China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

[Mahendra]

ah fk the bhotoshop, adminullahs please issue fatwa against clogging the forum with inline pictures

[Surya]

not sure what the admins are upto

adding to the plea to stop this nonsense of large inline images

[nakul]

China is a visual civilization. I understand it now. They don't understand words.

[RamaY]

Injuns are jealous of chini photoshop skills

Indian Internet speed and bandwidth is 10times lower than chinas

[krishnan]

just block those websites and let them post to their heart content...all we see is blank pages...thats what i see now

[shiv]

In this photo who is running away from the frontline - the tanks or the helicopters? And why are they shown retreating?

[Boreas]

^^looks photo-oped. Size of choppers are not in proportion with the tanks!

[asprinzl]

Amazing.....no rocket pods on the choppers but they are blazing away salvos of rockets with carefree...that too with wheels down!!!!! Now thats what I call Chinese Miracle.

[asprinzl]

Was this picked up in here?

http://www.dailypioneer.com/home/online ... corps.html

What a load of bull. When will Indian govts realise that only strength is respected

The government could have done this quietly without much funfare and if discovered could have said that it is a regular troop rotation.

[Don]

http://thelinkpaper.ca/?p=23396

The Legacy Of China-India War – China Has Moved On But India Stuck In Its Colonial Past
By Dr. Sawraj Singh

After 50 years, the India-China war is still very much alive in our minds. The Indian media has given the event very big coverage. The Chinese media has given very little coverage to this topic as compared to the Indian media. Why is there so much difference? I feel that India has never been able to break with its colonial past while the Chinese have moved into the future.

Very little has changed since 1947, when we supposedly became independent. India was faithfully preserved its colonial past. India did not change the civilian bureaucracy, the military officer’s mentality, the court system, the police forces and the educational system. All are essentially the same. The Indian elite has tried to merge with the western capitalist system on their terms rather than on its own terms. Probably, there is no other example in the world when a country admires its colonial masters, as much India does. Therefore, whether it is India’s foreign policy or the domestic policy, it is more or less continuation of the colonial period, even though the global and the regional conditions have radically changed.

During the British colonial period, China was very weak compared to the mighty British empire. The British never treated china with equality or respect. The borders with China were never defined on the principles of fairness and justice. The British did what was convenient and useful for them without paying any attention to the generally recognized international norms. The Chinese were thoroughly bullied and humiliated.

Unfortunately, the Indian bureaucrats and the military officers have been unable to get rid of the colonial mentality. They fail to recognize a simple fact, the power equations have fundamentally changed. Unlike the colonial India, the present India lacks the might of the British empire. We can use any parameter for comparison and the fact that China is way ahead of India becomes obvious. If we compare the size of the armed forces, the size of the air force, the GDP and the volume of the trade, China is very much ahead. It is an obvious fact that India cannot match China’s strength. The only way India can fight another war with China is with the American support. However, India has to carefully look at the American intentions. Does America want to help India or use India to advance its own interests in the region at India’s expense.

Looking at the past patterns, it becomes quite clear that America does not value long term friendship. It has switched or abandoned its friends when it is convenient or useful to do so. In India’s case, America has never considered India a true friend. America has always looked at India as a potential adversary. For America and the other western powers a balkanized India in more useful. They can exploit all India’s resources without worrying that India can join the opposite camp of Russia and China. India should have no illusion about the western intentions of dividing and disintegrating India. Actually, they started this process in 1947. Does India need any other proof of the western intentions towards it?

If India can be incited to start another war with China, America has a lot to gain. It can kill two birds with one stone. It can weaken its main adversary, China and it can disintegrate its potential adversary, India. India should see through the western plans. India should get rid of the colonial past and accept the realities of the present world. The equations between the East and the West have fundamentally changed. East is on the rise and the West is on the decline. America is becoming weaker and China is becoming stronger each day. The twenty first century is bound to be Asia’s century. India should try to solve the border problem with china on the principles of equality and mutual respect.

Dr. Sawraj Singh, MD F.I.C.S. is the Chairman of the Washington State Network for Human Rights and Chairman of the Central Washington Coalition for Social Justice. He can be reached atsawrajsingh@hotmail.com.

[nakul]

The Great Firewall of China must be pretty good as of all the articles of the 1962, this is the one gets posted. Nehru was quite aware of the asymmetry between India & China and looked to appease them. What he did not learn from the British was that appeasement did not work. The Brits found that out in 1939 & we did in 1962. Nehru received a jolt. Unfortunately, neither did he implement a new system nor did he continue with the existing British one. Any system is better than no system.

[wong]

^^looks photo-oped. Size of choppers are not in proportion with the tanks!

You mean like this pic of an Apache and a M1A1??? What isn't Photoshopped to Indians??



Congrats to China on the third J-20!

[pralay]

In this photo who is running away from the frontline - the tanks or the helicopters? And why are they shown retreating?
http://centurychina.com/plaboard/upload ... _93820.jpg

Thats a poor photoshop!

[nakul]

Aprt from the tail no, what is different in the 3rd prototype?

[member_20067]

Aprt from the tail no, what is different in the 3rd prototype?

Grey Radome

[nash]

Aprt from the tail no, what is different in the 3rd prototype?

Grey Radome

you mean a paint job

[DavidD]

Aprt from the tail no, what is different in the 3rd prototype?

It's still the 2nd prototype, just presumably with the radar installed now.

[nakul]

There are reports that AESA has already been equipped on the earlier J xx fighters. I presume the J 20 will have the best that China has to offer. Does anyone know the capabilities of the Chinese AESA?

[Don]

http://thestar.com.my/lifestyle/story.a ... ebookshelf

Sunday October 28, 2012

Book review: China is still ascendant

Review by BUNN NAGARA
star2@thestar.com.my

When China Rules The World: The End Of The Western World And The Birth Of A New Global Order
Author: Marc Jacques
Publisher: Penguin, 848 pages

SKEWED as they may be, reactionary Orientalist perspectives of East Asian realities remain the norm in Western punditry and news reports. The problem has become prevalent in both conservative and liberal circles.

The problem for the West itself is that such a persistent misperception of modern China may undermine Western interests further. Martin Jacques’ When China Rules The World: The End Of The Western World And The Birth Of A New Global Order is intended largely as a corrective, looking at the historic phenomenon of China’s grand return to the global stage in China’s own terms.

My review of the first edition of Jacques’ book appeared earlier in China awakens (Star Bizweek, Oct 3, 2009). The present consideration is of the second edition published by Penguin earlier this year.

The first edition was subtitled The Rise Of The Middle Kingdom And The End Of The Western World. The second edition, suggesting an evolution, is subtitled The End Of The Western World And The Birth Of A New World Order.

Jacques and Penguin are just as grandiose now as before. The titling remains as presumptuous and alarmist, at least to Western conservatives, and no apologies are tendered in that regard.

The title itself can be a problem for those who judge a book by its cover. Jacques does not believe that China or any other country can “rule” the world today, only that China and things Chinese would predominate globally.

The second edition contains new data and a new section in the Afterword. For Jacques, international developments in the three years between the two editions only confirm and strengthen his central themes.

His chief arguments remain intact: that China will be dominant economically and culturally, it will not essentially be Westernised, and China will be ascendant despite multiple challenges.

This rise, mainly economic but also in other spheres later, is of epochal proportions. China’s ascendancy would result from both its own efforts and the decline of the West simultaneously.

The 2008 recession in the United States, followed by economic doldrums there and the European sovereign debt crisis underline the situation impeccably. In contrast, China’s GDP growth continues, affected only minimally.

Like many others, Jacques believes that China’s current growth model based on cheap labour and global raw materials is unsustainable. For example, China would need to stimulate more domestic demand to compensate for a slackening of overseas markets.

The latest data show that more and more countries have now made China their main trading partner. And as with trade, increasingly so with investment.

Thus, China’s economic gravitational “pull” is becoming unerring and compelling. Not only has China swiftly replaced Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, its relationship with the United States has replaced Japan’s as the most important bilateral relationship across the Pacific and in the world.

Analysts impressed with China’s economic growth once expected it to surpass the US economy in a couple of decades. But that timeframe has shrunk.

In 2009 Jacques cited the Goldman Sachs prediction that China’s economy would overtake the US’ by 2027. Sceptics scoffed.

In this second edition, he cites The Economist’s projection that the Chinese economy will become the world’s biggest by 2018. Now the International Monetary Fund predicts the year will be 2016.

But even when that happens, China will still be a developing country with vast human resources yet to reach peak productivity. That means when China’s standard of living approaches that of the US, with a comparable GDP per capita, its economy will be two to four times that of the US today.

Unlike many China pundits, particularly critics, Jacques believes China will not succumb to the weight of its own promise. He does not accept that China has to Westernise or democratise before it can fully develop and prosper.

Jacques also rejects the alarmist Western notion that today’s China is re-arming aggressively. He finds Chinese defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP falling between the 1970s and 1990s, and since then only keeping pace with GDP growth.

As expected, the very people he seeks to inform are often those who spurn his information. Jacques attributes this Western stubbornness to a mixture of unfamiliarity, ignorance, prejudice, denial, stereotyping, racism and Cold War ideology against a non-Western country that is communist, at least in name.

With such unwieldy baggage, the nuances and subtleties about China are naturally lost on the bigots. For Jacques, China is a continent-sized civilisational state whose history has seen upheavals and expansion on its Asiatic land mass, but not military adventurism in a littoral and archipelagic East Asia.

In response to critics of an increasingly powerful China, Jacques does not see China as a global superpower. He finds China historically absorbed in its own internal governance as it is a very difficult country to govern, its trajectory will continue to be tempestuous, but it is still a complex and sophisticated state and the home of statecraft, so it cannot simply be dismissed with an epithet like “authoritarian”.

For example, while critics fret over the People’s Liberation Army and the PLA Navy, it is China’s Coast Guard rather than the military that is a key player in the disputed island claims. Jacques finds no less than seven uncoordinated Chinese agencies involved over these claims.

A key question in the book is whether the United States will allow China the space to be a major player in Beijing’s own regional backyard. Jacques finds that unlikely, while also convinced that US efforts, such as its “pivot” to contain China, will ultimately fail.

This book still has major gaps that need filling. A central theme is that China’s coming predominance will be different from that of Western colonialism, but how different and in what ways?

Jacques also envisages an updated revival of the tributary system in East Asia, in which all the smaller countries acknowledge their junior status with regard to China. But what form will a revised tributary system take?

Another key point is China essentially being a civilisational state rather than just a nation state like other countries. But what can this mean in practical policy terms, particularly in China’s relations with other countries?

Such answers are essential to an intelligent understanding of a rising modern China. But we may have to wait for a new book by the author for further illumination, because any answers are unlikely to be accommodated by the structure of the present work, notwithstanding its already intriguing insights.

The first edition was already a vast interdisciplinary work of far-reaching implications, and the second version even more so. Few analysts as authors have achieved what Jacques has: combining the depth and rigour of academia with the readability and vigour of journalism in a single volume on a subject of great topicality.

The result is a serious and interesting textbook which, despite its 800+ pages, has sold a quarter of a million copies (and counting) in a dozen languages in its first edition alone. His critics have yet to match that kind of appeal in whatever they have to say.

> Bunn Nagara is an associate editor at The Star.

[manum]

China cant be dominant culturally...It cant sway its friends with its culture forget enemies...Economically yes...the problems the author is simply putting in two words of "Internal consumption"......is not going to happen, unless you print excessive money and distribute it in whole of China...

Or you start giving the goodies for free...like the vacant homes worth millions to poor...

The fact is when China makes movies and if its not essentially by Directors based in HONGKONG...its only YEEEEEHAAAW movies....

Though its military thread...you gotta have to make some tough choices, like crossing a turbulent flooded river, you'll die crossing or you'll reach the green lands...but you wont make it unless you streamline your ways...A madman can only become successful in his lifetime as short or long it is, he/she cant make his/her generations successful and human...

Though please buy the book...It'll help fund this author...

[VinodTK]

How China Fights: Lessons From the 1962 Sino-Indian War

The rest of the world may have forgotten the anniversary, but a neglected border war that took place 50 years ago is now more pertinent than ever. Before dawn on the morning of Oct. 20, 1962, the People’s Liberation Army launched a surprise attack, driving with overwhelming force through the eastern and western sections of the Himalayas, deep into northeastern India. On the 32nd day of fighting, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire, and the war ended as abruptly as it had begun. Ten days later, the Chinese began withdrawing from the areas they had penetrated on India’s eastern flank, between Bhutan and Burma, but they kept their territorial gains in the West—part of the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. India had suffered a humiliating rout, and China’s international stature had grown substantially.
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Today, half a century after the Sino-Indian War, the geopolitical rivalry between the world’s two main demographic titans is again sharpening, as new disputes deepen old rifts. Booming bilateral trade has failed to subdue their rivalry and military tensions, and China has largely frittered away the political gains of its long-ago victory. But the war’s continuing significance extends far beyond China and India. By baring key elements of Beijing’s strategic doctrine, it offers important lessons, not only to China’s neighbors but also to the U.S. military. Here are just six of the principles the People’s Republic of China relied on in attacking India—and will undoubtedly use again in the future.

SURPRISE China places immense value on blindsiding its adversaries. The idea is to inflict political and psychological shock on the enemy while scoring early battlefield victories. This emphasis on tactical surprise dates back more than 2,000 years, to the classic Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, who argued that all warfare is “based on deception” and offered this advice on how to take on an opponent: “Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you. These are the strategist’s keys to victory.” The Chinese started and ended the 1962 war when India least expected it. They did much the same thing when they invaded Vietnam in 1979.

CONCENTRATE China’s generals believe in hitting as fast and as hard as possible, a style of warfare they demonstrated in their 1962 blitzkrieg against India. The aim is to wage “battles with swift outcome” (su jue zhan). This laser focus has been a hallmark of every military action Communist China has undertaken since 1949.

STRIKE FIRST Beijing doesn’t balk at using military force for political ends. On the contrary, China has repeatedly set out to “teach a lesson” to adversaries so they will dare not challenge Beijing’s interests in the future. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai explained that the 1962 war was meant to “teach India a lesson.” Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping used the same formulation in 1979 when he became the first Chinese Communist leader to visit Washington and told America’s then-president Jimmy Carter that “Vietnam must be taught a lesson, like India.” China invaded its Southeast Asian neighbor just days later. (India’s foreign minister happened to be in China at the time of the invasion, seeking to revive the bilateral relationship that had been frozen since 1962.) China ended its Vietnam invasion and withdrew from Vietnam after 29 days, declaring that Hanoi had been sufficiently chastised.

WAIT FOR IT Choose the most opportune moment. The 1962 war was a classic case: the attack coincided with the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon and thereby distracted potential sources of international support for India. No sooner had the U.S. signaled an end to the face-off with Moscow than China declared a unilateral ceasefire in its invasion of India. During the war, the international spotlight remained on the U.S.-Soviet showdown, not on China’s bloody invasion of a country that then had good relations with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The pattern has persisted. After America pulled out of South Vietnam, China seized the Paracel Islands. In 1988, when Moscow’s support for Vietnam had faded and Afghanistan had killed the Soviets’ enthusiasm for foreign adventures, China occupied the disputed Johnson Reef in the Spratlys. And in 1995, when the Philippines stood isolated after having forced the U.S. to close its major military bases at Subic Bay and elsewhere on the archipelago, China seized Mischief Reef.
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[wrdos]

10:32am, Oct. 31, J31 made its maiden flight in Shenyang, China.

[nits]

any link please ? BTW did it landed back

[shiv]

what is J 31?

[member_19969]

Guest Post 3: Dragon on the High Seas

[Sagar G]

what is J 31?

Digital art.

[Don]

10:32am, Oct. 31, J31 made its maiden flight in Shenyang, China.

[Don]

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... ht-378353/

PICTURES: New Chinese fighter conducts maiden flight
PrintBy: Greg Waldron Singapore 5 hours ago Source:
Images have emerged on Chinese defence sites that appear to show a new Chinese fighter aircraft in flight.

The flight was said to be the first conducted by the aircraft that is now being commonly referred to as the Shenyang J-31. Previous reports have variously given the aircraft's designation as the J-21, J-31 or F-60.

Images for the aircraft first appeared in mid-September 2012 and were said to be taken at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation airfield.





During the flight the J-31 was accompanied by a pair of Shenyang J-11 fighters. It seems to have conducted the ten minute flight with its landing gear in the lowered position.

Prior to its flight, it conducted a high speed taxi run and became briefly airborne

[saje]

what is J 31?

Digital art.

So now that the J-31 has flown, I think we can safely say that the below is what is called digital art.

[D Roy]

Yay,
free propaganda and insults.

[manum]

We dont hear about LCA for days, even after a break through...and we are seeing rigorous rituals of trials and integration...Despite having a free media..

here in China they get the news of activities the very next hour, they also remember to report it on BR and then...after some time exhaustive purposely grainy shots of the event....

The difference between human world and China...more than a billion Chuck Norris live there...

[shiv]

Questions:

J-20
1. Intended Role?
2. Dimensions?
3. Performance specs?

J-31
1. Intended Role?
2. Dimensions?
3. Performance specs?

[member_23370]

What do you mean intended role. Like type-051a to d and 052 a-d they are all following chinese experimental methodology of build and see if it works or try again.

[Will]

What do you mean intended role. Like type-051a to d and 052 a-d they are all following chinese experimental methodology of build and see if it works or try again.

[eklavya]

what is J 31?

New Target Drone

[vivek_ahuja]

what is J 31?

New Target Drone

For the IAF?

[eklavya]

^^^^

Difficult to pinpoint who may have the pleasure: IAF, USAF, Vietnam AF, Japan AF, Philippines AF, Taiwan AF. China is doing a good job of p*ss*ng off just about all its neighbours.

But Raffy will eat Su-30MKK/J-11 for breakfast, J20 for lunch, and J31 for tea.

[Kartik]

IMO, there is no doubt that its impressive that they've been able to put 2 new fighters with significantly different designs into the air within such a short time span of each other. They do have a lot more aerospace resources than we do and there is no shame in accepting that. It's also clear though, that both the J-20 and J-31 prototypes are basically at the Technology Demonstrator levels, with stop-gap arrangements for engines and possibly even a lot of the avionics on board. But they understand the value of psyops, without a doubt. Our people seem to have no clue about that.

There is a long way to go yet for these programs to become operational types, exploring the envelope, developing the FBW code, fine tuning the onboard avionics, radar, testing out the internal weapons bays which they're using for the first time, and in parallel develop indigenous variants of the AL-31 and the RD-33 for these fighters- but the Chinese seem to have embraced the philosophy of iteratively developing their weapons systems instead of waiting to get it all right in the first go itself. And they're lavishly spending on their own programs, while in our case at times indigenous programs starve for funds, which is criminal neglect.

The only good I can see coming out of this is that IAF and MoD top brass will have their tummies in knots and will see no other option but to push for timely completion of the MRCA deal, and back the FGFA and the AMCA to the hilt without setting goals that set up the AMCA for failure or for major delays. I also hope ADA/DRDO/HAL do a better job of project management, scope management and public perception management this time around.

[vivek_ahuja]

There is a long way to go, but the Chinese seem to have embraced the philosophy of iteratively developing their weapons systems instead of waiting to get it all right in the first go itself.

Clearly a better way to do it too, IMHO. Good luck selling that concept to the IAF though.

[Kartik]

There is a long way to go, but the Chinese seem to have embraced the philosophy of iteratively developing their weapons systems instead of waiting to get it all right in the first go itself.

Clearly a better way to do it too, IMHO. Good luck selling that concept to the IAF though.

I agree..one example I quoted earlier too was the IAF's requirement that the AMCA not feature a HUD and instead have ALL the HUD's data displayed on the HMDS itself. This is a drag and drop feature they've picked up from reading up on the F-35. This a requirement of very questionable benefit (ok, the pilot sees flight info even when looking off-bore sight, but how useful is that?), but one that has already given set backs to the F-35 program while the issues of jitter and image display lag are fixed. Yet, the IAF sets this as a requirement..why ?! why won't a HUD do? Ask for a bigger FoV, better resolution, frameless, whatever, but why dump the HUD altogether just because the F-35 does that?

The Chinese J-20 features a HUD and for sure the J-31 won't feature any major technological jump. But, they'll fine tune the design while any such technologies are developed in parallel. Unless the IAF recognises this and doesn't ask for the moon in the AMCA Mk1 itself before getting it to FoC, we'll be in for a decade or more of frustration.