Talk by Bharat Karnad at IISc on 30 August 2011

[Rudradev]

BTW, Shaurya, do you check your gmail? Sent you one there last week.

[ShauryaT]

BTW, Shaurya, do you check your gmail? Sent you one there last week.

No, I had not and just did, responded to you. Thanks.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

In fact BK is critical of Parakram. Not only Parakram, showed the bankruptcy of Indian strategic doctrine, but it also exposed the limitations of our offensive capabilities. At that time, we did not have enough and still need to acquire significant capabilities for a shock and awe performance. Our friends who track these toys know a lot more <SNIP>

Sorry for butting in the discussion, but can you please educate me where did the above come from? Thanks.

[ShauryaT]

IF that is what BK is getting at... that a robust military structure organized for plains warfare is itself a "threatening" posture with respect to Pakistan and should be forsaken because it will "never be used against Pakistan"... I disagree with it.

Modify it slightly. An offensive force optimized for warfare in the plains has only one posture, a threat to Pakistan. India does this with three strike corps - let us skip the IBG's for now. He is not saying eliminate them, but if there is no intent to use them, then why not say consolidate them into a single strike corps - that is the view of NSA SS Menon. Please bear in mind in addition, we have 10 holding corps for defensive purposes. The larger point is by optimizing the war machine against TSP, we are threatening a mouse and inevitably we get bracketed with the mouse - loosing out on much larger threats and opportunities, we should be focused on.

India has a long western border made up largely of plains, desert and salt marshes. Today it is Pakistan on the far side of that border. 2, 5, or 10 years from now it may not be Pakistan. It may be anything else... expanded Iran, independent Pakjab, a chaotic circus of Tanzeems, or even a massive influx of refugees with embedded Lashkar yahoos among them.

First, if someone holds that view, that there may not be a Pakistan, you will have to first show how. No one, I repeat no one, I know or read who is credible believes this. The ONLY scenario, where there will be no Pakistan is if India wishes it so and makes it happen. (Remember: why i was jumping for an Indian role in Afghanistan) IMO. It is a straight binary. Leave TSPA intact and TSP stays. Destroy TSPA and TSP goes. The only other way is a sectarian revolution but even that seem very far fetched, given ground realities. The Baluch cannot do it alone. Implosion theories are too far fetched and do not match ground realities. Never forget a Lashkar is prominent only because TSPA wishes them to be. This is not to say that they have perfect control over all groups, but enough to control the levers of a state.

Whatever emerges on the far side of that border, it is likely to be inimical to Indian interests for some time to come, and it is something we have to be prepared to defend against.

We will always be prepared to defend. The question of being ill prepared against a mouse, does not arise at all. Getting prepared for a bigger opponent by itself guarantees that.

Yes, costs have to be taken into consideration if we are to beef up against the Chinese threat, and holes already exist in our defense posture with respect to the Chinese threat while we have been focusing largely on Pakistan. But downgrading our capacity for military action on the western border as a matter of doctrine, is not an acceptable solution, and certainly not for the reason that our present political leadership lacks the political will to deploy those assets against the present state of Pakistan.

At the end of the day, war is an extension of politics. A conventional threat to the geographical entity of Pakistan is NOT in Indian Interests in the short term, except to reclaim our sovereign territory. Something we are not capable of - yet. This is the determination, IMO of our leadership (and not just the pussy footing ones). The question one has to answer is what happens after the battle? I am not even referring to a doom's day nuclear war. India is not ready to manage the after effects of this war and the REASON why our wars with TSP have been one of maneuvers than purpose. Nuclear weapons has just given one more reason for our leadership not to act. I believe the Indian leadership (and I am including a broad spectrum here) represents the will of the people in this matter and is right on this. What they have to do is align our postures and doctrines to this strategy, so that capabilities and resources are not wasted.

We will have a fun Jirga

[Rudradev]

Shaurya,

I should have been more clear. When I say "there may be no more Pakistan" I mean that whatever political structure exists there may or may not be the same as exists today, in several key respects. It may still go by the name and flag of "Pakistan" but in many ways it may have different policy options, compulsions and priorities than the TSP of today has. India, too, may face a different political situation at home which positively or negatively impacts the prevailing availability of policy options.

Whatever it is, we have to be ready for it, and just because we don't foresee using three strike corps against the present dispensation in Pakistan (since our leaders calculate it would serve no political purpose today)... that calculus may not hold good a year or several years into the future. I agree, 250km dash to the Indus is probably out of the question, and will be for a while, because though we could accomplish it, what would be the endgame? Still, we may not want to adopt a purely defensive posture in the west. Converting the holding corps into pivot corps that have certain theatre-specific offensive capability, and are prepared to invade and occupy well defined regions of territory across the border, may be a good idea.

A question I would like to see answered, though, is what exactly do we plan to do about our conventional posture vis-a-vis China? The current measures being proposed include beefing up air and missile assets for interdiction of a Chinese invasion, and raising more mountain divisions that are primarily holding formations. But can we even contemplate an offensive posture against China? No way, with 2% of GDP to fund our entire military needs. The question that needs to be asked is: are we seriously thinking of being able to invade and conduct offensive conventional operations on the Tibetan plateau?

If yes then there are a thousand more questions. What are the political circumstances under which we would invade Tibet? What kind of "mountain strike corps" will we need to accomplish this, and how will they be supplied? What infrastructural investments are required to support this capability? How will we move armoured divisions or MI, plus the supplies they will need, onto the Tibetan plateau... are large-scale airlifts even an option at that altitude? And of course, is the likelihood of a political climate conducive to invading Tibet, a probability that would ever justify the immense cost of investment and upkeep involved in preparing our armed forces for that capability?

My instinctive answer to all this is no. Our conventional posture w.r.t. China will be almost entirely defensive, and must be backed up by a sizeable nuclear deterrent. In fact the nuclear deterrent MUST increase in size and destructive power, because whatever the cost of testing again, developing megaton weapons, developing ICBMs, developing a seaborne second-strike capability: it is dwarfed by the cost of developing and maintaining the capacity to wage an offensive conventional war against China for the control of territory currently in the possession of China.

Completely agree with you that the reason India has behaved as it has, in EVERY conflict with Pakistan, is because we have no idea what to do on the day after we "win". So we play for small stakes, capture this piece of land, deny that piece of land. Other than 1971 the military has been given no other goals. We are not equipped to reabsorb Pakistan... or even POK... politically or economically, so there is absolutely no point in taking it. Ironically, liberating Tibet may be politically more feasible than say integrating Pakjab... but the military investment required to realize such a goal is a pipe dream.

[Rudradev]

Yes, indeed we will have a fun jirga

Ambitious thought here. Do you think it would be at all feasible to have a Skype conference with BK at the Jirga, where he could address the questions of attendees?

[shiv]

As Rudradev eloquently pointed out nuclear bombs have an aura that is not backed up by their effectiveness - at least in the last 7 decades since they were created. That is why I keep on questioning the idea of huge, large yield arsenals.

I must make a disclaimer here with an analogy. One often finds that if any one of us says something that is pro-Hindu - he is immediately branded as an RSS chaddwala right wing murderer. I face the same problem when I ask probing questions about what concept anyone has in mind when he speaks of a nuclear arsenal with a large number of "megaton bombs". It has happened even in this thread. One person immediately accused me of being a peacenik who wants to do away with all nukes.

No one, not even Bharat Karnad has been able to state a convincing reason to me why high yield nukes must be fielded. The best reason I have heard so far about "Thermonuclear weapons" is that they reduce the amount of fissile material that is used up and as a result you can make more bombs with the same amount of fissile material. There is a (weak) argument that they are cleaner. Cleaner, yes, in that they are cleaner per kiloton.

The argument about "cleaner nukes" is a really specious one.:With "plain vanilla fission" you may us up say 8 kg Pu to get a "mere" 40 kt. If you are a smart scientist you will use 2 kg boosted Pu to set off a primary hydrogen bomb, that sets off a secondary to give you 10 megatons. Now we get science here. 10 megatons is good enough to lay a large city to waste, but hey presto - only 2 Pu kg worth of fallout. But with the "old plain vanilla fission" - you need twenty bombs to do equivalent damage. and you use up 160 kg of Pu and cause 8000% more fallout and 8000% more Pu is used up..

This is more marketing hype than science - of a type that I used to hear in the 1960s where we were promised that by 1980 there would be laser "ray guns" to vaporize anything. Perhaps US university profs of that era got their funding using this sort of promotional hype. Now that many of my own peers are university profs in the US I have a fair idea of what they need to do to get funding.

When we talk of "science" we must have data. For the effect of nuclear wars on a nation, society and environment we have data from just two bombs in 1945. Everything else is hypothetical. At least one proper nuclear war has to be fought before any people remaining on the planet can "collect data" to show hat nuclear wars are less terrible than imagined or more terrible than imagined. More nuclear wars are needed to show what type of bomb and what delivery mechanism ended up most effective. Science is science and as someone said on this very thread "If it can't be measured it does not exist".

In reality most of what we write about nuclear war is conjecture. And yet we have, right here in this thread one person saying "This is the way nuclear war is fought" It is another matter that in scientific circles. conjecture and gut feeling are called "hypotheses" and "working rules" or "rules of thumb" or "ruff 'n' ready" practical guidelines. That allows the halo of science to be applied to guesswork. I can quote dozens of examples in medicine.

Why not apply the science of numbers to deterrence. Science always starts with hypotheses and conjectures and tries to validate or disprove them. Let us say "80 bombs does not deter China". How do you validate this? Is that too many or too little? Conjecture, gut feeling, and not science, says that it is "too little".

So how many do we need as a _minimum_ number reserved for China alone to deter China? Let us arrive at an educated theoretical maximum. Let us say "China is deterred by the USA/Russia" - so 5000 bombs is the maximum we will set. 80 is too small. 5000 is enough. But is 5000 the "minimum number" needed? This process can go on and on without any result because it is all about psychology and conjecture.

Things can get more absurd than this. Let us assume that we must have at least 400 bombs to deter China. But we have only 80. What can we do to address this imbalance? IDEA: "Give nukes to Vietnam". Fine. How many nukes can Vietnam get? Five. Twenty? But China needs at least 400 to deter her. What is the use of 80 in India and 20 in Vietnam?

Ultimately there is no scientific way of proving these things one way or another. You can apply "scientific method" but ultimately everything falls into the realm of politics and psychology which are sciences that deal with imprecision. It is really funny that the physics and chemistry of nuclear science which is highly precise is ultimately utilized in areas where precision does not exist.

[ShauryaT]

<SNIP>

In fact BK is critical of Parakram. Not only Parakram, showed the bankruptcy of Indian strategic doctrine, but it also exposed the limitations of our offensive capabilities. At that time, we did not have enough and still need to acquire significant capabilities for a shock and awe performance. Our friends who track these toys know a lot more <SNIP>

Sorry for butting in the discussion, but can you please educate me where did the above come from? Thanks.

Rohit ji: You butting in You are welcome anytime. Also, I am far from educating you. However the above should be read in context. The context being a 10-15 day day period. The below is a quote from a report, but I have read many such over the years. BK is of the same opinion also, that the requisite fire power to do the job in the needed time was lacking. Along with the fact that the mobilisation took time, led other factors to come into play.

India does not have enough armor, ground attack fighters, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and logistic support to make a breakthrough and drive 100 kilometers rapidly. This factor plus Pakistan’s increas- ingly credible nuclear capability has made India rethink its land attack strategy in the 1990s. A better strategy is now seen as drawing Pakistan’s forces into battle and inflicting severe losses through high-intensity attrition warfare.29 The logic behind this is that while India
would be able to make up its hardware losses quickly after a war, a cash-strapped Pakistan would not be. If in the process India were able to capture substantial territory while losing much less of its own, a strong bargaining chip would also have been created.

At present India does not have a true air-land warfare capability that can make combined use of close air support (CAS) and deep strikes against follow-up echelons. The army’s main demand of the Indian Air Force (IAF) is CAS, which it has problems delivering because of inadequate stand-off and precision-guided capability. The air force preference is for counter air operations designed to degrade the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) by disabling airfields and attriting aircraft. The problem is that counter air operations are unlikely to achieve decisive results in less than two weeks since India’s offensive air effort will have to be split from the beginning between counter air, CAS, and battlefield interdiction, all within Pakistan’s fairly good air-defense ground environment.

Verghese Koithara.

Just last week, read something similar on claws.in, but cannot find it now.

[ShauryaT]

No one, not even Bharat Karnad has been able to state a convincing reason to me why high yield nukes must be fielded.
....
Ultimately there is no scientific way of proving these things one way or another. You can apply "scientific method" but ultimately everything falls into the realm of politics and psychology which are sciences that deal with imprecision. It is really funny that the physics and chemistry of nuclear science which is highly precise is ultimately utilized in areas where precision does not exist.

Maybe that is your answer for if you are looking for a scientific or even a rational/methodical basis for TN/high yield weapons specifically for deterrence or power projection, you have to fall down to the realm of politics and psychology.

Political Science might be oxymoronic from the prism of physical sciences, however the world of international relations accepts certain norms for certain times. In this world, where hard power has a logic of its own, the possession of the supreme weapon of hard power denotes a level of capability - not in isolation from other capabilities but has a significant value of its own. Especially so, when it is accepted as THE norm amongst nations with this weapon.

These capabilities are essential, if India seeks to be:

- A major power by itself
- Non aligned
- Dominate the IOR
- Compete with China in Asia
- Guarantee the security of South Asia and beyond

There are certainly alternates to the above vision. Our PM does not think along the above lines (maybe he knows some things that we do not) and hence his answers are different. Maybe, Shiv your thinking is in lines of how our PM thinks?

We often lament that India lacks a strategic culture. Over the past few years, I have begun to understand why and gained greater appreciation of why a nation such as China is feared and respected but India is not.

[ramana]

Thinking about it and doing are very different things. The world respects those who do it and not just think about it.

[shiv]

Here is a 47.5 mb MP3 of BK's IISc talk - amplified and improved ( a little bit). I have removed the introduction and the question time (too garbled). About 48 minutes. Maybe listening with headphones is good?

Rapidshare download. If ten guys agree to do 5 minutes of transcript each we could even have a transcript. I am still doing the 45 minute Suhrawardy video transcript.

https://rapidshare.com/files/838227233/ ... 0-8-11.mp3

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

Whatever it is, we have to be ready for it, and just because we don't foresee using three strike corps against the present dispensation in Pakistan (since our leaders calculate it would serve no political purpose today)... that calculus may not hold good a year or several years into the future. I agree, 250km dash to the Indus is probably out of the question, and will be for a while, because though we could accomplish it, what would be the endgame? Still, we may not want to adopt a purely defensive posture in the west. Converting the holding corps into pivot corps that have certain theatre-specific offensive capability, and are prepared to invade and occupy well defined regions of territory across the border, may be a good idea.

Rudradev saar, my two cents on the topic (I don't much understand the nuclear-shooclear stuff...too complicated ji )

Now, when people say that we should some how make the three Strike Corps disappear, what are they alluding to? Has anyone bothered to go beyond the semantics and answer a simple question - what makes these Strike Corps, Strike Corps? Well, given the fact that we have limited holdings of stuff like MBTs and IFV and Artillery Division (unlike western/soviet armies with mass mechanization), they same are concentrated with select formations - and we call them Strike Corps. Now, if one really wants TSP to feel less threatened, the logical thing to do would be reduce the holding of these assets. Are we prepared to do that?

To quote Kayani himself, " The capability matters and not intent, as intent can change overnight". The ARN sits at Kharian, ~80kms from Akhnoor or, just ~135kms from Shakargarh. Given the excellent lines of communication, the whole ARN can be in this sector in less than 24 hours (when already in the general state of readiness). What if the 'intention' of Pakistan and TSPA change overnight? Can BK, or any else give a certificate of "good conduct" to pakis - after all they have done? And, in the meanwhile, what about the constant endevour of TSPA to modernize itself and add more teeth and muscle?

A question I would like to see answered, though, is what exactly do we plan to do about our conventional posture vis-a-vis China? The current measures being proposed include beefing up air and missile assets for interdiction of a Chinese invasion, and raising more mountain divisions that are primarily holding formations. But can we even contemplate an offensive posture against China? No way, with 2% of GDP to fund our entire military needs. The question that needs to be asked is: are we seriously thinking of being able to invade and conduct offensive conventional operations on the Tibetan plateau?

If yes then there are a thousand more questions. What are the political circumstances under which we would invade Tibet? What kind of "mountain strike corps" will we need to accomplish this, and how will they be supplied? What infrastructural investments are required to support this capability? How will we move armoured divisions or MI, plus the supplies they will need, onto the Tibetan plateau... are large-scale airlifts even an option at that altitude? And of course, is the likelihood of a political climate conducive to invading Tibet, a probability that would ever justify the immense cost of investment and upkeep involved in preparing our armed forces for that capability?

My instinctive answer to all this is no. Our conventional posture w.r.t. China will be almost entirely defensive, and must be backed up by a sizeable nuclear deterrent. In fact the nuclear deterrent MUST increase in size and destructive power, because whatever the cost of testing again, developing megaton weapons, developing ICBMs, developing a seaborne second-strike capability: it is dwarfed by the cost of developing and maintaining the capacity to wage an offensive conventional war against China for the control of territory currently in the possession of China.

Bang on the point.

And the simple answer is the political objective - or, lack thereof.

In any future Indo-China shooting match, the objectives will be to broadly blunt any Chinese offensive and deny it the sought after objectives. In the east, the same will mean to ensure the defence of Tawang tract and other politicaly significant areas in AP. In addition to this, the Chinese may want to use this opportunity to replicate 1962 and show India and its capability as an emerging power in bad light. They might resort to a military campaign to overwhelm IA/IAF without any explicit territorial objectives. Land may be occupied and then like 1962, they may withdraw after having made their point. The fight for dominance of Asia will be over in case of any such event.

In west (Ladakh/Himanchal), they might threaten Leh, play on the disputed nature of J&K, hold the territory and link up with NA in POK. Our military objectives will be to deny PLA their objectives and if we are ambitious, aim to retake Aksai-Chin and cut of Xinjiang-Tibet highway.

If you see the above narrative, IA/IAF will be engaged in denying PLA/PLAAF their objectives - they would be reacting to aggression from China. The counter-attacks from IA/IAF will be used as riposte and to throw PLA/PLAAF off-balance and put a spanner in their plans. At best, we may restore the sanctity of MacMohan Line and get China to accept as IB (highly unlikely). The force structure in place and planned over next 5-8 years all points to putting in place ability and capability to hold-off the PLA/PLAAF.

No one is planning to storm Lhasa any time soon - and even if we could, I don't think politically we are in a position to support and sustain an independent Tibet. A China which has lost Tibet will come at India with everything -- are we ready for all this? No, I don't think so.

However, in all this, one thing becomes clear - it is China which will play for very high stakes here.

[ShauryaT]

Now, when people say that we should some how make the three Strike Corps disappear, what are they alluding to? Has anyone bothered to go beyond the semantics and answer a simple question - what makes these Strike Corps, Strike Corps? Well, given the fact that we have limited holdings of stuff like MBTs and IFV and Artillery Division (unlike western/soviet armies with mass mechanization), they same are concentrated with select formations - and we call them Strike Corps. Now, if one really wants TSP to feel less threatened, the logical thing to do would be reduce the holding of these assets. Are we prepared to do that?

I do not think, anyone is expecting a reduction in fire power or mobility. Isn't one of our key modernizations for more lethal and precise firepower? NSA SS Menon has articulated the consolidation of the strike corps into a single corp in the western sector to reflect the political reality of our goals with TSP.

Can BK, or any else give a certificate of "good conduct" to pakis - after all they have done? And, in the meanwhile, what about the constant endevour of TSPA to modernize itself and add more teeth and muscle?

Re-assign armor and more arty to the Pivot corps to increase their fire power is an option and make them more mechanized. Gurmeet Kanwal is the biggest proponent of increased fire power for the army - probably all are. The difference will be although the pivot corps gets increased fire power and mobility the overall offensive ratio of 1.5:1 that we maintain against TSP is reduced, without reducing the fire power (5:1 or thereabouts) ratios or even increasing it. Essentially what is being called to question here is the reorganization of the strike corps into smaller IBG's and the purpose they serve. What is being argued for is that the increasing disparity in the capabilities of the two countries at EVERY level will allow for a reduction of troops and structures, in this posture.

Even if TSPA manages to breakthrough in the plains in a concentrated area, who will save them from a counter offensive. There is also the theory that keeping the gains in the plains is far more difficult than the ones acquired in the mountains. Our plains are not in dispute, largely. Our mountains are. The argument is for more investments in the mountains and fire power, rather than multiple large strike corps or IBG's for the plains.

Any such reorg cannot be done in isolation of other political and geo-political moves. If TSP wants to reduce threat levels, they will have to give up something for it. At this point, these are just policy critiques. Going too much into details of the Orbat scenarios will not serve purpose. Unless, you are saying, the entire idea is flawed either because you believe that there is a strategic purpose to our offensive posture against TSP and/or TSP represents now and in the future an offensive threat to India?

[shiv]

Even if TSPA manages to breakthrough in the plains in a concentrated area, who will save them from a counter offensive. There is also the theory that keeping the gains in the plains is far more difficult than the ones acquired in the mountains. Our plains are not in dispute, largely. Our mountains are. The argument is for more investments in the mountains and fire power, rather than multiple large strike corps or IBG's for the plains.

How sure are you Shaurya that "gains in the plains" can be regained easily?

A big deal is made about Longewala because when Pakis launched their attack, Indian armor was busy trying to mount an attack into Pakistan north of that area. If the Pakistanis had broken though - they could have driven tanks up motorable roads as much as 200 or 300 km deep into Indian territory in as little as a couple of days. Tanks. There is no way you can stop tanks once they are deep inside because we do not and cannot maintain defences every inch of the way.

Something will have to be brought in from somewhere - maybe an armored force, aircraft etc and battles within India will last for weeks if that happens - and once enemy tanks are 100 or 200 km inside India then there is very little question of not diverting forces from elsewhere.

I think Bharat Karnad's idea is better. Just maintain enough nuclear bombs to nuke such attackers. Our borders are so long and on those borders we have two adversaries that seek Indian territory. And the territory they get in India is far warmer and more fertile than anything they have on their side. On the other hand Tibet is the worst possible land to gain territory in except as a bargaining chip. Even PoK is mountainous and in my view if there is any land grab we can do that will be useful to us it will be the land to the east of the Indus river system in Pakjab and Sindh, - keeping the all the fertile land and wiping Pakis off that land. Pakis have reserved nukes for us knowing fully well that this is tempting. Nukes is good for that reason. We need nukes to take out such rats, Chinese or Pakis.

[ShauryaT]

How sure are you Shaurya that "gains in the plains" can be regained easily?

A big deal is made about Longewala because when Pakis launched their attack, Indian armor was busy trying to mount an attack into Pakistan north of that area. If the Pakistanis had broken though - they could have driven tanks up motorable roads as much as 200 or 300 km deep into Indian territory in as little as a couple of days. Tanks. There is no way you can stop tanks once they are deep inside because we do not and cannot maintain defences every inch of the way.

Something will have to be brought in from somewhere - maybe an armored force, aircraft etc and battles within India will last for weeks if that happens - and once enemy tanks are 100 or 200 km inside India then there is very little question of not diverting forces from elsewhere.

If we are not sure about our superiority in firepower and mobility along with air and C4 assets in being able to thwart any Pakistani attack then we should not consider this plan. Sure, no one can defend every inch all the time and a concentrated breakthrough can never be ruled out but there are other means to tackle such a situation than stationed forces.

There are two things going for the plains grab theory. One is legal the other is military. Our legal borders with Pakistan in the plains are not disputed, except when you get to the marshes. Militarily it is far easier to counter attack in the plains than in the mountains, as you well know and we have experienced and so has Pakistan. If India could enforce the sanctity of the LOC in Kargil, I see no reason why we would not do the same to maintain such for the IB.

I think Bharat Karnad's idea is better. Just maintain enough nuclear bombs to nuke such attackers. Our borders are so long and on those borders we have two adversaries that seek Indian territory. And the territory they get in India is far warmer and more fertile than anything they have on their side. On the other hand Tibet is the worst possible land to gain territory in except as a bargaining chip. Even PoK is mountainous and in my view if there is any land grab we can do that will be useful to us it will be the land to the east of the Indus river system in Pakjab and Sindh, - keeping the all the fertile land and wiping Pakis off that land. Pakis have reserved nukes for us knowing fully well that this is tempting. Nukes is good for that reason. We need nukes to take out such rats, Chinese or Pakis.

First, I do not think BK has suggested any such ideas to simply nuke attackers. It is gross misrepresentation of his views.

Our geo-political aim is to restore our sovereign territory back to our control. Nothing less, nothing more. One can debate the efficacy of that goal. But, in my view, it is the most strategic piece of territory that India needs to wrest control of. Fertile lands is not our quest, we have enough of those. More so, these fertile lands to the east of Indus come with additional baggage that negate the benefits of acquiring and maintaining such lands.

There are some additional critiques to cold start / IBG. Not sure how relevant they are but the IBG concept is heavily army based on land objectives and keeps air and sea assets as subservient to the army. Not saying, there is no integration. But, against TSP, there is a view that air and sea power should get its own prominent objectives than just helping the army salami slice.

[shiv]

First, I do not think BK has suggested any such ideas to simply nuke attackers. It is gross misrepresentation of his views.

Shaurya what do you think Karnad wants when he suggests that India should have large numbers of nuclear bombs? Do you interpret his views as meaning that others will somehow be scared by larger numbers when they re not scared by smaller numbers? I have stated time and again that I think this is a highly questionable viewpoint. One nuke that is used from an arsenal of five nukes is more scary than having 5000 nukes that you do not use at all and keep absorbing blows. I completely and totally reject as nonsense the view that a nation that has no confidence in 20 nukes will gain confidence by getting 200 nukes. I personally am completely unmoved by Karnads absurd argument that a 1 megaton Chinese bomb aimed at me is more scary than a Pakistani 12 kiloton bomb. Either one will vaporize me - and either will leave thousands of suffering people. Only there will be more happy dead people with 1 MT. If I am dead. I am dead. If I am wounded I am wounded. So what is more scary about 1 MT? Is this "misinterpretation" of Karnad's views?

Our geo-political aim is to restore our sovereign territory back to our control. Nothing less, nothing more. One can debate the efficacy of that goal. But, in my view, it is the most strategic piece of territory that India needs to wrest control of. Fertile lands is not our quest, we have enough of those. More so, these fertile lands to the east of Indus come with additional baggage that negate the benefits of acquiring and maintaining such lands.

The goal is great but I think you and anyone else who states this goal are missing out on some fundamental facts. Getting territory is one thing. Holding it is another matter. Holding it means that it needs to be livable. Holding it with an army who need constant logistics support from India makes it costly and more likely that all the gains will be reversed at some future date. We hold Siachen only because it is strategically important. Not because it pleasant or easy. I am all for gaining land in Pakjab and Sindh. I would support retaking Aksai Chin if someone could tell me how it can be held. The route to taking PoK is via Pakjab. Not via J&K. IMO.

[rohitvats]

I do not think, anyone is expecting a reduction in fire power or mobility. Isn't one of our key modernizations for more lethal and precise firepower? NSA SS Menon has articulated the consolidation of the strike corps into a single corp in the western sector to reflect the political reality of our goals with TSP.

Shaurya, again, I am not able to grasp what BK, and you, are trying to convey here? Are we saying that IA should have only one Strike Corps as against three or, consolidate - that is bring under one Corps, all the firepower under the three Corps? In case of latter, how does on consolidate 3 x Armored Divisions + 3 x RAPIDS under One Corps HQ? How does that alleviate the fear of Pakis? Another thing - What political realities are we talking about here which will not allow India to exercise its full military potential and, how having One Strike Corps is an alignment with the same?

Apologies if I come across as too questioning but it seems we're making arguments/advancing arguments without under standing the full implication of these arguments on the ground.

Re-assign armor and more arty to the Pivot corps to increase their fire power is an option and make them more mechanized. Gurmeet Kanwal is the biggest proponent of increased fire power for the army - probably all are. The difference will be although the pivot corps gets increased fire power and mobility the overall offensive ratio of 1.5:1 that we maintain against TSP is reduced, without reducing the fire power (5:1 or thereabouts) ratios or even increasing it. Essentially what is being called to question here is the reorganization of the strike corps into smaller IBG's and the purpose they serve. What is being argued for is that the increasing disparity in the capabilities of the two countries at EVERY level will allow for a reduction of troops and structures, in this posture.

Again, these are all general statements which do not explain anything about how the same will be implemented and long term consequence of the same. Let me give some background.

We have limited assets - even if we have ~3,500 tanks - and the principles of war suggest that the same need to be concentrated rather than spread them all around to maximize their effectiveness. That is why we have armored divisons and their placement in Strike Corps along with supporting firepower and engineering assets. The Pivot Corps have about enough assets to hold off PA attacks or carry limited assaults on supporting axis to Strike Corps.

Same is the case with PA - their firepower is also concentrated in ARN/ARS with limited armor/mechanized assets with their Pivot Corps. Between us and them, the game has always been of cat and mouse - each waits to see how the other commits its Strike Corps before revealing its hand. Then, there is the geographical angle to the deployment. Given the peace time location of these Strike formations and their main assets-armored divisons, they are likely to be deployed in certain geographical area.

In all this there is a common theme - ours and theirs Pivot Corps lack proper offensive firepower. And this is what we're trying to correct - by adding teeth to our Pivot Corps through IBG. It is important to note that IA did not simply try to transfer assets from Strike Corps to Pivot Corps on IB - like transfer assets from XXI Corps to XII Corps and make the latter a Strike Corps. There are two main reasons for the same - (a) IA wanted to ensure that by not deploying the full might of its Strike Corps, it does not give chance to Pakistan to claim crossing of its nuclear redline (b) It has reserves to counter any escalation by PA after the objectives are met by IBG.

In the above calculus, IMO, it was assumed that because PA has limited assets to counter IBG at their Pivot Corps level, PA will have commit their Reserves - that is, ARN and ARS. Because PA would have committed its premier strike formations to counter gains by IBG, IA would have a hands up and can then do two things - control the escalation and deploy its own Strike Corps at is own choosing of time and space.

Now, here is the funny bit - after the massive khakhi browing session in 2002 - when IA amassed three Armored Divisions in parallel from South Punjab to Jaisalmer, PA realized that it was seriously outmatched in this sector. And then on top of that, IA started talking about CSD and adding more firepower to Pivot Corps.

So, what PA has done is to add offensive capability to its Pivot Corps - it seems to have merged independent armored/mechanized brigades under its Pivot Corps and formed them into Mechanized Divisons - although, what I've been given to understand is that these are Armored Divisions but only in name. So, the Bahawalpur based XXXI Corps has 26th Mechanized Division and one Infantry Division. Similarly, Karachi based V Corps has 25th Mechanized Division along with two infantry divisions. The addition of similar Corps Reserve for Gujranwala based XXX Corps has been held up due to lack of funds - but may see light of the day in due course of time.

While the CSD is yet to see light of the day in full glory, PA has already added assets to counter it. What these assets - called as Corps Reserves - allow PA to do is launch counter strike on India whenever we implement CSD and prevent the committment of its Strike Corps - Multan based II Corps/ARS and Kharian based I Corps/ARN.

In the light of the above, if IA was to spread out its assets with Strike Corps to Pivot Corps - what reserves will it have left to counter PA Strike Corps?

Even if TSPA manages to breakthrough in the plains in a concentrated area, who will save them from a counter offensive. There is also the theory that keeping the gains in the plains is far more difficult than the ones acquired in the mountains. Our plains are not in dispute, largely. Our mountains are. The argument is for more investments in the mountains and fire power, rather than multiple large strike corps or IBG's for the plains.

If you dilute your premier Strike Corps - where will the counter offensive come from? Especially, when it is PA which will be in position to control the escalation ladder? And why is the objective only limited to land - the destruction of fighting capability of PA is an much an objective.

Any why should it even come to a situation that our territorial integrity is threatened?

To me, the entire argument is flawed at its very basic premise. To claim that we lack political will to fully implement our military might but will have the same if territorial integrity of India is threatened should PA acheive a breakout is contradictory. It is like feeding into the demands of a neurotic - PA is again negotiating with a gun to its head and we're expected to yeild ground.

[ManishH]

Even if TSPA manages to breakthrough in the plains in a concentrated area, who will save them from a counter offensive. There is also the theory that keeping the gains in the plains is far more difficult than the ones acquired in the mountains. Our plains are not in dispute, largely. Our mountains are.

I think next time around, TSPA's objective will be to inflict human collateral damage, not gaining land like it has been so far (47, 65, 71, Kargil). The TSPA has already morphed into a terrorist lashkar that's seeking to kill as many as possible. It doesen't matter how dishonourable the fight, neither if the victims are civilians. The terrorist mentality of taking maximum lives, whether in plains or mountains, will govern the Jarnail.

[Rudradev]

Rohitvats boss, fantastic posts, and very informative as always. I am very glad you decided to join the discussion on this thread! Running a little short on time now, but will post later with further questions/comments for you and others.

[ShauryaT]

Rohitvats: Let us rewind and try again. Before we get to details on what happens to the 3500 tanks, we will have to take it top down for that is the only way I can be coherent to myself.

Prediction of future events and scenarios are unlike mathematical equations, hence by nature imprecise. Yet, we have to make certain presuppositions, in order to have a future policy. These policy changes have far reaching consequences and take upwards of a decade and more to mature and translate to reality. To keep it focused, we will leave the shortfalls of current policy and its operational doctrines out of purview and not go into details of how we came to this place. You and many others are well read enough to understand current policy and doctrine and its results.

There are certain suppositions, that form the bed rock of a policy. Based on the policy, operational doctrines and capabilties are built. If the capabilties and doctrines are not achievable due to execution constraints then the policy has to be readjusted. If the supposition are wrong the policy has to re readjusted.

These are my views of the policy directions and suppositions thereof, so all deficiencies are mine only.

The policy being proposed are along the following lines:

1. India shall reduce its military threatening postures against TSP – in an attempt to have normal relations with TSP, with quid pro quos by TSP and TSPA. This will free up resources, primarily our strike forces and military personnel devoted to CI duties such as the Rashtriya Rifles.

2. India shall invest in building capabilities to increase fire power, mobility, C^4I, air, Naval, space, PGM with better integration – with a focus on the mountains and the Northern and Eastern sectors.

The reasoning for the above policy is that the current threatening posture against TSP has no political purpose. It does not serve purpose for the sub conventional threat that TSP poses. Neither does India desire and/or has the will to keep and maintain these lands and its peoples nor is a “destruction” of TSPA feasible due to nuclear red lines. At best under current doctrine, the military is now talking about using fire power, without crossing the border/LOC to deal with the sub-conventional threat. In all this, the military leadership itself is getting more passive (not that it was ever aggressive, but if the message from the top is almost always passive, it filters down).

TSPA continues to embolden itself using the IA threat as an excuse. The increasing asymmetries between TSPA and IA will not allow the TSPA to field a deterrent force in the future. The US doles will peter out in the coming decade.

Suppositions:

- Quid Pro Quo deal with TSPA that results in reduction of sub conventional threat and a reduction in TSPA’s need to match Indian capabilities – bankrupting TSP in the process
- Minimum 2.5% of India’s GDP allocated to defense (I wish it was 3% at least, but unlikely)
- Increasing asymmetries between TSP and Indian forces
- Need to free up resources to reorient and face the challenge from China
- Cannot do it all and still seek to be a leading independent power (hard choices have to be made)

It is tempting to fall back into known adages of “cannot trust TSP”, “TSP negotiates with a gun to its own head”. The purpose of policy is to recognize certain facts and yet figure a way to move forward.

India has resolved and accepted TSP as a fact to live with, without accepting its ideological premise.

How do these policy directives, translate on the ground is a large unknown. We can only decipher the general trends, but is largely a very unexplored area. I will try to answer them as I see them.

Shaurya, again, I am not able to grasp what BK, and you, are trying to convey here? Are we saying that IA should have only one Strike Corps as against three or, consolidate - that is bring under one Corps, all the firepower under the three Corps? In case of latter, how does on consolidate 3 x Armored Divisions + 3 x RAPIDS under One Corps HQ? How does that alleviate the fear of Pakis? Another thing - What political realities are we talking about here which will not allow India to exercise its full military potential and, how having One Strike Corps is an alignment with the same?

First this particular suggestion is not from BK but from NSA SS Menon. I do not know, to what degree is it thought through but my understanding would be it would be a reduction in the number of strike corps and some increase in force levels of the remaining corp(s) with significant increase in capabilities and fire power across the board.

We have limited assets - even if we have ~3,500 tanks - and the principles of war suggest that the same need to be concentrated rather than spread them all around to maximize their effectiveness. That is why we have armored divisons and their placement in Strike Corps along with supporting firepower and engineering assets. The Pivot Corps have about enough assets to hold off PA attacks or carry limited assaults on supporting axis to Strike Corps.

There is the expectation that the fire power and mobility of the holding/pivot corps will increase through armor (more than a brigade), dedicated artillery and mechanization.

Same is the case with PA - their firepower is also concentrated in ARN/ARS with limited armor/mechanized assets with their Pivot Corps. Between us and them, the game has always been of cat and mouse - each waits to see how the other commits its Strike Corps before revealing its hand. Then, there is the geographical angle to the deployment. Given the peace time location of these Strike formations and their main assets-armored divisons, they are likely to be deployed in certain geographical area.

The expectation is the asymmetries in capabilities that are already diverging at ALL levels will increase further, making this cat and mouse game played so far irrelevant for the future and TSPA will no longer be able to compete and field a deterrent conventional force to Indian fire power.

These asymmetries will be in the form of

- Dedicated attack helicopter resources
- An artillery division dedicated to each pivot corp
- Dramatic increase in PGM based fire power (precision arty/Missiles, MLRS)
- C4, leverage space assets and air control
- Increase in CAS capabilities
- Not to forget, the fire power available through the Navy
- (current army doctrine has a subservient role for air and naval power and this aspect will be corrected)

In all this there is a common theme - ours and theirs Pivot Corps lack proper offensive firepower. And this is what we're trying to correct - by adding teeth to our Pivot Corps through IBG. It is important to note that IA did not simply try to transfer assets from Strike Corps to Pivot Corps on IB - like transfer assets from XXI Corps to XII Corps and make the latter a Strike Corps. There are two main reasons for the same - (a) IA wanted to ensure that by not deploying the full might of its Strike Corps, it does not give chance to Pakistan to claim crossing of its nuclear redline (b) It has reserves to counter any escalation by PA after the objectives are met by IBG.

In the above calculus, IMO, it was assumed that because PA has limited assets to counter IBG at their Pivot Corps level, PA will have commit their Reserves - that is, ARN and ARS. Because PA would have committed its premier strike formations to counter gains by IBG, IA would have a hands up and can then do two things - control the escalation and deploy its own Strike Corps at is own choosing of time and space. .

True, the expectation is that each of India’s holding/pivot corps will have enough armor, fire power and mobility along with superior command and control over communications and enough air assets to thwart any such design of PA strike corps – in the future.

In the light of the above, if IA was to spread out its assets with Strike Corps to Pivot Corps - what reserves will it have left to counter PA Strike Corps?

The view is PA will not be able to overcome the fire power, C^4, mobility of our holding corps along with other air based assets due to the asymmetries gained. Also, it is not a reduction in overall numbers of strike corps per se, but a reorientation – one from plains to mountains.

A massive counter strike force will not be necessary in such a policy and doctrine with these asymmetries.

In order to truly understand, current doctrine, you have to link it with current policy. Maybe, you can make a post on the merits of the current policy and doctrine as you understand them and we can then see, what happens when you game them today, 5, 10, 15 years out.

To me there is a simple choice to be made. Do we continue to focus on TSP for the next decade and loose out on competing with PRC or do we come to a realistic policy and doctrine for TSP, in order to devote greater resources to the PRC challenge. We cannot do both.

I am attaching some reference material, which lays out the current state and reasons why they do not work and the need to change policy and doctrine along with some indications on future fire power of Indian forces.

Of India’s Pakistan policy
Is Delhi chasing its own tail?
by Zorawar Daulet Singh

Hiamlayan Task Ahead - Bharat Karnad

RECONCILING DOCTRINES : PREREQUISITE FOR PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA

Firepower India 2009

[ShauryaT]

Shaurya what do you think Karnad wants when he suggests that India should have large numbers of nuclear bombs? Do you interpret his views as meaning that others will somehow be scared by larger numbers when they re not scared by smaller numbers?
I have stated time and again that I think this is a highly questionable viewpoint. One nuke that is used from an arsenal of five nukes is more scary than having 5000 nukes that you do not use at all and keep absorbing blows. I completely and totally reject as nonsense the view that a nation that has no confidence in 20 nukes will gain confidence by getting 200 nukes. I personally am completely unmoved by Karnads absurd argument that a 1 megaton Chinese bomb aimed at me is more scary than a Pakistani 12 kiloton bomb. Either one will vaporize me - and either will leave thousands of suffering people. Only there will be more happy dead people with 1 MT. If I am dead. I am dead. If I am wounded I am wounded. So what is more scary about 1 MT? Is this "misinterpretation" of Karnad's views?

If you continue to look at nuclear weapons as either some type of weapon that is inconsequential or some type that is a Brahmastra to bring death and destruction to all and make arguments for one or the other extreme, I am afraid, you will keep on disagreeing with the point being made.

Nuclear weapons due to their immense power are weapons of mass destruction. The words mass and destruction are contextual. What is the level of destruction on what mass is enough to deter is a matter of debate. A safe position is to presume the worst and prepare for it. The debate exists as there is a debate on what is the worst presumption, what is enough destruction, how wide should this destruction be?

There is no precise science here, except for the capabilities present and its potential to destroy, which can be measured.

Does China have 100 TN weapons or 800? Who knows? Are the numbers and type relevant? Is Chinese past history and future trends relevant? Is the geo-political context with China relevant? Are conventional deterrent capabilities relevant?

All of them play a role into the answer. What we CANNOT do is assume that everyone is like us and hence our answers are our own unique and most "realistic" interpretation of how the world operates.

The best guidelines are already there for us, and it is the capabilities of our most likely opponents. Our policy should be to largely match these capabilities, within means. End of story. No one is going to come and save us, if anyone of our chanakian assumptions fail.

Play an escalation game, you will invariably conclude, either on the side of capability or will. BK seeks to take will out of this equation to the degree possible.

The goal is great but I think you and anyone else who states this goal are missing out on some fundamental facts. Getting territory is one thing. Holding it is another matter. Holding it means that it needs to be livable. Holding it with an army who need constant logistics support from India makes it costly and more likely that all the gains will be reversed at some future date. We hold Siachen only because it is strategically important. Not because it pleasant or easy. I am all for gaining land in Pakjab and Sindh. I would support retaking Aksai Chin if someone could tell me how it can be held. The route to taking PoK is via Pakjab. Not via J&K. IMO.

POK/NA are strategic not productive lands. India's land access routes to EURASIA are cut off. POK/NA in our control cuts off PRC access to TSP. Pakjab is the most easiest and hence logical route. There is another way, and this is through Afghanistan via coopting the Pashtuns. My critique of Kargil or even Parakram is that there was no strategic thinking, like a salami slice to Skardu? But, we get ahead of ourselves and in to dream scenarios, not likely to be a reality, in my lifetime.

[shiv]

What we CANNOT do is assume that everyone is like us and hence our answers are our own unique and most "realistic" interpretation of how the world operates.

The best guidelines are already there for us, and it is the capabilities of our most likely opponents. Our policy should be to largely match these capabilities, within means. End of story. No one is going to come and save us, if anyone of our chanakian assumptions fail.

Play an escalation game, you will invariably conclude, either on the side of capability or will. BK seeks to take will out of this equation to the degree possible.

I am in complete agreement with the idea that we should not imagine that the Chinese think like we do. We can at best imagine what they may be thinking by looking at their "megaton nuclear missiles" (to paraphrase Karnad). Karnad looks at those missiles and says that the Chinese are ready to wreak destruction on us because that is their capability. You say that we need to match those capabilities, and be ready to wreak a degree of destruction on China that is similar to the capability that have to inflict on India.

My biggest question about this conclusion is that in planning such a response Karnad is looking at Chinese capability and reaching the conclusion that the Chinese have the capability to destroy large parts of India and that if they develop the will, they could do that. And this threat is being help up against India to cow India down. The conclusion that Karnad reaches is that at every step of any escalation - from diplomatic spat to military action to war, the ultimate threat o destruction is breathing down India's neck and therefore India will capitulate. Because China has the capability, their only requirement is will and therefore we are bound to capitulate. And because Karnad reaches this conclusion he feels that by developing the capability, India will offer to the Chinese the same set of fears that he feels. Karnad reads a threat from China and imagines that others should think like him and then react as he advises. By doing an equal equal, Karnad assumes that the Chinese will start feeling about India the way he interprets the Chinese threat.

Why am I arguing against this seemingly elegant set of obvious conclusions? There are two major flaws in Karnad's reasoning:

1. The Chinese threat to India remains exactly the same whether we have as many nukes as China or not. Their capability is in no way modified by a change in our capability. What Karnad is hoping for can only be a change in Chinese will on the assumption that more nukes in Indian hands would lead to china backing out of a fight rather than forcing India to back out. After all, no matter how many nukes india may have, Indians have the right to be scared of China because they have al those nukes anyway. That means that we could well back down and capitulate even if we have 10,000 nukes. If we don't have the will, we will lose anyway. And we will never know about that until the time arises. We can only make plans that are fail safe as far as possible.

2. You have argued that we must not imagine that others think like us. But here we are saying "The Chinese think they can browbeat us with their huge and numerous nukes. So let us think like them and browbeat them back with a similar number of nukes". However what if they don't get browbeaten by our nukes? What if they are willing to climb the escalation ladder and challenge us to use our nukes. Are we going to climb down or nuke them? If we nuke them we get nuked anyway. If we don't then we have to back down.

Surely the solution lies in not making empty threats and unprovable assumptions. If the Chinese nuke us we are finished anyway. But we have to have the will power not to get browbeaten by them at all and challenge them to nuke us with the full knowledge that we will be destroyed. The Chinese have to understand that we know perfectly well that hey can destroy us, but that fact is not going to allow us to be browbeaten. We should be wiling to get nuked by them. Once they nuke us, they have tripped the nuclear wire. At that time we nuke them back. We will, of course, be totally destroyed. The damage we do to them will be severe and their act of escalation will be costly. They may well cause more deaths and destruction in India than we cause to them. But it would have to come to nuclear war for that to happen. And for it to come to nuclear war it means that we have not backed down one single inch from our stand. That is the sort of resolve I am looking for in India. Not some questionable safety in numbers. China has to start the nuclear war and take nuclear hits for that. But we must have the resolve to push them all the way to do that without backing down and then see if they have the willpower to do that. That resolve does not come from numbers. It comes from inner strength to face up to the Chinese and ask them to do their worst. If we don't have that resolve, we lose whether or not we can match them Let us see how much use their megaton nukes are to them.

No science here. No numbers. It's a plain and simple game of "swerve"

[kumarn]

Shiv sir, you are very eloquent and spin webs of rhetoric around your argument. And if someone attacks a viewpoint of yours, you switch to another. Excellent!

But, 1) what good is resolve when you don't have the danda to back it up with? 2) Are you going to dare someone on the fond hope that he will never use his danda just because it has not been used for 66 years?

Now not going to post for another few days and watch you utaroing my chaddi

[RajeshA]

We can screw with small penises or with big penises, but big penises will always get more respect, and if on the global stage only big penises are allowed, to be marveled at by all those without one, and if the small penises are just there to watch from the sidelines, then we do need a penis enlargement program for India.

Without a big one, we stand neither on the stage nor in the audience.

So let's all sing,
the song of the ling.


We want megatons!!!

[shiv]

Shiv sir, you are very eloquent and spin webs of rhetoric around your argument. And if someone attacks a viewpoint of yours, you switch to another. Excellent!

But, 1) what good is resolve when you don't have the danda to back it up with? 2) Are you going to dare someone on the fond hope that he will never use his danda just because it has not been used for 66 years?

Now not going to post for another few days and watch you utaroing my chaddi

No need to wait that long. And absolutely NO change in my viewpoint. We are screwed whether we destroy the Chinese or not. It is pure imagination to think: "We have more nukes so the Chinese are going to think like us. Our thinking is "We are sacred of more nukes'. So by India having more nukes the Chinese will think like us and be scared of our nukes. The Chinese may not think like us. The Chinese may say "WTF? You going to nuke us? Go ahead. Make my day"

It is not the number of nukes we have but our readiness to use them The only way we can signal our readiness is to not back down to Chinese demands, fight conventional war if needed and see if they have the balls to nuke us. If they have the balls to nuke us we are screwed whether we have 100 nukes or 1000 nukes. But they need to get over their inhibitions and use those hundreds of megaton nukes on us and take nuclear hits on their cities in return. Let's see if the Chinese have the balls to do that.

If we assume they have the balls to do that then we have already lost the game. Their balls are not going to change even if our balls change in character and number.

[shiv]

big penises will always get more respect,

Classic case of thinking that everyone else thinks like you do - something that we have been warned against.

[kumarn]

The Chinese may say "WTF? You going to nuke us? Go ahead. Make my day"

Alright, one point at a time, if you would indulge me. How does that question arise with the NFU declared by India?

[RajeshA]

big penises will always get more respect,

Classic case of thinking that everyone else thinks like you do - something that we have been warned against.

Well classic is thinking that if one has a big wallet (economy), or a car (conventional military), or a great job (industry), all that would translate to respect for the penis. It won't. The penis has to get respect on its own strength.

Or are we trying to say, "Mere paas Maan hai" (culture), or "Mere paas dil hai" (soft power), as an excuse?

Perhaps we would rather say, "It is not a question of length, but how you use it!" Well that may or may not be true, but one would have to do some convincing, that one really knows how to use our deterrent till now! Terrorism, Infiltration, Border Incursions in the North, Somebody sending us off in South China pond, wagerah wagerah, shows that the others are unimpressed.

[shiv]

Well classic is thinking that if one has a big wallet (economy), or a car (conventional military), or a great job (industry), all that would translate to respect for the penis. It won't. The penis has to get respect on its own strength.

I think India has a longer penis than Pakistan. How come Indians do not have the guts to take on Pakistan? Or even Bangladesh for that matter. Karnad conveniently does not ask why Pakistanis are not scared of India's length but says they are no problem. That is odd.

[RajeshA]

I guess it is because Karnad wants to spare our virility for the big fat Buddha laughing in the North, rather than the growling Mullah in the West.

After one jam session, some just roll over, as if the bear had been hit by a tranquilizer dart.

Karnad would rather we store our energies for the jam session with the lizard.

[ShauryaT]

Surely the solution lies in not making empty threats and unprovable assumptions. If the Chinese nuke us we are finished anyway. But we have to have the will power not to get browbeaten by them at all and challenge them to nuke us with the full knowledge that we will be destroyed. The Chinese have to understand that we know perfectly well that hey can destroy us, but that fact is not going to allow us to be browbeaten. We should be wiling to get nuked by them. Once they nuke us, they have tripped the nuclear wire. At that time we nuke them back. We will, of course, be totally destroyed. The damage we do to them will be severe and their act of escalation will be costly. They may well cause more deaths and destruction in India than we cause to them. But it would have to come to nuclear war for that to happen. And for it to come to nuclear war it means that we have not backed down one single inch from our stand. That is the sort of resolve I am looking for in India. Not some questionable safety in numbers. China has to start the nuclear war and take nuclear hits for that. But we must have the resolve to push them all the way to do that without backing down and then see if they have the willpower to do that. That resolve does not come from numbers. It comes from inner strength to face up to the Chinese and ask them to do their worst. If we don't have that resolve, we lose whether or not we can match them Let us see how much use their megaton nukes are to them.

No science here. No numbers. It's a plain and simple game of "swerve"

Fair enough. This sort of resolve comes from comprehensive national strength, married to our policy goals as it relates to China. Is BK saying please do exclusive development of megaton nukes as a response for if we not, the Chinese will simply walk all over us and it is this one thing that will save us? No.

What I understand from your posts is somehow, you think we can eliminate the quantity and strength of nuclear weapons from this debate? If so, then you should explain, how are nuclear weapons excluded from this matrix that comprises a nation's comprehensive national strength? If MCD means minimum quantity and quality, then please someone has to explain, why we are the smartest on earth to follow this policy? Why is MCD, interpreted as minimum in quantity and quality as "credible" deterrence against China?

One can make an argument based on policy that MCD is all we need but not based on competing with China at all levels. Such a policy will recognize that we are unable and do not desire to compete with China. We shall not be an independent power and at best will have to take a trajectory of joining alliances against China, if one is available. It shall recognize that when push comes to shove, we shall always back down against China. We shall not be able to thwart China's geo-political ambitions in IOR and we are better off not pissing China around in Vietnam. We have already ceded much ground to China in Tibet and it will be best if we stay quiet in what China considers to be her national interests.

If the above seeks to be Indian policy, which I know has takers in New Delhi, even if not openly admitted then yes, there is no need for us to invest in nuclear weapons to a degree to match China.

Doctrine and Capabilities work best, when married to policy. If the policy is confused, so would be the capabilities and doctrines.

[ShauryaT]

I think India has a longer penis than Pakistan. How come Indians do not have the guts to take on Pakistan? Or even Bangladesh for that matter. Karnad conveniently does not ask why Pakistanis are not scared of India's length but says they are no problem. That is odd.

Not a fair representation Shiv. First, you are making the classic mistake of thinking that the Chinese will think about us the way we do about Pakistan. TSPA is scared of Indian forces and the raison d'etre for all their stupid acts. What Karnad is saying is, they are not a military threat to India and hence the resources we allocate to them should be commensurate to our policy goals with TSP. If you disagree, you should make a case.

[satya]

I have a hammer so does my opponent , the manufacturer of my hammer says increase the number and weight of hammer and you will beat your opponent decisively till then he says keep your hammer with its limited number under one head for max effect but i am scratching my head as this been my strategy for past 3 decades and it has not made my opponent vanish or even soil his salwar on contrary every time i increase the number he gets a better shield plus small increase in his own set of hammers quantity that pushes me back to square one or even worse but how can i admit hammer never gonna work in first place it will make me look bad and also my late seniors and the legendary senior whose other legendary work might come in light but its not their fault too you see all they were taught was fight with hammer else smoke and drink man fight with hammer only and all the books i was allowed to read were ones with hammer , hammer do this hammer do that hammer makes you rich and happy in old age and wax your moustache if one dares to keep one these days even that is not glorious anymore .

This question calls for other solution some say have a shield its cheap others say spear is better still some say go for traditional sword and bow where we excel and they all want me to think i thought i made a plan but that plan had no use for hammer and it never came out of the room where it was devised , i was hurt , my quota of liquor became the first victim now i am all confused what should i do meanwhile i have another opponent high in the mountains where my hammer wears me down for its no use though being told i can use it in a small area but then this area is know to my opponent and we both have played all possible scenarios not to win with hammer but to make it useless there. Still the broker selling the hammer says its best option ( i know what he means i still get nightmares from the cut i had to face in my liquor quota ,now i want peace that's all my predecessor wanted and futures ones will wish for )as it pays for my retirement and has paid in past for many of my seniors meanwhile what should i do , hammer fighting is all glorious being told so over the ages by Gora Sahib now i hear my brokerage will go bust for a Brown Sahib is planning to manufacture hammer here so no more import its sad what bad i did to them that they kicked my tiny nail in the gravy train of hammer , i am all confused sleepy Dilli billi .



Sorry for rant .

[rohitvats]

^^^The problem is that no one told you to grow balls to use the hammer when push comes to shove. Size and weight of the hammer will come to a naught if you don't have guts to use the hammer or for that matter the Sheild/Sword/broomstick.

Also, while you can what have you for dealing with your problem in mountains, if again, you don't grow balls to use your magic wand, someone will again come and try to sell you the 'best thing' to deal with the problem.

[anjan]

I guess it is because Karnad wants to spare our virility for the big fat Buddha laughing in the North, rather than the growling Mullah in the West.

After one jam session, some just roll over, as if the bear had been hit by a tranquilizer dart.

Karnad would rather we store our energies for the jam session with the lizard.

Wouldn't the Chinese then be storing up to face the US instead Or the Russians? Rather than the cowering Yindoos to the West?

[ShauryaT]

My instinctive answer to all this is no. Our conventional posture w.r.t. China will be almost entirely defensive, and must be backed up by a sizeable nuclear deterrent. In fact the nuclear deterrent MUST increase in size and destructive power, because whatever the cost of testing again, developing megaton weapons, developing ICBMs, developing a seaborne second-strike capability: it is dwarfed by the cost of developing and maintaining the capacity to wage an offensive conventional war against China for the control of territory currently in the possession of China.

RD: Rohitvats has responded on the likely intent of a strengthened mountain divisions and I largely agree with his response. However, as I understand Indian policy, we do not intend to replace conventional deterrence with nuclear. It is not either or, it is both. It is true though that the TOTAL lifecycle costs of maintaining a strong nuclear arsenal (300+ TN Weapons), including delivery vehicles and C^3I assets, does not exceed in todays's money, about 100,000 crores. General K. Sundarji had it at about 3,000 crores for 150 warheads in 1996 money, but that was just for the nuclear weapons - not the entire spectrum or lifetime. These costs would dwarf the costs to maintain conventional deterrence.

[shiv]

I think India has a longer penis than Pakistan. How come Indians do not have the guts to take on Pakistan? Or even Bangladesh for that matter. Karnad conveniently does not ask why Pakistanis are not scared of India's length but says they are no problem. That is odd.

Not a fair representation Shiv. First, you are making the classic mistake of thinking that the Chinese will think about us the way we do about Pakistan. TSPA is scared of Indian forces and the raison d'etre for all their stupid acts. What Karnad is saying is, they are not a military threat to India and hence the resources we allocate to them should be commensurate to our policy goals with TSP. If you disagree, you should make a case.

OT. That was a bit of fun. It is always wrong to argue with analogies. It was never right - but just some fun with RajeshA.

[ShauryaT]

^^Maybe, it is just me, but sometimes, I cannot tell, when you are serious or transition to piskology or sometimes sarcastic

[ShauryaT]

Wouldn't the Chinese then be storing up to face the US instead Or the Russians? Rather than the cowering Yindoos to the West?

I hope this is not another one, where someone is having fun. China can afford to try and cower us Hindus only and only if, it is storing to confront the US or Russia.

[shiv]

What I understand from your posts is somehow, you think we can eliminate the quantity and strength of nuclear weapons from this debate? If so, then you should explain, how are nuclear weapons excluded from this matrix that comprises a nation's comprehensive national strength? If MCD means minimum quantity and quality, then please someone has to explain, why we are the smartest on earth to follow this policy? Why is MCD, interpreted as minimum in quantity and quality as "credible" deterrence against China?

One can make an argument based on policy that MCD is all we need but not based on competing with China at all levels. Such a policy will recognize that we are unable and do not desire to compete with China. We shall not be an independent power and at best will have to take a trajectory of joining alliances against China, if one is available. It shall recognize that when push comes to shove, we shall always back down against China. We shall not be able to thwart China's geo-political ambitions in IOR and we are better off not pissing China around in Vietnam. We have already ceded much ground to China in Tibet and it will be best if we stay quiet in what China considers to be her national interests.

My thoughts on this issue have been shaped literally by articles I have read about India China confrontations from the 1960s - particularly the 1965 to 1971 period when I was a schoolboy mature enough to understand and already had useful knowledge of military aircraft which were my passion. While Pakistan was a major military concern then, China was never far from the mind. In the post 1965 articles it became clear that the Indian armed forces would be able to "acquit themselves creditably" in a confrontation with China. However, it was always recognized that they would be fighting China without a nuclear weapon backing. In other words, if push came to shove in the 1965-1975 period, and the PLA found itself losing, they could nuke our military formations and forward bases and actually win a nuclear war. They were in a position to stop the Indian armed forces in their tracks and thwart any plans of India's political leaders while sustaining little damage to their own army columns and no damage to their own political set up in Beijing.

All that changed with India's acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. No longer could the PLA expect to wipe off the Indian armed forces in a tactical battle where they had nukes while the Indian armed forces did not have any. If they nuked Indian forces, their forces would be nuked back resulting in a costly war that would be unlikely to result in any major territorial or political gain for either side.

The next step up would be the worry that China could nuke Indian cities while we did not have the capability to do that. What did that mean to us? Imagine a war with China. China escalates with tactical weapons, India retaliates. The Chinese, beleaguered on the military front decide to do a Hiroshima like demonstration of capability by nuking 2 Indian cities. What would that mean to India? In fact India could say "heck now the cities are gone but our armed forces are still capable, so we will keep on fighting". But then China could nuke another 10 cities and suffer no hits on her own cities. After 12 Indian cities are nuked it is the Indian political leadership, having to cope with the devastation of losing 12 cities and no way of hitting China, would definitely have to back down. This is where we were between 1974 and the 1990s.

The situation we face now is that if war occurs and the PLA is on the losing side they cannot simply use a tactical nuke without expecting a tactical nuke in reply. But escalating by threatening Indian cities will evoke a response that takes out several of their cities. That leaves the Chinese political leadership in a situation of coping with massive damage in previously safe and peacefully developed Chinese cities simply because they wanted to take a military point too far to "teach India a lesson"

The US and USSR actually went through all these iterations of thought and there was a continuous series of people who imagined that nuclear war could somehow be won by taking out the entire Soviet arsenal and their cities. It was the US that first started this race and the USSR played catch up. It was the US that finally had to back down and not use any of its weapons despite all the hype we hear about "Who won the cold war" (Pakis actually! )

What Karnad seems to be going on about is that he is comparing (I think) the China-India equation with that of the USA in the 1950s. The USA believed in the 1950s that they could wipe out every Soviet nuclear weapon and Soviet forces and end up with a comprehensive nuclear victory without paying a price in mainland America. They gradually figured out that even with an initially smaller Soviet arsenal, they could not hope to wipe out all of them and that there was absolutely no guarantee that the US would not lose at least one city. This was considered too heavy a political price for America and hence the USSR was never nuked and the USSR got a chance to build an arsenal bigger than the US to do a tit for tat to the US.

As to whether the Chinese are willing to lose at least one city, Karnad (in his IISc speech) quotes Mao saying that Mao would have been happy to accept 300 million Chinese deaths because 300 million would be left alive. Mao's statement was one of bravado in the 1960s. Maybe Mao thought he had the political clout to hold on to power in China even if 300 million died in a war he started. To me the question is whether the political leadership in Beijing are willing to see just 2 cities, Beijing and Shanghai destroyed in order to get Arunachal Pradesh. China gets Arunachal Pradesh in military conflict. India loses 20 cities. China loses Beijing and Shanghai. If the Chinese political leadership are happy to face this scenario i would welcome them to start a war that gets them into this situation.

The actions of nation states are the actions of their political leaders. It may be easy to punish an army, but defeat means defeat of the political leaders. Can the political leaders of India accept the destruction of one or more Indian cities? Can they expect to survive as leaders after they lose even one city to a nuclear war with China? I would suspect not. I expect that Indian political leaders will not survive even the loss of one Indian city. This is where Karnad's calculus fails yet again. No matter how many weapons we have, if our political leaders cop out and capitulate because they cannot countenance the loss of even one Indian city, an arsenal of thousands of bombs will be completely useless. We will be capitulating long before any nuclear weapons are used.

The number of nuclear weapons we need is the number that is required to survive a first strike for a retaliatory strike that defeats the political leadership of China. What is the number of currently peaceful and developed Chinese cities in the far east that we need to destroy to make the Chinese political leadership cop out as domestic damage exceeds political success in a war with India?