Indian Naval Discussion

[Austin]

It happens regularly in international waters all sides do it , you cant shoot them all you do is tell them to leave which they do or if you have aircraft handy from land or aircraft carrier just escort them out.

[Philip]

It clearly shows you which side the Norwegians are on! AS said before,it has the closest relationship with the Yanquis after Britain.

[member_20067]

It is an AC....you cant hide it....as someone pointed over international water this is pretty common

[Austin]

It quite routine to get buzzed by friendly and not so friendly country in intl waters or while passing through areas of interest....if you visit IMS Vikrant you would find many pictures of indian naval aircraft buzzing USN Aircraft carrier and other ships.

[Austin]

India irked as China gets Pakistan's strategic Gwadar port

Pakistan's cabinet formally agreed to hand over the operation of its strategically located Gwadar port to China on Wednesday. This puts in place China's famed "string of pearls" strategy which may have significant implications for India.

On Wednesday, the Pakistan cabinet, in one of its last decisions, transferred the operations responsibility of the Gwadar port from Singapore's PSA (Port of Singapore Authority) International to China's Overseas Port Holdings. This had been agreed some time ago as PSA International and Pakistani navy fell out over land transfers, security issues and lack of infrastructure. PSA had asked to withdraw from the contract and Pakistan had agreed

.

[pentaiah]

what does irk mean and how do we mitigate irk
is it tamil word? can we start Aman ki irk to please china and TSP

[suryag]

Folks very dumb question, the Kilos that we have are supposed to be equipped with Uran missiles. Do the Kilos need to surface to fire this or is it launched while submerged

[D Roy]

they are equipped with klubs which can be fired submerged.

[suryag]

Now next in the series of dumb questions, the russians had the capability to fire submerged missiles for a long time, so what went wrong with the bulava project, wiki dada quotes the dir as saying that the failures in the first phase were all due to QC issues, find it hard to believe

[andy B]

Now next in the series of dumb questions, the russians had the capability to fire submerged missiles for a long time, so what went wrong with the bulava project, wiki dada quotes the dir as saying that the failures in the first phase were all due to QC issues, find it hard to believe

Suryag ji please dont take offence, however a visit to google chacha never hurts.

Klubs/Harpoons/Urans/Thawks/Slam ERs are all very different to Bulava which is an SLBM.

The ones we mentioned before are AShM/LACM etc that are used to target enemy ships, land installations, ityadi.

These inherently have a much smaller diameter and length relative to SLBMs which are tasked with massive retaliatory or first strikes with multiple warheads.

The launch techniques for both are also different as Bulava class are launched vertically whereas the others may be launched through 533 or 650mm torpedo tubes.

There are a completely different type of missiles hence uncomparable to be honest the complexities in developing a Bulava class missile is many many many times more than developing a Harpoon class.

Suggest you google away and I guarantee you will find mucho more info onlee.

[suryag]

Thanks Andy ullah, i didnt know that the AShM were launched from the torpedo tube.

[vic]

Brilliant Pakis lost Bangladesh, democracy, honor, dignity, economy for Kashmir and are now loosing bits and pieces of the rest of Nation in their obsession to f--k their own @-s.

[PratikDas]

^^^ Wrong thread?

[arijitkm]

Navy officer sent secrets to Russian wife?

A Board of Inquiry (BoI) the Indian Navy constituted a year ago is looking into whether a commander-level officer passed on classified information to his Russian wife, sources said. In 2011, when the officer was in India, he communicated with his wife, who was in Russia, through a social networking site, sources said. It was suspected that he may have passed on secrets in such interactions.
.......

[sankum]

Work on aircraft carrier to restart by month-end

[suryag]

Navy officer sent secrets to Russian wife?

A Board of Inquiry (BoI) the Indian Navy constituted a year ago is looking into whether a commander-level officer passed on classified information to his Russian wife, sources said. In 2011, when the officer was in India, he communicated with his wife, who was in Russia, through a social networking site, sources said. It was suspected that he may have passed on secrets in such interactions.
.......

In the current case, the officer under scrutiny was one of three navy men - all commanderlevel officers - who were posted in 2011 in Russia , where the Vikramaditya is being refitted. "The three officers were on deputation," said a navy source. "The officer in question met a Russian girl and fell in love, which resulted in their marriage." The officer and his colleagues later returned to India and his wife visited here once.

Honeytrapped? in any case before he married a foreign national shouldnt the navy be informed?

[Philip]

Bharat Karnad has this to say on the IN's sub options.His statement that what use is a conventional AIP subs which is lesser in capability than a nuclear sub is exactly what we've been saying on BR for aeons.A 12,000t SSGN Akula-2 costs just twice as much as a non-AIP Scorpene (whose controversies of the deal in the Indian context gas seen a 5 yr delay and double costs per unit) U-boat! Both boats with far lesser capability than a nuclear boat.The main reason why conventional AIP subs are in vogue is that for those navies which cannot afford or obtain a nuke boat,this is the next best thing.Secondly,in littoral waters,small conventional boats like the venerable Kilo-now in its third avatar,are very difficult to detect.However,for great power ambitions such as India and the IN's,blue water UW domination can best be achieved using nuclear powered subs.

Calling for greater indigenous sub-building capability instead of knee-jerk imports,the huige infrastructure built up for the ATV with Russian assistance,must be used for building future classes of SSGNs apart from the SSBNs.Perhaps a parallel line for nuclear boats would be a far better option than a second line of conventional boats.The shipyards are there,both pvt. and PSU.In order to make up numbers as an interim solution,there are options.A second line makes sense only if it is cost-effective and costs of an AIP-sub do not approach that of a vastly superior,thrice as large nuclear boat.

Immediate need options can be met with more Scorpenes after the initial runs is finished,or importing a few more Kilos,which perhaps can also be fitted with a Brahmos +AIP plugs.Both U-209s and Scorpenes cannot or will not be permitted to accommodate even the Klub series of very capable missiles,which makes them an inferior long term option.If the AIP Brahmos Amur is offered at reasonable cost it might make sense,but none of these if their cost per unit nears that of half the cost of a nuclear boat.

http://www.asianage.com/columnists/subm ... t-trap-507

Submarine import trap
Feb 04, 2013

Bharat Karnad

The Indian Navy needs to spearhead the amalgamation of nuclear and conventional submarine design and manufacturing capabilities

The Indian Navy has quietly and without fuss built up a great reputation for itself as a strategic-minded service. Its plans for distant defence are the best articulated, and its procurement of naval hardware mission-appropriate, reason why the government has accorded it the pivotal role in the strategic defence of the country.

As commendable is the Navy’s role in driving the country’s agenda for self-sufficiency in armaments in the teeth of sustained efforts over the years by the bumbling Indian government with the defence ministry and its department of defence production (DPP) to undermine it. The DPP conceives its remit as only ensuring custom for defence public sector units while trying to trip up the private sector whose built-up capacity and capability can more quickly and substantively attain for the country the goal of self-reliance, which has so far only remained rhetoric. The Navy is the only service to have had a main weapon design directorate, generating designs for 43 of the 45 warships under construction in the country. The Navy, moreover, has prevented indigenous projects such as the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft programme from sinking, by investing in the development of a navalised variant, managing a technical consultancy with US Navy’s aviation experts to iron out design kinks and shepherding this aircraft to the prototype stage.
But the singular success story and its greatest accomplishment is the strategic submarine project. Starting from scratch, it has got to a point where the basic Russian Charlie-II class nuclear-powered ballistic missile firing submarine (SSBN) design has been enhanced, which changes will be reflected in the second and third units of the Arihant-class boats, and a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine (SSN) as follow-on to the Akula-II class boat (INS Chakra) on lease from Russia, is in the works. The most heartening aspect is the driven nature of this programme leading to the Navy mastering the tasks of prime integrator and with, great foresight, nurturing this expertise in the private sector, which has acquired strategic submarine-production expertise and wherewithal.
The tragedy, alas, is that despite the success of the SSBN and the technology transferred from two earlier diesel-powered hunter-killer submarine (SSK) projects — the German HDW-209 and the French Scorpene, the Indian Navy still espies a gap in the indigenous design, development and production wherewithal, especially in “silencing” technologies and in producing “workshop drawings” to allow designs to be translated into actual manufacturing schemes, individual component up. This gap is sought to be bridged by importing yet another SSK for Project 75I (I for India). The Navy could, at the time the contracts were signed, have insisted on comprehensively complete transfer of technology in the deals for the HDW-209 or, much later, the Scorpene trumpeted for its stealth and “silencing” technologies. This was not done. The result is, other than creating multiple opportunities for corruption at all levels, this piece-meal purchase of technology may end up costing the taxpayer 300-400 per cent more for three separate submarine projects to obtain a conventional submersible manufacturing capability.
The argument that importing is necessary to be technologically in-date and meet “immediate need” is a hackneyed one. Considering the stretched HDW and Scorpene submarine delivery timelines, local Indian companies contracted to build a new line of SSKs may take no longer than the transaction with a foreign supplier, involving numerous stages — request for information, request for proposals, extensive trials, shortlisting, selection and elaborate price and contract-content negotiations, at the end of which the DPSUs will get to assemble the boat. In the context of the hard-won indigenous SSBN capability, naval stalwarts such as Vice-Admiral Raman Puri (retd.), former head of the Eastern Naval Command, have opposed the import option. It is incomprehensible that ignoring the huge sunk costs in developing, with Russian help and technical assistance, in-house/in-country infrastructure to design, develop and manufacture whole nuclear submarines, the Navy, astonishingly, is not confident about a lower-technology diesel submarine being produced indigenously! It is like a person proficient in calculus seeking help with arithmetic. Air-Independent-Propulsion (AIP) technology (enabling subs to remain underwater for longer duration) is the official justification for importing, but it is a weak reed to hang the deal on, especially because AIP units can be separately bought on transfer-of-technology basis, and fitted into a modern conventional submarine out of a new production line that an enabled private sector can readily establish.
The rub here is that left to Indian companies, the first product may, quality-wise, be sub-par. However, Vice-Admiral R.K. Dhowan, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, warned at a naval symposium on January 31, 2013, that indigenisation cannot be at the expense of the “combative edge”. The trouble with this formulation is that it perpetuates dependence on external sources. The services have to accept the fact that the Mark-I of any locally produced weapons-platform will not be as good as the best available in the market, but by the time the Mark-III version rolls out it will be world-class. This much grace the military will have to allow the indigenous efforts if Indian industry is to at all have a chance. Ultimately, this is a political decision the government has to make. What’s in collision are two philosophies — the nuclear visionary Homi Bhabha’s “learn as you make” thinking versus “import when you can” attitude of the military encouraged by venal politicians, a short-sighted government, and a DPP covering up for the inefficient defence public sector that has proved itself incapable of sustained technology absorption or innovation via offsets or any other route. The fatal reliance on imported armaments only underlines India’s second-rate military status.
Besides revising the “30-year submarine plan” of 1990s vintage in light of the currently available capacity at home and reversing the P-75I import decision, the Navy needs to spearhead the amalgamation of nuclear and conventional submarine design and manufacturing capabilities to achieve synergy and economy of scale such that India never looks to a foreign supplier again. Instead of just talking self-reliance, defence minister A.K. Antony can, for a change, do something about it by ensuring these steps are immediately taken.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

PS:In a discussion at length with a former VCNS,he also agreed with me that after much study and examination of the various systems,the best and proven AIP system was a nuclear boat! As Karnad has said,we have now acquired at much effort and cost,the ability to design and build SSBNs and have even developed their ballistic missiles (2 types) ! Long range ruise missiles are also on the anvil.Therefore maximum effort must be put into building more nuclear boats,both SSBNs and SSGNs.A couple more Akulas would be most useful giving us time to complete our SSBNs,the most urgent priority.

[kit]

Building in larger numbers certainly will make indian boomers and sub killers cheaper and comparable to conventional ones. But maintaining a nuclear armada will definitely be more expensive compared to AIP.and regarding fuel .. I think even more facilities for uranium enrichment might be needed.
India would definitely need both nuclear and non nuclear subs but how many and when ?

[Yagnasri]

Do we have minaral sourses for fuel and bombs for entirchment in the first place?

[tushar_m]

Do we have minaral sourses for fuel and bombs for entirchment in the first place?

we do have enough resources , also we are leaders in research for thorium based nuclear reactors(with US) which may take another 10 years to develop but could fulfill India's energy needs for next 1000 years once completed .

also 30-35% of worlds thorium deposits are in India , maybe more ???

[Singha]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mS1DjOIZR-Q

Philip sir going to love this one - docu on Soko DOKDO LPHD, with significant LCAC docking well in the stern and looks like room for a big complement of SH60

[Philip]

Yes Singha,the SoKo Dodko and Nippon Osumi classes are clever ways in which to build fledgling carriers to counter the PLAN's massive carrier ambitions.Expect new std. carrier designs from both nations in the future once the ex-Varyag Liaoning begins naval operations.

However,I prefer the Spanish Juan Carlos class which has an extra deck when compared with the Mistral class,far more capable and can also in future accommodate STOVL aircraft like the JSF or equiv.The ship has true multiple role capabilities ,able to swing from amphibious ops,to fleet escort,ASW and strike missions.It of course will be more expensive than the Mistral which Russia is also acquiring.Russian amphibious ops relate more to crises with the former Soviet republics like Georgia,where in that spat the absence of a dedicated amphib. warfare vessel was acutely felt.

The IN has a much larger role to play in the IOR,where we have significant agreements with island nations like Mauritius,the Seychelles,and until recently close ties with Male,where we prevented a coup during Rajiv G's era.We have to defend our A&N and Lakshadweep territories and have established close relations with several ASEAN nations like Indonesia,Malaysia,Singapore,Vietnam,etc.,many who feel threatened by the aggressive behaviour of the PRC.Therefore the scale of amphib ops will be substantial in case we are called upon to assist any of the states with whom we have defence agreements.This also requires the eventual creation of an Indian Marine Corps,where we have a force of at least 3 divisions that can the backbone of our amphibious capability.For the moment the future Marine Corps assets can be under the IA's command until they are large enough to warrant their own service like the CG or BSF.These assets will also be very useful in assisting any mainly land conflict with either Pak or China ,which might be a combined effort in the future.The IMC would then require its own amphibious vessels,air power,etc.,which could come under IN control.

[Singha]

funding seems the only thing holding us back from getting 4 LPHD right now. maybe a mix of 4 small ones like rotterdam/dokdo and 2 big ones like juan carlos is what we need. even plan is building a few.
http://www.seaforces.org/marint/Netherl ... age025.jpg

[krishnan]

i dont think GoI will have funds for these...atleast not till 2015

[SNaik]

Trikand starting sea trials in the Baltics this week.

[AbhiJ]

India - Rising Power, Growing Responsibilities - Building India’s 2020 Navy

Total: 3 Parts

Extract from Part 3:

From the foregoing gap analysis, essential risk reduction towards maintaining a balanced force level to offset any regional imbalances and to maintain credible capability the following force structure initiatives need to be contemplated:

Over and above the P15A, P17 and P17A and P15B programmes which need to be accelerated additional acquisition of 4 destroyers and 8 frigates from foreign and Indian private sector shipyards under the Buy and Make Indian procedure is inescapable to achieve the three Carrier Battle Group force levels by 2022. At least the eight frigates could be the proven Talwar Class hull form - with minor changes in weapons and sensors - but built in India in collaboration with an Indian shipyard. The four destroyers, frozen on the P15B requirements, can be procured under the Buy Indian category. This way there would not be undue proliferation of several types of hull forms, weapons and sensors.
Begin the process of designing the “generation after next” Destroyer equipped with the DRDO Advanced Air Defence System. This force level would comprise 6 destroyers.
Induct additional 6-8 Anti-Submarine Warfare corvettes, over and above the P28 programme, for Escort and LND duties under the Buy and Make Indian categorisation.
Bring up the amphibious force levels by accelerating the LPD and the LCU programmes for deliveries by 2022.
Review the P75I programme and instead of piecemeal construction of 6 submarines in three different yards as is presently proposed the way forward is to go firm with 18 Air Independent Propulsion submarines ordered in one lot of a modular design with allowance for expansion and obsolescence and distributed between the three shipyards on a competitive basis with international delivery standards of the first delivery in three years and thereon one submarine inducted every 9 months. This programme should also be categorised as Buy and Make Indian.
Immediate acquisition of additional two nuclear submarines over the contracted two submarines from Russia as an effort to tide over the interlude of indigenous nuclear submarine construction which envisages a fleet of five nuclear submarines. This would bring up force levels to nine nuclear submarines, still inadequate, but ensuring that at least three submarines can be on station at any one time.
Begin the process of creating the staff requirements for the next Air Defence Ship. At a minimum the ship should be able to embark 2 and ½ squadrons of fighters, 2 squadrons of Multi-Role Helicopters, one flight of AEW / Surveillance UAVs, one flight of loitering missiles and one flight of utility helicopters. This carrier should be in service no later than 2022 and procured through competitive bidding from an Indian shipyard.
Convince the Government / MoD to exercise the Option clause (50 per cent) and the Repeat order clauses (100 per cent) allowable under the DPP to bring up the order quantity to 40 MRH and negotiate a better price and delivery schedule. This would still leave more than 50 per cent of the total requirements unfulfilled. Future induction of these helicopters should be processed under the Buy and Make Indian Route to develop a national capability in helicopter manufacture.
Commence the process of identifying the alternate fighter to the Mig 29K, the Multi-Role Helicopters for the future Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, destroyers and the frigates and the heavy lift helicopter for the LPD.
Review the Staff Requirements of the Light Utility Helicopter to bring in contemporary technology of electro-optics, laser designators and UV scanners together with suitable armament and self-protection devices for low intensity operations. Now that there are a plethora of JV agreements between Indian private sector companies and foreign aviation majors such as Augusta Westland, Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin the categorisation should be Buy and Make Indian.
Energise sophisticated long range coastal surveillance with state-of-the-art technologies using a mix of network of High Frequency Surface Wave Radars, X Band Over the Horizon Radars and coupled with sophisticated Visual / Infra Red / Laser Designated Optronic systems to enable 24x7 simultaneous staring surveillance of the Indian EEZ is mandated.
Build-up maritime air surveillance through extensive use of indigenous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in technology partnership with world leaders. Indian defence forces already operate 78 UAVs manufactured by a world leader with the Navy holding 12 UAVs only. A production base in India for the Unmanned Aerial System should be the next step. This may entail an investment of about Rs 12,000 crore over six years to bring up force levels to a fleet of about 40 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for continuous EEZ surveillance. This force would be coupled to the coastal surveillance chain of radars to present an integrated composite picture to the war room.
Seaplanes can provide much needed island and offshore assets access and support, surveillance, long range SAR and CASEVAC, ultra long range fleet logistic support, long range VBSS operations, civil operations including anti-piracy, small arms and drugs trafficking operations, prevention of human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping and humanitarian assistance etc. Seaplanes would not only be an asset for the Indian Navy but also provide regional ocean safety of the SLOCs. This would be in keeping with India’s rising status as a responsible regional power.
Rapidly build-up a strong and efficient rapid reaction force of fast interceptor crafts using the most ultramodern propulsion and optical stabilisation technologies available across the world. With about 200 ports in India the requirement for effective surveillance and rapid reaction forces would be about 900 such boats at an investment of about Rs 8,100 crore but with a major benefit of securing Indian ports and harbours from catastrophes of the 26/11 kind forever. This should be again procured under the Buy and Make Indian category.
Position similar Fast Interceptor Craft in the Island territories. The requirement for these areas would be met by about 120 Fast Interceptor Boats in the Andaman and Nicobar island chain and about 90 Fast Interceptor Boats in the Lakshadweep island. This would require a total investment of about Rs 900 crore. The benefits would be enormous.
Create a sophisticated and networked Multi-Spectral Data Fusion Command and Control Engine that enables real time maritime domain awareness. This would be dovetailed with AIS, LRIT and other SIGINT technologies to analyse and plot cargo movements by source and destination. This would be expensive but it is completely within the capability of the Indian software giants to deliver in a few years time.
Obtain government approval for increasing the personnel strength to 12,500 officers, 80,000 sailors and 80,000 civilians by 2019 to man the future Navy.

[Pratyush]

Any news on the commissioning of the P 15 A

[AbhiJ]

Tsarkar may pitch in something?

Also P28?

[Philip]

Interesting note on the JV sub between Rubin and Finncanteri.This was offered to the IN.Chances lower now after the FM / AW scandal,but cost wise,very attractive.Compare this with the Scorpene.One would get at least 2 AIP S-1000s for the price of just one Scorpene.

http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_02_19/S-100 ... velopment/

S-1000 submarine - joint Russian-Italian development
Tags: Russia, Opinion & Analysis, World, submarine, Military news
Ilya Kramnik

Feb 19, 2013
© Photo: fincantieri.it
Russia and Italy are resuming their joint development S-1000 submarine, which is an export version of the Amur class submarine. The joint development is between Rubin Design Bureau of Russia and Fincantieri of Italy.

Although the main global producers of submarines such as Germany, France and Russia continue to receive stable revenues by exporting their submarines, the development of modern models is becoming more sophisticated. This often requires cooperation with other countries. Cooperation also enables the partners to make development and production less expensive. In conditions where more and more countries are planning to create or upgrade their own submarine fleet the Russian-Italian project on building the S-1000 submarine promises to become a profitable enterprise for both countries.

The idea of creating a joint Russian-Italian submarine emerged in the late 1990-s. The actual development of the 1000-tons heavy submarine began in 2004. In 2008, the work was interrupted because of the global economic crisis. However, today the situation looks more optimistic with the growing demand for submarines in the Asian-Pacific region.

The new submarine can interest any country that is looking for less expensive solutions. S-1000 is a quite universal submarine. It is designed for anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare, reconnaissance missions, and the transportation of up to 12 troops. The submarine is equipped with a new fuel cell-powered Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system developed in Italy. The price of the future S-1000 is not unveiled but industry experts say that it won’t exceed $120 million-150 million per unit. This price even together with the costs of maintenance and crew training makes the submarine affordable even for relatively poor countries.

Taking into account the current state of the joint project the production of S-1000 can start already in 2-3 years. Moreover in terms of price this project has almost no competitors.

Cooperating with Italy on S-1000 Russia will also continue working on other Amur-class submarines for example Amur-950. This is a more expensive submarine which also features an impressive array of weaponry including missiles. It is known that Russia’s Defense Ministry is planning to resume the serial construction of 677 submarines for the national Navy. These submarines are equipped with the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system. The export version of 677 is known as Amur-1650. China and Indonesia are showing interest in buying these submarines.

[Christopher Sidor]

It is no secret that PLAN has and continues to place heavy reliance on submarines as a means to check mate USN CBG and to blockade Taiwan. What is less appreciated is that those very submarines which can operate upto guam or deep in western pacific are equally capable of reaching A&N as well as western Indian ocean easily. And just as the nazis wreaked havoc over Americans and the Brits so can these submarines wreak havoc on India. What is needed is to transform the Indian Coast Guard into a very capable and competent Anti-Submarine force which can take over from Indian Navy all the anti-submarine operations.

In the first phase we have to target complete domination of ICG, independent of IN, over Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and A&N as far as Anti-Submarine operations are concerned. Second phase would see ICG expands is anti-submarine capabilities over Indian ocean and reaching upto the Equator. The third and final phase would take ICG's reach and capability right upto the Antartic continent and the cape of Good hope along with touching Tasmanian coast.

This would prevent not only PLAN, but even USN and any other state from fielding any submarines into the Ocean that bears our name. IN can concentrate on taking out opposing naval fleets or blockading states.

[srai]

^^^

What you are proposing is like saying "we should arm the police force with artillery, tanks, rockets, etc." What's the point of the army then? Are there enough resources for such an overlapping force?

[tsarkar]

P15A

Mid 2012 - The ship was ready except for a gaping hole in the mast where 2248 should be placed and hull where Barak-8 should be fitted. The Israelis deployed their scientists on the C-RAM projects rather than Barak-8, that is causing the delay.

[Christopher Sidor]

^^^

What you are proposing is like saying "we should arm the police force with artillery, tanks, rockets, etc." What's the point of the army then? Are there enough resources for such an overlapping force?

Resources as of now, no. But this 3-phase program can be carried out over a period of 10-20 years. And we need a very capable ICG so that IN can concentrate on Western Pacific.

IN will be needed in IOR too. Because ICG will not be able to take on surface combatants. The problem with submarines is that once they are detected, their survival chances reduce dramatically. Their survival is dependent on remaining undetectable. ICG will be still tasked with anti-piracy, anti-terrorism and deep-sea rescue missions. But a ICG which is a competent anti-submarine force will be a force multiplier as far as IN is concerned.

[asprinzl]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ODDjsK0BOg

For those who want to dabble in the art of building their own submarine in the garage here...How to build a nuclear submarine

[Prem Kumar]

P15A

Mid 2012 - The ship was ready except for a gaping hole in the mast where 2248 should be placed and hull where Barak-8 should be fitted. The Israelis deployed their scientists on the C-RAM projects rather than Barak-8, that is causing the delay.

Sad & shameful. Israel pulling a Gorshkov on us. What's the saying "Fool me once, shame on you ......"

We might have just as well purchased Barak 8 off the shelf rather than the LRSAM joint venture. The Yehudis are laughing all the way to the bank. We just bankrolled Iron Dome.

[Austin]

Cant blame the Israels thats the risk indian navy took knowing very well that P-15A commisioning would depend on when the Barak-8 would be ready and it was just at the very initial stage even as late as 2009.

If the IN wanted a ready LR SAM it would have opted for Aster-15/30 , Delays are inevitable for any new system under development , IN had put similar faith in Trishul SAM and the net result was they had to commision P-16A without the SAM unless after a year or two they were forced to opt for Barak-1

[tushar_m]

didn't know where to post this incredible video RUSSIAN MIG-29 SHOOTING DOWN GEORGIAN DRONE

i see water so posted here

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6b35gjZ ... creen&NR=1

[merlin]

Mid 2012 - The ship was ready except for a gaping hole in the mast where 2248 should be placed and hull where Barak-8 should be fitted. The Israelis deployed their scientists on the C-RAM projects rather than Barak-8, that is causing the delay.

Sad & shameful. Israel pulling a Gorshkov on us. What's the saying "Fool me once, shame on you ......"

We might have just as well purchased Barak 8 off the shelf rather than the LRSAM joint venture. The Yehudis are laughing all the way to the bank. We just bankrolled Iron Dome.

Is there a Barak-8? To my knowledge there isn't because LRSAM is the Barak-8.

[Austin]

didn't know where to post this incredible video RUSSIAN MIG-29 SHOOTING DOWN GEORGIAN DRONE

i see water so posted here

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6b35gjZ ... creen&NR=1

Saw that before dont remember the context but there was a discussion on mp.net on Russian Mig-29 shooting Georgian Drone , sort of drone fliming its own death.

[tushar_m]

Is there a Barak-8? To my knowledge there isn't because LRSAM is the Barak-8.

+1 LR-sam is same as Barak-8 with around 120km range , if there is any other project named LR_SAM anyone please provide details