cross the Durand line. This proved to Pakistan the utility of its nukes and utter futility of Indian nukes, as a repeat of 1965 was prevented. Pakistan till this date supports and abets terrorism targeted against India. China continues to target its weapons against India. It has now started, indirectly supporting terrorist in our North-East. It still supports Pakistan with nuclear technology, weapons, etc.
Did any country in the world recognize us as a nuclear weapons power? NO

On the balance our lack of any strategic gains does not negate the importance of Pokhran-II. These tests were necessary. But let us not delude ourselves these tests were just that validation of indian weapon designs. Nothing more. An important and crucial milestone.

[Lalmohan]

ideally i would like to wish nuclear weapons away... but since i can't, i have to accept that they are a reality of life. i believe that op shakti achieved its strategic goals, even if the technical ones remain open. The fall-out was always going to be pakistan - but they have been forced to show their hand. everyone knows (but will not as yet acknowledge) the chinese role and the western complicity. we remain shackled by the cold war frameworks of the americans w.r.t. nukes and the balance of power and the alignment of states... that said the americans (as the only superpower) are gradually waking up, and soon they will adapt to a post soviet world and there will be a rebalancing of power around the world. i still believe that our weapons are china centric, and must remain so. pakistan will soon cease to exist (one way or another) and is only a secondary consideration in the strategic calculus

[Marut]

Political & strategic developments:

1. Op Shakti put us on the world map as a confirmed nuclear power. The tests were not peaceful nuclear explosions to assist in mining operations

2. It forced Pak to follow suit and exposed their Chinese takeout maal. This forced a relook at the nuke walmart being run by Paki with AQK as figurehead and them being taken out of circulation.

3. It enabled the engagement of India by US towards accommodation in the NWS matrix.

4. The culmination of this engagement was the IUCNA and other similar agreements with US, France, Russia etc.

Technical developments:

5. The technical competency required for nuke weapons was proven. Although doubts were raised on the achievement of objectives of Shakti.

6. These doubts have enabled India to keep the door open to cater to future exigencies and also to relieve pressure during negotiations.

7. This ensures India will develop more facilities to further our arsenal and keep them up-to-date.

Military developments:

8. The military now had the benefit of a nuke umbrella to fight under.

9. It challenged them to find out ways to beat conventional wisdom of two nuke powers unable to fight without going nuclear.

10. It forced development of nuke doctrine and consequently putting in place procedures & protocols envisaged in it.

11. It accelerated the development of survivable delivery platforms for the nukes once they need to be used.

Further Steps:

12. Draft Nuclear Doctrine should be finalized and procedures put in place.

13. Our nuke designs have a question mark hanging on them wrt to confirmed yield. Develop new designs and plan a series of tests to confirm their yields unambiguously when a window opens up.

14. Need further focus on nuke delivery platforms. Also have to work/accelerate on ABM capability since our two adversaries do not subscribe to NFU against us.

15. Develop robust capabilities and procedures to prosecute a war under nuke umbrella but within the nuke threshold to achieve our objectives.

Lastly, NPT, CTBT, etc are inconsequential for us. Once we are set with our goals, the world will come to terms with us after some cribbing, grumbling and

The world needs India a bit more than we need them

[saadhak]

I think the primary objective was to test and demonstrate our nuclear capability, thereby firmly establishing a nuclear deterrent in a hostile neighbourhood.
The other objective I can think of was to ensure our nuclear capability is not capped for good by forcing us to enter into NPT/CTBT types of treaties.

I would think to an large extent we have achieved the objectives as related to our basic defensive posture.

By defensive posture I mean we were able to draft a doctrine and respond to the Paki nuclear blackmail (and Chinese?).
Pakis have still been able to bleed us, but I shudder to think how the reaction would have been to grave provocations like Kargil, Parliament attack, 26/11, etc in the absence of an overt nuclear weapons capability.
Similar sentiments as relates to China i.e. an increasingly assertive and stronger China against an India with an unverified nuclear weapons capability.
That is, I would think the reactions to Paki/Chinese threats / aggressive postures/provocations would have more alarming and panicky in the absence of a demonstrated nuclear capability. A perceived weak, docile leadership could have done us much more harm that it can today.

By that logic and convinced that Pakis would be much more aggressive with nuclear blackmail, India is a safer place post Op Shakti.

What we could do better given the chance to do it again:
- Don't commit to NFU - especially for states having nuclear capability. Can't do this in our neighbourhood. Don't spell out first use either - keep 'em guessing. Let them assume the worst if they plan to be the aggressor.
- No self-imposed moratorium on future nuclear tests
- With the benefit of hindsight, test for a wider range of weapon yields.

To summarize after going nuclear:
Are we better off? Yes
Could we have done better? Yes - much better (but that is more a whine about how foreign policy has been managed post-Shakti)

[VikramS]

Christopher Sidor:
I do not think you meant the Durand Line in the above post

[Marut]

^We may now be there and cross it too

[Klaus]

^We may now be there and cross it too

With many more Mr Brandy's as a result for the Pakis to suspect. With the current situation of TSP, it will truly be a well-deserved nightmarish scenario for them!

[shiv]

t
# is India a safer place post 11th May 1998 ? (I guess it is a little too early to ask that question)

Yes. A sudden light bulb lit up in my mind after reading Commodore Uday Bhaskar's article about Nuclear Enabled Terrorism - which was started by Pakistan from 1990. The link with that date (when China tested a Paki nuke) is crucial. It was only after the 1998 tests that Pakistan became brazen, and desperate when Kargil failed.

After that it was a slow unravelling of jihad and spread of nuclear enabled jihadis to other parts of the world - culminating with 9-11 which was a watershed.

[RamaY]

^
Shivji

doesn't it mean India is a safer place after 1998, given that pakis went nuclear as early as 1990s? After 1998, Indian nuke deterrence became a verified and overt force.

[shiv]

^
Shivji

doesn't it mean India is a safer place after 1998, given that pakis went nuclear as early as 1990s? After 1998, Indian nuke deterrence became a verified and overt force.

In fact one could keep on arguing if India is safe at all because of Kaluchak, Parilament attack and 26/11 and a lot of terrorist attacks that took place after 1998. But one way of viewing the issue is as follows.

Pakistan was sitting pretty on its nukes from 1990 conducting continuous terror operations against India. In the 1990-98 period both the US and China knew full well that Pakistan had nukes. The US in particular chose to take the line that the nukes did not matter because Pakistan needed them against India and that the terrorism in Kashmir was " a freedom struggle" against Hindu India.

1998 threw all these presumptions out of gear. It showed to the China and the US in particular that India was willing to come out into the open with nukes and challenge the "world order" (hahahahaha! LOL!) if that was in India's interests. It also forced Pakistan to show its hand and forced the US to apply equal-equal sanctions. The US of course had spent many hypocritical years supporting Pakistan based on presidential lies. According to the version seen abroad the world became a "less safe" place after 1998. The world was a "safe place" as long as Pakistan hid its nukes, had them tested in China and sent terrorists to India. Clearly India was not part of this world. The world became unsafe only after India broke this "order" in the world

After 1998 - I am really not sure why Pakistan went ahead and conducted Kargil. ISI's General Javed Nasir of course had openly assessed that the Indian Army was "tired" from insurgency (that "freedom fight"). Perhaps the sanctions from the US started pinching. Pakistan's ability to fight conventional war with India was going to be eroded further by sanctions post 1998 - so maybe Pakis felt Kargil was a good gamble. The gamble (to repeat for those who do not remember) was as follows:

• India army in Kashmir was thought to be "tired and demoralized"
• Jihadi inflitration in 1965 failed after India responded to Paki army action by opening a second front in Punjab making inroads towards Lahore. because of nukes India would no dare do this in 1999
• Because of the above two reasons - India would lose Siachen from the Kargil action followed by a victory in Kashmir (don't ask me how they figured out the latter)

It turned out that India chose the option of not opening a second front but beating back the rather difficult to beat high altitude positions taken by the Paki army in Kargil. Not opening a second front ensured that india had all its forces available to beat back the occupiers. And all summer to do that. It also put the onus of escalation on Pakistan. If Pakis felt they were being defeated, they would either have to downhill ski or escalate.

Pakistanis chose to downhill ski - but not before unzipping their fly and showing a nuclear pen1s to US satellite photos that got the US to apply pressure on Pakistan to speed up withdrawal. The unveiling of Pakistani nuclear pen1s in Kargil indicates that Pakisan had no conventional war plan to back up its Kargil plan. If they were willing to use the nukes then they should not have sent Nawaz Sharif to the US. This may have been a deliberate Pakistani plan to save face and be able to say that US pressure and mediation solved the crisis that the Pakistani army had no connection with.

But 1998 and Kargil (1999) had the effect of showing to a deliberately blind USA that Pakistan sponsored islamic terrorist would be able to spark the threat of nuclear war. It did not affect their thinking till 2004 when the US acknowledged that 2/3ds of all terrorist groups in the world came from Pakistan.

The nuke tests of 1998 showed the USA that the terrorism from Pakistan was backed by nuclear bombs - but the US did not care about this till 9-11. India of course had known that for a long time. But it was only after the US - Pakistan's single biggest sponsor through the ages realized this that the problem passed from being an India specific problem to a global problem. To that extent the burden was taken off India. It is another matter that 26/11 had to occur before people started suspecting Pakistan, and they are more likely to accept Pakistan as a problem after Bin Laden's death as a guest of the Pakistan army.

[shiv]

Found this link from 13 years ago. It is our friend the BBC

check the sanctimonious news on the page be,ow and on relatedlinks

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/asia_ ... /92783.stm

[Hiten]

a brief clip of the press conference called to announce that Operation Shakti had been conducted

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DIi1U--FzC0

[ramana]

X-post..

Indian Air Force in Wars:Jasjit Singh

Pakistan, after its first test of a nuclear device at Lop Nor with Chinese assistance in 1983, planned to take over Siachen Glacier and adjoining areas up to the Karakoram Pass (not to be confused with the Chinese built highway of the same name far to the west in Gilgit region of Kashmir).22 The Indian Army, in a pre-emptive move in early 1984 was able to just occupy the high crest marking the watershed before the Pakistan army could get to it the same day.

22 On the first anniversary of its nuclear tests, Dr Samar Mubarakmand (in charge of building the bomb) publicly stated that Pakistan had tested a nuclear device in 1983; see Gulf Today, 31 May, 1999.

India was the last power to nuclearize. All those NPAs who preach to India are all wrong. TSP already had the bomb tested in China in 1983.

[saumitra_j]

Fully agree with the Doc saheb. I think that by opening up the Paki nuke djinns by forcing them to show their hand in 1998, the biggest thing India has achieved is making the Pakis a world problem instead of them being just an India problem. For all the nuclear g**d masti that the US and China have done in our parts of the world, it serves Indian interest to make the Paki nuke jehadi spread his love to all parts of the world, especially where it works against US and Chinese interests. Serves the b*****ds right

We can debate for ever the technical aspects of the tests for ever, the reality is that strategically, the tests have actually made India a much safer place by making the Pakis a world problem - besides the small matter of Pakis doing downhill skiing on the economy ever since

[kit]

Wonder whether India will need a Shakthi III or go in for simulated weapon testing.Only further weapon tests can validate new designs even with the most sophisticated simulated weapon designs.What options does India have in furthering nuclear weapon designs ? Unless we have access to French weapon simulation labs or Russian weapon designs how can the state be confident of its nuclear capability ? especially with smaller warheads say for a cruise missile like the shourya ? India has to take on an increasingly belligerent China in the years ahead which is not hampered in any way regarding nuclear weapon development.PK will increasing be unrelevant as it further implodes and the main worry from it would be stolen tactical nukes in the hands of terrorists.

[PratikDas]

Rahul ji, I can only reply on a personal note. At the time I was an undergraduate student in nuclear-free environment-friendly New Zealand.

I remember defending the nuclear tests to my friends. I remember being offended at being told that countries like the US, UK and China could be trusted with nuclear weapons while India could not. In hindsight, every naysayer has been proven wrong.

India was held responsible for setting back the 'global' anti-nuclear weapon movement by several decades. India was held responsible for forcing Pakistan to test in retaliation.

As far as the Indian tests were concerned, I couldn't have been more proud. I learned much later that the success of the 43 kt test was being disputed. It is easy for me to enthusiastically suggest that India should test again, repeatedly, while I reside outside India. It is for India and Indians to decide if the cost of testing again is worth the improved deterrence.