I have not read the above in full context but the statement by itself is valid as per MCD.pgbhat wrote:hain? is TOIlet saying that or Army Chief?India even retains the option to retaliate with nuclear weapons if its forces "anywhere" are attacked with biological or chemical weapons.
Deterrence
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US weighing steep nuclear arms cuts
No final decision has been made, but the administration is considering at least three options for lower total numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons cutting to: 1,000 to 1,100; 700 to 800, and 300 to 400, according to a former government official and a congressional staffer. Both spoke on condition of anonymity in order to reveal internal administration deliberations.
The potential cuts would be from a current treaty limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.
A level of 300 deployed strategic nuclear weapons would take the U.S. back to levels not seen since 1950 when the nation was ramping up production in an arms race with the Soviet Union. The U.S. numbers peaked at above 12,000 in the late 1980s and first dropped below 5,000 in 2003.
Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/02 ... z1mOp06u5V
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They are becoming like Bharat with MND.
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They are trying to bring Russia into the "western" grouping thats the key move. They have been trying since GWB
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Shiv Sir's scenario where Rawalpindi is struck by a 50 kT device has been reproduced here
a 50 kiloton Nuclear Weapon explodes in Pakistan, over Rawalpindi [What-if?]
a 50 kiloton Nuclear Weapon explodes in Pakistan, over Rawalpindi [What-if?]
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Where did that 50kt come from when Chagai gave "ping pong" balls?
MMS and UPA have made it clear there wont by any Indian nuking of TSP.
It will be their own jihadis who will do it.
Most likely a jihadi Fizzleya pilot will turn around and do the job.
After all the Fizzleya has more than its share of jihadis to make up for their less numbers compared to TSPA.
MMS and UPA have made it clear there wont by any Indian nuking of TSP.
It will be their own jihadis who will do it.
Most likely a jihadi Fizzleya pilot will turn around and do the job.
After all the Fizzleya has more than its share of jihadis to make up for their less numbers compared to TSPA.
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It is important to understand why, because this is a major reason for America's aggressive pursuit of the whole NPT scam.ramana wrote:They are becoming like Bharat with MND.
Keeping an arsenal of strategic warheads and delivery system costs money... huge amounts of money every month and year in maintenance, security, safety, replenishment, fueling, material, repair, systemic upgrades, secrecy measures, readiness measures etc. Too often in our analysis, we lose sight of the fact that even the filthy rich Unkil has only a finite amount of resources.
As long as he had to keep an arsenal of 12000+ warheads around without using it, it continued to bleed and drain his exchequer; and it had to be kept around, only to deter the one circumstance in which it might actually be used. From a strictly business POV, a nuclear arsenal is the purest form of loss-making venture.
When USSR went away the bean counters in DC breathed a sigh of relief. No more need for five-figure warhead arsenals haemorrhaging money month after month. The US could win all its wars through overwhelming conventional superiority alone, and whittle down its nuclear arsenal while persuading its chums in the P5 (who already understood the financial burden of maintaining nuclear arsenals) to do the same.
But what if other nations developed and fielded nukes? In that eventuality the US would still have to keep many thousands of warheads ready to fire even after the Soviet demise. In fact, to deter each new debutante nuclear state they would have to keep hundreds or thousands more warheads at the ready.
This simply isn't sustainable... and the pinch shows, as now, when the US economy is seriously short of cash. That's why this talk of coming down to 1000 or even 400 warheads.
Hence, the NPT scam... hence, the US' willingness to impose sanctions even on potentially lucrative trading partners, like India, to coerce them against developing nuclear weapons. No matter how much the US might lose out on the opportunity cost of trade by sanctioning India... Washington calculated that it would lose still more from having to field sufficient additional nuclear weapons, year after year, with a nuclear weaponized India in mind.
Apply the money reasoning to the deterrence game and a lot of things become clearer:
1) That's why we declared the moratorium post Pokhran-II in 1998. It was not to convince the Americans that we were peaceful and responsible. It was to signal that we wanted to continue building an economic relationship based on good commonsense respect for mutual financial interests. It was to persuade the Americans that we were not immediately going to build a nuclear arsenal which they would have to account for (at great expense) in their own nuclear posture.
2) That's why the IUCNCA was offered. Not because the US has any love for India, but because the US had no choice.
A moratorium can always be rescinded at some point. For Washington, the alternative to offering IUCNCA was to eventually see India build a nuclear arsenal that America would definitely lose money in accounting for... because they'd have to field x number of weapons specifically with India's arsenal in mind. If you do the math, x becomes a very large number (in order to suppress multiple hostile weapons emplacements in a first strike with any degree of certainty, you need to keep up a lot of warheads dedicated to such a task.)
3) China's proliferation to other nations is not just a senseless act of defiance against the United States. It is a well-thought-out program of economic warfare by proxy. By creating rogue nuclear states with nothing to lose, China kicks the US where it hurts most.
4) The entire game of Pakistan's nuclear blackmail is not "don't retaliate against our terrorist attacks or we will nuke you." That is only their blackmail posture with respect to India.
Pakistan's nuclear blackmail of the US is a different game. Pakistan is making nuclear bombs at the rate of more than a hundred per year... why? Because every bomb it makes becomes the source of still more financial headache for the US, which is then compelled to maintain enough additional nuclear weapons of its own to account for Pakistan's arsenal.
But there is more to it; Pakistan knows that the US realizes that Pakistan itself could never afford to maintain such a large and rapidly growing nuclear arsenal.
It would be very, very interesting to see where all the money comes from that maintains Pakistan's nuclear arsenal even today... such upkeep takes a LOT of money, definitely more than Pakistan could afford with its domestic resources. In fact, I believe, Pakistan's arsenal maintenance costs (and its much vaunted "command and control infrastructure") as of today... are 100%, entirely, US bankrolled. By building more bombs the Pakistanis simply increase the money that they are able to blackmail out of the United States, and ensure that the inflows of such money will continue.
The very day that the US stops bankrolling the maintenance of their arsenal, the Pakistanis will have no choice but to either use it or sell it (a terrifying a prospect for the US.) The Pakis could not afford to maintain it for even a week with domestic resources. Therefore the US must keep paying and paying for the Pakistani arsenal to be maintained... paying funds into the coffers of the Pakistan army directly, without any civilian govt. intermediaries. The more bombs Pakistan builds, the more the US must pay... so they keep building more. Not for immediate use against India or NATO anybody else... just to keep the money flowing in.
See the fun!

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... and this must not be discouraged. Nor must India get in the way of Pakistan's pursuit of ever more longer-range missiles.
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It is not a matter of deterrence or the cost thereof. It is more about the freedom to lynch chaps like Gaddhafi when the need arises. If you are a third world dictator about to be dragged out and lynched, you are liable to press the button no matter what the consequences.Rudradev wrote: But what if other nations developed and fielded nukes? In that eventuality the US would still have to keep many thousands of warheads ready to fire even after the Soviet demise. In fact, to deter each new debutante nuclear state they would have to keep hundreds or thousands more warheads at the ready.
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Rudradev ji,
you do have a unique perspective on nukes. but are you sure that Pak is churning out 100/year???? this is huge. at this rate, I wouldn't be surprised if their nuclear arsenal is greater than India's. this is bad for India, no? and that rate, they will surely have an arsenal, in the next few years, that is at least a few multiples of what India has.....I think the 100/year might be a bit much. JMTPs.
you do have a unique perspective on nukes. but are you sure that Pak is churning out 100/year???? this is huge. at this rate, I wouldn't be surprised if their nuclear arsenal is greater than India's. this is bad for India, no? and that rate, they will surely have an arsenal, in the next few years, that is at least a few multiples of what India has.....I think the 100/year might be a bit much. JMTPs.
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Devesh, When TSP has one nuke its problem for India. When they have so many its a world problem.
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What if they really do not have many, only a few and that too not reliable or not operational? What if all the sheds and silos and hullababloo is about pretending infratsructure that does not really hid any real stuff? All for psy-ops and milking the USA?
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Devesh ji, the figure of approx. 100 nukes per year being churned out by Pakistan has been cited in a number of US press reports over the last couple of years. I don't know if it is accurate or not. Bharat Karnad believes the Pakis have ramped up production considerably, but he is unsure by how much.devesh wrote:Rudradev ji,
you do have a unique perspective on nukes. but are you sure that Pak is churning out 100/year???? this is huge. at this rate, I wouldn't be surprised if their nuclear arsenal is greater than India's. this is bad for India, no? and that rate, they will surely have an arsenal, in the next few years, that is at least a few multiples of what India has.....I think the 100/year might be a bit much. JMTPs.
It is certainly possible that, even now, the Pakis have nearly as many or even more nukes than India has. But the key factor to understand about deterrence, is that there are really two models of deterrence posture.
1) Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD.) This means that we have enough dedicated warheads and delivery systems to inflict "unacceptable damage" on a country whom we want to deter.
"Unacceptable damage" is of course a subjective term, but to have any rational meaning it must include comprehensively and irreversibly debilitating the state machinery of the enemy country, beyond any hope of recuperation or rebuilding on its own.
This does not require us to have more warheads than the enemy country has. For example, let us say Pakistan has 100 warheads ready for use today (nobody is sure what the real figure is, I've seen figures ranging from 50-150 so 100 is probably a good bet.)
Suppose India has some 50 warheads dedicated to Pakistan. We safely calculate that about 60% of these will reach their targets (based on cold war rule-of-thumb assumptions: http://homepage.mac.com/msb/163x/faqs/n ... e_101.html http://homepage.mac.com/msb/163x/faqs/n ... e_102.html http://homepage.mac.com/msb/163x/faqs/n ... e_103.html)... so at any given time we can be sure of landing 30 warheads on targets in Pakistan.
Regardless of how many warheads Pakistan has available to use on us, these 30 warheads from us will be enough to take out their major industrial/commercial centers, major military assets and HQs, major transport/communications infrastructure, sources of food production and water supplies. This is enough to put the TSPA and State of Pakistan permanently out of business. It is not enough to kill every single Paki, but nobody (other than cold-war era US/USSR) ever had that sort of capacity.
We do not have sufficient warheads to visit such comprehensive "unacceptable damage" on China; so, we cannot claim to possess a "Credible Minimum Deterrent" vis-a-vis China. There is no question whatsoever, that we must develop and deploy at least a few hundred proven thermonuclear warheads (200 plus kT MIRV and/or 1 plus MT unitary warheads) if we want to maintain a CMD posture against China.
Against Pakistan, however, it is likely that even our current arsenal of 20 kiloton fission warheads provides CMD. It does not matter if Pakistan has more warheads than we do; they will never have enough to suppress our entire arsenal in a first-strike, and as long as we have enough warheads left over to put the Paki state out of business permanently, it is CMD.
2) Credible First-Strike Deterrence (CFSD): This is a much bigger scale of deterrence, and was really enjoyed only by the US and USSR during the cold war. What it means is that I have enough warheads to mount a first-strike against the enemy and completely eliminate his ability to mount any nuclear retaliation against me.
This kind of deterrence requires far more warheads to maintain, and it is too expensive for India to realistically achieve, even against Pakistan. To carry out an incapacitating first strike, we would have to hit a large number of hardened targets, i.e. strategic weapons emplacements, HQs, storage facilities and emplacement facilities with great accuracy. We would have to be sure of hitting each and every potential target, while producing sufficient overpressure to completely destroy them.
For this we would need a huge excess of high-yield weapons over Pakistan; if they have 100 warheads, we might need 1000 plus of our own (with much more than 20 kT yield) to be sure of destroying them all. This is not a race we can afford to get into, because it would mean that just for Pakistan we'd have to go to the expense of maintaining 1000 warheads indefinitely.
The US' doctrine is to maintain CFSD against any nuclear-armed nation; that is why it becomes so much more expensive for them when Pakistan, NoKo and now Iran begin to develop their own nuclear arsenals. They have to maintain a large excess of warheads and delivery systems over the nuclear arsenal of each debutante nuclear power that emerges.
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Rudradevji,
If TSP makes 100/yr, wont they soon have CFSD deterrence against us unless we do something to proportionately enlarge our arsenal ?
Also, news periodically indicates we have only 2 days of ammo, etc stockpiles for a full-fledged conventional war. Wont these facts together mean TSP controls the escalation ladder and ensure TSP military hegemony on the subcontinent ?
What I have often heard is that TSP has 100+ and isbuilding up towards 200+ by 2020...hope we too, rapidly build up...
If TSP makes 100/yr, wont they soon have CFSD deterrence against us unless we do something to proportionately enlarge our arsenal ?
Also, news periodically indicates we have only 2 days of ammo, etc stockpiles for a full-fledged conventional war. Wont these facts together mean TSP controls the escalation ladder and ensure TSP military hegemony on the subcontinent ?
What I have often heard is that TSP has 100+ and isbuilding up towards 200+ by 2020...hope we too, rapidly build up...
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Rudradev ji,
very informative post. thank you. going back to Pakis, the 100/year would mean that they will have CFSD against India very soon. that rate of production is amazing, and they will effectively have CFSD against India within the next 5-8 years.
very informative post. thank you. going back to Pakis, the 100/year would mean that they will have CFSD against India very soon. that rate of production is amazing, and they will effectively have CFSD against India within the next 5-8 years.
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The same fellows who are putting estimates of 100 Paki nukes a year have also put a maximum estimate of the amount of Uranium that Pakis have access to and the max Pu they can get. Pakistan can at best get 400 nukes, given its known resources as per these estimates. I posted a whole lot of these links in the Pakistan nukes thread. Thousands, No.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1091470
Here is one pdf that suggests that Pakistan will face a Uranium crunch by 2020
http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publicatio ... ay-Raj.pdf
The following paper makes an asessment of Pakistan's current state
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/si ... mr08cv.pdf
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1091470
Here is one pdf that suggests that Pakistan will face a Uranium crunch by 2020
http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publicatio ... ay-Raj.pdf
The study finds that Pakistan may have sufficient natural uranium to fuel
the three reactors, if they are approximately 50MWt each, but that for some of these enrichment
capacities, there will be a shortfall of natural uranium by 2020. The paper considers
the impact of alternative sources of enrichment feed such as depleted tails from
previous enrichment activity and reprocessed uranium from low-burn-up spent fuel
from the Khushab reactors. There are signs Pakistan early on may have enriched some
reprocessed uranium, possibly acquired from China. It finds that by 2020, Pakistan
could have accumulated approximately 450 kg of plutonium from the Khushab reactors
and 2500–6000 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) (90 percent enriched) for enrichment
capacities ranging from 15,000–75,000 SWU. These stocks would be sufficient for
perhaps 100–240 simple fission weapons based on HEU and for 90 plutonium weapons.
Pakistan may be able to produce more weapons if it either increases its rate of uranium
mining or has more advanced weapon designs requiring less fissile material in each
weapon.
The following paper makes an asessment of Pakistan's current state
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/si ... mr08cv.pdf
As of 2007, Pakistan may have accumulated a stock of about 1.4 tons of highly enriched
uranium for its nuclear weapons (enough for perhaps 50 – 60 weapons assuming 25 kg
per warhead). It may be producing perhaps 0.1 tons of HEU per year (i.e. about 4 weapons
worth a year). Pakistan also has about 90 kg of weapon plutonium (enough for
15 – 20 warheads) from its reactor at Khushab, which yields about 10 kg (about 2 weapons
worth) per year. This suggests that Pakistan may have fissile material sufficient
for perhaps 65 – 80 weapons and may be increasing its stock by the equivalent of about
6 weapons worth per year.
Pakistan is expanding its fissile material production capacity. There are two additional
production reactors under construction at Khushab. Each of these new reactors could
produce about 10 kg of plutonium a year, if they are the same size as the existing reactor
at the site. Imagery from late 2006 shows that Pakistan has also been working on a
new reprocessing plant at Chashma, presumably to reprocess the spent fuel from the
new production reactors.
Pakistan also has about 1.2 tons of safeguarded reactor-grade plutonium in the spent
fuel from its nuclear power reactors. This is not reprocessed.
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Response to ‘Nonalignment 2.0′ — a regressive foreign policy roadmap
7) Versus Pakistan, the Report junks the strategy of capturing territory. Bye, bye, Cold Start! Advising, instead an “ingress” denial strategy, because it fears anything else will eventuate in Pakistani escalation to the nuclear level (p.34). This is nonsense. Will not repeat here the arguments made at great length and in great detail in my books – ‘India’s Nuclear Policy’ and ‘Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategy” now in its 2nd edition, as to why Pakistan simply cannot afford to escalate to a nuclear exchange no matter what the Indian provocation. But suffice to state just one fact: the improbably skewed exchange ratio – the loss of two Indian cities for the definite extinction of all of Pakistan.
Other than this there’s no mention anywhere else in this report of anything nuclear, certainly not in the strategy dealing with China. If one has to adopt a defensive strategy, why not, as I have been suggesting, place Atomic Demolition Munitions in mountain passes through which the aggressor Chinese units will likely pass and fairly forward of the present defensive pre-positioned line. The triggering of only one such device will halt the advance of all PLA units everywhere. With a large enough Chinese force allowed in before the ADM brings down the mountain sides burying most of them, the surviving troops and units can be eliminated in detail. China will have to seriously consider if nuclear escalating will help them, considering these ADMs will be going off on Indian territory after the Chinese are well inside it. This is the sort of hard options the Indian government and armed forces better begin preparing for, instead of the default option of kowtowing to the Chinese and bullying Pakistan that the Indian govt and military is habituated to realizing.
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X-post for ref...
Point 6 belongs to this thread.
Altair wrote:Today I was in discussion with Prof.Bharat Karnad and Prof. Jeffrey Legro on India-US Strategic relationship.
Here are some minutes.
1. India-Pakistan wars are more like communal riots with tanks and heavy arty. US should look at us in that way.
2. Gen.Pasha is actually a moderate when compared to Gen.Hamid Gul types
3. US has to put more effort in Tech Transfer if it wants to have an opening in huge defense deals. India is going to get great deals with Russia and France and it is entirely US loss if it does not match.
4. India will support Iran no matter what primarily because of 3 reasons.
(a) India gets access to CA through Iran, Chabahar port.
(b) India's fuel requirements cannot be replaced by either KSA or any other nation in any combination. It just cannot happen.
(c) India has 2nd largest Shia population after Iran which is a huge political weight in New Delhi.
India simply cannot dump Iran and US has nothing to offer in return either. It just cannot happen.
5. India cannot see restructure of Pakistan or Iran because of obvious complications and implications on the entire region including India.
(Baluchistan has no strategic interest for either India or US despite what anybody feels on this forum, including yours truly)
6. India will test Fusion bomb. It is not a question of "if" and only a question of "when".
Point 6 belongs to this thread.
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Timing a pre-emptive strikeExcept there’s a critical void in the Israeli capability that only the US government can fill, namely, a sufficiently powerful conventional weapon able to burrow deep under the earth before detonating, which is required to incapacitate the secret weapons facility at Fordow built inside the mountains in northwestern Iran. The US has what Israel does not — a strategic bomber deliverable 30,000-pound “Massive Ordnance Penetrator” (MOP) able to slice some 200 feet into the earth before exploding.
For context with India. The RAW had information on the centrifuges and refinement status of TSP as far back as 1979. IG could have acted but chose not to. The number of opportunities India had to disable or disrupt TSP are inexcusable acts of our leadership. They chose not to act. We and our progeny will pay the price.
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ShauryaT wrote:
Timing a pre-emptive strike
By Bharat Karnad
08 Mar 2012 10:48:00 PM IST
Timing a pre-emptive strike
In January 1988, I published a piece in the Sunday Observer entitled “Knocking out Kahuta” which gained some notoriety. Pakistan was, at that time, still short of crossing the nuclear weapons threshold and the “window of opportunity”, I argued, would remain open for only another six months or less. At the time of Operation Brasstacks in Spring 1987, Islamabad had succeeded in spreading disinformation, courtesy the infamous interview arranged for Kuldip Nayyar with Dr. A.Q. Khan, that Pakistan already possessed an atomic device. That piece was written with no confidence whatsoever that the Indian government would act pre-emptively to take out the uranium centrifuges at Kahuta.
After all, it had by then on three previous occasions permitted strike options, urged by Israel, to peter out, including one in 1982 related to me personally by the former Israeli Military Intelligence chief, Major General Aharon Yaariv, when I was in Israel in 1983 during the Lebanon war. While advocating prompt pre-emption, I had ended the article with a strong warning that if that opportunity lapsed, India should forever hold its peace with Pakistan because it would, to use the phrase currently employed by the Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak vis-a-vis Iran, enter the “zone of immunity”.
The Israeli government is, of course, nothing like its Indian counterpart — a bunch of perennially indecisive, finger-twiddling, risk-averse types. Israelis are, by nature and the fact of their country’s small margin of safety, inclined to nip a threat in the bud today than have it grow into an insurmountable problem tomorrow. No country keeps better tabs on its adversaries than Israel does on Iran. And Tel Aviv will order an attack — very likely combining Special Forces actions of sabotage followed by precision aerial bombardment — before Iran crosses the Israeli-designated redline, whether or not the United States concurs with such action.
However much Israel would like Washington to get on board, there’s a point beyond which it will not wait, notwithstanding the Obama administration’s belief, shared by the International Atomic Energy Agency, that Iran is still some years away from an actual weapons capability, and that precipitate actions would immeasurably worsen the situation all round. Considering its own incessant bluster, Iran will feel compelled to respond with long range missile strikes, and terrorist acts and rocket attacks by Hezbollah from Syria and southern Lebanon — contingencies Israel is already preparing for with underway civil defence measures.
The melee could quickly escalate into a drag out fight engulfing the entire region, with Tehran targeting other than Israel, Saudi-supported Sunni-ruled Shia-majority states, such as Bahrain, and the US Fifth Fleet based there, with its so-called Qods Special Forces unit. But the tipping point in this argument is that there is a lot more at stake for Israel than there is for the United States on the other side of the globe.
Except there’s a critical void in the Israeli capability that only the US government can fill, namely, a sufficiently powerful conventional weapon able to burrow deep under the earth before detonating, which is required to incapacitate the secret weapons facility at Fordow built inside the mountains in northwestern Iran. The US has what Israel does not — a strategic bomber deliverable 30,000-pound “Massive Ordnance Penetrator” (MOP) able to slice some 200 feet into the earth before exploding.
A newspaper report about the MOP, sourced to American intelligence, also talks about the vulnerability of the Fordow complex to multiple attacks on tunnel entrances, blast-proof doors, power and water systems, etc., as a means of collapsing the tunnels and disrupting the centrifuges. Such press reports along with President Barack Obama’s interview to the Atlantic monthly, are meant to warn Tehran and communicate the resolve to Tel Aviv that Washington will ensure Iran never obtains nuclear weapons. The US government plainly hopes this will persuade Israel against acting pre-emptively.
Stories of Iranian vulnerability may be psychological warfare tactics and American bluff. But David Ignatius, the Washington Post reporter considered close to US intelligence agencies, in a reply to his own question — “When is a bluff not a bluff?”, lays much store by certain assertions by Obama in the interview, like “I’m not saying this is something we’d like to solve. I’m saying this is something we have to solve.” It is unlikely Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would have felt reassured.
Recall that, notwithstanding its strong non-proliferation rhetoric and public stance, the US was complicit in Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation facilitated by China’s direct transfer of nuclear weapons material, technologies and expertise in the late 1970s, by providing it continuous political cover and protection against Non-Proliferation Treaty sanctions. During that period the US, it turned out, needed Zia ul-Haq regime’s help in its campaign to undermine the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.
It was only after the Soviet withdrawal in 1988 that President George Bush (senior) suddenly discovered Pakistan had proliferated and he could no longer certify its non-nuclear weapon status as mandated by the Pressler Amendment to the US Foreign Aid Act, whence US assistance was terminated. At the time Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, ordered the attack in June 1981 on the Iraqi Osirak reactor in its pre-commissioning phase, there were officials within the Reagan Administration counselling restraint. Begin had justified the operation, saying “We chose this moment...because later may be too late.” Unlike India, which is complacent about national security, has no sense of urgency, and is always ready to believe anyone and anything just to avoid a fight — as evidence: the country’s tail-between-its-legs attitude with China, Tel Aviv is unlikely to pay much heed to, or be swayed by, what America wants, if it thinks Iran is on the point of tripping the wire and gaining nuclear immunity.
Like all great powers, the United States is in the business of furthering its own national interest. Though they might be close friends of America friends, Israel and India, have to look out for themselves, something Tel Aviv understands better than Delhi.
(Views expressed in the column are the author’s own)
Bharat Karnad is professor at the Centre for Policy
Research, New Delhi, and blogs at http://www.bharatkarnad.com
© Copyright 2008 ExpressBuzz
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^^^^
Seriously, bombing Khatu would have stopped Pakistan nuclear capability? All it would have done is postpone the eventual day when Pakistan would have the nuke. The same fallacy is sought to be applied w.r.t Iran. Bombing Iran would not stop its alleged nuclear weapons program. Rather it would only postpone the final day of reckoning. Further bombing Iran, would strengthen the resolve of the Mullah-o-cracy to acquire nukes. It would also end up justifying Iranian actions of putting their nuclear facility inside bunkers.
This brings us, with another unspoken fallacy of the Pakistan nukes. It is widely held belief that Pakistan is able to export terrorism into India sitting under a nuclear umbrella. Well before Pakistan had the nuclear capability, it was exporting terrorism into India. Recall the invasion of the marauding tribal.
And the Israeli role model is very bad as far as India is concerned. In spite of all the Israeli military/intelligence powers, Israel has not managed to stop terrorist attacks against itself or its citizens. It has been an abject failure as far as protection of its citizens is concerned. All Israel can do is promise to kill somebody if its citizen gets harmed. But in spite of this explicit threat, there are still terrorist who will go and kill Israelis. Israel went ahead and killed Arafat. It still is facing issues in Palestine lands. In fact if we take the sum of all the actions of Israel since its independence, then we see that Israel has taken a wrong path. A path of bravado and, "I will show them" path. But it has yet to tackle the root cause of its insecurity.
What I see is tactically brilliance being substituted for Strategic blunder.
Seriously, bombing Khatu would have stopped Pakistan nuclear capability? All it would have done is postpone the eventual day when Pakistan would have the nuke. The same fallacy is sought to be applied w.r.t Iran. Bombing Iran would not stop its alleged nuclear weapons program. Rather it would only postpone the final day of reckoning. Further bombing Iran, would strengthen the resolve of the Mullah-o-cracy to acquire nukes. It would also end up justifying Iranian actions of putting their nuclear facility inside bunkers.
This brings us, with another unspoken fallacy of the Pakistan nukes. It is widely held belief that Pakistan is able to export terrorism into India sitting under a nuclear umbrella. Well before Pakistan had the nuclear capability, it was exporting terrorism into India. Recall the invasion of the marauding tribal.
And the Israeli role model is very bad as far as India is concerned. In spite of all the Israeli military/intelligence powers, Israel has not managed to stop terrorist attacks against itself or its citizens. It has been an abject failure as far as protection of its citizens is concerned. All Israel can do is promise to kill somebody if its citizen gets harmed. But in spite of this explicit threat, there are still terrorist who will go and kill Israelis. Israel went ahead and killed Arafat. It still is facing issues in Palestine lands. In fact if we take the sum of all the actions of Israel since its independence, then we see that Israel has taken a wrong path. A path of bravado and, "I will show them" path. But it has yet to tackle the root cause of its insecurity.
What I see is tactically brilliance being substituted for Strategic blunder.
Re: Deterrence
Chinese ASBM validation by Indian team, but huge Questions utility-wise
The Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile system has been touted as the great “game changer” mainly by commentators outside China. There’s however some confusion about the status of this ASBM system. PACOM CINC Admiral Willard in December 2010 stated that it was operational. But the Pentagon has held back from even confirming this. There’s for good reasons huge question marks hanging around it. Except now a high-powered team from NIAS (National Institute for Advanced Studies) – the Ramanna-founded outfit under the aegis of DRDO and led by a rocket propellant expert Rajaram Nagappa yesterday briefed a gathering of mostly Navy and DRDO types. The team, after doing fine work of gleaning DF-21D missile characteristics from published photographs and using data on the Chinese Yaogon constellation of satellites and the accompanying OTH radar that will facilitate the targeting of US Carrier Strike Groups, ran a simulation exercise and, in essence, validated the workability of the ASBM system. The DF-21D is expected to fly a ballistic course for most of its flight path, but change to boost-glide to target, in its terminal phase. It was suggested by VADM (ret) Ravi Ganesh, former head of the ATV (SSBN) program, introducing the NIAS study that the conventional warhead on the missile was meant to prevent a retaliatory escalation by the US forces to the nuclear stage and thus lengthen the nuclear fuze. As a panelist along with RADM (ret) Raja Menon, discussing the strategic ramifications of the Chinese ASBM, in the afternoon, I brought up that old problem — how is the targeted country to know the missile is conventional and not N-warheaded, and will it wait around for the missile to impact, meaning take out the Carrier, before mounting retaliation? Absent new and novel technology able to distinguish the type of warhead on an incoming missile, the reaction to any launch of a ballistic missile, including ASBM, by an adversary state and so detected, will, in the first instance, result in an immediate counter-launch of an N-missile.
The trouble here, I pointed out, is that the US has actually muddied the waters by equipping its Ohio-class SSBNs with conventional ICBMs in its strategy of “global strike”, which does not make any sense whatsoever. But neither does the Chinese ASBM, except as a means of creating turmoil in the US Navy, and unsettling America’ senior armed service — a psychological ploy to unhinge the enemy!! This last is something China is phenomenally good at doing. There’s no reason, as Raja Menon said that the OTH cannot be turned Bay of Bengal-wards, and the Yaogon satellites re-oriented. In which case, I wondered if the original plan for a small carrier/AD ship at 28,000 tons, wouldn’t have served Indian interests better? The carrier now being built at Kochi is getting onto 45,000 tons plus.
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Re: Deterrence
Deterrence does not work without a parallel determination to eliminate the threat forever.Christopher Sidor wrote:^^^^
Seriously, bombing Khatu would have stopped Pakistan nuclear capability? All it would have done is postpone the eventual day when Pakistan would have the nuke. The same fallacy is sought to be applied w.r.t Iran. Bombing Iran would not stop its alleged nuclear weapons program. Rather it would only postpone the final day of reckoning. Further bombing Iran, would strengthen the resolve of the Mullah-o-cracy to acquire nukes. It would also end up justifying Iranian actions of putting their nuclear facility inside bunkers.
This brings us, with another unspoken fallacy of the Pakistan nukes. It is widely held belief that Pakistan is able to export terrorism into India sitting under a nuclear umbrella. Well before Pakistan had the nuclear capability, it was exporting terrorism into India. Recall the invasion of the marauding tribal.
And the Israeli role model is very bad as far as India is concerned. In spite of all the Israeli military/intelligence powers, Israel has not managed to stop terrorist attacks against itself or its citizens. It has been an abject failure as far as protection of its citizens is concerned. All Israel can do is promise to kill somebody if its citizen gets harmed. But in spite of this explicit threat, there are still terrorist who will go and kill Israelis. Israel went ahead and killed Arafat. It still is facing issues in Palestine lands. In fact if we take the sum of all the actions of Israel since its independence, then we see that Israel has taken a wrong path. A path of bravado and, "I will show them" path. But it has yet to tackle the root cause of its insecurity.
What I see is tactically brilliance being substituted for Strategic blunder.
Israel's fate was doomed right from the beginning because the Brits planned to preserve and use the Arabs and Islamism at the same time they conceded Israel under US pressure and in the evolving dependence on USA for their war effort. Without US involvement, it is very likely that UK just might not have been able to sustain itself long term against Germany.
By preserving UK ruling class, Brits managed to preserve a core that would carry on in the hope of one day recovering their empire based on piracy and rapine. This is an exact copy of the Jihadi mindset - which also looks at any compromises necessary to preserve the imperialist core - so that one day they can revive and start their imperialistic and parasitic existence back on human civilization.
So under teh circumstances, Brits took to "Partition" of all disputed regions where they knew that on one side lay a religious, cultural identity that would never be digested by the British imperialist version of whatever faith the Brit rulers adopted. They started with Ireland, and carried it over to India and Israel. In each case they encouraged and supported on the sly - the faith that would be eager to bootlick the Brits. In Israel's case it was the Arab Islamism that the Brits solidly nurtured. We should remember that over Israel British policy was divided among factions, and a dominant theme was anti-Semitic and pro-Islamic. This manifested in many different event on the ground including the dubious promotion of the anti-Semitic Grand Mufti under direct British intervention. The Brit admin also collaborated with local Arab admin and structures to try and prevent Jewish migration, or growth of Jewish settlements, and looked the other way when the Islamists organized "riots".
The American Jewish community was something that the Brits could not match without jeopardizing the other geo-strategic interests [keeping US as a potential ally in the eventual imperialistic confrontations], and hence "Partition" was the ideal solution.
This meant that even if Israel won its corner of the land, it would forever be surrounded by a Jihadi culture - which would be carefully nurtured by Britain. Throughout the ME, it has been the consistent British policy to preserve each and every roots of Islamism and in turn therefore each and every root of Jihadi violence on the non-Muslim of the region. The British target was to ensure that if it could not have its piratical and rapist empire - not one of the other civilized cultures in the region would be able to live in peace and develop.
Israeli deterrence would not work unless the sources of Islamism in the area were simultaneously targeted for removal. This would never be solved until Islamism and Islamic institutions and regimes are wiped off from the entire region.
Indian deterrence against Pakistan would similarly not work unless Pakistan itself and the institutional structures that preserve the islamic memes are not wiped off the subcontinent. Maybe the further weakening and erosion of British financial and covert financial-flows-drugs-weapons-trade capital flows dating from the colonial times - can help in underming mullahcracy. Mullahcracy - each one of the Jihadists - whether Palestinian or Pakistani - flourish the greatest in Londonistan.
We should also note that USA with the ideological inputs also of the Vatican, carried on a determined struggle against the USSR - not only to deter it - but also to unravel and destroy USSR.
Deterrence without consistent and planned destruction of the enemy being deterred - does not deter the enemy.
Re: Deterrence
Some of the finest IN minds were at that NIAS seminar.
X-post..
Indian Air Force in Wars:Jasjit Singh
X-post..
Indian Air Force in Wars:Jasjit Singh
India was the last power to nuclearize. All those NPAs who preach to India are all wrong. TSP already had the bomb tested in China in 1983.
Pakistan, after its first test of a nuclear device at Lop Nor with Chinese assistance in 1983, planned to take over Siachen Glacier and adjoining areas up to the Karakoram Pass (not to be confused with the Chinese built highway of the same name far to the west in Gilgit region of Kashmir).22 The Indian Army, in a pre-emptive move in early 1984 was able to just occupy the high crest marking the watershed before the Pakistan army could get to it the same day.
22 On the first anniversary of its nuclear tests, Dr Samar Mubarakmand (in charge of building the bomb) publicly stated that Pakistan had tested a nuclear device in 1983; see Gulf Today, 31 May, 1999.
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Re: Deterrence
What do I know about these matters but that BK article read like a textbook case lifafa on behalf of joos.
Re: Deterrence
The only thing that might have worked would have been to facilitate the creation of independent Balochistan, Sindhu Desh, and Pakhtunkwa in the early 1970's. But then India had a very limited indigenous Mil-Ind complex, and the Soviets were not willing to support such a plan.Christopher Sidor wrote:^^^^
Seriously, bombing Khatu would have stopped Pakistan nuclear capability?
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Re: Deterrence
Truman, however, was not about to be rushed into any hasty decision. On the next day he ordered the formation of a special NSC committee, made up of Acheson, Lilienthal, and Secretary of Defense Johnson, to advise him on the matter. Since Johnson strongly supported the “super” and Lilienthal equally adamantly opposed it, Acheson’s would be the swing vote. To help him decide, he asked Kennan and Nitze to prepare separate reports on the matter, knowing that they would disagree. Acheson’s sympathies were with Kennan: his affectionate tribute at the National War College came only a few days after he read an early version of what Kennan was going to recommend. But Acheson’s political instincts told him that the decision would go the other way. For that reason, he put Nitze on the working group that advised the NSC committee. Nitze’s report, completed on December 19, was short and to the point. Although fission weapons were likely to remain of primary importance in the military strategies of both the United States and the Soviet Union, there was at least a 50 percent chance that either country could achieve a thermonuclear reaction. Weapons of mass destruction—the hydrogen bomb apparently qualified, the atomic bomb did not—would serve American interests in neither peace nor war, and the Soviets would probably not initiate their use. Nevertheless, “it is essential that the U.S. not find itself in a position of technological inferiority in this field.” Accordingly, the president should authorize the Atomic Energy Commission to test the possibility of a thermonuclear weapon, reserving any decision to produce and deploy it until the results were known. In the meantime, the NSC should review American security requirements in the light of the Soviet atomic bomb, and the prospect that a thermonuclear bomb might be feasible.11 Kennan, characteristically, wrote much more. He had begun composing a “super” bomb paper before Acheson asked him to, and he was determined to do justice to the secretary of state’s mandate. “Remarkable man,” Lilienthal noted, after watching Kennan read a draft: “Peeled off his coat, exhibiting farm-type gal-luses over his thin and bent shoulders. Then he nervously started rolling back his sleeves, folding them back by stages till they were way above his elbows.” Kennan submitted his final version, which came to seventy-nine pages, on January 20, 1950: he remembered it as “one of the most important, if not the most important, of all the documents I ever wrote in government.” Entitled “The International Control of Atomic Energy,” it called for nothing less than an end to reliance on nuclear weapons as instruments of offensive warfare. Its reasoning echoed Henry Adams’s concern that morality was lagging behind technology. There was no way, Kennan argued, in which weapons of mass destruction could be made to serve rational ends beyond deterring the outbreak of hostilities. War, after all, was a means to an end, not an end in itself; it might imply an end “marked by submission to a new political will and perhaps to a new regime of life, but an end which at least did not negate the principle of life itself.” Nuclear weapons lacked these characteristics. “They reach beyond the frontiers of western civilization, to the concepts of warfare which were once familiar to the Asiatic hordes. They cannot really be reconciled with a political purpose directed to shaping, rather than destroying, the lives of the adversary. They fail to take account of the ultimate responsibility of men for one another.” Shakespeare had seen how thin this thread was:
Take but degree away,—untune that string
And hark what discord follows: ...
Then everything includes itself in power—
Power into will, will into appetite,
And appetite, a universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce a universal prey
And at last eat up himself.
It was vital therefore, Kennan argued, “that we not fall into the error of initiating, or planning to initiate, the employment of these weapons and concepts, thus hypnotizing ourselves into the belief that they may ultimately serve some positive national purpose.” He was not arguing here for any unilateral relinquishment of nuclear weapons. Some such devices would have to be retained “for purposes of deterrence and retaliation.” What he was advocating was, in peacetime, a posture of what would come to be called “minimum deterrence”—restricting the number and power of bombs in the American arsenal strictly to “our estimate as to what it would take to make attack on this country or its allies by weapons of mass destruction a risky, probably unprofitable, and therefore irrational undertaking for any adversary,” and should war come, a strategy of “no first use.” Such an approach, he admitted, would require consultation with allies and a considerable upgrading of conventional capabilities. But it might obviate the need to build a hydrogen bomb, and it would place the United States in a better position from which to negotiate seriously with the Soviet Union on controlling all nuclear devices. Even an imperfect agreement would be less dangerous than leaving “the shadow of uncontrolled mass destruction weapons” lying across the world.
...
Kennan later doubted, correctly, that the paper was seriously considered.
...
Kennan’s memorandum, more than thirty times the length of Nitze’s, was the most serious effort by any American at the time to grapple with the implications of the nuclear revolution. The ideas it developed—especially “minimum deterrence” and “no first use”—would shape the strategic debates of the 1970s and 1980s, some of which Kennan conducted with Nitze himself.
...
Gaddis, John Lewis (2011-11-10). George F. Kennan: An American Life (pp. 378-381). Penguin Group.
Re: Deterrence
Satya_anveshi wrote:What do I know about these matters but that BK article read like a textbook case lifafa on behalf of joos.
On the contrary he is pointing out to Israelis, how complacency by India towards TSP's nuke proliferation via PRC has increased the threat from them.
Similarly Iran acquiring nukes will threaten Israel.
Now read his article with the one on geopolitics of Israel in the geopolitics thread.
It shows that any power that dominates the Middle East, west of Afghanistan will conquer Israel. No ifs and buts. And if such a power gets backing from another Asiatic power its curtains for the Davidic model of Israel.
Re: Deterrence
^^ I see it more like the situation where the Mamluks destroyed the Mongols (Assaad). After this, they took over Jerusalem and the eastern outposts of the christians.
Basically where there is unity among the surrounding arab states, then there is real trouble for Israel, but if they are dis united then Israel is at peace. The last 20 years or so there hasbeen disunity.
Basically where there is unity among the surrounding arab states, then there is real trouble for Israel, but if they are dis united then Israel is at peace. The last 20 years or so there hasbeen disunity.
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Re: Deterrence
The cowdung cake burns - and the yet wet cowdung laughs.
Re: Deterrence
ramana wrote:
On the contrary he is pointing out to Israelis, how complacency by India towards TSP's nuke proliferation via PRC has increased the threat from them.
Similarly Iran acquiring nukes will threaten Israel.
Now read his article with the one on geopolitics of Israel in the geopolitics thread.
It shows that any power that dominates the Middle East, west of Afghanistan will conquer Israel. No ifs and buts. And if such a power gets backing from another Asiatic power its curtains for the Davidic model of Israel.
how does this dynamic effect India in the long term? I would hazard a guess and say that the existence of Israel is going to be one "plus point" in favor of any future Indian empires. the geopolitical struggle between ME, Persia, and India from historic times can be upended by the presence of a power in ME, which India can back, to keep the other 2 from consolidating that arena in their favor, which is always the first step toward invasion of India. once they consolidate their hold on ME, every power has turned its covetous eyes towards India. future Indian "empires" might have an advantage in some or other form of Israel.
Re: Deterrence
brihaspati wrote:The cowdung cake burns - and the yet wet cowdung laughs.
cowdung cake == Israel
wet cowdung == India
right? if there is a serious chance of "wiping off" Israel, as the Islamists dream of, then India, in its present form, will be in grave danger, IMVHO. if Islam consolidates ME, they'll turn to India next. it is an easy target.
and there are no Chandragupta Mauryas, Yashodharmans, Gowtamiputra Shatakarnis in sight.
Re: Deterrence
devesh, As Kishore Mahbubani writes, the world will return to the old normal. In essense the three centuries of Western European dominance will gradually diminish. But that does not mean everything will be back to the same. Some things will change as we are all thinking humans. The trick is to find what stays the same and what changes.
Re: Deterrence
Off topic for this thread, but what is a "consolidated Islam in ME"? Is it fractured now?devesh wrote: if there is a serious chance of "wiping off" Israel, as the Islamists dream of, then India, in its present form, will be in grave danger, IMVHO. if Islam consolidates ME, they'll turn to India next. it is an easy target.
Re: Deterrence
one single "political power" which is declared as Islamic, and uses Islam as a tool to attain and hold power, establishing itself as the most powerful force in ME. all other smaller powers in ME will follow in that power's lead on promises of looted wealth from kafirs. this is consolidation of ME under Islam.
JMTP's.
that is how I imagine it will be. doesn't mean it is the only variety of "Islamic consolidation of ME" that's possible.
JMTP's.
that is how I imagine it will be. doesn't mean it is the only variety of "Islamic consolidation of ME" that's possible.
Re: Deterrence
It is fractured now between different nation states: Turkey, Arab states, Iran and so on.
Re: Deterrence
My response heredevesh wrote:brihaspati wrote:The cowdung cake burns - and the yet wet cowdung laughs.
cowdung cake == Israel
wet cowdung == India
right? if there is a serious chance of "wiping off" Israel, as the Islamists dream of, then India, in its present form, will be in grave danger, IMVHO. if Islam consolidates ME, they'll turn to India next. it is an easy target.
and there are no Chandragupta Mauryas, Yashodharmans, Gowtamiputra Shatakarnis in sight.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 6#p1256966
Re: Deterrence
Look at the neighbours and the leader of the political opinions. Egypt is now under MB rule which are not allied with the GCC at the moment to the point where KSA is boosting western fleet. Jordan is under the GCC umbrella. Syria is with Iran. Lebanon is under the influence of Syria. Saudi is the main voice. So right now there is disunity. Qualitatively Israel is streets ahead and quantitatively they need the support of either the US or EU for there to be peace. Libya morocco are under the influence of the gulf. The US withdrawal from the gulf is to ensure capability to deal with any problems Israel has.
Next once Asad falls, this will come under the influence of either Egypt or the gulf. Then Israel is once again surrounded by a unified enemy. However the plan is for Israel to give up the Golan once Syria falls for a fresh start and Hezbollah will be forced to give up their arms in accordance with the UN resolution and will become a purely political entity.
But it looks like Israel prefers to keep Asad in power and the voice in Jerusalem is not really unified.
Then there is rhetoric, dOnt believe it. Israel is close with some of its gulf states.
But Israel will be keen to avoid war for the time being and will reopen peace negotiations once Obama gets re-elected. Also if Asad falls. To give perspective when Egypt and Syria launched attacks during yom kipur war in 1973. Saudi was about to enter the war secretly with an offensive in eilat oil and fuel depots. Saudi never did go ahead with the attack because Kissinger told both parties that they would ensure an air bridge is created until Israel wins. Then they agreed with a ceasefire.
A strong US or EU is needed to keep Israel alive and deter any war.
Next once Asad falls, this will come under the influence of either Egypt or the gulf. Then Israel is once again surrounded by a unified enemy. However the plan is for Israel to give up the Golan once Syria falls for a fresh start and Hezbollah will be forced to give up their arms in accordance with the UN resolution and will become a purely political entity.
But it looks like Israel prefers to keep Asad in power and the voice in Jerusalem is not really unified.
Then there is rhetoric, dOnt believe it. Israel is close with some of its gulf states.
But Israel will be keen to avoid war for the time being and will reopen peace negotiations once Obama gets re-elected. Also if Asad falls. To give perspective when Egypt and Syria launched attacks during yom kipur war in 1973. Saudi was about to enter the war secretly with an offensive in eilat oil and fuel depots. Saudi never did go ahead with the attack because Kissinger told both parties that they would ensure an air bridge is created until Israel wins. Then they agreed with a ceasefire.
A strong US or EU is needed to keep Israel alive and deter any war.
Re: Deterrence
Suadis in 1973 were a para military force. And would have gotten a whipping if the intervened in Yom Kipur and that would have brought bin Laden types two decades early. As it is there was turmoil six years later with dissidents claiming the regime was a puppet one.
So lets not give more credit than due to the Saudis. Sounds like empty boasts of some one on hafim.
There ancestors used to carry Indian Muslims pilgrims in palkis for Haj. And the IM used to throw golden ashrafis to them.
They got some oil and they think they can rule?
They are still money changers.
So lets not give more credit than due to the Saudis. Sounds like empty boasts of some one on hafim.
There ancestors used to carry Indian Muslims pilgrims in palkis for Haj. And the IM used to throw golden ashrafis to them.
They got some oil and they think they can rule?
They are still money changers.
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Re: Deterrence
Saudi royalty itself might have to look out for their own skin within the next 10 years. Iranian Ayatollahs next time around will have to think of some other nation than France to have extended holidays - perhaps Londonistan would be ready to serve as hosts. The existing regimes - including the Jordanian enlightened despotism - all are in for a shaky ride. Israel may seem very vulnerable now and dependent on Islamist and US/Euro kindness. But the patrons are themselves in for surprises.
Trying to protect the GCC and handshaking with Iran, simultaneously, may require immense prices to be paid for by India.
Trying to protect the GCC and handshaking with Iran, simultaneously, may require immense prices to be paid for by India.