Jai SR
Member
Member # 5167
posted 09 March 2004 07:21 AM
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No eyeball to eyeball any more in new war doctrine
BATTLE ORDER CHANGES: New world, nuclear neighbourhood don’t allow massing of troops, long land and air campaigns
NEW DELHI, MARCH 5: With a peace process underway, India’s top military commanders have returned to their drawing board and worked on a new war doctrine: the ‘cold start’ strategy does away with massing of troops, introduces eight integrated battle groups with elements of IAF and Navy as thrust formations, calls for hard strikes yet limits them to the point which should not invite any nuclear retaliation.
Army Chief General N C Vij has his reasons not to go public with the new doctrine but, for the first time since Independence, age-old concepts of mobilisation of forces and Strike Corps spearheading the attack are being junked.
In short, no longer will armed forces be mobilised to prepare for war. Global powers in the changed world do not allow it. Op Parakram is a prime example: the international community intervened once the Cabinet signalled mobilisation of forces, five days after the attack on Parliament in December 2001. It took 20 days to mass the troops.
Military commanders are now looking at the ‘cold start’ doctrine. Although it was drawn before the Indo-Pak border stand-off, it was fine-tuned only after Op Parakram, taking into account the reality of a nuclear neighbourhood.
While many in the forces may take credit for this doctrine, the then Western Army Commander Lt General Vijay Oberoi was one of the first to root for this strategy. Present Army Vice Chief Lt General Shantano Choudhary has refined the concept keeping in mind the existing nuclear environment.
Gen Oberoi, who retired as Army Vice Chief in 2002, presently heads an Army think tank called CLAWS. This doctrine, debated at the last tri-Services military commanders conference, will be on the agenda again during the commanders’ conference next month.
The new doctrine does not believe in dividing the forces into defensive or attack formations. India’s three Strike Corps — Mathura-based I Corps, Ambala-based II Corps and Bhopal-based XXI Corps — will be there only for training purposes. The war will be fought through eight battle groups with integrated elements from the IAF and Navy.
Backed by tank regiments, heavy artillery, missile regiments and the air force, the battle groups will go for limited but lethal destruction on enemy territory. The Navy with its carrier-based fighters will have the key role of supporting the battle groups. Ships will also launch missiles like the Russian Klub. The idea is to destroy, not to hold or capture territory.
This concept was first war-gamed during Exercise Vijay Chakra in the Thar desert by Gen Oberoi in 2001 and synergised between the three forces during Exercise Brahmastra later that year. Still being war-gamed, a part of it was on view at Exercise Divya Astra in Pokharan this week.
This strategy was fine-tuned once the threat of nuclear war dawned on the security establishment. It was done by Gen Choudhary, then commander of the Jalandhar-based XI Corps, and his counterparts in IAF and Navy.
Measuring the force application during war time, they took into account the nuclear threshold of the adversary.
In short, don’t hit the adversary’s strategic points so hard as to invite a nuclear response or international intervention
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Jai SR
Member
Member # 5167
posted 09 March 2004 07:25 AM
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India working on new war doctrine
NEW DELHI - With the peace process getting momentum in the subcontinent, India is working on a new war doctrine under which it would surprise the international community by a sudden hard strike against its neighbours to avoid prior international intervention which is resulted by mobilisation of troops along international borders.
India’s top military commanders are giving the new war doctrine called ‘cold star’ final touches under which it would not need to deploy its troops on the borders, a daily newspaper the Indian Express reported Saturday.
The report said that while attacking its nuclear neighbours under the new war doctrine called ‘cold start’, Indian armed forces would also make it sure that the strike is not so hard that invites nuclear retaliation.
Under this doctrine there would be eight integrated battle groups with elements of Indian Air Force and Navy as thrust formations, calls for hard strikes yet limits them to the point which should not invite any nuclear retaliation, the newspaper said.
While discussing the new war doctrine the force application during war time was measured and the nuclear threshold of the adversary was taken into account. After this process, the Indian war strategists are understood to have concluded that don’t hit the adversary’s strategic points so hard as to invite a nuclear response or international intervention.
Those who are working on this new war strategy include Indian Army Chief General N C Vij, Army Vice Chief Lt General Shantano Choudhary and former Western Army Commander Lt General Vijay Oberoi who retired as Army Vice Chief in 2002 and presently heads an Army think tank called CLAWS.
Once the new war strategy is finalised India would junk its age-old concepts of mobilisation of forces and Strike Corps which spearheads the attack. In simple words, no longer will Indian armed forces be mobilised to prepare for war. “The new doctrine does not believe in dividing the forces into defensive or attack formations. India’s three Strike Corps - Mathura-based I Corps, Ambala-based II Corps and Bhopal-based XXI Corps - will be there only for training purposes. The war will be fought through eight battle groups with integrated elements from the IAF and Navy,” the Indian Express said.
“Backed by tank regiments, heavy artillery, missile regiments and the air force, the battle groups will go for limited but lethal destruction on enemy territory.
The Navy with its carrier-based fighters will have the key role of supporting the battle groups. Ships will also launch missiles like the Russian Klub. The idea is to destroy, not to hold or capture territory,” it said.
India is understood to have decided to work in this war doctrine keeping in view the changed global scenario in which mobilisation of troops would be allowed by the world powers. The Atal Bihari Vajpayee government has experienced it when it signalled mobilisation of forces along Pakistan’s borders five days after the attack on Parliament in December 2001.
The process of mobilisation took 20 days.
The Indian daily said that the work on the new war doctrine had started long before the recent stand-off between India and Pakistan. “This concept was first war-gamed during Exercise Vijay Chakra in the Thar desert by Gen Oberoi in 2001 and synergised between the three forces during Exercise Brahmastra later that year. Still being war-gamed, a part of it was on view at Exercise Divya Astra in Pokharan this week,” the newspaper report said.
Some observers feel that the United States military strikes on Afghanistan and its invasion in Iraq may have also given India’s war strategists some tips to formulate a new war doctrine.
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Jai SR
Member
Member # 5167
posted 09 March 2004 07:30 AM
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Indian Army drafts new war doctrine
quote:
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New Delhi, March 4. (PTI): With the warfare scenario undergoing dramatic changes, the Indian Army has drafted a new war doctrine which may be adopted soon, Army Chief Gen. N C Vij said here today.
"A rough draft has been evolved and would be finalised soon after it is circulated within the service as well as incoporating suggestions from the defence think tanks," he said while inaugurating a two-day seminar on 'Army 2020: Shape and Size and Structure and General Doctrine for Emerging Challenges'.
For the first time in recent years, all three service Chiefs shared the podium and took the occasion to call for forging greater cooperation among army, air force and navy saying, all future wars would require extraordinary synergy between the three divisions.
The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Naval Chief Admiral Madhvendera Singh said Indian armed forces would have to finetune tactics of precision standoff attacks.
Singh said that along with current modernisation drive in the armed forces, care has to be taken to change the attitude of the men who manned the machines.
"We have to go in for drastic changes in the attitude of men in uniforms to develop among them leadership qualities and means to imbibe futuristic technology", the naval Chief said.
Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
I found the chapters of study on NATO 'attack on
follow on forces' concept
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/
the point to read is about the soviet organization
and strategy (esp their OMG - operational manouver groups ...destined to be let through to rampage on their own in the rear...just like in the good old days in the steppe after stalingrad)
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871806.PDF
see also capabilities
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871811.PDF
soviet concerns on fofa (RayC is always complainin of someone hitting the shaft) and
counterstrategies
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871809.PDF
technology issues in C3I
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871812.PDF
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871813.PDF
packages of systems and munitions for fofa
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871814.PDF
follow on forces' concept
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/
the point to read is about the soviet organization
and strategy (esp their OMG - operational manouver groups ...destined to be let through to rampage on their own in the rear...just like in the good old days in the steppe after stalingrad)
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871806.PDF
see also capabilities
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871811.PDF
soviet concerns on fofa (RayC is always complainin of someone hitting the shaft) and
counterstrategies
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871809.PDF
technology issues in C3I
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871812.PDF
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871813.PDF
packages of systems and munitions for fofa
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871814.PDF
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
http://www.indiareacts.com/archivefeatures/nat2.asp?recno=66&ctg=
Test of fire
If the Indian Army succeeds with the 100-gun concept, it could change the rules of engagement with Pakistan.
By Our correspondent
18 January 2003: The Ambala-based headquarter II corps (one of the strike corps) has been tasked to carry out an exercise over the next couple of months which, if successful, could result in a paradigm shift in the Indian Army’s firepower strategy
Known as the 100-gun concept, it finds its origin in the military doctrine of the erstwhile Soviet Union. The concept aims at effecting maximum destruction on the enemy’s military and key civilian assets before the infantry can physically move in and capture territory.
Labeled as being rather expensive, this concept was buried by armies across the globe after the Soviet collapse. The concept involves 100 or more artillery guns to provide support to three infantry battalions as opposed to the Western doctrine of 64 guns for three infantry units.
The problem with the Soviet doctrine was that if the enemy were to open more than a couple of fronts, moving artillery pieces and other firepower assets would prove not just expensive but also cumbersome and predictable. In fact, opening several small fronts by way of swift manoeuvres lay at the heart of NATO’s strategic doctrine against the Soviets.
This concept, however, has found new life in India. During the Kargil conflict, between 100-120 guns on an average supported three infantry units. This was complimented by air power, namely laser-guided bombs. Together, the firepower component in Kargil was able to inflict a telling damage, officials said, on enemy positions making it easier for an infantry assault.
Recently, during Operation Parakram, the strategy of degradation operations in the Northern Command involved complete and thorough destruction of the enemy’s war-making capabilities, officials added.
Here too, a combination of artillery and air power formed the centrepiece of the strategy.
According to officials, the future India war scenario will be sectoral in nature, given the political compulsion not to escalate the conflict beyond a particular region. This would allow India to shift firepower resources, say, to the LoC from other sectors. This, in turn, would reduce the guns-to-men ratio enabling the implementation of the 100-gun concept.
Moreover, since the capture of territory is ruled out due to political compulsions, the destruction of enemy assets has emerged as a key marker of success in war these days, officials added.
Insiders also say that the successful execution of this exercise could impact future procurement of artillery and armour and increase the stress on air power. But this change would require more than a few successful exercises – and not before the Indian military is convinced that Pakistan won’t counter the 100-gun concept in novel ways.
Test of fire
If the Indian Army succeeds with the 100-gun concept, it could change the rules of engagement with Pakistan.
By Our correspondent
18 January 2003: The Ambala-based headquarter II corps (one of the strike corps) has been tasked to carry out an exercise over the next couple of months which, if successful, could result in a paradigm shift in the Indian Army’s firepower strategy
Known as the 100-gun concept, it finds its origin in the military doctrine of the erstwhile Soviet Union. The concept aims at effecting maximum destruction on the enemy’s military and key civilian assets before the infantry can physically move in and capture territory.
Labeled as being rather expensive, this concept was buried by armies across the globe after the Soviet collapse. The concept involves 100 or more artillery guns to provide support to three infantry battalions as opposed to the Western doctrine of 64 guns for three infantry units.
The problem with the Soviet doctrine was that if the enemy were to open more than a couple of fronts, moving artillery pieces and other firepower assets would prove not just expensive but also cumbersome and predictable. In fact, opening several small fronts by way of swift manoeuvres lay at the heart of NATO’s strategic doctrine against the Soviets.
This concept, however, has found new life in India. During the Kargil conflict, between 100-120 guns on an average supported three infantry units. This was complimented by air power, namely laser-guided bombs. Together, the firepower component in Kargil was able to inflict a telling damage, officials said, on enemy positions making it easier for an infantry assault.
Recently, during Operation Parakram, the strategy of degradation operations in the Northern Command involved complete and thorough destruction of the enemy’s war-making capabilities, officials added.
Here too, a combination of artillery and air power formed the centrepiece of the strategy.
According to officials, the future India war scenario will be sectoral in nature, given the political compulsion not to escalate the conflict beyond a particular region. This would allow India to shift firepower resources, say, to the LoC from other sectors. This, in turn, would reduce the guns-to-men ratio enabling the implementation of the 100-gun concept.
Moreover, since the capture of territory is ruled out due to political compulsions, the destruction of enemy assets has emerged as a key marker of success in war these days, officials added.
Insiders also say that the successful execution of this exercise could impact future procurement of artillery and armour and increase the stress on air power. But this change would require more than a few successful exercises – and not before the Indian military is convinced that Pakistan won’t counter the 100-gun concept in novel ways.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Rishi Durvasa was one of the seven wise sages of yore; very powerful; but mostly known for his violent hair trigger temper. People were on their best behaviour around him, because they did not want him to explode at the slightest provocation.
That should explain why I called it Op Durvasa
I would also incorporate Ashutosh's comment on the timeline for IAF's AD response. If there are other comments that you or anyone else feel are necessary to incorporate, please let me know.
One thing that I should do is to use some of my other posts from this thread as a preface to the scenario, to set a lot of things straight.
The rest is my response to Ray sahab, and involves some brazen tooting of my own horn. So viewer discretion advised.
Ray sahab
The first and most genuine reason for going with a fictional format was that it is much easier and a lot more fun doing it this way than to write a long and boring article with ten thousand references. However, many a truth is said in jest, and this particular format did permit me to include some "local color" that would have been difficult to explicitly include in a serious article. Let me assure you that the scenario is not based on any privileged information, nor has it been inspired by anything else than reading drawn entirely from the internet/books. In fact, most of the articles about the new doctrine that I drew from are found right here on this thread.
You should know that we have become good friends, but still I have never obtained any piece of information from you that you would consider sensitive. Not for lack of trying on my part, and you know that too. It is no different with my other friends who are knowledgable about military affairs - the pricipal reason is that most military people in particular have an ingrained paranoia about shop talk. The other reason is that in this day of internet, it is no longer necessary to rely on privileged information, since a lot lot more can be readily had over the internet and can therefore be discussed openly.
You also seem uncomfortable that my posting this scenario may be taken as an unofficial outlet for an official policy. Again, this is far from the truth, but I think I know why you feel this way.
I think you recognised that I was the one who grasped on to Paddy's "cold start" strategy long long before it got explicitly published in the popular media, and I started talking about it in connection to Divya Astra two days before reports on IA's new doctrines got splashed all over. Deadly timing, eh what? So you may have thought that I somehow had access to privileged information, or that I was being used to expand on an interesting cocept... if so, you were not alone because at least one other person I highly respect got the same impression and conveyed it to me privately. Again, this is not so. I "got it" simply because I have been hanging around BRF long enough, and because I am (sorry for this) a smart guy who has had some really good training on grasping essential ideas.
So don't hate me for my wet dreams, just let me have some fun, and correct me if I am wrong!
That should explain why I called it Op Durvasa
I would also incorporate Ashutosh's comment on the timeline for IAF's AD response. If there are other comments that you or anyone else feel are necessary to incorporate, please let me know. One thing that I should do is to use some of my other posts from this thread as a preface to the scenario, to set a lot of things straight.
The rest is my response to Ray sahab, and involves some brazen tooting of my own horn. So viewer discretion advised.
Ray sahab
The first and most genuine reason for going with a fictional format was that it is much easier and a lot more fun doing it this way than to write a long and boring article with ten thousand references. However, many a truth is said in jest, and this particular format did permit me to include some "local color" that would have been difficult to explicitly include in a serious article. Let me assure you that the scenario is not based on any privileged information, nor has it been inspired by anything else than reading drawn entirely from the internet/books. In fact, most of the articles about the new doctrine that I drew from are found right here on this thread.
You should know that we have become good friends, but still I have never obtained any piece of information from you that you would consider sensitive. Not for lack of trying on my part, and you know that too. It is no different with my other friends who are knowledgable about military affairs - the pricipal reason is that most military people in particular have an ingrained paranoia about shop talk. The other reason is that in this day of internet, it is no longer necessary to rely on privileged information, since a lot lot more can be readily had over the internet and can therefore be discussed openly.
You also seem uncomfortable that my posting this scenario may be taken as an unofficial outlet for an official policy. Again, this is far from the truth, but I think I know why you feel this way.
I think you recognised that I was the one who grasped on to Paddy's "cold start" strategy long long before it got explicitly published in the popular media, and I started talking about it in connection to Divya Astra two days before reports on IA's new doctrines got splashed all over. Deadly timing, eh what? So you may have thought that I somehow had access to privileged information, or that I was being used to expand on an interesting cocept... if so, you were not alone because at least one other person I highly respect got the same impression and conveyed it to me privately. Again, this is not so. I "got it" simply because I have been hanging around BRF long enough, and because I am (sorry for this) a smart guy who has had some really good training on grasping essential ideas.
So don't hate me for my wet dreams, just let me have some fun, and correct me if I am wrong!
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Thanks YIP and R^2. I see the light. Dont mess with quick tempered but correct action sages.
Trevor Dupuy in his book 'Future Wars' also talks of a similar situation but it has a different ending.
Trevor Dupuy in his book 'Future Wars' also talks of a similar situation but it has a different ending.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
hmmm... some things never change; sounds like good old fashioned tactics that the Muscovy Princes learnt as vassals and levies of the Khans of the Golden HordeOriginally posted by Rudra Singha:
...destined to be let through to rampage on their own in the rear...just like in the good old days in the steppe after stalingrad)
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
I genuinely admire your posts YIP.
But I do have to post my contra views just to make it spicy hot.
From the Indian military leadership point of view, we are assured that, what you say is entirely doable, but will political leadership ever unleash the full potential of our Jawans?
Thanks
But I do have to post my contra views just to make it spicy hot.
From the Indian military leadership point of view, we are assured that, what you say is entirely doable, but will political leadership ever unleash the full potential of our Jawans?
Thanks
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
:o
Jumrao thank you very much. I can honestly say that having feedback from people like you keeps me, and indeed all of us on BR, on our toes.
Re your question about India's politicians, what can I that you already have not? Their mode of thinking is very Indian. India has a unique political and strategic culture, for better or for worse. I don't think a two bit terrorist nation will make us change our essence.
But truth wins, and knowledge empowers. That's what we are here for, right?
Jumrao thank you very much. I can honestly say that having feedback from people like you keeps me, and indeed all of us on BR, on our toes.
Re your question about India's politicians, what can I that you already have not? Their mode of thinking is very Indian. India has a unique political and strategic culture, for better or for worse. I don't think a two bit terrorist nation will make us change our essence.
But truth wins, and knowledge empowers. That's what we are here for, right?
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
After briefly reviewing the NATO's "Follow-On Forces Attack" (FOFA) concept, IMO, IA looks to have incorporated elements of this concept as well in its new stategy ... one only has to look at the new armaments being developed or purchased (i.e. new tactical SSM from Isreal, LR-MBRL, laser-guided ammunitions, LR-UAVs, etc.).Originally posted by Rudra Singha:
I found the chapters of study on NATO 'attack on
follow on forces' concept
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/
...
With the 100-gun concept, IA combined with IN/IAF would have the capability to destroy the forward formations of PA with superior firepower ... whose reaction would be to call for reinforcements from the rear; this is when the FOFA concept would come into play and cause massive destruction of the "follow-on" reinforcements and supplies.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
search for word 'skeet' in following URL and read
the Debut with a Bang article. This is the future of US Anti-vehicle/tank warfare, not Apaches
http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cache :3-LZYzk7GnoJ:www.precisionstrike.org/pdf/currentdigest.pdf+B-52+flying+unleashed+skeet&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
they mention skeet in the techonologies for fofa
paper. laser sensor, IR sensor, rocket booster, defuse mode...packs all the toys.
the Debut with a Bang article. This is the future of US Anti-vehicle/tank warfare, not Apaches
http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cache :3-LZYzk7GnoJ:www.precisionstrike.org/pdf/currentdigest.pdf+B-52+flying+unleashed+skeet&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
they mention skeet in the techonologies for fofa
paper. laser sensor, IR sensor, rocket booster, defuse mode...packs all the toys.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-on Forces
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871814.PDF
...
The flexibility of systems for FOFA is especially important. Flexibility would allow the battlefield commander to use the best operational concept for a particular tactical situation —for example, to strike deeper against a division, and then to strike closer in against the weakened regiments of the division, rather than always having to strike either deeper or closer in.
...
Command and Control
...
Locating Moving Combat Units
...a capability to detect, locate, and track moving combat units (regiments and divisions) to a depth of at least 150 kilometers beyond the Forward Line of own Troops (FLOT), and benefit from an ability to distinguish them from resupply or other support traffic in the enemy rear.
...
Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns (at 5 to 30 km)
...
Standoff Air Attack of Division Columns (at 30 to 80 km)
...attacks with a Modular Stand- Off Weapon (MSOW) that flies a distance of 25 to 50 kilometers and then dispenses smart submunitions against targeted columns of vehicles within the division that is moving.
...
Missile Attack of Division Columns (at 30 to 80 km)
This package uses ground-launched missiles to attack the same targets with the same objective as that of the previous package. The weapon system is the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which is launched from standard MLRS launchers.
...
Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted
Units (at 80 to 150 km)
...This package attacks follow-on divisions as they move on roads toward their concentration areas (division assembly areas). The attack is conducted in two phases. First, a chokepoint is created along a division’s route by dropping a bridge just before the division column arrives. Second, after a period of time sufficient to let enough of the division arrive at the chokepoint and halt there, the resulting bunches of stationary vehicles are attacked by tactical aircraft using short stand-off weapons.
...
Cruise Missile Attack of the Deep Rail
Network (at 350 to 800 km)
...
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
can someone give a rough estimate of the IA+IAF
assets reqd to achieve the above zones of attack
for one of these new composite units ?
my idea:
surveillance:
10 medium UAV - searcher2
20-30 small UAV - nishant
5 IAF a.c with EL-2222 SAR pod
15-20 scout helos (LOH/Dhruv)
TES / Ofek / abc @ twice a day download.
Artillery:
60 155mm 52cal
60 155mm 39cal (converted 133mm/fh77b)
100 light 105mm
3-4 WLRs
CAS dedicated:
1 sq upg Jag/Mig27 with PGMs,AT bomblets
Missile attack:
1 regiment of Pinaka/BM21
0.5 regiment Smerch (with advanced submunitions)
few brahmos TELs for leadership nodes
BAI dedicated:
1 sq upg Jag/Mig27/M2K.
EW:
1 samyukta unit
SF:
1 batallion
****
for 8 groups
1. 200 IAF a/c
2. 8 samyukta units
3. 8 regiment pinaka / bm21
4. 4 regiment smerch
5. 24 reg 155mm 52cal
6. 24 reg older 155mm
7. 40 reg 105mm light
8. 30-40 WLR units
9. 80 searcher2/heron
10. 200-250 small uav
11. 150 scout helos
12. 8 batallions para SF
13. 40 recce ac/helos with ground moving target
pods
To me it looks like by 2010 all of it will be in
place except the enlarged no of 155mm 52cal. the
rest have already been ordered, exists or is under delivery.
assets reqd to achieve the above zones of attack
for one of these new composite units ?
my idea:
surveillance:
10 medium UAV - searcher2
20-30 small UAV - nishant
5 IAF a.c with EL-2222 SAR pod
15-20 scout helos (LOH/Dhruv)
TES / Ofek / abc @ twice a day download.
Artillery:
60 155mm 52cal
60 155mm 39cal (converted 133mm/fh77b)
100 light 105mm
3-4 WLRs
CAS dedicated:
1 sq upg Jag/Mig27 with PGMs,AT bomblets
Missile attack:
1 regiment of Pinaka/BM21
0.5 regiment Smerch (with advanced submunitions)
few brahmos TELs for leadership nodes
BAI dedicated:
1 sq upg Jag/Mig27/M2K.
EW:
1 samyukta unit
SF:
1 batallion
****
for 8 groups
1. 200 IAF a/c
2. 8 samyukta units
3. 8 regiment pinaka / bm21
4. 4 regiment smerch
5. 24 reg 155mm 52cal
6. 24 reg older 155mm
7. 40 reg 105mm light
8. 30-40 WLR units
9. 80 searcher2/heron
10. 200-250 small uav
11. 150 scout helos
12. 8 batallions para SF
13. 40 recce ac/helos with ground moving target
pods
To me it looks like by 2010 all of it will be in
place except the enlarged no of 155mm 52cal. the
rest have already been ordered, exists or is under delivery.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
For those who don't intend to read the article fully, here's a summary!
Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1987/8718/871808.PDF
Category 1—5 to 30 Kilometers
The objective of category 1 FOFA operations is the destruction of second-echelon regiments. The most feasible approach to destroying these targets appears to be to attack them while they are moving on roads on their final approach to battle. These regiments will be moving in battalion columns of approximately 40 to 50 vehicles, with the combat battalions in the lead. There are about eight battalionsized column targets per regiment. In these columns the fraction of armored combat vehicles is roughly 70 percent. The support elements of the combat regiment are not likely to leave the departure area with the combat elements.
According to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), each column will be on the road for only about 30 to 60 minutes, and it will take the entire regiment between 1.5 and 2.1 hours to accomplish the move forward.
...
The amount of time a target battalion is moving is so brief that it may not be feasible to reattack it. Therefore, individual attacks should be “sized” to destroy a battalion in one attack.
...
Category 2—30 to 80 Kilometers
The objective of FOFA operations in this category is the destruction of second-echelon divisions. Within this range, divisions will be moving between their division assembly areas (concentration areas) and the departure areas and then occupying the departure areas.
While on the move, the division marches by regiments along two or more roads...Compared to category 1 attacks, a smaller fraction of the vehicles will be armored combat vehicles. Of the 55 or so battalion-sized columns in a division, about 25 will contain armored combat vehicles, and these 25 will average about 50 percent armored vehicles...
This portion of the division’s movement will last about 6 to 8 hours; any one battalion-sized column will take about 1.5 to 3 hours to traverse this distance. Compared to Category 1, there will be more opportunity to attack each target and perhaps opportunity to re-attack. Another approach to destroying second-echelon divisions is to attack their component regiments in their assembly areas. These areas will be occupied for at least several hours, while the units perform final preparations for battle (including maintenance, supply, and rest).
...
Category 3—80 to 150 Kilometers
At this range, the objective of attacking follow-on forces is limited to disruption. In addition to the types of attacks discussed above, other approaches are also under consideration.
Second-echelon divisions can be attacked directly while they move in this range, and perhaps while in assembly areas...
Two other approaches to disrupting secondechelon divisions (and first-echelon armies) are often advanced. In the first, “chokepoints” are created in front of moving ... units, and the units are subsequently attacked while they are halted trying to clear the chokepoint. The other approach is to attack command posts. The classic concept for chokepoint attack is to destroy bridges across a major river just prior to the arrival of an enemy unit..Other possible chokepoints include narrow roads through towns or natural defiles, tunnels, and dikes. The advantage of this approach is that the target division will be halted at the chokepoints, simplifying the problem of target location because targets will not be moving. Further, the density of vehicles (and personnel) will be greater than for either moving units or assembly areas, making area munitions more destructive.
...
Category 4—150 to 350 Kilometers
The objective here is to disrupt and delay second-echelon armies. General approaches are attacking units moving on roads, and creating chokepoints and barriers to their further movement forward...
For this approach to be effective the bridges must be attacked just as or before the enemy division uses them, and the subsequent attack of forces would have to follow closely.
...
Category 5—350 to 800 Kilometers
In this deepest region, the objectives of FOFA operations are to delay the secondechelon fronts during the 10 to 20 days after D-day in which the fronts mobilize and move forward...Attacks to delay this movement can be targeted against the units themselves, or against the rail transportation system being used.
...
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Rudra,
I just read your comment about me complaining about the 'shaft'.
The shaft does matter.
Notwithstanding, since I find you post informative stuff, even though I disagree with you at times, possibly because of the generation gap or because you use American style of posting eg fair skin - fair skin etc, which is Greek to me and I don't understand you.
I am very keen about the East Germany stuff leads.
We can discuss at e mail id
I will explain what I am convyeing and you could do the same. Mybe I can learn from you. However, please explain slowly and in the language that I understand.
YIP,
You may also discuss since we could exchange some ideas.
I have nothing against what your scenario is all about. I am only indicating think about the wherewithal currently available.
As far as FOFA, prima facie it is all about interdiction which is already in vogue and old hat (Americans have a way to may the mundane seem important) and maybe not be so elaborate as NATO because the wherewithals are not there as it would be with NATO. We can't superimpose their concepts. As an example, even Afghan Talibans could knock out UAVs with their elementary weapons! How many UAVs do we have? Take a stock of the equipment and then a realistic picture can be arrived at.
100 guns. Great concept. Can we muster so many in each sector of operations? I do not wish to elaborate on last time the 100 guns concept was applied. Suffice it to say, it denuded elsewhere.
The exhuberance displayed warms my heart but my mind gets doubtful. I am with you all, but maybe I rather be pragmatic. I like India shining and not whining.
No offence to anyone and least to my venerable friends here and YIP in particular because I respect his insight.
Its just a thought or 'stray thoughts' like Indira Gandhi! One political party would call it stupid and the other will kowtow.
I think Rudra is on the right lines and getting hold of assets. However, what I was saying, this web is watched all voer the world. Paranoid? Yes.
I just read your comment about me complaining about the 'shaft'.
The shaft does matter.
Notwithstanding, since I find you post informative stuff, even though I disagree with you at times, possibly because of the generation gap or because you use American style of posting eg fair skin - fair skin etc, which is Greek to me and I don't understand you.
I am very keen about the East Germany stuff leads.
We can discuss at e mail id
I will explain what I am convyeing and you could do the same. Mybe I can learn from you. However, please explain slowly and in the language that I understand.
YIP,
You may also discuss since we could exchange some ideas.
I have nothing against what your scenario is all about. I am only indicating think about the wherewithal currently available.
As far as FOFA, prima facie it is all about interdiction which is already in vogue and old hat (Americans have a way to may the mundane seem important) and maybe not be so elaborate as NATO because the wherewithals are not there as it would be with NATO. We can't superimpose their concepts. As an example, even Afghan Talibans could knock out UAVs with their elementary weapons! How many UAVs do we have? Take a stock of the equipment and then a realistic picture can be arrived at.
100 guns. Great concept. Can we muster so many in each sector of operations? I do not wish to elaborate on last time the 100 guns concept was applied. Suffice it to say, it denuded elsewhere.
The exhuberance displayed warms my heart but my mind gets doubtful. I am with you all, but maybe I rather be pragmatic. I like India shining and not whining.
No offence to anyone and least to my venerable friends here and YIP in particular because I respect his insight.
Its just a thought or 'stray thoughts' like Indira Gandhi! One political party would call it stupid and the other will kowtow.
I think Rudra is on the right lines and getting hold of assets. However, what I was saying, this web is watched all voer the world. Paranoid? Yes.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
hmmm thanks RayC. but pls remove your email-id
to avoid spammers picking it up.
you need to spend more time in the strategy forums
Paki threads to get the lingo right! someday Dr.Shiv might publish a handbook giving the distilled essence of the wisdom from the 'great sages' like Dr. Shiv himself, jrjrao, JEM, manku thimmas sliderule theorem et al.
to avoid spammers picking it up.
you need to spend more time in the strategy forums
Paki threads to get the lingo right! someday Dr.Shiv might publish a handbook giving the distilled essence of the wisdom from the 'great sages' like Dr. Shiv himself, jrjrao, JEM, manku thimmas sliderule theorem et al.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Rudra,
Thanks for your advice. I value it. I am what is Coke - the Real thing; and the Zing thing!
I don't wish to give you my bio data. I am proud of my on hands experience and yet, I have worked in organisations that look at strategy too. And interstingly enough those that are connected with DRDO.
Great stuff. But then you are better! Of that there is no doubt. I am no expert. You could be. I am here to be educated but if I can say I am ready to learn but without gobledegooks, semantics, but with hard facts and no fancy amrericanism. Others may understand, I cn't. Forgive me for my ignorance.
Thanks for your advice. I value it. I am what is Coke - the Real thing; and the Zing thing!
I don't wish to give you my bio data. I am proud of my on hands experience and yet, I have worked in organisations that look at strategy too. And interstingly enough those that are connected with DRDO.
Great stuff. But then you are better! Of that there is no doubt. I am no expert. You could be. I am here to be educated but if I can say I am ready to learn but without gobledegooks, semantics, but with hard facts and no fancy amrericanism. Others may understand, I cn't. Forgive me for my ignorance.
-
Raj Malhotra
- BRFite
- Posts: 997
- Joined: 26 Jun 2000 11:31
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
YIP
You would do well to include the Navy Tu-142, Il-38, Dorniers and herons also in the scenario. Also even if the whole fleet cannot be immediately deployed but a few ships and subs would definitely on patrol for instant response (in hours).
Gen
This is not the first time the use of wall of fire/100 gun concept being touted. I think it is being going around including on BRF for some time. Is it something to do or create demand for 155mm guns? After all, it is the question of US$ 1-3 billion green backs.
You would do well to include the Navy Tu-142, Il-38, Dorniers and herons also in the scenario. Also even if the whole fleet cannot be immediately deployed but a few ships and subs would definitely on patrol for instant response (in hours).
Gen
This is not the first time the use of wall of fire/100 gun concept being touted. I think it is being going around including on BRF for some time. Is it something to do or create demand for 155mm guns? After all, it is the question of US$ 1-3 billion green backs.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
RayC
I think one of the reasons that BR is so unique is the ability of its participants to bring in information from a variety of sources.
However as you rightly pointed out we are greenhorns and amateurs, we do not know how the army operates and what its requirements are.
If per chance you could bring in more hands-on military perspective to this forum, I am sure that the response will be a lot more specific. I mean views from not only the generals but also the foot soldiers, the arty guys etc etc.
For example we assume that C4I is super essential and go gaga about video feeds to individual soldiers, whereas as military person you would rather have say much simpler system but concentrate on using lay of the ground mapping to decipher where the enemy is most likely to be.
Perhaps the army-soldiers would prefer warm underwear instead of fancy camo, perhaps the army would even like a uniform that allows add on from local materials such as leaves/twigs/cutup newspaper to provide better / more customizable camo.
All these are issues may need out of the box thinking, I am certain that the number of people here spending their times surfing the net of information will be able to provide good answer such questions.
I think one of the reasons that BR is so unique is the ability of its participants to bring in information from a variety of sources.
However as you rightly pointed out we are greenhorns and amateurs, we do not know how the army operates and what its requirements are.
If per chance you could bring in more hands-on military perspective to this forum, I am sure that the response will be a lot more specific. I mean views from not only the generals but also the foot soldiers, the arty guys etc etc.
For example we assume that C4I is super essential and go gaga about video feeds to individual soldiers, whereas as military person you would rather have say much simpler system but concentrate on using lay of the ground mapping to decipher where the enemy is most likely to be.
Perhaps the army-soldiers would prefer warm underwear instead of fancy camo, perhaps the army would even like a uniform that allows add on from local materials such as leaves/twigs/cutup newspaper to provide better / more customizable camo.
All these are issues may need out of the box thinking, I am certain that the number of people here spending their times surfing the net of information will be able to provide good answer such questions.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
IS'T IT OBVIOUS MATE.Originally posted by shankar:
RayC
However as you rightly pointed out we are greenhorns and amateurs, we do not know how the army operates and what its requirements are.
If per chance you could bring in more hands-on military perspective to this forum, I am sure that the response will be a lot more specific.
Ray sir Hello. Long time. Hope things are well.
Sachin Kanbargimath
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Sure the BRF gives tremendous info that is of use to even professionals. And very good ones too!Originally posted by shankar:
RayC
I think one of the reasons that BR is so unique is the ability of its participants to bring in information from a variety of sources.
For example we assume that C4I is super essential and go gaga about video feeds to individual soldiers, whereas as military person you would rather have say much simpler system but concentrate on using lay of the ground mapping to decipher where the enemy is most likely to be.
Perhaps the army-soldiers would prefer warm underwear instead of fancy camo, perhaps the army would even like a uniform that allows add on from local materials such as leaves/twigs/cutup newspaper to provide better / more customizable camo.
All these are issues may need out of the box thinking, I am certain that the number of people here spending their times surfing the net of information will be able to provide good answer such questions.
The equation divide between the Officer and soldier is not so wide as I gather from other websites. Therefore, the bond to my mind is closer and the soldier's problems and that of officers are quite similar. This is more so since we live, work and operate in close proximity on the post or CI environment.
While we use the GPS, we still are working of the maps. Therefore, should tyhe GPS fail, we are not up a gum tree. C4I is a bigger picture.
Thanks for the response.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Hi Sachin
Regards to you and your father.
Regards to you and your father.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Yogi,
Should we be looking at the evolution of IA doctrine since the early eighties - Meghdoot, Brasstacks, Falcon, Checkerboard, Poorna Vijaya, and so to see how the various factors - political, economic, and military came into play in this evolution?
Should we be looking at the evolution of IA doctrine since the early eighties - Meghdoot, Brasstacks, Falcon, Checkerboard, Poorna Vijaya, and so to see how the various factors - political, economic, and military came into play in this evolution?
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Brasstacks itself flowed out of Digvijay (early to mid 80s, Krishna Rao COAS, Sundar Corps commander), which was an outcome of the lessons learned during 71 (Longewala may have played a part in showing what could be possible). So all in all, a fairly demanding task for one article unless it is a very "broad view" article. Another possibility would be to look at Meghdoot and trace the developments in the arty docrtine that led to the current emphasis on heavy fire power. If there is one area IA has really made a mark for itself, it is in the employment of arty in mountainous terrain. No mean achievement.Originally posted by ramana:
Yogi,
Should we be looking at the evolution of IA doctrine since the early eighties - Meghdoot, Brasstacks, Falcon, Checkerboard, Poorna Vijaya, and so to see how the various factors - political, economic, and military came into play in this evolution?
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
So this is where you have been hiding Yogi
First of all I think you have crafted a scenario that appears quite realistic in terms of the dynamics of such a crisis. I can not argue with them, but in its own way those dynamics are secondary, because unlike Leila, you have already determined the end state.
The most important questions about your scenario are whether the effects you've described can be acheived within the standard constraints of the enemy, time, weather and own forces. Military rather than political questions.
So if you dont mind I'd like to ask a few questions to flesh out the situation at the end of hostilities before I make any comments with regards to those bigger questions.
- What was the assumed size and number of the PA formations that 2 (Ind) Armd Bde and '10 RAPIDS' come in to contact with on the Pakistani side of the IB during Durvasa? How were these PA units deployed?
- What was the assumed combat efficiency of these PA units after bombardment, but before contact with advancing IA armour and infantry?
- Were PA corps HQs attacked, or were they off-limit as political leadership?
- IA formations penetrate 6km, but what was their frontage?
- What were your estimates of casualties at the end of hostilities among the IA forces crossing the IB?
First of all I think you have crafted a scenario that appears quite realistic in terms of the dynamics of such a crisis. I can not argue with them, but in its own way those dynamics are secondary, because unlike Leila, you have already determined the end state.
The most important questions about your scenario are whether the effects you've described can be acheived within the standard constraints of the enemy, time, weather and own forces. Military rather than political questions.
So if you dont mind I'd like to ask a few questions to flesh out the situation at the end of hostilities before I make any comments with regards to those bigger questions.
- What was the assumed size and number of the PA formations that 2 (Ind) Armd Bde and '10 RAPIDS' come in to contact with on the Pakistani side of the IB during Durvasa? How were these PA units deployed?
- What was the assumed combat efficiency of these PA units after bombardment, but before contact with advancing IA armour and infantry?
- Were PA corps HQs attacked, or were they off-limit as political leadership?
- IA formations penetrate 6km, but what was their frontage?
- What were your estimates of casualties at the end of hostilities among the IA forces crossing the IB?
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Arre Johann I am like this only since long time Good to get you distracted from Mtn Thunder!
Regarding your questions, my prime concern in such a situation would be speed. The important thing would be to draw first blood quickly, even if it is just a drop... my operational objectives would then be necessarily modest to help me acheive required speed.
This means that my primary target would a PA brigade; my penetration front restricted to about 5 kms or so. I would expect the PA brigade to have two batts forward deployed, with two in reserve. The main effort would be directed at degrading the defences of this brigade, but efforts that would aid this goal would also be permitted. Since degrading C3 to the brigade would be so important, I would say that its Div and Corps HQs would be fair game.
So I am thinking of using the Armd Regts and mech batts of 2 IAB as the point of the spear, 10 RAPIDS formations following and reinforcing. For the sake of speed (again!) I would send the units in assuming that the enemy formation would be 15-20% degraded. I realise this means the battle would be bloody, but I am counting on the concentration of formations and intensity of firepower to help me slug it out.
Note that in peacetime 10 Inf is within stone's throw of IB, so probably is 2 IAB. That is crucial, because I don't want to waste time bringing a formation up from the hinterland.
Also note the extensive use of first person singular. We will get some of these details fleshed out in the coming years, as more information becomes available from different exercises. Right now, as you note, this is very much a "what could be" kind of thing.
Rakesh please check your email!
Good to get you distracted from Mtn Thunder!Regarding your questions, my prime concern in such a situation would be speed. The important thing would be to draw first blood quickly, even if it is just a drop... my operational objectives would then be necessarily modest to help me acheive required speed.
This means that my primary target would a PA brigade; my penetration front restricted to about 5 kms or so. I would expect the PA brigade to have two batts forward deployed, with two in reserve. The main effort would be directed at degrading the defences of this brigade, but efforts that would aid this goal would also be permitted. Since degrading C3 to the brigade would be so important, I would say that its Div and Corps HQs would be fair game.
So I am thinking of using the Armd Regts and mech batts of 2 IAB as the point of the spear, 10 RAPIDS formations following and reinforcing. For the sake of speed (again!) I would send the units in assuming that the enemy formation would be 15-20% degraded. I realise this means the battle would be bloody, but I am counting on the concentration of formations and intensity of firepower to help me slug it out.
Note that in peacetime 10 Inf is within stone's throw of IB, so probably is 2 IAB. That is crucial, because I don't want to waste time bringing a formation up from the hinterland.
Also note the extensive use of first person singular. We will get some of these details fleshed out in the coming years, as more information becomes available from different exercises. Right now, as you note, this is very much a "what could be" kind of thing.
Rakesh please check your email!
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
OP-ED: India’s ‘Cold Start’ strategy —Shaukat Qadir
Neither Indian nor many Pakistani commanders are comfortable taking risks. There is far too much at stake! It is for this reason most of all that I consider it unlikely that such a concept might actually be tried. If it ever is, I would like to witness it
In March this year the Indian army leaked news about the salient features of its new war doctrine. The doctrine hopes to exploit more fully India’s conventional superiority without giving Pakistan cause to escalate to the nuclear level.
The Indian army has named it ‘cold-start’ strategy since it purports to avoid the noise of a military build-up and achieve surprise. The strategy rests on operations through ‘eight integrated battle groups with elements of IAF and Navy as thrust formations’ and ‘calls for hard strikes’ limited ‘to the point which should not invite any nuclear retaliation’. What does this mean?
Given the current relationship of forces, despite India’s qualitative and quantitative edge, Pakistan could successfully defend itself against an Indian aggression. War termination strategy, which we have discussed in this space, is an important part of conflict. India is better placed than Pakistan to think up concepts and then equip its forces to operationalise them.
In the 1980s India borrowed from the Soviet concepts. One of the concepts, which we could term the “Multi-tiered Offensive Concept,” intended to simultaneously engage our front-line defensive forces while airlifting forces to engage our reserves. This was meant to upset the state of balance (‘balance’ is a product of time relationship between any force and the reserves. If a defensive force can survive the offensive for the period it takes for the reserves to reinforce it, the entire force is said to be in a state of balance).
It was a highly ambitious concept given India’s rather humble capability to airlift less than a division at a time with no artillery. But it could have been done at a critical moment in time imposing a delay on the reserves at which time it could have been most telling. Pakistan’s response was fairly easy. We ‘layered’ our reserves — i.e., infantry elements were moved closer to the front, so that if interdicted by enemy forces, some would engage them and the rest, with the armour and artillery, reroute themselves to retain the balance.
The current Indian concept has two aspects to it: one part of it retains the concept explained above, but the other seeks to offset another advantage Pakistan enjoys: the shorter mobilisation time. Because of its size, Indian forces deployed against China or located in depth, take considerable time to assemble at our borders. This time used to be about twenty days which they have perhaps managed to reduce to around two weeks. On the other hand, Pakistani forces assemble in a week’s time (at places even less) given our lack of depth. The moment news of the movement of Indian forces reaches us, we can be ready and waiting for them before their arrival.
However, for any operation, not all forces are required simultaneously. If, for instance, there are five Indian offensive divisions located within a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles of our borders, which can get there say within three days, they could open the offensive at perhaps Sialkot and opposite Bahawalnagar. If, of the remaining nine Indian offensive divisions, another three could reach the border within eight days and the five that had opened the offensive could last five days, these forces would still be in a state of balance. The remaining Indian offensive forces could initiate a delayed offensive somewhere in the south on arrival. This would be a cold start; all preliminary preparations having been completed in their cantonments, they arrive at the border to immediately go into action.
While it is definitely workable and, if well executed, very threatening, there are a number of problems with the concept.
Firstly, the timing has to be immaculate. There is no room for error. Secondly, in the north the Pakistani defensive forces are located at or very close to the border and, even the reserves are fairly close. There is little doubt that if such a concept is adopted it will rely heavily on the far-superior Indian air force, IAF, to interdict and prevent Pakistani reserves from intervening early. But if the IAF were to fail, Pakistani reserves could enter the fray early and destroy the Indian forces piecemeal.
Thirdly, the PAF, though considerably inferior to the IAF, when coupled with our fairly strong air defence system could extract a terrific toll of the IAF in a defensive battle within our own borders. That could reduce the IAF’s superiority to very acceptable proportions for the PAF for the remainder of the war.
There is little doubt that the Indian concept is a most challenging one. It demands a highly superior command over operational strategy (which is the art of bringing troops into battle such that they enjoy a greater chance of success). However, it is fraught with risk. No bureaucracy, particularly the military, produces ‘risk-takers’; in fact, they invariably die young. There is always the odd exception, but one exception is not enough. For such a concept to succeed all senior commanders down to the division level will need to have faith in it.
Risk-taking, like any other art, is honed through practice. It cannot be acquired suddenly. In military history, peacetime commanders have usually failed during wars and war itself has thrown up the required leadership, the German general staff system being the sole exception.
To take the American example; Eisenhower was a Colonel on the faculty of the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, while Mark Clark, Omar Bradley, and Patton were Lt Cols when Pearl Harbour was attacked in 1941. Within the span of less than three years Eisenhower became the supreme commandeer of the allied forces, without having commanded anything other than a regiment.
Omar and Clark rose to command army groups, while Patton rose to command an army. The sole exception was McArthur who was a general before the war began and remained successful. He resigned due to his disagreement with Roosevelt on which theatre of war should be of greater significance to the American war policy.
Neither Indian nor many Pakistani commanders are comfortable taking risks. There is far too much at stake! It is for this reason most of all that I consider it unlikely that such a concept might actually be tried. If it ever is, I would like to witness it.
The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
Neither Indian nor many Pakistani commanders are comfortable taking risks. There is far too much at stake! It is for this reason most of all that I consider it unlikely that such a concept might actually be tried. If it ever is, I would like to witness it
In March this year the Indian army leaked news about the salient features of its new war doctrine. The doctrine hopes to exploit more fully India’s conventional superiority without giving Pakistan cause to escalate to the nuclear level.
The Indian army has named it ‘cold-start’ strategy since it purports to avoid the noise of a military build-up and achieve surprise. The strategy rests on operations through ‘eight integrated battle groups with elements of IAF and Navy as thrust formations’ and ‘calls for hard strikes’ limited ‘to the point which should not invite any nuclear retaliation’. What does this mean?
Given the current relationship of forces, despite India’s qualitative and quantitative edge, Pakistan could successfully defend itself against an Indian aggression. War termination strategy, which we have discussed in this space, is an important part of conflict. India is better placed than Pakistan to think up concepts and then equip its forces to operationalise them.
In the 1980s India borrowed from the Soviet concepts. One of the concepts, which we could term the “Multi-tiered Offensive Concept,” intended to simultaneously engage our front-line defensive forces while airlifting forces to engage our reserves. This was meant to upset the state of balance (‘balance’ is a product of time relationship between any force and the reserves. If a defensive force can survive the offensive for the period it takes for the reserves to reinforce it, the entire force is said to be in a state of balance).
It was a highly ambitious concept given India’s rather humble capability to airlift less than a division at a time with no artillery. But it could have been done at a critical moment in time imposing a delay on the reserves at which time it could have been most telling. Pakistan’s response was fairly easy. We ‘layered’ our reserves — i.e., infantry elements were moved closer to the front, so that if interdicted by enemy forces, some would engage them and the rest, with the armour and artillery, reroute themselves to retain the balance.
The current Indian concept has two aspects to it: one part of it retains the concept explained above, but the other seeks to offset another advantage Pakistan enjoys: the shorter mobilisation time. Because of its size, Indian forces deployed against China or located in depth, take considerable time to assemble at our borders. This time used to be about twenty days which they have perhaps managed to reduce to around two weeks. On the other hand, Pakistani forces assemble in a week’s time (at places even less) given our lack of depth. The moment news of the movement of Indian forces reaches us, we can be ready and waiting for them before their arrival.
However, for any operation, not all forces are required simultaneously. If, for instance, there are five Indian offensive divisions located within a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles of our borders, which can get there say within three days, they could open the offensive at perhaps Sialkot and opposite Bahawalnagar. If, of the remaining nine Indian offensive divisions, another three could reach the border within eight days and the five that had opened the offensive could last five days, these forces would still be in a state of balance. The remaining Indian offensive forces could initiate a delayed offensive somewhere in the south on arrival. This would be a cold start; all preliminary preparations having been completed in their cantonments, they arrive at the border to immediately go into action.
While it is definitely workable and, if well executed, very threatening, there are a number of problems with the concept.
Firstly, the timing has to be immaculate. There is no room for error. Secondly, in the north the Pakistani defensive forces are located at or very close to the border and, even the reserves are fairly close. There is little doubt that if such a concept is adopted it will rely heavily on the far-superior Indian air force, IAF, to interdict and prevent Pakistani reserves from intervening early. But if the IAF were to fail, Pakistani reserves could enter the fray early and destroy the Indian forces piecemeal.
Thirdly, the PAF, though considerably inferior to the IAF, when coupled with our fairly strong air defence system could extract a terrific toll of the IAF in a defensive battle within our own borders. That could reduce the IAF’s superiority to very acceptable proportions for the PAF for the remainder of the war.
There is little doubt that the Indian concept is a most challenging one. It demands a highly superior command over operational strategy (which is the art of bringing troops into battle such that they enjoy a greater chance of success). However, it is fraught with risk. No bureaucracy, particularly the military, produces ‘risk-takers’; in fact, they invariably die young. There is always the odd exception, but one exception is not enough. For such a concept to succeed all senior commanders down to the division level will need to have faith in it.
Risk-taking, like any other art, is honed through practice. It cannot be acquired suddenly. In military history, peacetime commanders have usually failed during wars and war itself has thrown up the required leadership, the German general staff system being the sole exception.
To take the American example; Eisenhower was a Colonel on the faculty of the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, while Mark Clark, Omar Bradley, and Patton were Lt Cols when Pearl Harbour was attacked in 1941. Within the span of less than three years Eisenhower became the supreme commandeer of the allied forces, without having commanded anything other than a regiment.
Omar and Clark rose to command army groups, while Patton rose to command an army. The sole exception was McArthur who was a general before the war began and remained successful. He resigned due to his disagreement with Roosevelt on which theatre of war should be of greater significance to the American war policy.
Neither Indian nor many Pakistani commanders are comfortable taking risks. There is far too much at stake! It is for this reason most of all that I consider it unlikely that such a concept might actually be tried. If it ever is, I would like to witness it.
The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Any historical instances of armies dominating the front (or achieving vistory) simply because they got there earlier than the other side?
I can think of only the Germans in WWI ("Shieffen Plan (sp?)") who reached the gates of Paris.
[Added later] - One more is the Egyptians in the '73 Arab-Israeli war.
I can think of only the Germans in WWI ("Shieffen Plan (sp?)") who reached the gates of Paris.
[Added later] - One more is the Egyptians in the '73 Arab-Israeli war.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
The Impossible task of defending Pakistan.
This article that a leading brigadier from the Pakistani army has written gives a great deal of insight into the thinking of a lot of Pakistanis the elite and all. Indians have always been seen as lesser mortals be it the classical equation in which one paki = 10 indoos or be it the superior mobility of a Pakistani brigade. The brigadier also looks at the war pretty much in a single dimension as if it were still the 1920’s . Huge army’s come to a place they dig trenches they stay. If needed they an be moved elsewhere.
What the Indian army hopes to achive by cold start and which is sooo wrongly interpreted by the brigadier sahib is that India hopes to come and do in Pakistan what the US has done in Iraq, turn it into a colony. India I guess now does not wish to intrude on Pakistani territory that sir was brasstracks remember…dividing Pakistan and all that… This time its different, like a very well honed boxer it wants small short decisive engagements. A quick combination of punches to give the other guy a bloody nose or a black eye. Something which not only puts a stern message across, but also something which does not capture the world headline.
If you observe the developments over the past few years it is precisely how the Indian army is being molded. The formations of units like the “RAPIDS” are meant to do precisely just this. Independent strike brigades are being fortified by adding more armor to it, they are being made more mobile. More amounts of Special Forces are being added. It is my opinion that the usual army would not be doing the quick strikes. Yes they will require their time to move from place A to place B. But I guess they will be used more on the bases of holding forces. This is unconventional thinking this if the good brigadier can see it is risk taking. I am not sure but has he heard of a guy called Gen Jacob? And how he went all the way when the top brass would have been happy with a part of the then east Pakistan.
Also what the good general is forgetting is that his so called tremendous airdefence is nothing but a handful of hand held missiles and some really outdated fighters. The Only missiles which the Pakistanis have and which I think can reach a target above 5000 ft is probably the clotels.. and they really don’t have those many of them. So if the general thinks that his point defense fighters are going to save the day for him … he is sadly mistaken.
Also why is he not considering the good old navy.. If Pakistan thinks that its 3 submarines are gonna be effective sea denial forces or they can mobilize his navy before the Indian navy strikes well what can one say except wish them all the verry best.
In conclusion yes the cold start is a different strategy. It is meant to be executed by a different set of people, In a verry different way. Having massed formations would counter productive as it only gives a fatter target.
Ne ways I leave on the good brigadier to derive his own conclusions
This article that a leading brigadier from the Pakistani army has written gives a great deal of insight into the thinking of a lot of Pakistanis the elite and all. Indians have always been seen as lesser mortals be it the classical equation in which one paki = 10 indoos or be it the superior mobility of a Pakistani brigade. The brigadier also looks at the war pretty much in a single dimension as if it were still the 1920’s . Huge army’s come to a place they dig trenches they stay. If needed they an be moved elsewhere.
What the Indian army hopes to achive by cold start and which is sooo wrongly interpreted by the brigadier sahib is that India hopes to come and do in Pakistan what the US has done in Iraq, turn it into a colony. India I guess now does not wish to intrude on Pakistani territory that sir was brasstracks remember…dividing Pakistan and all that… This time its different, like a very well honed boxer it wants small short decisive engagements. A quick combination of punches to give the other guy a bloody nose or a black eye. Something which not only puts a stern message across, but also something which does not capture the world headline.
If you observe the developments over the past few years it is precisely how the Indian army is being molded. The formations of units like the “RAPIDS” are meant to do precisely just this. Independent strike brigades are being fortified by adding more armor to it, they are being made more mobile. More amounts of Special Forces are being added. It is my opinion that the usual army would not be doing the quick strikes. Yes they will require their time to move from place A to place B. But I guess they will be used more on the bases of holding forces. This is unconventional thinking this if the good brigadier can see it is risk taking. I am not sure but has he heard of a guy called Gen Jacob? And how he went all the way when the top brass would have been happy with a part of the then east Pakistan.
Also what the good general is forgetting is that his so called tremendous airdefence is nothing but a handful of hand held missiles and some really outdated fighters. The Only missiles which the Pakistanis have and which I think can reach a target above 5000 ft is probably the clotels.. and they really don’t have those many of them. So if the general thinks that his point defense fighters are going to save the day for him … he is sadly mistaken.
Also why is he not considering the good old navy.. If Pakistan thinks that its 3 submarines are gonna be effective sea denial forces or they can mobilize his navy before the Indian navy strikes well what can one say except wish them all the verry best.
In conclusion yes the cold start is a different strategy. It is meant to be executed by a different set of people, In a verry different way. Having massed formations would counter productive as it only gives a fatter target.
Ne ways I leave on the good brigadier to derive his own conclusions
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Correct me if i am wrong...but these eight integrated battle groups are to take the role of the RAPIDS. It was General Paddy who said that his RAPIDS were not ready, in the early stages of Operation Parakram. Thus the creation of this new system, which negates the earlier disadvantage we had.Originally posted by sudip:
If you observe the developments over the past few years it is precisely how the Indian army is being molded. The formations of units like the “RAPIDS” are meant to do precisely just this.
Their three, shiny new Agostas are very good submarines manned by well trained submariners. It was a IN Admiral who once said that he would like to have a couple of those in his fleet. IN needs to focus more on ASW assets. Those submarines will be quite a nuisance during war.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
The Brigadiers historical observations may need some fine tuning. However, his assumptions that Indian armed forces leaders even today are low risk takers is IMHO way off the mark. The MKI is the best example. Also, he seems to have totaly discounted what technologies bring to the table in the present era and how mature India is in that field - much of his analysis is based on 1970-80s time frame.
But, good to know such views exist.
But, good to know such views exist.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Rakesh
yes you were right the concept of rapids was not fully implemented but there were a few of these implemented In the 1st strike corps here is a quote to it.
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As if often the case in India, plans for one concept become plans for another. While waiting for the Government to clear and fund Plan 2000, the Army decided to utilize available resources to at least get the RAPID concept underway. Since boosting the combat power of the holding divisions - which were to convert to RAPID - while ignoring the strike divisions - which were to convert to mechanized/tank formations - made little sense, <B>the first four RAPIDs were in the strike corps (I and II Corps)</B> and in X Corps, which is a holding corps. Because resources for Plan 2000 were never made available, and because after 1990 the Indian Army's attention became increasing engaged in the Kashmir insurgency, neither did more tank/mechanized divisions emerge, no more RAPIDs were created."
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but these rapids are supposedly used for deployment in the Jammu-Samba-Pathankot sector (Indian XVI Corps), and in the increasingly built-up areas of the North Punjab.
The point that I want to bring forth is that, what India would be looking at is not making mass movements of troops but making movements of highly specialized troups with heavy firepower in a short time, which again theoretically is supposed to go un detected. The Policy hence fort I guess would be more like go there get your job done and then leave it to the holding guys.
also with respect to the agost submarines well yes they are good but i feel their greatness is a bit over stated. Then again who knows may be the admiral was basically making a sly sales pitch for inducting the scorpine class ones in our side. No way am i concerned with 3 agostas.
A point to be noted here is that, DRDO is making quite significant inroads into sonars and sonar detection.
The point again being, we might suffer a burse here and there but they might just suffer a paralysis shock.
For me the article written by the good brigadier is aimed more towards psy ops or prolly perking up the poor NLFI soldier than anything else, all I just wanted to do is call his bluff.
yes you were right the concept of rapids was not fully implemented but there were a few of these implemented In the 1st strike corps here is a quote to it.
--------------------------------------------
As if often the case in India, plans for one concept become plans for another. While waiting for the Government to clear and fund Plan 2000, the Army decided to utilize available resources to at least get the RAPID concept underway. Since boosting the combat power of the holding divisions - which were to convert to RAPID - while ignoring the strike divisions - which were to convert to mechanized/tank formations - made little sense, <B>the first four RAPIDs were in the strike corps (I and II Corps)</B> and in X Corps, which is a holding corps. Because resources for Plan 2000 were never made available, and because after 1990 the Indian Army's attention became increasing engaged in the Kashmir insurgency, neither did more tank/mechanized divisions emerge, no more RAPIDs were created."
--------------------------------------------------
but these rapids are supposedly used for deployment in the Jammu-Samba-Pathankot sector (Indian XVI Corps), and in the increasingly built-up areas of the North Punjab.
The point that I want to bring forth is that, what India would be looking at is not making mass movements of troops but making movements of highly specialized troups with heavy firepower in a short time, which again theoretically is supposed to go un detected. The Policy hence fort I guess would be more like go there get your job done and then leave it to the holding guys.
also with respect to the agost submarines well yes they are good but i feel their greatness is a bit over stated. Then again who knows may be the admiral was basically making a sly sales pitch for inducting the scorpine class ones in our side. No way am i concerned with 3 agostas.
A point to be noted here is that, DRDO is making quite significant inroads into sonars and sonar detection.
The point again being, we might suffer a burse here and there but they might just suffer a paralysis shock.
For me the article written by the good brigadier is aimed more towards psy ops or prolly perking up the poor NLFI soldier than anything else, all I just wanted to do is call his bluff.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
Three Agosta 90B may be small but it could post a bit of a threat. If we got a Helo carrier with the Merlins then it would be a completely different scenario.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
What is your basis of saying that Indian or Pakistani generals will take more risks now than they had taken before in the heat of war?Originally posted by Niranjan Rao:
The Brigadiers historical observations may need some fine tuning. However, his assumptions that Indian armed forces leaders even today are low risk takers is IMHO way off the mark. The MKI is the best example. Also, he seems to have totaly discounted what technologies bring to the table in the present era and how mature India is in that field - much of his analysis is based on 1970-80s time frame.
But, good to know such views exist.
How come MKI is an example of generals taking risks in wartime?
The cold start concept is very good and unsettling for Pakistan but implementing it for India would be challenging and using it effectively will depend on ability and initiatives of the generals like the man said!
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
It seems to me that the Paki Brigadier is making statements that history dosen't bear out.
1965: Taking the risk of attacking India when their airforce was effectively grounded in a week was a stupid risk. Plus they lost a few salients that were never returned. That was a gamble by Ayub Khan. Harbaksh Singh disobeyed JN Chaudhari over standing and fighting at some place in Punjab, that was a big risk.
1971: IN decided to go straight for Dacca going around several Paki fortifications, that was a risky move, IMHO, esp. with Nixon and the 7th fleet steaming in that general direction. Paki generals decided to attack India by sending in their F-86's from East Pakistan, that was a stupid and risky move.
Kargil: Wasn't there a risk that the US would call TSP's bluff regarding the freedom fighters and India hitting back at TSP somewhere other than the North, it seems this scenario came closer to reality than one might believe.
I think there are degrees of risks, and both countries produce enough risk takers. However there may be some truth to the fact that extreme risk takers get weeded out above Brigadier, atleast in the IA.
1965: Taking the risk of attacking India when their airforce was effectively grounded in a week was a stupid risk. Plus they lost a few salients that were never returned. That was a gamble by Ayub Khan. Harbaksh Singh disobeyed JN Chaudhari over standing and fighting at some place in Punjab, that was a big risk.
1971: IN decided to go straight for Dacca going around several Paki fortifications, that was a risky move, IMHO, esp. with Nixon and the 7th fleet steaming in that general direction. Paki generals decided to attack India by sending in their F-86's from East Pakistan, that was a stupid and risky move.
Kargil: Wasn't there a risk that the US would call TSP's bluff regarding the freedom fighters and India hitting back at TSP somewhere other than the North, it seems this scenario came closer to reality than one might believe.
I think there are degrees of risks, and both countries produce enough risk takers. However there may be some truth to the fact that extreme risk takers get weeded out above Brigadier, atleast in the IA.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
RK,
The Brig., mentions why commanders did not take risks in the past - too much at stake. Two things have chnaged on the Indian side of the equation (IMVVHO): the political gumption (economy included) and preparedness - both in terms of acquiring better equipment and training. The MKI falls into this cat very well. (The MKI by itself was a very hugh risk - thus it becomes a very good indicator for planning/preparing and risk taking - during peace and wars.)(Others: Phalcon, tankers, upgrades galore, etc - are indicators of planning, MKI training seems to show maturity to take the toys to the next level.)
To that list I would like to add my 2 cents: based on techs the Indian commanders plan on getting AND the tech available in-house, I feel that the Indian commander will be in a better position to "predict" - should be one step ahead in wars.
Also, in the past intel wise, etc, India has shown solid maturity WRT A'stan, Taliban, etc - in the region. My feel is that India will be better prepared in the future.
As far as the article itself, I do think the good Brig. is serious in what he has written - not for some audience. I strongly feel even if TSP gets more F-16s, etc, etc, they will not think out of the box - no risks. That by itself will be an adv to India.
If I may, if "Cold Start" is such a quantum leap, then it is THE biggest risk anyone in the subcontinent has taken. Just its proposal.
The Brig., mentions why commanders did not take risks in the past - too much at stake. Two things have chnaged on the Indian side of the equation (IMVVHO): the political gumption (economy included) and preparedness - both in terms of acquiring better equipment and training. The MKI falls into this cat very well. (The MKI by itself was a very hugh risk - thus it becomes a very good indicator for planning/preparing and risk taking - during peace and wars.)(Others: Phalcon, tankers, upgrades galore, etc - are indicators of planning, MKI training seems to show maturity to take the toys to the next level.)
To that list I would like to add my 2 cents: based on techs the Indian commanders plan on getting AND the tech available in-house, I feel that the Indian commander will be in a better position to "predict" - should be one step ahead in wars.
Also, in the past intel wise, etc, India has shown solid maturity WRT A'stan, Taliban, etc - in the region. My feel is that India will be better prepared in the future.
As far as the article itself, I do think the good Brig. is serious in what he has written - not for some audience. I strongly feel even if TSP gets more F-16s, etc, etc, they will not think out of the box - no risks. That by itself will be an adv to India.
If I may, if "Cold Start" is such a quantum leap, then it is THE biggest risk anyone in the subcontinent has taken. Just its proposal.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
I am of the view that the cold start scenario will NOT work for the Indo-Pak situation. This is simply because,unlike Pakistan, India does not have a fixed and stated objective or strategy for Pakistan. It has always reacted to Pakistans' moves, but never acted pro-actively. Even in 1971, the initiation was by Pakistanis, to which India merely reacted, may be not the way Pakistan wanted India to, but still it is a reaction to a large extent.
During Kargil, we reacted, but only to push them out, that too by tying our own hands. Durng Operation Parakram, as events are now coming out, looks like we mobilised first without an objective and then did not know what to do.
This will all boil down to war gaming at the decision making levels. First the political leaders should decide on options of what to do, say, if another Kargil happens, another attack on parliament happens etc. Does not seem to have happened inspite of all the hind sight we now have. We are still preparing the army to react - Last time it took a while for us to mobilise, so we will cut that time now, but the important decision regarding what the reply should be, needs to be made before the events. If another event happens, now all Pakistan will have to do is mobilise immediately than wait for India to mobilise - they can tell the India is already done it by this cold start strategy. Key questions such as, do we want to hold the ground, if so which areas, what will be our aims in various situations, will need answers to really implement the cold start strategy, and these need to come from the political leaders and this missing elements will make this new strategy just something on paper. The army will then have to plan for these scenarios.
At the moment, it looks like the army is ahead of the game, but does not have a direction. At the same time, use of IAF and Navy to do some punitive strikes seem to be off the table as the army wants them to support their battle than having them do something on their own while the army just make sure no one takes our land.
During Kargil, we reacted, but only to push them out, that too by tying our own hands. Durng Operation Parakram, as events are now coming out, looks like we mobilised first without an objective and then did not know what to do.
This will all boil down to war gaming at the decision making levels. First the political leaders should decide on options of what to do, say, if another Kargil happens, another attack on parliament happens etc. Does not seem to have happened inspite of all the hind sight we now have. We are still preparing the army to react - Last time it took a while for us to mobilise, so we will cut that time now, but the important decision regarding what the reply should be, needs to be made before the events. If another event happens, now all Pakistan will have to do is mobilise immediately than wait for India to mobilise - they can tell the India is already done it by this cold start strategy. Key questions such as, do we want to hold the ground, if so which areas, what will be our aims in various situations, will need answers to really implement the cold start strategy, and these need to come from the political leaders and this missing elements will make this new strategy just something on paper. The army will then have to plan for these scenarios.
At the moment, it looks like the army is ahead of the game, but does not have a direction. At the same time, use of IAF and Navy to do some punitive strikes seem to be off the table as the army wants them to support their battle than having them do something on their own while the army just make sure no one takes our land.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
One of the points that is made in the Parkarm book by Lt Gen Sood and Sawhney is that our political masters cannot countenance the loss of " a single inch" of territory. That puts a great burden on the army/armed forces. As a result we have 2000 miles of the strongest defensive fortifications in the world on both sides of the border.Originally posted by Sribabu:
I
At the moment, it looks like the army is ahead of the game, but does not have a direction. At the same time, use of IAF and Navy to do some punitive strikes seem to be off the table as the army wants them to support their battle than having them do something on their own while the army just make sure no one takes our land.
Apart from that is the fact that so far - it would take some days for the army to get ready for a strike.
I think the "cold start" concept came from Parakram - after the concept of "pivot corps" was spoken of - I think someone has referred to that earlier in this thread - I haven;t bothered to check. The "Pivot" corps is supposed to act like a pivot and could be used flexibly for attack and defence. With our forces now being posed rather closer to the baorder than normal - a "relative" cold start is theoretically possible I expect. But the problem of course is that both nations have access to satellite data and Pakistan will have reasonably uptodate info on what is going on - and that will have to be bypassed.
Ultimately we need changes in our thinking as well as modern forces. Teh government should have aseries of alternative military plans available for sifferent situarions and should share thse with the aremed force. The Army and other forces of course need to have close coordination regarding objectives. The latter may be possible - but it is not clear to me that the GoI has too many offensive plans against Pakistan other than the militarily absurd order "We shall not give away and inch of territory"
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
'cold start' seems to share some features with 'war combat zone'... i.e. create a zone where enemy forces are destroyed and then withdraw when the political objective is achieved. the mechanics of how IA will achieve destruction vs. PLA is different. I think PLA are going for huge spear with any support it can get, whilst IA is going for large hammering followed by big spear...
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
The most notable point in the Pakistani opeds post Parakram and now post Divya Astra is a shift from hi-fi "Offensive Defence" to plain old "Defensive Defence".
The Pakistanis have effectively given up any ideas of seizing anything in India.
`Cold Start' has poured cold water on all their fantasies.
The Pakistanis have effectively given up any ideas of seizing anything in India.
`Cold Start' has poured cold water on all their fantasies.
Re: Exercise Divya Astra: Shock & Awe
the franco-belgian border (maginot line) was very
well designed and defended. instead of battering
ram strategy the wehrmacht selected some places in
belgium and used paras/SF to seize forts and bridges....no ponderous buildup and offensive in the initial hits.
methinks a large fleet of around 150 Mi17V equipped to fly nap-of-earth in any weather using MH53 type gadgets would be advantageous to strike the dagger in great depth at selected places than attrition based nibbling from one end of bread.
Each can presumably carry about 24 troopers and their eqpt. A batallion of 800 could be delivered
in a single_wave by 33 of these enabling 5 such SF movements with the fleet. wave2+ would ferry in more men and materials. This is apart from the
existing AN32,Mi17 paradrop capability.
Paks say indian can use air assault to disrupt
their battle zone but presently unable to disrupt
their communication zone behind the battle..and they are right. time to change that.
Fleets of Dhruv/LCH and the Mi17V themselves(vikhr,rockets) can provide air cover to these formations and attack the supply chain behind the PA formations selected for destruction by the IBGNs (integ battle group new)
well designed and defended. instead of battering
ram strategy the wehrmacht selected some places in
belgium and used paras/SF to seize forts and bridges....no ponderous buildup and offensive in the initial hits.
methinks a large fleet of around 150 Mi17V equipped to fly nap-of-earth in any weather using MH53 type gadgets would be advantageous to strike the dagger in great depth at selected places than attrition based nibbling from one end of bread.
Each can presumably carry about 24 troopers and their eqpt. A batallion of 800 could be delivered
in a single_wave by 33 of these enabling 5 such SF movements with the fleet. wave2+ would ferry in more men and materials. This is apart from the
existing AN32,Mi17 paradrop capability.
Paks say indian can use air assault to disrupt
their battle zone but presently unable to disrupt
their communication zone behind the battle..and they are right. time to change that.
Fleets of Dhruv/LCH and the Mi17V themselves(vikhr,rockets) can provide air cover to these formations and attack the supply chain behind the PA formations selected for destruction by the IBGNs (integ battle group new)