LCA News and Discussions

[vina]

HOw do you know? IAF has done plenty of jugaad on its own as well. Even TKS's Darin story fits the bill.

That is not comparable. The equivalent would have been the Air Force funding, sending folks across and in collaboration with academia and industry come up with a Passive Phased Array Radar.

Disagree here. A simpler version of the LCA would have provided the IAF what it needed, WHEN it needed it, and by now they could have built upon this experience in tranches, adding more esoteric technology in a stepwise fashion. Has been done before quite successfully. A less riskier approach if you will.

No. Let me tell you why.If we did as you said, A simple Bandar would be something like this JL-9 /FTC2000.It is a good old Mig-21 with side inlets a big radar in the nose and as a mil-std 1553bus. Doable in 5 to 7 years with Mig-21 as a base. Next, 5 to 7 years, composites and after 12-13 years, FBW and in 18 to 20 years,like the Russians did with the Mig-21-97 update, put in a RD-93/GE-404/ whatever and you will have presto a Bandar as China/Pakistan with FBW and RD-93, are fielding entering into service at around 2000 or so, even everything was fine and dandy with no delays and you started the project in 1985 and everything ran in parallel. Problem is that it is entry and obsolete even as it enters service, something which folks like the former Navy Chief and others claim the LCA would be when it enters service. While you can contest that assertion here, it would be difficult to contest that with a Bandar entering service in 2000, being built in numbers by 2010 and retiring by 2020 and you would be in the market shopping for a 4+ gen fighter and talking to buy the Jas-39 Gripen!

Again, disagree. That kind of airframe can still be very competitive. Flanker is another example.

Nope the Flanker airframe that IS competitive is not the Su-27 from the Soviet Union days, but rather the unstable, FBW stabilized, foreplane canard sporting versions, like in SU-30 and other versions.

Not so. The M2K, at that point in time was still very much state of the art, and Dassault offered a hybrid FBW. 3 digital + 1 analog, and the IAF was quite satisfied with it

.
The Mirage is an all analog system. The 3 channel digital + 1 analog backup is the F-16s! In fact, if you read up Philip Rajkumar's book (I have a copy) , what the ADA/ Lockheed tie up wanted to do was exactly that, a 3 channel digital + 1 analog backup , the analog backup being the one that LM provided as chipsets. When the denial came, what was not available per the book was precisely the analog backup channel and we were forced to go full digital in all 4 channels. Ideally , you should have two sets of FBW laws, developed totally independently by two teams, with different laws, software, hardware etc the works to provide perfect redundancy (like what would have come from the LM provided analog). In fact before the LCA first flight, per the book, it seems that LM sent a note to George Fernandes about how "dangerous and unsafe" it was and that the system wont work, and to his credit, George Fernandes threw the LM memo into the dustbin!

Even if it was completely analog, so what? Convert to digital later, no? The problem iirc, was that the Rafale's FBW was still not totally developed.

That is exactly the point. The analog system would have to be replaced within 5 to 10 years and Dassault weren't willing to co-develop the digital FBW with us (could have gone into both the Rafale AND the LCA), while the Americans were willing to do so. It actually was a sound call.

Events show that the MiG-21 upgrade made the bird very competitive even in the 2000s.

The only legacy soviet platform that continues to be competitive is the SU-30 today because of the technology infusions (largely thanks to Indian Money and Chinese Money in the 90s!). Same thing we did with the Gorshkov. The Russians took our money and rebuilt their skill base and industrial infra that they lost for that kind of thing to Ukraine when the Soviet Union broker up !

That is one idiotic goof up where the Navy was suckered into a deal that was simply too good to be true. And like the old saying goes, if it too good to be true, it definitely isn't. The Navy should have stuck to their instincts and built the IAC-1 earlier rather than go for the promise of a short cut of an old burnt out semi cruiser hull with a compromised hanger space and air wing capacity, refurbished at cut prices.

[vina]

so delivering a bandar-- early would just have been rejected. the minimum IAF will accept is likely around F-16-block40 level...and thats where the IOC is headed toward on current platform.

Exactly! All this Mig-21 replacement talk is fine. The problem is , unless you bought that story of "Replacement of a Mig-21 is a more modern Mig21 ..aka a Bandar" hook line and sinker, it was simply not true. The F-16 Blk-15 that the Pakistanis sent absolute Dhoti Shivers in the IAF at that time. Even today, few aircraft will have the maneuverability of a Blk-15 (an eye watering roll rate of 360deg/s, unmatched sustained turn rate), stuff that a Mig-29 (even the latest ones with higher thrust engines, but also added weight) will have tremendous difficulty matching (esp roll rate) and the LCA ASR was to beat the F-16 specs in field performance!

You cannot do that with an "evolved Mig-21" like the FTC-1000 or an "evolved Bandar" without critical technologies like FBW and composites and a high thrust to weight ratio engine. That is the fundamental bottom-line. The configuration and tech choices of the LCA reflect that fact and it comes directly from the IAF ASR requirements and not some wonkish dream from the technology side, unless someone thinks that the IAF ASR was drawn up by the DRDO and NOT IAF!

So let us put that piece of fiction to rest. The IAF want the Mig-21's replaced alright, not with a Mig-21 but with an F-16 class and that is what you are getting , the equivalent of of an F-16 Blk-40 atleast entering service in 2012/13.

Any rant from the retired IAF types on wanting otherwise or claiming that it an be done otherwise with a program starting in 1984 is clearly an ill formed rant. It cannot be . I wrote about he "Evolved Mig21 timeline",lets look at the LCA timelines.

As for timelines, look at the best possible case with no constraints in terms of technology , money and experience of a comparable plane, is the Gripen. This is the benchmark of what would have been ideally possible in the best case scenario. Initial studies 1979 ,project sanctioned in 1982, roll out 1987, first flight Dec 1988!, Squadron Service Nov 1997 and Gripen C/D in around 2003 to 2005 timeframe.

Compare that with OUR time lines. Initial study 1984. Actual work start 1989 ! Roll out 2005? First flight 2000/2001 ? Entry into service 2012/3! So if you consider the equivalent, very good indeed and if you factor in circumstances like Shakti tests, brilliant !

Had the Dassault option for the FBW been chosen, and perhaps a modded M88 or even RD-33 to go with it, FCS development time, and engine might not have been such an issue. As it stands, it took almost a decade to get the FCS going (until first flight 2001). Dassault with its team of engineers bailed out, Marietta/LM dilly-dallied in its consultancy and things were considerably slowed down. And then you have the sanctions. The ADA was squarely responsible for this decision that contributed considerably to the delays

Given the fact that we started roughly a decade later than the Gripen (it flew in 1988, we started work in 1989!) and the technology denial regimes leading to FBW delays, economic troubles in the early 90s, despite all that, the Gripen C/D timeline and Tejas MK-1 timelines are roughly comparable. In fact, we have done very well on that , even if you take into account that the Gripen had a "ready made" digital 3 channel + 1 analog backup FCS ported into into it right from the F-16, just like what you wanted the Mirage 2000 analog FCS to be ported into the Tejas.

At best we could have got the Tejas into service 5 years earlier. That is the BEST that could have been done.

Anything else, claiming that a project starting with studies in 1984 could have a plane in service by 1990 is living in La La land.

Had the Dassault option for the FBW been chosen, and perhaps a modded M88 or even RD-33 to go with it,

In fact, there was exactly that plane planned and it was the Yugoslav Novi Avion . If ever there was a single engine Rafale, with the same Rafale nose/cock pit and a single M-88 engine, this was the one.

Thank heavens that we decided to go on our own on that and not get caught up with that "NAM" rhetoric and Nehru-Tito Bhai-Bhai rubbish from the 60s that nearly brought the shipbuilding industry to it's knees in India when we did the similar thing with ship building back in the 60s/70s and not get into a joint venture.

But even there , look at the timelines they had in mind in case of best case of entry into service.It would not have been anything less than close to 2000.

Google translation of the wiki entry of the program in Serbo-Croat

[vina]

so delivering a bandar-- early would just have been rejected. the minimum IAF will accept is likely around F-16-block40 level...and thats where the IOC is headed toward on current platform.

Exactly! All this Mig-21 replacement talk is fine. The problem is , unless you bought that story of "Replacement of a Mig-21 is a more modern Mig21 ..aka a Bandar" hook line and sinker, it was simply not true. The F-16 Blk-15 that the Pakistanis sent absolute Dhoti Shivers in the IAF at that time. Even today, few aircraft will have the maneuverability of a Blk-15 (an eye watering roll rate of 360deg/s, unmatched sustained turn rate), stuff that a Mig-29 (even the latest ones with higher thrust engines, but also added weight) will have tremendous difficulty matching (esp roll rate) and the LCA ASR was to beat the F-16 specs in field performance!

You cannot do that with an "evolved Mig-21" like the FTC-1000 or an "evolved Bandar" without critical technologies like FBW and composites and a high thrust to weight ratio engine. That is the fundamental bottom-line. The configuration and tech choices of the LCA reflect that fact and it comes directly from the IAF ASR requirements and not some wonkish dream from the technology side, unless someone thinks that the IAF ASR was drawn up by the DRDO and NOT IAF!

So let us put that piece of fiction to rest. The IAF want the Mig-21's replaced alright, not with a Mig-21 but with an F-16 class and that is what you are getting , the equivalent of of an F-16 Blk-40 atleast entering service in 2012/13.

Any rant from the retired IAF types on wanting otherwise or claiming that it an be done otherwise with a program starting in 1984 is clearly an ill formed. It cannot be . I wrote about he "Evolved Mig21 timeline",lets look at the LCA timelines.

As for timelines, look at the best possible case with no constraints in terms of technology , money and experience of a comparable plane, is the Gripen. This is the benchmark of what would have been ideally possible in the best case scenario. Initial studies 1979 ,project sanctioned in 1982, roll out 1987, first flight Dec 1988!, Squadron Service Nov 1997 and Gripen C/D in around 2003 to 2005 timeframe.

Compare that with OUR time lines. Initial study 1984. Actual work start 1989 ! Roll out 2005? First flight 2000/2001 ? Entry into service 2012/3! So if you consider the equivalent, very good indeed and if you factor in circumstances like Shakti tests, brilliant !

Had the Dassault option for the FBW been chosen, and perhaps a modded M88 or even RD-33 to go with it, FCS development time, and engine might not have been such an issue. As it stands, it took almost a decade to get the FCS going (until first flight 2001). Dassault with its team of engineers bailed out, Marietta/LM dilly-dallied in its consultancy and things were considerably slowed down. And then you have the sanctions. The ADA was squarely responsible for this decision that contributed considerably to the delays

Given the fact that we started roughly a decade later than the Gripen (it flew in 1988, we started work in 1989!) and the technology denial regimes leading to FBW delays, economic troubles in the early 90s, despite all that, the Gripen C/D timeline and Tejas MK-1 timelines are roughly comparable. In fact, we have done very well on that , even if you take into account that the Gripen had a "ready made" digital 3 channel + 1 analog backup FCS ported into into it right from the F-16, just like what you wanted the Mirage 2000 analog FCS to be ported into the Tejas.

At best we could have got the Tejas into service 5 years earlier. That is the BEST that could have been done.

Anything else, claiming that a project starting with studies in 1984 could have a plane in service by 1990 is living in La La land.

Had the Dassault option for the FBW been chosen, and perhaps a modded M88 or even RD-33 to go with it,

In fact, there was exactly that plane planned and it was the Yugoslav Novi Avion . If ever there was a single engine Rafale, with the same Rafale nose/cock pit and a single M-88 engine, this was the one.

But even there , look at the timelines they had in mind in case of best case of entry into service.It would not have been anything less than close to 2000.

Google translation of the wiki entry of the program in Serbo-Croat

In fact, my strong guess this Novi-Avion had the Rafale's digital four channel FBW and I think this was precisely the reason that Dassault walked out on us for that FBW, because they sold it to a competing aircraft and wanted to sell us their older analog to avoid potential conflicts and possible violations of contractual obligations (I am sure there would have been in it to stop selling to competing aircraft).

Thank heavens that we decided to go on our own on that and not get caught up with that "NAM" rhetoric and Nehru-Tito Bhai-Bhai rubbish from the 60s that nearly brought the shipbuilding industry to it's knees in India when we did the similar thing with ship building back in the 60s/70s and not get into a joint venture.

[nrshah]

While we have mentioned CNS cry about ADA, there is one thing that we need to look into.

CNS bad mouth is and has to be accepted with a heart. This is becuase he has invested around a 1000 cr into the project before shouting. Further more, he has not cried about LCA - Navy as a project. We have seen the Video of J Maolanker during last Aero India and we know both ADA and IN are fully aware of challenges. They are not dragging away despite this and have been mentally ready even to have accidents that is intergral part of any development. CNS has blamed ADA for being more involved into AF's case and not giving enough attention to LCA - Navy. See the difference. His intention is to channelise the efforts of ADA agency towards the project which will be only a learning project with final operational project to start later.

CNS badmouth is in sheer contrast to top brass of IAF where they belittle the red letter day in India Aero Industry by calling a M2K calibre aircraft as three legged Cheetah or Mig 21+++. Vivek Ahuja though his analysis have already confirmed what additional it brings it to the table interms of range/payload etc over Mig 21. Except for Payload and marginal more range of M2K (which is a much bigger a/c) what is that it cannot do that a M2K can do (M2k being India's Premier multirole a/c till the MKI came into picture recently).

I personally feel, people in IAF does not have moral rights to say anything for LCA Airforce project with such Step child, no neighbour child attitude.

[chackojoseph]

IMHO,

The chiefs have every right to say that the project is not on schedule, if its so. He is not Chief for "understanding" limitations but get job done.

AFIK, all parties are eager to get job done. They are working at a frantic pace.

Currently, I think that there is no need for debates on Mil/civi tussle in this project as it doesn't exist.

[vina]

belittle the red letter day in India Aero Industry by calling a M2K calibre aircraft as three legged Cheetah

That particular guy is a d*ck and going by the garbage he passes off as "professional" (yeah, maybe like the oldest one) writing, looks retarded as well. Pay no heed to him. Typical blow hard who is over the hill trying to get attention with outrageous rubbish. Sort of like Rakhi Sawant or even worse like Veena Malik. Loser.

or Mig 21+++

This one was absolutely boorish, totally lacking in any grace and so full of himself , that he ruined what was indeed a red letter day. A pity.

[nrshah]

Chacko,

I am not against the chiefs complaining as long as the spirit is to create MIC, Learn, increase R &D base and make the things operational. My only point is that while you complain, you should have been sensitive towards it. It is like saying, while we want our constitutional rights, we will pay not heed to our duties towards the nation. Both cannot co-exist together. Basic Management lesson though to me in Class 9 was that all the three "Responsibiliity, authority and liablity should co exist and at any given point of time, one cannot exclude anything from the list.

This is why I accept CNS criticism considering their involvement while i am not ready to accept IAF/IA feedback.

In a similar case IA kept mum while Arjun was being developed and suddenly dragged its feet of the MBT stating its weight and that bridges will not be able to handle it... What was it doing earlier? Should we accept such feedback? I dont. IAF till a very long time had a similar attitude and it did not helped the larger cause and although some claim things have improved recently, the statements quoted in earlier post are not indicative...Bandar gets into service at a stage it is premature than current LCA, while LCA cannot. We evaluated Gripen NG, but our airforce did not notice that the base line grippen was inducted into service even without FOC. We can induct MKI at MK standard to be converted to MKI only 8 years later or T 90 with lot of corrections to be made later, while we dont have similar stand for our domestic products.

As some one mentioned, let IN oversea all the projects even for IAF/IA. Time and again they have proved they are better project managers than the ones in IAF/IN. And it is not about succeeding, IN had to induct a frigate without PDS waiting for Trishul. You have to take pain as well. Leaders are the one who take pain and hence they are acknowledged as leader. Look at the sacrifice of Mr. Mullah onboard INS Kurkhi and we will now why he was the leader of the ship and is respected.

All the first grade imported weapons have not brought our defense industry admiration comparable to second grade but indigenous weapons of PRC.

[Drishyaman]

Now, team LCA gearing up for fifth naval prototype

The prototype will be powered by the GE-404 engine that powers other LCAs.

NP 3 and NP 4 (LCA MK-II) to be powered by the GE-414 engines and NP 5 to be powered by GE-404 engine ?
Am I correct in understanding or is it a typo or are we going backwards ?

[chackojoseph]

nrshah,

The naval chief was stating a 'factual' position on the status of the project. Navy folks are plain speakers, but are not unreasonable. There was no 'criticism.' It was invented by me-dia. For example, Defense Minster got embarrassed, gag order on defense chiefs, chief taken to task etc.

Navy has a project management team dedicated (infact for all its projects) for it.

So, when he was plain speaking with money and a PM team in the project, he is right.

Look at Vikramaditya project. its bloody late and IN project management team was working on it to ensure completion of the project. If you remember sometime back, the then CNS came very hard on the Vik project and almost created a diplomatic incident. It was in 2007? They told govt to not re negotiate price etc. he wanted multi vendors, rethink Russian ties, not buy USS Kittyhawk etc. Do you remember it?

They are like that.

[nachiket]

NP 3 and NP 4 (LCA MK-II) to be powered by the GE-414 engines and NP 5 to be powered by GE-404 engine ?
Am I correct in understanding or is it a typo or are we going backwards ?

They must be planning to build the NP-5 before the Np-3 and 4 come out. The 3 and 4 will take time anyway. We don't even have the engines yet and even the AF version won't fly for another few years. What they are saying is that earlier they had planned for only 2 Mk 1 naval prototypes. Now they are going to build another one.

[Austin]

**** deleted ********

[pragnya]

the LCA programme was 'not' about just producing a fighter to the IAF to replace Mig 21s. it was govt of the day's decision to create modern infrastructure to cater to the future AEROSPACE needs of armed forces in general and IAF in particular. hence ADA was created specifically for this after both HAL and other private enterprises were unable to take up the challenge - as the programme was quite ambitious -

1. FBW/CLAW

2. CARBON FIBER COMPOSITES

3. MMR

4. TURBOFAN ENGINE

5. A WHOLE HOST OF AVIONICS INCLUDING GLASS COCKPIT.

6. EW

it was a right decision. we just had to leapfrog straight to 4+ generation. there was no other option. after all how long you want to keep importing and be held to ransom for TOT/MONEY/SPARES??

a 2009 interview -

LCA programme over the hump - 2nd gen to 4+, says ADA director, Dr PS Subramanyam

remember this was necessary to bridge the gap with other countries - even if it meant delay because we had to reinvent the wheel in many ways. without any 'datapoint/database' to build on particularly wrt to design/testing/flight testing etc..(does the loss HF Marut programme ring a bell here??). the infra needed also meant even building the blocks for ADA/ADE!!!

now it was also necessary to do the whole hog for other reasons too -

1. indian armed forces are never lenient to local manufature even if it proves itself in real trials. they have to be 'completely proven' and should cater to the 'modern needs' of the day before they see induction. i don't have to illustrate this as it is well known. these are waived if it is an import where OEM's word is taken without batting even an eyelid - but well it is another matter.

2. the other reason being creating a whole set of datapoints/base for future use. this was wrt all the 6 main points referred above. this means you would have at your disposal sufficient ways (datapoints) and means (infra - including trained manpower) to build, test, operate and provide.

has the investment even though miniscule - been dead?? or has it paid back already?? this is very important. what is obvious to me is that the second question has been answered in good measure. one can check Jaguar Darin, Mig 27, Mig 21 Bison, Mig 29 upg, SU 30MKI or even IJT Sitara for an answer.

......................................

CM,

now the real question is - was the IAF not in the loop in all this at all?? i would be 'shocked' if they were not!!!
it is true they were apprehensive and thought it was risky about the fruition as was the govt too - which is why the programme was run in phases with committees reviewing and giving the go ahead. so -

1. project definition (started 1987)

2. FSED to prove the concept with TDs (funds released 1993).

3. prototype development/testing leading to IAF config for IOC - till now.

i find it hard when you say FBW or for that matter any other requirement was some fancy idea from DRDO/ADA. it just could not have been for obvious reason. why would ADA do it if IAF was the end user particularly when it will delay the matter even further?? was LCA born of some vague ADA idea?? IAF gave its ASR in 1985 which changed later on in 1994 AFAIK. i can't fathom the thought IAF was not in the loop in all this!! afterall it was ACM Idris Latif's pet project!! IMO it got due attention as long as he was there and was sidelined after he left the scene as been borne out in open media. it seems they simply thought LCA will not fly just like LM!! so why bother?? the delay was not just due to ADA and the science community as you seem to imply. there was a whole lot of reasons.

- 80s to early 90s india's cash crisis meant funds were a problem.
- due to the loss of only other fighter programme Marut meant ADA had to literally start from scratch!!
- add to that no MIC. they had to be created afresh, manpower needed to be scoured from different sources.
- sanctions.
- attitudes of the user.

let me give an example to the last point above. take IJT Sitara which was designed and produced in a record 3 years - thanks to LCA. IAF was never in the picture and once it started flying with french Larzac engine they come and ask for a change in the engine as they want more thrust. HAL scurries around for a new engine and there is none. finally russians are called in and they design and develop a new engine for the IJT which takes away another 3/4 years!! if IAF had been actively part of it from the top it could have been easily avoided right?? same is the case with LCA they never took active part in the development but for the last 6 years. all along it is like 'ok. i have given my requirement. now deliver!! and remember if you don't deliver on time the requirements may change. i don't care how you do it but do it' no where does national projects are run like this. what surprises they can sit on for decades for AJT, MMRCA and not talk about delay!! there are instances where aircrafts have been inducted at IOC and have been worked upon actively later to the standard but in India alas...

unless there is an active loop of 'feedback/development' programme these things will keep happening because none is clear. it is not like going to a shop and buying a dvd player. these are complex programmes involving great capitals with long gestation periods which calls for equal participation by all the stake holders. pointing fingers, talking in different voices will take one no where. obviously this means having a clear vision about one's needs, drawing them up, sticking to it, being part of it as an equal and taking it to its logical conclusion.

inspite of all odds, peanut budgets - ADA has done a stupendous job if you look at timelines/technologies developed and used across other platforms but all they get is brickbats. very odd!!!

[Austin]

India’s Naval LCA Flies but Needs More Power

The naval prototype of India’s Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) made its first test flight on April 27. Already delayed by four years, the program still faces design concerns, including weight. Strengthening of the rear airframe for carrier operations, and the addition of an arrestor hook, has made the aircraft about 1,000 pounds overweight.

“The naval variant of the LCA will require the F414 Enhanced Performance Engine [EPE] providing up to 26,500 pounds of thrust, a 20-percent boost,” an Indian Navy official told AIN. General Electric and Boeing have proposed the EPE for future versions of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, with a new fan, compressor and turbine, but it is still in development. India has ordered 99 F414-INS6 engines to power Mk2 versions of the Tejas, but they are believed to offer the standard 22,000 pounds of thrust. The prototype and limited series production Tejas Mk1s–including the naval prototype–are powered by GE F404-IN20 engines that produce 17,700 pounds. India ordered 41 of these after development problems with the indigenous Kaveri engine that was supposed to power the LCA.

Indian Defense Minister A.K. Anthony attributes delays to the naval LCA to “technical complexities, non-availability of infrastructure and critical components and technology denial regimes, extended user trials and the failure of some of the components during testing.” EADS has been providing technical assistance. The naval LCA schedule is supposed to align with construction of India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, due to be completed in 2014. To facilitate proving the aircraft for carrier operations, a shore-based test facility is being set up at Naval Air Station Goa replicating an aircraft carrier with a ski jump for launch and arresting gear for deck recovery. The takeoff area is ready, and completion of the landing area is scheduled for year-end. The cost of developing the naval LCA has escalated from the initially sanctioned $186 million to $336 million.

Over the next decade the Indian Air Force (IAF) plans to form six Tejas squadrons, four of them flying the Mk2 version. The first squadron is slated to deploy by July next year, to Sulur airbase in Tamil Nadu, but this date appears likely to slip to the end of next year. The preliminary design of the Mk2 powered by the F414 has been completed. The first flight is expected by 2014, around the time the Tejas Mk1 is declared fully operational. The IAF has said it will buy at least 83 Mk2s if the variant meets performance requirements.

Meanwhile, development of the Kaveri engine continues with Snecma, which has been providing technical assistance. The Kaveri is still considered an alternative engine for the LCA, and a spin-off version could power India’s proposed Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle. The ninth Kaveri engine prototype was integrated with an Il-76 testbed aircraft at the Gromov Flight Research Institute in Russia last year.

[SaiK]

didn't we once discuss on the MTOW and T:W requirements.. what is the NLCA max config, and the needed power requirements? does it require 26.5k lbs thrust?

[ramana]

Guys, on the verge of the LCA proving to be a success why this self-flagellation about the program?

[Vivek K]

Good question, Ramana. a better discussion would be on remaining test points, slow pace of a/c manufacture, weapons fit, time for weaponization to be complete, differences in weapons between Mk1 and 2, radar for Mk2 etc. All this rona dhona is pointless.

[Cain Marko]

Exactly! All this Mig-21 replacement talk is fine. The problem is , unless you bought that story of "Replacement of a Mig-21 is a more modern Mig21 ..aka a Bandar" hook line and sinker, it was simply not true. The F-16 Blk-15 that the Pakistanis sent absolute Dhoti Shivers in the IAF at that time. Even today, few aircraft will have the maneuverability of a Blk-15 (an eye watering roll rate of 360deg/s, unmatched sustained turn rate), stuff that a Mig-29 (even the latest ones with higher thrust engines, but also added weight) will have tremendous difficulty matching (esp roll rate) and the LCA ASR was to beat the F-16 specs in field performance!

You cannot do that with an "evolved Mig-21" like the FTC-1000 or an "evolved Bandar" without critical technologies like FBW and composites and a high thrust to weight ratio engine. That is the fundamental bottom-line. The configuration and tech choices of the LCA reflect that fact and it comes directly from the IAF ASR requirements and not some wonkish dream from the technology side, unless someone thinks that the IAF ASR was drawn up by the DRDO and NOT IAF!

So let us put that piece of fiction to rest. The IAF want the Mig-21's replaced alright, not with a Mig-21 but with an F-16 class and that is what you are getting , the equivalent of of an F-16 Blk-40 atleast entering service in 2012/13.

If you can show me proof that in 1985 ASR the IAF wanted the LCA to have F-16 performance, I'll stop this argument as my whole premise is compromised. It would be insane for the IAF to make such a demand - replace the MiG-21 with an F-16. From TKS's writing, the IAF was looking for a far more modest MiG-21 replacement. It was the DRDO's initial plan/proposal that was overly ambitious:

The details were received through mail next morning. It was contained in a few pages of print. It described the intention to build a single engine tail-less delta plan-form aircraft powered by an engine designed by the GTRE. It was to have a multi-purpose radar designed and built within the country that was to be totally contemporary and to be highly capable in the air to air / air to ground / maritime roles. The aircraft was to be an unstable platform controlled by ‘fly by wire’ technique. It was also to contain all functionalities of a small agile low-observable fighter that could be found anywhere in the world at that point of time. Its projected weight was to be seven tons empty. It was to be designed and developed within about ten years. This dream, the DRDO felt, was achievable. Personally I disagreed with that statement.

Again,

The project seemed extremely ambitions.....and all this within a decade!

, and

Bit by bit we tried to prove that to create a structure that was somewhat lighter than the MiG21 and then extract aerodynamic performance from it that almost equaled the Mirage 2000 (which was about two tons heavier) would need us to technologically improve our performance in every single element of design and construction of the airframe and engine by at least fifteen to twenty percent from our currently known capabilities or aspirations. (We were yet to build a single operational jet engine). We felt that a time frame of ten years for this scale of achievements was implausible.

Point is, TKS is "whining" about the same - overpromise and underdeliver tendency of the agencies involved. ANd all of the above is around 1982 - long before IAF drew up any ASRs!! Kind of hard to believe that the IAF had floated an F-16 requirement in those days, as a MiG-21 replacement no less, and the DRDO responded with all of the above.

Thank heavens that we decided to go on our own on that and not get caught up with that "NAM" rhetoric and Nehru-Tito Bhai-Bhai rubbish from the 60s that nearly brought the shipbuilding industry to it's knees in India when we did the similar thing with ship building back in the 60s/70s and not get into a joint venture.

Not sure we went "on our own" at all. They just hooked the LCA project to a technological superpower that was utterly whimsical (and even capricious towards Indian POV), and paid the price (rejecting safer, albeit less fancy alternatives). A mistake that we rue till this day, and might even in the future.

[SaiK]

The only aspects of negative criticism I don't like is the absence of correction feedback on how it should have been done given constraints we have faced. Constraints include, brain drain, sanctions, budgets and cost restriction from babudom, management issues, Gov sector policies, MUTUs and MPTPs insides, etc.

All negative criticism are actually constructive criticisms if they include a feedback to corrections. I know it is hard to provide corrections and is easier to blame on things.. and at the same time, there should be more accountability from these performing sectors to be more responsible especially in asking for the right budget, right plan, usability and requirements coverage and scope, etc.

Lessons learned can be easily forgotten if not documented or carried forward to future projects. hence it is important we move on from LCA, NLCA to Mk2, Mk3 and on to AMCA.

[vina]

If you can show me proof that in 1985 ASR the IAF wanted the LCA to have F-16 performance, I'll stop this argument as my whole premise is compromised. It would be insane for the IAF to make such a demand - replace the MiG-21 with an F-16.

It obviously impossible to get the ASR from 1985 and post it online here. But these things about the LCA are well known , especially to the old timers like Sunil Sainis, George J (GJman who still does a cameo appearance every now and then), B.Harry (who passed away, but what brilliant work he did in writing about this. Our DDMs should learn from him) and of course the likes of Enqyoob. Unfortunate that many of them stopped coming here for a variety of reasons. But they all did a great job of publishing and writing in the BR Monitor that documents much of what happened.

A good place to start will be here BR LCA/Tejas Resources which has a couple of published articles and in particular the one by Air Marshal MSD Wollen he absolutely would know the ins and outs of what happened those days from where he was..According to him , the

The IAF's Air Staff Requirement, finalized in October 1985 is the base document for development. Requirements of flight performance, systems performance, reliability, maintainability criteria, stores carnage, etc. are spelt out. Concessions or a higher standard of requirements have to be mutually agreed upon by the IAF (customer) and ADA (constructor).

The ASR has gone revisions since 1985 (twice I think) and what we have today is of a higher requirement (obviously, don't blame the IAF, the situation changes, but that will result in delays and budget hikes).

From TKS's writing, the IAF was looking for a far more modest MiG-21 replacement. It was the DRDO's initial plan/proposal that was overly ambitious:

It is possible that the planning and definition and requirements of what went into Tejas was done by others in IAF , possibly above his pay grade and he was not in the loop. But facts are facts.

The IAF knew that it was ambitious alright, but it was required for very very good reasons. Read up the articles in the BR Monitor archives on how the IAF wanted those addressed. There were four programs if I remember correctly (Gripen, LCA, Novi Avion and I think an Indonesian program which got killed) that looked at exactly similar small, lightweight , single engine fighters and all of them came up with remarkably similar configurations (Delta winged, FBW, high composite). That 3 countries come to a similar solution is not an "accident" or a whim of "technocrats" or whatever. Those were sound logical choices.

It was also to contain all functionalities of a small agile low-observable fighter that could be found anywhere in the world at that point of time. Its projected weight was to be seven tons empty. It was to be designed and developed within about ten years. This dream, the DRDO felt, was achievable. Personally I disagreed with that statement.

Firstly, there was no other like that anywhere in the world at that point in time (the F-16 and M2K and Mig29 are bigger planes) and the Mig21 was outdated.

Also, despite all the skepticism, it WAS designed and developed in about ten years. With work starting in 1989 to first flight in 2000/1, it is about 10 years, DESPITE sanctions and 90s economic crisis.

Where we lost out is during the flight test stage from 2001 to today due to lack of prior experience and of course the well know reasons of IAF going comatose from 2000 to 2007!

Point is, TKS is "whining" about the same - overpromise and underdeliver tendency of the agencies involved. ANd all of the above is around 1982 - long before IAF drew up any ASRs!! Kind of hard to believe that the IAF had floated an F-16 requirement in those days, as a MiG-21 replacement no less, and the DRDO responded with all of the above.

Despite all the "skepticism", the tech developments have delivered fully, except in Radar(bad choice of agency there) and Engine (that was always tough, but partly there). The IAF ASR in 85 did reflect the F-16 acquisition by Pakistan , just like the Arjun's revised one in the 80s, reflected the possible transfer of M1-A2 to Pakistan (Zia Ul Haq got his 72s from the mangoes after witnessing firing trials of M1 Abrams in Pakistan) .

In fact, this whine about "I wanted an evolved Mig-21, while you give me an F-16 in a Mig-21 form factor" is uncannily similar to the whine in the Arjun case "I want a 50 ton Evolved T-72 while you give me Western Style MBT of 57 tons!" In both cases, you got what you wanted. To go back and claim ifs and buts and what was "really wanted" and if only we had done X or Y and not done what we currently did, we could have got "something" a decade ago is simply being ridiculous.

Not sure we went "on our own" at all. They just hooked the LCA project to a technological superpower that was utterly whimsical (and even capricious towards Indian POV), and paid the price (rejecting safer, albeit less fancy alternatives). A mistake that we rue till this day, and might even in the future.

What I meant was singing up with the Yugoslavs. We burnt our fingers with them the 60s/70s in shipbuilding. They were the closest to us in terms of ideology and rhetoric and requirements (Socialism, Non Alignment and replacing Mig-21s) and I just thank the heavens some very smart Foreign Service babu decided to hitch our program with theirs. That would have been monumentally stupid , similar to hitching the Marut program to an Egyptian engine!

The cold hard fact is that the Americans were willing to support us a lot more in the LCA program than the French did in critical areas. Pokhran-II and the subsequent events are a catharsis that drained the poison that blocked Indo-US relations nu-necessarily for all those years since the 60s. That is gone now and I don't see why we cant have relations with the US on the lines that France has with the US in defense and other matters.

[marimuthu]

-del-

[SaiK]

Aligning with US would be a hard fought exercise, and it would take years longer than our lives we could make especially considering our history and facts. There is a big difference in the way we think and how US thinks, and operates. Of course, we imbibe everything masan do, but selectively.

Alternatively I think project plan itself could have anticipated these, and accommodated all these. Sleeping from Marut and without a Mig21 equivalent in the middle, it is going to be a task that will face these kind of challenges in addition to socio-political challenges we face.

If I were to architect this, I would have gone subsystem and distributed approach, first in assimilating technologies. Taken ownership like Jaguar or Mig29s, and then slowly converting or change parts, with heavy investments. We should now be flying Jaguars and Mig21s with Kaveri engines.

Radars for Jaguar replacements (instead of 2032s) should have been considered long time back. May be we were weak in getting influence by the same socialistic setup, and tie ups, and gray hair brained officials at helm. However, our scientific and engineering community thrived to meet challenges, all because of the inherent qualities we have.

It is still no late to invest heavily into Kaveri, all home grown, test facilities equally gromov or other western setup. All indigenous Kaveri will put us in a real advantageous space, and would make us really arrive on manufacturing fighter jets.

Engines and radars are heart and brain of the jets. We must have put time and efforts, some 50 years back.

[vina]

Guys, on the verge of the LCA proving to be a success why this self-flagellation about the program?

Not self flagellation, but rather I hope stopping the LCA pgm and the folks associated it FROM flagellation for actually succeeding, despite being set up to fail , and letting grumpy old folks of the "three legged cheetah" or the "Mig 21++" persuasion with whatever axe to grind (was the three legged cheetah man pushing the Gripen ?) getting away murder, literally, facts and background and their own record and role in letting industry and capability from the period 1960s to 1985 rot, because the LCA didn't do what they wanted to, that is fail and disappear?

[SaiK]

may be it was a conundrum to project the force (cheetah), and the leg aspect is a riddle to fighter jet 3 legged undercarriage. may be there is a genuine interest, but acceptable only in the form they like. please remember, they always wanted indigenous technology. IAF hated imported stuffs in LCA... but slowly are accepting US engines in it for the initial orders.

[ramana]

In about 1982 or so Mrs Gandhi attended a summit in Central America (Cancun?) and Reagan was there too. He invited her to visit the US. She did and brought along VS Arunachalam on specific request. VSA was later asked to present a wish list to Pentagon subsequently. He did not ask for RLG but they threw it in along with FBW contract. In the 80s the US was very serious in working on the LCA to wean away India from the USSR. So there was some self interest too.

[negi]

If you can show me proof that in 1985 ASR the IAF wanted the LCA to have F-16 performance, I'll stop this argument as my whole premise is compromised. It would be insane for the IAF to make such a demand - replace the MiG-21 with an F-16.

It obviously impossible to get the ASR from 1985 and post it online here. But these things about the LCA are well known

This is FALSE; actually a lot of things on BRF get wrongly painted in B&W when in the real world the reality is somewhere in between.

IAF's ASR for what is today known as MRCA too was very modest to begin with in fact originally it was supposed be essentially a follow up order of the M2K's latest variant , to say that IAF wanted LCA to have a F-16 level performance in 1985 itself is a baseless claim.

Going by the kind of platforms IAF has inducted till date and the way it goes about shortlisting them and evaluating them it sounds highly unlikely that back in 1985 i.e. hardly 5 years after USAF started inducting what was then world's most advanced fighter AC , IAF would demand for an AC of matching performance . Going by that yardstick IAF should have floated an ASR for F-22 like performance for the MRCA .

The ASR requirements by themselves are functional in nature no one says that they need a cranked delta design in ASR , that choice is essentially the one made by designer. In fact even the MTOW is listed as a 'range' and not a fixed number . Basically only performance and functional specs for designated mission requirement are listed. This impression that ASRs are written to match a certain platform is something I have only read on BRF.

[SaiK]

So, I see why this is being an issue.. the real user should know how to state requirements rather give design inputs.

example: instead asking for 100kN engine, ask for a T:W ratio, and a MTOW capacity, capability to drop these type of bombs, missiles, payload, turn rate, etc.

This should have been verified much earlier, for example we get so many modifications from IA and IAF requests only later in the lifecycle. the issue may be with either teams, one not yet ready, and the other not in belief drdo labs will deliver.

I think, these are challenging industrial character building exercise.. we have to face it.

[chackojoseph]

The ASR requirements by themselves are functional in nature no one says that they need a cranked delta design in ASR , that choice is essentially the one made by designer. In fact even the MTOW is listed as a 'range' and not a fixed number . Basically only performance and functional specs for designated mission requirement are listed. This impression that ASRs are written to match a certain platform is something I have only read on BRF.

Have you even read the ASR? the First line says that it should be equivalent to current generation. At the same time, there was hardly any difference between scripting a 1 digi + 3 manual and quad FBW. In terms of time, yes may be bit extra, but we still needed the foreign help in validation and the sanctions would have screwed it. If not FBW, there was always something else that could have brought the project under sanctions.

LCA is definitely something that matches the ASR first line. Even now, people crib that when inducted, it be outdated.

[negi]

No I have not; but I have read other ASRs which are in public like IN's request for short range AD missile they are very generic in nature i.e. most of the OEMs will qualify. Again current generation simply means what most of the world operates and not the latest AC out there. Even today if you will say current generation fighter AC Su-30 MKI the MRCA contenders and even the eagle family will make the cut, F-22 and F-35 are still future generation as far as rest of the world is concerned.

On CLAW and FCS again you are confusing it with the ASR issue; IAF if you would know did induct Mig-29 around the same time period and it neither had anything digital about it nor was the airframe itself unstable in any axis. The quad FBW was a choice which was made by the design team.

[shiv]

So, I see why this is being an issue.. the real user should know how to state requirements rather give design inputs.

example: instead asking for 100kN engine, ask for a T:W ratio, and a MTOW capacity, capability to drop these type of bombs, missiles, payload, turn rate, etc.

This should have been verified much earlier, for example we get so many modifications from IA and IAF requests only later in the lifecycle. the issue may be with either teams, one not yet ready, and the other not in belief drdo labs will deliver.

I think, these are challenging industrial character building exercise.. we have to face it.

SaiK the following video on Luptonga's channel is a very good one that illustrates the challenges in developing technology although this is about missiles. It is a must watch for technically minded jingos. Watch the whole video - but I have linked the video below to a point where they have realised that even plans for future tech should be based on knowledge of what is achievable and what is not based on knowledge of of "national technical ability" . That was probably not known in earlier days when the LCA was being planned
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pl ... aI#t=1695s

[pragnya]

CM

let's look at tks article itself for the answer you are seeking. lets see what tks says in 1982.

One fine morning at about that time I received a call from my AOC in C Air Marshal JR Bhasin. The Air HQ desired that the DRDO would take on the task of designing and building a modern fighter aircraft that could be used by the air force. An outline of a proposal received from the DRDO was available with the Command HQ. The Air HQ had decided to seek field level opinion about the proposal and tabulate the wish list of the operators so that a consolidated response could be put out to the MOD and the DRDO.

The details were received through mail next morning. It was contained in a few pages of print. It described the intention to build a single engine tail-less delta plan-form aircraft powered by an engine designed by the GTRE. It was to have a multi-purpose radar designed and built within the country that was to be totally contemporary and to be highly capable in the air to air / air to ground / maritime roles. The aircraft was to be an unstable platform controlled by ‘fly by wire’ technique. It was also to contain all functionalities of a small agile low-observable fighter that could be found anywhere in the world at that point of time. Its projected weight was to be seven tons empty. It was to be designed and developed within about ten years. This dream, the DRDO felt, was achievable. Personally I disagreed with that statement.

read the highlighted portion. it makes it amply clear AirHQ desired DRDO to build modern fighter aircraft and the outline was received from drdo which was to be debated in a conference for field opinion!!

that answers your point IAF knew all along and was part and parcel to the proposal. they knew it was FBW in 1982 itself!! so your point that it was scientific community's wish to have FBW is wrong. there were 3 parties to it as i wrote in my last post - GOI, IAF and DRDO/ADA. as i said previously (read PS's interview too i linked) the idea was to leapfrog from 2+ gen to 4+ gen as there was no other option!! IAF itself would not have accepted a 3rd gen aircraft in 2000!! they themselves wanted a 'modern' aircraft as highlighted above. besides it was not just building a replacement for Mig 21. it was much broader in creating MIC for aerospace needs and closing the gap with the rest of the world.

also tks opines that it was ambitious -

To substantiate the first point we put the outline of the proposed LCA as received under a microscope, put every goal stated to a comparative study with the standards achieved by the MiG21 BIS, the Mirage 2000 and a general study of achievements within public knowledge anywhere in the world. We talked of structural weight and structural volume, we talked of clean aircraft design and of drag and lift, and we talked of thrust weigh ratios and of range and endurance. We talked of Specific Fuel Consumption and fuel carrying capacities within the airframe. Bit by bit we tried to prove that to create a structure that was somewhat lighter than the MiG21 and then extract aerodynamic performance from it that almost equaled the Mirage 2000 (which was about two tons heavier) would need us to technologically improve our performance in every single element of design and construction of the airframe and engine by at least fifteen to twenty percent from our currently known capabilities or aspirations. (We were yet to build a single operational jet engine). We felt that a time frame of ten years for this scale of achievements was implausible.

answered below -

The initial projection for completion of the program was totally erroneous and is largely attributable to lack of knowledge and experience. Projections were: first flight in 1990; production to commence in 1994.

BRMONITOR - WOLLEN

add to that the FSED funds only came in 1993. this point was raised by you too which answered previously.

so as per the tks article the conference was held and some other groups wanted LDP too to be added too. so various field opinion was heard and that was it. infact ACM latif was upset as told by tks about his presentation.

The Chief, Air Chif Marshal Idris Latif was present. All his PSOs and most of the ACASs and Directors were also present. There was a senior rep from the Navy. The HAL, the NAL and many other DRDO Labs were represented. The hall was actually overflowing with middle ranking officers, many of them standing two or three deep in the rear. The SWAC team took the stage. Very soon all the monotony of the morning was gone. The audacity and challenge of our presentation shook up the audience. I am however not sure whether the Chief took to our presentation kindly. He was an ardent supporter of the concept of the LCA. Our open disbelief of the DRDO’s claims and aims ran contrary to the theme of the conference. There was a frown on his face as we rambled on, and he left the hall before we came to the end of our presentation. He did however come back to be present during the vociferous Q&A session that followed.

so what happens later?? IAF finalises its ASR in 1985. is it even conceivable even from a layman's pov that it did not call for FBW particularly when it had been known and debated in a conference in 1982?? or was the ASR was watered down?? (inconceivable IMO) which only IAF can answer as we don't have ASR in open source.

ofc the delays happened but not 'only' beacuse of ADA but others incl IAF which has been dealt earlier on.

[negi]

^ Boss no one ever floats a ASR or even a RFP stating we are looking for not so modern or ancient AC; so not sure what is the point in emphasizing the modern part.

Also your quoted para itself says that proposal was sent in by DRDO so where is the confusion; tail less delta concept and FBW choice in the proposal has to come from someone who wishes to design and build an AC, no air force will ever say we want our AC to have canards or not have a tri-plane config but instead be a tail less delta.

Having said that it would be interesting to look at the ASR and see what kind of performance specs were lined up back in 1985 specially in terms of max speed, altitude, weapons load, STR and ITR.

[chackojoseph]

No I have not; but I have read other ASRs which are in public like IN's request for short range AD missile they are very generic in nature i.e. most of the OEMs will qualify. Again current generation simply means what most of the world operates and not the latest AC out there. Even today if you will say current generation fighter AC Su-30 MKI the MRCA contenders and even the eagle family will make the cut, F-22 and F-35 are still future generation as far as rest of the world is concerned.

On CLAW and FCS again you are confusing it with the ASR issue; IAF if you would know did induct Mig-29 around the same time period and it neither had anything digital about it nor was the airframe itself unstable in any axis. The quad FBW was a choice which was made by the design team.

Its very much in open domain. The same trap was Arun project that wanted Western type tanks and then Army chose Soviet type.

The thing is that, even the non stable delta / quad fbw was current generation of the expected end of development of LCA in original timeline.

Added later...

IAF is gungho about delta carnad with quad fbw. M2K to Rafale is the proof.

[negi]

Chacko you have picked your side so it's difficult to discuss stuff with you when you are not open to revisit your stance; I am like that on some issues so I know.

You see you now bring in Arjun into this discussion , why ? Arjun's case is different it was ready and IA said no to it and was replaced by a clearly inferior tank , has IAF done the same to Tejas ? Yes we have read about IAF big wigs in media being critical of the project itself, but why should it evoke such a strong reaction ? I see this being the case in every project across various industries the 'tu-tu main main' never ends however it does not mean that the party at another end simply wants the project to fail. IN chief himself was critical of the NLCA so going by the sentiments being expressed here should I conclude that IN too is against NLCA ?

[pragnya]

^ Boss no one ever floats a ASR or even a RFP stating we are looking for not so modern or ancient AC; so not sure what is the point in emphasizing the modern part.

seems you have not followed CM's posts where he has been saying FBW was not IAF's requirement and that it was 'scientific community's' wish. i was answering him quoting tks article.

Also your quoted para itself says that proposal was sent in by DRDO so where is the confusion; tail less delta concept and FBW choice in the proposal has to come from someone who wishes to design and build an AC, no air force will ever say we want our AC to have canards or not have a tri-plane config but instead be a tail less delta.

yes it was sent by DRDO and IAF knew in 1982 itself that it would be FBW. and even the conference called for eliciting field opinion does not say whether IAF later in 1985 watered down the ASR based on the inputs from the conference. OTOH the fact that ACM Idris latif was upset at tks'S presentation gives an inkling AHQ did not go with it (tks presentation) IMHO only.

[negi]

IAF is gungho about delta carnad with quad fbw. M2K to Rafale is the proof.

IAF is gungho about those platforms because of their 'CAPABILITY' and not because the way they look; that is what I have been saying all this while ASR talks about capability not if the design is a delta canard or a tri plane config. IAF btw is gungho about the Su-30 MKI too and in future should be happy with the PAKFA too, now are they tail less delta canards ?

[negi]

Pragnya across the industry the way things work are if you send in a proposal with certain 'xyz' feature listed down; the end user will take it at face value. If DRDO included FBW in it's proposal back in 82 then the whole debate should end there, it's plain and simple.

Key thing to note is that the quad FBW which was to be designed with American assistance ran into rough waters because of Khan playing bait and switch. It is unfair to do a post mortem on this aspect and pin the blame on any one party for when the choice was made no one knew about the future, who knows something similar could have happened with ADA opting for the Ana-Digi FBW which the French were supposed to help us with too.

[chackojoseph]

IAF is gungho about delta carnad with quad fbw. M2K to Rafale is the proof.

IAF is gungho about those platforms because of their 'CAPABILITY' and not because the way they look; that is what I have been saying all this while ASR talks about capability not if the design is a delta canard or a tri plane config. IAF btw is gungho about the Su-30 MKI too and in future should be happy with the PAKFA too are they tail less delta canards ?

Delta carnard is not about looks and is all about capability. An unstable carnard with quad fbw is easily the most maneuverable out there.

The 'excuse' that the ASR did not say this and that is the Achilles heel of the arguments. We can use the same argument against that since ASR did not specify, it was up to the designer. It works both ways.

MKI purchase was more political. Yes, the tailess delta is futuristic and not the current gen. The LCA delta experience will lead to next stage of evolution that's F-22 / PAK FA design.

[negi]

Delta carnard is not about looks and is all about capability. An unstable carnard with quad fbw is easily the most maneuverable out there.

This is not true; case in point my first love the Mig-29.

The 'excuse' that the ASR did not say this and that is the Achilles heel of the arguments. We can use the same argument against that since ASR did not specify, it was up to the designer. It works both ways.

Chacko my point is very simple i.e. the delays in Tejas program are due to more bigger systemic and technological deficiencies than IAF not providing moral support to the ADA and DRDO . I am in fact willing to say that IAF should induct the Tejas in it's current avatar. Having said that I do strongly believe that there is no need for making this a IAF vs ADA-DRDO slinging match.

Btw you comment about ASR not being specific and hence it being a designer's call sounds very ITVTY to me , you see with projects like Tejas eventually the thing does meet the ASR .

MKI purchase was more political.

All foreign weapons imports have a political back drop, however it is not like political tone overrides IAF's requirements , MRCA tender is a classic example of the same.

[chackojoseph]

MRCA was most transparent when it came to selection. Show me the SU-30 procedure.

I totally dis agree that the delta design caused the delay. It was the infrastructure build, the manpower etc

1993 : Full funding started from April 1993 full-scale development work for phase 1 started in June.

1995 : First technology demonstrator, TD-1, rolled out on 17 November 1995 and was followed by TD-2 in 1998.

1998, the sanctions st in.

You can clearly see what happened here.

4 January 2001 - LCA’s maiden flight successfully completed by Technology Demonstrator TD-1

it took just 6 years for the concept to be shown inclusive of sanctions. (minus 1993 as funds were sanctioned and 2001 as it flew in jan.)

Added later...

The design also continues to be not just current and has never caused a problem in the LCA testing and other phases. The wing redesign is on account of IAF's 2004 ASR.

[nachiket]

negi, you can't compare the induction of the Mig-29 in the 80s with that of the LCA. Even if the the LCA had been designed without an FBW, it still could not have been ready for induction before the late 90s. Especially since the main funding did not materialize before 93. Now which aircraft did the IAF select for induction in that period? The MKI, which as you know is an unstable triplane with an all digital quad-redundant FBW. The LCA had it been ready for IOC by the end of the 90s without an FBW would have looked thoroughly outdated compared to any other aircraft which was being inducted at the time anywhere in the world and was unlikely to have been acceptable to the IAF (even if they originally had been averse to an unstable FBW equipped jet when the program was beginning).