Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

[member_23455]

^^^
Not all BPJs protect all sides of the torso. Some protect only the frontal and back area mainly. So it is possible to get hit in the side and not have adequate protection there. The arm pit area is a particularly vulnerable area in many BPJ designs. If the vest doesn't fit well, a bullet could also pass through the gap between the neck and the BPJ (especially if in a prone position). Finally, different BPJs have different ratings. Some can stop rifle bullets, others only pistol bullets. Some only stop lead bullets, others can stop steel bullets as well. You get the idea.

Thanks ArmenT, one hopes there would be a full de-briefing session that would be made public and clarifies that there is no mismatch between the weapons the rebels are using vs. the BPJs the UN contingent had. The statistics on the protection offered by various BPJ designs in a frontal assault position and in prone position should make matters clear. Kargil was another instance where the soldiers were moving exposed on the forward slopes of the mountains and took bullets in the face-neck area.

Anyways, main title of the article here Indian jawans killed in Sudan took on rebels for one hour: UN says that they fought for 1 hour, thats more than enough time for a heli-borne or a turbo-prop based squad to arrive on the scene as re-inforcements

1. Just as there are no silver bullets, there are no silver BPJs - so unless one is seduced by Bollywood interpretations of what BPJs can do or marketing spiel masquerading as fact in one of those "Futureweapons" shows on Discovery etc., some realistic expectation setting might be the need of the hour.

2. Troops, and usually the most tactically savvy and well equipped ones frequently choose to dispense with heavy protection (and a ceramic insert is pretty heavy) in favour of some other tactical advantage that they hold more important in a battle - like ease of maneuver and fire. Sometimes, like in Kargil and the Battle of Takur Ghar that can actually be a life saver.

3. A well sited ambush, executed competently, will always cause casualties. Remember what happened to a 1 Para Cdo team led by Maj. Mohit Sharma in Kashmir a few years ago. Unless the SOP was to have a very aggressive force protection posture with helicopters etc. providing overwatch and that was not followed, no one is owed any public briefing or explanation.

4. As the COAS said post the beheading, this is an operational and tactical matter that the on ground commander will have to deal with. The fact that this is a thankless UN mission will make it more difficult, but as India has shown in the Congo, we can get very aggressive, if the UN allows it. That's pretty much the only relevant question here.

[Surya]

mohit sharma did not die in an ambush per se.

He and his men had to tackle 25 odd highly trained and equipped (possibly SSG) infiltrators in the Haphruda forests who were already in position.

the terrain is hard and the effing place has also been a jinx for the SF.

A lot of valiant SF men have died in that god forsaken place but each one fought superbly and made the SF proud

[vasu raya]

1. Just as there are no silver bullets, there are no silver BPJs - so unless one is seduced by Bollywood interpretations of what BPJs can do or marketing spiel masquerading as fact in one of those "Futureweapons" shows on Discovery etc., some realistic expectation setting might be the need of the hour.

2. Troops, and usually the most tactically savvy and well equipped ones frequently choose to dispense with heavy protection (and a ceramic insert is pretty heavy) in favour of some other tactical advantage that they hold more important in a battle - like ease of maneuver and fire. Sometimes, like in Kargil and the Battle of Takur Ghar that can actually be a life saver.

3. A well sited ambush, executed competently, will always cause casualties. Remember what happened to a 1 Para Cdo team led by Maj. Mohit Sharma in Kashmir a few years ago. Unless the SOP was to have a very aggressive force protection posture with helicopters etc. providing overwatch and that was not followed, no one is owed any public briefing or explanation.

while all the above are valid points, and whether they make the details of the incident public or not, there will be changes to the SOP and maybe use of ceramic inserts as well else a repeat of such incidents with the same outcome cannot be ruled out. As an example the SOP in Maoist areas has been evolving and now has added UAVs for recce purposes.

4. As the COAS said post the beheading, this is an operational and tactical matter that the on ground commander will have to deal with. The fact that this is a thankless UN mission will make it more difficult, but as India has shown in the Congo, we can get very aggressive, if the UN allows it. That's pretty much the only relevant question here.

UN as you know is not about embroiling in confrontation with warring sections, its mostly about dissuasive measures hence the conclusion of aggressiveness is operationally iffy

Now if we assume there was intel on such large groups possibly laying ambush, just don't know when or where and again an assumption that UN cannot skimp on protection levels (supposedly on par with western armies) if and when asked by the local commander based on the intel, would one see so many casualties?

Again as an example of the many options possible in defining the detail for the SOP, if one were to add a gunship based reinforcement that is less than say 30 mins flight time away, would we have seen a different outcome?

not sure if the gunships that were brought back from UN missions are being used against Maoists when local police forces are caught in a similar situation, tough, remote terrain and totally outnumbered. whats the problem in using superior reinforcements when horribly trapped? institutional boundaries aside.

[Sanku]

Something for Surya, excellent discussion on Special forces

http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/s ... 130415.htm

The fact is that a parachute battalion is an infantry battalion that can be delivered by air and once para-dropped, it performs its infantry role. In April 2002, Lt Gen R K Nanavatty, then northern army commander (who had served as commander, HQ special forces including as part of IPKF in Sri Lanka) had stated, "I find the vision blurring in certain quarters on the issue of parachute and parachute (special forces) battalions. I am very clear that a parachute battalion is simply an infantry battalion in an airborne role and has nothing in common with a special forces battalion

We have gone for unprecedented special forces expansion ignoring the universally accepted four special forces truths: one, humans are more important than hardware; two, quality is better than quantity; three, special forces cannot be mass produced; four, competent special forces cannot be created after emergencies arise. We have faulted in the unprecedented expansion of the NSG as well.

So what is the use of having large numbers when they are reduced to playing the role of a super-infantry at best. This is an extremely sad state of affairs because special forces, by nature, are small, need intensive investments to develop special skills which cannot be mass produced.
.........................

Gen Katoch: Let me put it this way, they have been successful within the constraints of their employment albeit they have hardly been employed as how special forces should actually be -- strategically.
............................
While special forces should be central to asymmetric response including against irregular forces, asymmetric warfare does not automatically equate to a physical attack. A physical attack is only the extreme and potentially most dangerous expression of asymmetric warfare. The key lies in achieving strategic objectives through application of modest resources with the essential psychological element.

But special forces are meant to perform strategic tasks. That is the reason countries have special forces. However, a shy politico-military leadership has trapped themselves into a vicious cycle. They have always viewed and employed the special forces in very narrow, tactical terms. As a result they have never bothered to arm, equip or task them for the strategic interests that special forces are supposed to achieve.
...................................
For instance, the only military officer who sits with the cabinet's crisis management group in the United Kingdom is the director, special forces, a major general officer who has served with the elite SAS in his career. That is the importance mature democracies and governments accord the special forces.
....................................

Gen Katoch: Analysis proves that failures have occurred when the hierarchy/higher commanders fail to understand what special forces are about, and ironically fail to listen to special forces advice.

Even if one is stupid enough to task them wrongly, you have to leave the execution to them -- not compound the stupidity of ordering them 'how' to execute the task. Besides, you cannot task special forces on zero intelligence.


Special forces units are much smaller than a conventional infantry unit and since they work in small teams they don't carry any heavy guns or firepower. Despite that, they were thrown into frontal assaults like conventional infantry battalions leading to several failures. This was a criminal misuse of special forces and left them high and dry.
.

[VinodTK]

Manpower crunch: Indian Army short of 9,590 officers

New Delhi: The Indian Army is short of 9,590 officers. Sources told CNN-IBN on Wednesday that the current intake of officers at various academies will ensure that the deficit will be cut by two per cent every year.

Intake of officer cadets at the National Defence Academy rose from 1,800 to 2,100 since the last two years.

Meanwhile, a report on Wednesday claimed that the Army is looking to induct 200 more women officers with permanent commission (PC), but has ruled out any combat role for them.

[Vipul]

Situation has got better, remember reading some years ago the shortage of officers was around 15,000.

[VinodTK]

Situation has got better, remember reading some years ago the shortage of officers was around 15,000.

I thought I saw the number of 15,000 before, I do not know as to which of these numbers are reliable!

[aditya.agd]

Indian army has to learn to fight with their own (indegenous) weapons. Otherwise they wont be able to win any war in future.

[Austin]

VK Singh invites AK Antony, Army chief and defence secy for daughter's marriage

[Surya]

must be a slow day for SU

[rohitvats]

From Orbat.Com: http://orbat.com/

· Chinese PLA is not world’s largest For years we have been saying the People’s Liberation Army is not the world’s largest. That position is held by the Indian Army. But without fail, the media as well as trade sources would put the PLA first. We cannot blame folks for not heeding us because just a very people read the blog, even fewer read our annual Concise (now Complete) World Armies. Even those who do will come up against the US Defense Intelligence Agency’s annual report to Congress on Chinese military power, which steadfastly insists that the PLA has 1.25-million personnel.

· Since India does not publish the manpower strength of its army, for years people have been stuck on a strength of a million, plus/minus 100,000 depending on the source. Well, the million mark was crossed years ago. The correct figure – which we have never been able to find out, by the way, is close to 1.3-million authorized strength. The PLA at 850,000 has a strength reached by the Indian Army more than 40 years ago.

· Naturally readers will ask: Could China be understating its strength so as not to appear threatening? Perhaps. If so, however, why would China claim an air force with larger manpower than the USAF? The figures are 400,000 PLAAF and 330,000 USAF. Even though Chinese airborne troops are under the air force, personally we think the PLAAF figure is overstated but that is another discussion. Further, China claims what is easily the second largest naval manpower in the world.

· The PLA now calls its armies Combined Corps, which is, of course, what they have been for decades: the Chinese army was the western corps and in most cases much smaller. It may seem that 850,000 personnel for 18 corps is way too small. India had just six corps when its manpower was 850,000. But many PLA corps are the size of a reinforced Indian division because PLA has been removing the division echelon and adopting the European corps-brigade structure.

· Ever since we had to stop paying our World Armies correspondents, we’ve been out of touch with the PLA, but we are under the impression that the brigade structure has not in some cases worked out well, there being too many units under the brigade’s span of control. So there has been a slowing in the disbandment of divisions; nonetheless, PLA divisions tend to be smaller than their Indian standard counterparts.

· Still, in recent years the PLA has been a theatre force, with armies generally operating within their military regions. This did not mean armies from one military region could not operate in another, but until the last few years formations from one part of China did not deploy to any part of China, as is the case with the Indian Army. This meant fewer support troops, and in any case PLA formations have a smaller logistical tail than Indian formations. Nothing wrong with that because the PLA was primarily an infantry force with few vehicles. In the late 1970s, for example, Chinese divisions depending on their type had one-sixth to one-fourth as many vehicles as did Indian divisions. So overall, the PLA could operate with significantly fewer support troops than the Indian Army. Though the PLA is transforming into an all-theatre force, the number of armies and divisions has been drastically cut, so 850,000 personnel suffice for 18 corps.

· The real question is why the US Defense Intelligence Agency has for years been overstating the PLA’s manpower. All we can say at this point is that the DIA has an excellent grasp on the PLA’s order of battle and the odds are high this exaggeration was on purpose. Well, now it’s clear that DIA will have to accept that the Indian Army is soon going to be a full 50% larger than the PLA.


This doesn’t mean much; PLA is the size it is as much because of its internal control mission as the size of its threats. China could cut back to a 600,000 modernized force and still meet its offensive/defensive requirements. India’s Army is the size it is in part because of Pakistan. China no longer faces any threat from Russia, Taiwan is not about to invade, and neither are the Indians. But still, people should get their facts right. And we think Indians’ impression of themselves as a nation will change once they realize how much larger their army is compared to China’s.

[member_20317]

From Orbat.Com: http://orbat.com/

· In the late 1970s, for example, Chinese divisions depending on their type had one-sixth to one-fourth as many vehicles as did Indian divisions. So overall, the PLA could operate with significantly fewer support troops than the Indian Army. Though the PLA is transforming into an all-theatre force, the number of armies and divisions has been drastically cut, so 850,000 personnel suffice for 18 corps.

rv ji,

Before restructuring efforts, the Chinese seem to have understated their support staff also, while the IA states the full apportionment of support staff at all levels, say for example a standard infantry division. PLA being ~15000 IA being ~23000 (15k+8k).

Would you confirm/counter this view with your understanding of the situation.

Separately, it does not makes sense to have a PLA that is growing in mechanization, which they go on to claim needs bigger support structure and yet they end up having a smaller army.

Also I have never been to this site. Would you recommend it for nubies like myself.

[svinayak]

From Orbat.Com: http://orbat.com/

· The real question is why the US Defense Intelligence Agency has for years been overstating the PLA’s manpower. All we can say at this point is that the DIA has an excellent grasp on the PLA’s order of battle and the odds are high this exaggeration was on purpose. Well, now it’s clear that DIA will have to accept that the Indian Army is soon going to be a full 50% larger than the PLA.

DIA is the official propaganda machine of PLA.
All PLA capability and its reach are published only in western media. Bill Gertz is chief for this

[rohitvats]

rv ji,

Before restructuring efforts, the Chinese seem to have understated their support staff also, while the IA states the full apportionment of support staff at all levels, say for example a standard infantry division. PLA being ~15000 IA being ~23000 (15k+8k).

Actually, from what I understand, Indian divisions top out at 15K troops. This includes combat/combat support/support troops. However, you need to understand the cascading effect of large motor-vehicle pool. Not only do you need 1st line of manpower to man/support these vehicles, you need workshops to undertake various line of repairs and logistical tails to support them. That adds to logistical tail and manpower.

Would you confirm/counter this view with your understanding of the situation.

I will go with Ravi Rihkye on most of the things he says. And I'll confess that my understanding on PLA is not too great.

Separately, it does not makes sense to have a PLA that is growing in mechanization, which they go on to claim needs bigger support structure and yet they end up having a smaller army.

Larger mechanization does not translate into larger army. They are mechanizing the existing force levels. And while this will add to the overall requirement of logistical tail, it does not add significantly to overall manpower. Just look at the US Army and level of mechanization. In fact, mechanization adds by way of firepower and mobility and this may actually allow the PLA to reduce the number of troops which it would have earlier required to accomplish a particular task.

Also I have never been to this site. Would you recommend it for nubies like myself.

By all means.

If you have time, go through the Center of Indian Military History (CIMH) and History sections of his website. In history section, you'll find interesting articles on Indian-Pakistan and Sino-India war.

He is the only author who understands the nitty-gritty of Orbat and Table of Equipment (TOE) of armies around the world. Especially, India/Pakistan/PLA. He has written couple of books on India-Pakistan scenario including a fictional account of fourth India-Pakistan war (this was written in 1984). In that book, he actually spoke about Kargil being one of the sectors which will see PA incursions as well as area south of Fazilka-Abohar ( in Indian Punjab) becoming the hot-spot of large scale armored warfare. And that is what exactly is happening today.

His another book - "1987: The war that never was" was about the Operation Brasstacks conducted by Sundarji. In this book, he claimed for the first time that Op. Brasstacks was a ruse in the plains while the real motive was to take POK and that too, in dead of winter. Over the years, bits and pieces of news have come out which indicate that this was actually the case.

He has authored a book along with Richard Rinaldi on Orbat of Indian Army. It is available on Amazon and I would consider it as a good primer for anyone wanting to understand the Orbat business. Here is the link:

http://www.amazon.com/Indian-Order-Batt ... 0982054173

[Austin]

During Cold War DIA and CIA used to have their own assessment on FSU Orbat and they used to have their own ugly debate.

DIA was considered more reliable over CIA then but those days US intel use to be more professional and had less politics involved.

[member_22906]

Before restructuring efforts, the Chinese seem to have understated their support staff also, while the IA states the full apportionment of support staff at all levels, say for example a standard infantry division. PLA being ~15000 IA being ~23000 (15k+8k).

Typical manpower of an Inf. Div in IA is ~ 15K (assuming 3 Inf. Bde + 1 Arty Bde + 1 Armd. Regt + Div HQ and other support resources). An Inf. Bde would be ~ 3K to 3.5K and an Arty Bde would be ~ 2.5K

[Lilo]

del.

[Raja Bose]

^^Marten mullah, remove the link from your post too.

[Rahul M]

a note on PLA : in PLA and the red army that it copied division was roughly little more than half the size of commonwealth armies. however, in recent re-structuring (mba giri influenced) PLA has started adopting US style brigade based system.

[Lilo]

Re:Marten
Oops Iam sorry i didnt contextify my post well

But this is what i was speaking about when i said "again" -->> http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 1#p1444811

Its not about army but its about Delhi.

I see MODs have deleted the post , i have come across quite a few references to this thing in the past 5 years . One can try to identify causes and try to stem the rot or one can turn a blind eye and say no such thing exists.

Thats all i have to say.

[schowdhuri]

Before restructuring efforts, the Chinese seem to have understated their support staff also, while the IA states the full apportionment of support staff at all levels, say for example a standard infantry division. PLA being ~15000 IA being ~23000 (15k+8k).

Typical manpower of an Inf. Div in IA is ~ 15K (assuming 3 Inf. Bde + 1 Arty Bde + 1 Armd. Regt + Div HQ and other support resources). An Inf. Bde would be ~ 3K to 3.5K and an Arty Bde would be ~ 2.5K

Does that not seem way to less for an Arty Brigade, 3 Field + 1 Med + 1 Light + 1 Divloc + Brigade HQ ?

[member_22906]

^^
IIRC, a medium regt has ~ 550, and a field regt is ~ 450... Lt regt should be ~ 300, SATA surely lesser.

It was behind the envelope calculation but a std Arty Bde is lesser in manpower than an Inf Bde

[Katare]

I wouldn't get suckered into Chinese White Paper lies, they may have used some innovative counting method to come to the number that they wanted. With ~$100B/year budget for last several years, they are wound to have way more mechanization now than we would have in next 10 years. Their civilian heavy vehicle industry is 10X bigger than ours for over a decade at least. There is no reason to believe that they are not significantly better mechanized than Indian forces.

Let's not let them derail modernization of our armed forces by these blatant lies cooked up for those very purposes. To me the fact remains that Chines armed forces are at least 50% larger than indian forces and they have much larger contingent of vehicles, arms, ammunition, equipment, infrastructure, budget and industrial base to support its manpower.

[Vipul]

The Chinese Armed forces number at their peak was 4 Million. Any info on what the comparative sizes were in 1962?

[SaiK]

check tarmak photos, and the one where indo-uk soldiers are exercising on the bars.. now, the firang shoes looks normal civilianish.. but sdre indics are way too ordained. why the diff? is that a joint protocol not signed for dress code?

[member_23455]

http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/india- ... o-featured

For every Sundarji, there is a VP Malik

And Ajai Shukla seems to have developed a bipolar ability to speak great sense sometimes and absolute crap on other occasions. Amazing spin given to the Sumdorong Chu incident.

[rohitvats]

From Broadsword: http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2013/04/i ... r-man.html

Good analysis, IMO.

As the army’s Military Intelligence (MI) and Military Operations (MO) Directorates study the Chinese troop incursion into Indian territory at Daulat Beg Oldi, below the towering Karakoram Pass in Ladakh, military analysts are also scanning a newly-released Chinese document for information that might be of help.

Issued on Apr 16 by the State Council Information Office, the defence White Paper entitled "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces" (hereafter “China’s Armed Forces”) provides an unusually clear look into the structures and missions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA includes China’s ground, air and naval forces, and the Second Artillery Corps that operates the country’s strategic arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, including those that carry nuclear payloads.

The document “China’s Armed Forces” has surprised Indian analysts by revealing that the PLA land forces (long regarded as the largest standing army in the world) are actually just half the size that intelligence agencies worldwide had estimated. India has always estimated that the PLA Army (PLAA) numbers 16 lakh soldiers; but the White Paper says the PLAA is just 8.5 lakh strong.

If the White Paper’s figures are authentic the Indian Army, with 12 lakh soldiers, is 50 per cent larger than the PLAA.

The PLAA’s numbers do not include the People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) and the militia, both of which operate behind the frontlines. The Indian Army too gets assistance from central police organization (CPOs) like the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB).

According to the White Paper, 4 lakh airmen man the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), while the PLA Navy (PLAN) has 2.35 lakh sailors.

Indian military planners who prepare for eventualities like the current PLA incursion spiraling out of control, perhaps even into actual fighting, focus less on total numbers than on the units and formations that can quickly come into action. The White Paper fully corroborates the army’s estimates of Chinese formations on the Sino-Indian border.

MI has long known that two out of China’s seven Military Area Commands (MACs) --- Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu --- are responsible for the Indian border. The Lanzhou MAC, which includes the 21st and 47th Combined Corps (earlier known as Group Armies), is responsible for operations on the Ladakh border. The Chengdu MAC, which includes the 13th and 14th Combined Corps, is responsible for the Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh borders.

Between them, these four Chinese combined corps muster up nine divisions and five mechanized brigades. The Indian Army matches that with nine divisions on the Sino-Indian border --- one in Ladakh, three in Sikkim, four in Arunachal and two in Nagaland and Manipur. In addition, India plans to raise a mountain strike corps during the 12th Defence Plan (2012-2017), which will add two more divisions. These will be stationed in the Brahmaputra Valley for launching offensive operations into Tibet.

India not just matches the PLAA division-for-division but, given the PLAA’s revised overall numbers, China’s formations could have significantly less troops than what had been earlier anticipated. That means numerical superiority on the Sino-Indian border quite clearly lies with India.

However, China’s road and rail infrastructure allows it the major advantage of being able to move troops rapidly, even from other MACs. This would permit the PLAA to quickly concentrate a large number of troops in a small area, attacking and overwhelming the Indian defenders at that point. Since the Sikkim and Arunachal roads are poor and railways non-existent, the Indian Army would find it difficult to move defenders as quickly to the threatened sector.

The White Paper reveals that the PLAA has extensively practiced concentrating troops in a conflict zone. The document says, “Since 2010, a series of campaign-level exercises and drills code-named "Mission Action" for trans-MAC maneuvers have been carried out…. In 2011, relevant troops from the Chengdu and Jinan MACs were organized and carried out the exercise in plateau areas (i.e. Tibet). In 2012, the Chengdu, Jinan and Lanzhou MACs and relevant PLAAF troops were organized and carried out the exercise in southwestern China (i.e. Tibet).

“China’s Armed Forces” is apparently Beijing’s response to the international community’s repeated demands for clarity on China’s worrying military build up. Beijing’s projection of a benign and responsible international image goes hand-in-hand with its rather more bare-knuckled handling of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute with Japan; its insistence on control over the South China Sea; and its recent protests over Washington’s decision to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan.

[Manish_Sharma]

So we have superiority in Air Force (qualitywise), equality in ground forces (numberwise), while chinese have superiority in cruise and ballistic missiles (numberwise) & much better road/rail network.

[pralay]

^+1 Katare

All historic and current Chinese War Doctrines and tactics are based on Deception and Surprise.
we should not rush to believe the claims in that whitepaper.

Rather we should release a white paper to show that total strength of all our armed forces is just about 8lacs.
(We can ignore the ground crews, officers/soldiers with civilian, support and transportation duties etc.)

There is no trusting the Chinese.

[VinodTK]

From Sify News: Army Chief arrives at 16 Corps HQ in Nagrota, reviewing security measures

Jammu: Chief of Army Staff General Bikram Singh has arrived at the headquarters of the army's 16 Corps in Nagrota at the start of a two-day visit to Jammu and Kashmir from Tuesday.

He was received by General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Army's Northern Command, Lt. Gen.K.T. Parnaik, UYSM, YSM and 16 Corps commander Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda.

During his visit, General Singh would review security situation of the region, following the recent Chinese incursion in Ladakh sector of Jammu and Kashmir.

The sources also said that field commanders are expected to brief General Singh on the security situation and counter infiltration and counter-insurgency measures.

General Singh will chair a meeting at 16-Corps headquarters at Nagrota and then fly to forward areas of Rajouri and Akhnoor sectors, where he will be briefed by the field commanders about the security situation and counter infiltration measures.

He will also meet Chief Minister Omar Abdullah during the day and will have dinner meeting with Governor N N Vohra at Raj Bhawan on Tuesday.

Next day, the Army Chief will fly to Doda region and will be briefed by the commanders of counter-insurgency Delta force.

General Singh's visit to the state comes even as the Indian Army has reportedly moved an infantry regiment specializing in mountain warfare to Ladakh's Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector, where the Chinese Army has allegedly intruded into Indian territory, and set up a tented post.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has also reportedly pitched a tented post opposite to the Chinese post.

While the Chinese foreign ministry continues to deny that its troops have violated the Line of Actual Control with India, India's External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has said that flag meetings between the armed forces of the two sides are taking place to resolve the issue at the earliest.

Chinese troops are said to have entered 10 kilometers into Indian territory at a height of 17,000 feet.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said on Tuesday that local military commanders of India and China are holding flag meetings on Tuesday to resolve the situation arising out of the incursion by Chinese troops in Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector in Ladakh.

Apart from summoning the Chinese Ambassador to South Block, the Joint Secretary in charge of East Asia in the MEA, Gautam Bambawale, who is heading the India-China Joint Working Mechanism to deal with issues on the boundary from the Indian side, spoke to his counterpart in Beijing last week, and emphasised the need to resolve the issue.

Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai had summoned Chinese Ambassador Wei Wei to South Block and stressed on the need for resolving the issue, the sources said.

The Chinese side said they will look into the issue and respond accordingly. However, when contacted the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi reiterated the comments made by their Foreign Ministry spokesperson in Beijing yesterday.

[VinodTK]

Army tells brigades to plug holes on China border

[Aditya G]

....His another book - "1987: The war that never was" was about the Operation Brasstacks conducted by Sundarji. In this book, he claimed for the first time that Op. Brasstacks was a ruse in the plains while the real motive was to take POK and that too, in dead of winter. Over the years, bits and pieces of news have come out which indicate that this was actually the case....

Hey, you had asked me for the copy of the book ...

[rohitvats]

....His another book - "1987: The war that never was" was about the Operation Brasstacks conducted by Sundarji. In this book, he claimed for the first time that Op. Brasstacks was a ruse in the plains while the real motive was to take POK and that too, in dead of winter. Over the years, bits and pieces of news have come out which indicate that this was actually the case....

Hey, you had asked me for the copy of the book ...

Yes, Yes.

And I had completely forgot whom I had got in touch with

Can you drop me an e-mail at rohitvats29@gmail.com? Thanks.

[member_25399]

Given the nature of our border with Chinese , is it not possible for us have drones, satellite mapping on the border ? As far as i know, we have the infrastructure for this and have used it on the paki front. (correct me I am wrong).

[member_23455]

Given the nature of our border with Chinese , is it not possible for us have drones, satellite mapping on the border ? As far as i know, we have the infrastructure for this and have used it on the paki front. (correct me I am wrong).

...And what would that do? In Gulf War I The Iraqi Army had massed 100,000 men for a fortnight before the actual invasion of Kuwait in the full view of spy satellites and other ISR assets but most folks, especially the Kuwaitis didn't think Saddam would attack.

Wrt the current crisis with China you either need to have very good HUMINT about Chinese intentions like Richard Sorge gave the Russians about Japan's intent to enter WWII - which was ironically ignored, or the national security leadership moves proactively to seize the initiative - like we did in 1987 in Sumdorong Chu and earlier in Siachen.

We have neither currently. And Drones and satellites won't help.

[member_25399]

...And what would that do? In Gulf War I The Iraqi Army had massed 100,000 men for a fortnight before the actual invasion of Kuwait in the full view of spy satellites and other ISR assets but most folks, especially the Kuwaitis didn't think Saddam would attack.

For one thing it is better to hold people when they are trying to enter your house, rather then after they have set up families in your house.
Political masses have and are still trying to destroy both are will and ability to fight. If we continue like this, no doubt will end up like those chaps, who just sit and watch things happening around them.

[shyamd]

Correction - actually it was the politicians who refused to believe the intelligence. A week before the MI6 station located in Kuwait city sent warning to the top politicians in London to no avail.

[KrishnaK]

...And what would that do? In Gulf War I The Iraqi Army had massed 100,000 men for a fortnight before the actual invasion of Kuwait in the full view of spy satellites and other ISR assets but most folks, especially the Kuwaitis didn't think Saddam would attack.

Wrt the current crisis with China you either need to have very good HUMINT about Chinese intentions like Richard Sorge gave the Russians about Japan's intent to enter WWII - which was ironically ignored, or the national security leadership moves proactively to seize the initiative - like we did in 1987 in Sumdorong Chu and earlier in Siachen.

We have neither currently. And Drones and satellites won't help.

We didn't use the IAF in 1965, hence it is useless.

[Sanku]

Correction - actually it was the politicians who refused to believe the intelligence. A week before the MI6 station located in Kuwait city sent warning to the top politicians in London to no avail.

Or the politicians deliberately egged on Saddam to attack Kuwait and later used that excuse to punish him for it.

Would be typically Brit-Saudi strategy of double dealing and backstabbing.

[member_23455]

Correction - actually it was the politicians who refused to believe the intelligence. A week before the MI6 station located in Kuwait city sent warning to the top politicians in London to no avail.

Correction to what?

...And what would that do? In Gulf War I The Iraqi Army had massed 100,000 men for a fortnight before the actual invasion of Kuwait in the full view of spy satellites and other ISR assets but most folks, especially the Kuwaitis didn't think Saddam would attack.

Wrt the current crisis with China you either need to have very good HUMINT about Chinese intentions like Richard Sorge gave the Russians about Japan's intent to enter WWII - which was ironically ignored, or the national security leadership moves proactively to seize the initiative - like we did in 1987 in Sumdorong Chu and earlier in Siachen.

We have neither currently. And Drones and satellites won't help.

We didn't use the IAF in 1965, hence it is useless.

Ummm...so you are agreeing with my thesis? Since despite having airpower around, it was a political decision not to use it.