Civil Aviation Development & Discussion

[chaanakya]

^^

Late First Officer Ahluwalia was known to be a stickler for following SOP. This was reiterated by not only the pilots who had flown with him in Air India Express, but also by pilots of Jet Airways with whom he was employed earlier. During investigation, it came to light that First Officer Ahluwalia had complained in writing about one Foreign Pilot to the management of Air India Express. The management was yet to counsel him and the Foreign Pilot. Possibly, due to such feelings, the First Officer did not try to wake up the Captain, who was sleeping. It is evident from the CVR that there had been practically no conversation between the two pilots for a prolonged period of time, made worse by the Captain having slept for a considerable period.

It is also evident from the CVR that the flight crew had failed to carry out the required Descent Preparation Checks prior to descent. It is pertinent to note that the First Officer, who was known to be a strict follower of SOP, had also failed in this respect. However, the CRM was not effective, as evident in this case; a casual tone set by the Captain might have also affected the First Officer. This was evident from the selection of ‘000’ on the altitude select window of the Mode Control Panel (MCP)instead of Missed Approach Altitude of 2200 ft during approach. Such serious contravention of SOP was apparently not noticed by either of the pilots. That the CRM has not been effective is also evident from a very steep Trans-Cockpit Authority Gradient.

[chaanakya]

^^

Cause of the Accident
3.2.1 Direct Causes
The Court of Inquiry determines that the cause of this accident was Captain’s failure to discontinue the ‘unstabilised approach’ and his persistence in continuing with the landing, despite three calls from the First Officer to ‘go around’ and a number of warnings from EGPWS.

[chaanakya]

^^

In view of Multi-base operations of Air India Express, there is an urgent need to computerise both, intra and inter departmental activities. Currently followed use of Pencil and Eraser to maintain crew schedules leads to ambiguity and lack of
transparency. In order to obviate this, it is recommended that all crew schedules should be computerised urgently in keeping with CAR Section 3, Series ‘C’ Part II (Revised 2009) issued by DGCA. This non-compliance had also been brought out
by the DGCA Audit carried out from 30th October to 3rd November 2007.

During the process of investigation, it was also revealed that the commercial staff was not aware of MEL release on Seat No 25C and the same was wrongly allotted to a passenger from Dubai. With inter-departmental networking, such errors can be overcome.
Use of Computers will also allow an efficient and faster means of communications with the flight crew operating from multiple bases. Changes to operating instructions or any flight safety alerts can also be made known to them at the earliest.

[chaanakya]

^^

There is a need for Air India Express to carry out a detailed check into background of Foreign Pilots, prior to issuance of FATA by DGCA. Emphasis should be laid especially on flight safety issues for the entire flying career, as well as anomalies during training, if any, from all the previous employers. There is also a need to examine medical history of Foreign Pilots in its entirety. The airline should
conduct pre-employment medical examination for all Foreign Pilots similar to Indian pilots.
While proposing the employment of Foreign Pilots, Air India Express should justify such an employment. Yearly Training Plan and quantifiable targets achieved in upgrading Indian pilots to PIC, should accompany such proposal.

[chaanakya]

^^

As per worldwide data published by ICAO, most of the accidents occur during landing and take-off phases, with a large number of runway excursions and aircraft overrunning into the Overshoot Area. Considering the large momentum of these
aircraft, a downward slope in the overrun area can worsen the outcome. It is therefore recommended that such downward slopes as obtaining in Mangalore, be brought to the same level of the runway surface. This also needs to be ensured at all table top airports in the country.

[chaanakya]

^^

4.2.7 Location of Air Traffic Control Tower at Mangalore
After commissioning of runway 24/06 in 2006, the earlier ATC Tower was not found suitable for controlling air and surface movement operations, safely. Hence, a temporary ATC Tower had been built near 24 dumbbell. However, in addition to limited space, this location does not offer a clear field of view to the ATC controller, especially with commencement of operations from the New Terminal.
It is, therefore, recommended that a new ATC Tower be built at a central location. The Tower should have adequate space to accommodate meteorological officer to facilitate him to take weather observations from all sides.

[chaanakya]

^^

4.2.9 Preventing Erosion of Strip Width at Mangalore
Due to the constraints of terrain, the Table Top runway 24/06 has a strip width of 150 metres instead of standard 300 metres. The limited strip width is also one of the permanent concessions being sought by AAI for licensing of airport at Mangalore.

In order to ensure that the strip width does not reduce further, there is a need to initiate engineering measures. Use of nets and strict control over quarry and mining activity in this area are some of the recommended measures.

All Operators should cater to safe crosswind limitation for the type of aircraft operations in view of the narrower strip width. The ATC Controller needs to caution the pilots in this regard.

[chaanakya]

^^
Accident Aircraft Performance Report by M/s Boeing

The airplane does have adequate stopping performance to come to a complete stop on the improved surface available using a dry runway assumption.
Based on the data from Figure 8 (described in the next paragraph) and the event airplane's weight (~143,000 pounds), the airplane could stop in approximately 2400 feet with the following assumptions: max manual braking, detent reverse thrust, Speedbrakes deployed, and reverse thrust maintained until fully stopped. Since the airplane's final touchdown point was approximately 5200 feet from the Runway 24 threshold, the airplane could have come to a complete stop at 7600 feet from the threshold (438 feet of runway remaining).

[chaanakya]

^^ Good work and help by Locals and fast response by Local Authorities

Although the crash site was outside the airport area, the crash and fire crew responded timely. Since the roads are narrow, the RFF Vehicles reached the crash site with difficulty. The response by the Civil Administration including Fire, Medical and Police Departments to this disaster was also fairly fast. The local population rendered a lot of help for the rescue operations. Subsequently, Air India volunteers known as ‘Air India Angels’ provided yeomen service to the bereaved families and survivors in association with Civil Administration.

At the time of accident, Mangalore airport maintained Rescue and Fire Fighting Capability at level - 7 as laid down in CAR, Section-4, Series-B, and Part-I, dated 31st July 2006. There were a total of 6 RFF vehicles, 4 of which were Rosenbauer,
re- christened as Panther 1 to 4 and 2 TATRA vehicles known as Agni Shatru and Agni Vijay. There were 3 ambulances as part of the team.

The 4 Rosenbauer were procured centrally by AAI. These new RFF vehicles are heavy, but have a good capability of Rescue and Fire Fighting within the airfield. Considering the surrounding terrain of the Table Top runway at Mangalore, no terrain specific tests were conducted prior to their allotment to Mangalore Airport. As such, when these RFF vehicles were taken outside the airport, difficulty was experienced while negotiating the narrow and curving roads. These vehicles had not been registered with Regional Transport Authority at the time of accident. The RFF manpower was 31 and was well trained. It was given to understand that the responsibility of Rescue and Fire Fighting operations outside the Mangalore Airport area lies with the civil administration.

However, within 5 km of the airport especially in view of an accident on overshoot orundershoot area, the RFF for the airport needed to be deployed at the earliest tocarry out RFF operations. As per the Airport Director, Mangalore, yearly exercises involving civil administration had been carried out for an aircraft emergency within the airfield.

However, a full-scale simulation for outside the perimeter had not been carried out. Only a Table Top exercise had been carried out to assign responsibilities and for preparing an emergency telephone list of various authorities. Full emergency exercise was carried out in December 2007 inside the airport.

Partial mock up exercise was carried out on 19th April 2010. The last fire drill was carried out on 7th May 2010 and the last Airport Environmental Management Committee meeting was held on 17th February 2010.

After the accident, ‘Panther 1’ reached the localiser area in about 30 seconds. Thereafter, it extinguished the aircraft parts, which were on fire, and lying close to the airport fence. However, the aircraft had gone down the slope and came to a halt in the gorge about 500 metres from the fence.

As per the discussion at Mangalore airport as well as with AAI, the jurisdiction of Mangalore RFF was to attend to contingencies within the airport. However, on the day of accident, Mangalore Airport RFF was the first to reach the crash site. Since the
Rosenbaur RFF vehicle was unable to negotiate the narrow roads, TATRA RFF reached the sites within 4-5 minutes.

[chaanakya]

Throttle in forward position+survivor reporting a bang+veering off might means bird hit that might have led to loss of control >> hitting tower>>crash.

Not necessarily tyre burst. No report says that the plane actually touched the runway.

No Bird hit --As per report.

[chaanakya]

The thing to note is that the tire burst might be the main culprit. The pilot overshot so that he doesn't have to bang the aircraft down on the runway like they do on those carriers. Instead the thing that he wanted to avoid - damage to the landing gear or the tires, happened.

One burst tire in an aircraft which is easily doing 200-250 Kmph would easily have made the aircraft careen out of control. Once the plane goes into a slow spin and slides at that speed, no airbrakes, mechanical tire brakes are going to help.

No tire burst as well.

[chaanakya]

Gagan, Localiser is at the right end of the runway after the sand-bedded safety area of 90 metres when aircraft is landing.
From the picture of crash site, it appears that aircraft tumbled down straight below creating charred path and clearing the area where plane had engulfed in fire. This fits with throttle being in forward position as if he tried to take off on failed landing/TD.If one tyre bursts still aircraft can take off, but it appears that autopilot system would have caused some problem. Just my thoughts though. Would like to wait for full report from experts.

chaanakya saar,

Autopilot would have been off well before touch down saar.
Auto brake would have been on but what setting it had will come out after the FDR analysis.

There are accounts (rumors) of thrust reversers activating
after touchdown. This sounds OK to me. If actually so then the reversing buckets would have taken considerable time to cycle back to normal housed position.Reading between the lines, the throttles were fire walled in a last ditch attempt to go around. These big engines would take 6-8 or more seconds to spool up to full thrust. The Boeing has an anti skid system that will not let the wheels lock during braking whether the brakes are in auto or manually operated. This would mean that the Boeing was way below its un stick speed when the Captain opened full power. Too little and too late. Why the poor guy did not go around in the very first instance is beyond my comprehension.

If you observe during normal operation of the reverse thrusters, at the end of the operation sometimes both engine reversers will not house simultaneously.

The tire burst may have occurred during a possible asymmetric thrust condition when the captain fire walled the thrust on both engines. One main gear may have already been on soft ground at this stage while the other was still on concrete further complicating the directional stability. Can you imagine the situation in the cockpit.? It's nightmarish.

The tire burst being spoken about is the nose tire, I think.

Funny that the ATC chappie is keeping very very quiet. He is the only official and knowledgeable eyewitness. How come the DDM channel morons have not latched on to him yet?

He knows what happened inside ( last RT communications) and out side the cockpit ( he would have been watching the landing with his binoculars) much more than anyone else.

Yes Auto pilot was off and Pilot took manual control.
Auto brake was on at 2 instead of 3 for full braking.
Thrust reverser activated.

From report

The Captain had selected Thrust Reversers soon after touchdown. It was evident from the DFDR and wreckage examination that the Auto Brake selection was at position 2. As per the DFDR, within 6 seconds of applying brakes, the Captain had initiated a ‘Go Around’, in contravention of Boeing SOP.

[chaanakya]

So , plane may not be on autoland system. That means manual approach and landing.
Just watch this to see how scary it is to land on mountainous terrain
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAxAso8xSo0&feature=fvw

Manual approach is confirmed

[chaanakya]

Question: If reverse thrusters are in operation won't the throttle be full forward as well?

Boss,

The auto brake will kick in the thrust reversers automatically and immediately on touch down. Auto brake is usually set for critical runways like Mangalore. Very very little chance that it was not set at all.

Depending on the chosen setting of the autobrake ie 1, 2 or 3, the full or partial reverse thrust is automatically deployed. Selection is made to accommodate dry, short or contaminated runways.

Normally one would approach Mangalore with a 1 or 2 auto brake setting. Setting 3 is not usual for Mangalore as the 8000 odd feet of runway is plenty of runway for the B738.

Boss you were right. Autobrake setting was 2. For late touchdown it should have been 3, though not required for Normal landing.

[chaanakya]

Somehow, the 'landed in the middle' theory is incredible. Which pilot in the right mind would actually touch down in the middle, when he very well know that he can't stop?

The 'expert investigators' of manorama claims that the plane touched down too fast at the normal region, became airborne again, touched down again in the middle, and then crashed because it couldn't be stopped.

Plane landed at 4500 ft bounced and retouched at 5200 ft. With full braking operations it could have come to stop sparing some 438 ft ( Boeing report) . A sleepy crew could cause that incredible landing.

That is one reason I watch which landing zone marker Pilot touches, the first one or the fourth one and how hard / soft is TD.

[chaanakya]

I don't think the accident has anything to do with the approach path however, as we hear nothing from ATC and the weather suggests it could have been easily flown visually. I'd like to speculate that it will probably end up being an unfortunately timed tailwind gust combined with a crew trying too hard to get a soft landing and floating too far, and being indecisive about going around / RT failure, but I hate blaming a dead crew, so I'll hope it's something else.

Mountain updraft or wind shear or gust. or tailwind :-yes it could be, given the terrain
Soft landing /flare/float :- again yes, a very likely possibility

indecisive:- may not be for an experienced pilot.
RT failure:- still would have distance to stop. RT is factored by 7% only in reduced runway length.

Boeing would try hard not to blame 737-800, but there are some significant accidents on this( not statistics wise though)

Main thing is if runway length was sufficient enough for a combination of factors. Which one played main role , well only after the report.

Weather reported Normal Wind, calm. Visibility 6 Km.
RT did not fail
Brake did not fail
No soft landing and no flare up as assumed.
It was steep descent with high speed.

[chaanakya]

^^ from the report

The aircraft first came in contact with the Mangalore Area Control on frequency 127.55 MHz at 05:32:48 hours IST, when it was approaching the Reporting Point IGAMA, at FL-370. The Mangalore Area Radar (MSSR) was unserviceable since 20th
May 2010 and a NOTAM to this effect had been issued. The First Officer, who was making all the R/T calls, requested for Radar Identification to which, he was informed regarding un-serviceability of the Radar.

The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), which normally records conversation for a minimum period of last two hours of the flight (2 hours, 05 minutes for this flight), indicated that there was ‘no conversation’ between the two Pilots for the first 1 hour and 40 minutes of recording and the Captain was asleep with intermittent sounds of snoring, deep breathing and towards the end of this period, sound of clearing throat and coughing. The First Officer was making all the Radio Calls.

The aircraft reported position at IGAMA at 05:33:20 hours IST. Approximately 5 minutes later, the First Officer asked for the type of approach to which the ATC replied ILS DME Arc approach. At about 130 miles from Mangalore, the aircraft requested for descent clearance. This was, however, denied by the ATC Controller, who was using standard procedural control, to ensure safe separation with other air traffic. At 05:46:54 hours IST, aircraft reported its position when it was at 80 DME on radial 287 MML, as instructed by Mangalore Area Control. The aircraft was cleared to 7000 ft and commenced descent at 77 DME from Mangalore at 05:47:34 hours
IST. The visibility reported was 6 km.
.

[chaanakya]

^^

On having reported 10 DME Arc, the ATC Tower had asked aircraft to report when established on ILS. It appears that the Captain had realised that the aircraft altitude was higher than normal and had selected Landing Gear ‘DOWN’ at an altitude of approximately 8,500 ft with speedbrakes still deployed in Flight Detent position, so as to increase the rate of descent. As indicated by the DFDR, the aircraft continued to be high and did not follow the standard procedure of intercepting the ILS Glide Path at the correct intercept altitude. This in-correct procedure led to the aircraft being at almost twice the altitude as compared to a Standard ILS Approach.

So it was trying to capture ILS glide slope from above, that too with twice the height.

[chaanakya]

^^

During approach, the CVR indicated that the Captain had selected Flaps 40° and completed the Landing Check List. At 06:03:35 hours IST at about 2.5 DME, the Radio Altimeter had alerted an altitude of 2500 ft. This was immediately followed by, the First Officer giving a call of “IT IS TOO HIGH” and “RUNWAY STRAIGHT DOWN”. In reply, the Captain had exclaimed “OH MY GOD”. At this moment, the
Captain had disconnected the Auto Pilot and simultaneously increased the rate of descent considerably to establish on the desired approach path. At this stage, the First Officer had queried “GO AROUND?”

So it was manual approach and landing with high descent speed to catch the glide path from above.

[chaanakya]

^^

The First Officer had given a second call to the Captain for “GO AROUND” followed by “UNSTABILISED”. However, the First Officer did not appear to take any action, to initiate a Go Around. Having acquired the R/W visually and to execute a landing, it appears that the Captain had increased the rate of descent to almost 4000 ft per minute. Due to this, there were numerous warnings from EGPWS for ‘SINK RATE’ and ‘PULL UP’.

On their own, the pilots did not report having established on ILS Approach. Instead, the ATC Tower had queried the same. To this call, the Captain had forcefully prompted the First Officer to give a call of “AFFIRMATIVE”. The ATC Tower gave landing clearance thereafter and also indicated “WINDS CALM”.

As per the ATC Controller, the aircraft was high on approach and touched down on the runway, much farther than normal. This was also substantiated by other witnesses such as RFF Crew and AME of Air India Express awaiting arrival of this aircraft, at the apron. As per the DFDR, aircraft had crossed the threshold at about 200 ft altitude with indicated speed in excess of 160 kt, as compared to 50 ft with target speed of 144 kt for the landing weight.

[chaanakya]

^^

Short of Touchdown, there was yet another (Third) call from the First Officer, this time on VHF Channel “GO AROUND CAPTAIN” followed by “WE DON’T HAVE RUNWAY LEFT” on the intercom. However, the Captain had continued with the landing and the
final Touchdown was about 5200 ft from the threshold of R/W 24, leaving approximately 2800 ft of remaining paved surface.

[chaanakya]

[chaanakya]

^^

The Captain had selected Thrust Reversers soon after touchdown. It was evident from the DFDR and wreckage examination that the Auto Brake selection was at position 2. As per the DFDR, within 6 seconds of applying brakes, the Captain had initiated a ‘Go Around’, in contravention of Boeing SOP.

[chaanakya]

Thereafter, aircraft broke two runway edge lights towards the left of landing run (1st and third on left of centre line viewing from R/W 24). Then the aircraft overran the R/W 24 end and entered the Runway End Safety Area (RESA). It further broke five approach lights for R/W 06, in the RESA. In the RESA, wheel marks of all the three landing gears indicated that the aircraft was gradually turning towards the left. This is indicated in a rough Diagram 10, placed above.

[Arav]

CVC unearths Rs 190 crore flying club fraud

A large number of flying schools across India are involved in an elaborate fraud, posing as no-profit no-loss operations while raking in crores.

An investigation by the Central Vigilance Commission has found that a majority of flying schools/clubs in India posed as registered societies, operating on no-profit no-loss basis, to avoid paying the government full fee for operations. Resultantly, the government has lost at least Rs 190 crore in revenue, according to the CVC probe.

Airports Authority of India (AAI) officials allowed 28 flying schools to wrongly claim that they were either registered educational societies or were run on no-profit no-loss basis. This qualified them to pay only a nominal fee to the government.

Sources said the CVC has written to the civil aviation ministry to take appropriate action against officials who allowed the flying schools to hoodwink the system.

The CVC probe found several deviations from rules: These clubs were not registered as educational societies, most of them were not operating on a no-profit no-loss basis and some were even involved in commercial operations.

The nominal fee for flying clubs is just 10% of the original fee to be paid to the government. This nominal charge is only permitted for those that are registered as educational societies and run on no-profit no-loss basis, and not as profit-making entities. "The concessional rates were extended to 28 flying clubs without proper examination/justification," a senior official said.

The investigation found that none of the 28 clubs was registered as a society. Only four of them operated on a no-profit no-loss basis. To the surprise of the investigators, they found that one flying club was even a non-schedule operator registered with DGCA (Director General of Civil Aviation) since 2004.

In response to a questionnaire from TOI, AAI said, "Action being taken on CVC's recent instructions, outcome of the same will be made public as and when any decision is taken in this regard."

AAI asserted that it had "not allotted land to any flying school at nominal licence fee since its inception" but did not discuss details of any other fee that the flying clubs may have had to pay the government.

[pgbhat]

Opinion: Bangalore airport should disclose full details of premature runway surface failure

Late last month, the airport operators of the Bengaluru International Airport announced a closure of the sole runway (09-27) starting from March 11, which will result in a suspension of all flight operations during the day, effectively shutting down the whole airport.

The runway will be shut down in three phases. The first phase will see a full runway closure between 10:30 to 17:30 IST (5:30pm) from March 11, 2012 to April 3, 2012. Phases two and three will see partial runway closures.

What kind of internashnul airport is this?

[Aditya_V]

Somehow, I feel GMR has done a much better job In Hyderabad and Delhi compared to Seimens in Bengaluru.

[Vipul]

GMR had the chance to develop large greenfiled projects in Delhi and Hyderabad with out any infra constraints.Given the challenges it faced, GVK group has done a better job in managing/developing CSIA and will no doubt improve the Bangaluru airport.

[Austin]

Update on Indias National Civil Aircraft Development in AW&ST ( pg 53 )

http://www.zinio.com/reader.jsp?issue=416213559&e=true

[Marut]

Opinion: Bangalore airport should disclose full details of premature runway surface failure

Late last month, the airport operators of the Bengaluru International Airport announced a closure of the sole runway (09-27) starting from March 11, which will result in a suspension of all flight operations during the day, effectively shutting down the whole airport.

The runway will be shut down in three phases. The first phase will see a full runway closure between 10:30 to 17:30 IST (5:30pm) from March 11, 2012 to April 3, 2012. Phases two and three will see partial runway closures.

What kind of internashnul airport is this?

There have been too many murmurs about BIAL Terminal 1 since its inception, construction and operation. Rehash of an existing design, lackadaisical attitude towards planning of facilities and in adequate monitoring and enforcement of construction standards mean we will have our hands full as one by one the band aids used earlier start to peel off. Hopefully with GVK now in the helm, things should improve for the expansion area and T2 when it comes up.

[chetak]

Earth on earth

When you launch an airline, to the usual fanfare of trumpets, a queue of suits from high finance waits in the ante room of the Big Boss, eager to flood his coffers with cash in the name of economic growth. When, in a thousand days or two, you have piloted your airline into visible bankruptcy, an even larger number of banks flock around to parcel out even more money, this time in the name of patriotism. Their only requirement is that Big Boss makes silent deals with politicians and garrulous ones with journalists. This public relations smokescreen does not need logic, nor does it have to make sense: those obligations are for a less exalted breed of businessman. But it has to be loud. The louder the demand for a bailout on jugglery terms, the more ecstatic the response from bankers eager to hand out the public's hardearned money for an endless bonfire in the skies. No one questions this clamour as long as it is conducted in correct English. It is a hallmark of economic reform nationalism to chase bad money with fresh capital. The true motto of such a glamorous business is: Heads, I win; tails, you lose.

Who is "you"? Well, you and me. All of us mugs who put money in a bank in the belief that it is in safe custody, and in any case there is nowhere else to put it. Big Bosses and Bankers are not so stupid as to employ personal wealth in their five-star game. Cats do not get fat by slurping from their children's inheritance. They dine sumptuously on borrowed food. Bankers justify their "lending" on the ephemeral strength of an accountant's imagination. The accountant, of course, is smart enough to collect his 3 per cent fee long before the board acknowledges publicly what it knew all along, that it was all a fantasy to indulge a few lifestyles. Then the board assumes a doleful countenance in order to ask for more. Such is the merry go round of postmodern capitalism.

Running an airline, as far as one can make out from airports, is pretty cool as well. The rules are different; and you can make up new ones when the old turn decrepit. Try this experiment. Order a car, or a safety pin, pay for it, and turn up at the shop. You will get what you paid for. Buy a fully paid airline ticket, and all you have purchased is a promise within a zone of uncertainty. It is understandable if weather, for instance, is the reason for delay or cancellation. But airlines no longer feel compelled to offer the truth as an explanation. They hide behind a catch-all excuse: "technical reasons". One of these days I shall be very delighted to be introduced to non-technical reasons. Which glamour puss would be so considerate as to announce that a flight has actually been cancelled because Big Boss forgot to pay for the fuel for passengers although he does seem to have enough for his own private Boeing? Those who bluff and hide away live to fly another day.

The real trick is to fail on a spectacular scale; that is, in front of millions of spectators. This, naturally, must be accompanied by dramatic outbreaks of attitude. Everyone gets intimidated into submission.

I know of one airline owner, however, who is modest, and frameworks his business philosophy in the same culture.

He sticks to the possible, and then personally ensures that his company achieves it, before venturing into the probable. He keeps to himself, and has coffee incognito in a coffee shop when he wants to chat with a friend. There are no parties for Page 3 photographers or interviews to jaded sections of a newspaper. He is supremely unconcerned about whether anyone recognizes him or not, and I won't annoy him by publishing his name. His company lives within the prudent confines of black ink, despite the fact that he has to pay the same price for fuel as anyone else. He has an ego, since it is part of human chemistry, but he doesn't hang it out like boutique laundry in an upwardly mobile home. He has created one of the great brands of modern aviation. He is not a star on Twitter. But he is a star in office. He belongs to a genre where an industrialist understood that his first commitment was to industry, not caprice. Such a role model is not, alas, heaven on earth. It is earth on earth.

[chetak]

the-curious-case-of-vijay-mallya-and-his-bailout-and-one-more-scam

[armenon]

the-curious-case-of-vijay-mallya-and-his-bailout-and-one-more-scam

Thank you Chetak sir, that whole web site is a great read.

[suryag]

Undoubtedly Sir his articles are thought provoking, well researched and fun reading. The one of E Sreedharan and Bharat ratna is also good

[Vasu]

Opinion: Bangalore airport should disclose full details of premature runway surface failure

There have been too many murmurs about BIAL Terminal 1 since its inception, construction and operation. Rehash of an existing design, lackadaisical attitude towards planning of facilities and in adequate monitoring and enforcement of construction standards mean we will have our hands full as one by one the band aids used earlier start to peel off. Hopefully with GVK now in the helm, things should improve for the expansion area and T2 when it comes up.

Flew from Bangalore to Mumbai yesterday. The terminal extension is already under construction and should be a welcome addition. The road to the airport is also under major construction with lots and lots of flyovers coming up.

Of course like any other airport in the country, you have autowalas and taxi walas pouncing on you the moment you walk out with your luggage, but the BMTC service is excellent. There are dedicated bus bays and dedicated BMTC people telling you what bus to take to where.

Soon Praful Patel's name should join the great achievements of the UPA era. What a nice read that is. Thanks for posting!

[Sriman]

^^
Agreed. The BMTC Vajra service from airport is excellent.

[Zynda]

Of course like any other airport in the country, you have autowalas and taxi walas pouncing on you the moment you walk out with your luggage, but the BMTC service is excellent. There are dedicated bus bays and dedicated BMTC people telling you what bus to take to where.

++1, BMTC Volvo is a god sent service to Bangalore. When I flew from Pune to BLR a couple of weeks ago (incidentally on KF which took off & landed on time with out interruptions ), a couple of firangi backpackers boarded the bus along with folks from other parts of country as well. I have heard people from outside BLR sing praises about Vajra service. Now only if the drivers of Vajra drive a less rashly, it would be a perfect boon to commuters

Sorry for OT.

[Singha]

>> Of course like any other airport in the country, you have autowalas and taxi walas pouncing on you the moment you walk out with your luggage

this was NOT the case when the BIAL opened. this freelance business was very minimal then even though almost same amt of passengers were passing few yrs ago. at some point the policing or standards slipped and the place is overrun by these freelancers now just as it used to be in palam airport. the outside concourse has adopted the feel of a railway platform than a showpiece airport.

methinks the taxi unions and their political goon backers have put pressure on BIAL to allow this to happen and tear away share of the pie with meru and easycabs.

I forsee dark days ahead for BIAL if policing and adherence to original procedures is not followed strictly. it takes a long time to climb up the pole and only few weeks to slip down. the car parks outside could use some sprucing up. the pay and use toilets are heavily used by the taxiwallahs and shall we say do not project a presentable image to people looking to use it (people who come to drop or lift passengers). meantime the insidious habit of parking the cars in the long approach roads and waiting for call either as a pvt taxi or to avoid paying parking fees if picking up a family member is gaining currency.

[Bade]

I got some sweet deal for a family trip to India online, the catch was a segment of the flight uses KingFisher. I knew the risk but still went for it, this was before the IATA dropping its weight also into KF's current pains. IF KF folds in 5 months time, or even cancels the flight segment that I plan to use, what happens to my ticket. Does other domestic airlines honor them ?

The deal was too sweet, so I am willing to take the train or bus if I have to but just asking.

[chackojoseph]

Boeing 787-8 series Dreamliner lands at Begumpet Airport First look.