From Muppala's post :
Kayani`s gamble
By R. Prasannan/Islamabad, Swat and PoK
Thought it was positive for India. (And didn't know Indian journos were operating in PoK!). Some of the things I note below may be known, but it seems we have fresh information that needs to be raised by Pakistani media.
It is a war, full scale, in Pakistan.
India and the world may scoff at Pakistan that it is fighting an army of Frankenstein’s monsters it had spawned in the eighties through an illicit liaison with the US. Such historical prudery has no relevance in General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s war room in the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. It is war and he has to win it. Already he has cleared large swathes of territory from the enemy [see maps].
Makes it appear like a war journal of a awe-struck chronicler. But that adoration aside.. this information if handled well may unravel favourably!
He has left the Indian border thinly defended. Kayani has drawn entire divisions and brigades from the Indian border and sent them to fight militants in the west, leaving his 2,240-km Indian border thinly defended. In the process, he has put blind faith in three things—his less-than-100km range Hatf nuclear missiles to scare India’s three strike corps, a strategic insurance policy taken with the Chinese and the good sense of a 78-year-old man sitting in Delhi’s South Block.
The blind faith would only be in the Chinese factor (as shown by their reluctance to get into Gwadar inspite of relentless efforts by Pakistan). So, all that are left are 100km Hatf missles and India's leadership. Now, one can argue that former is in itself a sufficient condition while latter has been the norm whether it was INC or BJP at the helm (from Rajiv Gandhi to Vajpayee to MMS).
Now onto the corner in which PA is supposedly in.
The generals and brigadiers at GHQ say Kayani has been serious. Look at the order of battle (orbat). Traditionally seven of Pakistan’s nine corps were poised against India; the exceptions were the Peshawar (XI) Corps and the Quetta (XII) Corps. Now the entire Peshawar Corps, complete with 7 and 9 Divisions, is committed to operations; the Quetta Corps has lent two full brigades.
The big news for Indian commanders is the orbat in the eastern theatre. A few months ago, US RAND Corporation’s Seth Jones and Christine Fair had estimated that troops drawn from two division headquarters, eight infantry headquarters, 20 full battalions, eight engineer battalions, one special battalion, two signals battalions and 38 Frontier Corps wings have been pressed into battle at various stages in Operation Al Mizan in South Waziristan. In the subsequent Operation Zalzala, the entire 14 Division, drawn from the India-centric Multan (II) Corps, was put to battle. In Operation Sherdil in Bajaur, a brigade headquarters, four battalions and seven Frontier Corps wings were pressed into action under the command of a three-star general.
The entire 19 Division, attached to the Rawalpindi (X) Corps and earlier stationed in Mangla on the Indian frontier, is still fighting in Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat. Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan involved 7 Division and 9 Division from the Peshawar Corps, plus two Special Services Group battalions and two infantry brigades taken off from the Indian border. Some 30,000 troops were inducted into battle, along with several artillery regiments, against 10,000 die-hard Pak Taliban in this operation.
Now THE WEEK learns that Kayani has drawn more from the east, including from the two strike corps—Mangla (I) Corps and Multan (II) Corps. The strike corps are the sword-arms of Pakistan which would blitzkrieg into Indian Punjab and Rajasthan in the event of a war. The Mangla Corps has lent 17 Division and the Multan Corps 14 Division to the war in the west. The five defensive (pivot) corps, the shield arms that have to fend off Indian armoured thrusts, have lost more. The Rawalpindi Corps, charged with defending the entire capital region and reinforcing the Mangla strike corps, has been deprived of its prized 19 Division. It is left with just 12 Division (HQ Murree), 23 Division (Jhelum) minus a couple of brigades, Force Command Northern Areas (Gilgit), one infantry brigade, one armoured brigade and one artillery brigade.
The Gujranwala (XXX) Corps and the Bahawalpur (XXXI) Corps have lent one brigade each. In all, four full infantry divisions, 17 brigades (three in North Waziristan alone), 54 battalions, one Special Services Group battalion, one task force and 58 Frontier Corps wings are still battling the militants. The remaining line-up left in the east may appear utterly butterly to the knives of Indian generals.
In summary, several of India centric troops have been engaged in war in west, leaving the eastern border thinly defended. And still, India has not undertaken any aggressive moves or actions
. Infact, India has been gradually lowering its troop presense in Kashmir. Or IOW, from Pakistani POV, Pakistan has successfully kept India at bay.
Going back a few steps...
(reason 1) If Pakistan was going to achieve that under the nuclear umbrella (100km Hatf for example) then why is there need for a giant army sucking up resources?
(reason 2) If Pakistan was going to achieve that by maintaining a huge army, then current events prove that as redundant!
Basically, this whole decade can be used as a reality check for Pakistanis.
- They are most vulnerable on Eastern Front like never before.
- But big bad chanakyan-baniya-India has not taken advantage of it, like they were taught it would
- So.. why the hell does the Army need to be so big (only to create the mess for Pakistanis internally)
- All Army has really done in past few decades is creating internal issues like the one in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Karachi or Baluchistan (it obviously gained nothing in Kashmir)
Pakistani sources would not comment on the formations. Yet, “we have committed 1,47,400 troops” into the war on terror, said Brigadier Syed Aznat Ali, a director at the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Rawalpindi. Add to them the thousands who are manning, patrolling and doing sentry duties on the Durand Line. “One-third of our force is in the west,” said Major-General Athar Abbas, ISPR director-general.
Given a total active strength of 5,50,000, Abbas’s one-third would work out to more than 1,83,000 troops committed to the west-of-the-Indus theatre, compared with just about 1 lakh manning the precarious Line of Control in Kashmir against India. (Another 10,000 are on UN duties.) That leaves just about 3.5 lakh troops to defend Pakistan against an Indian Army that has three full armoured strike corps to thrust into West Punjab and Sind.
Again, if 3.5L troops (along with nuclear overhang) are sufficient to stop the big bad India, then that defeats the whole argument for larger army that costs 26% of the budget officially (double that unofficially).
But the average tenure of the Pak soldier in combat zone is now stretching to 26 months, whereas a German soldier, just across the Durand Line in Afghanistan and doing the same job, goes home and to his girlfriend after six months, and an American soldier after one year. This is affecting morale, as also training, since the drills for conventional war are entirely different from the drills for counter-insurgency war.
So 1/3 of the India-specific army is now a counter-insurgency force in the West. Assuming there never was a Taliban/good-bad actors issues (yeah.. I know!!, but stay with me for the sake of argument), then Pakistan should only need 2/3 of the army that it currently has for detering India. That can be presented as defence budget taking 18% instead of 26%
.
“The price is very heavy,” said General Abbas. “We have lost 2,795 brave soldiers since 2001. Another 8,671 have been injured.”
And it would have avoided unnecessary attrition on its forces.
Kayani worries that such deep involvement of more than a third of his army is blunting his capability to fend off India.
His army traditionally had been trained to fight in the plains of Punjab and around the sand dunes of Sind, but Pervez Musharraf, following his 2004 accord with A.B. Vajpayee, changed all that. Against Musharraf’s promise not to allow Pak-held territory for anti-India terror, Vajpayee ‘allowed’ him to move three (some say four) divisions from the Indian frontier. He called a corps commanders’ conference immediately after the 2004 ‘accord’ and declared that his army was no longer India-centric.
Most importantly, the promise not to allow Pak-held territory for anti-India terror (IOW, moving away from low-intensity conflict) bought more peace than actually causing anti-India terror.
Kayani wants to reverse this, but finds he cannot. “While the Pakistan army is alert to and fighting the threat posed by militancy, it remains an ‘India-centric’ institution and that reality will not change in any significant way until the Kashmir issue and water disputes are resolved,” he declared early last year.
“The media interpreted it as a political statement,” said a brigadier. “He meant that it should be trained and equipped to deter India, as it always has been.” The problem is that Kayani cannot deter India, with more than a third of his army committed to fight militancy.
Yeah.. Kiyani wants to reverse this, but what do the so called "now suffering and outraged" Pakistanis want. Is there something India can put spotlight on?
On one hand the author provides datapoints that prove PA, even after being thinly stretched, successfully detered India. And goes on to suggest Kiyani cannot deter India. This needs to be pointed out.
Initially he tried quick-fixes—kill’em quick and get back to the Indian frontier. Soon after he took over, Kayani sent 9,000 troops, gunships and fighter planes to Bajaur which killed a thousand militants in one month. “If they lose here, they’d have lost everything,” said General Tariq Khan, who commanded the Frontier Corps deployed in Bajaur then. F-16 supersonics bombed South Waziristan even before ground troop movement commenced. The successes were short-lived; the enemy simply shifted base. “Bajaur had to be retaken thrice,” said a brigade commander. “It will take another two or three years to have a reasonable level of order in the [frontier] region,” added Brig. Ali.
The extended engagement in west (against his will) gives us (and media) a chance to point out the fallacy of Kiyani's and PA's views.
Will Manmohan and General V.K. Singh wait? Or, would they put their enigmatic Cold Start doctrine to test? Cold Start is a doctrine evolved by the Indian Army after it found it was too slow in mobilising in Operation Parakram, ordered following the attack on Parliament.
Any discussion on Cold-start has to be prefaced with above. It was neccesitated by the attack on Parliament. If there are no attacks on India, then there is no need to worry about cold-start!
Pakistan army’s old doctrine of ‘Riposte’ presumed that any large-scale Indian thrust could be countered by unleashing firepower and manoeuvrings to counter-attack into Indian territory. However, India’s reliance on Cold Start has made Kayani realise that he would not have the latitude for manoeuvre. Kapoor’s and a few other statements last year also rattled Kayani. Pak generals say Kayani’s ‘India-centric’ statement was in response to Kapoor’s. That is why he is now doing some Hatf-rattling.
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Kayani, however, is not resting on the Indian denials and assurances. Especially after India announced it was going ahead with the month-long Exercise Vijayee Bhava (Be Victorious) which ended mid-May, involving the strike corps in Ambala and the Delhi-based Western Air Command.
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Kayani, too, is learnt to be sharpening his doctrine, and tightening its nuts and bolts. His strategic doctrine had allowed use of nuclear weapon against a conventional strike by India, but as a last resort. This was officially spelt out by the then strategic plans division chief Lt-Gen Khalid Kidwai three years ago. He said nuclear weapons would be “weapons of last resort, and could be used against India in the event of space losses, severe force destruction or economic losses.”
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Kayani is also lowering the nuclear threshold or the ‘nuclear overhang’. In fact, a few months ago, President Zardari had openly talked of a no-first-use policy for Pakistan. Kayani bitterly opposed this, as was revealed by WikiLeaks recently, and the then US ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, wrote: “Although he has remained silent on the subject, Kayani does not support Zardari’s statement... that Pakistan would adopt a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons.... We believe that the military is proceeding with an expansion of both its growing strategic weapons and missile programs.”
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So Kayani is testing and re-testing his short-range Hatf-9 missiles, essentially to warn India that the nuclear option can be exercised not at the last moment or as a last resort, but when Indian tank columns have entered less than 100km. To India, “this means we will have to strike, with conventional force, at Pakistan’s Hatf missile bases first, and destroy them, simultaneously or even before our strike corps move in,” said a general officer involved in Vijayee Bhava. No wonder, India insisted on discussing nuclear confidence-building measures at the meeting between the two foreign secretaries last week.
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For the Indian military, it means something else—that a two-front war is still in the realm of the possible.
All the above makes a stronger case for smaller Pakistani Army!!!!