Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 11 Aug 2012 02:04

Desert ops,yes,a paradox,as one of the participants in the very interesting video clip said that for the desert a heavier tank was required and gave the example of other major mil. powers whose tanks were of the heavier variety.In Iraq for example,the Abrams,Challenger were the primary tanks used by the west.

Looking at the FMBT,while the debate had its feet firmly on the ground,the threat from the air,esp. today with the proliferation of UCAVs,tactical missiles with anti-armour top attack munitions and attack helos ,is a factor that cannot be underestimated.An attack helo can launch its missiles and rockets at armoured formations well out of range of its anti-air MG and unless MBTs either carry some sort of MANPADs sized SAM,or are very closely integrated during ops with integral anti-air armoured units like Tunguska,etc.,armoured formations are going to be sitting ducks from the air.The last Lebanese spat also saw that tanks are equally vulnerable on the ground from attack by tandem warhead RPG rounds.The "holy grail" of designing and producing a 50t FMBT by 2020 is going to be a very challenging task indeed.

PS:One of the participants differed with the other two reg. tank weight,saying that we had very different terrain in the country,requiring diff. solutions.In fact,all agreed that a light tank 15-20t was required for the mountains.Therefore,one can rescue the 37 yrs of effort of developing Arjun by ordering at least accelerated production of 500-600+ tanks ,and solving the problem of spares and logistics-the "reliability factor" that was mentioned ,by heavily involving private industry, copying the example of Israel.

The phrase used ,"involving the end user,not isolating him",perfectly summed up the key reason for the dilemma of today,and the way to go in the future to prevent a recurrence.

S_Prasad · Post by **S_Prasad** » 11 Aug 2012 07:27

One small question, would the IA talk about the same BS if the next Imported T-series was 60 Tonnes??
Wouldn't they create additional logistics then?
It's only a propaganda against the desi projects that we hear these BS about logistics and spares.
Unfortunately IA seems to be not learning from IN.

Also thinking that the next war would be like 71 with large tank battles is stupidity.
Look around in Iraq and Afganisthan, they would be fighting Gurilla attacks from TFTA's .
Better luck using the teens with limited portection against the unconventional tactics.
Just like Iraq the T72's would be toast.
I am pretty sure if the moneys continue to come from the lobbyists we would be continue to use T72's even in 2072, saying everything else in the world is overweight or doesn't meet the smoke screen requirement.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 11 Aug 2012 08:17

Quote:
This beggars the Q,what was going on for decades between the IA and the DRDO/DVRDE. "What did the IA have to say about the weight factor and when did they say it?"

A very pertinent question. This will be the key to solve problems in co-operation between DRDO and the Army.

The unsuitability of Arjun in desert and its deployment is a paradox indeed.

or simply a dirty disinformation campaign by the Eastern group.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Aug 2012 08:43

the fig leaf about desert trotted out was the iraqi desert was less sandy and hence the western heavies could operate there (never mind iraqi desert also had sandy areas which these folks negotiated with natural ease while truck units like PAC2 and PAC3 batteries got stuck and delayed)....oh we Thar are like sahara onlee....never mind Egypt also operates the Abrams and so does Israel the Merkava in equally if not more sandy conditions.

all these "indic env is special" only holds true for Leh aircraft ops on a hot day and full load and not much more.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Aug 2012 08:54

nelson wrote: My understanding is that GSQR is not made with relation to a particular platform, say Arjun or T-90. GSQR is framed for in general for a weapon system, say MBT. The RFP for T-90 would have been formulated on the basis of then prevailing GSQR for MBT.

oh really ?? the T-90 was bought because it satisfied army's 'then prevailing' GSQR ?

kindly go back and read articles from the late 90's. T-90 was bought as an 'interim measure' to counter 'T-80UD' of TSPA and because it was 'so similar' to the T-72 it would be no extra pressure on army's logistics and maintenance efforts (which turned out to be a bunch of lies).

please do not make things up about how T-90 satisfied some non-existent GSQR.

===============

in any case the ground pressure of tincan is higher than arjun. if any tank is unsuitable for desert it is the tincan, which may get stuck in the isspecial Indian soft sand.

member_23360 · Post by **member_23360** » 11 Aug 2012 09:09

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QnlAJlrMr_Y

nice video on Merkava 4

Israeli's gave 1st priority to crew protection, 2nd to Firepower and 3rd to Mobility and mobility doesn't mean speed for them.

But it's also clearly mentioned that since this beast weighs 60 + tons, this is not suitable in conditions of slash and swamp, on clayey soil.

its designed for dry, rocky terrain, deserts, non river areas.

Clearly we have these conditions except borders nearby Punjab, j&k.

except those places Arjun can be deployed anywhere.

Its time to tighten the screws on folks who are saying BS about Arjun.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Aug 2012 09:53

per a ram jethmalani article posted in the other forum , the russian leadership authorised payment in dollars of around $1.5b to our first family since the 70s. must have been a quid pro quo for making sure a lot of action goes their way . with the rot starting at such top levels, corrupting any other institution or people 5-10 rungs below is childs play for foreign powers and they have done so.

and this is not to say only the first family benefitted, in true secular and scientific-socialist spirit the russians probably paid off everyone in the political spectrum

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 11:06

The sentence in the article in Force, on unsuitability of Arjun in deserts might be a mistake.

The ground pressure of Arjun has been kept below that of T-90 by ingenuous circumvention. The widened track width has other problems that are not obvious from the brochures. The issue of tracks getting off the bogey wheels often is mentioned in the article. The increased track width would also also contribute to higher kill ratio in minefields.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 11:19

Rahul M wrote:
nelson wrote: My understanding is that GSQR is not made with relation to a particular platform, say Arjun or T-90. GSQR is framed for in general for a weapon system, say MBT. The RFP for T-90 would have been formulated on the basis of then prevailing GSQR for MBT.
...

kindly go back and read articles from the late 90's. T-90 was bought as an 'interim measure' to counter 'T-80UD' of TSPA and because it was 'so similar' to the T-72 it would be no extra pressure on army's logistics and maintenance efforts (which turned out to be a bunch of lies).

please do not make things up about how T-90 satisfied some non-existent GSQR.

===============

...

I agree the circumstances under which the first purchase was made were peculiar, but that does not mean that GSQR was non-existent or T-90 did not meet the technical specifications contained therein.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 11 Aug 2012 13:53

Is there any offical figure as to how much an Arjun MK-1/2 costs/will cost in comparison with a T-90/upgraded T-90? This will give us a view as to the eeconomics of operating the two types.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 15:27

The killing ratio of a minefield or stopping power is calculated for different tanks based on the track width among other factors. There is a near linear relation ship between the kill ratio and the track width. An increased track width will result in a higher kill ratio for same density of mines in the minefield.

http://books.google.co.in/books?id=Wmbf ... th&f=false

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 15:37

Philip wrote:Is there any offical figure as to how much an Arjun MK-1/2 costs/will cost in comparison with a T-90/upgraded T-90? This will give us a view as to the eeconomics of operating the two types.

Ajai Shukla's blog quotes Def Min statement in Parl that Arjun Mk2 will cost Rs 37 crore apiece, nearly double the cost of T-90S. Of course that is in the context of deriding T-XX which he is inclined to do since he quit service.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Aug 2012 15:39

the true cost of the T90 will never be known . there was a false cost given under parliamentary question by removing some stuff like the invar missiles and TI by the defence minister. then came the long running issue with gun barrels, then addl cost to procure better APDS rounds, then long running issue with TI sights, then they are attempting to put a small APU to cool the electronics atleast. If we add up all these "extras" over the years I would not be suprised to see the true cost be much highter than the false cost advanced to present a favourable comparison with arjun.

with arjun there were not any such jugglery done, and the high cost of the renk & MTU kit was ack'ed from day1. I also feel the relationship with MTU is not so good. even at 250 tanks the arjun fleet will equal or better the inventory of most western european nations however there is no sign that MTU is interested to offer their newer engines on the Mk2 atleast. one thing is sure - western europe is moving out of heavy MBTs, US buys its own engines and also supplies to israel. where will the MTU tank engines find a market now?

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 15:47

The cost of T-90 quoted in Broadsword factors in what has been pointed out here less the missiles and ammunition. Other wise the production cost of T-90S by HVF is about 11 crore, from the same page. I don't expect Col retd Shukla to have missed out on that point.

When you say that such jugglery can not be done in 'indigenous' products please remember TATRA.

pralay · Post by **pralay** » 11 Aug 2012 15:48

nelson wrote:The killing ratio of a minefield or stopping power is calculated for different tanks based on the track width among other factors. There is a near linear relation ship between the kill ratio and the track width. An increased track width will result in a higher kill ratio for same density of mines in the minefield.

The mineplough on Arjun is not just to make it look like a monster

nelson wrote:The cost of T-90 quoted in Broadsword factors in what has been pointed out here less the missiles and ammunition. Other wise the production cost of T-90S by HVF is about 11 crore, from the same page. I don't expect Col retd Shukla to have missed out on that point.

Please read other Operations books as well which elaborate the relation between Quantity and cost. Cost per unit will be less if you order Larger Quantity.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Aug 2012 15:54

TATRA was never indigenous. just CKD kits. they never even changed the right hand drive to left.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 15:55

^^That is also correct. But the scaling of mine ploughs in Armoured regiments and the tactics of using them in combat will have to be kept in mind too.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 15:58

Singha wrote:TATRA was never indigenous. just CKD kits. they never even changed the right hand drive to left.

But the percentage of indigenous content is rough about the same even though Tatra has not been labeled one. HVF is a PSU much similar to BEML and the import conditions for parts of Arjun and Tatra are the same.

This said you brought out an important aspect with respect to the engine and MTU. Even the firm order of 263, till date, is a sizeable number.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 16:05

^^^^Economies of scale of scale can be achieved, provided that many number of tanks are usable. I think that was the starting point of this 'discussion' for the past two days.

pralay · Post by **pralay** » 11 Aug 2012 16:12

nelson wrote:^^That is also correct. But the scaling of mine ploughs in Armoured regiments and the tactics of using them in combat will have to be kept in mind too.

When you complain about weight, don't you include the weight of plough in it?

And for tactics.. Tanks with ploughs are used at forward positions to make way through minefields, and other tanks follow exactly same path. So they don't use ploughs on every tank.

Besides Arjun mk2 will have anti-tank mine detector..

Economies of scale of scale can be achieved, provided that many number of tanks are usable. I think that was the starting point of this 'discussion' for the past two days.

And what is your definition of "Usable" ? We already have 2 regiments.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 11 Aug 2012 16:13

UK and France will likely be left with around 150-200 of heavies each once all proposed cuts and trims are done.
Netherland has retired all its leopards and has no plans to get any replacements.
I dunno about germany , italy and spain but they are unlikely to be more than UK or France.

what are the new MBT projects in non-Rus/non-Cheen world - south america to my knowledge has none.
turkey is likely doing something.
india, south korea and japan are the only remaining candidates.
Israel does not seem to be working on a successor to the Merk4...they are happy enough with incremental upgrades and heavy IFV like Namer for now.

the korean MBT is said to have some ground penetrating radar of sorts to detect and avoid mines...quite a force multiplier if it works in most conditions...

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 16:47

sameer_shelavale wrote:
nelson wrote:^^That is also correct. But the scaling of mine ploughs in Armoured regiments and the tactics of using them in combat will have to be kept in mind too.
When you complain about weight, don't you include the weight of plough in it?

And for tactics.. Tanks with ploughs are used at forward positions to make way through minefields, and other tanks follow exactly same path. So they don't use ploughs on every tank.

Besides Arjun mk2 will have anti-tank mine detector..

Economies of scale of scale can be achieved, provided that many number of tanks are usable. I think that was the starting point of this 'discussion' for the past two days.
And what is your definition of "Usable" ? We already have 2 regiments.

Arjun Mk1 weighs 58.5 tons without ploughs. That is heavy enough to preclude its use from a major portion of the western theatre. The 'usability' is also in this context.

For tactics, you have covered one small part but there is much more in it. I will leave it at that.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 16:59

Singha wrote:UK and France will likely be left with around 150-200 of heavies each once all proposed cuts and trims are done.
Netherland has retired all its leopards and has no plans to get any replacements.
I dunno about germany , italy and spain but they are unlikely to be more than UK or France.

what are the new MBT projects in non-Rus/non-Cheen world - south america to my knowledge has none.
turkey is likely doing something.
india, south korea and japan are the only remaining candidates.
Israel does not seem to be working on a successor to the Merk4...they are happy enough with incremental upgrades and heavy IFV like Namer for now.
...

There have been enough numbers to buy ToT. Even with larger numbers ToT will have to be bought separately. The argument of CVRDE chief and others that ToT will come only with increased quantity is questionable.

All the accusations of incompetence and shoddiness are directed at only one player, IA. In nearly twenty years of using a particular engine and its improvements, for Arjun, we are no were near making it on our own. May I know why? What does the 'R' in CVRDE stand for? Isn't it research?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Aug 2012 17:13

Arjun Mk1 weighs 58.5 tons without ploughs. That is heavy enough to preclude its use from a major portion of the western theatre.

sorry, there is no credible reason provided for us to believe this.

the tank tread width ~ risk from mines is equally hilarious. no sane commander would deploy tanks through minefields w/o de mining first. in any case, the difference in mine risk due to width would be negligible. the same can't be said about the destruction of road surface due to T-90's high ground pressure, creating mobility problems for all of army's support units.

I agree the circumstances under which the first purchase was made were peculiar, but that does not mean that GSQR was non-existent or T-90 did not meet the technical specifications contained therein.

it DOES mean so. army's GSQR at the time wanted a western type heavy. there is ABSOLUTELY no two ways about it.
the T-90 was bought as an interim purchase as an upgraded T-72 (which, in fact, is what it is)

there was no GSQR which T-90 satisfied. to give a similar example, if dassault offers a rafale Mk2 in 2020, IAF might order a couple of squadrons without needing yet another MRCA tender.

the T-90 was bought similarly, but expanded to become a full fledged purchase, when it in fact utterly failed its own trials with IA.

pralay · Post by **pralay** » 11 Aug 2012 17:18

nelson wrote:Arjun Mk1 weighs 58.5 tons without ploughs. That is heavy enough to preclude its use from a major portion of the western theatre.

"PRECLUDES" << thats says a lot man

You are actually saying that Army top brass are/were idiots to ask for heavy tank even though it is/was impossible to field heavy tanks in most of Indian War theaters.

Shouldn't the generals have asked for 45tons tank then?

Don't say that it was feasible to field heavy tank then during 70s and 80s, but its not feasible now

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 17:29

@Rahul M
The result is there for all to see. The numbers and area of operations of Arjun are restricted to a particular sector. You can question the IA/MoD through all democratic means at your disposal, including RTI.

Increased susceptibility to being a mine casualty is incidental due to increase in track width. This is a fact.

The notion that tanks enter minefield only after demining is wrong. sameer_shelavale was right when he said about using tanks and trawls in minefield, but that is only one of the minor tactics, which can not be applied in all situations. A sane commander will never take his tanks on its tracks, on road except in defiles.

If there was no restriction on gross weight of an MBT for IA at any point of time, how does it figure in the initial specifications of FMBT.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 17:32

sameer_shelavale wrote:
nelson wrote:Arjun Mk1 weighs 58.5 tons without ploughs. That is heavy enough to preclude its use from a major portion of the western theatre.
"PRECLUDES" << thats says a lot man
You are actually saying that Army top brass are/were idiots to ask for heavy tank even though it is/was impossible to field heavy tanks in most of Indian War theaters.

Shouldn't the generals have asked for 45tons tank then?

Don't say that it was feasible to field heavy tank then during 70s and 80s, but its not feasible now

I don't know, but the terrain can not be changed because the General were idiots.

Which heavy tank in 70s and 80s are you talking about ?

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 17:40

It is quite easy to dismiss the need for adequate bridging capabilities as 'tail wagging the dog'. However the need has been acknowledged and is being worked upon. To this date the success achieved has been few and far in between. Here is a list of equipment being developed towards fulfilling the need.

http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/labs/RDE%28E%29 ... chieve.jsp

member_23360 · Post by **member_23360** » 11 Aug 2012 17:58

I think , DRDO should try to sell Arjun to other countries, if DRDO succeeds in securing sizable orders, it will be a true eyeopener for IA.

but m not sure if MOD will give its NOD for exports.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 11 Aug 2012 18:37

the goal posts continue to shift.

after 10m bridges, R&D in metallurgy, to vague references to GQSRs which no one has seen (of course RTI) we are now on track width, mines

, 200 orders are sufficient, where convenient "I don't know' etc

(mines are so a show stopper when the tin cans turrets fly off and other things slice through them - but they fit the weight catgeory)

There is great faith in the makers of huffy and tuffy to come up with specs for a FMBT

sure sure

the drones keep buzzing

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Aug 2012 18:48

nelson wrote: I don't know, but the terrain can not be changed because the General were idiots.

but tincan's inbuilt russian magic changes the terrain, is it ? of course, it has a higher ground pressure AND lower power to weight ration than arjun, so it must do better than arjun, defying the laws of physics in the process.

I wonder if the people who make such arguments would like to apply for the physics nobel prize alongside such luminaries as agha waqar ahmad, the inventor of the pakistani water car.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 19:02

Terrain also includes obstacles or gaps (wet and dry). A bridge or a crossing does not see ground pressure, it sees weight. Military Load Classification is a term used to denote the maximum weight.

Please apply your mind before laughing at others. I am reporting your post.

The same point was brought out in this forum, by another member, <del> some time back. Sorry that was in this thread only.

Gurneesh wrote:
rohitvats wrote:...

Sorry, but in this case, there is a problem with the army. The Arjun weighs, looks and feels the way it is because IA GSQR wanted it that way. As for the terrain and weight - well, the ground pressure of Arjun is lesser than T-90. It can go places where even T-90 cannot. BRF has a detailed history of discussion on the Arjun topic. You might want to scan that.
Arjun has lower ground pressure than T90 which means it will be better in spongy terrain (like marshes, sand etc).

But a bridge sees only gross weight (and not ground pressure) and T90 might have an advantage here.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 11 Aug 2012 19:12

If you want monologues and others only to applaud without contesting the points put forth, fine. But that will be doing disservice to the traditions of BRF and there would be no need to call it a forum.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 11 Aug 2012 19:25

Can we all refrain from using emoticons in a serious and extended discussion please?

TIA.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 11 Aug 2012 19:50

On bridges in India.

The load rating of bridges should be public knowledge. For purely civilian purposes EVERY bridge should have TWO ratings: one a load rating and a "health" (there is another term which escapes me right now) rating. The load rating is determined at design time - it HAS to be predetermined WAY prior to construction and consists of Dead + Live + Secondary loading. This thinking has been in place for EONS. (The other rating is used for funding purposes.)

A few things:

1) The load rating of a bridge should be public knowledge - I assume pretty much every bridge was designed by a public agency.
2) I am not too sure, but I very much doubt that some/certain bridges (in India) fell under the MoD (unlike in the US, where the entire Interstate actually belongs to the DoD). IF none of them did, then the chances of designing a load for military capacity would decline. It is natural - since the cost would escalate substantially if it is for the military
3) All that matters - from a bridge PoV - is the Live and Secondary weights. Ground pressure makes NO diff on a bridge.It cannot. Since it is the cumulative ground pressure that matters = should be the weight of the item crossing the bridge
4) Since most bridges in India ("western front") were designed in an era when India had relatively low load requirements (50-60+ years ago) I find it hard to believe that the same bridges would sustain more aggressive loading. Some may, some others could need redesigns. But, I would expect MOST to be at about 90% capacity today (based on design values from years ago). And, I bet a handful would be at 50% of capacity
5) And, even in the best cases, my expectation would be, that the capacity of a bridge would be reduced. Tanks may be able to go across. But, as opposed to a well designed bridge that allows X number of tanks per (say) an hour, these would allow X-n (may be that is good enough)

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 11 Aug 2012 21:19

I would say if protection is not at priority #1, then your are not protected by the protection forces. IA needs protection as #1 priority considering equality among fire power that is available with every nation. Terrorist nations are even more capable and advancing than formal Geneva followers.

Firepower of course should not be below any thing less than the enemy forces. Which I think Arjun has not compromised at all.

Mobility of Arjun Mk1 was excellent even with the added weight.

There are other features like BFMS, active protection, firing missiles, etc.. to enhance efficiency and fire power.

This argument only about weight factor is totally lame... and totally misguided.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 11 Aug 2012 21:52

nelson wrote:GSQR -> RFP -> Procurement of T-90 in 2001, 2006, 2007. I don't need to use RTI because I think I have sufficient first hand knowledge of the issue at hand.

The level of ignorance is quite stupefying...you are commenting on a topic which you clearly don't understand.

If you understood anything about T-90 induction saga, you'd know that -

- green light for induction was given by the IA after conducting trials of T-90 in SIBERA...Last I checked, IA has no plans of fighting for Slavs in Far-East

- The of the two tanks which went through trials, one tank's engine failed and had to be replaced. This engine failed while covering only ~20% of the claimed performance of T-90.

- The engine's actual output is less than 90% of the brochure claims...this degrades further in desert heat.

- The NVDs on the tank were not allowed to be stripped and hence, IA team could not comment on the maintainability of the these sites.

So, after all the above, you think T-90 met some mythical GSQR?

Oh! and by the way, IA's GSQR called for a four-man crew and western style heavy tank. Show me a 50T 4-man MBT and I have a white-domes building to sell to you in Agra.

ravar · Post by **ravar** » 11 Aug 2012 21:59

^^^ If what the article highlights about the rejection of Mk 2 in numbers that otherwise would have been favourable for an Economy of Scale is indeed true, the point that I am not able to get is what is the Defence Minister, Mr. Antony doing (or not doing in all this). I thought that in any project management good leadership is the key. Though RM can take control of only the macro management, he should have been able to take stock and steer the nation away from such fiascos. Fix accountability impartially and let heads roll! Or as is typical in a babucracy, will more steering/standing and 'sitting' committees be formed and he allows the circus to continue.

He allows Mk 2 development but hears from IA at the end of the trials that the tank is overweight. So, was the army not in the loop regarding the weight characteristics until the prototype came for the trials? Why can't he question the fallacy of the argument and call the bluff. But really, how much of a say does an RM have over the decision makers in the army? Is the RM just a mute witness to this or as a leader responsible for the defence and self reliance of this country, can't he say 'enough is enough'!

IMHO what is required of him is to take charge, ask IA to have a design team/institution just like the IN, give more powers to implement whatever it takes and fix accountability (hot stove principle). He should ask them (includes all wings of military) to come up with an indigenisation roadmap with a cutoff date for achieving total indigenisation (say, 25 years from now)! Support them to the hilt (if they want some DARPA-isque equivalent to leapfrog or a chaebol-isque MIC to deliver, sanction that) ; but tell them that there would not be any more imports after the cutoff date. Whatever is made after that will be their responsibility (hence, they will have to come up with new ideas and commit) and they will have to live with it! The current easy-way out through imports is the cause of their flippant attitude towards indigenisation! Give them the Hobson's choice and see how the creative juices will flow!

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 11 Aug 2012 22:03

http://livefist.blogspot.in/2012/08/ind ... ealed.html
The C-17 Globemaster to be inducted by the Indian Air Force (IAF) has a maximum payload of 75 tonnes — insufficient to airlift the 67 tonne Arjun Mk-2 with attendant support equipment.

what I am saying is this.. where is the need to air-lift any tanks? given our borders BD, Pakis and chips, we can reach destination in numbers by road and rail faster than air drops. Even if the tonnage was 50tons, it can't be airlifted by C130Js.. and it is in poor taste that livefist should say this:

Arjun cannot be airlifted by the IL-76 and C-130 J transports of the Indian Air Force (IAF).

C130 has max 16Tons. It CAN NOT lift the tin cans as well. that is bad argument and reporting. And the worst insinuations is IL76 being referred. By the same logic that 75T can't lift 67T with support equipments, how come IL76 with max40-50T payload be able to lift the tin cans weight 50+ tons.

This is very badly researched reporting by atul chandra.

And we have drum beating crowd following up with this type of DDMish reporting..

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Aug 2012 22:03

nrao sahab, the rajasthan front does not feature bridges, only the punjab one does. max weight has no relevance there since the army already operates the relevant bridging equipment for whatever canals the pakis might have dug on the other side of the borer.

even in punjab, whether the bridges over the canals are rated for that weight class is unknown to most of us. we are told by some that they are not. whether that is true is anybody's guess. after all, even the flimsiest and most dangerous bridges around the country routinely carry heavy duty trucks which easily weigh in that ballpark.
_______________
about serious discussion, it's hard to keep a straight face and avoid emoticons when confronted by farcial reasonings.