Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation

arun · Post by **arun** » 10 Mar 2011 08:18

MARCH 9, 2011, 10:12 P.M. ET

Pakistani Man Charged Over Shipments to Pakistan's Nuclear Program

By EVAN PEREZ

WASHINGTON—U.S. prosecutors on Wednesday charged a Pakistani man with running a smuggling operation that shipped materials and equipment to the agencies operating Pakistan's nuclear program.

A grand-jury indictment in Baltimore accuses Nadeem Akhtar, 45 years old, who operated an export firm in Maryland, of obtaining the items from U.S. companies and illegally exporting them to agencies that are on a U.S. Commerce Department blacklist.

Prosecutors said the materials include radiation-detection devices, calibration equipment and nuclear-grade resins that can be used "directly or indirectly in activities related to nuclear reactors and the processing and production of nuclear-related materials." …………………….

WSJ

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 10 Mar 2011 08:23

We need to dredge early reports of TSP offering Iran, Libya and anyone else suff they got for free from PRC.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 13 Mar 2011 14:37

From ISIS:
Image analysis of the Fourth Military Reactor at the Khushab Nuclear Site

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Mar 2011 23:51

SSridhar, Gerard and Gagan et al, I am looking for refs where TSP offered AQK material to Iran but they refused it. I know they handed over old centrifuges from TSP to Un inspectors there were also other details. We need Iran nuke/missile thread to make sense of the issues.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 16 Mar 2011 14:10

ramana wrote:SSridhar, Gerard and Gagan et al, I am looking for refs where TSP offered AQK material to Iran but they refused it. I know they handed over old centrifuges from TSP to Un inspectors there were also other details. We need Iran nuke/missile thread to make sense of the issues.

Ramana - don't know if this helps - but it's from my personal archives

http://www.dailyindia.com/show/186385.p ... -70s-help-
Pakistan-proliferate-nuclear-weapons
Did US Governments since '70s help Pakistan proliferate nuclear weapons?
From our ANI Correspondent

London, Oct 27(ANI): Every US Government from Jimmy Carter to George W Bush has condoned Pakistan's nuclear activity, rewriting and destroying evidence provided by the US and Western intelligence agencies.

The Asian Age report by its correspondent Sarju Kaul quotes Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott, the authors of "Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Weapons Conspiracy" as saying that that the successive US Governments looked the other way when they received information about the activities of Pakistan from their own intelligence agencies.

On some occasions government agencies sanitised reports by their own intelligence agencies "by either rewriting them or destroying all evidence painstaking collected " which helped Islamabad achieve its nuclear goals clandestinely.

In a sensational disclosure, the authors of the book say that "Evidence was destroyed, criminal files were diverted, the US Congress was repeated lied to, and in several cases, in 1986 and 1987, presidential appointees even tipped off the Pakistan government to prevent its agents from getting caught in the US Customs Services stings that aimed to catch them buying nuclear components in America"

The objective of successive US administrations was to obtain Pakistan's cooperation in the war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and now Pakistan's cooperation in war on terror. The authors of the book claim that ' Pakistan was still busy selling its nuclear secrets in the world market". ccording to European analysts and Saudi intelligence officials who plotted Khan's spending, the Khan Research Laboratory (KRL) was only able to advance by using US aid money intended for Pakistan's infrastructure and into the covert aid dispatched by the CIA to arm the mujahideen factions pitted against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Britain had informed Washington about its concerns that Pakistan was diverting US aid and covert CIA funds to its bomb, the book quoted a British diplomat, as saying.

"Our compatriots in the US heard our concerns. We made them forcibly. But they didn't want to turn off the tap or even pressure Pakistan." The diplomat added.

The Pakistan-controlled Bank of Credit and Commerce International, which collapsed in 1991, according to the book, was one of the major avenues of funds transfer.

"To access CIA money was relatively easy. Bags of dollars were flown into Pakistan and handed over to Lt. General Akhtar Adbur Rehman, the ISI director. Rahman banked the cash in ISI accounts held by the National Bank of Pakistan, BCCI and Bank of Oman (one-third owned by BCCI)," the book says.

"KRL was also associated with these banks, enabling Rehman or Ghulam Ishaq Khan (who was in charge of project's finances from 1973 to 1988, and later became President of Pakistan) to dip into the CIA money and redistribute it to (A.Q.) Khan without raising suspicion," the book adds.

Other US money was channelled to the KRL through the BCCI Foundation, a Pakistan-based charity set up by BCCI founder Agha Hasan Abedi in 1981, the Asian Age quotes the authors, as saying.

However, despite warnings, the Reagan Administration continually denied it's involvement.

Pakistan to had realised that it could not always depend on US aid to finance its nuclear programme. Efforts were made to keep the nuclear project running and look beyond US aid.

In early 1985, an elite group of principals began highly secretive meetings to explore how to trade KRL's skills and assets, the book says.

Part of the motivation to sell nuclear technology came from General Zia's long-held view that Pakistan should share its weapons technology with the wider Muslim ummah.

"The subject was first tentatively broached with potential customers in September 1985, when a delegation from Pakistan's Foreign Ministry met their counterparts from Iran, Syria and Libya to discuss strategic cooperation," the book says.

The nuclear relationship between Pakistan and Iran formally started in February 1986, when Islamabad offered to help Iran with its stalled nuclear programme and Dr A.Q. Khan visited the country.

In the summer of 1987, Khan, along with a group of aides, discussed the list of material ordered by Tehran: "A sample machine (disassembled), including drawings, specifications, and calculations for a 'complete plant', and material for 2,000 centrifuge machines."

The Pakistan Army top brass, right from the time of General Zia-ul-Haq to General Pervez Musharraf, knew about the secret deals engineered by disgraced nuclear scientist Dr A Q Khan.

The Asian Age quotes the authors as saying that the technology for the nuclear bomb was offered to Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya and other nations by Dr A Q Khan's network.

General Mirza Aslam Beg, who took over as the Army chief after General Zia's death, has been quoted by the authors as saying that the annual budget for the KRL, at Kahuta was only 18 million dollars a year.

However, just an analysis of the costs of shopping in North America and Europe by Pakistan in 1984 and 1985, according to the book, was estimated by Western intelligence agencies as between 550-700 million dollars.

Under General Zia, Pakistan had also facilitated a deal between China and Riyadh for the sale of missiles, and also proposed the sale of nuclear warheads to Saudi Arabia.

Even after General Zia died in a plane crash in August 1988, the Pakistan Army's control over the nuclear programme was total, so much so that democratically-elected then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was not allowed to know even one detail about the programme and weapons development.

In fact, General Beg thrice openly told US officials, including Ambassador Richard Oakley, that Pakistan would share nuclear technology with Iran.

The Pakistan military by now had also adapted F-16s to carry nuclear warheads, something that the US Government had kept reassuring the US Congress it would never do.

During Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's tenure, the Pakistan military got a new client for its nuclear arsenal: North Korea. General Beg also reached out to Iraq's President Saddam Hussein. His envoy offered a nuclear bomb to Baghdad just after Saddam had invaded Kuwait, the book adds.

After the offer to Baghdad, General Beg decided to go to Tehran and offered the Iranians the bomb too (on completion of the earlier order of centrifuge parts and fully functioning centrifuges).

Tehran agreed to the deal, ordered four devices and suggested that shipment be made via Kazakhstan, the authors add.

However, the deal did not materialise eventually. The Iranians asked for blueprints for German-designed centrifuge designs, and this was sold in 1995 by the Pakistan military, the book says.

The Saudis were supplied nuclear warheads for their Chinese missiles, the book says. The US, in a familiar pattern, refused to believe its own intelligence agencies and was satisfied with a simple denial by Riyadh.

The US felt the first pinch when in 1993 terrorist bombers targeted the World Trade Centre in New York.

Ramzi Yousef, a Pakistani, was identified as one of the key planners. However, in continuation of the old US policy on Pakistan, the new Clinton administration offered to deliver F-16s, which Islamabad had ordered four years ago, in return for a nuclear rollback.

Barely three years after being sacked, Benazir Bhutto won another election, and this time she, on Dr A.Q. Khan's insistence, went to visit North Korea and carried back a bag full of CDs and blueprints for the army, the book says.

In return for the 1993 Nodong missile deal, Pakistan offered Pyongyang a uranium enrichment plant in lieu of cash in 1996. In 1998, A.Q. Khan also went on a series of trips to Africa with his usual contingent of agents, suppliers and KRL scientists.

The Pakistan bomb became public soon after India conducted a nuclear test on May 11, 1998. Islamabad, in response, tested its own device swiftly. Pakistan had formally announced its status to the world.

Even with the change in government after the coup by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999, the proliferation went on, claims the book.

In the CIA's biannual report to the US Congress on acquisition of WMD technology in 2000, Pakistan was for the first time described as a potential supplier of blackmarket technology, The Asian Age reports.

After George W Bush became US President, the report says, " for a while it seemed that the US would change its policy of obfuscation" and start getting tough on Pakistan for nuclear proliferation.

The father of the Pakistani bomb, A.Q. Khan, was made the fall guy. In a deal sewn up by the Bush Administration with General Musharraf, Khan admitted to having led unauthorised proliferation activities and gave a clean chit to the Pakistan Government.

It was agreed that A.Q. Khan and his aides would be arrested and charged with "privately" engaging in proliferation, but they would not be extradited and all the questioning would be done only through the ISI. The country's military, which was the real power behind the nuclear programme, was left untouched.

The report says that Pakistan was, however, again saved after the US realised that it needed an ally in the region after the September 11, 2001 attacks by al Qaeda.

Pakistan, far from being an ally of the West, is a "rogue nation at the epicentre of world destabilisation" and "continues to sell nuclear weapons technology" to clients known and unknown even as President Pervez Musharraf denies it, the book claims.

"Pakistan continues to sell nuclear weapons technology which means either that the sales are being carried out with Musharraf's secret blessing, or that he did not know and is no more in control of his country's nuclear programme," the book observes.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 16 Mar 2011 18:07

ramana wrote:SSridhar, Gerard and Gagan et al, I am looking for refs where TSP offered AQK material to Iran but they refused it. I know they handed over old centrifuges from TSP to Un inspectors there were also other details. We need Iran nuke/missile thread to make sense of the issues.

I have "deception" by Catherine... with me, will look it up, if it has something.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 16 Mar 2011 21:22

Ok, from the book, you can infer that TSP did offer, most decidedly in 1986, discussions started in 1984, which was a reaction to Iraq bombing Busher. Some items were transferred but Iran wanted to build rather than acquire a capability. But TSP was not the only one helping Iran, Iran was being helped by PRC too in the matter and some of the PRC help was in turn procured from TSP, stolen by Khan from URENCO.

Iran did not pursue this entire thing, primarily due to a lack of technical skills in the country and this capability being not a priority for the Ayatollahs.

The Author's references are Dr Rehman, members of Iranian resistance and other public sources.

So, did they specifically "reject"? I would say no, but their heart was set on a different route. So, the word "reject" may not be correct.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Mar 2011 21:37

I am looking for contacts around 1992.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 16 Mar 2011 23:33

ramana wrote:I am looking for contacts around 1992.

Attached is an Ayatollah report from half bright. See if it answers your query. But, to me the read seems to be, Iran was looking to build its technology base and not just import and use. Libya probably fits that category better.

http://www.isis-online.org/publications ... ations.pdf

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 17 Mar 2011 15:52

I think we should change the title of this thread to Pakistan, China and Nuclear Proliferation. China should not get a pass.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 07 Apr 2011 11:24

Khuzdar Missile Complex

Pakistan's Khuzdar Missile Complex just south of Khuzdar township, Balochistan.
Storage for MRBMs and Nuclear Weapons.

The base is still under construction, but a few TELAR garages and possible tunnels have already been constructed. Google is not updating past images which will show the construction of the TELAR garages and the tunnel network.

Notice one particular long straight road which might eventually be used as an airstrip, although the township has a small airstrip a few Kms north of the base.

Guess who makes an appearance on a hillock.

Narad · Post by **Narad** » 07 Apr 2011 11:27

Gagan Saar, excellent work as always.

I am very eager to see what gurus have to say.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 08 Apr 2011 01:21

Beyond excellent, that's bloody awesome!!! I look at something like that all i see is various shades of brown...

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 14 Apr 2011 05:51

Gagan. you should *really* put a website up so that you can showcase all of your work in one place!

Call it "Secret Pakistan" or "Bunkeristan" or something! It should be linked from the main BR site as well!

Its a great way to unnerve the Pakistanis by exposing their crown jewels, as well as all their covert hosting of the drone program, the Chinese encroachment, etc.

Its also a great expose of the ways in which aid to Pakistan is diverted and misused - what taxpayer wants to support this?

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 14 Apr 2011 07:20

Gagan, I completely agree with Johann's idea of a website. Please do that asap.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 14 Apr 2011 15:05

^^^ + all members of BRF I'm sure

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 14 Apr 2011 15:28

Simply awesome Gagan ji..second Johanns idea of a website linked to BR. deserves more eyeballs really..

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 14 Apr 2011 15:52

Gagan I apologise for this personal question - but does the word histopathology have any special significance for you?

PS why not space on BR itself for this? Webmasters?

I have made a request for this on the appropriate page linked below.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1069980

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 14 Apr 2011 17:33

tha map of pakistan with kashmere should leave no one in any doubt as to the jarnails intentions...

ManishH · Post by **ManishH** » 15 Apr 2011 14:22

GaganJi, appreciate your analysis of

Kirana Hills (31.9565932N 72.6989928E)

This shows a silo (or gobar gas plant?) with a hardened shelter similar to Khuzdar ...
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.9740872&lo ... 36632&z=19

Older shelters (sloped design) ...
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.9565932&lo ... 89928&z=19

Newer shelters (note the sloping wall in front of the entrance) look
like command and control shelters designed to protect humans inside.
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.941315&lon=72.7031609&z=19

FEMA article on design of monolithic dome shelters ...
http://static.monolithic.com/thedome/wi ... index.html

boundary wall with sentry post
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.9725241&lo ... 94622&z=19

railway station (with a standing train?)
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.9548226&lo ... 40361&z=19

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 15 Apr 2011 19:11

Hi Manish,
I have made an analysis of the Kirana Hills / Sargodha complex on the previous page, you might want to go through it.

Here is a link to that post: Link

To elaborate a little more (& since I have time on my hands today)
Basically the small building you are referring to:

ManishH wrote:This shows a silo (or gobar gas plant?) with a hardened shelter similar to Khuzdar ...
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.9740872&lo ... 36632&z=19

are shelters / hardened bunkers for storing SRBM M-11(DF-11 / Hatf-II) & M-9 (Shaheen-I) missiles. The missiles have since been redistributed to as many as half a dozen installations across Pakistan.
But there are other longer hardened shelters which house MRBMs (Ghauri / No Dongs) in the kirana hills area.
These bunkers are build such that a TELAR parked inside can come outside the bunker onto the hardened apron area in front and launch its missile from there itself. This would have meant that the pakistanis would have to have exact coordinates, altitude of the launch site so that they can feed target data into the missile. These pakistani missiles are not particularly intelligent, and rely on 60s and 70s era technology - mostly inefficient rocket motors, heavy bodies, older generation INS resulting in poor range and very poor CEPs. The Chinese missiles are still better, but the North Korean No Dongs / Shaheen series are notoriously unreliable.

ManishH wrote:Older shelters (sloped design) ...
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.9565932&lo ... 89928&z=19

Newer shelters (note the sloping wall in front of the entrance) look
like command and control shelters designed to protect humans inside.
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.941315&lon=72.7031609&z=19

Most of these are meant to hold conventional ammunition inside. The Kirana hills is the largest weapons depot in Pakistan. There are some bunkers that are meant to hold personnel safely in the event of an attack.

ManishH wrote:boundary wall with sentry post
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.9725241&lo ... 94622&z=19

This particular boundary wall isolates the Short Range Missile storage facility from the rest of the ammo depot. You can follow the boundary wall as it goes around the entire missile facility.

ManishH wrote:railway station (with a standing train?)
http://wikimapia.org/#lat=31.9548226&lo ... 40361&z=19

This is part of the older ammo depot which holds conventional ammo. Railway lines are usually present in such depots all over the world. In many instances these lines go right upto the bunker opening itself.

Raghavendra · Post by **Raghavendra** » 16 Apr 2011 12:13

Pakistan in illicit nuclear trafficking activities? http://www.zeenews.com/news700100.html

Washington: Alleging that Pakistan remains an active procurer of nuclear dual-use goods and utilises highly sophisticated networks to obtain what it needs, a leading US think-tank has asked the Obama Administration to stop Islamabad's illicit nuclear trafficking activities.

Referring to the chargesheet against a Pakistani man living in Maryland for illegally buying US goods with nuclear dual-use applications between 2005 and 2010 and sending them to Pakistan, Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security said this highlights the need to improve US government/industry cooperation and information sharing to detect illicit procurement networks.

The two Pakistani entities which received goods through this alleged illicit procurement operation were the Chashma nuclear power plant (CNPP) and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).

"This cooperation should encourage more corporate diligence about checking the bona fides of a customer and include the US government sharing more information about current illicit procurement schemes," said David Albright and Andrea Stricker in a statement.

"It also shows that Pakistan remains an active procurer of nuclear dual-use goods and utilizes highly sophisticated networks to obtain what it needs. As an ally, the United States should insist that Pakistan stop its illicit nuclear trafficking activities and prove it is truly committed to global non-proliferation norms and laws," the two leading American scholar said.

The indictment alleges that Nadeem Akhtar, a Pakistani national, conspired with others to illegally export restricted goods and technology to Pakistan without the necessary licenses, specifically radiation detection devices, resins for coolant water purification, calibration and switching equipment and surface refinishing abrasives.

The indictment alleges that Akhtar attempted to conceal the ultimate end-use and/or end-users of the commodities that he sought to purchase and export, and their true value by causing false, misleading and incomplete information to be placed on documents such as invoices, purchase orders, air bills and end-user statements. The indictment also alleges that Akhtar transported funds to carry out this illegal activity.

"Pakistan publicly claims to be a responsible nuclear nation and says it wants a civilian nuclear trade deal as a result. Yet, its illicit nuclear procurement efforts remain steadfast and belie its claims of acting like a responsible nation," the think-tank said.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 16 Apr 2011 17:29

The report mentioned by Raghavendra's post is available here:
ISIS Reports: Man Charged with Exporting U.S. Goods to Pakistan’s Nuclear Program

The report ends with:

Finally, this case study shows that Pakistan remains an active procurer of nuclear dual-use goods and utilizes highly sophisticated networks to obtain what it needs. This case reveals that Pakistan also appears to hold or threaten to hold its procurement agents accountable for delays and failures to obtain needed goods, a sign of how confident Pakistan appears to be in obtaining goods despite knowing that its agents are violating U.S. laws.

Pakistan publicly claims to be a responsible nuclear nation and says it wants a civilian nuclear trade deal as a result. Yet, its illicit nuclear procurement efforts remain steadfast and belie its claims of acting like a responsible nation. As an ally, the United States should insist that Pakistan stop its illicit nuclear trafficking activities and prove it is truly committed to global non-proliferation norms and laws.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 19 Apr 2011 14:54

Published on Apr 15, 2011
By Yogesh Joshi
Understanding U.S. Policy on China-Pakistan Nuclear Deal: World Politics Review

Sourcing from elsewhere, as subscription dependent:

Code: Select all

http://www.pkarticleshub.com/2011/04/17/understanding-u-s-policy-on-china-pakistan-nuclear-deal/

China, however, never went to the NSG for a waiver. And although U.S. nonproliferation hawks made a lot of noise when the Sino-Pakistani deal was announced in the summer of 2010, it now appears that the U.S. has tacitly approved the deal. On a recent visit to China, Robert Blake, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Central and South Asia, expressed U.S. acceptance of the new plants as a way to address Pakistan’s chronic energy deficits.

The reason for China’s decision to forego an NSG waiver is straightforward. Unlike the U.S.-India nuclear deal, China would never have received approval from the NSG for civilian cooperation with Pakistan without full-scope IAEA safeguards. First, aside from China, none of the NSG members will benefit from allowing the Sino-Pakistani nuclear deal to go through. Whereas the U.S.-India nuclear deal effectively opened India to the international nuclear market, bringing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of trade to the table, civilian nuclear cooperation with an ailing economy like Pakistan’s was a nonstarter. Indeed, China will invest 80 percent of the capital required for the new nuclear plants. Second, it takes a great deal of political capital to get the NSG, a nonproliferation norms-enforcer, to agree on exceptions like the Sino-Pakistani deal. China may be a rising power with considerable global political clout, but it can hardly match the influence of the U.S. when it comes to the nonproliferation regime.

Washington’s silence on the deal is more surprising, however. The Chinese decision to bypass the NSG constitutes a serious challenge to the norm-based nuclear order. Even if outlier states like India and Pakistan need to be accommodated in the nonproliferation regime, the process of accommodation needs to be “orderly and coordinated.” While the U.S.-India nuclear deal was an exception to established norms, it was based on a process of democratic accountability and global consensus. Unlike Pakistan, India has an unblemished nonproliferation record. Moreover, India also implicitly agreed to continue its voluntary moratorium on further nuclear weapons testing and to seriously consider signing disarmament treaties such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. The Sino-Pakistani nuclear deal does not further the cause of nonproliferation and disarmament, since it fails to extract guarantees and commitments, whether explicit or implicit, from Pakistan. Nor does it enjoy the kind of universal support that the U.S.-India nuclear agreement did.

Two factors help to explain the U.S. position. First, had the U.S. attempted to force China to go to the NSG for an exception and the group ultimately denied the request, there was a strong probability that China would exit the group altogether. With global demand for nuclear energy set to rise, Washington preferred that Beijing remain half-inside the nuclear nonproliferation regime rather than go fully rogue. Second, allowing the Sino-Pakistani deal to go through will assuage Pakistan’s anxieties vis-à-vis India. The U.S. engagement with Pakistan is one of the most complex strategic relationships of 21st century, and the U.S.-India deal created a lot of bad blood between Islamabad and Washington. Pakistan has often demanded that it receive the same treatment as India, but to no avail. Domestic U.S. politics and Pakistan’s checkered nuclear past rule out any possibility of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear energy sector. By removing itself as an obstacle to China’s nuclear relationship with Pakistan, the U.S. is attempting to consolidate its position in Pakistan by pacifying its troublesome ally.

Nevertheless, U.S. reticence on the issue should not be interpreted as a sign of relative decline or a kowtow to China. Even since the financial crisis, the U.S. has increased its commitments in East and Southeast Asia. It has supplied arms to Taiwan and has stood firmly behind Japan and Vietnam on their territorial disputes with China. And despite innumerable warnings issued by China, the U.S. has continued conducting naval exercises in and around the South China Sea and the Korean peninsula.

U.S. acceptance of China-Pakistan nuclear engagement flows from American strategic interests in Pakistan and the desire to keep China in the nonproliferation regime. As such, it is a reflection not of its declining power relative to China, but of a savvy diplomatic approach to two thorny problems.

Yogesh Joshi is a graduate student at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and a CSIS-Pacific Forum Young Leader.

Seems like a jholawala trying to wipe off American sins of nuclear proliferation!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Jun 2011 20:41

X-Posting for sake of completeness....

Philip wrote:Will be crossposted,but where will the Saudis get their N-weapons from? No prizes for the correct answer.A transfer (if not already safe in Saudi Arabia) of warheads from the Pakia arsenal,of Chinese origin and funded by the Saudis .This report might also explain the indecent haste with which Pak is building new reactors and increasing dramatically production of N-warheads.Western sources also say that Iran has conducted secret tests of N-warhead capable missiles and recent official tests of its 2000+km missile that can reach Israel has shown that it has made significant progress and has all the capabilities,human resources,tech. base,etc., to build N-capable ballistic missiles.

This has added a new dimension to world N-proliferation.The N-genie allowed to be let loose in Pak,is now getting out of control as an indifferent west allows Pak to expand its illegal N-weapons industry.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ju ... apons-iran

Riyadh will build nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, Saudi prince warns
Prospect of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East is raised by senior diplomat and member of the Saudi ruling family.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 30 Jun 2011 21:52

ramana wrote:SSridhar, Gerard and Gagan et al, I am looking for refs where TSP offered AQK material to Iran but they refused it. I know they handed over old centrifuges from TSP to Un inspectors there were also other details. We need Iran nuke/missile thread to make sense of the issues.

Check the IAEA report around 2002, I think US had to tell IAEA to shutup about the Paki role. Paki's were kneck deep, the arabs have all his manifests and where he travelled. 44 times to Dubai and then onwards to Bandar abbas to isfahan - tehran etc. He was really active for about 4 years in transferring the gear.

Have a look at the following names:
Sultan Bashir uddin Mahmud
Abdul Majeed Khan

These were the guys arrested for helping to build Taleb Nuke capability.

Regarding Tehran:
There were about a dozen guys involved in 2003.

The Iranians - Mohammed Ayatollahi - he visited Pak several times throughout the 90s to get the technical cooperation.
Mohsen Fakhri Zadeh Mahabaden - He trained with AQK.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 02 Jul 2011 10:50

Video report:
US 'considering' further missions inside Pakistan

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 07 Jul 2011 06:17

Pakistan’s nuclear-bomb maker says North Korea paid bribes for know-how

Abdul Qadeer Khan has made available documents that he says support his claim that he personally transferred more than $3 million in payments by North Korea to senior officers in the Pakistani military, which he says subsequently approved his sharing of technical know-how and equipment with North Korean scientists.

Some Western intelligence officials and other experts have said that they think the letter is authentic and that it offers confirmation of a transaction they have long suspected but could never prove.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 07 Jul 2011 06:19

Anujan wrote:Pakistan’s nuclear-bomb maker says North Korea paid bribes for know-how

Abdul Qadeer Khan has made available documents that he says support his claim that he personally transferred more than $3 million in payments by North Korea to senior officers in the Pakistani military, which he says subsequently approved his sharing of technical know-how and equipment with North Korean scientists.

Some Western intelligence officials and other experts have said that they think the letter is authentic and that it offers confirmation of a transaction they have long suspected but could never prove.

Thanks for cross posting.

If Korea was up to speed with Pu designs why on earth did they want Uranium enrichment? Smells like they knew the Pu business was not working.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 07 Jul 2011 06:40

Anujan wrote:Pakistan’s nuclear-bomb maker says North Korea paid bribes for know-how

Abdul Qadeer Khan has made available documents that he says support his claim that he personally transferred more than $3 million in payments by North Korea to senior officers in the Pakistani military, which he says subsequently approved his sharing of technical know-how and equipment with North Korean scientists.

Some Western intelligence officials and other experts have said that they think the letter is authentic and that it offers confirmation of a transaction they have long suspected but could never prove.

The report is most likely true. AQK put a CD in Benazir's Bhutto pocket on a visit to N. Korea and she personally delivered them. TSP was peddling the PRC supplied Pu designs too.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 07 Jul 2011 06:49

ShauryaT wrote:The report is most likely true. AQK put a CD in Benazir's Bhutto pocket on a visit to N. Korea and she personally delivered them. TSP was peddling the PRC supplied Pu designs too.

Did PRC supply Pu designs? I can't recall reading that anywhere.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 07 Jul 2011 07:12

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:The report is most likely true. AQK put a CD in Benazir's Bhutto pocket on a visit to N. Korea and she personally delivered them. TSP was peddling the PRC supplied Pu designs too.
Did PRC supply Pu designs? I can't recall reading that anywhere.

When Libya/Gaddafi was arm twisted to come clean, on the documents recovered the designs still had Chinese language markings, supplied by AQK. My recollection is they were Pu designs, I will dig in from my materials to confirm.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 07 Jul 2011 07:42

Anujan wrote:Pakistan’s nuclear-bomb maker says North Korea paid bribes for know-how

Letter from North Korean official to A.Q. Khan

Ambar · Post by **Ambar** » 07 Jul 2011 08:28

NRao wrote:
Anujan wrote:Pakistan’s nuclear-bomb maker says North Korea paid bribes for know-how
Letter from North Korean official to A.Q. Khan

Odd,so although AQK was supplying the nuclear know-how to PRK, his actions were not supported by the ISI ? PRK is very conspicuous in its allegation that ISI along with CIA was solely responsible for the assassination of PRK officer's wife. Few questions :

a) Is there a clear rift within TSPA ? If AQK was helping PRK's nuclear projects along with Karamat and Zulfiqar Khan but it does not mention Musharraf or Ziauddin Butt. So was AQK and some runaway generals acting on their own in total defiance of ISI and COAS ?

b) Why was PRK looking for help from Pakistan when they could've easily gained it from Pandas ?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Jul 2011 21:04

b)
Plausible deniability for Pandas.

Its all Panda droppings anyways. Only delivery boy is different.

Panda chose TSP to deliver goods to NoKo for TSP is Uncle's munna.
Uncle wont hit munna so India wont get an upper hand.

On other hand Panda could get economic hits from uncle. Now no plausible reason to do so.

a) it could be a sub-plot with wheels within wheels.
Maybe the NoKo diplomutt's wife was offed by ISI due to a supari from uncle?

Looking at the date of July 1998, I think we are missing the forest for the weeds. There were reports that NoKo guys were at the site of the Ras Koh nuke test, the Pu one in Chagai. Soon after the wife turned up dead.

So this payoff could be for that delivery of test design.

- Would be poetic justice of those diamonds and rubies turned up to be zirconia and fake rubies!

Begum Zulfiqar Khan would be hopping mad.

arun · Post by **arun** » 08 Jul 2011 07:00

For archival purposes coverage in other media outlets on the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to N. Korea:

TIME Magazine:

A.Q. Khan's Revelations: Did Pakistan's Army Sell Nukes to North Korea?

Daily Mail:

Pakistan general accused of selling nuclear secrets to North Korea for $3m

AP via CBS:

Scientist: NKorea paid Pakistanis for nuclear tech

Reuters:

N.Korea bribed Pakistanis to get nuclear know-how –report

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 08 Jul 2011 09:19

From whiskey to nuclear secrets, North Korea plays a remarkably entrepreneurial role in international affairs for a Communist regime.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 11 Jul 2011 00:59

ShauryaT wrote:
shiv wrote: Did PRC supply Pu designs? I can't recall reading that anywhere.
When Libya/Gaddafi was arm twisted to come clean, on the documents recovered the designs still had Chinese language markings, supplied by AQK. My recollection is they were Pu designs, I will dig in from my materials to confirm.

Shiv: At least the AQK supplied Chinese designed from Libya were not Pu based but a 1966 tested HEU implosion type device.

But, there is enough evidence of assistance of the Chinese help to TSP around their plutonium infrastructure around Kushab. If we believe that TSP has embarked on a Pu weapon, then Chinese assistance on the same cannot be ruled out.

What is unanswered for is if DPRK was on a Pu route, why the deal with TSP for a HEU based route? It is known that TSP under Munir Khan was pursuing the Pu route and AQK was pursuing the HEU route.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 12 Jul 2011 21:17

The HEU is for more advanced weapons.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 12 Jul 2011 21:48

NightWatch

For the Night of 7 July 2011

Pakistan-North Korea: Special comment. The international news media have reported that Pakistan provided North Korea the technology and sample centrifuges for making Highly Enriched Uranium for nuclear weapons.

The source of the revelation is a newly disclosed letter sent in 1998 from a senior North Korean official to Abdul Qader Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The letter contains details of bribes or payoffs to then Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat and another general. It was signed by North Korean National Defense Commission member Chon Pyong Ho. The letter mentions missile components sent to Pakistan and the dispatch of a new emissary who has been in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iran - all conventional weapons or missile clients of North Korea.

Pakistani officials have charged the letter is a forgery by A.Q. Khan so as to distribute blame for his conviction for selling strategic secrets. Khan is under house arrest, but always swore he acted under orders from the highest authorities. In 1998, those would have been General Karamat and then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Those luminaries always claimed Khan acted on his own in selling Pakistan's strategic nuclear secrets to North Korea.

US intelligence people have said the letter looks authentic, according to press reports. And this time they have it right. The transaction in 1998 involved strategic assets which North Korea and Pakistan guard jealously. Pakistan desperately needed a reliable nuclear weapons delivery system after India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998. Pakistan had tested its nuclear technology in response. The date of the letter is July 1998.

North Korea had plutonium for fissile material, but was in the market for uranium enrichment technology. North Korea had the NoDong medium range ballistic missile as a delivery system, a reliable weapons carrier, to trade for enrichment technology. Most nuclear weapons states have both plutonium and highly enriched uranium processes for producing fissile material.

The individuals mentioned in the letter include people who must be involved in such a transaction, namely General Karamat and Chon. Chon Pyong Ho was the chief of the Second Economic Committee, the North Korean name for the group that supervises the military industrial complex - all the plants that make ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and all other military ordnance. He is a classmate of Kim Chong-il, who still chairs the National Defense Commission.

Karamat probably did not take a bribe as he claims. Any money from North Korea would have been diverted into Pakistan Army secret funds. Chon Pyong Ho's involvement indicates the highest level of the North Korean government was involved directly in the transaction. That raises a prima facie inference that Chon was dealing with his counterparts in Pakistan. RThe Chief of the Army Staff is the highest ranking military officer in Pakistan. A.Q. Khan was the project director and middleman.

The facts are that the four prototype uranium enrichment centrifuges that the North obtained were made in Pakistan and supplied by A.Q. Khan, by his own admission. The Ghauri missiles in the Pakistan Army came from North Korea and are NoDongs.

The obvious inference is that this was a high level arrangement authorized by both governments. This was not a simple swap because of the huge follow-on investments in land and equipment required to build Ghauri missile production and testing facilities and bases in Pakistan and to build a nuclear enrichment centrifuge cascade in North Korea. These were large-scael and expensive undertakings by both countries.

In short, in 1998, Pakistan, a US friend, provided nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, an enemy with whom the US was and is still at war. The letter adds details about the physical exchange of strategic assets in 1998.

Brilliant analysis by Nightwatch except its plain dead wrong in the sequence of events.

The Nodong/Ghauri missile was tested by TSP on 6 April, 1998 and Indian nuke tests were on 11-13 May 1998. So clearly the TSP had acquired and brandished the Nodong missile atleast a month before the nuke tests by India.

IOW the Pak acquitions of NoDong/Ghauri missile were prior to the nuke tests and throwing India into the mix Nightwatch loses his otherwise impeccable credibility.

My take is the Noko Gave the NoDong in exchange for getting their Pu device tested in Chagai. The missing Noko diplomat's wife figured this out and was killed.