Indian Naval Discussion

VikB · Post by **VikB** » 25 Aug 2011 16:37

Kersi Boss, you are any budget planners nightmare

Vipul · Post by **Vipul** » 25 Aug 2011 18:39

Fast attack warship INS Karuva commissioned by Indian Navy.

Indian Navy today commissioned highly maneuverable fast attack warship INS Karuva at the Eastern Naval Command here with an objective to thwart asymmetric threats emanating from the sea.

The warship is capable of operating in shallow waters at high speeds and is fitted with enhanced fire power for day-night surveillance and is an extension of the efforts by the Indian Navy to step up vigil post the 26/11 Mumbai terror strikes.

"The navy's importance had increased tremendously after the 26/11 terror attacks in protecting the security of the country. The newly commissioned warship (INS Karuva) will definitely strengthen the navy's ability in future," said Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command Air Marshal K J Mathews while commissioning the warship.

Named after an island situated in Kerala, the 325-tonne INS Karuva, measuring 52 meters, could achieve speed in excess of 30 knots. The warship had a complement of four officers and 39 sailors.

Built for extended coastal and offshore surveillance and patrol the warship is fitted with advanced MTU engines and latest communication sets and follows the footsteps of INS Koswari commissioned on July 12.

INS Karuva, indigenously built by the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Kolkata, is the tenth such warship built by the GRSE, its Chief Managing Director Rear Admiral (Retd) K C Sekhar said.

Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command Vice Admiral Anup Singh said, Indian Navy has turned into "builders' navy from the buyers' navy" as it is now able to indigenously secure its vessels.

Karuva would be based at the Naval establishment in Karwar under the naval officer-in-charge (Karnataka) and would be deployed for coastal patrol and anti-piracy operations along the Konkan coast and the Lakshadweep group of islands, he said.

Kersi D · Post by **Kersi D** » 25 Aug 2011 21:57

VikB wrote:Kersi Boss, you are any budget planners nightmare

Maybe.

But I will make the CNS and the IN a friend for a lifetime

Anshul · Post by **Anshul** » 25 Aug 2011 22:41

prithvi wrote:was exploring youtube for some defense related videos n came across this blast from the past post operation cactus...
can anyone identify the naval officer? damn smart chap...

Late DCNS S.V.Gopalachari.I know him as Capt.Uncle.Was my late dad's boss as Naval Attache at Jakarta , Indonesia from 1985 - 1988.One of the best the navy had.He was destined to be the CNS but fate had other plans.He passed away in 2005.

http://www.hindu.com/2005/03/11/stories ... 941200.htm

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 26 Aug 2011 08:15

unless we are getting some martian tech in TOT, I have never understood why we need two separate lines of SSKs with double the cost of initial infra, training and spares rather than just replicating the Scorpene line in another location or inhouse and carrying on with a Scorpene2/Marlin design with progressively more Indic systems , incl Klub which is fired from torpedo tubes. the small size and endurance of SSK makes them unsuitable for VL systems and large missiles like brahmos and incapable of a strong salvo of smaller missiles like nirbhay (torpedo magazine room has onlee 15 places). so let them focus on mine laying, mine hunting, recon, Anti ship strike and ASW.

ie unless our 2nd line is a huge Soryu MKI type design which Scorpene doesnt scale up to. no sign of that yet - inspite of strong brf support

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 26 Aug 2011 13:16

Singha wrote:unless we are getting some martian tech in TOT, I have never understood why we need two separate lines of SSKs with double the cost of initial infra, training and spares rather than just replicating the Scorpene line in another location or inhouse

I completely agree Singha , Its a complete waste of effort and time and money to duplicate what already exist just for the sake of operating Submarine from East and West. Its a colossal waste of public money , money that can be better utilised for other critical naval programs.

My recomendation will be to double Scorpene build up from present 6 hulls to another 6 with MESMA AIP in a parallel line that MDL plans to have , Purchase the bigger S-80 from Spain thats a big brother of Scorpene and a proven platform which will greatly easy the logistical burden buy and build 12 of those.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 26 Aug 2011 13:21

India will soon receive Project 971 submarine
Arms Tass

India will soon receive on lease for 10 years, the Russian nuclear submarine with a missile-torpedo armament "Seal" ("Shark-1", "Pike-In"). Testing should be completed on this boat by late August according to Indian correspondent, reports the London weekly "Jane's Defence Weekly."

Leasing boats will be part of a secret agreement worth 650-700 million dollars. Currently, the Indian boat crew with Russian instructors are working out various tasks in the Sea of Japan.

The boat will be put into service the Indian Navy in late 2011 and in November will arrive on a special base of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles (SSBNs), which is based in Rambilli on the east coast of India.

After the adoption of "Chakras" India will be the sixth country in the world after China, France, Russia, UK and USA, which has in the Navy nuclear submarine.

The Indian Navy refused to comment on the program fee, but news reports from Moscow confirmed the schedule of the program.

"Chakra" is used as a platform for training crew of SSBN "Arihant" - the first SSBN, designed and built in India, which is due out in the sea to bear the duty with full long-range weapons at the end of 2012 the Indian Navy plans to build three to five SSBNs.

saurav.jha · Post by **saurav.jha** » 26 Aug 2011 13:37

Do we not possess the entire design blueprints for Type-209 SSKs..? Wonder if that could be useful in designing the indigenous Subs..

uddu · Post by **uddu** » 26 Aug 2011 14:06

There seems to be song like Akulaaaa... Akulaaaa.... you areeee, sooooooo faaaaaaaaaaaar

uddu · Post by **uddu** » 26 Aug 2011 14:15

saurav.jha wrote:Do we not possess the entire design blueprints for Type-209 SSKs..? Wonder if that could be useful in designing the indigenous Subs..

May not be, since Scorpene know how is there.
What I dont understand is, we need further designs knowledge of Russian systems when we are operating Russian sub for a longer time? So is it not a good move to go for larger Scorpene offered b DCNS as part of P75I and then have our own design with whatever we have learned from the Russian and western subs to have our own indegenous submarine that's something like the Soryu in size and will have all the capabilities of Russian as well as western subs.
But we'll surely need large number of Attack subs. When the first Akula being decomissioned, 10 years from now, we must have our own attack sub. It can be the SSN variant of Arihant (Arihant-II) without the extra bulge meant for carrying SLBM, but packed in those space with as much as Brahmos and Nirbhay that it can accommodate. It may be able to carry about 50 Brahmos and Nirbhay in it's place.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 26 Aug 2011 15:57

Our sub inventory and future force planning leaves a lot to be desired.Let me enumerate.First let's look at the challenges that we will face in the future.

Pak is acquiring at least 6+ AIP Yuan subs from China.These subs will be better than late model Kilos that the PLAN possesses.They will have Stirling cycle AIP systems.In addition,Pak has its newly built AIP Agosta-90Bs with the French MESMA system.They will then have the benefit of operating two kinds of western AIP systems.These subs will be able to launch/fire both western and Chinese anti-ship and land attack missiles.China meanwhile will possess between 80-100 modern subs according to US intel by 2020.It already has a large fleet of late model Kilo 636s,and the new Song,Yuan and other new N-sub classes being built numbering 60+.The ASEAN nations,Japan (18+),SoKo (18+),NoKo (unknown-a few doz. cold war designs and midget subs),Vietnam (6+),etc. will also possess upwards of 60+ subs and even nations without them like the Phillipines,are considering acquiring them.S'Pore has already acquired old Swedish subs (6).Iran also possesses Kilos and a large fleet of home-made mini-subs and the SAfricans and others add to the total count,not forgetting the USN (Diego Garcia) and other western powers whose N-subs are permamently stationed iin the IOR/Arabian Sea.

(to be contd.)

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 26 Aug 2011 18:53

So we have theis huge number of modern subs all operating in the IOR and the Indo-China Sea/Pacific region as well.Given the PLAN advances into the IOR with their largesse of bases,ports,etc. being liberally doled out to Pak (Gwadar),Lanka (Hambantota) Burma,BDEsh et al,the IN has determined that a pro-active stance must be adopted to prevent a "break-in" ,into the IOR by the PLAN.The astronomical cost of supporting a carrier task force just fro 40 strike aircraft,for US carriers,requires at least one AEGIS CG,two DDGs,one support aux. vessel,and one N-sub.A few thousand naval personnel aboard these ships are needed to crew them,the whole costing billions per year per task force! The strike capability of the carrier according to some US analysts,is not more than that of an coverted OHIO SSGN which can carry 160+ cruise missiles! Just one sub can do the job of the entire task force! Well,its not entirely accurate but you get the picture.

Therefore,China with its small carrier fleet-by 2020 at least,will use its huge advantage in AIP/N subs to infiltrate into the IOR through the ASEAN chokepoints and use the port facilities in the nations whose ports and bases it built to support its naval assets.The IN will have by then 3 carriers and the unsinkable "INS India",which I always make note of,to combat the challenge from the Sino-Pak combine within the IOR as well as in the Indo-China Sea hopefully using port facilities in Vietnam for support.The appearence of carrier busting ballistic missiles by China is worrying the US and should the IN too,as even though a carrier will have a few minutes of warning if a ballistic missile attack,able to move rapidly to a new position and might have capable anti-missile defences,if salvoes of such missiles are launched it will complicate matters for a task force.The PLAN needs carriers not merely to assist in amphib ops to recapture Taiwan,but to "show the flag" just as western navies do to impress smaller nations of their "big stick"! As the Chinese have said,if others (smaller nations) have carriers,why not us? Despite the IN's geographical advantage in the IOR,and the avilablity of at least 3 carriers,the best way to fight the intruders is underwater by our own sub fleet.This why we need the best of both east and west.

Now there is a cultural difference between western and eastern sub design,which is why we need both of them as mentioned and we have been operating German and Russian subs for almost 3 decades now.Western systems are more automated than Russian ones and western submariners most often look down upon them,but so do the Russians,who say that the western subs are too "soft" and when a system breaks down (Collins class for example),are difficult to repair/support.In Russian subs,automation is often used only as an alternative to manual operations/mechanisms,as a fail-safe mechanism.Russian double-hulled subs can also take more damage than a western sub and offer an inner hull as well for better acoustic silencing.They also have unique weapon systems like Shkval,etc., and some sensors which do not have a western equivalent.In quieting,US studies have shown them to be almost as quiet as late model US subs.The venerable Kilo is still being ordered by countries like Venezuela and Vietnam .

The IN's inventory has 4 German U-boats being upgraded and 10 Kilos also being upgraded-most of them,but both classes belong to the '80s and will by 2020 have to be replaced.It would be foolish to throw away our long ecxperience with German sub tech and gvien the capabilities of the German U-boats,acquire another 4 AIP subs to complement and progressively replace the U-209s.By 2020 we will then have about 12 Scorpenes and U-boats,along with the remaining Kilos and a new line of Russian AIP subs which can accomodate Brahmos,which is fast becoming a force-multiplier in naval warfare today.The western subs would be best used primarily for littoral warfare,hunting down PN and PLAN intruding subs,while the larger Russian design,with B'Mos, would be a better blue-water combatant.This new class should progressively replace the 10 Kilos in service.12+ Western subs and 12+ Indo-Russian B'Mos subs would be ideal.

As for AIP systems,the Russians also have a fuel-cell system-Kristal,but its performance vs the German fuel-cell system is unknown as of now.The IN could perhaps fit the German fuel-cell onto the Indo-Russian boat for commonality.This is poss. as the Russians were willing to have a Russo-Italian sub design on offer for the IN at one time.By 2020,we would then be able to distinguish which AIP system is the best for the IN,plus which weapon systems ,missiles,torps,etc.,suitn us best.The eclectic composition of the IN's sub fleet will have a profound effect upon the enemy who will be unsure as to which type of sub will confront him.Our nuclear subs,Akula/s and ATVs is another tale to tell later.From available info,we plan to have between 10-12 N-subs split between SSBNs and SSGNs and about 24 conventional subs are also required.This will give us at any time about 60% of the subs available should any crisis erupt,as some still be in dock for maintenance,repairs,mid-life refits,etc.

titash · Post by **titash** » 26 Aug 2011 19:03

Hello everyone...my name is Titash. I am an ardent military fan (mostly IN & LCA), and have been following BR since the 1996-97 timeframe (yes...using a lynx text browser). I'm an early-morning-before-I-brush passive participant in BRF on a pretty much daily basis. I used to send across a few scanned pics from annual MoD reports for the BR webpages in the early 2000s, before digicams proliferated. I guess its time to dive into BRF

@ Philip:
I like the way you think/write sir, but I have to disagree on one fundamental point...just because our threat includes an increased number of subs doesn't mean we have to counter it with the exact same pieces of equipment. Planners will take into account upfront costs, equipment availability, and long term maintenance costs of any assets that they procure to counter this threat perception. In my mind, the most flexible response to a sub threat is an extensive passive sensor array (eg: SOSUS) coupled with high endurance naval aviation assets (eg: JMSDF has over 90+ Orions)

Just because P* anc C* have more subs doesn't mean we have to do the same. 20+ P-8I backed by 60+ heavy manned helicopters and 30+ unmanned NRUAVs is a formidable ASW asset that will operate well within the range of shore based fighter protection. This is a far cheaper solution than procuring more subs

Our diesel electric subs exist to deny the P* anc C* surface naval/merchant ships the freedom of the seas. They hardly have the endurance or sprint capability to act as independent ASW assets even with AIP. If the IN feels that 24 diesel electric subs produced over 30 years are sufficient sea denial assets, then perhaps that is indeed the case

Open for discussions...

Avid · Post by **Avid** » 26 Aug 2011 22:55

titash wrote:Hello everyone...my name is Titash. I am an ardent military fan (mostly IN & LCA), and have been following BR since the 1996-97 timeframe (yes...using a lynx text browser). I'm an early-morning-before-I-brush passive participant in BRF on a pretty much daily basis. I used to send across a few scanned pics from annual MoD reports for the BR webpages in the early 2000s, before digicams proliferated. I guess its time to dive into BRF

@ Philip:
I like the way you think/write sir, but I have to disagree on one fundamental point...just because our threat includes an increased number of subs doesn't mean we have to counter it with the exact same pieces of equipment. Planners will take into account upfront costs, equipment availability, and long term maintenance costs of any assets that they procure to counter this threat perception. In my mind, the most flexible response to a sub threat is an extensive passive sensor array (eg: SOSUS) coupled with high endurance naval aviation assets (eg: JMSDF has over 90+ Orions)

Just because P* anc C* have more subs doesn't mean we have to do the same. 20+ P-8I backed by 60+ heavy manned helicopters and 30+ unmanned NRUAVs is a formidable ASW asset that will operate well within the range of shore based fighter protection. This is a far cheaper solution than procuring more subs

Our diesel electric subs exist to deny the P* anc C* surface naval/merchant ships the freedom of the seas. They hardly have the endurance or sprint capability to act as independent ASW assets even with AIP. If the IN feels that 24 diesel electric subs produced over 30 years are sufficient sea denial assets, then perhaps that is indeed the case

Open for discussions...

Ummm.... I would recommend saving your breath on this particular point. Many others and I have made the same point aiming to straighten some of the curly dog tail jingos on BR

The point has been made many a times that you do not counter sub for sub, and planning on that basis is evidence of inability to think at fleet level. However, we keep circling. Is what happens with selective Alzheimer

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 26 Aug 2011 23:11

Arre Bhaiya how many of those subs will be able to enter the IOR undetected? hain?

I know, some sub bahadurs are just itching to give me a one line rejoinder " many". But given our ability to surveillance seed all known choke points, and increasing ability to do so in the future I don't think so.

Bhaiyya PRC ka threat window lag bhag bandh ho chuka hai. Bas ab ye MSC aur border infra banaa lo, aur jo jo force accretion plan kiye ho karte raho , Chicom will soon sue for peace.

P.S: Anybody unhappy with the desi "north Indian"/ "hindustani"/ "bihari bhaiyya" type language, please ignore my post.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 27 Aug 2011 00:10

excellent first post titash ! welcome to BR.

regarding our fleet, if MDL sticks to the revised schedule (!) we would have 6 new subs by 2019 and the first decom dates for the 209 and the kilo can be stretched to 2020, at the rate of (say) 2 subs every 3 years. MDL can continue churning out scorpenes and improved scorpenes and eventually Indian SSK designs. some pvt yard can be asked to start a second line of the same sub. HSL and L&T should focus fully on SSNs and SSBNs. I would really like to see IN to stress on SSNs.
rather than trying to match PLAN one on one on numbers (*) even a smaller fleet of SSNs would be a much more flexible option to match the capabilities.

titash · Post by **titash** » 27 Aug 2011 01:15

Thanks Rahul M

To be perfectly honest, the distance from Zhanjiang to Port Blair is approx 2000 nautical miles or 4000 miles round trip. A C* diesel electric submarine will either need a full fleet train / logistical support ships (aka easy targets) in the Bay of Bengal, or will need to operate at a crawl of 3-4 knots (batteries) or 7-8 knots (AIP). Snorkelling and Surface Running are not survivable options. What this means in practical terms is that the C* diesel electric fleet lacks the capability to pursue an extended campaign in the Bay of Bengal, let alone in the Arabian sea. Even with AIP, you are going to run out of Diesel fuel if you move, manouvere, evade, or pursue targets. With no way for easy replenishment, the only realistic and persistent C* threat is their small fleet of SSN (7 boats the last time I checked)

I personally like the idea of having HSL and L&T concentrate on nuclear boats. A small SSN fleet (3-4 boats even) backed by a handful of P-8I based on the east coast can provide a very flexible solution to any C* naval incursion into the Bay of Bengal. Unless C* builds up to match Uncle's current capabilities (60+ SSN and 10+ carriers), I don't see that incursion ever happening...not while BrahMos is still around

Titash

Nikhil T · Post by **Nikhil T** » 27 Aug 2011 01:32

titash wrote:Thanks Rahul M

To be perfectly honest, the distance from Zhanjiang to Port Blair is approx 2000 nautical miles or 4000 miles round trip. A C* diesel electric submarine will either need a full fleet train / logistical support ships (aka easy targets) in the Bay of Bengal, or will need to operate at a crawl of 3-4 knots (batteries) or 7-8 knots (AIP). Snorkelling and Surface Running are not survivable options. What this means in practical terms is that the C* diesel electric fleet lacks the capability to pursue an extended campaign in the Bay of Bengal, let alone in the Arabian sea. Even with AIP, you are going to run out of Diesel fuel if you move, manouvere, evade, or pursue targets. With no way for easy replenishment, the only realistic and persistent C* threat is their small fleet of SSN (7 boats the last time I checked)

I personally like the idea of having HSL and L&T concentrate on nuclear boats. A small SSN fleet (3-4 boats even) backed by a handful of P-8I based on the east coast can provide a very flexible solution to any C* naval incursion into the Bay of Bengal. Unless C* builds up to match Uncle's current capabilities (60+ SSN and 10+ carriers), I don't see that incursion ever happening...not while BrahMos is still around

Titash

Titash,

This logic assumes that the PLAN subs have to start from Chinese mainland. If the Chinese get a base in Myanmar/Pakistan/Sri Lanka, which is likely with the global shift of economic and political power towards China, then their Subs will suddenly become very handy. Brahmos/P8-I is one answer for this scenario but IMHO, we can't do with 6-8 rusty boats in our inventory.

titash · Post by **titash** » 27 Aug 2011 06:32

Nikhil T,

You are right...we cannot do with 6-8 old subs. We need a minimum of 20+ boats to maintain 10 at sea (one thing to note however, is that newer generation mechanical equipment tends to have higher availability/uptime...I expect a higher fraction of Scorpenes to be operational as compared to Kilos)

But, I disagree with your assessment that the Chinese will get a base in Sri Lanka. India is the top dog in this neighbourhood, and it will be an exceedingly foolish leader that will grant naval bases to the Chinese. Every decision maker there knows that in the event of Indo-Chinese hostilities, that naval base and attendant port facilities are legitimate targets. The recent Russian invasion of Georgia reinforced one sad but true fact...small countries do not antagonize their considerably larger neighbours by cozying up to a distant power. Sri Lanka will do well to bear that in mind
To some extent, there is historical precedent for my confidence. The US has not acquired a foothold in Sri Lanka even though there was strong interest in the 1980s and mild interest as recently as 2007

Re: Pakistan, I think we need to have a little more faith in AmirKhan. The Persian Gulf remains the world's premier energy source for the forseeable future...which means the 5th Fleet is going nowhere. AmirKhan will be seriously annoyed if Pakistan makes any move in that direction. Expect an army coup / leadership change / political assassination in such an eventuality. Gwadar still remains a PSA managed venture in spite of Chinese funding

Re: Burma...wildcard. Not sure how things will play out. But I suspect GoI will have an overnight realization of the need to support the legitimate aspirations of freedom and democracy of the Burmese people (read Aung San Suu Kyi) if the Junta does take said steps

Open for discussions...

ps: it is said that Nixon's hatchet man Chuck Colson had a sign in his office that read "When you've got 'em by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow". Simply put, every one of our neighbors has a pressure point that can be squeezed

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 27 Aug 2011 09:29

Austin wrote:India will soon receive Project 971 submarine
Arms Tass
SNIP..............

Has the interior paint job been completed on the boat??

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 27 Aug 2011 11:06

maz wrote:TSarkar, nice to see you here. One point of correction: if I am not mistaken, the P-15A are not getting the 127mm OTO. What we see on these ships are the same gun mounts as Satpura - stealth Oto 76mm SRGM. A bit underarmed for such a large DDG. Of course, I could be wrong and once the covers come off, they may turn out to be 127mm mounts.

Hello Maz, good to see you too.

In that case it would be terribly underarmed.

The OTO deal for 30 pieces was signed for ICG. If I remember right, the Samar class first had this gun, followed by last 3 Kora. However, ICG discovered - as IN discovered sinking the Thai trawler - that terrorists and pirates often have hostages - and large and medium caliber shells cause collateral damage. Imagine the hue and cry in the media if citizens were killed in collateral damage. Hence ICG moved to lower caliber 30 mm BMP-2 gun.

However, I believe all 30 pieces havent been utilized, and some could be upgraded to 127 mm - since OTO delivers them only during build & fitting out. We could pay some incremental money and get the larger gun.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 27 Aug 2011 13:47

The plan is not to match the PLAN "sub for sub",If one looks at the numbers I have given,the PLAN and PN will still outnumber the IN sub's fleet by a factor of 3! Secondly,the enormous difference in technology and approach to sub design between western and Russian subs has to be understood and taken advantage of.The weaponry used by both is another factor.We have been very fortunate to have had access to German and Russian subs thus far and will now also have access to the French and MESMA AIP.However,MESMA is according to some analysts inferior to German fuel-cell AIP systems.We cannot allow the German experince be consigned to Davy Jones' Locker!

In shallow littoral waters,conventional AIP subs have the advantage over N-boats,both in cost and capability.It is why the USN is training its submariners against leased Swedish conventional subs.Now look at the enormity of the task of defending India's vast coastline and island territories.Just recently,an abandoned merchantman floated all the way from Oman to Juhu Beach undetected! Read the history too of WW2 subs ops and the role of midget subs.Today we are entering into the era of UUVs launched from both mother subs and surfacec vessels for surveillance and sabotage-laying mines,suicide UUVs,etc.With a small fleet of subs,the IN will be unable to sanitise its strategic assets and the multitude of ports around the coast.We are establishing many new naval bases and facilities like Rambili for our N-subs,Karwar and others.The ease with which a PLAN conventional sub tracked a US carrier task force came as arude shock to the US.The SoKos also recd. a huge blow when their ASW corvette was allegedly sunk by a NoKo midget sub of vintage design.

Western subs have little experience of double-hulled designs.The huge advantage that Russian double hulled subs have is in better survivability after suffering damage .During the Cold War many Soviet subs surfaced and survived after experiencing colliisions and other problems mainly due to their double-hulls,where the sub could survive even if one compartment was flooded.Study the single-hull German U-boats,Dolphin design for Israel for comparison.The double hulls also give four surfaces where quietring anechoic coatings can be applied.But this come with a larger sub,capable of carrying missiles like Klub,Brahmos,etc., better suited for all-round offensive ops,than the smaller western subs used primarily as SSKs.

Therefore it can be seen that we should adopt a holistic approach to our sub inventory.The unique characteristics of each type of sub can be employed where it is best.The variety of weaponry will also be a huge force multiplier.Maintaining a variety of subs will also not be a problem because we will have at least 6-8 of each type .Just look at the surface fleet's number of types,not forgetting the fact that we perhaps operate the largest variety of anti-ship missiles of any navy! Brahmos,Klub,Uran,P-20,Exocet (to be used on Scorpenes),Harpoon (on P-8s),Dhanush,K-15 (on the ATV) Nirbhay and even perhaps Prahar in the future aboard large surface combatants.

Given subs long endurance and range (I mistakenly said earlier that a certain sub had a range of 12000km when in fact it should've been 12,000 nm instead!),and we haven't forgotten how the Ghazi was found at the entrance to Vizag in '71,underwater threats will come at us from all points of the compass.In addition we will also have to send our subs into "harm's way",into the Indo-China Sea,so that we have advance warning of the PLAN's intentions and meet the challenge by force if need be during a crisis in order to prevent a "break-in" into the IOR.AS for SOSUS and maritime patrol aircraft,SOSUS is prohibitively expensive,it cannot be "thrown around" the entire sub-continent and our LRMPs and MRPs have so many tasks that the numbers required will be in the hundreds and unaffordable.Remember the huge task that the Allies had in WW2 in the Battle for the Atlantic.Admittedly while it cannot do all the work alone,and requires a 3-D approach with surface ASW ships and ASW aircraft and helos,a quiet stealthy sub is the best platform to counter another sub in the depths of the ocean.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 28 Aug 2011 02:27

Pratyush wrote:Has the interior paint job been completed on the boat??

A few pipes are still left. They are being painted in an orange glow, so that our sailors can see them when the lights go off.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 28 Aug 2011 14:35

Pipes or sailors! Remember the old CW joke,"Q: How do you tell a Russian submariner in the dark? A: From the way in which he glows!"

http://twocircles.net/2011aug28/counter ... omacy.html

To counter China, India needs to do naval diplomacy

By Mohan Balaji, IANS,

It was 500 years ago that the Portuguese captured the Malacca Strait, establishing supremacy in the East Indies. Despite limited military might, Portugal set up active sea-trading outposts in Asia such as Goa, Malacca, Kochi, Macau and Nagasaki and controlled trade between Europe and Asia.

The region between the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden is now hailed as the "centrestage of the 21st century". If India has to graduate from being a regional power to a great power in Asia-Pacific, it needs to control these vital links in the Indian Ocean.

India shows both continental and maritime country characteristics. With a growing economy, it can re-link its historical maritime and cultural contacts politically through naval diplomacy.

For example, India's 'Look East' policy boosted its trade relations with Southeast Asia, complemented by naval diplomacy which involved regular visits of Indian Navy officers to Southeast Asia. However, there's a need to extend India's Look East policy till the South Pacific by utilizing its peninsular characteristic for its strategic objective. For this, one must draw lessons from history.

India's relations with countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia are historically interlinked. So far, India hasn't fully understood the strategic dimensions of its winding coastline as other great powers did in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Countries such as Britain, the US and Japan (naval powers) and the Soviet Union, Germany and France (continental powers) maximized their geographic position to exert maximum strategic maneuvering when they were considered Great Powers.

Though India has failed to tap these long lost relations, it's now the time to revisit the cultural ties with the atolls and island nations from the west of the Indian Ocean till South Pacific. This can act as a counter-weight to China's String of Pearls strategy which involves building bases around India's peninsular region.

China started this by building a deep sea port in the southern coast of Sri Lanka, at Hambantota. Second, China has helped Pakistan build a deep sea port in Gadara in Balochistan. Third, China has started to court the littoral states in the Indian Ocean such as the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles through what is called yuan diplomacy in exchange for naval bases.

To counter China's encircling in the Indian Ocean, India's naval diplomacy should mean sending naval officers on routine trips to atolls and having regular exchanges at the naval officers' level.

Second, India should initiate more bilateral trade pacts and multilateral initiative in the Indian Ocean region by strengthening the regional multilateral organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation.

If India wishes to graduate itself from being a regional power to a great power, it will need to counter China's influence in its own sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean.

(28-08-2011- The author is Asia editor for World Security Network. He can be reached on mohanbalaji2003@gmail.com

[/quote]

Kersi D · Post by **Kersi D** » 29 Aug 2011 22:13

Philip wrote:Pipes or sailors! Remember the old CW joke,"Q: How do you tell a Russian submariner in the dark? A: From the way in which he glows!"

Q: How do you tell a Russian nuclear submariner in the dark? A: From the way in which he glows!"

Nikhil T · Post by **Nikhil T** » 30 Aug 2011 00:04

titash wrote:Nikhil T,
Re: Pakistan, I think we need to have a little more faith in AmirKhan. The Persian Gulf remains the world's premier energy source for the forseeable future...which means the 5th Fleet is going nowhere. AmirKhan will be seriously annoyed if Pakistan makes any move in that direction. Expect an army coup / leadership change / political assassination in such an eventuality. Gwadar still remains a PSA managed venture in spite of Chinese funding

Agreed that AmirKhan will be uneasy with a Chinese base but the act of war does not require a permanent base to be established. Even refueling facilities would be sufficient for PLAN capital ships to pose a threat to Mumbai. In times of high tension (say over a border incident) PLAN ships could very easily do a port call at Gwadar/Karachi and stay there for an extended time under the garb of "naval exercises". This unsaid message would not be lost in the corridors of New Delhi.

titash wrote: Re: Burma...wildcard. Not sure how things will play out. But I suspect GoI will have an overnight realization of the need to support the legitimate aspirations of freedom and democracy of the Burmese people (read Aung San Suu Kyi) if the Junta does take said steps

Open for discussions...

Again, the GoI's sudden turnaround in favour of Aung San Kyi would not change the immediate situation that the PLAN would be taking up a base there. Over a medium/long-term, yes, GOI's opposition to the Junta will push the Junta deeper into a corner. Its not totally inconceivable to think that 10-20 years from now, China can manage a base in Burma. Heck, who was betting 10-20 years back that Indian Navy will get a base in Vietnam? But it is in discussions now.

The objective here is not dhoti-shivering but that our Navy needs to have both capital ships and submarines in numbers.

Juggi G · Post by **Juggi G** » 30 Aug 2011 04:31

Ship Building and India’s Offset Policy
..:: India Strategic ::..

Ship Building and India’s Offset Policy
By S N Misra
Published : September 2011

Introduction: Post Kelkar Committee Recommendations, the Ministry of Defence introduced the Offset provisions in its DPP 2005 to leverage its big ticket arms acquisition to bring in FDI, Joint Venture arrangements and counter trade arrangements to boost India’s indigenous defence industry capability.

The policy subsequently included civil aerospace and homeland security products in DPP 2011. However, surprisingly the commercial ship building sector was kept out of the ambit of offsets. This paper brings out the need for looking at both commercial ship building and warship building in tandem so as to reap the enormous opportunities which can flow out of such initiatives. Countries like South Korea and China have become global powers in ship building due to focused government attention, liberal policy and investment in infrastructure and design capability.

Commercial Ship Building

India is a major maritime country, predominantly peninsular in nature having a coastline of 7515 Km and 1197 islands, and located strategically on major maritime routes.

The Indian Commercial shipbuilding depends mainly on 28 shipyards comprising 8 Public Sector (6 yards under Central and 2 under State Governments) and 20 Private Sector shipyards. Only Cochin Shipyard Limited (1,10,00 DWT) and Hindustan Shipyard Limited (80,000 DWT) have the required infrastructure and graving dock to build large vessels.

The current capacity of all the yards is 5,00,000 DWT approximately. The Indian Shipbuilding Industry, which had only about 0.1 per cent share of the world shipbuilding in 2002, expanded over tenfold to claim 1 per cent share by 2007/2008 riding on the global boom and supported by a subsidy scheme. Shipbuilding turnover for Private and Public Sector Shipyards excluding Defence Shipyards has grown about 14 fold in the last nine years from about Rs. 440 crores in 2001-2002 to an estimated Rs. 6200 crores in 2010-2011as shown below:

Shipbuilding Turnover of Major Non-Defence Shipyards (Rs. in Cr.)

Warship Building

Four defence shipyards viz. MDL, GRSE, GSL and ASL are presently engaged in warship building and repairs and refits. Indigenous Shipbuilding accounts for nearly Rs. 8511 Crores ($1.9 billion) during 2010-11. It constitutes nearly 60 per cent of the Navy’s total acquisition budget.

The productivity of the Indian DPSU (Defence Public Sector Undertakings) shipyards is, however, much below the levels achieved by international standards. Whereas the first tier yards like MDL (Mazagon Dock Ltd) and CSL (Cochin Shipyard Ltd) have a capacity to build 1.33 and 0.48 ships respectively, the comparable international standards are 5.7.

Similarly in terms of the build-time trends, it is almost four times more than the international standards. For instance, a ship with displacement tonnage of 3,500 tonnes in the US is built in 30 months with 2,50,000 man hours as against 72 months and 1.8 million man hours (Godavari class). Also there are substantial time and cost overruns between the contractual milestones and actuals as under:

Time and Cost Overruns

The overall shipbuilding capacity of the DPSUs is at the best 4 ships a year. During the next 10 years, as against the annual requirement of 107 SSUs (Standard Ship Units), around 40 SSUs are available at the DPSUs.

At the end of year 2010, the world market stood at 261 million GT in terms of orderbook position, 77 million GT in terms of new orders and 96 million GT in terms of completion of order. Growth of the world market has been very erratic since 2009 in terms of the order book and new orders while growth has been stable as far as completions are concerned. The fluctuations in the world market are captured in the following graph:

Source: HIS (Former Lloyd’s Register) “World Shipbuilding Statistics” year end (Shipbuilding Statistics: Shipbuilding Association of Japan- March 2011)

The world market in shipbuilding is dominated by three Asian countries, namely China, South Korea and Japan which together account for approximately 90 per cent of the world market in terms of the existing order book at the end of year 2010.

The emergence of these countries in the second half of the last century is a lesson for other countries such as India. Among the three nations, China has seen some spectacular growth in the industry since 1990s while South Korea usurped Japan as the world leader in 1999.

Share in World’s Order for Shipbuilding

Lessons for lndia

The National Manufacturing Council (NMCC) in its report to the (PMO) Prime Minister’s Office in 2009 made the following recommendations for developing Indian ship building Industry:

• Prepare on an urgent basis a comprehensive plan to enhance domestic shipbuilding capabilities and building large new shipyards.
• Adopt a Mission Mode approach for the purpose. In this context, the examples of both Korea and China be studied·
• A continuing mechanism be evolved to synergise the efforts of the naval authorities under the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Shipping for meeting long term requirements of the country.

It clearly emerges that in the existing structure governing the Indian shipbuilding sector, commercial and warship building is inadequate to meet the country’s burgeoning demands ahead.

Capacity expansion in the commercial sector will have a positive spinoff for the warship construction activity as it will allow shipyards to focus more on the complex warship construction activity.

In that sense the policy facilitation of a level playing field to private sector players in Shipbuilding Procedure 2011 is really welcome.

This will include construction of additional international standards greenfield shipyards through private public partnership as also through foreign JV arrangements.

Concurrently modernization/ upgradation of existing shipyards needs to be undertaken to improve productivity and turnover time in line with global benchmarks. Build period is greatly improved when a series of ships of identical design are constructed. Series effect studies have shown that the 10th ship require 35 per cent less work load than the first one.

India has severe limitation in design capability with only IIT, Kharagpur and CUSAT, Kochi and IIT Chennai having some expertise. Vital gaps remain in design/development areas like vulnerability, survivability, stealth technologies, effects of shocks/blasts on ship construction and hydrodynamics of high spread marine vehicles and submarines. An Indian Maritime university needs to be established as an overarching institute to source requisite talent, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Funding R&D to educational and research institutions in shipbuilding needs to be encouraged.

The Defence Production Policy 2011 is a welcome initiative in this regard.

Fiscal Initiatives

(a) Subsidy SchemeDuring 10th Five Year Plan (2002–2007), a subsidy scheme was introduced where 30 per cent subsidy on bid price was available to shipyards on domestic and export order. This galvanized the shipbuilding by raising its global share from 0.2 per cent in 2002 to 1.3 per cent in 2007.

This subsidy was withdrawn by the government in 2007 for all new orders which has resulted in India’s share dropping to 0.01 per cent in 2009 as depicted below:

The subsidy scheme needs to be reintroduced urgently and redirected towards capital expenditure. It should extend to capital equipment such as cranes and plasma cutting machines to improve the Indian shipyards’ productivity.

Some of the marine systems and equipment where foreign partnership and collaboration can be considered are:

There is also a need to kick start the private public partnership in the shipbuilding sector as major private shipyards like Pipavav, ABG and Bharati and L&T often take an adversarial posture vis-à-vis defence shipyards.

The private shipyards, despite their good facilities, are seriously hamstrung in terms of design and development capability and in integrating major subsystems, where defence shipyards like MDL, DGND, DG WESEE have a definite advantage. However, for achieving global standards in niche technology, construction of submarines, frigates, even shipyards like MDL have considerable distance to catch up.

The way forward is public private partnership, JV arrangements with reputed foreign OEMs and design houses with 50:50 FDI participation and bolstering our indigenous R&D capability. Some of the areas in which offset in commercial shipbuilding sector can be allowed are:

Conclusion

It is apparent that with proper policy facilitation, investment in infrastructure, building design capability and public private partnership, the shipbuilding sector can be a major manufacturing hub. The offset policy should not be myopic and defence specific but should try to harness the commonality between civil and military segments.

There is a lot of complementarity in systems used for aerospace and shipbuilding sectors like propulsion, weapons, avionics and sensors. Sip and aircraft engines, or propulsion units for missiles, are made by and large by same companies.

The offset policy should take advantage of these commonalities and leverage India’s big ticket acquisitions to get key technologies and improve India’s self reliance quotient substantially.

© India Strategic

Rupak · Post by **Rupak** » 30 Aug 2011 06:11

Delay in delivery of Indian Frigates
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20110829/166263843.html

arun · Post by **arun** » 30 Aug 2011 07:05

X Posted from the Military Acquisitions, Partnerships, Developments thread.

A Russian view on the delay in the supply of Series 2 of the Project 1135.6 frigates Teg, Tarkash and Trikand by the Yantar Shipyard:

The bright side of the delayed frigate delivery to India

SRay · Post by **SRay** » 30 Aug 2011 11:14

arun wrote:The bright side of the delayed frigate delivery to India

I'm missing what the bright side is. If the shipyards were in such a rusty state, why were such optimistic delivery schedules agreed upon?

sum · Post by **sum** » 30 Aug 2011 11:21

^^ This is similar to the bright side where some folks here were arguing that the Nerpa delays were good for India since Russians were knowingly delaying the delivery( by extensively re painting the sub) to help us getting our infra ready first else IN would have been shown in bad light if not for the Russians!!

krishnan · Post by **krishnan** » 30 Aug 2011 11:24

The bright side is , we got the infra ready at last, and babus got their packets filled up , which is bright side for babus

bmallick · Post by **bmallick** » 30 Aug 2011 12:23

SRay wrote:
arun wrote:The bright side of the delayed frigate delivery to India
I'm missing what the bright side is. If the shipyards were in such a rusty state, why were such optimistic delivery schedules agreed upon?

The bright side is from the point of view of the Russians. Firstly, with the Talwar batch of frigates, they got their one shipyard out of doldrums and then with the follow on order their second shipyard is revived. So its definitely a bright side for them. We did not get the ships in time is something for us to worry, not them.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 30 Aug 2011 13:23

There is no "bright side" to any delay from whatever quarter is comes for us! As far as Russian orders are concerned,one hopes that there are penalties for delays,which appear to have been imposed in the first batch of Talwars due to Shtil SAM problems.However,these frigates have performed superbly,are a very successful design which should get even better when Brahmos equipped versions arrive, and regularly win prizes for performance in fleet exercises.

One interesting stat from the report on Indian yards and their delays.There seems to be a "300%" increase in costs for the Delhi class due to delays.This is simply unacceptable.We can't have a similar situ like the CWG with respect to defence orders.From various sources reg. delays in Indian yards,there seems to be poor planning in the procurement of material and weapon/sensor systems ,arriving late,plus late decisions reg. some eqpt. leading to cascading delays.We then have to outsource some orders to keep up the IN's fleet strength,ordering from Russia,etc.These seem to afflict all our shipbuilding yards and delays have been experienced on all types of warships and subs under construction from the IAC at Cochin to DDGs and FFs and subs at MDL,GR,HSL,etc.

Part of the problem seems to also be late dev./delivery of indigenous weapon systems/sensors.Look at how the "B" class arrived without an integral SAM system as Trishul failed completely.The time taken also from design stage to comissioning of a warship or sub is at least a decade.So obsolescence builds up quickly and unless schedules are met,the desire to further improve by modifying the original design is a constant pressure.
Until we are able to vastly improve our shipbuilding capability,we will still have to have some %age imported and put up with delays even from abroad.The only silver lining in the cloud is thta oif you examine almost all programmes even in the most developed nations and their navies,they too experience the same problems and delays,but the difference is that there is accountability for ineffiiciency unlike in India.

SNaik · Post by **SNaik** » 30 Aug 2011 13:41

The bright side is that Russian MoD has signed contract with Yantar for the second batch of 11356 for Russian Navy at a price of 400 million USD per unit. If I'm not mistaken, India is paying 1.7 billion for it's trio.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 30 Aug 2011 14:27

er our signed deal was $1.6b , comes to $533/ship .. not sure how much we eventually paid
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20091007/156380619.html

the RuS MoD deal may have been *signed* for 400 mil , does not mean they will get it for that price eventually

prices of these projects generally tend to escalate

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 30 Aug 2011 15:54

The price for an equiv. western warship would be in the region of at least $750m-1B.I think that the later batch is to have more indigenous content if I;m not mistaken.What further news of the third batch-perhaps to be built in India by one of the private yards?

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 30 Aug 2011 16:07

Singha wrote:er our signed deal was $1.6b , comes to $533/ship .. not sure how much we eventually paid
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20091007/156380619.html

the RuS MoD deal may have been *signed* for 400 mil , does not mean they will get it for that price eventually prices of these projects generally tend to escalate

The difference in cost is because of the marginal profit that these SY earns from MOD projects ( its discounted ) compared to the good profit they make from export orders , export orders also include post sales support,training cost etc

Another thing that adds to the cost is the integration cost of 3rd party system like Barak-1 CIWS , Indian Sonars/ESM or other systems in there.

vipins · Post by **vipins** » 30 Aug 2011 20:51

Suspected Chinese Spy Ship Detected Near Andamans

A suspected Chinese spy ship apparently camouflaged as a fishing trawler has been detected by the Navy near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to possibly keep an eye on Indian military activities in the area.

The ship was detected nearly four months ago in the international waters and may have been used to track Indian missiles tests and movement of other aircraft and warships in the region, Navy sources said here today.

The Navy warships could not take any action against it as it was not in Indian territorial waters but kept a close watch on its activities there, they said.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 30 Aug 2011 21:46

vipins wrote:Suspected Chinese Spy Ship Detected Near Andamans
A suspected Chinese spy ship apparently camouflaged as a fishing trawler has been detected by the Navy near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to possibly keep an eye on Indian military activities in the area.
The ship was detected nearly four months ago in the international waters and may have been used to track Indian missiles tests and movement of other aircraft and warships in the region, Navy sources said here today.

The Navy warships could not take any action against it as it was not in Indian territorial waters but kept a close watch on its activities there, they said.

Why not try and board it claiming to suspect it being a pirate ship?