indranilroy wrote: SNIP.........
Can they reuse SAMHO's guidance for a Krasnopol equivalent. The answer I think is a definite yes.
The reason why nations place a significant part of their nuclear arsenals on board nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is because of their invulnerability, in comparison with static air force bases and missile sites or even mobile launchers. Once at its patrol station, a few hundred metres underwater, the SSBN is considered safe from prying sensors, including satellites.
From this top-secret redoubt, her battery of ballistic missiles poses the threat of a devastating riposte to any adversary who may contemplate a nuclear first-strike.
In this context, the final launch of India’s K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), marking successful completion of its development programme, is yet another feather in the cap of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). This event denotes the achievement of mastery over a sequence of esoteric technologies by Indian scientists. These include safe underwater ejection of the missile, ignition of its rocket-motor at the moment of breaking surface, control during its ballistic-trajectory and precise delivery of its payload over the target.
All that remains to be tested is how the K-15’s nuclear warhead will fare during its hypersonic flight and white-hot re-entry into the atmosphere; and the kind of explosive yield that its nuclear blast will deliver. However, the last bit may remain an unknown, in view of India’s self-imposed 1998 test-moratorium and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.
The primary aim of India’s no-first use (NFU) nuclear arsenal has always been to deter China from threatening it or attempting coercion with its powerful nuclear arsenal. It is for this reason that Indian scientists have steadfastly persevered, since the early 1980s, in their endeavours to produce a missile capable of delivering a sizeable nuclear warhead out to an inter-continental range of 5,000-8,000km. Their worthy efforts were crowned by success, with the successful test-firing of the Agni-V last year, and India can now claim to have an effective, land-based, nuclear deterrent against China.
An SSBN, being a vessel of immense strategic value, has to be deployed with care and secrecy in areas which are not frequented by shipping traffic. Their patrol stations are, therefore, chosen in remote parts of the ocean where they can loiter for months at a time, without fear of detection or interference. The obvious corollary is that their missile range must be adequate to reach adversary targets from safe waters. For example, the Chinese Jin-class SSBN is armed with the JL-2 SLBM, which has a range of 8,000km and can target both San Francisco and Kolkata from the South China Sea.
In this context, it becomes obvious that the 750km range of the K-15 is grossly insufficient for it to zero in on targets in mainland China from home waters. To be a truly effective third leg of the nuclear triad, an Indian nuclear submarine will have to await the delivery of an underwater launched missile of intercontinental range, so that it can threaten desired targets from safe patrol areas in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.
However, it must be recognised that the American, Russian and Chinese navies had all followed a similar route before achieving SLBM capability of intercontinental range. Installed on board the soon-to-be-commissioned SSBN Arihant, there is no doubt the K-15 will serve as the most valuable stepping-stone and learning tool for more capable SLBMs that will follow.
Nuclear deterrence is all about sending the right signals to the adversary and there is a school of thought that Pakistan has already misinterpreted, inadvertently or deliberately, a number of Indian signals. The K-15 must not add to this list.
Even as India sought deterrence stability with respect to China, it clearly understood that the latter’s strategic calculus and nuclear arsenal looked well beyond India to include the US and Russia. It is a most regrettable aspect of sub-continental geopolitics that Pakistan has been unwilling to acknowledge that India’s arsenal, too, was predicated on factors other than Pakistan and has consistently sought to acquire parity with India.
Regardless of India’s true intentions in undertaking the Pokhran I nuclear test in May 1998, Islamabad jumped to the conclusion that India had embarked on a Pak-centric nuclear weapon programme and accelerated its own ongoing bomb project. The test of the liquid-fuelled, nuclear-capable 150km-range Prithvi missile in 1988 and that of the 1,500km-range Agni the following year confirmed Pakistan’s apprehensions that India’s nuclear capability was intended, not against China, but itself. The range of these missiles seemed to confirm this. India’s much publicised ballistic-missile defence programme, the launch of the Arihant and the maiden display of Agni V during the Republic Day parade may have all added to this paranoia. None of these developments are meant to be Pakistan-centric, but the induction of the 750km K-15 SLBM will certainly fuel the fears of Pakistan.
In a related context, since nuclear weapons have a large kill radius, accuracy is a relatively minor consideration for the delivery system — as long as the targeting strategy calls for counter-value attacks against cities, envisaged in the current Indian nuclear doctrine. However, the mention of single-digit accuracy’ by the DRDO chief in the K-15 context raises the spectre of ‘counter-force’ targeting and an entirely different ball game.
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions have acquired such a desperate edge that its fissile plutonium production rate, from China-supplied reactors, will soon enable it to acquire one of the world’s largest warhead inventories. Apart from inducting cruise missiles, Pakistan has also stepped into the dangerous realm of tactical nuclear weaponry, and, there has been intriguing mention of Pakistan Navy’s Strategic Forces Command being the ‘custodian of the nation’s second-strike capability’.
With India’s scientists having done their job well, it is high time India’s national security experts and analysts step on to the strategic stage and, apart from considering the strategic context of the K-15, reflect on the state of mutual suspicion, rather than the actual needs of deterrence and stability that seem to be driving the growth of nuclear arsenals on the sub-continent.
{Admiral (retd.) Arun Prakash is a former chief of the Indian Navy and former chairman, Chiefs-of-Staff Committee.}
— IANS
BALASORE: For the second consecutive day, India's indigenously developed multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) weapon system, 'Pinaka' was successfully test fired today from a defence base at Chandipur-on-sea, about 15 km from here.
If it wasn't bunch of ball-less congressi dudes deciding future of this country, tsp would have been cornered into giving up its nuclear expansion plan long back. It is unparalleled in history that a country as unstable and as bankrupt as tsp is able to maintain and increase its warhead count and rest of the world is watching elsewhere.Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions have acquired such a desperate edge that its fissile plutonium production rate, from China-supplied reactors, will soon enable it to acquire one of the world’s largest warhead inventories. Apart from inducting cruise missiles, Pakistan has also stepped into the dangerous realm of tactical nuclear weaponry, and, there has been intriguing mention of Pakistan Navy’s Strategic Forces Command being the ‘custodian of the nation’s second-strike capability’.
With India’s scientists having done their job well, it is high time India’s national security experts and analysts step on to the strategic stage and, apart from considering the strategic context of the K-15, reflect on the state of mutual suspicion, rather than the actual needs of deterrence and stability that seem to be driving the growth of nuclear arsenals on the sub-continent.
Event the west will be interested. If countries like Pak get these capabilities then countries like Israel will be sitting next to GHQ all the time.hnair wrote:I am curious at Admiral-saab's reference to Paki naval second-strike. Other than this article, not many people in India seem to talk about it much.
Gosh, pakistan as a state is like a two-day old roadkill teeming with maggots - one dont feel like going near it to examine closely and even if you do, the internals are completely mushed up to make any sense.
These are tactical or strategic missiles? do they have any vessels which can carry these missiles in the first place?mention of Pakistan Navy’s Strategic Forces Command being the ‘custodian of the nation’s second-strike capability’.
In a second strike scenario, the SLCM range required will be 1500 to 3000kms hence cj-10 cruise missiles with strategic warheads, paint job and title from Pakis and Chinese control. This cooperation for 2nd strike solely aimed at India frees up Chinese SSBNs back to their original tasking.SLCM defence is inherently dual pronged, and involves using LRMP (Long Range Maritime Patrol) aircraft, warships and submarines to engage the launch platform, and AEW&C, tankers and fighters to destroy any missiles which are launched. The range of the opposing SLCM type will critically determine the effectiveness of either prong in this model. A shorter ranging 160 NMI missile like the regional 3M-54/14 series forces the submarine into a relatively small zone surrounding the target, increasing opportunities for ASW forces to find and kill it, especially once it has fired its SLCMs off. Conversely, with a 450 KTAS SLCM cruise speed, aerial interception opportunities are compressed into a 20 minute time window, making the odds of successful missile strikes greater.
A 400 to 650 NMI range class SLCM frustrates ASW operations as the footprint to be patrolled increases with the square of missile range, but it also much increases opportunities for aerial interception by tripling if not quadrupling SLCM flight duration over water.
The conventional force structure model used for defeating SLCMs is inherently expensive - 24/7 ASW patrols using aircraft and naval assets must be combined with 24/7 AEW&C, tanker and fighter patrols. While ground alert interceptors are an option, the ten minutes required to get them airborne on station reduces available time to effect engagements against the inbound SLCMs. Supersonic climb-out and sustained dash would minimise the time to station, but this is not an option for F/A-18A and JSF.
The biggest cost burden in defending against SLCMs lies in the need for concurrent airborne patrols using LRMP aircraft and AEW&C aircraft, effectively doubling up on the required airborne ISR component of the defending force. This is a byproduct of the niche specialisation of these systems.
LRMP aircraft on station searching for submarines being positioned for launches present an opportunity to free up AEW&C aircraft for other tasks - if the LRMP aircraft is equipped with radar/datalink capability to cue interceptors to SLCMs in flight. Existing search radars on LRMP aircraft have neither the power-aperture performance nor azimuthal coverage to be credible in this role. A viable radar for this role is an X-band active phased array in the class of the MT-RTIP family of radars planned for the E-8 JSTARS upgrade, the E-10 MC2A and growth Global Hawk variants. These radars will be used by the US Air Force for cruise missile defence, mobile ground target tracking, and likely by the US Navy for the BAMS maritime search role on UAVs - the Global Hawk being a leading candidate.
An LRMP aircraft equipped with such a radar acquires an inherent capability to detect and track SLCMs, in addition to gaining improved ASW and ASuW surface search capabilities, and JSTARS-like littoral GMTI search capabilities. This is an important synergy in functions which should not be ignored. Supplementary AEW&C capability for naval surface action groups, and over the horizon midcourse guidance and illumination for shipboard SAMs are also feasible.
While SLCMs lack the sustainable rate of fire, and achievable weight of fire of air launched cruise missiles, they do present a complex equation for a defender.
Kanson wrote:I doubt...indranilroy wrote:Can they reuse SAMHO's guidance for a Krasnopol equivalent. The answer I think is a definite yes.
I think, the dynamics involved in the shell will be atleast marginally different from that of missile.indranilroy wrote: Why?
If you are aware of Indian/Bharat history, you wouldn't have to let loose your feelings like this.Boreas wrote:If it wasn't bunch of ball-less congressi dudes deciding future of this country, tsp would have been cornered into giving up its nuclear expansion plan long back. It is unparalleled in history that a country as unstable and as bankrupt as tsp is able to maintain and increase its warhead count and rest of the world is watching elsewhere.
A very rare acknowledgement of what is obvious to some of us for quite sometime. Don't expect any thing more than the current acknowledgement on the potential we are seeking because the topic is sensitive.In a related context, since nuclear weapons have a large kill radius, accuracy is a relatively minor consideration for the delivery system — as long as the targeting strategy calls for counter-value attacks against cities, envisaged in the current Indian nuclear doctrine. However, the mention of single-digit accuracy’ by the DRDO chief in the K-15 context raises the spectre of ‘counter-force’ targeting and an entirely different ball game.
At 10:30, says it was called "Dhanush" also. So was B-05 being tested everytime we heard Dhanush and assumed naval version of Prithvi ?Prithwiraj wrote:x Post from multi-media thread...
NDTV seems to have a pulled a coup of sort... a different view of the B-05 missile test from the observation ship..shows the jubilation of DRDO folks .....!!
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/ndtv-s ... /263753?hp
At least not yet. not yet.no skin of my nose.
Really... ? I tend to agree that different ethnic groups working together towards a common goal is fantastic... a bong director trying hopelessly with funny hindi .. was the icing on the cake... we all Indian all right...D Roy wrote:ethnic groups?
I see only one ethnic group - Indian.
Speaking only one language - Indian.
And if anybody here with ideas of "rakshaking" India hasn't got that down straight should seriously consider doing something else.
Sorry cant agree with you .. I have enough example of parochial favoritism within scientific communities in India. I don't want to list down the examples here but will respectfully disagree with your notion.D Roy wrote:Yes really.
Their peer affiliation - a common techno-scientific endeavour for India's strategic security.
Their macro affiliation - Indian.
Their *really* isn't any need or scope for identifying any other "ethnic markers" in that event.
And if you are indeed an Indian you will understand this standpoint and not regard it as a counterpoint to the unity in diversity argument.
It is time the Indian grew out of the British anthropological mindset on every issue.
Look carefully at the video and you can actually ID The vessel.. Didn't take more then a couple of min to figure out that a desi company was contracted for this job.Prithwiraj wrote:x Post from multi-media thread...
NDTV seems to have a pulled a coup of sort... a different view of the B-05 missile test from the observation ship..shows the jubilation of DRDO folks .....!!
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/ndtv-s ... /263753?hp
yes.. I noticed that too.. !!pushkar.bhat wrote:Look carefully at the video and you can actually ID The vessel.. Didn't take more then a couple of min to figure out that a desi company was contracted for this job.Prithwiraj wrote:x Post from multi-media thread...
NDTV seems to have a pulled a coup of sort... a different view of the B-05 missile test from the observation ship..shows the jubilation of DRDO folks .....!!
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/ndtv-s ... /263753?hp
Ohh. That will be the other vessel that delivered the package to the pontoon.. Zimble Sir..sum wrote:What is the intentionally blurred thing in the video between 0:25-0:28?
Another pooch was what was so special in this test which caused such amount of jubilation and tears in the eyes of the Project Director, given that this was actually the 12th successful launch? What was special in this test compared to earlier 11?