Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II

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brihaspati
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

But on the other hand - aren't they now showing they are not left liberal - by opening up the economy to FDI in retail etc? The petrol/diesel price hike is aof course a grand drama, with the markup process well hidden, and the whole process of marking up and then subsidizing it is a hilarious process after all. But still, arent' they showing their "capitalist" roots?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RamaY »

Bji

What is the possibility of ROL melting into the smoke-screens pushing RoP to the front (using manufactured riots) making it the visible enemy of SD in Bharat?

I think RoL doesn't want to come out open until it has sufficient numbers (around 15-20% of the population).

I see this trend around the world already. If not for current jihadi noise, the perfidy of RoL would have been very clearly visible all over the world.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

They have consistently remained silent or MIA when Islamics have gone on the offensive - on almost all recent issues, except, the "love jihad" issue in God's own country in 2009-10. The holy city has of course been in trouble internally for some time, so the outposts on Hadrian's walls all over the world probably have been asked to reduce visibility until the imperial power struggles become more manageable. But why the non-holy-city ones too following the same tactics? that could however be related to the financial crisis.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

In order to understand what we see aorund today, we need to understand totalitarianism. Even though the western study of totalitarianism was geared towards painting their rivals in the power business - the Nazis and Communists, the insights of those studies can be applied to totalitarian mindsets from even the Sumerian times to Akhenaten to Roman Chistianity to Islamism.

The greatest danger that is shaping up now - is that we are slipping more and more into a future of totalitarianism, and the tragedy is that we might be laughing at the very notion. Do remember that to be slipping into totalitarianism, we don;t actually need an Adolf Hitler, or a Yosif Jugashvili - and very "secular", very "liberal", parliamentary democracies can equally be nurturers and protectors of future totalitarianism under an overt pretension of "progressive" slogans.

I have restarted my studies of totalitarian systems after a long time, and was really thankful to the one who logged me into Viktor Suvorov. Here is a quote from one of his better known translations : here his angst is against the USSR, but we can see the generalizations applicable even to our current situation.

http://scilib.narod.ru/Military/Suvorof ... _army.html
Why don't they protest? Why don't they rebel? Can they really enjoy living like this? Why are they silent?
An excursion guide once showed me an area in a large Western city which he said was entirely controlled by the Mafia. Prostitutes, drug-peddlers, shoeblacks, shopkeepers, owners of restaurants, cafes and hotels – all of them controlled, and protected by the Mafia.

Once we had emerged, unscathed, from this unhappy district, in our large tourist bus, and felt that we were back in safety, I put these same questions to our apprehensive guide. Why the hell didn't they protest? Everyone living there had grown up in freedom and democracy; behind them lay centuries of freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly. Yet, despite these centuries-old traditions, the inhabitants were silent. They had a free press on their side, the population of the entire country, running into many millions, the police, political parties, parliament, the government itself. And yet they said nothing. They made no protest.

The society from which I fled is not simply a spacious well-lit prison, providing free medical care and full employment. It, too, is under the control of a Mafia.
The difference between Soviet society and the Western city which I visited, is that those who live where I used to live are unable to turn to the police for help, because the police themselves represent the mailed fist of our Mafia. The army is another section – the most aggressive one – of the Soviet Mafia. The government is the ruling body of the Mafia: parliament is the old people's home in which the aged leaders of the Mafia are cared for. Press, television, the judges, the prosecutors – these are not influenced by the Mafia – they are the Mafia.

[...] In their place, they [foreign tourists in USSR] think, I would write to the papers, or organise a demonstration. But clearly the KGB has stifled inhabitants so that they are unable to protest. The KGB has driven them to their knees and made them slaves.

My friend, you are right. We are slaves: we are on our knees: we are silent: we do not protest.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by abhischekcc »

I read the beginning parts of the Suvorov Book. It gives an interesting insight into the way the balance of power existed between the party, Army and KGB. What was more interesting was how it enabled me to read Russian politics after the collapse of the berlin wall and communism.

In the 80s and early 90s, high party officials had first taken over control (before end of communism), and then ownership (after the collapse) of Russia's economic crown jewels. These people had gathered around Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin (who himself was a big owner in Gazprom). The change happened when Putin was installed by this very coterie under the (mistaken) assumption that he would continue with policies favorable to them. After settling down, he turned the tables and forced most of them to give up their assets. And in the tumultuous years following the fall of the USSR, the army was controlled by simply shutting off it money supply. IOW, KGB was the final winner in the tripartite contest between the three power centers.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

Bji, I dont know what you know about the 1975-1977 Emergency in India and Suvorov's angst reflects the situation in India during those years to a perfect match.


Bji limiting the study to modern totalitarian systems excludes a big inspiration that sustains them: One God hypothesis.

I fully agree with your comment that:
In order to understand what we see aorund today, we need to understand totalitarianism. Even though the western study of totalitarianism was geared towards painting their rivals in the power business - the Nazis and Communists, the insights of those studies can be applied to totalitarian mindsets from even the Sumerian times to Akhenaten to Roman Chistianity to Islamism.
INC in India is transforming itself into elected totalitarian system.

Have you heard of Mosca's Iron Law?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Yes. Micheles gave the name I think (all three of them worked on it, including Pareto). Many thanks for the pointer actually! While Mosca wrote of it almost in a Churchillian way, semi-justifying it, Pareto was more critical. I have been studying the development of personality cults as a political tactic for continuing corruptive elite power, and your "Iron Law" provides a missing piece of the puzzle.

What I am worried about more is that with ongoing increasing integration (biz+pol) with the west as well as elsewhere, like say China, that timelsess class of Indian elite who were always collaborators - with each invading/imperial regime, and who have managed to stay on in power as oligarchy - will find ways and means to subvert, again.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

Bji, MY take is Mosca's Iron Law applies to INC after Independence. Mahatma Gandhi wanted to disband it. After Independence we see double application of Pareto's law to the Nehru-Gandhi family.

Version of Mosca's Iron Law as I got it:

Regardless of the purpose for which and organization is established,it will, sooner or later, serve the personal advancement of its leaders.
Pareto's law is the 80:20 rule. 20 percent will garner 80% of the resources. If you apply it again 1% will control over 90 % of the resources just as INC is doing.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

One way is to constantly keep it shaky. Introduce new members and broaden the base. Use external heterogeneities opportunistically to eliminate the whole lot in a subregion [as they did in Russia] and use other parts of the oligarchy itself to digest a given part [ as in the transition through Indian independence - more a cooption of pliable aspirants to oligrach status].

Massive communication infrastructure is becoming uncontrollable by a small oligarchy, and long term - their days are numbered. Another century at most unless shift base to Mars and build empires all over again. Almost 99% of the accumulated data is beyond current analytical capacity, and its growing faster than exponential. Impossible to stop subversion and diffusion of centres of control.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

It will be good to observe the separatist movements within pure-"west" nations - they all seem to be intensifying suddenly over the last 1.5 years. Canadian-Quebec, Spanish-Catalan, UK-Scotland. Scots want to go for referndum by 2014, and David doesnt want to be on spot if it goes ahead.

It is to be seen if they are experimenting in a very planned way, as it is an important window on their laboratory mindsets into how they want to use separatism elsewhere.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012 ... cr--58.asp
'Jammu gets Rs 194 Cr, Kashmir Rs 553 Cr'
Madrassa Funding
ABID BASHIR

Srinagar, Oct 10: Ruling out that the Jammu and Kashmir has received any financial assistance for Madrassas from outside India, the J&K Government Wednesday said Rs 194 crores were released for Madrassas in Jammu and Rs 553 crores for Kashmir region by New Delhi and the state government.
The government stated that Rs 6.30 cores have been sanctioned for the 11 NGOs of Kashmir. The figures have been dished out in reply to a query raised by independent legislator, Engineer Rasheed.
“Rs 194 crores have been released for various Madrassas based in various districts of Jammu for the year 2011-12. Similarly, Rs 553 crores have been released for the Madrassas based in Kashmir,” the reply reads.
It further states that 11 NGOs based in valley have been provided with the financial assistance of Rs 5.25 crore in 2009-10 and Rs 6.30 crore in 2011-12.
Interesting - we do spend tax-payer money on madrassahs.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan ... er-25-2012
An interesting map of the protests in Pakiland. The hotspots are an indication of the Islamist strength and organized strength to boot. They are along the Afghan border and along the Indian border - and more concentrated in the north proximal to the Pindi heartland. That will be the base for the next Paki jihad.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Samudragupta »

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: The Man Who Knew The Future Of Pakistan Before Its Creation
Congress president Maulana Abul Kalam Azad gave the following interview to journalist Shorish Kashmiri for a Lahore based Urdu magazine, Chattan, in April 1946. It was a time when the Cabinet Mission was holding its proceedings in Delhi and Simla. Azad made some startling predictions during the course of the interview, saying that religious conflict would tear apart Pakistan and its eastern half would carve out its own future. He even said that Pakistan’s incompetent rulers might pave the way for military rule.

According to Shorish Kashmiri, Azad had earmarked the early hours of the morning for him and the interview was conducted over a period of two weeks. This interview has not been published in any book so far — neither in the Azad centenary volumes nor in any other book comprising his writing or speeches — except for Kashmiri’s own book Abul Kalam Azad, which was printed only once by Matbooat Chattan Lahore, a now-defunct publishing house. Former Union Cabinet Minister Arif Mohammed Khan discovered the book after searching for many years and translated the interview for COVERT



Q: The Hindu Muslim dispute has become so acute that it has foreclosed any possibility of reconciliation. Don’t you think that in this situation the birth of Pakistan has become inevitable?

A: If Pakistan were the solution of Hindu Muslim problem, then I would have extended my support to it. A section of Hindu opinion is now turning in its favour. By conceding NWFP, Sind, Balochistan and half of Punjab on one side and half of Bengal on the other, they think they will get the rest of India — a huge country that would be free from any claims of communal nature. If we use the Muslim League terminology, this new India will be a Hindu state both practically and temperamentally.

This will not happen as a result of any conscious decision, but will be a logical consequence of its social realities. How can you expect a society that consists 90% of Hindus, who have lived with their ethos and values since prehistoric times, to grow differently? The factors that laid the foundation of Islam in Indian society and created a powerful following have become victim of the politics of partition. The communal hatred it has generated has completely extinguished all possibilities of spreading and preaching Islam. This communal politics has hurt the religion beyond measure. Muslims have turned away from the Quran. If they had taken their lessons from the Quran and the life of the Holy Prophet and had not forged communal politics in the name of religion then Islam’s growth would not have halted. By the time of the decline of the Mughal rule, the Muslims in India were a little over 22.5 million, that is about 65% of the present numbers.

Since then the numbers kept increasing. If the Muslim politicians had not used the offensive language that embittered communal relations, and the other section acting as agents of British interests had not worked to widen the Hindu-Muslim breach, the number of Muslims in India would have grown higher. The political disputes we created in the name of religion have projected Islam as an instrument of political power and not what it is — a value system meant for the transformation of human soul. Under British influence, we turned Islam into a confined system, and following in the footsteps of other communities like Jews, Parsis and Hindus we transformed ourselves into a hereditary community.

The Indian Muslims have frozen Islam and its message and divided themselves into many sects. Some sects were clearly born at the instance of colonial power. Consequently, these sects became devoid of all movement and dynamism and lost faith in Islamic values. The hallmark of Muslim existence was striving and now the very term is strange to them. Surely they are Muslims, but they follow their own whims and desires. In fact now they easily submit to political power, not to Islamic values. They prefer the religion of politics not the religion of the Quran. Pakistan is a political standpoint.

Regardless of the fact whether it is the right solution to the problems of Indian Muslims, it is being demanded in the name of Islam. The question is when and where Islam provided for division of territories to settle populations on the basis of belief and unbelief. Does this find any sanction in the Quran or the traditions of the Holy Prophet? Who among the scholars of Islam has divided the dominion of God on this basis? If we accept this division in principle, how shall we reconcile it with Islam as a universal system?

How shall we explain the ever growing Muslim presence in non-Muslim lands including India? Do they realise that if Islam had approved this principle then it would not have permitted its followers to go to the non-Muslim lands and many ancestors of the supporters of Pakistan would not have had even entered the fold of Islam?

Division of territories on the basis of religion is a contraption devised by Muslim League. They can pursue it as their political agenda, but it finds no sanction in Islam or Quran. What is the cherished goal of a devout Muslim? Spreading the light of Islam or dividing territories along religious lines to pursue political ambitions? The demand for Pakistan has not benefited Muslims in any manner. How Pakistan can benefit Islam is a moot question and will largely depend on the kind of leadership it gets.

The impact of western thought and philosophy has made the crisis more serious. The way the leadership of Muslim League is conducting itself will ensure that Islam will become a rare commodity in Pakistan and Muslims in India. This is a surmise and God alone knows what is in the womb of future. Pakistan, when it comes into existence, will face conflicts of religious nature.

As far as I can see, the people who will hold the reins of power will cause serious damage to Islam. Their behaviour may result in the total alienation of the Pakistani youth who may become a part of non-religious movements. Today, in Muslim minority states the Muslim youth are more attached to religion than in Muslim majority states. You will see that despite the increased role of Ulema, the religion will lose its sheen in Pakistan.



Q: But many Ulema are with Quaid-e-Azam [M.A. Jinnah].

A: Many Ulema were with Akbare Azam too; they invented a new religion for him. Do not discuss individuals. Our history is replete with the doings of the Ulema who have brought humiliation and disgrace to Islam in every age and period.

The upholders of truth are exceptions. How many of the Ulema find an honourable mention in the Muslim history of the last 1,300 years? There was one Imam Hanbal, one Ibn Taimiyya. In India we remember no Ulema except Shah Waliullah and his family. The courage of Alf Sani is beyond doubt, but those who filled the royal office with complaints against him and got him imprisoned were also Ulema. Where are they now? Does anybody show any respect to them?



Q: Maulana, what is wrong if Pakistan becomes a reality? After all, “Islam” is being used to pursue and protect the unity of the community.

A: You are using the name of Islam for a cause that is not right by Islamic standards. Muslim history bears testimony to many such enormities. In the battle of Jamal [fought between Imam Ali and Hadrat Aisha, widow of the Holy Prophet] Qurans were displayed on lances. Was that right? In Karbala the family members of the Holy Prophet were martyred by those Muslims who claimed companionship of the Prophet. Was that right? Hajjaj was a Muslim general and he subjected the holy mosque at Makka to brutal attack. Was that right? No sacred words can justify or sanctify a false motive.

If Pakistan was right for Muslims then I would have supported it. But I see clearly the dangers inherent in the demand. I do not expect people to follow me, but it is not possible for me to go against the call of my conscience. People generally submit either to coercion or to the lessons of their experience. Muslims will not hear anything against Pakistan unless they experience it. Today they can call white black, but they will not give up Pakistan. The only way it can be stopped now is either for the government not to concede it or for Mr Jinnah himself — if he agrees to some new proposal.

Now as I gather from the attitude of my own colleagues in the working committee, the division of India appears to be certain. But I must warn that the evil consequences of partition will not affect India alone, Pakistan will be equally haunted by them. The partition will be based on the religion of the population and not based on any natural barrier like mountain, desert or river. A line will be drawn; it is difficult to say how durable it would be.

We must remember that an entity conceived in hatred will last only as long as that hatred lasts. This hatred will overwhelm the relations between India and Pakistan. In this situation it will not be possible for India and Pakistan to become friends and live amicably unless some catastrophic event takes place. The politics of partition itself will act as a barrier between the two countries. It will not be possible for Pakistan to accommodate all the Muslims of India, a task beyond her territorial capability. On the other hand, it will not be possible for the Hindus to stay especially in West Pakistan. They will be thrown out or leave on their own. This will have its repercussions in India and the Indian Muslims will have three options before them:

1. They become victims of loot and brutalities and migrate to Pakistan; but how many Muslims can find shelter there?

2. They become subject to murder and other excesses. A substantial number of Muslims will pass through this ordeal until the bitter memories of partition are forgotten and the generation that had lived through it completes its natural term.

3. A good number of Muslims, haunted by poverty, political wilderness and regional depredation decide to renounce Islam.

The prominent Muslims who are supporters of Muslim League will leave for Pakistan. The wealthy Muslims will take over the industry and business and monopolise the economy of Pakistan. But more than 30 million Muslims will be left behind in India. What promise Pakistan holds for them? The situation that will arise after the expulsion of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan will be still more dangerous for them. Pakistan itself will be afflicted by many serious problems. The greatest danger will come from international powers who will seek to control the new country, and with the passage of time this control will become tight. India will have no problem with this outside interference as it will sense danger and hostility from Pakistan.

The other important point that has escaped Mr Jinnah’s attention is Bengal. He does not know that Bengal disdains outside leadership and rejects it sooner or later. During World War II, Mr Fazlul Haq revolted against Jinnah and was thrown out of the Muslim League. Mr H.S. Suhrawardy does not hold Jinnah in high esteem. Why only Muslim League, look at the history of Congress. The revolt of Subhas Chandra Bose is known to all. Gandhiji was not happy with the presidentship of Bose and turned the tide against him by going on a fast unto death at Rajkot. Subhas Bose rose against Gandhiji and disassociated himself from the Congress. The environment of Bengal is such that it disfavours leadership from outside and rises in revolt when it senses danger to its rights and interests.

The confidence of East Pakistan will not erode as long as Jinnah and Liaquat Ali are alive. But after them any small incident will create resentment and disaffection. I feel that it will not be possible for East Pakistan to stay with West Pakistan for any considerable period of time. There is nothing common between the two regions except that they call themselves Muslims. But the fact of being Muslim has never created durable political unity anywhere in the world. The Arab world is before us; they subscribe to a common religion, a common civilisation and culture and speak a common language.

In fact they acknowledge even territorial unity. But there is no political unity among them. Their systems of government are different and they are often engaged in mutual recrimination and hostility. On the other hand, the language, customs and way of life of East Pakistan are totally different from West Pakistan. The moment the creative warmth of Pakistan cools down, the contradictions will emerge and will acquire assertive overtones. These will be fuelled by the clash of interests of international powers and consequently both wings will separate.

After the separation of East Pakistan, whenever it happens, West Pakistan will become the battleground of regional contradictions and disputes. The assertion of sub-national identities of Punjab, Sind, Frontier and Balochistan will open the doors for outside interference. It will not be long before the international powers use the diverse elements of Pakistani political leadership to break the country on the lines of Balkan and Arab states. Maybe at that stage we will ask ourselves, what have we gained and what have we lost.

The real issue is economic development and progress, it certainly is not religion. Muslim business leaders have doubts about their own ability and competitive spirit. They are so used to official patronage and favours that they fear new freedom and liberty. They advocate the two-nation theory to conceal their fears and want to have a Muslim state where they have the monopoly to control the economy without any competition from competent rivals. It will be interesting to watch how long they can keep this deception alive.



I feel that right from its inception, Pakistan will face some very serious problems:

1. The incompetent political leadership will pave the way for military dictatorship as it has happened in many Muslim countries.

2. The heavy burden of foreign debt.

3. Absence of friendly relationship with neighbours and the possibility of armed conflict.

4. Internal unrest and regional conflicts.

5. The loot of national wealth by the neo-rich and industrialists of Pakistan.

6. The apprehension of class war as a result of exploitation by the neo-rich.

7. The dissatisfaction and alienation of the youth from religion and the collapse of the theory of Pakistan.

8. The conspiracies of the international powers to control Pakistan.

In this situation, the stability of Pakistan will be under strain and the Muslim countries will be in no position to provide any worthwhile help. The assistance from other sources will not come without strings and it will force both ideological and territorial compromises.



Q: But the question is how Muslims can keep their community identity intact and how they can inculcate the attributes of the citizens of a Muslim state.

A: Hollow words cannot falsify the basic realities nor slanted questions can make the answers deficient. It amounts to distortion of the discourse. What is meant by community identity? If this community identity has remained intact during the British slavery, how will it come under threat in a free India in whose affairs Muslims will be equal participants? What attributes of the Muslim state you wish to cultivate?

The real issue is the freedom of faith and worship and who can put a cap on that freedom. Will independence reduce the 90 million Muslims into such a helpless state that they will feel constrained in enjoying their religious freedom? If the British, who as a world power could not snatch this liberty, what magic or power do the Hindus have to deny this freedom of religion? These questions have been raised by those, who, under the influence of western culture, have renounced their own heritage and are now raising dust through political gimmickry.

Muslim history is an important part of Indian history. Do you think the Muslim kings were serving the cause of Islam? They had a nominal relationship with Islam; they were not Islamic preachers. Muslims of India owe their gratitude to Sufis, and many of these divines were treated by the kings very cruelly.

Most of the kings created a large band of Ulema who were an obstacle in the path of the propagation of Islamic ethos and values. Islam, in its pristine form, had a tremendous appeal and in the first century won the hearts and minds of a large number of people living in and around Hejaz. But the Islam that came to India was different, the carriers were non-Arabs and the real spirit was missing. Still, the imprint of the Muslim period is writ large on the culture, music, art, architecture and languages of India. What do the cultural centres of India, like Delhi and Lucknow, represent? The underlying Muslim spirit is all too obvious.

If the Muslims still feel under threat and believe that they will be reduced to slavery in free India then I can only pray for their faith and hearts. If a man becomes disenchanted with life he can be helped to revival, but if someone is timid and lacks courage, then it is not possible to help him become brave and gutsy. The Muslims as a community have become cowards. They have no fear of God, instead they fear men. This explains why they are so obsessed with threats to their existence — a figment of their imagination.

After British takeover, the government committed all possible excesses against the Muslims. But Muslims did not cease to exist. On the contrary, they registered a growth that was more than average. The Muslim cultural ethos and values have their own charm. Then India has large Muslim neighbours on three sides. Why on earth the majority in this country will be interested to wipe out the Muslims? How will it promote their self interests? Is it so easy to finish 90 million people? In fact, Muslim culture has such attraction that I shall not be surprised if it comes to have the largest following in free India.

The world needs both, a durable peace and a philosophy of life. If the Hindus can run after Marx and undertake scholarly studies of the philosophy and wisdom of the West, they do not disdain Islam and will be happy to benefit from its principles. In fact they are more familiar with Islam and acknowledge that Islam does not mean parochialism of a hereditary community or a despotic system of governance.

Islam is a universal call to establish peace on the basis of human equality. They know that Islam is the proclamation of a Messenger who calls to the worship of God and not his own worship. Islam means freedom from all social and economic discriminations and reorganisation of society on three basic principles of God-consciousness, righteous action and knowledge.

In fact, it is we Muslims and our extremist behaviour that has created an aversion among non-Muslims for Islam. If we had not allowed our selfish ambitions to soil the purity of Islam then many seekers of truth would have found comfort in the bosom of Islam. Pakistan has nothing to do with Islam; it is a political demand that is projected by Muslim League as the national goal of Indian Muslims. I feel it is not the solution to the problems Muslims are facing. In fact it is bound to create more problems.

The Holy Prophet has said, “God has made the whole earth a mosque for me.” Now do not ask me to support the idea of the partition of a mosque. If the nine-crore Muslims were thinly scattered all over India, and demand was made to reorganise the states in a manner to ensure their majority in one or two regions, that was understandable. Again such a demand would not have been right from an Islamic viewpoint, but justifiable on administrative grounds.

But the situation, as it exists, is drastically different. All the border states of India have Muslim majorities sharing borders with Muslim countries.

Tell me, who can eliminate these populations? By demanding Pakistan we are turning our eyes away from the history of the last 1,000 years and, if I may use the League terminology, throwing more than 30 million Muslims into the lap of “Hindu Raj”. The Hindu Muslim problem that has created political tension between Congress and League will become a source of dispute between the two states and with the aid of international powers this may erupt into full scale war anytime in future.

The question is often raised that if the idea of Pakistan is so fraught with dangers for the Muslims, why is it being opposed by the Hindus? I feel that the opposition to the demand is coming from two quarters. One is represented by those who genuinely feel concerned about imperial machinations and strongly believe that a free, united India will be in a better position to defend itself.

On the other hand, there is a section who opposes Pakistan with the motive to provoke Muslims to become more determined in their demand and thus get rid of them. Muslims have every right to demand constitutional safeguards, but partition of India cannot promote their interests. The demand is the politically incorrect solution of a communal problem.

In future India will be faced with class problems, not communal disputes; the conflict will be between capital and labour. The communist and socialist movements are growing and it is not possible to ignore them. These movements will increasingly fight for the protection of the interest of the underclass.

The Muslim capitalists and the feudal classes are apprehensive of this impending threat. Now they have given this whole issue a communal colour and have turned the economic issue into a religious dispute. But Muslims alone are not responsible for it. This strategy was first adopted by the British government and then endorsed by the political minds of Aligarh. Later, Hindu short-sightedness made matters worse and now freedom has become contingent on the partition of India.

Jinnah himself was an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. In one Congress session Sarojini Naidu had commended him with this title. He was a disciple of Dadabhai Naoroji. He had refused to join the 1906 deputation of Muslims that initiated communal politics in India. In 1919 he stood firmly as a nationalist and opposed Muslim demands before the Joint Select Committee.

On 3 October 1925, in a letter to the Times of India he rubbished the suggestion that Congress is a Hindu outfit. In the All Parties Conferences of 1925 and 1928, he strongly favoured a joint electorate. While speaking at the National Assembly in 1925, he said, “I am a nationalist first and a nationalist last” and exhorted his colleagues, be they Hindus or Muslims, “not to raise communal issues in the House and help make the Assembly a national institution in the truest sense of the term”.

In 1928, Jinnah supported the Congress call to boycott Simon Commission. Till 1937, he did not favour the demand to partition India. In his message to various student bodies he stressed the need to work for Hindu Muslim unity. But he felt aggrieved when the Congress formed governments in seven states and ignored the Muslim League. In 1940 he decided to pursue the partition demand to check Muslim political decline.

In short, the demand for Pakistan is his response to his own political experiences. Mr Jinnah has every right to his opinion about me, but I have no doubts about his intelligence. As a politician he has worked overtime to fortify Muslim communalism and the demand for Pakistan. Now it has become a matter of prestige for him and he will not give it up at any cost.



Q: It is clear that Muslims are not going to turn away from their demand for Pakistan. Why have they become so impervious to all reason and logic of arguments?

A: It is difficult, rather impossible, to fight against the misplaced enthusiasm of a mob, but to suppress one’s conscience is worse than death. Today the Muslims are not walking, they are flowing. The problem is that Muslims have not learnt to walk steady; they either run or flow with the tide. When a group of people lose confidence and self-respect, they are surrounded by imaginary doubts and dangers and fail to make a distinction between the right and the wrong.

The true meaning of life is realised not through numerical strength but through firm faith and righteous action. British politics has sown many seeds of fear and distrust in the mental field of Muslims. Now they are in a frightful state, bemoaning the departure of the British and demanding partition before the foreign masters leave. Do they believe that partition will avert all the dangers to their lives and bodies? If these dangers are real then they will still haunt their borders and any armed conflict will result in much greater loss of lives and possessions.



Q: But Hindus and Muslims are two different nations with different and disparate inclinations. How can the unity between the two be achieved?

A: This is an obsolete debate. I have seen the correspondence between Allama Iqbal and Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni on the subject. In the Quran the term qaum has been used not only for the community of believers but has also been used for distinct human groupings generally. What do we wish to achieve by raising this debate about the etymological scope of terms like millat [community], qaum [nation] and ummat [group]? In religious terms India is home to many people — the Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis, Sikhs etc.

The differences between Hindu religion and Islam are vast in scope. But these differences cannot be allowed to become an obstacle in the path of India gaining her freedom nor do the two distinct and different systems of faith negate the idea of unity of India. The issue is of our national independence and how we can secure it. Freedom is a blessing and is the right of every human being. It cannot be divided on the basis of religion.

Muslims must realise that they are bearers of a universal message. They are not a racial or regional grouping in whose territory others cannot enter. Strictly speaking, Muslims in India are not one community; they are divided among many well-entrenched sects. You can unite them by arousing their anti-Hindu sentiment but you cannot unite them in the name of Islam. To them Islam means undiluted loyalty to their own sect.

Apart from Wahhabi, Sunni and Shia there are innumerable groups who owe allegiance to different saints and divines. Small issues like raising hands during the prayer and saying Amen loudly have created disputes that defy solution. The Ulema have used the instrument of takfeer [fatwas declaring someone as infidel] liberally. Earlier, they used to take Islam to the disbelievers; now they take away Islam from the believers. Islamic history is full of instances of how good and pious Muslims were branded kafirs. Prophets alone had the capability to cope with these mindboggling situations. Even they had to pass through times of afflictions and trials. The fact is that when reason and intelligence are abandoned and attitudes become fossilised then the job of the reformer becomes very difficult.

But today the situation is worse than ever. Muslims have become firm in their communalism; they prefer politics to religion and follow their worldly ambitions as commands of religion. History bears testimony to the fact that in every age we ridiculed those who pursued the good with consistency, snuffed out the brilliant examples of sacrifice and tore the flags of selfless service. Who are we, the ordinary mortals; even high ranking Prophets were not spared by these custodians of traditions and customs.



Q: You closed down your journal Al-Hilal a long time back. Was it due to your disappointment with the Muslims who were wallowing in intellectual desolation, or did you feel like proclaiming azan [call to prayer] in a barren desert?

A: I abandoned Al-Hilal not because I had lost faith in its truth. This journal created great awareness among a large section of Muslims. They renewed their faith in Islam, in human freedom and in consistent pursuit of righteous goals. In fact my own life was greatly enriched by this experience and I felt like those who had the privilege of learning under the companionship of the Messenger of God.

My own voice entranced me and under its impact I burnt out like a phoenix. Al-Hilal had served its purpose and a new age was dawning. Based on my experiences, I made a reappraisal of the situation and decided to devote all my time and energy for the attainment of our national freedom. I was firm in my belief that freedom of Asia and Africa largely depends on India’s freedom and Hindu Muslim unity is key to India’s freedom.

Even before the First World War, I had realised that India was destined to attain freedom, and no power on earth would be able to deny it. I was also clear in my mind about the role of Muslims. I ardently wished that Muslims would learn to walk together with their countrymen and not give an opportunity to history to say that when Indians were fighting for their independence, Muslims were looking on as spectators. Let nobody say that instead of fighting the waves they were standing on the banks and showing mirth on the drowning of boats carrying the freedom fighters [¼].
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Maulana's clever misappropriation of Marxist memes, reminds me of the whole genre of so-called educated Muslims "finding" Marxian ideas in "Islam" and propagating the fond myth that non-Muslims must see Islam as a "liberating" and "equalizing" force - a la communism, minus the communist party and plus a "God".

Shia derivatives, are a particularly susceptible lot in these explorations, but are therefore no less subersive and dangerous than the Sunni jihadist. One way or the other, both want to capture power and hegemony for a totalitarian society.

The reason why Marxism and Islamism attract each other should be amply clear from Indian politics, and from such chracters as Carlos "the Jackal". The last I know of him, he has converted to Islam, and married his third wife - his defense lawyer Isabelle while still married to his second wife[ Magdalena?].

More importantly, Ramirez [his real name] should be studied through his book on what he dubs "revolutionary Islam" and justifies Islam on the basis of Marxian "class struggle". It is not the first time that this has been done in the history of marxism or Islam, but Ramirez's is particularly interesting because of his career - that spanned and interfaced almost all the political and intel regimes of the ME and their connected Western components, a whose who of Arab spring and winter before that spring : Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Libya, France, Germany, UK, Switzerland.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by abhischekcc »

When the EU was formed, it was designed specifically to move power in two different directions - one to Brussels, and the other to smaller, local areas (sub national) with homogenous ethnic communities. And since local communities will never have enough power to challenge Brussels, the net effect is to empower Brussels at the cost of the nations of Europe. The unstated purpose of the design is that smaller regions will challenge the national governments, but will leave the true center unchallenged.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

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Last edited by D Roy on 21 Oct 2012 12:08, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Agnimitra »

brihaspati wrote:Maulana's clever misappropriation of Marxist memes, reminds me of the whole genre of so-called educated Muslims "finding" Marxian ideas in "Islam"
The late Shah of Iran called this the collusion of Red with Black (the Black standard is considered holy in Islamism - the Prophet used it and the imminent Mahdi's army will supposedly use it). Recently you had brought up Ali Shariati, a good example of this collusion. It will be interesting to see the effects of the US releasing the Mojahedin e Khalq on the Islamist regime. If they are successful, in the short term the West may benefit, but I wonder about what forces will be unleashed in the longer term. But as some anti-Islamist Iranians keep hoping - paayaan e shab e siyah sepeed ast -- the end of the Black night is white (dawn)...
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

All options are apparently being explored - including half decimated Iranian communist party [which itself is probably split into three groups]. The ayatollahs are showing signs of strain anyway. India's double-pseudosecular-pseudoleft could have used their image to set up an axis here [just as a hedge].
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by kit »

"The Emerging Doctrine of the United States is republished with permission of Stratfor."

Read more: The Emerging Doctrine of the United States | Stratfor

By George Friedman

Over the past weekend, rumors began to emerge that the Syrian opposition would allow elements of the al Assad regime to remain in Syria and participate in the new government. Rumors have become Syria's prime export, and as such they should not be taken too seriously. Nevertheless, what is happening in Syria is significant for a new foreign doctrine emerging in the United States -- a doctrine in which the United States does not take primary responsibility for events, but which allows regional crises to play out until a new regional balance is reached. Whether a good or bad policy -- and that is partly what the U.S. presidential race is about -- it is real, and it flows from lessons learned.

Threats against the United States are many and complex, but Washington's main priority is ensuring that none of those threats challenge its fundamental interests. Somewhat simplistically, this boils down to mitigating threats against U.S. control of the seas by preventing the emergence of a Eurasian power able to marshal resources toward that end. It also includes preventing the development of a substantial intercontinental nuclear capability that could threaten the United States if a country is undeterred by U.S. military power for whatever reason. There are obviously other interests, but certainly these interests are fundamental.

Therefore, U.S. interest in what is happening in the Western Pacific is understandable. But even there, the United States is, at least for now, allowing regional forces to engage each other in a struggle that has not yet affected the area's balance of power. U.S. allies and proxies, including the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan, have been playing chess in the region's seas without a direct imposition of U.S. naval power -- even though such a prospect appears possible.

Lessons Learned

The roots of this policy lie in Iraq. Iran and Iraq are historical rivals; they fought an extended war in the 1980s with massive casualties. A balance of power existed between the two that neither was comfortable with but that neither could overcome. They contained each other with minimal external involvement.

The U.S. intervention in Iraq had many causes but one overwhelming consequence: In destroying Saddam Hussein's regime, a regime that was at least as monstrous as Moammar Gadhafi's or Bashar al Assad's, the United States destroyed the regional balance of power with Iran. The United States also miscalculated the consequences of the invasion and faced substantial resistance. When the United States calculated that withdrawal was the most prudent course -- a decision made during the Bush administration and continued by the Obama administration -- Iran consequently gained power and a greater sense of security. Perhaps such outcomes should have been expected, but since a forced withdrawal was unexpected, the consequences didn't clearly follow and warnings went unheeded.

If Iraq was the major and critical lesson on the consequences of intervention, Libya was the smaller and less significant lesson that drove it home. The United States did not want to get involved in Libya. Following the logic of the new policy, Libya did not represent a threat to U.S. interests. It was the Europeans, particularly the French, who argued that the human rights threats posed by the Gadhafi regime had to be countered and that those threats could quickly and efficiently be countered from the air. Initially, the U.S. position was that France and its allies were free to involve themselves, but the United States did not wish to intervene.

This rapidly shifted as the Europeans mounted an air campaign. They found that the Gadhafi regime did not collapse merely because French aircraft entered Libyan airspace. They also found that the campaign was going to be longer and more difficult than they anticipated. At this point committed to maintaining its coalition with the Europeans, the United States found itself in the position of either breaking with its coalition or participating in the air campaign. It chose the latter, seeing the commitment as minimal and supporting the alliance as a prior consideration.

Libya and Iraq taught us two lessons. The first was that campaigns designed to topple brutal dictators do not necessarily yield better regimes. Instead of the brutality of tyrants, the brutality of chaos and smaller tyrants emerged. The second lesson, well learned in Iraq, is that the world does not necessarily admire interventions for the sake of human rights. The United States also learned that the world's position can shift with startling rapidity from demanding U.S. action to condemning U.S. action. Moreover, Washington discovered that intervention can unleash virulently anti-American forces that will kill U.S. diplomats. Once the United States enters the campaign, however reluctantly and in however marginal a role, it will be the United States that will be held accountable by much of the world -- certainly by the inhabitants of the country experiencing the intervention. As in Iraq, on a vastly smaller scale, intervention carries with it unexpected consequences.

These lessons have informed U.S. policy toward Syria, which affects only some U.S. interests. However, any U.S. intervention in Syria would constitute both an effort and a risk disproportionate to those interests. Particularly after Libya, the French and other Europeans realized that their own ability to intervene in Syria was insufficient without the Americans, so they declined to intervene. Of course, this predated the killing of U.S. diplomats in Benghazi, Libya, but it did not predate the fact that the intervention in Libya surprised planners by its length and by the difficulty of creating a successor regime less brutal than the one it replaced. The United States was not prepared to intervene with conventional military force.

That is not to say the United States did not have an interest in Syria. Specifically, Washington did not want Syria to become an Iranian puppet that would allow Tehran's influence to stretch through Iraq to the Mediterranean. The United States had been content with the Syrian regime while it was simply a partner of Iran rather than Iran's subordinate. However, the United States foresaw Syria as a subordinate of Iran if the al Assad regime survived. The United States wanted Iran blocked, and that meant the displacement of the al Assad regime. It did not mean Washington wanted to intervene militarily, except possibly through aid and training potentially delivered by U.S. special operations forces -- a lighter intervention than others advocated.

Essential Interests

The U.S. solution is instructive of the emerging doctrine. First, the United States accepted that al Assad, like Saddam Hussein and Gadhafi, was a tyrant. But it did not accept the idea that al Assad's fall would create a morally superior regime. In any event, it expected the internal forces in Syria to deal with al Assad and was prepared to allow this to play out. Second, the United States expected regional powers to address the Syrian question if they wished. This meant primarily Turkey and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia. From the American point of view, the Turks and Saudis had an even greater interest in circumscribing an Iranian sphere of influence, and they had far greater levers to determine the outcome in Syria. Israel is, of course, a regional power, but it was in no position to intervene: The Israelis lacked the power to impose a solution, they could not occupy Syria, and Israeli support for any Syrian faction would delegitimize that faction immediately. Any intervention would have to be regional and driven by each participant's national interests.

The Turks realized that their own national interest, while certainly affected by Syria, did not require a major military intervention, which would have been difficult to execute and which would have had an unknown outcome. The Saudis and Qataris, never prepared to intervene directly, did what they could covertly, using money, arms and religiously motivated fighters to influence events. But no country was prepared to risk too much to shape events in Syria. They were prepared to use indirect power rather than conventional military force. As a result, the conflict remains unresolved.

This has forced both the Syrian regime and the rebels to recognize the unlikelihood of outright military victory. Iran's support for the regime and the various sources of support for the Syrian opposition have proved indecisive. Rumors of political compromise are emerging accordingly.

We see this doctrine at work in Iran as well. Tehran is developing nuclear weapons, which may threaten Israel. At the same time, the United States is not prepared to engage in a war with Iran, nor is it prepared to underwrite the Israeli attack with added military support. It is using an inefficient means of pressure -- sanctions -- which appears to have had some effect with the rapid depreciation of the Iranian currency. But the United States is not looking to resolve the Iranian issue, nor is it prepared to take primary responsibility for it unless Iran becomes a threat to fundamental U.S. interests. It is content to let events unfold and act only when there is no other choice.

Under the emerging doctrine, the absence of an overwhelming American interest means that the fate of a country like Syria is in the hands of the Syrian people or neighboring countries. The United States is unwilling to take on the cost and calumny of trying to solve the problem. It is less a form of isolationism than a recognition of the limits of power and interest. Not everything that happens in the world requires or justifies American intervention.

If maintained, this doctrine will force the world to reconsider many things. On a recent trip in Europe and the Caucasus, I was constantly asked what the United States would do on various issues. I responded by saying it would do remarkably little and that it was up to them to act. This caused interesting consternation. Many who condemn U.S. hegemony also seem to demand it. There is a shift under way that they have not yet noticed -- except for an absence that they regard as an American failure. My attempt to explain it as the new normal did not always work.

Given that there is a U.S. presidential election under way, this doctrine, which has quietly emerged under Obama, appears to conflict with the views of Mitt Romney, a point I made in a previous article. My core argument on foreign policy is that reality, not presidents or policy papers, makes foreign policy. The United States has entered a period in which it must move from military domination to more subtle manipulation, and more important, allow events to take their course. This is a maturation of U.S. foreign policy, not a degradation. Most important, it is happening out of impersonal forces that will shape whoever wins the U.S. presidential election and whatever he might want. Whether he wishes to increase U.S. assertiveness out of national interest, or to protect human rights, the United States is changing the model by which it operates. Overextended, it is redesigning its operating system to focus on the essentials and accept that much of the world, unessential to the United States, will be free to evolve as it will.

This does not mean that the United States will disengage from world affairs. It controls the world's oceans and generates almost a quarter of the world's gross domestic product. While disengagement is impossible, controlled engagement, based on a realistic understanding of the national interest, is possible.

This will upset the international system, especially U.S. allies. It will also create stress in the United States both from the political left, which wants a humanitarian foreign policy, and the political right, which defines the national interest broadly. But the constraints of the past decade weigh heavily on the United States and therefore will change the way the world works.

The important point is that no one decided this new doctrine. It is emerging from the reality the United States faces. That is how powerful doctrines emerge. They manifest themselves first and are announced when everyone realizes that that is how things work.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by abhischekcc »

More bull-fertilizer from George Friedman.

His swan song is always - America may have been doing something wrong earlier, but NOW everything is alright!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

But whoever wins the election will try some dramatics. Lets see.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

http://www.khaama.com/isaf-not-reponsib ... rders-379/
ISAF not reponsible for the security of Afghan borders
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force officials on Monday announced that the protection of the borders in Afghanistan is not part of the ISAF’s mission inAfghanistan.

This comes as cross-border shelling from Pakistan continues in eastern provinces of Afghanistan during the past one and half years which led to growing criticisms towards coalition forces silence to react towards the shelling. ISAF spokesman Brigadier General Günter Katz while speaking during a press conference in capital Kabul on Monday said protection of Afghanistan borders is not part of the ISAF responsibility based on the final statement of the Bonn Conference in 2001.

This is the first time ISAF officials deny responsibility for controlling the borders of Afghanistan during the past 11 years after the formation of Bonn conference in 2001. Brigadier General Günter Katz earlier said NATO officials were negotiating the issue of cross-border shelling with the Pakistani officials. General Günter Katz said security of the borders in Afghanistan was not handed over to ISAF despite repeated calls to hand ove the security to coalition security forces. ISAF spokesman also expressed concerns regarding the militants sanctuaries in Pak-Afghan borders and said targeting militants outside the Afghan borders is also not part of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
Interesting acknowledgment. They have already made noises about giving in to Pak about the border-line. The reduction of casualty figures from a peak in 2010 - also shows the deliberate avoidance of conflict and tacit truces with the Talebs.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RamaY »

I wonder what the implications of 2014 withdrawal for Bharat.

2001 US went in to dislodge Taliban from power. After 13 years, it would leave the scarred nation without any strong military or govt structures to protect itself from the same Taliban.

Let us assume India-Russia-Iran support ANA where as Pakis support Taliban. What will be Unkil/NATO role?

If US-KSA-Paki combine support Taliban for their own reasons (Iran-India) then we are back to pre 9/11 scenario.

If USA doesnnt support Pakis directly, then the $B military aid and modern equipment will be the indirect funding of Taliban.

What will be india's options?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RoyG »

We don't have any options. ANA will be a small player in Afghanistan even with external support.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

RamaY wrote:I wonder what the implications of 2014 withdrawal for Bharat.

2001 US went in to dislodge Taliban from power. After 13 years, it would leave the scarred nation without any strong military or govt structures to protect itself from the same Taliban.

Let us assume India-Russia-Iran support ANA where as Pakis support Taliban. What will be Unkil/NATO role?

If US-KSA-Paki combine support Taliban for their own reasons (Iran-India) then we are back to pre 9/11 scenario.

If USA doesnnt support Pakis directly, then the $B military aid and modern equipment will be the indirect funding of Taliban.

What will be india's options?
For them the best option is
(1) [preferred] to let the Talebs and Pakis be embroiled in a regional war with Russia and India and each side destroys each other [and/or Iran]
(2) [second] estimate that Pakis+Talebs will show a far greater ruthlessness than the Russians or the Indians and support Pak+Taleb as the winning combination to keep the Asian "giants" down.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

First need to ensure the outsiders leave. Any move before that will make them stay.

Dont forget that TSP has charged the US in the past with abandonment after the FSU left Afghanistan. So most likely the US will keep some links to the area.

So its a long haul of atleast two decades if not three.

This is the price that INC paid for Partition.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

ramana wrote:First need to ensure the outsiders leave. Any move before that will make them stay.

Dont forget that TSP has charged the US in the past with abandonment after the FSU left Afghanistan. So most likely the US will keep some links to the area.

So its a long haul of atleast two decades if not three.

This is the price that INC paid for Partition.
But they have not paid price, have they? They are doing just fine!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

No price is being paid by India.

I oncc wrote there were two vision of India: the greater India from Suleiman mountains to Burma and the lesser India with the periphery hived off.
It was the lesser India that the INC freedom struggle stalwarts agreed to.


We need to get back "our geography" for it will exact its "revenge" otherwise.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

A relevant report significant to Afghanistan

Nightwatch;
Iraq-US: For the record. Iraqi auditors believe as much as US $800 million is being sent out of the country illegally each week, according to a report by the US Special Inspector General released Tuesday. His findings point to widespread money laundering and focus attention on lax oversight at Iraq's central bank, which is at the heart of a probe into alleged financial wrongdoing involving its former governor and other top officials.

Comment: That is more than $41 billion a year with nothing to show for it and no accountability and after the departure of US troops.

Hmmm… that raises a question about what are the savings, if any, from the withdrawal of US soldiers. The answer is that the post-withdrawal costs to the US appear as large as or larger than when the US had combat forces deployed in Iraq.

The US is not engaged in combat in Iraq, but it is still spending $4 billion a month in Iraq, which is about what the US was spending when it had combat forces there.

Similarly US exit will lead to an exodus of money from Afghanistan. India should have systems in place to shelter that funds in India for later use.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RamaY »

ramana wrote: We need to get back "our geography" for it will exact its "revenge" otherwise.
The challenge is, in which form?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

Its already exacting its revenge. If we dont own our geography it will be worse.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RamaY »

Oh I am not talking about the revenge, which I understood. I am talking about taking our geography back.

I seriously doubt secular-India can even make any claims, because it is the one who let this geography go as part of a compromise.

It will have to get worse within as well as in the periphery before it can get better.

It goes back to "strategic leadership" of Bharat.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

No sickular India has the best chance to manage the takeover (calms the West) but the aftermath has to be a nationalist dispensation. And takeover has to be time bound: 20 years as military government, then UT and then states right after fifty so on.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

At the moment the balance of forces is in favour of the Jihadis. For the west - a jihadi adventure thst spreads into ME and Russia and India is good [but spreading too deep into Africa is not good - hence already a string of west affiliated - hopefully Christian enclaves on the east and west coast to be managed from the southern tip]. Such an adventure ties up these two with a potentially disturbing and indigestible factor for the west - India has "Hindus", and Russia has the "Orthodox". Maybe something more - a deep-seated something else that is deeply mystical at the social psyche level firmly rooted to the land. In the end neither Islam nor Catholicism nor communism/Marxism could hold on to Russia. But it could do so for China - because perhaps China disempowered its popular mysticism.

So West can manipulate almost all of the globe by using Islam, Catholicsm, Anglicanism, Communism - but two pockets stand out [a third of them could be the "Persian" and not the current Iranian].

In their calculations if they can stand aside, and supply maybe to both sides - they can manage to cage Russia and India. China is playing along what the west planned for it. Islamic world is doing the same. So the AFPak area will be abandoned in a way that rehabilitates the talebs in power, while political infrastructure is already in place to see to it that Indian regimes do not pre-empt the outcome. This is not about so-called pragamtism/concern-for-loss-of-prosperity-if-war arguments. It is a much more deeply seated fear of taking initiatives that may seem like "imperialism". Our leaders have been taught to bind themselves in - and not think of "expanding". Anyone who does that increases the chances of getting assassinated dramatically.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Sushupti »

John Dayal calls for a Muslim-Christian alliance in India
Why so little Christian-Muslim Dialogue in India?

By John Dayal,

When was the last time we read a joint statement on communal harmony, a statement signed by accepted representatives of the Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist and Jain faiths recognised in India as national religious minorities?

I recall one in 1984, after the massacre of the Sikhs, and then in 2002 in the violence targeted against Muslims in Gujarat. There were no such statements in the wake of the anti-Christian pogrom in Kandhamal, Orissa, in 2007 and 2008.

The one time Muslim and Christian leaders came together was in an advocacy rally for the rights of converts to the two religions from Hinduism’s former “untouchable” castes -- now called the Dalits.

In the recent riots in the northeastern state of Assam, where over 400,000 people were displaced in clashes between the Bodo ethnic community and Bengali and Assamese speaking Muslims, several top Muslims leaders from New Delhi asked me to urge the Catholic Church to intervene – presuming that the Bodos were all Christians.

The Bodos are an ethnic community, and while some of them indeed are Christians, most of the others profess Hinduism or their own ancient religions. Sociologists are still debating if the Assam violence was economic, ethnic or religious in its root causes.

Christian sociologists and activists did intervene as strong voices for peace, and in helping quell the panic large-scale movement of people of northeastern origin from cities such as Hyderabad and Bengaluru in southern India amid rumors of retributive Muslim attacks on them. The rumors were just malicious mischief by some political groups, among them the infamous Hindutva Parivar seeking to polarize communities.

Considering that both Muslims and Christians, constituting perhaps no more than 10 percent and 2.3 percent respectively of India’s 1.20 billion population as religious minorities, and both victims of State harshness and violence at the hands of Hindu fundamentalists, it would be presumed that the two communities occasionally made common cause, or at least existed in close camaraderie and cooperation.

In reality, both live in their own separate, individual cocoons, mostly ignorant of the problems of the other community, and largely unconcerned with the crises they both find themselves in with unfailing regularity.

I do not recall in the last forty years or so where Church hierarchy, Protestant and Catholic, came together with the top leadership of the Jamaat-e-Islami, an orthodox group, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, a more “nationalist” organization with roots in India’s Independence movement and similar groups, on any issue of concern to the people.

It is a different matter that there is little political cohesion in India’s extremely diverse Christian community.

In Parliament, I have seen the Muslim community come together, defying party whips, on issues relating to the community.

However, but I have not seen Christians come out to speak when the issues concern persecution, or during nuanced debated on the controversial Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, the matter of denial of Indian Visas to missionaries and activists, ban on religious conversions by some provincial governments all of which vilify and target Christians.

To be fair, I have not seen the Christian MPs come together as a block to speak in defense of the Muslims, preferring the safety of the party whip.

Unlike the Christian religious leaders, who are not part of ideological divides and political polarities in the country, the Muslim religious leadership is deeply political.

Muslims are active in almost every political party, and in some states, have their own parties, which contest elections and are even part of coalitions in government.

There is a direct connect between the Moulvies if the mosques and the teachers of the hundreds of thousands of Madrasas, with the political leadership. The only apparent division is in theological loyalties between the Shia and Sunnis, and within the Sunnis, the Barelvis, the more liberal, and Deobandi schools of theology.

The recent Wahabi movement, financed by Saudi Arabia, has rapidly radicalized a section of the Muslim leadership in all provinces, and especially in Assam, Kerala and Kashmir.

The Wahabi radicalization is perhaps the single major reason for souring whatever relationship there was between the Christians and Muslims. This is the most apparent in the valley of Kashmir and in Kerala – even though the two regions differ so widely with each other in demographic and social parameters.

The argument is not that the Christian community in India consciously follows the West’s perceptions post 9/11 United States of America.

If anything, perhaps, the more pious in the Christian community and specially the urban middle class look at the Islamic groups in India with glasses not very much different from those worn by the hyper nationalist members of the Hindutva Sangh Parivar. Christians from Kashmir often say, “You may know Islam, we know the Muslims.”

On the other extreme are the purported dialogues that go in the name of “Idd Milan” after Muslim religious festivities twice a year, and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and diocesan “inter faith dialogues” in which a prayerful representative from each community is invited to a small meeting, where a brass lamp is lit, every one recites from their own holy books, a group photograph is taken, and tea served.

Not everyone sips the tea or nibble at the sweats and hors d’ oeuvres. Most are in a hurry to get back home. Some do not eat outside their own place of worship or home. The photographs of course serve their owners well in annual reports and funding drives and to prove their “secular” credentials.

Would it be that there is nothing in common in the diverse situations of India’s many religious minorities? Don’t the religious minorities share anything in India’s history, its common heritage? Do they not suffer and bleed when hit by the barbs, bombs and slings of the hyper nationalist rightwing majoritarian groups? And are they really insulated from the massive political and social developments sweeping this wonderful nation?

These are questions that beg an answer – social, political, and in relation to the guarantees of the Constitution, contained in the Preamble, and Articles such as 25, 29, 30.

It was unfortunate that two years ago – before the “Arab Spring” -- Muslim academics in Egypt have suspended their dialogue with the Vatican over Pope Benedict XVI’s remarks on anti-Christian violence in Egypt calling it as "unacceptable interference in Egypt’s affairs."

Pope Benedict XVI as the leader of the Catholic Church in his remarks condemned violence expressed his closeness to suffering Christians and highlighted the concern for the religious freedom of Christian minorities.

The Christians in India perhaps did not even know that there ever was a dialogue between Rome and the Muslim world. Its eyes were glued to some developments in Srinagar and Kerala.

The Kashmiri militancy, with a heavy overlay of religious fundamentalism and intolerance, has been tragic for both the Hindu and the Christian communities.

Almost all Hindus have fled the Kashmir valley in the face of a threat of violence.

The Christian community was perhaps as small as 500 families in the region, and they have been under pressure. The half a dozen Christian schools in the valley have less than 50 Christian students, but even they are in constant fear. Militants have banned any proselytization among the Muslim community. The police have arrested people accused by the militants of being involved in proselytization.

In Kerala, where the Christian and Muslim communities live in broadly distinct regions, there has been growing stress manifesting itself in occasional violence from Islamic extremists and a demographic and social fear among the Christian community.

Two years ago, a Christian teacher’s hand was cut off for alleged blasphemy. Catholic clergy have cautioned against the fast growing Muslim population, and the stagnant Christian population. On prelate went as far as to call upon the faithful to start large families.

But the most peculiar, or hilarious depending one’s point of view, is the matter of “Love jihad.” It is a fact that a large number of Christian girls in Kerala are marrying outside the community.

There are many reasons for this, the presence of a notorious dowry system being a major one. But Hindu girls are also marrying non-Hindus. Many Christian and Hindu girls are marrying Muslim youth.

The religious, and now political, leadership of both Hindus and Christians allege there could be a strategy to woo these young women – a sort of human piracy. Criminal cases have been registered with the police. It is a simmering issue, but could well explode at any time.

Security and development issues of the two communities however demand the start of a really serious and constructive pan-regional dialogue between the leaderships of the two communities.

In a political environment of collective bargaining, mutual collaboration and cooperation can help getting a decent share of the national development pie.

A greater understanding can also reduce tensions, and perhaps help a successful social challenge to extremist groups, including the Hindutva Sangh Parivar, who are every so keen to feed off religious differences and perceptions.

http://twocircles.net/2012nov01/why_so_ ... india.html
ramana
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

8) Interesting fool. Doesn't know the basics of either.
RoyG
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RoyG »

There is already an alliance between Christian and Muslim under the political framework of secularism.
ramana
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

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He doesn't want the seculars mediating between/coordinating the two religions in their political activities.
RoyG
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RoyG »

Why not? Secularism has done wonders for both.
ramana
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

It restricts their power.
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