US and PRC relationship & India

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 12 Mar 2011 00:22

China had a trade deficit in February, as exports barely budged from the year before while imports rose nearly 20 percent from February 2010.

That is the hardest part to believe. Is that Shanghai stats too. Apparently this also caused the stocks to go down yesterday is what I heard on the radio.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 13 Mar 2011 12:38

it's all maya. full of smoke and even more screens. there are completely contradictory pieces about US-China trade among various news sources. it's all maya. one this is for sure. US will continue to print money until a crisis point is reached. the rest of the world will become so disgusted with this policy that they will abandon the dollar. i am personally not looking forward to that day. it will mean chaos and disorder and pain for aam admi. but it will be inevitable if US continues on this path.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 15 Mar 2011 11:34

When Sleeping Giants Awaken: China and India in the New World Order

A review of

Pranab Bardhan, Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India

Wendy Dobson, Gravity Shift: How Asia’s New Economic Powerhouses Will Shape the 21st Century

Prem Shankar Jha, Crouching Dragon, Hidden Tiger: Can China and India Dominate the West?

Shalendra D. Sharma, China and India in the Age of Globalization

From here, PDF here.

arnabh · Post by **arnabh** » 15 Mar 2011 20:11

Is It Time to Figure China Into the 'World Military Power' Equation?

http://www.defenceiq.com//air/articles/ ... nt=3/15/11

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Mar 2011 02:19

A very insightful interview in Barron's with Ray Dalio

X-posted from the Prespectives thread...

Ray Dalio Interview

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Mar 2011 22:19

good post argued like a lawyer....

Ravi Karumanchiri wrote:X-POSTED from MRCA Thread

Since this thread is straying geopolitically-OT somewhat, I’d like to offer a few thoughts germane to the MMRCA contest:

The original American strategic rationale for the Pro-Pakistan tilt was set in the Eisenhower Administration, on the desks of John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen Welsh Dulles, who created the ideological schema through which all ‘Cold War’ matters were viewed by Americans. This thinking still colours institutionalized American foreign policy making to this very day. Together, the Dulles brothers successfully promulgated an extremely simplistic (mis)understanding of the Post WWII dispensation, wherein, “You’re either with us or against us”. Rakshaks will recall very similar sentiments expressed by Bush-43 after 9/11.

India, being true to her own ideological roots, while grounded in a deep appreciation for history, and informed of the high stakes involved, and with a long-view in mind; chose instead to walk a Non-Aligned path. If Rakshaks will permit me this; in so doing, India effectively threw America behind Pakistan, because the simple-minded US administration couldn’t figure out what else to do, and Pakistan was all too willing (which is not intended to blame India – she had to do what she had to do, and the Americans didn’t know any better – and apparently still don’t). This Indian decision wasn’t just a reflection of a post-colonial desire for independence. Nor was it naïve, facile or expedient. Indeed, it was quite the opposite. Indians of the day knew that when everyone picks one side or another, that wider war becomes *inevitable*. Yet, standing apart from either block carries its own dangers, which was a conscious decision taken with bravery, let no one doubt. For these reasons among others, India did not become a “poodle” of either Cold War superpower, as evidenced by the military engagements she undertook during that period – always on behalf of herself and none other.

In this light, anyone now advocating for India to closely ally with the United States is effectively abrogating pretty much all of Indian strategic thought going back just about three thousand years. No thinking person with pro-India inclinations should undertake this lightly (nor at all, I would suggest). Granted, this in itself does not instruct India not to pick the F-16 or F-18 if indeed either is technically superior to the other MMRCA contenders. But, it does caution against an overly-close or formalized alliance with the United States (a la CISMoA), because to the Indian mind, alliance is an obligation, whereas to the American mind, alliance is an opportunity – and this ideological and philosophical mismatch will bring nothing but woe to India if ever a formalized alliance is instituted between India and the United States. By all means, buy American warplanes if they’re in fact the best on offer and can be had without abandoning Indian sovereignty or military prerogative – but don’t do it for any supposed (short-sighted, ill-considered) geostrategic reason bent on alliance with America. That’d be stupid, and could set India on a very dangerous course.

Consider that India’s Non-Aligned stance gave the Americans enough of a reason to back Pakistan in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, despite the complete lack of any moral justification to do so. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the Americans an even bigger Pro-Pakistan reason in the 80s – a reason that was shared between “all three” (being the US, Pakistan and China, owing to the ‘Sino-Soviet Split’). But let no one forget that when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the Americans effectively ignored Pakistan until 9/11/2001. Then, once again, Pakistan became “a major non-NATO US ally”. What does this mean for the MMRCA contest? It means that the Americans will offer India “the moon” (including a UNSC P-seat, F-16, F-18, even F-35, etc.), but only because of America’s own interests (such as Af-Pak, countering China, US manufacturing jobs, etc); American interests which seemingly are always calculated on very short time frames, subject to change without notice.

Now, I will admit that I have no way to prove this, but let me ask you, dear Rakshak, if India had ‘fallen in line’ with US interests when she first had the ‘opportunity’, do you think America would have exhibited the Pro-Pakistan tilt from 1950-1979? Of course you don’t and neither do I. Make no mistake, America of that day would have quickly disposed of Pakistan had India ‘played ball’. Furthermore, in a very real sense; America’s arming of Pakistan contributes to Indian insecurity, which (they hope) leads to Indian purchases of American weapons, thereby profiting America. In a way, India purchasing American weapons validates and facilitates this dynamic, and feeds into a continuing cycle of insecurity and American weapons purchases. The only way to effectively break this dynamic is to not buy American weapons. If the Americans see that the instability and insecurity they foster goes to enrich Russia or France, they will not play that game with the same gusto they have been.

When America’s interests shift, which they inevitably do because of the short-sightedness inherent in expedient strategymaking, so too does American support for her client states. In fact, I would argue, that the structural dynamics of the American establishment itself – with its ‘checks and balances’, open access for paying lobbyists, two-year-long election cycles, the milindustrial complex itself and the combined heavy dependence on middle-eastern oil and Chinese sovereign credit – this virtually guarantees that America’s interests vis a vis India will shift over the coming decades, as they have over the past decade, making it by no means certain that relations will improve along the current trajectory.

If history provides any salient lesson, we can be assured that the present push for warming relations will not last indefinitely, especially as the ramifications of global climate change increasingly pit the so-called ‘developed world’ at loggerheads with the ‘developing world’. If India plans to fly the MMRCA winner for 30-40 years, as I’ve read; then India should consider buying from a country that has exhibited a far greater degree of geopolitical constancy than has the United States of America. By my geopolitical estimation, that would indicate either Russia or France (Mig-35 or Rafale, respectively).

IMHO, far too many here on BRF are keen to kick Russia to the curb. I think this is also a short-sighted response to the aggravation of perceived cost overruns on the Gorshkov/Vikramaditya, and also the supply disruptions that came in the wake of the Soviet collapse. I also think there is some significant misperception of the strategic position of Russia. Allow me to explain briefly:

Firstly, third-party observers to the Gorshkov refit (like you and me) are in no position to question the validity of costs on the project. Any upset on the topic can only be informed by inflammatory media portrayals, ignoring the fact that the GoI/MoD finally came to accept things and the whole affair was settled. Nobody on BRF should overlook that.

Second, the Soviet collapse caused a great deal of disruption in Russia, and regrettably this resulted in some supply disruptions, but that was the past, and there is no indication that anything like that would happen again – so while Russia may not be a perfect supplier yet, they are on the road to improving and with continued patronage (and larger production volumes) the Russian milindustrial complex should stabilize its operations and improve their supply performance. Don’t forget, other deals with the Russians have already been settled (notably the FGFA) and so any steps to thicken the foundations of Russian producers is likely to pay dividends to India over the long term.

Third, with regards to Russia’s geostrategic position; like India, Russia has concerns about Chinese expansionism; like India, Russia has concerns about terrorism and Islamist militancy; like India, Russia has concerns about petro-dollar fuelled Islamism; WHILE AT THE SAME TIME; unlike the United States, Russia is an energy exporting country; and unlike the United States, Russia’s sovereign debt is below 10% of GDP (much lower than any other MMRCA contender).

Undeniably, Russia has gone through a rough patch since the collapse of the USSR, but things are improving rapidly. If India wanted to pick a geopolitical power with which to partner to march into her preferred future, it should not be one that is so beholden to China, which would include America, of course, but increasingly also the EADS member countries.

Some additional rebuttals:

1) A number of posters have commented that India, the world’s largest democracy, is a “natural ally” of America, the world’s oldest democracy. This depiction of America is wrong-headed because the United States didn’t become a true democracy until the Civil Rights act of 1964(!) and the Voting Rights Act of 1965(!!). By this measure, India is an older democracy than is the United States, so please spare us the revisionist depiction of American democracy – overlooking a recent history of racial segregation and disenfranchisement.

2) America didn’t enter WWII on the side of the British until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour in 1942! That’s right, America stayed out of the fray from 1939-1942, and in fact a number of American companies and businessmen were trading with the Nazis even after the Americans entered the European theatre, notably IBM which provided a punch-card system the Nazis used to “catalogue” concentration camp prisoners, thereby improving the efficiency of Hitler’s holocaust machine. The take-away lesson here: America has demonstrated a depth of moral bankruptcy that should give any Indian pause when considering formal alliances with the United States.

3) Have no concern about blow-back on the US-India nuclear deal. For starters, there are entirely different lobbies in the US for nuclear equipments and warplanes, and so little chance that a sour note for one will taint the other. More importantly, India has already made the sound decision to operate low-enriched fuel, heavy-water moderated nuclear reactors, and the Americans have long ago made the *cheap* decision to operate light-water moderated reactors. This means that India doesn’t really want US reactors, only access to other NSG products and fuel. BRIEFLY, the main safety advantage of heavy-water moderated reactors is that a loss of containment, and leakage of heavy water, would result in an automatic shutdown (because the reaction requires ‘slow neutrons’), whereas in the light-water reactors offered by America, a loss of containment and loss of water would result in a meltdown, which is exactly what we’re seeing in Fukushima right now. For this reason, I don’t think India or anyone else would consider buying a light water reactor anymore, because they are inherently unsafe, whereas pressurized heavy-water reactors will always ‘fail safe’. (IMHO, India would be better off buying an AECL reactor from Canada, like the CANDU-6 or ACR-1000, both of which will burn thorium, unlike any American reactor.)

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 01 Apr 2011 01:03

http://blog.american.com/?p=29297

Getting the Indo-Pacific Right

As Washington struggles to deal with a deteriorating Pakistan, an unstable Afghanistan, and now military action in Libya, it seems that the Middle East remains the most demanding realm for foreign policy makers. Yet the long game for us remains the Indo-Pacific, the only region on the globe that promises dynamism and growth, even amid its own instability. Positioning ourselves to take advantage of the Indo-Pacific’s opportunities, while preparing to ensure its security, is the key policy requirement for this and future administrations.
Today, the House Foreign Affairs Committee will hold a hearing entitled “Asia Overview: Protecting America’s Interests in Asia and China” at 2 p.m. in Room 2360 of the Rayburn House Office Building. I’ll be testifying on how not merely to protect our interests, but to promote them, drawing in part on my report “Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons,” released last December. That Congress is holding this hearing indicates it understands the importance of getting the Indo-Pacific right, even amid a host of other pressing problems

( worth watiching, keeping eye on the hearing)

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 01 Apr 2011 01:08

http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/Documen ... c_2010.pdf

Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons

The Indo-Pacific’s unique geography makes the
balance of regional security most vulnerable in its
“commons”: the open seas, air lanes, and cyber networks
that link the region together and to the world.
Given the importance of the Indo-Pacific commons
to the continued prosperity and stability of the
region, the policy objectives of the United States and
its Indo-Pacific allies and partners should be to:
• Ensure access to the Indo-Pacific commons
for all nations
• Deter or contain conflict in the commons
• Maintain credible military capabilities that
can deter or defeat the most likely threats
to regional stability

• Encourage the evolution of liberal-democratic
norms that will help spread freedom and
lead to cooperative behavior in service of
the above
The overriding goal of this strategy is to create a
security environment that enhances stability and
prosperity and does not require the use of U.S. or
allied military power.
The interests of the United States and its allies
and partners lie in protecting the Indo-Pacific commons
from any disruption that would cause political
tension or conflict, adversely affect global
economic activity, or hinder the access of any nation
to the rest of the region and globe for political or
military reasons. However, as a result of China’s
military buildup in particular, the United States and
its allies can no longer be assured of maintaining
regional superiority of forces either numerically
or, eventually, qualitatively. The comprehensive
buildup of Chinese military power should be recognized
as a tool for the broader geopolitical expansion
of Chinese influence, providing the means
necessary to achieve regional acceptance of Chinese
aims, however those may be defined in the future.
At the same time, security in the Indo-Pacific
region must not be reduced to hedging against
China’s rise or limited to attempting to shape
Chinese behavior, but rather must be focused on
the Indo-Pacific commons as a whole. Therefore,
America’s strategy should have three parts: an
enhanced, superior, forward-based U.S. presence in
the region; an innovative new approach to allies and
partners; and a political goal of helping create a
more liberal Indo-Pacific region.
Our regional strategy must be based on U.S.
forces maintaining their forward presence with

superior power projection capabilities in the Indo-
Pacific region, responding to disruptions, and mitigating
uncertainty. To do so, a forward-based military
force structure in the Pacific must focus on the
power projection capabilities and weapons systems
most appropriate for defeating potential adversaries’
key strengths, and it must be postured to increase
U.S. forward presence in the Indo-Pacific in both
peacetime and times of conflict. This includes
ensuring control of the undersea realm through an
increased U.S. attack submarine force, increasing
the number of forward-deployed BMD surface combatants,
enhancing U.S. Air Force forward presence
in the region, and maintaining and increasing comprehensive
cyber and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
Military capability, however, is only one part of a
strategy for security in the Indo-Pacific commons.
The United States should also pursue a new political
strategy that explicitly links together both its close
partners and strategically important nations that
increasingly share common concerns. Conceptually,
this new strategic arrangement can be thought of as a
set of “concentric triangles.” The outer triangle links

Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia; the inner triangle
connects Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Vietnam. The outer triangle should serve as the
anchor for security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, as
well as for U.S. policy in the region. The inner triangle
will play a unique role in enhancing littoral security
and focusing on the “inner commons” of the lower
South China Sea.
The final leg of this strategy must focus on the overall
political environment in the Indo-Pacific. This new
strategy for security in the Indo-Pacific commons is
not designed explicitly to promote democracy, liberalism,
or a freedom agenda. It aims to be a prudent strategy
for ensuring stability and the interests of nations
that contribute to regional prosperity, including the
United States. For this reason, it must be as realistic
about the type of regional environment that will promote
stability as it is about the means to be used to
counter disruptive influences. However, it is clear that
liberally inclined nations are more likely to work
together to provide public goods, uphold regional
security, and cooperate in resolving regional issues.
Encouraging a more liberal Indo-Pacific region is
therefore a political goal as well as a strategy.

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 01 Apr 2011 15:32

It seems there are two threads which are competing for US policy.
The first thread wants US to utilize its geographical defenses of Pacific-Atlantic oceans and play the Balance of Power card. This is the card which Britain played successfully till the fall of Poland in 1939. It allowed the burden to fall disproportionately on others, while Britain was kept relatively safe.
The second thread wants US to play the active balancer against certain rising Asian powers. Something similar to what US did against the soviet union. This does not mean that a cold war will exist between US and certain asian powers.

But this is compounded by the fact that certain Asian nations see US in a terminal decline. A decline from which they believe US will not be able to rise. Whether this perception is the reality is yet to be determined. It is has happened before, that US was seen in a decline. First w.r.t to the soviets in late 1960s and early 1970s. The second time in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when US was seen in a decline against Japan, which was assumed to have set up the second Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, after the failure of the first in WWII.

I wonder what will win out, containment/semi-containment or balance of power.

Sudip · Post by **Sudip** » 05 Apr 2011 02:48

Recently there was a program on india & china by foreign policy research institute. i havent checked all videos and ppts, but might be resourceful.

China and India: Ancient Civilizations, Rising Powers, Giant Societies, and Contrasting Models of Development A History Institute for Teachers

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 09 Apr 2011 08:03

Is China Overtaking America?: Joseph S. Nye

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commen ... 93/English

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Apr 2011 20:01

X-post...
Nightwatch

4/13/2011

On the recent spat betwqeen TSP and US on intel matters:

Pakistan: Two US remotely piloted aerial vehicles launched missile attacks that killed at least six people near the Afghan border in South Waziristan, Pakistan, according to Pakistani intelligence official on 13 April. The attacks targeted a vehicle and a motorcycle in a forested area.

Comment: In an intelligence system officially guided by the Director of National Intelligence's directive and emphasis on integration, a drone attack in Pakistan seemingly should not be approved when the head of Pakistani intelligence is visiting United States intelligence leaders to protest missile attacks by drones. The DNI nor the Director of CIA seem to be in control of the drone attacks.

The strain between the US and Pakistani intelligence is genuine, but not because of the drone attacks. The Pakistanis are putting distance between themselves and the US in order to gauge their vulnerability based on the extent of the drawdown of US forces that is to begin in mid-2011. In that context, the intelligence dispute is a cover for larger strategic concerns.

There are several issues. The threat to Pakistan does not arise from the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has not hunted or pursued the Quetta/Karachi Shura leaders from Afghanistan. They remain allies of Pakistan.

Pakistan has never accepted the US conflation of an AF-Pak enemy. While groups might cooperate, the Afghan Taliban who take guidance from leaders in Pakistan are not hostile to the Pakistan government. The Pakistani Taliban, on the other hand, seek to overthrow the government of Pakistan.

Pakistan Army operations always have been targeted against threats to the stability of Pakistan and not against elements based in Pakistan that threaten the stability of the present regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan's strategic interests in confronting India require access to a friendly Afghanistan, which is not now the case.

The Karzai government is friendlier to India than to Pakistan. Thus, Pakistani intelligence has not and most likely will never cut its connections and support to the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, especially if they return to power in Kabul.

Long after US forces depart, Pakistan must survive in a hostile environment. US support has flowed and ebbed in the recent past, but has never been enough to enable Pakistan to defeat India in conventional warfare. China has been the only ally of Pakistan that has provided the strategic advantage that deters India, in the Pakistani view: nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.

The intelligence dispute is a proxy for Pakistan's fundamental distrust of the US as an ally, compared to China. As the time for the withdrawal of US forces in Afghanistan draws nearer, strain in relations will increase.

What will be the imapct of the recent Sanya statement where in PRC endorsed India for UNSC? I think things are changing as PRC realizes there are bigger threats to it than India.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 25 Apr 2011 09:47

China's Search for a Grand Strategy
By: Jisi, Wang.
Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90 Issue 2, p68-79,

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ ... d-strategy

A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way

ANY COUNTRY'S grand strategy must answer at least three questions: What are the nation's core interests? What external forces threaten them? And what can the national leadership do to safeguard them? Whether China has any such strategy today is open to debate. On the one hand, over the last three decades or so, its foreign and defense policies have been remarkably consistent and reasonably well coordinated with the country's domestic priorities. On the other hand, the Chinese government has yet to disclose any document that comprehensively expounds the country's strategic goals and the ways to achieve them. For both policy analysts in China and China watchers abroad, China's grand strategy is a field still to be plowed.

In recent years, China's power and influence relative to those of other great states have outgrown the expectations of even its own leaders. Based on the country's enhanced position, China's international behavior has become increasingly assertive, as was shown by its strong reactions to a chain of events in 2010: for example, Washington's decision to sell arms to Taiwan, U.S.-South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea, and Japan's detention of a Chinese sailor found in disputed waters. It has become imperative for the international community to understand China's strategic thinking and try to forecast how it might evolve according to China's interests and its leaders' vision.

THE ENEMY WITHIN AND WITHOUT

A UNIQUE FEATURE of Chinese leaders' understanding of their country's history is their persistent sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats. From ancient times, the ruling regime of the day has often been brought down by a combination of internal uprising and external invasion. The Ming dynasty collapsed in 1644 after rebelling peasants took the capital city of Beijing and the Manchu, with the collusion of Ming generals, invaded from the north. Some three centuries later, the Manchu's own Qing dynasty collapsed after a series of internal revolts coincided with invasions by Western and Japanese forces. The end of the Kuomintang's rule and the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 was caused by an indigenous revolution inspired and then bolstered by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

Since then, apprehensions about internal turbulences have lingered. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, from 1949 to 1976, the Chinese government never formally applied the concept of "national interest" to delineate its strategic aims, but its international strategies were clearly dominated by political and military security interests--themselves often framed by ideological principles such as "proletarian internationalism." Strategic thinking at the time followed the Leninist tradition of dividing the world into political camps: archenemies, secondary enemies, potential allies, revolutionary forces. Mao's "three worlds theory" pointed to the Soviet Union and the United States as China's main external threats, with corresponding internal threats coming from pro-Soviet "revisionists" and pro-American "class enemies." China's political life in those years was characterized by recurrent struggles against international and domestic schemes to topple the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership or change its political coloring. Still, since Mao's foreign policy supposedly represented the interests of the "international proletariat" rather than China's own, and since China was economically and socially isolated from much of the world, Beijing had no comprehensive grand strategy to speak of.

Then came the 1980s and Deng Xiaoping. As China embarked on reform and opened up, the CCP made economic development its top priority. Deng's foreign policy thinking departed appreciably from that of Mao. A major war with either the Soviet Union or the United States was no longer deemed inevitable. China made great efforts to develop friendly and cooperative relations with countries all over the world, regardless of their political or ideological orientation; it reasoned that a nonconfrontational posture would attract foreign investment to China and boost trade. A peaceful international environment, an enhanced position for China in the global arena, and China's steady integration into the existing economic order would also help consolidate the CCP'S power at home.

But even as economic interests became a major driver of China's behavior on the international scene, traditional security concerns and the need to guard against Western political interference remained important. Most saliently, the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 and, in its wake, the West's sanctions against Beijing served as an alarming reminder to China's leaders that internal and external troubles could easily intertwine. Over the next decade, Beijing responded to Western censure by contending that the state's sovereign rights trumped human rights. It resolutely refused to consider adopting Western-type democratic institutions. And it insisted that it would never give up the option of using force if Taiwan tried to secede.

Despite those concerns, however, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, China's strategic thinkers were depicting a generally favorable international situation. In his 2002 report to the CCP National Congress, General Secretary Jiang Zemin foresaw a "20 years' period of strategic opportunity," during which China could continue to concentrate on domestic tasks. Unrest has erupted at times--such as the violent riots in Tibet in March 2008 and in Xinjiang in July 2009, which the central government blamed on "foreign hostile forces" and responded to with harsh reprisals. And Beijing claims that the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a political activist it deems to be a "criminal trying to sabotage the socialist system," has proved once again Westerners' "ill intentions." Still, the Chinese government has been perturbed by such episodes only occasionally, which has allowed it to focus on redressing domestic imbalances and the unsustainability of its development.

Under President Hu Jintao, Beijing has in recent years formulated a new development and social policy geared toward continuing to promote fast economic growth while emphasizing good governance, improving the social safety net, protecting the environment, encouraging independent innovation, lessening social tensions, perfecting the financial system, and stimulating domestic consumption. As Chinese exports have suffered from the global economic crisis since 2008, the need for such economic and social transformations has become more urgent.

With that in mind, the Chinese leadership has redefined the purpose of China's foreign policy. As Hu announced in July 2009, China's diplomacy must "safeguard the interests of sovereignty, security, and development." Dai Bingguo, the state councilor for external relations, further defined those core interests in an article last December: first, China's political stability, namely, the stability of the CCP leadership and of the socialist system; second, sovereign security, territorial integrity, and national unification; and third, China's sustainable economic and social development.

Apart from the issue of Taiwan, which Beijing considers to be an integral part of China's territory, the Chinese government has never officially identified any single foreign policy issue as one of the country's core interests. Last year, some Chinese commentators reportedly referred to the South China Sea and North Korea as such, but these reckless statements, made with no official authorization, created a great deal of confusion. In fact, for the central government, sovereignty, security, and development all continue to be China's main goals. As long as no grave danger--for example, Taiwan's formal secession--threatens the CCP leadership or China's unity, Beijing will remain preoccupied with the country's economic and social development, including in its foreign policy.

THE PRINCIPLE'S PRINCIPLE

THE NEED to identify an organizing principle to guide Chinese foreign policy is widely recognized today in China's policy circles and scholarly community, as well as among international analysts. However, defining China's core interests according to the three prongs of sovereignty, security, and development, which sometimes are in tension, means that it is almost impossible to devise a straightforward organizing principle. And the variety of views among Chinese political elites complicates efforts to devise any such grand strategy based on political consensus.

One popular proposal has been to focus on the United States as a major threat to China. Proponents of this view cite the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, who said, "A state without an enemy or external peril is absolutely doomed." Or they reverse the political scientist Samuel Huntington's argument that "the ideal enemy for America would be ideologically hostile, racially and culturally different, and militarily strong enough to pose a credible threat to American security" and cast the United States as an ideal enemy for China. This notion is based on the long-held conviction that the United States, along with other Western powers and Japan, is hostile to China's political values and wants to contain its rise by supporting Taiwan's separation from the mainland. Its proponents also point to U.S. politicians' sympathy for the Dalai Lama and Uighur separatists, continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. military alliances and arrangements supposedly designed to encircle the Chinese mainland, the currency and trade wars waged by U.S. businesses and the U.S. Congress, and the West's argument that China should slow down its economic growth in order to help stem climate change.

This view is reflected in many newspapers and on many Web sites in China (particularly those about military affairs and political security). Its proponents argue that China's current approach to foreign relations is far too soft; Mao's tit-for-tat manner is touted as a better model. As a corollary, it is said that China should try to find strategic allies among countries that seem defiant toward the West, such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Some also recommend that Beijing use its holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds as a policy instrument, standing ready to sell them if U.S. government actions undermine China's interests.

This proposal is essentially misguided, for even though the United States does pose some strategic and security challenges to China, it would be impractical and risky to construct a grand strategy based on the view that the United States is China's main adversary. Few countries, if any, would want to join China in an anti-U.S. alliance. And it would seriously hold back China's economic development to antagonize the country's largest trading partner and the world's strongest economic and military power. Fortunately, the Chinese leadership is not about to carry out such a strategy. Premier Wen Jiabao was not just being diplomatic last year when he said of China and the United States that "our common interests far outweigh our differences."

Well aware of this, an alternative school of thought favors Deng's teaching of tao guangyang hui, or keeping a low profile in international affairs. Members of this group, including prominent political figures, such as Tang Jiaxuan, former foreign minister, and General Xiong Guangkai, former deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, argue that since China remains a developing country, it should concentrate on economic development. Without necessarily rebuffing the notion that the West, particularly the United States, is a long-term threat to China, they contend that China is not capable of challenging Western primacy for the time being--and some even caution against hastily concluding that the West is in decline. Meanwhile, they argue, keeping a low profile in the coming decades will allow China to concentrate on domestic priorities.

Although this view appears to be better received internationally than the other, it, too, elicits some concerns. Its adherents have had to take great pains to explain that tao guang yang hui, which is sometimes mistranslated as "hiding one's capabilities and biding one's time," is not a calculated call for temporary moderation until China has enough material power and confidence to promote its hidden agenda. Domestically, the low-profile approach is vulnerable to the charge that it is too soft, especially when security issues become acute. As nationalist feelings surge in China, some Chinese are pressing for a more can-do foreign policy. Opponents also contend that this notion, which Deng put forward more than 20 years ago, may no longer be appropriate now that China is far more powerful.

Some thoughtful strategists appreciate that even if keeping a low profile could serve China's political and security relations with the United States well, it might not apply to China's relations with many other countries or to economic issues and those nontraditional security issues that have become essential in recent years, such as climate change, public health, and energy security. (Beijing can hardly keep a low profile when it actively participates in mechanisms such as BRIC, the informal group formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the new member South Africa.) A foreign policy that insists merely on keeping China's profile low cannot cope effectively with the multi-faceted challenges facing the country today.

HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS

A MORE SOPHISTICATED grand strategy is needed to serve China's domestic priorities. The government has issued no official written statement outlining such a vision, but some direction can be gleaned from the concepts of a "scientific outlook on development" and "building a harmonious society," which have been enunciated by Hu and have been recorded in all important CCP documents since 2003. In 2006, the Central Committee of the CCP announced that Chinas foreign policy "must maintain economic construction as its centerpiece, be closely integrated into domestic work, and be advanced by coordinating domestic and international situations." Moreover, four ongoing changes in China's strategic thinking may suggest the foundations for a new grand strategy.

The first transformation is the Chinese government's adoption of a comprehensive understanding of security, which incorporates economic and nontraditional concerns with traditional military and political interests. Chinese military planners have begun to take into consideration transnational problems such as terrorism and piracy, as well as cooperative activities such as participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Similarly, it is now clear that China must join other countries in stabilizing the global financial market in order to protect its own economic security. All this means that it is virtually impossible to distinguish China's friends from its foes. The United States might pose political and military threats, and Japan, a staunch U.S. ally, could be a geopolitical competitor of China's, but these two countries also happen to be two of China's greatest economic partners. Even though political difficulties appear to be on the rise with the European Union, it remains China's top economic partner. Russia, which some Chinese see as a potential security ally, is far less important economically and socially to China than is South Korea, another U.S. military ally. It will take painstaking efforts on Beijing's part to limit tensions between China's traditional political-military perspectives and its broadening socioeconomic interests--efforts that effectively amount to reconciling the diverging legacies of Mao and Deng. The best Beijing can do is to strengthen its economic ties with great powers while minimizing the likelihood of a military and political confrontation with them.

A second transformation is unfolding in Chinese diplomacy: it is becoming less country-oriented and more multilateral and issue-oriented. This shift toward functional focuses--counterterrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, environmental protection, energy security, food safety, post-disaster reconstruction--has complicated Chinas bilateral relationships, regardless of how friendly other states are toward it. For example, diverging geostrategic interests and territorial disputes have long come between China and India, but the two countries' common interest in fending off the West's pressure to reduce carbon emissions has drawn them closer. And now that Iran has become a key supplier of oil to China, its problems with the West over its nuclear program are testing China's stated commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Changes in the mode of China's economic development account for a third transformation in the country's strategic thinking. Beijing's preoccupation with GDP growth is slowly giving way to concerns about economic efficiency, product quality, environmental protection, the creation of a social safety net, and technological innovation. Beijing's understanding of the core interest of development is expanding to include social dimensions. Correspondingly, China's leaders have decided to try to sustain the country's high growth rate by propping up domestic consumption and reducing over the long term the country's dependence on exports and foreign investment. They are now more concerned with global economic imbalances and financial fluctuations, even as international economic frictions are becoming more intense because of the global financial crisis. China's long-term interests will require some incremental appreciation of the yuan, but its desire to increase its exports in the short term will prevent its decision-makers from taking the quick measures urged by the United States and many other countries. Only the enhancement of China's domestic consumption and a steady opening of its capital markets will help it shake off these international pressures.

The fourth transformation has to do with China's values. So far, Chinas officials have said that although China has a distinctive political system and ideology, it can cooperate with other countries based on shared interests--although not, the suggestion seems to be, on shared values. But now that they strongly wish to enhance what they call the "cultural soft power of the nation" and improve China's international image, it appears necessary to also seek common values in the global arena, such as good governance and transparency. Continuing trials and tribulations at home, such as pervasive corruption and ethnic and social unrest in some regions, could also reinforce a shift in values among Chinas political elite by demonstrating that their hold on power and the country's continued resurgence depend on greater transparency and accountability, as well as on a firmer commitment to the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, all values that are widely shared throughout the world today.

All four of these developments are unfolding haltingly and are by no means irreversible. Nonetheless, they do reveal fundamental trends that will likely shape China's grand strategy in the foreseeable future. When Hu and other leaders call for "coordinating domestic and international situations," they mean that efforts to meet international challenges must not undermine domestic reforms. And with external challenges now coming not only from foreign powers--especially the United States and Japan--but also, and increasingly, from functional issues, coping with them effectively will require engaging foreign countries cooperatively and emphasizing compatible values.

Thus, it would be imprudent of Beijing to identify any one country as a major threat and invoke the need to keep it at bay as an organizing principle of Chinese foreign policy--unless the United States, or another great power, truly did regard China as its main adversary and so forced China to respond in kind. On the other hand, if keeping a low profile is a necessary component of Beijing's foreign policy, it is also insufficient. A grand strategy needs to consider other long-term objectives as well. One that appeals to some Chinese is the notion of building China into the most powerful state in the world: Liu Mingfu, a senior colonel who teaches at the People's Liberation Army's National Defense University, has declared that replacing the United States as the world's top military power should be China's goal. Another idea is to cast China as an alternative model of development (the "Beijing consensus") that can challenge Western systems, values, and leadership. But the Chinese leadership does not dream of turning China into a hegemon or a standard-bearer. Faced with mounting pressures on both the domestic and the international fronts, it is sober in its objectives, be they short- or long-term ones. Its main concern is how best to protect China's core interests--sovereignty, security, and development--against the messy cluster of threats that the country faces today. If an organizing principle must be established to guide China's grand strategy, it should be the improvement of the Chinese people's living standards, welfare, and happiness through social justice.

THE BIRTH OF A GREAT NATION

HAVING IDENTIFIED China's core interests and the external pressures that threaten them, the remaining question is, how can China's leadership safeguard the country's interests against those threats? China's continued success in modernizing its economy and lifting its people's standards of living depends heavily on global stability. Thus, it is in China's interest to contribute to a peaceful international environment. China should seek peaceful solutions to residual sovereignty and security issues, including the thorny territorial disputes between it and its neighbors. With the current leadership in Taiwan refraining from seeking formal independence from the mainland, Beijing is more confident that peace can be maintained across the Taiwan Strait. But it has yet to reach a political agreement with Taipei that would prevent renewed tensions in the future. The Chinese government also needs to find effective means to pacify Tibet and Xinjiang, as more unrest in those regions would likely elicit reactions from other countries.

Although the vast majority of people in China support a stronger Chinese military to defend the country's major interests, they should also recognize the dilemma that poses. As China builds its defense capabilities, especially its navy, it will have to convince others, including the United States and China's neighbors in Asia, that it is taking their concerns into consideration. It will have to make the plans of the People's Liberation Army more transparent and show a willingness to join efforts to establish security structures in the Asia-Pacific region and safeguard existing global security regimes, especially the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It must also continue to work with other states to prevent Iran and North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. China's national security will be well served if it makes more contributions to other countries' efforts to strengthen security in cyberspace and outer space. Of course, none of this excludes the possibility that China might have to use force to protect its sovereignty or its security in some special circumstances, such as in the event of a terrorist attack.

China has been committed to almost all existing global economic regimes. But it will have to do much more before it is recognized as a full-fledged market economy. It has already gained an increasingly larger say in global economic mechanisms, such as the G-20, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Now, it needs to make specific policy proposals and adjustments to help rebalance the global economy and facilitate its plans to change its development pattern at home. Setting a good example by building a low-carbon economy is one major step that would benefit both China and the world.

A grand strategy requires defining a geostrategic focus, and China's geostrategic focus is Asia. When communication lines in Central Asia and South Asia were poor, China's development strategy and economic interests tilted toward its east coast and the Pacific Ocean. Today, East Asia is still of vital importance, but China should and will begin to pay more strategic attention to the west. The central government has been conducting the Grand Western Development Program in many western provinces and regions, notably Tibet and Xinjiang, for more than a decade. It is now more actively initiating and participating in new development projects in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Central Asia, and throughout the Caspian Sea region, all the way to Europe. This new western outlook may reshape China's geostrategic vision as well as the Eurasian landscape.

Still, relationships with great powers remain crucial to defending China's core interests. Notwithstanding the unprecedented economic interdependence of China, Japan, and the United States, strategic trust is still lacking between China and the United States and China and Japan. It is imperative that the Chinese-Japanese-U.S. trilateral interaction be stable and constructive, and a trilateral strategic dialogue is desirable. More generally, too, China will have to invest tremendous resources to promote a more benign image on the world stage. A China with good governance will be a likeable China. Even more important, it will have to learn that soft power cannot be artificially created: such influence originates more from a society than from a state.

Two daunting tasks lie ahead before a better-designed Chinese grand strategy can take shape and be implemented. The first is to improve policy coordination among Chinese government agencies. Almost all institutions in the central leadership and local governments are involved in foreign relations to varying degrees, and it is virtually impossible for them to see China's national interest the same way or to speak with one voice. These differences confuse outsiders as well as the Chinese people.

The second challenge will be to manage the diversity of views among China's political elite and the general public, at a time when the value system in China is changing rapidly. Mobilizing public support for government policies is expected to strengthen Beijing's diplomatic bargaining power while also helping consolidate its domestic popularity. But excessive nationalism could breed more public frustration and create more pressure on the government if its policies fail to deliver immediately, which could hurt China's political order, as well as its foreign relations. Even as it allows different voices to be heard on foreign affairs, the central leadership should more vigorously inform the population of its own view, which is consistently more moderate and prudent than the inflammatory remarks found in the media and on Web sites.

No major power's interests can conform exactly to those of the international community; China is no exception. And with one-fifth of the world's population, it is more like a continent than a country. Yet despite the complexity of developing a grand strategy for China, the effort is at once consistent with China's internal priorities and generally positive for the international community. China will serve its interests better if it can provide more common goods to the international community and share more values with other states.

How other countries respond to the emergence of China as a global power will also have a great impact on China's internal development and external behavior. If the international community appears not to understand China's aspirations, its anxieties, and its difficulties in feeding itself and modernizing, the Chinese people may ask themselves why China should be bound by rules that were essentially established by the Western powers. China can rightfully be expected to take on more international responsibilities. But then the international community should take on the responsibility of helping the world's largest member support itself.

~~~~~~~~

By Wang Jisi

WANG JISI is Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, in Beijing.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 May 2011 19:49

India needs allies in China's backyard just as China has in Indian backyard. The ASEAN countries are Sinophiles so its difficult. A unified Korea for there are historical issues would be a good candidate. Large areas of Eastern China have Korean population.

Its imperative for India to work for unification of Korea for long term changes.

In mean time need to find a short term solution in Outer Mongolia and/or Vietnam.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 May 2011 20:05

X-Post...
Shyam Saran at Brookings: Full of TFTA Foreign Policy

Audio

MR. POLLACK: One other question here and then I would like to open this up to questions from the floor, of which I’m sure there will be many. China enjoys, dare I say, a nearly unique relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan is clearly a very troubled state in a variety of ways, underscore it even more by the events of the past few days. Presumably, this is not something that the Chinese have been very forthcoming in their interactions with India about, but could we -- I’ve heard some voices coming out of China of some concern about the state of affairs in Pakistan and this long precedes recent
events. Can we imagine ways in which this looks less zero sum, or is there any kind of a possibility that you could imagine where China and India could have an intelligent and reasonable and candid discussion about Pakistan’s future and what that implies for both countries?

MR. SARAN: It’s not that we don’t have conversations with China about Pakistan or what’s happening within Pakistan. It is also not the case that China does not express concern about developments in Pakistan, particularly with respect to, say,
fundamentalism or how this impacts on, say, Sinjia. But having said that, I think the Chinese support for Pakistan, I think, is almost unconditional, certainly as far as, say, relationship with India is concerned. We have to accept that as a fact of life.
What we do see, if I look historically at various points at which there has been confrontation between India and Pakistan or even conflict between India and Pakistan. There has been a certain caution in China so they may make sort of
rhetorical statements condemning India, but there has not been much of a stomach for actually getting into an armed confrontation with India on behalf of Pakistan. Will that remain true? Well, let’s see. But Pakistan is a very good, in a sense, and very convenient, you know, (inaudible) for China. So, I’m not surprised. As a professional, I’m not surprised that this is a very convenient thing for China to pursue its interests in the subcontinent. But I as the salience of India-China relations, as the substantive content of the relationship between India and China continue to improve, yes, obviously this will have some impact on the relationship with Pakistan. Much will also depend upon what happens in Pakistan. You know, there is a certain minimum degree of, shall I say, coherence that you need in Pakistan for it to be a coherent ally.
So, that is something which is perhaps more worrisome, and as that’s worrisome not only for China, it is worrisome for all of us.

MR. TALBOTT: Shyam, I hope you won’t mind taking a question about the big story, which I would characterize as the extra-judicial, extra-territorial execution of Osama bin Laden, and I would focus not on the action itself, but what it tells us about Pakistan, both from an Indian standpoint and insofar as you would be comfortable speculating about it from a Chinese standpoint. The circumstances of his death, we are learning more about as the days go by, but what is extremely significant, it seems, is the circumstances of his life for the last number of years, and what that tells us about the very complex arrangement between him and powerful circles and people in Pakistan. And obviously that has
bearing on India’s security and you do know China so well, and the Chinese are very sotto voce about this, but they also are aware of connections between al-Qaeda and extreme Islamist secessionism, particularly in Shinjan. So, would you give us your thoughts on these two questions?

MR. SARAN: As I mentioned, Strobe, that it’s not that we have not had this as a topic of conversation between China and India, you know, the fundamentalism as a threat to both the secular society in India as well as to China and the threat faced by China from elements which may be based in Pakistan, but at the end of the day the Chinese perception, so far, has been that, yes, there is a threat, but Pakistan is such a close ally that it will always deliver on whatever we want Pakistan to deliver on. So, if you just take, for example, the Lal Masjid case, I mean, in a sense, that was the beginning of the end for Musharraf, but he took that action because China was mad because of what had happened to its six nationals.
So, as long as there continues to be a feeling in China that at the end of the day its larger interests are served by this alliance with Pakistan, and that this particular threat -- very specific threat, of terrorism in (inaudible) can be contained, can be handled. Because of the very close understanding and relationship between the two countries, I do not see much change taking place in that. It is depressing, but I think that’s how we see the relationship.

Now, as far as the impact of this particular incident is concerned, of course you have seen the Indian statement. Obviously we are very happy that he’s no longer around, but I think the question in our mind is, how is this going to play out in the next few months? That is the key question. One is, will the United States of America and the international community use what is a big leverage today in your hands to try and bring about a fundamental shift in Pakistani thinking about the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy or is there going to be a temptation to use this for some shortterm ends, short-term end being, well, can we bend them to our will to help us with our exit strategy in Afghanistan, which will be perhaps a short-term gain, but may not resolve the longer term challenge that it poses.
We would certainly hope that it is the latter , because that is -- unless that change comes about in the manner in which Pakistan looks at its interests vis-à-vis India, vis-à-vis Afghanistan, vis-à-vis the United States of America, I think we will continue to face this problem.

SPEAKER: Jack (inaudible), George Washington University. The last two questions set the stage for what I was going to ask. One, about China nexus with Pakistan. Recently after the Sunday incident, China impressed upon Pakistan not to release any information about (inaudible) cases and so on and so forth and not to give any information to India. That’s one instant. Two, Pakistan, in a recent delegation to Afghanistan, Prime Minister Galani and so on and so forth, impressed upon Afghan government to rely more on China than the United States. So, if you see (inaudible)
trend with Pakistan and China. China always tries to create problems for (inaudible).

MR. SARAN: Well, I was not aware of the fact that Pakistan has asked -- sorry, China has asked Pakistan not to share any information on 26/11. That’s news to me. I must confess I have not seen that report.

I think much will depend upon how Pakistan sees its own interests in the engagement with India. So, from our side we have opened the possibilities of a positive turn in the relationship and in that what Pakistan does to bring closure to 26/11 and punish those who were responsible for that horrifying incident, is going to be a key in terms of any kind of reestablishment of at least a minimal degree of trust and confidence. So, if this is what China has told Pakistan and if China -- if Pakistan believes that, yes, this is in Pakistan’s interest, I’m afraid India-Pakistan relations will not
move in a positive direction. I mean, that’s the reality. Reported remarks by Galani to Karzai about depending more on China and less on the United States. I think the ground reality, as we know, is very different.

So, I cannot see -- I cannot see how even from Pakistan’s perspective. What the U.S. role is going to be in Afghanistan is also critical to its own security interests. I think the problem really is that Pakistan is not quite certain about what
its interests are. It is still thinking in very old categories when the whole situation in the region has changed. So, to think in terms of, say, a strategic depth in Afghanistan, it is today -- I think it is quite irrelevant. Or to think in terms of, you know, being able to keep India off balance through the use of terrorism. Well, this is something which already you
are seeing is eating into the Pakistani polity itself. It’s a danger -- more of a danger to Pakistan than it is a threat to India. There are far more terrorist incidents taking place, far more Muslims being killed in Pakistan than today, I think, in India.

So, is Pakistan still going to -- despite the reality that it confronts -- is it still going to think in those old terms? If it does, than I’m afraid, you know, the situation will not change for the better. This is why I said what the reaction to this latest incident is going to be, is what is more important than the incident itself.

Arihant · Post by **Arihant** » 08 May 2011 11:35

ramana wrote:India needs allies in China's backyard just as China has in Indian backyard. The ASEAN countries are Sinophiles so its difficult. A unified Korea for there are historical issues would be a good candidate. Large areas of Eastern China have Korean population.

Its imperative for India to work for unification of Korea for long term changes.

In mean time need to find a short term solution in Outer Mongolia and/or Vietnam.

Not to forget Indonesia and Taiwan, who are most emphatically not Sinophiles.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 08 May 2011 19:24

for that matter even Malaysia and Vietnam are not Sinophiles. these guys would like to keep good relations with both countries without becoming satraps. i think that's their strategy. to develop and to have cordial trade/economic/strategic relations with both countries.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 08 May 2011 21:12

ramana wrote:India needs allies in China's backyard just as China has in Indian backyard. The ASEAN countries are Sinophiles so its difficult. A unified Korea for there are historical issues would be a good candidate. Large areas of Eastern China have Korean population.

Its imperative for India to work for unification of Korea for long term changes.

In mean time need to find a short term solution in Outer Mongolia and/or Vietnam.

Thailand, Vietnam, Malays, Cambodia, Myanmar are all worried about PRC expansionism. Although some of them don't want to face off against the PRC. But recent chinese moves are getting some nations quite scared. PRC have a nazi esque view. Aus are open to join into a coalition against PRC. Japs are now weak, so they will seek partners, aside from Unkil. India is the most logical. Singapore is also worried - dont know about the indonesians.
#
Rewind to ABV, watch his moves. He went all over to these Dharmic countries and offered indian defence goods and defence cooperation. Not all of the visits were successful. Vietnam for example was uninterested in facing off with the chinese again. But as of 2009 defence relations are back. MMS is continuing the foreign policy. Singapore have been asking us for defence relations since 1965! But lack of coordination, now they have a deep relations with India which will be expanded. We have annual exercises with Thailand. Vietnam and some others have begun looking at Unkil for support against PRC recently, so obviously they wanted an uptick in defence relations. THe Chinese have a nazi-esque ideology and everyone is scared, so these guys will realise one day that they need us.

India will have a naval base in a SE Asian nation soon.

All this is about cutting off oil/trade route at chokepoint for PRC.

Religion is another factor.

UBanerjee · Post by **UBanerjee** » 08 May 2011 22:15

So we can soon expect the Chinese to make noises about lebensraum, eh? What does that suggest long term, the most logical expansion is northwards!

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 08 May 2011 23:06

^^^^
The problem with expanding northwards is that, they will end up expanding into tundra, very cold regions and too near to the arctic circle. Regions which will not be able to support the population which the Chinese have with agriculture. Siberia has agriculture lands but the Russian far-east due to geography cannot sustain agriculture for a large population. This is one of the reason that manchu region of China is home to about 100 million people, but Russian far east, the region bordering it, is home to about 10 million or less. For Russian Far-East population, food is bought from other parts of Russia.
Also between Russian Far east and siberia sit a group of people called Mongols and a country called Mongolia.
And right now, Taiwan is the primary concern of PRC. After Taiwan has been pacified and/or co-opted in the greater Chinese scheme of things, then only will the turn of Southern Tibet and lands lost to the marauding cossacks to be reclaimed will arise.

History has a parallel over here. Hitler first isolated Poland from her historical ties with French. Then hitler took over Czechoslovakia bloodlessly. What the fall of Czechoslovakia meant to Poland was a disaster. It resulted in Poland being surrounded by Nazi Germany on three sides. The remaining side was Soviet Union, with which Hitler eventually signed a non-aggression pact. Also it prevented any western allied help from reaching Poland.
Right now China has an understanding with Russia. Which allows it to focus its attention on Taiwan. Prior to the border agreement between Soviet Union/Russia, during the last days of the cold war, the cream of PRC was stationed against the Soviets/Russians. With the border agreement with Russia, PRC was free to concentrate on unfinished agenda of China's civil war, Taiwan. The result was within a decade China had built up forces which would overwhelm Taiwan's defense. Now only thing stopping PRC invasion of Taiwan is the lack of amphibian capability and the capability to deny Taiwan strait to outside navies.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 09 May 2011 07:49

^^^
Siberia is a very attractive target b/c of the huge natural resources available. if any country can pull off the kind of tech developments needed to utilize Siberian resources, it is PRC. they can ruthlessly exploit the region by setting up massive mining/manufacturing facilities in a way that nobody else can do.....

another target is Arunachal.....PRC is paranoid about the choke spot in the Malay straits. if they can cross the Himalayas, then getting to Bay of Bengal from that point will be easy. how exactly they intend to deal with the crores of people living in this region......that leads to some terrible thoughts. if PRC has an underlying feeling of racial nationalism like Nazi Germany, then we can expect mass genocide as the favored strategy.

of course, the tragedy of all this will be that the West will be laughing all the way about it. this will give them the right opportunity to set up military bases in India/Myanmar/Tibet......this kind of PRC aggression will be secretly welcomed by US/UK imperialists......and perhaps even the broader West.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 May 2011 07:53

Arihant wrote:
ramana wrote:India needs allies in China's backyard just as China has in Indian backyard. The ASEAN countries are Sinophiles so its difficult. A unified Korea for there are historical issues would be a good candidate. Large areas of Eastern China have Korean population.

Its imperative for India to work for unification of Korea for long term changes.

In mean time need to find a short term solution in Outer Mongolia and/or Vietnam.
Not to forget Indonesia and Taiwan, who are most emphatically not Sinophiles.

Namo Namah! With a name like yours, you should have got the message from my above post!

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 10 May 2011 07:30

Day one of the U.S. China dialogue: Lots of talk, no new deals

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 13 May 2011 09:04

Top-level talks between US and China are essential, but not enough

US-China economic relationship

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 15 May 2011 22:49

http://www.eurasiareview.com/osama-bin- ... -15052011/

Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan And China – Analysis
Written by: SAAG

China and 26/11 in India:

As far as India is concerned, India has always maintained that like bin Laden, other dreaded terrorists have also found sanctuary in Pakistan. Some of the most wanted terrorist such the mastermind of the 26.11 Mumbai attack and LeT founder Hafiz Saeed, Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Maulana Masood Azhar, the principal accused in the 2001 Parliament attack who was released in exchange of hostages in the Kandahar hijack episode in 1999, and the underworld don Dawood Ibrahim, responsible for the 1991 Bombay bomb blasts have all found shelter in Pakistan. These have been used by Pakistan as assets against India and have rendered them protection. When asked if China would ask Pakistan to transfer the killers involved in Mumbai attack by a reporter to Jiang Yu, she said, “We uphold principles of non-interference in other’s internal affairs. Chinese government will continue to support Pakistan in formulating and implementing anti-terrorist activities based on its national conditions.” We have seen that how the Chinese press absolved Pakistan from 26.11 Mumbai attacks and blamed it on some Hindu fundamentalists as Kasab and others were supporting the Hindu sacred thread on their wrists. If we analyze the Chinese news for domestic consumption, we would see that it has always supported the stand of Pakistan irrespective of its brazen involvement whether it was the reportage of the Kargil, attack on the Indian parliament or the Mumbai attacks in Chinese media.

This is primarily because China does not recognize the thesis of cross-border terrorism, especially in south Asian context. China must not forget that it has equal and diverse nationalities that account for 8.49% of the population and inhabit 64% of the total land area of China, particularly, Xinjiang that borders 8 countries including India. The stability in the region according to the Chinese government has been endangered by the forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism as well as narcotic smuggling. China is aware of the Trans border nationalism and its effects in Xinjiang. According to Chinese sources, there are over 50 East Turkestan separatist organizations in Xinjiang; and between 1990 and 2001 there have been 360 terror incidents causing 162 causalities and injuring over 440 people. The activities of Eastern Turkestan Movement before and after the Olympics are well known, especially the July 5th 2009 Urmuqi violence that rendered 197 dead and 1700 injured. As far as extremism or religious fundamentalism is concerned, China so far has blamed the pan Islamic religious fundamentalism emanating from Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan for armed smuggling, supporting East Turkestan Liberation Organization and creating instability and extremism in Xinjiang. It is mum on Pakistan albeit has admitted since 2001 that al Qaeda was in hand and glove with the Xinjiang ‘terrorists’.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 18 May 2011 09:40

Ferguson vs. Kissinger on the future of China, and what it means for Americans

The West and the Rest: the Changing Global Balance of Power in Historical Perspective: Niall Ferguson

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 18 May 2011 13:12

abhishek_sharma wrote:The West and the Rest: the Changing Global Balance of Power in Historical Perspective: Niall Ferguson

Kissinger's argument is therefore that one cannot expect Chinese policymakers, particularly foreign policy-makers, to behave in ways that we can
recognise using our traditional categories in international relations. They are not Realists, nor are they idealists. They do not pursue the balance of power or indeed any other of the goals that we associate with Western statecraft and diplomacy. They seek, and this is one of his most important arguments, to balance in some sense the barbarians against one another, to play them off against one another. But they also seek to draw some of the barbarians into a tender embrace from which it is hard to escape.

May be Kissinger does understand the importance of Pakistan. Who uses the Islamists to wage war on whom!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 May 2011 09:23

Thinking over the material gathered in this thread and the previous one I came to a one liner:

PRC is the Lehman Brothers of the US-PRC-TSP power system.

Take them down and the whole thing crashes down.

PRC provides the low cost goods and buys Treasury notes from US.

US keeps TSP viable financially and gives them weapons that allows them to threaten India.

PRC provides nuke weapons to TSP to threaten India.

Its PRC that is the linchpin and not either of the other two.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 19 May 2011 10:03

ramana wrote:PRC provides the low cost goods and buys Treasury notes from US.

<snip>

Its PRC that is the linchpin and not either of the other two.

When PRC hints that there is not enough space in Asia for both of us, one corollary is that they mean, that there is no place for a second factory of the world, and they fear that if India establishes itself as a manufacturing hub on a similar scale as China, it would collapse their whole economic model of manufacturing monopoly. It also has to do with access to resources. There aren't enough resources to feed the industries of both nations at low prices. With competition in the market for commodity resources, the commodities would shoot up in price, and Chinese goods may become uncompetitive if the major portion of the costs of production are in procurement and not labor. Thirdly with India's growing labor force due to changing demographics and improving infrastructure, it is possible that the production lines move to India, and then India gets a hold both in services as well as manufacturing.

csharma · Post by **csharma** » 19 May 2011 11:42

Nial Fergusson writes about Mughal India in the context of British. Where were the Mughals when the British were in India? Thought he was a historian.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 19 May 2011 15:01

the first british traders arrived during jahangir's time and were overawed by the grandeur of the court, but only en masse after aurangzeb, the opportunity they exploited was the collapse of mughal power, even though for a while they absorbed themselves into the delhi court and its life. that all changed after the company began to take over

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 19 May 2011 20:22

csharma wrote:Nial Fergusson writes about Mughal India in the context of British. Where were the Mughals when the British were in India? Thought he was a historian.

Their historical narratives and what they want of India is very selective. It shows in his book Empire. The entire story is not told but Indians have to do now research on this and How the British benefited from their policies in India. THis is extensive and this is a govt funded project.

British are careful when they describe 1900-1940 without mentioning India. This period is the decline in British Empire.

1940-1950 is the total collapse of the empire and what they did to the India and partition is carefully filtered for the western audience. All the reference to India and Indians have been removed from their history narrative from 1975.

Check their narratives about India and Indians in any new ones.
Check their interpretations of the history wrt India in the new narrative.
When you recognize this then you can conclude on what they want to emphasize and what they want to suppress.

Arihant · Post by **Arihant** » 20 May 2011 18:32

ramana wrote:
Arihant wrote: Not to forget Indonesia and Taiwan, who are most emphatically not Sinophiles.

Namo Namah! With a name like yours, you should have got the message from my above post!

Only bits of the message coming through (lots of static on the line...). Taiwan and Indonesia will be lost opportunities for us - for sinophiles they are not. We cling to old cliches. Namo Nityang...

Klaus · Post by **Klaus** » 23 May 2011 20:08

ramana wrote:Thinking over the material gathered in this thread and the previous one I came to a one liner:

PRC is the Lehman Brothers of the US-PRC-TSP power system.

Take them down and the whole thing crashes down.

PRC provides the low cost goods and buys Treasury notes from US.

US keeps TSP viable financially and gives them weapons that allows them to threaten India.

PRC provides nuke weapons to TSP to threaten India.

Its PRC that is the linchpin and not either of the other two.

For taking down this lynchpin, Uttarapatha of Bharatha will need complete overhaul. The lynchpin will only collapse when the advance is made from Uttara-patha restored to its original state. Whereas TSP can be taken down via current Dakshina-patha.

There is an article on Uttara-patha and Dakshina-Patha in the Distorted History thread. Dakshina Patha is a reverse S shaped entity and has got more effective nodal function, Uttarapatha is just a shrivelled up relic of its former self, a hollow shell with a serious rot developed within. Link

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 23 May 2011 20:22

^^^
I could be wrong, but my reading is that in the past the Uttara-patha was always strengthened, and in times of retreat, rejuvenated and restrengthened by Magadha. the lack of any regional pride in present day Magadha is what's keeping Uttara-patha, and as a consequence, Bharat, down. I think we are seeing the beginning of that in Bihar today. once awareness takes root of what Magadha once was, I think that is when the internal enemies of Bharat will really start trembling. I know I'm dramatizing it, but a resurgent Magadha can crush the pseudo-secs, Commies, assorted Islamist networks, and consolidate Bharat-varsha.

Klaus · Post by **Klaus** » 23 May 2011 20:29

^^^ Magadha with its fullest geographical reach will be needed along with Rudra-resident land to take down the lynchpin. At the moment, a plan with Dakshina-patha striking the first blow is what is necessary, its geographical and political nodes are better synchronised than Uttara-Patha at the moment, also Dakshina-Patha has the capability to elongate the other half of its S curve southwards through alliances with dharmic nations!

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 23 May 2011 20:44

^^^
agreed that Uttara's Dharmic networking aspects have take a severe beating, to the point of widespread disarray and delusion, over a period of 1400 years. one reason for Magadha's deracination today is b/c it's original size has been forgotten and lost. Bengal and the fertile lands of BD was all part of Magadha. the mouths of the Ganges and Brahmaputra were in Magadha. but modern Bihar has lost control of these crucial river systems, especially their draining basins.

anyway, here's an interesting news:

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... ouse-bihar

Nitish said Bihar these days is bubbling with high spirit in every sector. "When other places were in darkness, Bihar was at its zenith of civilization. Now it is in the process of revival," he said.

http://ibnlive.in.com/generalnewsfeed/n ... 95562.html

Nitish Kumar today launched Bihar's first River Patrolling Police Station (RPPS) on the banks of the Ganges near Maujipur village under Fatuha police station in Patna district on May 20. The first-ever RPPS has been built at a cost of Rs 56 lakh in just two months, official sources said. Chief Minister also inaugurated 131 police buildings, including model police stations and newly constructed police stations the same day. Though the state government identified 18 places on the banks of important rivers for setting up of RPPS in Bihar, initially, it would start functioning at five places covering a long stretch of the Ganges, Kosi and Gandak rivers. The RPPSs would be set up at Patna Rural (Fatuha), Naugachhia, Bagaha, Supaul and Darbhanga.

^^^interesting that Nitish is developing a law and order network on the rivers. the immediate reasons for this are given of course, but an integral consciousness of the rivers could have more fundamental influences over long term.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 May 2011 08:07

Columbia Uty's Journal of International Affairs has a special issue devoted to Sino-India relations:

http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/in-the-journal/286

Some of the articles are pdfs. Read rest by buying a copy or at Borders. Or wait for a couple of months to get the pdfs.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 01 Jun 2011 08:11

Henry Kissinger discusses his book 'On China' (video)

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 01 Jun 2011 08:13

In the Prologue of the book - On China has some interesting quote by Mao during the 1962 war.

Mao says that China does not need to wage war against India since it is peaceful

He quotes war with India 1000 years ago and says now it is needed for peace