Kargil War Thread - VI

[sanjeevpunj]

Salute! I attended the funeral of Capt.Vijayant Thapar, and it was a very sad day yet there was no fear or anger but sublime peace.All of NOIDA was there on that day, the roads to the Antim Niwas were blocked for hours.Thanks for posting the letter, though I did read it once earlier. Jai Hind!

[jamwal]

A website dedicated to his memory

[Aditya G]

The Perils of Prediction: Indian Intelligence and the Kargil Crisis

http://www.claws.in/download.php?action ... P%2029.pdf

[ramana]

The Perils of Prediction: Indian Intelligence and the Kargil Crisis

http://www.claws.in/download.php?action ... P%2029.pdf

He refers to a lot of work on BRF and BRM.

I still think we dont have the complete picture.

The main problem is the entire GOI is the assessment agency and the intel agencies are providers of secret information and not assessment. The onus is still on the assessment agency to put together the complete picture. Here GOI got cognitive dissonance for the govt was pursuing peace initative with TSP and the assessment got distorted.

The blaming intel agencies comes from looking at a British setup thru American glasses.

Interesting thing is he doesn't look at my commentary in BRM on the Kargil Surprise: How and Why? in 1999 nor the Review of the KRC report.

In the fiorst article I worte in 1999!

It appears that Indian intelligence agencies are very good at collecting information and data but not well versed in assessment. This points to the police origins of such agencies in India. They are like giant vacuum cleaners sucking up facts, relevant or not and building up dossiers. It would appear that due to a high degree of compartmentalization in these agencies, dubious and simplistic opinions pass off as estimates and cause policy failures. This failure to create dedicated assessment groups is an administrative failure on the part of both the bureaucrats and the political leadership. As access to such information is restricted, the recipients are grateful for the flow and do not question the estimates. Moreover, the existence of personality cults around strong Prime Ministers (such as Pt.Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi- both of whom did their own assessments) for much of India’s history has meant that here has been no institutional emphasis on the quality of assessments. Demanding better quality could show them up in bad light. Indeed much as been written in the press about Gujral’s contempt for RAW’s efforts and advice.
...

and so on.

Surprises in international affairs are not new. Barbarossa, Pearl Harbour, Yom Kippur, the collapse of the Soviet Union are all examples of this phenomena. Uri Bar and Zachary Sheaffer (see J. of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol.11, No.3) have studied the topic of surprise and its causes in much detail. The main variables that they discuss are 1) surprise, 2) preventing surprise, 3) indicators, 4) crisis and 5) cover & deception. A surprise is caused by failure of early warning systems and/or policy makers who ignore warnings. In preventing surprise they examine the zero-sum relationship between the victim and the initiator which results in the victim treating all indicators as noise as opposed to signals. Indicators are signals and warnings are indicators about initiator's intent. The quality of a warning is based on clarity and timing. In crisis they identify the strategy of the initiator in reducing the timeframe for the victim to react. In cover and deception these are described as key elements of achieving strategic surprise. They argue surprises are not caused by a lack of early warning indicators or intentional inaction by policymakers with hidden agenda, but rather results from the relevant people not comprehending the meaning of the available indicators owing to the interaction of various factors involved in the process.

These factors can be broadly divided into psychological, organizational, political, and strategic interaction and warning response related factors. These have further sub-divisions.

Psychological factors (Psy) are:
1) Fear of superiors
2) Dearth of skepticism
3) Paranoid-megalomaniac leadership.
4) Cognitive dissonance
5) Heuristic judgments
6) Bridge Over River Kwai syndrome- escalating commitment to chosen course of action
7) Over confidence syndrome- Drowned and Boiled frog syndrome
8 ) Managerial stress
9) Self-enactment
10) Conflictual and introverted managerial style
11) Aversion to discrepant information
12) Group-think

Organizational factors (O) are:
1) Organization atrophy
2) Politicking & hierarchy orientation
3) Centralization of authorities
4) Over reliance on SOP
5) Compartmentalization

Political Inhibitors (Po) are:
1) Politicking of information
2) Policy makers act as own estimators
3) Instinctive acceptance of estimate
4) Intelligence intervention in policy-making
5) Politicizing of professional product
6) Commitment to political agenda
7) Political intervention in the process

Strategic factor (S) are:
1) Cover
2) Deception
3) Cry Wolf syndrome
4) Time lag factor
5) Initiation factor

Let us see how many of these factors apply to Kargil based on Manoj Joshi’s article.

Psychological factors - 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, & 11
Organizational factors - 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5
Political factors - 1(?), 3 & 6.
Strategic factors - 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5.

The point is Kargil or something was bound to happen. The same analysis can be applied to any situation that has come up in the past. Only additional factors will be added to this list. There will not be a reduction. A through overhaul is needed to prevent further lapses. As it was pointed elsewhere, the nuclearization requires India to be on guard. The Pakistani military propensity to take risk and operate under nominal political control makes the deterrent situation in South Asia suspect. If the intelligence system is unable to process indicators it could lead to disasters.

And in latter article after KRC report was released I tabulated the factors for surprise.

My views have changed to not just the agencies but the giovt failed to assess the threat.

However once the magnitude of the threat was realised they acted very very well.
And surprised the perpetrators.

[Aditya G]

Did anyone get their hands on this book? The CCC had published some good work on the internet earlier:

http://assets.cambridge.org/97805217/67 ... matter.pdf

Asymmetric Warfare
in South Asia
The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil
Conflict
Edited by
Peter R. Lavoy

...

This volume took six years to research and compile. From the beginning,
this study was a challenge. This crisis, in comparison to previous conflicts
in the region, drew an unprecedented level of controversy, competing
narratives, and implications for domestic politics specifically in Pakistan,
but also in India and for the course of international relations in South
Asia. For this reason alone, I owe a great deal of gratitude to those who
contributed to this volume and many people who were forthcoming with
their candor in formal interviews and private exchange of views with me
and my colleagues over the past six years. This multi-authored volume is a
testimony of the Clauswitzian proverb of “wading through the water” and
an earnest attempt to provide the most objective and authenticated version
and analysis of this conflict.
The project editor and authors interviewed dozens of policymakers,
intelligence officials, and military officers in Pakistan, India, and the
United States. They also received a formal presentation by the
commander of the Pakistani formation that conducted the Kargil intrusion,
Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), and several other civilian
and military officials associated with the operation. Project authors
presented preliminary findings and received helpful feedback from other
scholars and various governmental and military representatives at conferences
in Monterey, California in June 2002, at the United Services
Institute in New Delhi in September 2002, and at the Institute of
Strategic Studies, Islamabad in January 2003. Subsequent research trips
and interviews in South Asia were undertaken to provide as complete and
balanced an account as possible.
I am especially indebted to former Pakistani President General Pervez
Musharraf and General Ved Prakash Malik, who were the respective
Chiefs of Army Staff at the time of the conflict, for giving their candid
views during my several meetings with them. Special thanks are owed to
Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed and Lieutenant General Javed
Hassan, commanders of the Pakistan army’s 10 Corps and FCNA respectively
at the time of the Kargil operation, for their extensive interviews
with this author, and to Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmed,
Commander of FCNA in 2003, for his detailed briefing and views in
Gilgit at FCNA Headquarters. Without these insights, the Pakistani side
of the story would have remained murky.
Finally, I owe a word of gratitude to the team of the Center for
Contemporary Conflict (CCC), who in the past five years conducted
extensive research, and kept pace with new events and narratives, just
when they thought they had reached the final version. My special thanks
go to Brigadier (retd.) Feroz Hassan Khan of the Pakistan army and
Lieutenant Colonel (retd.) Surinder Rana of the Indian army, both senior
researchers with CCC and having the experience of command in the area
of operation, for their insights, inputs, edits, and comments. This research
would have been incomplete without the relentless efforts of CCC
researchers, Christopher Clary, Adam Radin, and Puja Verma. Lastly, a
very special thanks to my wife Debra Lavoy and our two children for
bearing the brunt of my distractions, midnight-oil burning, and their
support. Debra never believed this would come to an end. Publication
of this book is fulfillment of one promise among many that I vowed to her
...

[ManuT]

http://www.indianexpress.com/Storyold/103055/


I had missed this news then, posting in full for what it is worth, for sometime in the future.

Jun 11, 1999

Pak troops planning airdrop in Ladakh?

NEW DELHI, JUNE 10: The Pakistan army special forces, the Special Service Group (SSG), appears to be preparing to launch another audacious operation through an airborne assault somewhere in the Ladakh region. And the operation could well be conducted before Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz arrives for talks on Saturday.

In the last few days, the SSG is understood to have conducted some practice jumps around Skardu in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). And it is believed that the SSG operation "could well be to set the agenda for Sartaj Aziz before he arrives here'', a senior Government official told The Indian Express on Wednesday on the condition of anonymity.

Various Government agencies have reported the jumps carried out by the SSG at a drop zone (DZ) near Skardu. The jumps, said the officials, were carried out from C-130 transport aircraft flown from the Chaklala air base. The SSG is headquartered at Chaklala, where the British Indian Army's Para Training School was located. The Pakistan army continues to maintain its para-jump training at Chaklala.

While the Army has been alerted to the possibility of an airborne assault by the SSG, a careful analysis is under way as to the likely objectives of such an operation. "Being a jump in an high-altitude area, it seems pretty much certain that their DZ would be in the Ladakh region. And we have informed the Army units in the area to be prepared in case such an assault was launched,'' said a senior official.

All those serving in the SSG are trained paratroopers. And the SSG also has more than a company's strength (a 100 plus) who are specialised skydivers. "This gives them more flexibility as to their likely DZ,'' said an Army skydiver. "Being a mountainous region they would have to deploy their parachutes at higher altitudes using high-altitude high-opening techniques. The aircraft from which they would be launched need not then have to enter our airspace,'' continued the officer. A standard static-line jump would, however, require that the aircraft enter Indian airspace "thereby limiting its options for a DZ'', he added.

The likely targets, said the officials, would have to be high-value, in terms of either military impact or returns through publicity. "They may be planning an operation which has an high-return impact. Something which effects our military operations, or something that simply draws a lot of attention. We are well aware of both possibilities and have instituted effective counter-measures for such an eventuality,'' said the senior official.

[Shrinivasan]

I had missed this news then, posting in full for what it is worth, for sometime in the future.
Jun 11, 1999
Pak troops planning airdrop in Ladakh?

Manu, you gave me a heart-attack when I started reading it, and then saw the DATE... Phew... you could have put a disclaimer at the top and avoid getting sued by Kith and Kin of old men like me!!!

[rohitvats]

Prime facie, and what would such a para-drop have achieved but get the SSG butchered? Another tactially brilliant idea from TSPA?

[Aditya_V]

Prime facie, and what would such a para-drop have achieved but get the SSG butchered? Another tactially brilliant idea from TSPA?

Further, given this was during operation Safedsagar when IAF fighters were in the area 24X7, it would be highly likely that the C-130 carrying them would have meet a similair fate to the Atlantique in August 1999.. Damn who stopped the operation.

[Pratyush]

^^^

I recall hearing some thing like that in the daily breifings given. But the plan that I remember was for a Helo born Brigade level attack on Tortuk town North of Kargil. This operation had to be shelved due to the IAF.

This is IIRC only. The SSG op may be totaly different.

[rohitvats]

There are three scenarios one can think of:

(1) Heli-borne opns/Air-Assault or even paradrop make sense if the idea is to drop behind enemy lines and capture some center of gravity. However, it will only be worth something if the ground forces can link up with the air-assault/paradropped elements and re-inforce them. Otherwise, what will such an assault achieve? And this link up was impossible in case of Kargil.

(2) Second scenario could be take out high value targets and have more psycological impact. Something SSG tried with air-field drops in 1965. But for this to succeed, their has to be proper exfiltration plan. Unless the SSG men were on one way ticket, there was no chance of them being able to go back; they would have been hunted down like mice.

(3) Capture a choke point, cut-off one segment of IA troops from another, put pressure on troops/posts which have been cut-off and prevent reinforcement. This is what PA tried to do in 1947 when they captured Zoji-La. The capture of this pass basically cut-off the entire Ladakh sector from India. And PA used this opportunity to attack across the river Shyok from Skardu.

Now, coming to the possible assualt on Turtok - one needs to keep in mind that this is a very vital sector for a simple reason that it allows PA to outflank us in Siachen (actually, east of Siachen). It also makes holding posts along the Shyok very difficult and can also be used to outflank us in the Batalik Sector.

So, it is possible that they wanted to try something like point (3) above - capture the Turtok Village using air-assault and attack across the LOC to capture the ground between LoC and Turtok. As the crow flies, Turtok Village is hardly ~11kms from LoC. And IMO, IAF presence could not have dettered such an air-assault. 5-6 Mi-17 helicopters in the middle of the night flying along the river valley would have been difficult to detect. Plus, I don't think we were mounting 24*7 CAP over the area.

Whether such an assault succeeded or not, is a different matter.

[Shrinivasan]

Prime facie, and what would such a para-drop have achieved but get the SSG butchered? Another tactially brilliant idea from TSPA?

Further, given this was during operation Safedsagar when IAF fighters were in the area 24X7, it would be highly likely that the C-130 carrying them would have meet a similair fate to the Atlantique in August 1999.. Damn who stopped the operation.

Not that simple, Atlantique came thru flat lands / marshy territory in the Rann of Kutch, also Desh was looking for it based on previous incidents. They knew the Pake SOP.
In the SSG drop scenario, the C130 could be on the other side of the LOC, drop the SSG very near the LOC and dart back. This would give enough opportunity for the SSG to glide into some pre-determined valley to regoup and accomplish their mission. It was summer in Kargil, so Terrain / Weather might not be that a major constraint. BUT TROOPS COULD BE IN WAIT AT THESE PLACES AND HAVE A TRACK&SKEET COMPETITON PICKING THESE PARACHUTES. As usual a tactically brilliant Paki plan which is full of operational holes, fraught with danger (for everyone)!!!

[Shrinivasan]

^^^I recall hearing some thing like that in the daily breifings given. But the plan that I remember was for a Helo born Brigade level attack on Tortuk town North of Kargil. This operation had to be shelved due to the IAF.
This is IIRC only. The SSG op may be totaly different.

Heli borne attack in Tortuk, North of Kargil might be difficult from another angle - altitude. What would be the endurance of these Helos at that altitude? what could be the payload? to insert 50-60 soldiers with gear and supplies might need multiple sorties (or para drop supplies, which could also get detected). The plan is fraught with danger (of getting detected, caught and killed) but then who can find fault with Pakees for attempting something daring (and foolish)

[Aditya G]

The news items belong to an era where the quality of reportage was much poor compared to today. The leads were often misquoted or blown out of proportion.

For example, IE also carried a report that India bombed Skardu during Kargil using Bofors guns. We know that it was nigh impossible since Skardu is 70-90 Kms away from the LoC.

That SSG conducted SHBOs during the war is more plausible and we also have some sources to confirm it as well.

[ManuT]

Srinivasan sir, Well, I was myself surprised by the article. 

I would have thought they would be on a one way ticket on an attention grabbing mission as exfiltration would have been impossible. The other would have been to use them to counter attack but then they were losing too many in quick succession. So good feedback.Thanks to all.

I would imagine SSG would have seen the point of carrying out the raid if it already had been printed in an Indian newspaper a day before it could be mounted. Would have deterred, I guess, and keep it for a later date.

[suryag]

Ahh!! had the SSG gone ahead with its tactically brilliant plan it would have given us the chance to have another set of POWs like the '71 war. Btw in the tactically brilliant plan there was jump from high altitude, what were they smoking when they conjured this,if at all they had any chances of succeeding it would have been in the case of low level penetration

[Shrinivasan]

Ahh!! had the SSG gone ahead with its tactically brilliant plan it would have given us the chance to have another set of POWs like the '71 war. Btw in the tactically brilliant plan there was jump from high altitude, what were they smoking when they conjured this,if at all they had any chances of succeeding it would have been in the case of low level penetration

Actually we had almost a hundred PoWs during Kargil. This apart from the fact that we let some Pigs down hill ski without challenging them. funny that the Mujahids slipt away and the PA regulars surrendered?

[Aditya_V]

12 years since the famed Martail Army in Khaki did downhill skiing, Lets commenrate this day and hope the preparators of war crimes sitting in London and GHQ get thier just deserts.

[Dilbu]

RIP brave soldiers. Jai Hind!

[Shrinivasan]

Happy "Kargil Vijay Diwas" to our brave soldiers and our Forum Rakshaks... the men and women in uniform are our rakshaks...guys are we doing a collection for the NSG guy?

[SaiK]

Jai Hind!

[Bala Vignesh]

Vijay Divas- The day we must remember the warriors who fought and fell in the Cold, barren and desolate place called kargil.. I salute those brave warriors.. Jai Hind..

[nikhilarora]

Jai Hind and my homage and respect to the brave soldiers and defenders of India.

[BijuShet]

Happy Vijay Diwas to all and eternal gratitude to the men in Uniform.

[jimmy_moh]

watching LOC kargil now........

[BajKhedawal]

Jai, jai, jai.....Vijay Diwas!!!

[Airavat]

Army personnel paying tribute to the Martyrs of Kargil War at Umbala Top,11, 500 ft high from Drass - PTI

"I am confident that this (Kargil war) will never happen again," General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 14 Corps Lt Gen Ravi Dastane

Every Indian must safeguard country`s territorial integrity : Ibobi Singh, Manipur CM



Kargil Vijay Diwas today: Remembering the war heroes

[abhishek_sharma]

The Defence Minister, Shri A. K. Antony along with the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. V.K. Singh, the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik and the Vice Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral D.K. Dewan paying homage to Kargil martyrs at Amar Jawan Jyoti, on the occasion of Kargil Vijay Diwas, in New Delhi on July 26, 2011.

Photo no.CNR - 38860 (PIB, Govt of India)

[RajSingh]

Happy "Kargil Vijay Diwas" to our brave soldiers and our Forum Rakshaks... the men and women in uniform are our rakshaks...guys are we doing a collection for the NSG guy?

Happy Vijay Diwas !!

We ar UC Berkeley are organizing a small donation from 6-7 friends I know. We are each giving $100 and will transfer to a bank account I got after calling Mr. PV Manesh on his mobile number. If you need more information you can mail me at

rsingh(at)lbl(dot)gov !!

[hnair]

From an SSC post:

Memorial ceremony in Trivandrum



Rain or shine, he (and his late brother, till '91) used to be there to pay homage for the fallen at Palayam Junction (Palayam = garrison) in Trivandrum. There was another official one with political leadership etc present at Camp Pangode in the outskirts.

[sum]

MIGs, warships to be displayed at War Memorial

The National War Memorial Project (NWMP), which is now nearing completion, will be a showcase of indigenous weapons and heroic tales of martyrs.

Scenic: The Memorial Park design incorporates green, lush, forested garden consistent with the heritage of the City. Many ornamental trees are being planted in the park to increase foliage and greenery. Indigenous missiles such as Agni, Akash and Prithvi, MIG 23 aircraft and various armed vehicles used by armed forces are now showcased in NWMP in the City and will be open to public once the project is completed.

Sailing through the waves of protests launched by various sections of society, especially green activists, the upcoming NWMP will be a platform for the families of martyrs to pay their tributes to the sacrifices made by the martyrs. This place is now all set to draw crowds within a couple of months.

Designed by City-based architects, Mathew and Ghosh, this project which is almost 70 per cent complete is now home to various war-winning equipment. The missile boat for instance, played a crucial role in defeating Pakistani Navy in 1971. “The over 50 ft ship will either be a original one or a downsized model. The discussions are on with the Navy,” said a source here.

Other attractions here include MIG 23, Vijayanth tanks and Armed Personal Carriers which were used in the war. The MIG 23 fighter craft which turned the tide of the war in 1965 war at Longowal, according to a source here has been brought here from Halware in Ludhiana.

The absolute tank and APC, which won the war at Asal Utta in Punjab by destroying over 300 Patton tanks will also undergo changes to make it more attractive. The 10,000 sq metre underground motivation hall will be home to various displays and pictures which will speak about the glory of Indian army, its martyrs and heroes.

A 65-metre flag mast and 75-foot Veeragallu along with flags of three armed forces will be housed at the entrance of motivation hall.

The Veeragallu, an imposing and traditional monolith granite which symbolises the strength and courage of conviction of soldiers will bear the names of 25,000 martyrs. As submitted to the High Court, the State Government has kept its promise regarding the felling of trees as only four eucalyptus trees have been chopped for construction of motivational hall.

Mohandas Pai and co will be very unhappy!

[Aditya G]

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... l-conflict

12 years after Kargil, retired colonel plans book on experiences
Prasad Kulkarni, TNN Jul 26, 2011, 03.23am IST

PUNE: Memories of that day during the Kargil conflict in 1999 are still fresh in the mind of Col (retd) Gautam Khot who carried nearly 60 injured soldiers in a helicopter from a tough mountain terrain to the Army base in Kashmir. Khot, a Veer Chakra winner - the third highest gallantry award of the country - is now thinking of penning down his memories in a book. Khot is also one of the two army officers from Maharashtra, who have received Veer Chakra for their valour in the Kargil war.

....

[shiv]

MIGs, warships to be displayed at War Memorial


The MIG 23 fighter craft which turned the tide of the war in 1965 war at Longowal, according to a source here has been brought here from Halware in Ludhiana.

What??

[Jagan]

From Sakaal Times

http://www.sakaaltimes.com/sakaaltimesb ... 782311.htm
IAF’s accurate aerial photography helped win Kargil war
-
Tuesday, July 26, 2011 AT 11:57 AM (IST)
Tags: IAF, kargil, kargil war, Ashwani Bhakoo, WAC, Pune
The accurate bombardment by Indian Army's Bofors guns and Air Force jets that helped in dislodging enemy intruders from Kargil, was largely possible due to the continuous feedback of their hits generated through aerial photography done by the Jaguar unit of the Indian Air Force led by Wing Commander Ashwani Bhakoo (now retired Group Captain) amidst enemy fire.

“After the army a reconnaissance team led by Lt Saurabh Kalia of the 4th Jat Regiment went missing, information was floating around that some intruders were positioned in forward areas. There was no other information available about them. The IAF had Canberra reconnaissance aircraft (now phased out), which were old and slow. They were coming under fire while trying to film the ridges. So they had to pull out,” Bhakoo told Sakal Times.

Now settled in Pune, the former IAF pilot's Jaguar squadron was positioned in Ambala, which was part of Western Air Command (WAC) in Delhi. The WAC's jurisdiction ranged from Siachen glacier in north to Bikaner in Rajasthan.

"Our unit was summoned to carry out aerial surveillance. We had the capacity of photo reconnaissance. We were asked to find out actual position of the enemy,” he said.

The unit specialises in low level reconnaissance at around 200 feet above ground level. The aircraft were fitted with a lot of sensitive high resolution cameras, which could be put on video mode.

“Four of us flew the mission, led by me as I was the commanding officer (CO). We were travelling at a speed of 850 km/h covering an area of 200 km along the LoC,” he said.

The films were sent to Air Headquarters in Delhi for accurate interpretation by photo interpreters of the Army and IAF. The cursory interpretation revealed around 30 built-up areas.

“Once the army identified its structures, the target was clear to plan its operation. Half of my unit's aircrafts were engaged in reconnaissance while the other half was on standby for attacking enemy airfields in case they became active,” he said.

After the initial data was provided to the Army for commencing its operations, the Jaguar unit's recce aircraft would fly throughout the day to capture visuals of the LoC.

“These visuals were used to see whether the Air Force and artillery were able to inflict damage upon the enemy structures or not. This would help ascertain the effectiveness of our attack. But the enemy was firing at us from ground. I had to reorient the pilots to fly outside their range at higher altitude. The camera focus and resolution. The unit did 50 sorties in one month," he said.

Bhakoo has two distinct memories from the war. The first one is unflinching support from his wife Kavita, whose father was a fighter pilot and went missing in 1971 Indo-Pak war after his aircraft was shot down.

The other is sense of humour in pilots despite criis. “One of my team members Squadron Leader K R Prasad (now Wing Commander) named his new born son Tololing named after the Tololing peak in Kargil.”

http://www.sakaaltimes.com/SakaalTimesB ... 576344.htm
The copter pilot who saved many lives
-
Tuesday, July 26, 2011 AT 11:53 AM (IST)
Tags: Army, Pilot, kargil, kargil war, Gautam Khot, soldiers, Vir Chakra, IAF, Pune
The scores of soldiers gravely injured during the Kargil battle of 1999, have to thank the brave helicopter pilots from the Army Aviation Corps like city-based Colonel (retd) Gautam Khot, who flew into the mountains of Kargil to evacuate these soldiers and shift them to the military hospital, despite relentless enemy fire.

This act of courage shown in the battlefield by Col (then Major) Khot during Operation Vijay earned him the gallantry award Vir Chakra (VRC). Incidentally, out of the total four VRCs awarded for air operations during the Kargil battle, only two of the recipients are living, the remaining two from the IAF, were rewarded posthumously.

"Deputed at Sonmarg near Srinagar, I started flying from June 10, 1999. We were flying Cheetah helicopters as part of the 8 Mountain Division, which was covering operations from Drass, Kargil to Mashkoh," Col Khot said.

Flying for 40 days and clocking over 100 hours, Col Khot and the other Army Aviation pilots were continuously moving in and out of the battlefield, which were mountains measuring up to 22,000 ft above sea level.

"We were evacuating the wounded, taking essential supplies and ammunition to our soldiers. This raised their morale," he said.

Apart from this, these choppers were also guiding the artillery fire to hit the enemy accurately and also doing troop insertion - taking up soldiers one by one to the unoccupied spaces on the mountain, to help the soldiers cover the distance faster and keep them fresh.

"On 19 July '99, I along with my co-pilot Col D S Yadav, evacuated six casualties and delivered essential load at Tololing top, a makeshift helipad barely 2mx2m in size, at an altitude of 14,500 ft. We were coming under heavy enemy fire from the nearby peaks. Tololing was the first peak captured by the Army," he said.

"I evacuated four persons from Mashkoh, which was under heavy enemy shelling. I was commended by GOC 8 Mountain Division," he said.

According to him, Pakistan lost, despite being in an advantageous position, was due to the difference in support for the two forces from the people of their respective nations.

[Lalmohan]

MIGs, warships to be displayed at War Memorial


The MIG 23 fighter craft which turned the tide of the war in 1965 war at Longowal, according to a source here has been brought here from Halware in Ludhiana.

What??

yes yes and jaggu-ars attacked krachi from pune, didn't you know?! (chaiwallah's taking herbs...)

[Aditya_V]

MIGs, warships to be displayed at War Memorial


The MIG 23 fighter craft which turned the tide of the war in 1965 war at Longowal, according to a source here has been brought here from Halware in Ludhiana.

What??

You Kaffir!! Dont you Know Battle of Longewal was fought in 1965 and not in early Dec 71 as the Fascist Hinuds belive.

A sqadron MIG-23 was secretly inducted in 1964 by the Yondoos, But fighter Pilot Alam shot them all in 30 secs in this Sabre over Sargodha, hence the Yindoos hid the fact and claimed that Mig-23's were inducted only in 1982-83 when the 2nd sqadron arrived.

[ramana]

A Vir Chakra is awarded not rewarded.

[chetak]

A Vir Chakra is awarded not rewarded.

It is painfully earned.

[wig]

excerpts from an article by a former IAF Officer
Buy a fighter for war By Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patni

The army has not forgotten the IAF's irrelevance during the Kargil conflict. When IAF fighters should have been supporting assaulting infantry by hammering Pakistani positions with air strikes, fire support came almost exclusively from the army's own guns. Meanwhile, the IAF was searching for a way to equip its Mirage-2000s (an MMRCA!) to deliver bombs accurately onto mountaintops.

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/

[RKumar]

NDA government ignored intelligence on Kargil attack: Study

I am supporter of NDA and Atalji but this was a genuine policy decision taken hostage by rouge PA and ISI.

But credible reports suggest that RAW was informally pressured to retreat from the alarming projections it had made in October 1998, as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was preparing to undertake a peace journey to Lahore,” says the report.