UnFair's prepared remarks can be read here (PDF)
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/fai110311.pdf
Excerpts:
Most observers of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship admit that Pakistan’s allies—such as the Haqqani Network, the Afghan Taliban and Islamist militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, among others—are America’s foes. It is equally clear that America’s ascendant ally in the region—India—is Pakistan’s nemesis. Thus what bedevils U.S.-Pakistan relations is not pervasive distrust but rather a surplus of certitude: certitude that, for the foreseeable future, U.S. and Pakistani strategic interests have only a small—and quickly vanishing—area of overlap.
U.S. policy makers have been reluctant to embrace this unpleasant reality because it raises serious questions about how the United States can secure its interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond. But the mounting evidence that the United States and Pakistan share fundamentally orthogonal goals on most issues of interest to the United States can no longer be ignored or deferred. After a brief recounting of the last decade and its discontents, this written statement lays out a number of possible engagement strategies towards Pakistan in the near and medium term.
Whether Islamabad and/or Rawalpindi believed that Pakistan’s abandonment of the Afghanistan Taliban in 2001 would be temporary or whether this overture signaled a genuine willingness to change course will likely never be known. However, a perusal of President Pervez Musharraf’s September 19, 2001 speech reminds us that Pakistan acquiesced to U.S. demands not because of an inherent strategic alignment but rather to counter any Indian advantages.
Pakistan is the firefighter, the arsonist and the vendor of a variety of propellants.
The United States has simply failed to grasp that Pakistan will not, in any policy-relevant future, accept Indian hegemony. To do so would be to concede defeat for Pakistan’s expanding revisionist goals, which first focused upon changing the territorial status quo over Kashmir and which increasingly involve undermining India’s expansion in the region.
While the United States remains dependent upon Pakistan, it has virtually no political will to compel Pakistan to cease support for the Taliban and the Haqqani network much less group like LeT.
United States assistance to Pakistan should focus on tangibles such as power and infrastructure rather than areas, such as education, curriculum reform, and social issues, that are deeply inflammatory. The United States should quickly move to a less ambitious aid program that is demand-driven rather than supply-driven. If the United State wants to invest in human development, it should consider doing so through multilateral development agencies, which are more capable of delivering results.
Equally disconcerting is the likely reality that, as India continues its rise, Pakistan’s reliance upon Islamist militancy, the only tool that it has to change India’s trajectory, will increase, not decrease . The fact that Pakistan is suffering grievously as a result of this policy does not diminish the confidence of the ISI and the army that they can continue to manage their fissiparous former and current proxies.
It is imperative that Pakistan not become North Korea: a rogue regime that is disengaged from most of the international community.
Fifth, the United States should engage Pakistan’s military as it does with any other military. The International Military Education Training (IMET) program is important. Where possible, it should be expanded. However engaging Pakistan’s military does not mean the provision of strategic weapon systems or other weapon systems that are more suitable for fighting its revisionist conflict with India than domestic terrorism and insurgency.
The United States should move aggressively to counter Pakistan’s militant networks outside of Pakistan. I recognize that operating against Lashkar-e-Taiba’s headquarters in the Punjab and elsewhere will be nearly impossible and subject to the limits of tradecraft. Similar concerns exist for operating against the Afghan Taliban in Quetta, Karachi and other cities. However, nearly every one of these groups has an extensive network in the Gulf, the rest of South Asia, South East Asia, Europe and North America. There is no reason why the United States should not be more aggressive targeting these nodes of activity, be it through monitoring financial transactions, identifying individuals facilitating the groups and working with host-nations to conduct police and other raids upon these organizations and their facilitators.
In short, the United States must engage where it can, with clear thinking about the nature of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and an honest assessment of whether the terrorists Pakistan is helping the United States to eliminate are more important than the terrorists they continue to nurture.
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(An Obama-administration spokesperson had no comment.) 