Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 08 Jan 2012 15:38

The Wahhabi Invasion
Saudi charities pump in huge funds through hawala channels to radicalise the Valley

rajkumar · Post by **rajkumar** » 10 Jan 2012 16:34

Smartphone makers gave India spy tools, 'leaked' memos say

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45931204/ns ... -security/

I knew they would give into GoI.

Sachin · Post by **Sachin** » 11 Jan 2012 14:29

Indian Diplomat gets bail
Madhuri Gupta is now out on bail, after being "inside" for 21 months. Bail conditions are..Additional Sessions Judge Pawan Kumar Jain released Gupta on a personal bond of Rs 5,000 with the stipulation that she would not leave Delhi.
(as reported in the news link).

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 11 Jan 2012 18:43

I fail to understand how come in India people commiting grave sin are released with very minimal punishments ?????

Sabyasachi · Post by **Sabyasachi** » 18 Jan 2012 22:11

China banking on Pakistan for India intel?

China banking on Pakistan for India intel?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Jan 2012 22:14

Please dont post blind links. Add a title or short description out of courtsey to other members.

Thanks, ramana

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 19 Jan 2012 08:23

Sabyasachi wrote:China banking on Pakistan for India intel?

China banking on Pakistan for India intel?

One chini amirkhan tells me that lot of Paki people are in India to get information and spy on India. He was trying to scare me with this information. I told him India has more people inside Pakistan. He has shut his mouth.

sum · Post by **sum** » 19 Jan 2012 08:36

Feuding police arrest key witness in 13/7 Mumbai terror attacks; allow terrorists to escape

For the past six weeks, an obscure Darbhanga-based leather-business owner has been at the heart of India's hunt for the men who planted three improvised explosive devices that went off in a crowded Mumbai marketplace last summer, killing 26 and injuring at least 130.

Naquee Ahmad has helped the Intelligence Bureau and the Delhi Police build images of the two Pakistani nationals suspected to have planted the bombs, and sat with under-cover detectives staking out the apartment they last used.

For his contributions, Mr. Ahmad has been rewarded with arrest on charges of obtaining a mobile phone subscriber identity card using fake documents — a case a top Mumbai Police official told The Hindu was “totally without merit.” His brother Rafi Ahmad has also been detained; their youngest sibling, Taquee, was questioned on Wednesday.

Mr. Ahmad's surreal fate, the outcome of a feud pitting Maharashtra's élite anti-terrorism unit, the ATS, against the Delhi Police and the Intelligence Bureau, demonstrates how India's national security effort is still mired in incompetence — three years after the tragic events of 26/11.

Key witness

Intelligence Bureau investigators first held Mr. Ahmad on December 9, following a series of arrests in New Delhi. The story he had to tell was consistent with what the authorities already knew: Mr. Ahmad was a key witness, not a suspect.

Late in 2008, an Arabic-language student, Gayur Ahmad Jamali, had fallen ill with a lung condition. Friends in Bihar introduced Mr. Jamali to an Ayurvedic physician called “Dr. Imran”. The two men became friends of sorts: “Dr. Imran,” Mr. Jamali told the police, would often advocate armed jihad as a means to retaliate against the oppression of Indian Muslims; he would argue otherwise.

“Dr. Imran,” the Delhi Police believed, was none other than Muhammad Ahmad Zarar Siddibapa — a fugitive Indian Mujahideen commander also known by the alias “Yasin Bhatkal,” and long sought by the authorities across the world for his alleged involvement in a series of bombings across India.

In November, Mr. Jamali had contacted Mr. Ahmad with a request: finding a room in Mumbai for his old doctor and two business associates. Mr. Ahmad, who often travelled to the city on business, helped as best he could. In November 2011, the three men made a Rs. 1,00,000-deposit with Razia Begum, to hire a one-room apartment at Byculla.

In testimony to the Delhi Police, which is available with The Hindu, Mr. Ahmad offered a wealth of detail on the two men he was introduced to as “Waqas” and “Tabrez.” He accompanied the two terrorists to a local gym, and got them supervising work at a construction site. He also identified “Waqas” from closed-circuit camera footage taken outside a store in Jhaveri Bazaar.

Mr. Ahmad's questioning had all but ended by January 7 — when the Delhi Police arrived on his doorstep with one last request for help.

In New Delhi, highly-placed government sources told The Hindu, Intelligence Bureau Director Nehchal Sandhu had been personally supervising the monitoring of a phone investigators had established was being used by “Dr Imran.” In an intercepted conversation in December, “Dr Imran” told his landlady that he wanted a refund of Rs. 84,000 that remained of the advance on the apartment at Byculla.

The Intelligence Bureau's Delhi centre faced technical problems in tracking the mobile phone, and so passed on its details to its station in Mumbai. Then, under circumstances that still haven't been clear, the top-secret number was passed on to the ATS.

Little understanding either the value or context of this information, the Maharashtra ATS promptly conducted a series of raids: Razia Begum was detained, the Byculla apartment searched, and Mr. Ahmad himself arrested in an effort to understand the case. Not surprisingly, the ATS action destroyed any hope that Mr. Siddibapa or his Pakistani aides might be found.

Maharashtra's ATS has long faced allegations of sharp practice, and worse. In 2008, for example, it failed to inform the Intelligence Bureau and other State police forces that it had held Mumbai criminal Afzal Usmani, who is being tried on charges of providing vehicles used to stage bombings in Ahmedabad in July 2008. The failure to share intelligence, Delhi Police sources have told The Hindu, facilitated a subsequent Indian Mujahideen strike in the capital that September.

Summary of story:

*IB/Delhi police special cell track down Yasin Bhatkal through TECHINT in 2008. IB director, Sandhu himself was monitoring the phone tapping.
* DP find it tough to triangulate the locaion due to poor equipment and turn it over to better equipped ATS.
* ATS takes over the case and instead of waiting pateintly and tracking Bhatkal blindly raids all the names mentioned int tapped calls. This leads to innocent landlord and IB's own informer being nabbed which alerts Bhatkal and he promptly escapes to Pak!!!

Thankfully, all this were only happening with "secular" state agencies( like IB, Delhi, Maharashtra and not fascists states like Gujarat police or MP police) else we would have had the word "communal"/"fascist" thrown around and most of the policemen involved behind bars for "arresting innocent minorities".

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 Jan 2012 11:19

It could have been done to ruin the case.ATS doesn't have sterling reputation.

Aaryan · Post by **Aaryan** » 19 Jan 2012 13:59

Just a thought for the Gurus.. Is it possible that we combine IB with NIA.. Also bifurcate CBI into 2 parts.. Economics Offence wing can be separated from other branches ( It can be bought under preview of LOK PAL). Criminal investigation and Anti terror cell can be merged in IB-NIA. ATS os every state can directly contact and ask help and information from this NIA-IB kind of agency. This way is possible to create an agency which is much more effective as counter terrorist and counter- intelligence...

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Jan 2012 15:40

Remember this hilarious accusation? Well,it now has been revealed that it was true!

Quote:
""This is the first time we literally caught them red-handed in the process of contacting their agents here and received evidence that they finance a number of non-governmental organisations."

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... dmits.html[

quote]Russian 'spy rock' was genuine, former chief of staff admits
It was a spy plot so far-fetched it would be worthy of James Bond – a transmitter concealed inside an artificial rock by British agents and placed next to a Russian street in order to steal classified data.

Image 1 of 3
The FSB, the Russian intelligence service, broadcast X-rays of a hollowed-out rock filled with circuitry Photo: REUTERS
Image 1 of 3A video showed men alleged to be British agents repeatedly walking past the rock located next to a Moscow street Photo: REUTERS
Image 1 of 3Six years on, Tony Blair's former Chief of Staff has admitted that the 'embarrassing' episode was entirely true.

Photo: REUTERS By Nick Collins, and Duncan Gardham
19 Jan 2012

But it has emerged that the 'spy rock' diplomatic row which damaged relations with Russia in early 2006 was not a work of fiction after all.

Britain initially laughed off accusations from Moscow that spies had been caught "red-handed" using the fake rock to contact agents and download sensitive information.

Now six years on, Tony Blair's former Chief of Staff has admitted that the "embarrassing" episode was entirely true and not merely far-fetched Russian propaganda.

Jonathan Powell accepted that Britain did indeed plant a "spy rock" despite attempts by the then-prime minister to dismiss the story and denials of improper conduct by the Foreign Office.

In an interview broadcast on Putin, Russia and the West, a BBC Two series which starts tonight (THURS), he said: "There’s not much you can say. The spy rock was embarrassing. Clearly they had known about it for some time and had been saving it up for a political purpose.”

The incident was broadcast on Russian TV at a time when its government was seeking to justify new restrictive laws on human rights and pro-democracy campaigners.

Vladimir Putin, then President of Russia, claimed the groups were being funded by Western government agencies, adding: "This law had been adopted to stop foreign powers interfering in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation."

The video, which appeared at the time to be an effort to frame the British, showed men alleged to be British agents repeatedly walking past the rock located next to a Moscow street.

One clip showed one of the men kicking the device, possibly because it had malfunctioned, while another British diplomat was seen picking up the football-sized rock and walking away with it.

The FSB, the Russian intelligence service, broadcast close-ups and X-rays of a hollowed-out rock filled with circuitry and accused four British men and one Russian of using a transmitter inside to download information onto palmtop computer.

In this way, they claimed, the Russian informant could wirelessly store information in the rock where it was , retrievable by the British agents in a 21st-century version of what is known as a 'dead-letter drop'.

Sergei Ignatchenko, a spokesman for the FSB, said: "This is the first time we literally caught them red-handed in the process of contacting their agents here and received evidence that they finance a number of non-governmental organisations."

But Mr Blair attempted to play down the allegations, smiling as he told journalists: "I think the less said about that, the better."

The programme hired Katia Zatuliveter, who was later arrested and accused of being a Russian spy, as a researcher. An immigration panel found there was insufficient evidence to deport her.

While researching the programme she made contact with a Nato official from who she was accused of trying to extract secrets.

Anatol Lieven, an expert in Russia at King's College, London, said: "The Russian authorities were always quite sure that this was a case of spying, even though they were accused of paranoia at the time, and there is no reason this will cause them to stir it up again.

"However it shows that, while we always accuse the Russians of not changing since the cold war, the same might be said of MI6."

A spokesman at the Russian Embassy in London said: "We believe that sufficient comments were already given by Russian officials back in 2006."

The Foreign Office declined to comment.

[/quote]

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 21 Jan 2012 01:13

Strategic Review Committee's report out next month

HT Correspondent , Hindustan Times
New Delhi, December 27, 2011
First Published: 11:49 IST(27/12/2011)
Last Updated: 13:55 IST(27/12/2011)

With the Strategic Review Committee headed by Naresh Chandra expected to submit its report next month, the government is expecting the former cabinet secretary to recommend specific charters for Indian intelligence in order to avoid task overlap and one-upmanship among agencies.

Government sources said the 14 member committee was currently in the process of compiling the report with all the six sub-groups ready with their recommendations on border management, internal security, defence management and intelligence reform. The committee, set-up in June 2011, will submit its report in January 2012.

While the Committee will push for national security reforms, the government is hoping that Naresh Chandra will define mandates for intelligence agencies particularly the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the tri-service Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). Apart from presence of disgruntled elements within, the R&AW is often at odds with Indian diplomats and growing number of Intelligence Bureau posts abroad. Top officials feel that rather than focus on core intelligence collection outside the country, R&AW agents often play diplomats and tinker with country specific foreign policy.

The DIA, on its part, is a matter of serious concern to the national security managers as the post of Director General DIA has become a sinecure for Lieutenant Generals awaiting their next postings. The average tenure of a DG DIA is around one to one-and-a-half years with only defence attaches coming under its ambit. As the individual services intelligence do not share data with DIA, the organisation has become bit of an orphan.

With former R&AW chief KC Verma and former Intelligence Bureau chief PC Halder on the Naresh Chandra committee, the government is hoping to spruce up its intelligence gathering apparatus to meet the demand of ever growing consumers.

BajKhedawal · Post by **BajKhedawal** » 21 Jan 2012 07:18

Philip wrote:Remember this hilarious accusation? Well,it now has been revealed that it was true!

Quote:
""This is the first time we literally caught them red-handed in the process of contacting their agents here and received evidence that they finance a number of non-governmental organisations."

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... dmits.html

Something already known on BRF, is validated and publicized - covert action under the guise of NGO's, by and for the west.

In Indian context this sponsored NGO's have shitloads of money, and access all over the country. Their insidiousness knows no bound with simple rural folks in awe of their magnanimity and new age urbanites gaga over this seemingly philanthropic selfless phoreniers.

sanjchopra · Post by **sanjchopra** » 21 Jan 2012 07:20

'Pak will be India’s security test’

NEW DELHI: Challenges rising from Pakistan would remain the most serious security test for India over the next decade, says Naresh Chandra, chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, who is also heading a taskforce on reviewing the country's security architecture.

Delivering the 6th R N Kao Memorial Lecture, organized by the Research and Analysis Wing, Chandra said, "dealing with the security challenges from Pakistan" will be the "most serious challenge that our armed forces, intelligence and security agencies and the people as a whole have to face in the next decade or more."

"There is a perception that our human intelligence capacity in our western neighbourhood has declined in recent years. I am sure this area is being given special attention in order to ensure that timely and accurate information is available not only to agencies responsible for counter-terrorism, but also to decision-makers for taking more informed decisions and timely action," Chandra said.

Klaus · Post by **Klaus** » 21 Jan 2012 16:21

The Uttarkhand state intel machinery needs to watch out if there are signals coming of a possible surprise attack from Tibet. It must be a hectic time for 'em folks, with elections on and the external threat scenario as high as it can ever be.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 21 Jan 2012 19:42

RN KAO MEMORIAL LECTURE BY SHRI NARESH CHANDRA. A Good read

India’s Security Challenges in the next decade – Role of Intelligence

I feel greatly honoured and privileged to have been asked to deliver the R. N. Kao Memorial Lecture this year. I believe, it is the sixth in the series started in 2007 by Shri Tharakan, the then Secretary, R&AW . It feels good to be following the five distinguished speakers who have delivered the lecture in previous years.

Before this distinguished gathering, it is hardly necessary to enumerate the achievements of Shri Ramji Kao, one of the most celebrated civil servants of our time and the architect of our secret service. He was given charge of organizing the R&AW in September, 1968. Shri Kao had been associated with the creation of the Aviation Research Centre after 1962. He was able to set up and harness the capacities for both human and technical intelligence so successfully that within a period of less than three years, the Organisation was able to make a most valuable contribution to our triumph in the 1971 conflict.

He is recognized as a father figure and role model for all officers, young and old, in the R&AW and the Directorate General of Security. As a person Shri Kao had an elegant and striking presence. He was measured and precise with his words yet had a keen sense of humour, an amazing human touch and a love for arts.

A significant feature of Shri Kao’s vision for the R&AW was to lay strong emphasis on the quality of manpower and the multi-disciplinary sources from which select personnel should be drawn. He realized that the most important element of the whole exercise was the expertise and the quality of personnel that R&AW could select and motivate for the complex tasks entrusted to the Organisation. He was also the first to recognize the need for having a specialized service like the RAS to develop a body of professionals with core competencies needed by the agency.

I am happy to recall that my first contact with Shri Kao was when he called me on phone in late 1968 to assist in securing release of an IPS officer from UP. All I could do as Deputy Secretary in the Home Ministry was to get the information and inform him that the file was stuck in the office of Chief Secretary. Later, Shri Kao was successful in his attempt to get the services of that officer, who later came to head the R&AW. My last meeting with Kao Saheb was in March, 2001, when I returned to New Delhi from Washington DC. He was gracious enough to invite me to tea at his residence and was generous in his remarks about the improvement of relations with the USA. His analyses of India-US relations and knowledge of the current situation was impressive and as keen as ever. I would always cherish his genial friendly manner and the way he could put junior officers at ease.

Presently engaged in review of National Security systems and issues, in a Task Force, which will make recommendations to Government of India soon, I cannot be very free, therefore, with loud thinking and tentative conclusions at this time. Nevertheless, I will venture to highlight some aspects of the issues involved that might be of interest to the knowledgeable gathering present here. These do not reflect the views being finalized in the Task Force.

To take up the security challenges we might face in the next decade and beyond, it might be appropriate to dwell on what our National Security Doctrine ought to be.

A country’s national security is conceived in terms of its capacity to defend and advance its stated interests and principles. This requires adequacy of infrastructure and the availability of specialized personnel to meet these challenges effectively. National security has come to acquire a much wider connotation comprising not only the traditional aspects of defence and maintenance of public order but also issues of nation’s economic strength, its technological capability along with food and energy security and the quality and well-being of its human resource. It is in this wider context that one has to identify and analyse challenges at present and those emerging in the future and consider the role that intelligence agencies have to perform. Proper intelligence input is essential to taking informed decisions on issues of national security. Intelligence agencies are important arms of the State for meeting external challenges and for the proper management of internal security.

In brief, our national security objectives are: (i) preservation of territorial and maritime integrity of the country; (ii) having friendly relations with all countries; (iii) providing for sustained economic and social development accessible to all; (iv) creating credible capacities to meet conventional and non-conventional threats and challenges emerging from space and cyber space; and (v) nurturing the values of secularism and democracy. These objectives set the agenda for our policies and programmes and bring out the challenges that we face in the future for the successful prosecution of these objectives.

To consider the security environment in which we have to fashion our policies, we find that the global strategic context is changing rapidly, driven by the speed of technology development, realignment of forces with the recent decline in the markets of the West along with emerging economic strength and rise of China and India. Many see in this a strategic shift from the West to the East, but one has to be realistic and not assume that this shift is going to indefinitely endure. Even today, the aggregate size of the economies of the US, Europe and Japan, covering about a tenth of the world’s population have an aggregate GDP which is eight times the size of the combined GDP of China and India, which together account for one-third of human-kind. This imbalance will reduce but gradually as the years roll by and so it needs to be factored in our policies aimed at managing the rebalancing of strategic power internationally.

These developments require careful management of the current global redistribution of power and taking steps to engineer a suitable political equilibrium within a rising Asia. In the economic sphere the main challenge would be in the shape of achieving rapid economic growth, a larger share of international trade and business along with substantial growth in employment opportunities. While every effort would be necessary to expand bilateral trade relations on fair terms of trade, the challenge would be in acquiring the necessary mineral resources for both energy, fertilizer and other industrial inputs in friendly countries. Sustained and broad-based economic development and all inclusive growth are central to strengthening national security. Programmes aimed at employment-generation, along with inclusive economic development remain a challenge. Promoting vast sections of our people out of poverty into gainful occupations has to be recognized as a security imperative.

The main constraint to achieving rapid economic growth is going to be inadequacy of infrastructure, particularly the capacity to meet energy requirements in various sectors of our economy. The problem is likely to get more complex with the threat of climate change that calls for effective national and global intervention. All nations recognize the importance of taking urgent and drastic measures to reduce dependence on fossil fuels that add to greenhouse emissions but their approaches are heavily conditioned by national self-interest. In this area, India will have to be alert to the need for promoting a more equitable sharing of the global commons to secure its right to reasonable share of the ecological and economic space.

Our strategic concern has to seek an external environment in the region and beyond that is conducive to peaceful development and the protection of our value systems. While our policies are centred on the fact that we do not harbour any aggressive designs nor seek to threaten anyone, we have to take all necessary measures to safeguard the country and the interests of the people. We must also keep pace with technological advancement and provide for adequate infrastructure and the human resources required for growth in agriculture and industry and specialized services in the new emerging fields of military technology, cyber security, techint, forensics, etc.

To describe the security challenges nearer home, I would like to mention the rise of China as the first issue. In my view, we should not consider this only in the narrow context of a security threat or challenge, but also take note of the opportunities that emerge from the rapid growth of China’s economy. One need not under-estimate the apprehension generated by the thrust of China’s actions in countries of our neighbourhood, particularly in Pakistan and the coastal areas of our immediate neighbours. We are also yet to deal with and resolve the border disputes persisting in the Northeast as well as the Northwest. The continued military and technological assistance extended to Pakistan by China directly or through North Korea in the sphere of nuclear weapons technology and missile systems has been a dangerous development.

The growth in various sectors in China, especially in defence production capability require concentration of efforts to improve our defence preparedness, much larger capacity for defence production and upgradation of our armed forces. It is a national security requirement that the gap in the size of the economy between China and India does not widen to a level that further increases our concerns for a balanced relationship between the two major powers in Asia. This also highlights the need of improving the capability of our agencies in the area of economic and commercial intelligence.

Our relations with China have elements of cooperation and competition at the same time. While both of us are pre-occupied with internal transformation, we will need much better communication and dialogue to avoid misunderstanding each other’s actions and motives without letting the guard down on the serious security aspects. This is another area in which the role of intelligence agencies is of crucial importance.

While these challenges have to be taken very seriously, the importance of dialogue and building up of trade and investment relations with China have to be accorded priority. China is already our largest trading partner, but the terms of trade need urgent reform. It is also necessary to promote greater understanding of each other by promoting exchanges between the two countries involving not only diplomats and military personnel but also trade delegations and people from various walks of life.

This also highlights the importance of having language experts covering not only the Chinese language but the languages spoken in countries of our extended neighbourhood. There is paucity of language experts today and the capacity to train more people is very limited. Besides ensuring a number of language experts for translation and simultaneous interpretation, it would be necessary to train our own officers in the government and the agencies to acquire proficiency in various foreign languages of importance.

In the case of Pakistan, the situation is likely to remain as difficult and complex as before. Recent trends are even more discouraging. It has now become customary to describe Pakistan in very negative terms, such as a failing state, epicenter of terrorist activities, untrustworthy ally, etc. A noted academic and terrorism analyst has called Pakistan “perhaps the biggest and wobbliest domino on the world stage”.

The fact that the Pakistan military has a number of nuclear devices and associated delivery systems including missiles is a serious cause of concern, not only to India but to all powers committed to non-proliferation. Cooperation with agencies to ensure the provision of necessary safeguards has become international security imperative because of the fear that such weapons, or fissionable material might fall in the hands of non-state actors.

Dealing with the security challenge from Pakistan is a subject by itself and cannot be covered adequately in this address. Suffice it to say that this is the most serious challenge that our armed forces, intelligence and security agencies and the people as a whole have to face in the next decade or more. This is one area in which the armed forces and all the agencies including the NTRO, NATGRID and the recently announced NCTC will need to function in close coordination. Systems will have to be kept under constant review to ensure free and unrestricted flow of information through the entire security network covering many departments. This is essential to ensure that actionable intelligence inputs reach stations where counter measures have to be taken in time.

There is a perception that our humint capacity in our western neighbourhood has declined in recent years. I am sure this area is being given special attention in order to ensure that timely and accurate information is available not only to agencies responsible for counter-terrorism, but also to decision-makers for taking more informed decisions and timely action. While creating the capacities to anticipate and deal with unwelcome developments, infiltration and worse from across the border, we must not lose the long-term objective of having fruitful and friendly relations with people of Pakistan who are our closest neighbour in terms of history, culture and language. While exercising the utmost vigilance and remaining alert, we need to seize every opportunity of communicating with counterpart segments of Pakistani society in the hope of convincing our neighbour that we as a people wish them no harm and would like to partner with them in the overall development of the sub-continent.

Other countries of the region which have to be on our radar screen are Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. While these are all passing through a period of transition, our relations with them would further improve with the resolution of many problems dogging their internal situation.

In the case of Afghanistan, our policy of providing development assistance and support for infrastructure development, training of Afghani personnel and maintenance of certain basic services in that unhappy land must continue according to the wishes of the Government of Afghanistan. For stability in this region a strong government in Kabul is in everybody’s interest.

The situation today is fluid. Deterioration in US-Pakistan relations has created problems for provisioning the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. Further reductions planned this year in US force levels would create space for other interested powers, particularly Pakistan to take undue advantage of the situation. Development in Afghanistan and the ground situation needs to be specially monitored to enable making the right choices.

With Nepal, we have the closest and most comprehensive relationship. The fact that we have a largely open border between India and Nepal adds a major security dimension to our relationship. Continued engagement with Nepal with adequate assistance to their development programme is to the mutual benefit of both the countries. Nepal has been fairly cognizant of our security concerns, particularly in ensuring that their territory is not used by any neighbouring country or non-state actors for launching terrorist and other unfriendly acts against India. However, activities of some foreign agencies in Nepal will continue to be of serious concern.

In the case of Sri Lanka, our economic and political support to them should help in securing a more fair and durable political settlement between the major communities of that island. Problems and grievances of the Tamil community, if not adequately addressed by Colombo, have the potential of spilling over to the southern tip of India, creating a complication in India-Sri Lanka relations.

Our sincere efforts to improve the relations with Bangladesh have started to bear fruit, but much still needs to be done to take full advantage of the great potential that exists for cooperation and exploitation of water and mineral resources in a spirit of cooperation and friendship. There is great potential for economic cooperation between India and Bangladesh, including projects which improve connectivity and better road transport between Bangladesh and the territory of India bordering Bangladesh. Mutually beneficial projects have not been able to take off because of domestic political considerations. The situation can improve with sincere diplomatic efforts taking into account the political sensitivities involved on the Bangladeshi side. Lately, Bangladesh government has been quite responsive to our security concerns with regard to insurgent groups making unauthorized use of places in that country in order to regroup, train and make unwelcome inroads into Indian territory.

In the Indian Ocean and the countries of the littoral, India has unique and special responsibilities for ensuring safety of passage of vessels carrying precious cargo, particularly oil, fertilizer and minerals. Besides providing requisite capacity to Indian Navy, cooperative arrangements would need to be worked out with concerned Navies. Effective arrangements for sharing intelligence and commercial information would need to be worked out by our agencies.

Among the security challenges requiring urgent attention, terrorism is the most pressing real and eminent threat; especially from externally sponsored and state-assisted cross-border terrorism. Home-grown terrorism, both complements and adds to the burden. Left-wing extremism is the most serious threat to our internal security.

Note has to be taken of the nexus that exists between terrorist outfits, criminal gangs involved with drug trafficking, gun-running, pushing of fake currency and irregular movement of persons across national borders. This creates a very nefarious network of crime and threat to security that requires a very comprehensive and refined approach. For instance, relevant data and information on the activities of all these elements will need to be compiled, analysed and assessed as a base for supporting preparation of counter-measures by the concerned agencies. Needless to say this requires coordinated efforts by the intelligence agencies, para-military forces and state police. To the extent possible, cooperative assistance will have to be sought from agencies in neighbouring countries.

Within the country, there are serious gaps in our capacity to manage internal security issues effectively. This is a very wide subject but mention needs to be made about the crying need for reforming and modernizing the police force at the level of police stations and districts. There is similar need for augmenting resources for the lower judiciary and the government prosecution branch at the district level. Delays in securing assistance from the police or availing judicial remedy in a fair manner is a major cause of frustration, resentment and disaffection among the people at large. Substantial improvement in these areas is a national security imperative.

Although there is less likelihood of any conventional or full-scale conflict breaking out in the near future, the possibility of limited conflict or skirmishes in sensitive locations on the border or LOC cannot be ruled out. These perceptions require the necessary level of readiness in our capability to respond adequately. Our Defence Services cannot lower their guard in discharge of their paramount responsibility in this respect. Defensive and fighting capabilities of the Services will have to be continually upgraded along with establishing adequate infrastructure. Defence expenditure and programmes for upgradation of military technology, equipment, etc., has to be in reasonable proportion to the capabilities being developed in our neighbourhood. In this area, intelligence agencies have to play an important role in gathering and assessing relevant information to enable more informed decisions being taken by government. Shri Kao had realized the importance of R&AW working with other agencies to optimize the quality of intelligence and analysis generated by different agencies. Cooperative arrangements organised by him were in evidence during the 1971 conflict and thereafter.

The role of intelligence agencies has transformed tremendously and their functions have become manifold. In response to the changing security scenario from days of mere surveillance and information gathering through spies, double agents and police informers, the scene has changed completely with the introduction of new technologies, electronic gadgets and cameras and methods which are not only available to State agencies but also to well-funded terrorist and militant organizations and insurgents. The problem has acquired a new dimension with the ability of these irregular outfits to hire or recruit as their members from among highly qualified personnel. In this context, it is evident that the importance of what the Indian intelligence agencies are required to do cannot be over-emphasized.

Besides the traditional work involving gathering of information, making assessment and producing actionable reports for those in-charge of taking remedial measures, the agencies have now to manage new areas in a fast-changing scenario. For instance, highly specialized and trained personnel are needed to read and decode signals, interpret long distance photo-imageries, do forensic analysis of all explosives and other materials, undertake analytics, do horizon-spotting for anticipating emerging problems and connecting the dots coming out of diverse sources of data collection. The principal challenge in meeting these requirements would be to hire specialized personnel in requisite numbers and train them to the professional level required in the organization. A comprehensive programme of manpower planning and personnel development is going to be the single-most important issue to be tackled. The scene today is not encouraging. There are huge shortages in the agencies, specially in certain critical areas of their work. The rules and procedures for creating posts, recruiting people and the institutional capacity to train them is not adequate to meet this requirement in a timely manner. Finding innovative solutions, more pragmatic and liberalized procedures will need to be adopted to overcome this problem. This whole area is currently being reviewed by the Task Force to examine issues connected with National Security.

It is not necessary to provide for all specialization and skilled manpower within the agencies and government departments. There are experts and analysts available outside the government in the universities, think-tanks, the scientific community, specialists in business and commerce and journalism. I think the time has come for those in the government to reach out more and more to these national assets which are outside the government fold. This can be done not only through cooperative arrangements with necessary safeguards, but also through interchange of specialist personnel between government agencies and non-government institutions. In times of conflict, many nations have adopted such an approach to great advantage. In the US, interchange between government think-tanks and other non-government institutions is very common. In India, we are yet to utilize the substantial potential that exists in this respect.

A revolution in communication and the tremendous expansion of the internet has created a new situation. The utility of monitoring telephonic conversation or intercepting messages on wireless is hardly sufficient any more. Besides the print media and TV, the social media has now a reach which runs into millions with extremely fast communication capable of creating a surge of public opinion and movement faster than any government agency can monitor, let alone control. We have seen highly centralized governments taken by surprise on movements springing on to the streets in unexpectedly large numbers united with a common intent. This is a new destabilizing phenomenon, but the impact of such events is fortunately less in democracies where the media is free and open.

Cyber security threats are very real and pose a serious danger to our security systems. It transcends geographical and domain boundaries and is not subject to control through physical security. The prevalent threats, besides threat and fraud include espionage, sabotage, psywar and propaganda. For adequate cyber security considerable expertise needs to be developed in the areas of cryptography, network security and information security. In fact, establishing and following a cyber security doctrine is the first step to building an effective defence system. Such a doctrine has to be developed for the entire cyber space covering each organization involved with providing or using internet services. Recent experience has shown that threats and actual attacks are becoming more and more unpredictable. This requires preventive measures and contingency plans to deal effectively with the crisis in quick time.

These new developments call for structures and methods enabling much faster response. The earlier divisions and distinctions in the sphere of security and intelligence are no longer valid. The line between internal and external threats has got blurred. Cross-border terrorism has links in our own country and several internal insurgencies and home-grown terrorism has external ramifications, like sanctuaries, training camps, etc., available in neighouring countries.

Earlier the premier intelligence agencies concentrated mainly on strategic intelligence, leaving technical intelligence mostly to security forces and police organizations. Now there is need for greater emphasis on collecting both strategic and technical intelligence. There is increasing requirement for timely and specific intelligence on which rapid response can be planned and executed.

There is also greater need for effective systems and mechanisms for sharing all worthwhile actionable intelligence without delay and for coordination in the follow-up action or response. This requires a holistic view of the entire network through which information flows to the departments and agencies of the Central and State Governments. In all spheres it has been found that important bits of information lie unnoticed and unattended while it would have made a crucial difference in the hands of the concerned authority. This aspect needs to be studied by the major departments and agencies to improve the system of collection, storage and retrieval of information across different turfs in a seamless manner. In the case of sensitive information, officials in the hierarchy can be accorded a level of clearance to enable use with the necessary safeguards.

[b]India is steadily building capabilities to take care of its security concerns largely on its own, but some concerns have international dimensions. In this, diplomacy and strategic partnerships would play an important role, but intelligence cooperation with major powers and countries is also required, particularly in combating international terrorism. We have to always oppose any move to compartmentalize terrorism by considering foreign terrorists as your terrorists and some as ours, depending on their target country. However, we may have to make allowances for each other’s constraints, priorities and areas of divergence of interests.
[/b]
Suggestions in this regard range from reforms across the board involving setting up of new structures, systems and procedures to the more moderate ones of refinement and modifications of the existing structures and systems, making provision for more radical changes in an evolutionary way. Diverse views need to be examined and studied carefully. The bottom line is that the measures suggested have to be effective and acceptable in the existing and emerging realities. There is the conventional view that systems and procedures evolve over decades along with periodical reviews and modifications from time to time. The other view is that the present structures and systems are not capable at all to deal with new challenges and threats and there should be a major overhaul.

The intelligence apparatus in India conforms to the generally accepted pattern prevalent in democratic countries. Most totalitarian governments and dictatorships follow an integrated system as is the case in communist countries, China, Russia, Pakistan, Myanmar, etc. In democracies like USA, UK, France, Japan, etc., the security service and the secret service have come to be separated. This occurred in India in September, 1968. Separation of normal police, the security service and the secret service provide necessary safeguards in protecting citizens’ rights and upholding due process of law. For instance, the intelligence establishment is not empowered to arrest and detain persons except through and with the help of civil police. The citizen is thus assured that the secret security apparatus cannot touch him directly, but only through normal police where legal and judicial remedies are available. Further, the secret service does not have a role within the country and operates in a manner which is consistent with the overall national security objectives and interests of the country.

The operations of the external agency have certain specialized features. Its officers and operatives often have to work in alien or even hostile environment. We have to see how these intelligence operatives should be best recruited and trained and how to take care of their future prospects. First, we need persons of strong nerves who can take care of themselves in unpredictable circumstances and who can work coolly under pressure, and also having the judgement to guard against various risks and retaining the benefit of deniability. They are expected to do whatever it takes to achieve their objective and yet discharge their duties without breaking the law of their own country, although the rules of engagement differ when they have to operate abroad in unfriendly and hostile territory. We have also to choose people from different backgrounds and walks of life with special skills and aptitudes. Therefore, all recruitment to the organization may not be best done through the normal selection procedures and bodies or into one or two organized services. We have to study procedures in other countries and adopt some features to suit the conditions in our own country. In bringing about any major changes in the system of recruitment the prospects of existing incumbents should not be overlooked.

In the training of recruits, more attention has to be paid to their minds and mental orientation and the overall approach and attitude towards service in the organization they are joining. Needless to say, much more attention has to be given to the practical side of training in addition to theory. At the same time, besides the need for area specialization and acquisition of some special skills, there will be obvious need for diversifying their cover and having different criteria for placement, promotions and remuneration.

In the interest of their work, intelligence agencies have to be provided much greater degree of flexibility and freedom in using public funds and resources. It is not possible to apply the same rules of transparency and audit that are imposed on other departments of the government. On the question of accountability, I find that the views I had expressed several years ago remain largely valid still. If public servants undertake activity with public funds, then a measure of transparency and accountability are questions which cannot be ignored. Being part of the Executive there is no fundamental immunity available to intelligence agencies from parliamentary scrutiny or judicial review. To an extent, this also goes for audit of expenditure incurred by the intelligence agencies. It would be clear to the meanest intelligence, however, that there is no way the intelligence agencies can be expected to function in the open for a substantial part of their operations. If public funds are to be utilized for the purposes described above as functions which intelligence agencies must necessarily perform in the national interest, then a balance has to be struck between two sets of conflicting considerations. It is no use imposing the standard framework of accountability in a manner which brings essential secret and security services to a halt, causing funds and energy to be expended to no effect. We must remember what we are dealing with and what the other side is throwing at us. So in a democracy run by rule of law who is ultimately responsible for striking a balance on this issue, and for making a right choice? In Parliamentary form of government this can be only done by the Prime Minister as chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Security with ultimate accountability to Parliament.

There is also the contradiction involved in the spirit that characterizes the RTI Act on the one hand and the Officials Secret Act on the other. The generally accepted principle in securing right balance is to weigh the pros and cons of putting information in the public domain, keeping in mind that the same would be also available to the interested diplomatic agents of foreign missions based in India. While intelligence agencies are exempted from application of the RTI Act, audit and accountability has to be ensured rather carefully to avoid damage to security interests.

At the same time, it is important for intelligence agencies to devote attention to their image, public relations as well as communication with the media. Closed-door meetings by officers with senior editors on non-attributable basis have helped in the past in managing public opinion in crisis situations. Failure to do so has on occasion resulted in embarrassment and avoidable burden upon those taking important strategic and tactical decisions. This is an area requiring greater interaction and special handling by trained professionals.

I thank Secretary (R&AW), former heads of agencies, members of the media and other distinguished colleagues for enabling me to share my views.

Thank you.

sum · Post by **sum** » 21 Jan 2012 21:44

The operations of the external agency have certain specialized features. Its officers and operatives often have to work in alien or even hostile environment. We have to see how these intelligence operatives should be best recruited and trained and how to take care of their future prospects. First, we need persons of strong nerves who can take care of themselves in unpredictable circumstances and who can work coolly under pressure, and also having the judgement to guard against various risks and retaining the benefit of deniability. They are expected to do whatever it takes to achieve their objective and yet discharge their duties without breaking the law of their own country, although the rules of engagement differ when they have to operate abroad in unfriendly and hostile territory. We have also to choose people from different backgrounds and walks of life with special skills and aptitudes. Therefore, all recruitment to the organization may not be best done through the normal selection procedures and bodies or into one or two organized services. We have to study procedures in other countries and adopt some features to suit the conditions in our own country. In bringing about any major changes in the system of recruitment the prospects of existing incumbents should not be overlooked.

So currently none of the above mentioned qualities are judged before absorbing a agent/officer into RAW?

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 21 Jan 2012 22:38

Unfortunately no. The whole manpower allocation is just plain wrong. You have alot of people there just for foreign junkets and trips/holidays, no interest in security - I cant remember the exact phrase that is used.

Hence Naresh Chandra's comments to change the way we recruit

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Jan 2012 01:17

RAW as the wags say is called "Relatives and Wives Wing"

Those recruited mostly are in that category. These are folks who don't make the civil services grade. Others are seconded from IPS and military.

satya · Post by **satya** » 25 Jan 2012 18:14

Had a talk with not so hot billi in dilli ( billi don't like this cold weather ) wrt Sh. Naresh Chandra's lecture . It fits the piece in puzzle of India's National Intelligence Set Up's ongoing transformation taking place . What i remember from talk is :

1) Desh had & still has very few defense background intell officers in upper levels why don't ask we all know . Most of them come on deputation & were not allowed to put in groundwork to be followed up by their successors apart from the gravy train lure is still there specially among the air force's officers on deputation . Whatever limited role defense background officers have is in field of techint & covert ops ( karate sarate commando wammando thing in words of billi

) not in actual planning or related remotely to strategy . Sadly not much has changed in this regard . So we still miss out their PoV who for a change now very well understand strategy & its aspects .

2) Current RAW Top Black Hat RAS himself well regarded in the set up . Was instrumental in increasing the pay & perks for officers above certain rank . Did few other things gud ones as he has blessings from the very top so some sort of house cleaning taking place to be followed by trim the fat & build the muscle exercise to be followed by an increase in brain cells if we are lucky ok its too far but still this what the intention is .

3) Given most of our intell set up is based on police officers , set up's philosophy is to look at everything from a law & order thing so what ever humint & techint we have is almost entirely focussed on foot soldiers & their cell leader ( if lucky) . Had a big trouble to look at things from a strategic PoV ( an example wht happened in Kerala wrt to cow slaughter in temple permises would have seen some PMO or another ministry babu ringing up RAW & IB office to ask them what's happening & why was it not told so before in short no focus as current need is to get one more angle in talks over chai biscuit & to butter one's own position in eyes of Master, top priority in intel is what ever that hits the media so in morning one thing evening it will the something else & in between we all can imagine ) . This has led to considerable diversion of resources who even in best of times work 4 /10 times other 2-3 times plain lucky rest we get bomb blasts here & there. Myopia might be the right word & then there is need to talk else how can we digest our pandara road & khan market food no wonder Blackberry is a much cherished handset for such mantris & santris.

4) NSA is one of few people who tend to look at things strategic pov . PC was sent to TSP to meet TSPA Jernails what transpired was some sort of message delivered ( might be understanding might not be ) whereby another Mumbai scale incident to be considered a strategic attack & not a mere law & order terror related incident & will have some consequences what they are don't know but there was a frank discussion given more than 2 Generals were present from TSP side . Cold Start one of the vectors in place should another 26/11 or worse happen, there's talk of TSP jihadis ( uniformed & non uniformed to go for something bigger & they agree on something bigger to happen but to what purpose not clear yet so till then maybe there's time maybe there's not big uncertainty on this front ) . TSPA jernails said not in control of all Abduls fauji/jihadis maybe a lie not one sure .

5) If we remember there was news of SPS under PMO , it was primarily tasked initially to give specific tasks to our intel boys ie things to do clearly so now we have a set up ( SPS) that gets feedback ( for now to be used later on to develop our own strategic options ) to understand the strategic affairs that will affect India ( work in progress) . Its a slow process but nevertheless a start . One more thing what ever u hear about intel set up in media 10/10 times its false there might be one or 2 that may count up to something but what media paint is nowhere near the things are . Again had things been so bad Dilli would have the largest embassies of Unkil & Aunty overtly again words of Billi . For very first time there's growing recognition of babu log from South India specially Kerala held in very high esteem but what to do when some chu***a in party suggested to Yuvraaj to have babus from UP if he wanted to get a good performance in UP election & now we have a wonder called Home Secretary following in footsteps of Sh. Gowda sleeping in official meetings & yet we hear PC is bad what to say its all Kalyug getting jawan

6) MMSjee & a few others ( club boys ) were frustrated in getting almost 0 strategic intel from our set up so tube light or bulb moment

& was agreed that this needs to be changed resulting in committee under Sh. Naresh Chandra to find first the causes & remedies . SPS was made functional so as not to waste time .

7) As per what i understood all terror related incidents ( below Mumbai /parliament scale ) to be handled by local police-ATS -IB over the time RAW will become increasingly focus on strategic aspect once our Janabs ( old timers still luv this word more than Saab ) understand what makes up strategic aspect in intelligence . Debate did take place & wht they mentioned was strategic aspect meant vote bank politics so how much re education had to happen one can imagine but atleast there's growing realization things cannot go on like this where MI boys too were given terror related tasks as top priority . Anyhow normal sense coming back . PMO under new secretary working nicely atleast on this aspect .No word on NIA , GoI knows it was a wrong move

Asked why it took so longer to understand that India is a natural empire but as dilli billi said correction India is the longest surviving empire functional since dawn of tube light moments in gora log & mankind came into existence if one go by their definition of what makes up an empire & state . Point is what Shr. 5 pegs of JD down every night ABVjee ( sorry couldn't resist this dig

) decided to do in '98 has led to this statement from billi's mouth = dawn of realization or realization of dawn almost here

. In short now there's certain degree of acceptance to play the game .I will believe it more when i will see a world map or atleast a tiny globe on their table till then have to work with it

TWIW .

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 25 Jan 2012 22:31

Sensitive Navy information leaked?

In August 2011, a sweep conducted by Command Intelligence of the WNC chanced upon a trail wherein four officers of Commander level rank were found allegedly misusing their online networks and releasing information which were detrimental to Navy's interests.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 25 Jan 2012 23:43

satya ji, very hard to decode what you are saying. no breaks between sentences, no punctuation, are you perchance using a one time pad ?

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 25 Jan 2012 23:54

Is Saik now satya???

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Jan 2012 01:53

It has enough details.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 26 Jan 2012 05:13

SPS

Penny-wise government sets up secret cell

NEWDELHI: Austerity can wait.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has sanctioned the creation of yet another powerful office under National Security Advisor (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon Called the Strategic Programme Staff (SPS), it will be serviced by 33 officers at an annual cost of Rs 4.24 crore.

While Menon holds the rank of Minister of State, the SPS will have one secretary, nine directors and 23 support staff, including one principal private secretary, nine private secretaries, four drivers and six multi-tasking employees. This is in addition to the people already working for the NSA and National Security Council Secretariat.

The SPS has also been allocated a massive office in New Delhi.This is the first time that the PMO has not followed the normal procedure of seeking advance budgetary approval before setting up a new body.

In fact, the SPS creation process was such a closely-guarded secret that not even top bureaucrats were involved. A top-secret note, dated April 8, 2011, signed by a joint secretary in the National Security Council Secretariat, says: “This secretariat was not aware of the proposal of setting up the SPS at the time of formulating the Budget Estimates for 2011-2012 and, therefore, no provision has been included towards this in BE 2011-2012 and neither it is possible to meet the expenditure on the new raising from the NSS budget allocation.” The note reveals that the exercise started even before Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee presented his budget on February 28, 2011. Both Mukherjee and the Secretary (Expenditure) had given their official nod on January 10 itself. Surprisingly, the PMO conveyed its approval to the NCS only on March 5. As per the rules, any proposal for the creation of a new department has to be submitted to the Cabinet with full justification. In the case of the SPS, no such justification has been seen by anyone except a note seeking the release of funds

The PMO seems to be in such a tearing hurry that it has sought money from the Contingency Fund of India for making the SPS functional immediately. Bureaucratic sources say that the SPS will be used by Menon to be independent of agencies like Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) and Military Intelligence. None of the other 50 ministries and 150-odd departments has such massive paraphernalia to service a single authority. None of the previous NSAs like Brajesh Mishra, J N Dixit and M K Narayanan had demanded such huge infrastructure either.

The government is already spending over Rs 200 crore on the IB and an unaudited sum on R&AW operations; the addition of yet another white elephant will significantly hike expenditure and start a turf war among the alreadyinimical security agencies.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Jan 2012 09:07

ShyamD, Smt. Indira Gandhi had a strategic planning/foreign policy plannig cell under G Prathasarathy which got disbanded in the 80s.

Glad SSM revived it.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 26 Jan 2012 14:07

It's definitely needed. I think intel will be vetted by SPS before reaching the top. Need to look at larger trends and the major strategic threats. Solutions to it.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 27 Jan 2012 04:00

ramana wrote:ShyamD, Smt. Indira Gandhi had a strategic planning/foreign policy plannig cell under G Prathasarathy which got disbanded in the 80s.
Glad SSM revived it.

A good move indeed, even during Kargil, raw intel was available in plenty, there was no co-relation done, no-one to connect the dots and let the picture emerge. hopefully the SPS fill this void. Better late than never...
What happened the recommendations of Shri K Subrahmanyam (Kargil review Committee)?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 31 Jan 2012 23:22

Old article on RAW:

http://www.sunday-guardian.com/investig ... favourites

member_21708 · Post by **member_21708** » 01 Feb 2012 21:16

CMM sends ex-Army plea against RAW officials to Dt Judge

New Delhi, Feb 1, 2012, (PTI): A Delhi court has transferred from itself to the court of city's lower judiciary chief a former Army officer's plea for a direction to CBI to lodge a corruption case against some RAW and SPG officials for their alleged dubious roles in buying some communication gadgets.

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Vinod Yadav gave the order, noting CBI's "inaction" on the complaint by Army's former Maj Gen V K Singh who himself faces prosecution for allegedly divulging some sensitive information about the country external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing in a book authored by him.

"Prima facie, there appears to be inaction on behalf of CBI. However, considering the fact that complainant seeks registration of the FIR in the matter in respect of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act against the public servants, this court cannot take cognisance in this case, as contemplated U/s 190 CrPC," said CMM Yadav while hearing the former Army officer's plea to direct CBI to register a case.

"As per law, the same (the ex-Army officer's plea) is liable to be considered by Special Judge, constituted under Prevention of Corruption Act," he pointed out, adding "let the case file complete in all respects be placed before District and Sessions Judge, Delhi with the request to mark it to the court of competent jurisdiction for passing appropriate orders therein."

In his complaint, sent to the CBI Director in 2008, the former Army officer had alleged corruption in procurement of ultra and very high frequency (UHF/VHF) antennae and other communication for RAW and Special Protection Group, and had sought registration of corruption and criminal cases against various officials of the two security agencies.

As CBI failed to take any action on Singh's compliant, he moved the CMM's court in 2009 seeking its direction to CBI to follow up on his complaint.

A chief signal officer with the Army's Western Command, Singh was posted on deputation as a Joint Secretary (Telecom), with Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) under the Cabinet Secretariat in November 2000. After his retirement from the Army on June 30, 2002, he continued with RAW on re-employment up to June 30, 2004.
After his retirement, he authored a book titled "India's External Intelligence Secrets of the Research & Analysis Wing" in which he highlighted some instances of alleged corruption detected by him during his tenure.

He said that in October 2008 he had sent a detailed complaint in this regard to the then CBI Director seeking registration of case in the matter. Since the complaint evoked no response, he sought a response on its status through a plea under the RTI Act in January, 2009.

He was merely informed that an inquiry was under progress, he said. The court noted that as per the CBI (Crime) Manual, 2005, a secret verification/preliminary enquiry has to be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the complaint.

http://www.deccanherald.com/content/223 ... -plea.html

Sachin · Post by **Sachin** » 02 Feb 2012 17:26

^^^ Had read the book written by Maj.Gen V.K Singh. Another story he had was these agencies drafting a specification dcoument in such a way that only one single vendor (the most preferred one

) would be able to supply the product. It seems in a case of supplying UHF/VHF wireless sets to an agency, one Indian vendor openly stated that they are pulling out of the contract as they knew which other foreign firm could supply the exact wireless sets

.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 04 Feb 2012 00:16

The Secret Secret Service
How Indian Army's Military Intelligence Directorate works

On the topmost floor of Sena Bhavan in Delhi are the headquarters of one of India's 21 intelligence agencies, the Indian Army's Military Intelligence Directorate (MI). The building, located behind South Block, is the closest India gets to the Pentagon. Its warren of corridors and cramped offices helps India's military spies maintain a veneer of anonymity.

It was the MI that warned Sheikh Hasina about a coup brewing in the Bangladesh Army. The incident brought the agency's role into focus. Set up in 1950 as a small army department primarily to investigate corruption within the force, MI has made its share of blunders. It survived the embarrassment of the 1978 Samba spy case, where it falsely implicated three Indian Army officers as being Pakistani spies. The agency gathered momentum in the 1990s especially after the Kargil conflict with Pakistan. The army chafed at the poor quality tactical intelligence provided by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and R&AW. It boosted MI's mandate.

Today, the organisation comprises just over 700 officers, including women officers, and over 3,000 men. It is still tiny when compared to r&aw and IB, whose staff is over 25,000. MI's operating budget, too, is a tiny fraction of the well-entrenched IB and R&AW, though all three agencies have somewhat overlapping mandates vis-a-vis trans-border tasks.

The director-general, MI, a lieutenant general-rank officer who reports directly to the army chief, is indispensable when it comes to furthering Indian Army's diplomacy and exchanging intelligence with friendly countries like Myanmar, Israel, Afghanistan and Vietnam.

MI was initially tasked with generating only tactical or field intelligence in all countries bordering India. Its geographical mandate was set to 50 km from the border. These limits were quickly crossed in the mid-1990s when the organisation began playing an increasing role in countries within the subcontinent and its outer periphery.

MI operatives moved into Tajikistan and later Afghanistan in support of the Ahmad Shah Massoud-led Northern Alliance that overthrew the Taliban in 2001. Besides furthering national strategic goals, MI officials say these 'third country operations' allowed the agency to peep into countries of their immediate interest. MI was also active in Myanmar, which nurtured insurgent groups. In 1998, an MI operative impersonated a Khalistani terrorist and infiltrated a gun-running Myanmarese insurgent group. He led them into a death trap in the Andaman islands. Operation Leech, as the operation was called, marked the start of the Indian Army outreach to the Myanmarese junta in the 1990s. It also aimed to offset China's expanding footprint on India's eastern border.

Bangladesh is another country that has figured high on the MI scanner, particularly because of the safe sanctuaries provided to insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the United National Liberation Front of Manipur (UNLF) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation of Assam. Within months of the Hasina government taking over in 2009, the entire leadership of the ULFA and UNLF was handed over to Indian authorities.

MI's mandate also includes counterterrorism in the north and North-east and generating pinpoint intelligence for small team operations. It is also tasked with counterintelligence in the army, which entails detecting spies in military areas.

MI survived the post-Kargil loss of turf to two new intelligence agencies, the National Technical Research Organisation and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). dia took away some of its signal monitoring capabilities and foreign military attaches who used to report to MI. A measure of the turf wars between India's spy agencies is brought out by the pithy remark of an MI official: "Let us remain low profile, we don't want to tread on too many toes."

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 04 Feb 2012 04:02

India’s strategic challenges

:
:
At present, defence policymaking is ad hoc, short-term, and service-specific. The state of readiness of forces and jointness of operations, training, and planning have not been addressed. Although a Chief of Defence Staff has been discussed, the position is not in harmony with India’s size and democratic structure; a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee under a full-time chairman is more appropriate. The National Security Council, which had been expected to address policy incoherence and inadequate strategic planning, burdened itself with executive responsibilities. The services intelligence directorates are ill-equipped for long-term intelligence assessments, and area specialists are few, suggesting a greater need for think tanks. The armed forces have also not fully though through important aspects of nuclear policy and strategy. In a nuclear era, the role of the military becomes, essentially, preventing wars from breaking out through appropriate weapons acquisitions, force deployment patterns, the development of infrastructure, military exercises, and defence diplomacy.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 05 Feb 2012 13:18

I thought that the MI was absorbed into the DIA. Whats the mission and scope of DIA?

nits · Post by **nits** » 07 Feb 2012 10:47

Israeli couple suspected of being agents, to be deported

KOCHI: An Israeli couple who came to the city on March 3, 2010, will be deported for "suspicious activities". Shneor Zalman and Yaffa Shenoi came on a multiple-entry visa and rented a house on Rose Street,"Central intelligence got an alert about a covert operation being carried out by suspected Israeli agents after the 26/11 terror attacks in which south Mumbai's Chabad House came under attack and six Jews, including a Rabbi and his pregnant wife, were killed. ADuo were under lens

In their report, the state intelligence department said a group of people turned up at the couple's rented house regularly and held meetings. "These meetings lasted for hours in the night. They were under close surveillance".

JMT and i may be wrong - if they wree here to avenge 26\11 - what could be they planning in India - the need to across the border to punish ISI

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 07 Feb 2012 10:51

wah wah reminds me of the self goal in the DI bump off case. The central agencies should have allowed these folks to do what they want and tail them and intervene only in case their stay was inimical to our interests

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 07 Feb 2012 11:16

under no circumstances should foreign agents, however friendly, be allowed to operate in India. even overlooking other factors you risk your own citizens becoming collateral damage.

Aditya G wrote:I thought that the MI was absorbed into the DIA. Whats the mission and scope of DIA?

coordination and sat imagery would be my guess.

ASPuar · Post by **ASPuar** » 07 Feb 2012 11:43

Sachin wrote:^^^ Had read the book written by Maj.Gen V.K Singh. Another story he had was these agencies drafting a specification dcoument in such a way that only one single vendor (the most preferred one ) would be able to supply the product. It seems in a case of supplying UHF/VHF wireless sets to an agency, one Indian vendor openly stated that they are pulling out of the contract as they knew which other foreign firm could supply the exact wireless sets .

When Gen VK Singh was Jt Secy (Tech) at RAW, he unearthed a can of worms, including favouritism even in grant of contracts for PMs security. No wonder he was quickly shunted out.

chiragAS · Post by **chiragAS** » 07 Feb 2012 17:53

Don't know if its posted already
how true is this ?
Hackers threaten to release Symantec source code Tuesday

Evidence at the time suggested that hackers found the code after breaking into servers run by Indian military intelligence

Vashishtha · Post by **Vashishtha** » 08 Feb 2012 17:50

One little question that ive been pondering over the last couple of days is how opposition political parties keep away from the prying of IB and RAW that the UPA uses for political intel. Its election season!!!